MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: White House meeting on Tuesday, 22 Sep 59 (U)

Present:

Mr. Douglas Dillon, State
Mr. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., DOD
Mr. Allen Dulles, CIA
Mr. John A. Maccone, AEC
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy
Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret)
Brig. General A. J. Goodpaster

ITEM ONE. McRae Report

Dr. Kistiakowsky

Summarized the McRae Report.

Stated the ad hoc panel on Nuclear Test Requirements, headed by Dr. McRae, limited its consideration to nuclear weapons tests and to technological considerations. The whole report deals with progress of our own technology.

He then read and discussed the seven conclusions contained in the report.

There was no other significant comment on the report.

ITEM TWO. Tests for Safety of Presently Manufactured Weapons

Mr. Gates

Stated he was in favor of CREEP Test of the weapons.

Mr. Dillon
He also said that any statement which the United States may put out on any tests or experiments should be characterized as a high explosive experiment and not a weapons test. This was concurred in by everybody.

He then said he approves beginning any experiment not involving nuclear explosion when we want to.

State realized that time was important but the difference between readiness at LASL and NTS was only a couple of weeks. Also, it was necessary to consider whether a chance should be taken on any explosion which might give a nuclear yield before 1 January, 1960.

Mr. McCone

AEC could start experiments within about six weeks. Therefore
if it is decided to conduct experiments after 1 January, they should start preparations for the experiments now. He agreed with the CREEP method of tests.

The President asked if we were making a laboratory experiment or testing weapons. If we are making laboratory experiments, laboratory experiments go on all the time and there would be nothing unusual about them.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that everybody connected with the operation must be completely intellectually honest. It really is an experiment. There should be a strong injunction to the laboratories to so design the experiments that there would be no nuclear explosion as such. Of course, a small nuclear yield does not mean a nuclear explosion since no energy of significant proportions is released.

Mr. McCone stated that this was a fine line as to when a nuclear yield was or was not a nuclear explosion. Everybody agreed that a few pounds of nuclear reaction surely is not a nuclear explosion.

The President felt that perhaps it might be wise to wait until after 1 January before conducting experiments (later changed view). Do not use words that are used in connection with weapons systems. He felt no statement is needed now. He felt experiments should not be done at NTS, Nevada.

He suggested that we could start experiments now and gradually work up to major experiments, that is, where they might get a small nuclear yield. He made the statement that no country can go back to atmospheric testing now. He repeated that he was sure of that. The world opinion was such now that although we state that we might go back to nuclear testing in the atmosphere, nobody really believes it. There was great relief throughout the world when the tests were stopped. The public takes it for granted that stopping of atmospheric tests is permanent.

Suggested that before any big tests above the atmosphere are made he would like to talk again about the problem.
He reiterated that we were not testing weapons. We were conducting H.E. experiments.

Mr. McCone

Summed up, stating they would start experiments now, there would be no statement, they would conduct experiments which they were sure would not produce a nuclear yield first, and they would conduct them in LASL.
ITEM FOUR. Discussions with the Russians on Exchange of Information on Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes

Mr. Dillon
Mr. McCone

Explained the present weakness of IAEA.

Emelyanov, the Russian atomic scientist, saw Mr. McCone on Friday and suggested to him that Mr. McCone go to Russia with a group of United States scientists and look through USSR plants and that the Russians come to the United States with a similar group of scientists and look through our plants. They wanted to discuss thermonuclear fusion and nuclear power plants for peaceful purposes. (not submarines and men-o'-war.)

Emelyanov said that both countries wanted to continue their experiments in nuclear power but USSR could not afford all types of plants. It was very expensive. He suggested that maybe the USSR could develop one type of plant and the United States another, thereby both countries save money.

In a telephone call last night Ed Teller said he had talked to Emelyanov in San Francisco yesterday.

Emelyanov told Teller that perhaps the USSR and the United States could build a nuclear power plant jointly. Perhaps in Vienna. The laboratory would be jointly manned, jointly financed, jointly controlled, and jointly built. If the United States did not like this idea, perhaps the two countries could exchange 20 or 30 nuclear scientists in each other's nuclear power plants.
The President interrupted, stating that the Russians know that we are far ahead of them in this field anyway and that is why they want to do it.

Mr. McCone stated that the Russians wanted to exchange knowledge in regard to high energy physics, cyclotrons, et cetera.

The President asked about the British; do we give them all the data that the Russians want?

Mr. McCone said we did. We gave the British and the Canadians everything. In addition to that, everything in regard to peaceful uses of atomic energy was published in this country.

The President suggested to Mr. McCone that they talk to Britain and Canada first about the Russian proposition before taking any action. He suggested that Mr. McCone listen to their ideas rather than put forward any of ours.

Adm Burke stated that there might be merit in getting information from the Russians because the Russians already knew all the information that we had (we published it), hence any information we got from them would be gravy. Nevertheless, if we joined hands with the Russians on this exchange of information, our allies throughout the world would be suspicious. Suggested caution.

The President said keep it in an international agency such as IAEA or with the Lacy-Zurubin arrangement. The President then asked can the Russians hold out on us?

Mr. McCone said yes. They can show us just as much or just as little as they want to. What they probably would do would be to show us things just about up to the level of the things that we showed them if they had progressed that far.

This subject will come up at Camp David (although it is thought that no experts would be needed there on this subject). Khrushchev
has stated that the only man that he wanted at Camp David is Zhukov, the cultural exchange expert.

ARLEIGH BURKE

Copy to:
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