

September 23, 1961

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APPENDIX I TO THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces 1963-1967 (C)

This Appendix summarizes the main factors I have taken into consideration in determining United States' requirements for Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces in the years 1963-1967. The Appendix includes:

- I. Recommended Force Levels and their Fiscal Implications;
- II. The General Basis for My Recommendations on Force Levels;
- III. The Basis for My Recommendations on Specific Weapon Systems.

I. Recommended Force Levels and Their Fiscal Implications

I recommend that you approve, for inclusion in the FY 1963 budget, the procurement of the following operational missiles and aircraft to supplement our Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces:

	Total	
	Purchase Cost to Be Funded	FY 1963 NOA
	(Millions of Dollars)	
a. 100 Minutemen Hardened & Dispersed	\$ 461	\$ 284
b. 50 Mobile Minutemen	935	270
c. 6 Polaris Submarines	1,072	963
d. 92 Skybolt Missiles	347	200
e. 100 KC-135 Tankers	287	270
Total for FY 1963 Decisions	\$3,102	\$1,987
Total Funding Requirements from Prior Years' Decisions		6,939
Total for FY 1963		<u>\$8,926</u>

Moreover, I recommend that we adopt, for planning purposes, the force structure summarized in the table on the next page. In those cases in which the forces I am recommending differ from those recommended by the Navy and Air Force, the latter are shown in red beneath mine.

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EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION Section 3.4(b) (2) & 5 E.O. 12958 Declassification Date/Event:

DOM SHELF: Long Range Nuclear Delivery Area 63-C

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
RECOMMENDED FORCES ^{a/}

	End-Fiscal Year						
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
<u>Bombers</u>							
B-52	555	630	630	630	630	630	630
B-47	1,125	855	585	450	225	--	--
B-58	40	80	80	80	80	80	80
Total Bombers	1,720	1,565	1,295	1,160	935	710	710
<u>Air-Launched Missiles</u>							
Hound Dog	216	450	522	522	522	522	336 ^{b/}
Skybolt	--	--	--	--	322	690	1,150
Total GAM's	216	450	522	522	844	1,212	1,486
<u>ICBM and Polaris Missiles</u>							
Atlas	36	75	135	135	135	126	117
Titan	6	51	78	114	114	114	114
Minuteman H&D	--	--	150	600	700	800	900 ^{c/}
Minuteman Mobile	--	--	--	--	50	100	100
Polaris	80	96	144	288	480	560	656
Total ICBM/Polaris	122	222	507	1,137	1,479	1,700	1,887
<u>Other</u>							
Quail	224	392	392	392	392	392	392
KC-135	400	440	520	620	640	640	640
KC-97	600	460	340	240	120	--	--
RB-47	45	45	45	45	--	--	--
RC-135	--	--	3	13	23	23	23

Alert Force Weapons ^{d/}

No. of Weapons

Megatons



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^{a/} Numbers of aircraft and missiles are derived by multiplying authorized squadron unit equipment by the numbers of squadrons. They do not include R&D, Combat Training Launch or maintenance pipeline missiles or command support aircraft. Effective 1 August 1961, [redacted] of the

[redacted] ICBM numbers represent over-

[redacted] The table excludes 17 Regulus missiles inoperational submarines from end-FY 61 to end-FY 64 and 5 at end-FY 65.

^{b/} This difference is a consequence of the difference in recommended B-52 forces. ^{c/} 1,000 by end-FY 68. 1,100 by end-FY 69. and thereafter.

^{d/} [redacted]

The estimated Total Obligational Authority required to procure and operate these forces over this period is shown in the following table. The difference between the Total Obligational Authority required to finance the forces I am recommending and that required to finance the forces recommended by the individual Services is shown on the second line. Over the five years, 1963-67, the cost of the aircraft and missiles recommended by the Air Force and the Polaris recommended by the Navy exceeds the cost of the forces I am recommending by approximately \$10 billion. As will be shown later in this paper, the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of target destruction. In my judgement, it is an increment not worth the cost of \$10 billion over the five year period.

	Total Obligational Authority						
	FY 62	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY63-67
Secretary of Defense Recommendations	9.3	8.9	8.0	5.6	4.7	4.1	31.3
Service Proposals over Secretary/Defense	+6	+1.5	+1.6	+3.0	+2.2	+1.4	+9.7

(Billions of Dollars)

The forces I am recommending for procurement in FY 1963 are compared with the recommendations of the Service Chiefs in the following table. The numbers represent operational aircraft or missiles.

	Secretary of Defense	Initial Recommendations of Chiefs				JCS 9-11-61 Recoms. e/
		Chairman JCS	Army	Navy & USMC	Air Force	
B-52 Aircraft	0	0	0 ^{b/}	0 ^{b/}	45 ^{a/}	45
Skybolt	92	92	0	0	92	92
KC-135 c/	100	100	100	100	120	100
Titan	0	18	0	0	18	18
Minuteman H&D	100	300 ^{d/}	100 ^{d/}	100 ^{d/}	600	300
Minuteman Mobile	50	50	0	0	50	50
Polaris	96	96	96	160	0	128

- a/ 45 B-52's recommended by the Air Force for 1962 procurement.
- b/ The Chief of Staff, USA, agrees "to a limited procurement of the system to minimize engineering and economic risks." The CNO and Commandant, USMC, believe "research and development should continue", and "budgetary planning should proceed, but the decision to allocate substantial funds for production should be delayed . . .".
- c/ The Secretary of Defense, along with the Chief of Staff, USA, the CNO, and Commandant, USMC, recommend a total strength of 640 aircraft; the CJCS recommends 760, the Chief of Staff, USAF, 800. In each case, command support aircraft would be in addition to the numbers shown.
- d/ These recommendations are for "at most" the stated number of missiles.
- e/ During a discussion between the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs, on September 11, 1961, they stressed their concern about the reduction in our nuclear capability as the B-47's were phased-out. The Secretary of Defense therefore added 5 Wings of B-47's to his recommendation for FY 1963 and


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The aircraft and missiles recommended for procurement in FY 1963 by the Air Force and the Polaris submarines recommended for procurement in FY 1963 by the Navy would cost approximately \$3.1 billions more to buy than the aircraft and missiles I am recommending. Of this, approximately \$2 billions would require funding in FY 1962 and FY 1963.


As well as these forces, I will recommend at a later date that the Air Force be authorized to procure and operate a secure command and control system for SAC. Except for 20 KC-135's which will be available for use as airborne command posts, the cost of this system has not been included in the figures on page 3.

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II. General Basis for Force Level Recommendations




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
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
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
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
COMPARISON OF TARGET IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITIES OF
ALTERNATIVE FORCES
END FISCAL YEAR 1955

Enhoven
thinks
this "most
important
table" -



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COMPARISON OF TARGET IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITIES OF
ALTERNATIVE FORCES
END FISCAL YEAR 1967



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
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
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
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APPENDIX I

ASSUMED OPERATIONAL FACTORS FOR 1965 AND 1967 TARGET
DAMAGE CALCULATIONS

All assumptions are characterized alternatively as Optimistic,
Median, or Pessimistic.




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
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