MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft of Revised NSDD 32

1. (S) The enclosed memorandum to the Office of the National Security Advisor to the President responds to the National Security Council’s request for comments on the draft revision of the US National Security Strategy, NSDD 32.

2. (U) Request you forward the enclosed memorandum to the Office of the National Security Advisor to the President.

3. (U) This memorandum is regraded Secret when separated from Top Secret enclosure.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

P. F. CARTER, JR.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure
a/s

Reference:
* Executive Secretary to the NSC Memorandum, 8 July 1986, subject as above

Classified by Director, J-5
Declassify on USBR

09-M-2769
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Draft of Revised NSDD 32 (U)

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft revision of NSDD 32 and are pleased that the draft incorporates many of the recommendations they made during the NSDD 32 review. They are also pleased to find that the document's size has been greatly reduced, while retaining most of the essential policy and strategy guidance necessary to formulate a coherent military strategy. However, in two areas the deletion of guidance previously found in NSDD 32 could be perceived as a policy shift and, therefore, requires additional clarification.

2. (S) The previous version of NSDD 32 provided a detailed assessment of both US and Soviet conventional and strategic military capabilities and based a large portion of the policy and strategy guidance upon that assessment. Deleting that assessment has greatly reduced the size of the revised directive, but leaves unclear whether the policy and strategy guidance contained therein considers the limitations imposed by current conventional force capabilities. To correct this and to avoid the need to place a net assessment in NSDD 32, text should be added to the Resource Priorities section similar to that suggested below:

"In order to close the gap between strategy and capabilities, the U.S. must undertake a sustained and balanced force development program that is guided by periodic net assessments of U.S. and Soviet conventional and nuclear military capabilities."

Classified by Director, J-5
Declassify on ( )
3. In light of the need to guide force development programs by current net assessments, the force structure expansion guidance for maritime, tactical air and ground forces appears to be inappropriate. Based on our current net assessment, there is a clear need to expand and modernize all our Service capabilities if we are to approach a level of reasonable risk of accomplishing our military objectives. Based upon this JCS assessment, the guidance giving the expansion of tactical air and ground forces a low priority and maritime forces a high priority ought to be deleted and the following wording substituted:

"Force structure expansion of U.S. maritime, air, and ground forces shall be prioritized in accordance with the national military strategy. This strategy recognizes that we must continue to build and modernize national forces sufficient to retain maritime superiority. Tactical ground and air forces will have sufficient priority for modernization to regain and maintain U.S. qualitative advantages to offset the Soviet quantitative superiority".

4. One other area of the draft requires some clarification. In the section on Priorities and Objectives in War, the draft discusses conventional force capabilities to place Soviet interests at risk, seizure of strategically significant territory for promoting war termination and a post-conflict settlement, and efforts to deter escalation by altering the nuclear balance. Though these operational and strategic concepts are generally sound, the consolidation of these concepts into one paragraph and the absence of any discussion of when in a global war the capabilities would most likely be used makes it possible to interpret this guidance as a contradiction to the guidance provided in the same section on counter-offensives, war limitation, and nuclear deterrence. This apparent contradiction can be eliminated by moving the draft paragraph to just prior to the statement of overall US war aims and by indicating that some of these actions may be necessary to achieve successful war termination. The following wording is suggested:
"In prosecuting a global conflict, although early U.S. efforts will be directed at the denial of Soviet initial objectives, United States conventional forces should have the capability to place Soviet interests, including those within the Soviet homeland, at risk. Successful war termination may require seizure of strategically significant territory in order to provide incentives to end hostilities and to create leverage for favorable post-conflict settlement. It may also include conventional attacks on Soviet nuclear capabilities, including Soviet ballistic missile submarines. Such actions would be intended to deny the Soviets the ability to operate from sanctuaries and to deter or control escalation."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

P. F. CARTER, JR.
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff