7th Air Division in the Cuban Crisis
AIR DIVISION

IN THE

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CUBAN CRISIS

A STUDY OF ACTIONS IN THE EMERGENCY

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HEADQUARTERS
7th Air Division
Strategic Air Command
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This study of actions taken by or affecting 7th Air Division during the Cuban Crisis of October and November 1962 was prepared by the 7AD Historical Division with the generous assistance of the Headquarters staff and staff agencies.

In particular, the historian wishes to acknowledge the help obtained from Colonel S. M. Abrams and Lt Colonel D. J. Mannen of the Operations and Plans Division; Lt Colonel R. L. Strong and CMS J. D. Wixson of the 7AD Command Post; Lt Colonel A. J. Switzer and Lt Colonel Elbert Wilson of the Logistics Division; Major Hiram L. Snowden, C/Aircraft Maintenance Branch; Lt Colonel I. M. Johnson and TSgt W. M. McKenna of the Supply Division; MSgt A. J. Schuckman of the Air Munition Branch; and Mr. Milton Beller of the Management Analysis Division.

WILLIAM P. HAESTETTER
Command Historian
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7TH AIR DIVISION:

THE MISSION AND THE MAN
Throughout the period here under review, the 7th Air Division commander was directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, for the command jurisdiction and administration of units and installations assigned to his organisation. (U)

To discharge this obligation, the 7AD commander—as directed by SAC under policies established by Hq USAF—had to insure that (1) assigned units were manned, equipped and trained; (2) assigned installations were prepared and maintained in a condition able to support SAC units as required by the EWO; (3) effective operational control was exercised and support provided for all SAC units operating from or through 7AD bases, as prescribed by SAC and the EWO; (4) IRBM units within the United Kingdom were supported as directed by Hq SAC; (5) coordination was achieved with USAFE agencies in the provision of the operational and logistical support required by SAC forces operating in areas under USAFE control; (6) mutually satisfactory working agreements and procedures were established with appropriate agencies on matters not fully covered in directives; and (7) special missions assigned by CINCSAC were performed. (U)

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* Abridged and re-stated from SAC Regulation 23-6, subj: Mission —7th Air Division, 16 Feb 59. UNCL. In Vol II, Exhibit 1, 7AD Hist Jan-Jun 59.

** These were chiefly B-52 bomber units, but also included reconnaissance units of the 55th BW and special missions. (C)
Charles Marion Eisenhart was born in Culbertson, Nebraska, February 19, 1914. He graduated from Nebraska State College at Kearney, Nebraska, in 1937 with a Bachelor of Science Degree.

In October 1937, he entered flight training at Randolph Field, Texas. He graduated at Kelly Field in October 1938 from the bombardment course and was rated a pilot after receiving his wings. Upon graduation, he was assigned to the 96th Squadron of the 2nd Bombardment Group at Langley Field, Virginia.

In December 1939, he was transferred to the 27th Reconnaissance Squadron which soon moved to Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico (now Ramey AFB). Here he spent two and one-half years after which time he joined the 25th Bomb Group as Commander of the 12th Squadron on the Islands of St. Croix, VI and Aruba in Netherlands West Indies.

In June of 1943, he returned to the United States for assignment with the First Air Support Command of Charlotte, N. C., from which headquarters he commanded their advanced headquarters in "Tennessee Maneuvers" until January of 1944, at which time he attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

In July 1944, he was named 484th Squadron Commanding Officer of the 505th Bomb Group at Harvard, Nebraska, for B-29 training, and in December moved to the Marianas where he assumed command of the 505th Bomb Group on Tinian Island in April 1945, until December of that year.

He returned to the United States to join the 58th Bomb Wing at March Field, California, in 1946 which, in July of that year moved to Fort Worth and became the 8th Air Force.

Late in 1946, he was transferred to the newly organized Air Tactical School of the Air University at Tyndall Field as Chief of the Bombardment Branch. He remained there until February of 1948, at which time he attended the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia.

His next duty assignment was in Headquarters USAF where he served as Deputy Director of Public Relations for the Air Force for four years.
ATLANTIC OCEAN

NORTH SEA

GREAT BRITAIN

 Indicates TAD area

7th Air Division area in the United Kingdom
Background

The Beginnings. The regime of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista collapsed on 1 January 1959. The next day, in Santiago de Cuba, Dr. Fidel Castro, leader of the rebel militia, proclaimed a provisional government headed by Dr. Manuel Urrutia, an ex-judge of a Santiago court, who took up residence in the presidential palace in Havana on 5 January. Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, dean of the Havana Bar Association, was appointed premier the next day, and the announcement was made that the provisional government would rule Cuba for "at least" 18 months, after which free elections would be held. (U)

Following recognition by Great Britain and several other countries, the United States recognised the new government on 7 January 1959. On 8 January, Dr. Castro entered Havana at the head of a triumphal procession of 5,000 of his bearded revolutionaries, secure in the knowledge that he was Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of a legitimate government whose announced aims met with sympathy in the eyes of his most powerful near neighbors. (U)

In spite of the vow to rule for 18 months, Dr. Cardona resigned on 14 February 1959, and Dr. Castro succeeded him as premier two days later.1 This event marked the beginning of deterioration in Cuban-American relations and an equivalent, compensatory affiliation by Cuba with Soviet Russia and the Communist bloc of nations. (U)

Decay of Cuban-American Relations. The Castro regime's increasing hostility to the United States and the American presence in Cuba reached its first climax on 6 July 1960, when the Cuban government authorized nationalization of all U.S. property—estimated to be worth nearly $1 billion—in that country. This move coincided with cancellation of the Cuban sugar import quota by the United States, an action taken by President Eisenhower in retaliation for the previous arbitrary piecemeal confiscation of nearly half of U.S. property in Cuba by the Castro government. Soviet Russia supported this and every previous anti-American measure undertaken by Dr. Castro; on this occasion, Premier Khrushchev remarked that "Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire...in case of necessity." (U)

Further decay in U.S. relations with Cuba took place in the next two years. In October 1960, the U.S. Government prohibited all exports to Cuba except certain foods and medicines. In December of that year, Cuba and the Soviet Union reached an accord which openly aligned the Castro regime with the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. On 3 January 1961, the United States severed diplomatic relations in response to a Castro demand for an unacceptable cut in the size of the U.S. Embassy. In April 1961, the abortive invasion of Cuba by exiles took place; Castro blamed the United States for assisting this vanquished expedition, which certainly enjoyed the sympathy of large sections of the American public although it was not officially supported by the U.S. Government. In December 1961 Castro publicly proclaimed his adherence to
Communism in a speech in Havana in which he announced that he was a "Marxist-Leninist," and would remain one "until the last day of my life." In February 1962, President Kennedy halted all U.S. trade with Cuba except for certain foods and medicines. (U)

Sino-Soviet Military Aid. In the meantime, Sino-Soviet military aid to Cuba had been building up. Beginning in the autumn of 1960, this program poured approximately $300 million worth of Communist-bloc weapons, equipment and services into Cuba by the early part of 1962. By means of this assistance, Castro was given possession of the strongest military establishment in Latin America. (U)

In July 1962, this aid was stepped up by unprecedented quantities of weapons, equipment and technical personnel. This development in turn led the United States Congress to pass a joint resolution in September which expressed its determination to use every means, including military measures, to prevent the spread of Communism to the Western Hemisphere by force, and to prevent the creation or use in Cuba of a military capability which would jeopardize the security of the United States. Although at that time President Kennedy vetoed direct military intervention on the ground that the weapons so far supplied to Cuba were defensive in nature, he made it clear at a press conference on 13 September that conditions could be created which would require such intervention. Among these were (1) if the military build-up in Cuba were to endanger the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, free passage to the Panama Canal, the lives of American citizens in the United States, or missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral; (2) if Cuba should threaten or commit aggression in the hemisphere; and (3) if Cuba should become
an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union.2 (U)

From that point on, the flow of military manpower, equipment and materiel into Cuba was kept under close surveillance. Normal Intelligence sources indicated that much more was being developed there than a system of defenses. By mid-October, it was evident that detailed and conclusive information concerning the nature of the Cuban military build-up was required, and aerial reconnaissance was the method chosen to obtain it. (U)

SAC Surveillance and Its Results. With this decision, SAC entered the picture. Using its famed U-2's, SAC undertook on 14 October a series of high-altitude reconnaissance missions which covered nearly the entire island, and resulted in conclusive photographic evidence that a large-scale concentration of offensive weapons, among them missiles with a nuclear capability and a range of up to 2,000 nautical miles, was being rapidly established 90 miles from U.S. territory. In addition, nuclear-capable Iljushin jet bombers were being assembled in Cuba, while air bases from which they would be able to operate were being prepared. It was this evidence, obtained chiefly by SAC, which the President relied on heavily as a basis for his subsequent decisions.3 (U)

First evidence of the massive build-up in Cuba of offensive weapons by the Soviet Union was placed before the President on Thursday, 18


3. For Commanders, cited above, p 3; Msg CINC 107479, CINCSAC to 7AD et al., 4 Dec 62 (U). In 7AD Cdr files.
October. Final photo confirmation of the presence of Soviet MIRV's in Cuba was presented on Saturday, 20 October.4 (U)

Preliminary Preparations. From Thursday through Sunday, the Chief Executive and his key advisers conferred to consider what countermeasures should be taken by the United States to nullify or eliminate a Communist penetration which jeopardized the basic security of the nation and threatened every major population center from Hudson's Bay to Bolivia. As the President said in his subsequent speech, "The greatest danger of all would be to do nothing."5 (U)

That action of some kind would come was certain. In preparation for it, an entire tactical force, operational upon landing and consisting of thousands of men, thousands of tons of equipment, and scores of fighter, reconnaissance and troop carrier aircraft, was moved into the southeastern United States, chiefly Florida. Naval units were put on alert, dependents were evacuated from the base at Guantanamo and its strength nearly doubled, and SAC began dispersing EWO-configured aircraft to scores of auxiliary bases in the United States.6 (U)

The Quarantine. The decision was announced on 22 October by President Kennedy in a major speech to the nation and the world. In view of the threat posed by the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba, the purpose of which "can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere," the President declared that

5. For Commanders, cited above; Msg DXIP-3 106959, SAC to 7AD et al. (USAF msg SAP01-3C, 29 Nov 62), 30 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DXI files.
he had directed seven initial steps, which he warned "may be only the
beginning," to be taken immediately: (U)

(1) a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment
to Cuba, meaning that ships containing such cargoes and bound for Cuba
—and if necessary, other types of carriers and cargoes—would be
turned back, irrespective of what nation or port they came from;

(2) continued close surveillance of the military build-up
in Cuba, with an eye toward further action by the alerted U.S. Armed
Forces if the offensive preparations should continue;

(3) issuance of notice to the Soviet KGB that "any nuclear
missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemis-
phere" would be regarded "as an attack upon the Soviet Union on the
United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union;"

(4) reinforcement of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo,
evacuation of dependents there, and placement of additional military
units on alert;

(5) an urgent request for an immediate meeting of the Organ
of Consultation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in order
to invoke the pertinent provisions of the Rio Treaty to support necessary
actions;

(6) request for an emergency meeting of the Security Council
of the United Nations, to consider the proposal that all offensive
weapons in Cuba be dismantled and withdrawn under the supervision of
U.S. observers; and
(7) an appeal to Khrushchev to "halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace" by withdrawing the offensive weapons provided by the Soviet Union voluntarily from Cuba.\(^7\) (U)

The SAC Role. SAC was in the air even before the Presidential

It was the presence of this devastatingly destructive, irresistible force-in-being which gave effective weight to the President's warning words. SAC, in short, held off a counter-blew while the U.S. Navy, assisted by the Air Force, enforced the Cuban quarantine.\(^8\) (U)

The Position and Function of 7AD. Seventh Air Division in the Cuban crisis was called upon to fulfill its traditional role as an outpost of the far-flung SAC organization.
In short, it performed its normal function in a thoroughly normal manner for the duration of an utterly abnormal situation. Along with other SAC components, 7AD functioned in the crisis in a manner which evidenced the value of years-long training by repetitive exercises against just such a contingency. (S)

The Crisis Breaks

First Developments. With decisions reached and the die cast at the highest Governmental level, the Cuban Crisis was set to break on the evening of 22 October, when President Kennedy addressed the world. Yet SAC was in the air, on the qui vive, long before the darkness of what could have been its last peaceful night lifted from the nation's eastern shore. (U)

It was in the small hours of the morning of 22 October that Lt General Hunter Harris, Vice Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Air Command, reached for his telephone handset and asked to speak to 7th Air Division. With that small and ordinary action, the Cuban Crisis broke for 7AD—half a day ahead of the nation its forces helped guard. (U)

Colonel Horton H. Van Sicklen, Acting 7AD Commander, took the call in Britain. The SAC alert posture, he was told, was due for increase at any moment, and he should expect DEFCON III to go into effect very soon. The SAC airborne alert had already been increased,

* The entire broadcast was carried "live" by the British Broadcasting Corporation throughout the United Kingdom.
General Harris pointed out, and even then the B-47 dispersal plan was being implemented. As a precautionary measure, he added, SAC bases in Florida were being evacuated.9

Immediately, Colonel Van Sicklen notified the 7AD Command Post and Battle Staff to expect DeFeon III. Soon after, he and the Battle Staff together reviewed the responsibilities which an increase to DeFeon III would entail.10

9. S005 telegram (re-established on 7AD, 22 Oct 62, noted in 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 22 Oct-6 Nov 62 (78). In 7AD Hist files.

10. Ibid.

* Airborne Command Post.
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17. Msg DF 93617, 7AD to 7AD, 7 Oct 62 (TS). In 7AD DF files, Control 20.3c-1.

18. Msg DAF/UF 8647, 7AD to 7AD, 23 Oct 62 (TS). In 7AD D/UX files, Control 20.34 Msg APOAC 50/3 92754, COPS USAF to APOCMAVA in Oct 62 (TS). In 7AD Command files, Control No. 1031-J.
Major General Eisenhart, 7AD Commander, reported to the 7AD Command Post under the newly-established "Beer Can" procedure at 1416Z hours.* 23 It was while he was present in the Command Post that he and other CP personnel were addressed by General Power, CINCSAC, in a PAS broadcast to all SAC Commanders. General Power assured them all that SAC was well prepared for any eventuality, and that throughout the Strategic Air Command plans previously developed were being smoothly implemented. He directed that the telephone be used to clarify issues where possible, that strict security be maintained, and that calm judgment be used. He also insisted that non-essential activity be eliminated and all effort be devoted to attaining and maintaining a condition of maximum readiness.24 [5]

Just at this time, Upper Heyford was receiving four additional ECM aircraft, and the 7AD Commander, considering this and the words of General Power, decided on several steps to increase the survival

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23. Msg Zippo 10-40z, SAC to November, "Beer Can", 24 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD Command Post files, Control No. 133/05.

* The "Beer Can" procedure had been instituted by SAC only a few days earlier, on 20 October. It required the Commander to proceed to the Command Post and remain there until relieved by SAC direction.

Furthermore, there were altogether nine Special Mission aircraft assigned or attached to 7AD units. Three of these were U-2's, which had arrived in a flurry of publicity at Upper Heyford two months before, and were engaged on an atmospheric sampling mission.

Two transient aircraft which had an ultimate impact on the strength of the 7AD Alert Force were also in Britain at the time. Both carried members of parent units making staff visits to 7AD Reflex bases. One of these, visiting Upper Heyford, came from the 98th Bomb Wing at Lincoln AFB, Nebraska, and the other, visiting Brize Norton, belonged to the 301st Bomb Wing at Lakenheath AFB,
The first move was to deploy the 3-54's from Fairford (where maintenance facilities were concentrated) to the several 7AD bases where their support could be effective. This was accomplished in the morning of 23 October, beginning about 0300Z. In addition, the C-54 then in Wiesbaden was immediately recalled. Upper Heyford that day sent two C-54's to Greenham Common, two to Fairford, and three to Brize Norton. Five, including the one which
had returned from Wiesbaden, remained at Upper Heyford.33 (5)
used in a variety of ways by 7AD in carrying out its normal activities; primarily they were used by qualified rated officers to obtain their required Combat Readiness Training (CBT), or "flying time," but they were also called upon for administrative transportation when jet speeds were required.
On 30 October, SAC directed the complete combat configuration of these aircraft, and completion of sortie planning, target study and Combat Mission Folder (CMF) preparation as soon as possible. SAC also asked to be notified as to when crews were expected to be ready to assume alert duty.
The protracted tension under which the alert crews lived began to result in mental and nervous fatigue, with a consequent threat to morale. First recognition of this condition by SAC came with its announcement on 8 November that commanders could grant leaves of absence to personnel at their discretion, provided that their ability to maintain the current DefCon position would not be jeopardized. This authority was planned to take effect on 15 November.

Accordingly, on 12 November a C-54 was ferried from Upper Heyford to Greenham Common to strengthen the alert support force there, and on 14 November another C-54 transfer was made, this time from...
Greenham Common to Fairford, for the same purpose. 68 (g)

This schedule called for approximately 35 aircraft to be rotated by 17 December. 69 (3)

7AD transmitted the SAC requirements and schedules for rotation to its bases on the same day. 70 On the next, 17 November, 2AF established its own deployment-read deployment schedule, affecting the 307th, 98th and 340th Bomb Wings at Upper Heyford, Greenham Common and Fairford, and 8AF set up a similar schedule for the 380th Bomb Wing at Brize Norton. These were all coordinated by 7AD with the bases concerned, so that the program for the next month was clear and firm. 71 (3)

In the meantime, on 16 November, a C-54 was sent from Fairford (which had received an extra support aircraft two days before) to Upper Heyford, where it underwent maintenance check. 72 On the 19th,

60. RELAR Repts (recorded on Reflex Movement Log), as of dates indicated (3), cited above; Support Aircraft Movement Logs, dates indicated (3), cited above.

70. Msg D0 7-336-11, 7AD to QCESC, 16 Nov 62 (3). In 7AD D00 files.

71. Msg Suppo 11-517, 3IF to 7AD, 3909, 3918 & 3919 CSG, 17 Nov 62 (3). In 7AD Command Post Files, Control No. 74116.

72. Support Aircraft Movement Log, 16 Nov 62 (3). In 7AD Command Post Files.
a C-54 was sent from Bristo Norton to Upper Heyford for the same purpose, and another was sent from Upper Heyford to Greenham Common to support the alert force. 73 (5)
No further aircraft movements or staff action occurred on Sunday, 25 November, but activity resumed at a stepped-up tempo on Monday.

Redeployment was to be made at the direction of the parent air force.
On 27 November, the Cuban Crisis closed for 7AD. By PAB broadcast later confirmed by Zippo message, SAC re-established Defcon IV—the normal alert condition—with effect from 2310Z hours, with no exceptions. The 7AD commander and senior Battle Staff were notified immediately by telephone, and the rest of the 7AD staff was informed the next day. Central Security Control was also notified. Sabotage Alert and the telephone alert of EWO personnel were terminated on 28 November.
By midnight of 30 November, 7AD had almost, but not quite, returned to its usual condition.

Of the 15 support aircraft in the command on 30 November, all but one—a C-54 still at Fairford—had been returned to their parent units. The three 7AD B-47's had been returned to the 3920th CSG at Brize Norton, and the other 11 C-54's had been redeployed to the 3918th CSG at Upper Heyford. The only Special Mission aircraft still in the command were one RB-47 and one KH-97, both at Brize Norton. 89 (S)

Special Mission Aircraft Movements and Dispositions

The U-2 Flight. Three U-2 aircraft of the 4080th Strategic Wing were deployed on 19 August 1962 to RAF Upper Heyford for a 90-day period of reconnaissance activity involving sampling of high-altitude radioactivity. These sorties began in the latter part of August, and continued throughout September and October. 90 (S)

90. 3918 CSG Hist, Sept 62 (S), pp 3-7; 3918 CSG Hist, Oct 62 (S), pp 1-2, both in 7AD Hist files.
In Great Britain, memory was still fresh of the 1960 incident in which pilot Francis Gary Powers was brought down while on a reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union, and even the designation "U-2" had a sinister connotation in the public mind. Press interest in the arrival of these aircraft in the UK was accordingly intense, and comment—which included open disbelief that their mission was being honestly described—was widespread.\(^1\) (U)

However, operations of these aircraft were undertaken without incident after the first flurry of publicity, and continued routinely until after the outbreak of the Cuban crisis.\(^2\)

91. 3918 OSG Hist, Aug 62, News and Photographic Supplement.
92. 3918 OSG Hist, Nov 62, p 16.
Despite this first decision by SAC, it did end all sampling missions three days later,\(^95\) and on 28 October specifically cancelled U-2 flights at Upper Heyford until further notice.\(^96\)\(^(3)\)

On 31 October, SAC authorized resumption of U-2 missions in some parts of the world, but not in the UK.\(^97\) On the following day, 1 November, it specifically authorized the U-2 flights from Upper Heyford to start again,\(^98\) and 7AD on the same day passed on this authorization to both OL-7, the TDY unit, and the 3918th CSG at Upper Heyford. SAC and 7AD made it clear that the same procedures would apply to the new operation as to the old.\(^99\)\(^(3)\)

Actual U-2 flying began again on 2 November,\(^100\) and continued through 17 November, when SAC directed termination of the sampling mission and redeployment of the aircraft to their home unit.\(^101\)

Redeployment took place on 19 November, when, beginning at 0731z and continuing at 15-minute intervals, the three U-2's took off.

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95. Msg Zipco 10-686, SAC to 7AD, OL-7 (Upper Heyford), 27 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD Command Post files.

96. Msg Zipco 10-695, SAC to 7AD, OL-7 (Upper Heyford), 28 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD Command Post files, Control No. 28/1.


98. Msg DOCOR 1-11-5, SAC to 71D, 1 Nov 62 (TS). In 7AD DOOR files.

99. Msg DOCOR 1-7-251-11, 7AD to OL-7, 3918 CSG, 1 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD DOOR files.

100. Interv, 7AD Historian with Lt Edward Finkelstein, 3918 CSG Info Off, 34 Feb 63 (U).

101. Msg DOCORS 9160, SAC to 7AD, 2AF, OL-7, 17 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD DO files, Control No. 71D 522.
for Laughlin AFB, Texas, via Plattsburgh AFB, N.Y., on a flight expected to last for seven hours and 45 minutes. 102

Press releases were not made on the departure of the U-2's from Britain, and surprisingly little press comment was observed. Only routine coverage was given to the event by the London (national) press, and even the Daily Worker was restrained in tone. Press coverage was straightforward and unexcited, in contrast to the attention given to their arrival. 103

When Defcon III was instituted on 22 October, there were four aircraft assigned to the mission. However, on the same day the 7AD Commander directed that additional steps be taken to increase the survival capability of his command's resources, and the measures so directed

102. USAF, USAF 11-236, 3918 CSG to 7AD, SAC et al., (RELAB report), 19 Nov 62 (a). In 7AD Command Post files; 3918 CSG Hist, Nov 62, p 16.

103. 3918 CSG Hist, Nov 62, p 16.

104. Entries for 22 Oct 62, Reflex Data Book (3); cited above; RELAR Repts (extracted from Reflex, Support Aircraft Movement Log) for 22 Oct 62 (3), cited above.
The task force commander, and crews would plan to orbit for the longest time possible. Attempts would be made to maintain radio contact on the UHF frequency of the 7AD Command Post, but Croughton, Prestwick and High Wycombe would also be monitored if the equipment aboard permitted. Landing would be made at a 7AD base if possible, but if not, any suitable surviving airfield could be utilised. In this event, any communications facility available was to be utilized to contact the 7AD Command Post or a surviving 7AD base, in order to file an aircraft and crew-status report. Activity continued despite assumption of this new responsibility until 28 October, when SAC cancelled the mission.
and directed the return of the home units as soon as possible. 7AD action to comply began that day, but before movement could be accomplished, SAC reinstated the mission. After the requirements of this resumption had been coordinated within and among 7AD Material, Operations and Intelligence staff agencies, and receipt and understanding of the reinstatement message had been confirmed with the OL-1 commander, the status was substantially the same as it was when the emergency broke out. It continued unchanged until SAC terminated the mission finally on 15 November, when the aircraft were also instructed to return to their home units.

SAC instructions for terminating the mission were passed on to OL-1 for implementation on the same day. Also on the same day, the aircraft themselves were redeployed in the

109. Msg Zippo 10-703, SAC to 7AD inter alia, 28 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD Command Post files, Control No. 28/19.

110. Msg Zippo 10-664, SAC to 7AD, OL-1, 2AF, 15AF, 31 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD Command Post files.

111. 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 22 Oct-6 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD Hist files.

112. Msg DOCOR 15-11-110, SAC to 7AD, 15 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD DOCOR files.

113. Msg DI 15-11-107, 7AD to Commander OL-1, 15 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD DOCOR files.
second westward transatlantic movement since 25 October.\textsuperscript{114} \textsuperscript{(3)}

The Fall-Out of KC-97 Airlift Support. Under the SAC-7AD EWO plan, B-52 aircraft post-striking to the United Kingdom would be supported by "start teams" from each of the 7AD Combat Support Groups. The plan called for each Group to deploy selected maintenance personnel and required equipment to the bases utilized for post-strike landings. \textsuperscript{(3)}

For this action, air transport was obviously required, but the actual provision of it was a problem both to SAC and to 7AD, and had been for many months. In the past, several alternatives had been explored; in July 1962, for example, it seemed as if MATS would assume this responsibility with C-124's deployed on a rotation plan similar to Reflex. In September, however, this plan was cancelled in favor of KC-97 aircraft operating under a Reflex schedule and drawn from SAC's own resources. \textsuperscript{115} \textsuperscript{(8)}

As the Cuban Crisis reached its peak, the plan still held for these KC-97's to be deployed to Reflex bases on 3 November; in the meantime, 7AD was to use its own C-54's for the purpose. \textsuperscript{116} However, on 4 November SAC postponed indefinitely the deployment of KC-97 aircraft for this purpose to 7AD bases. \textsuperscript{117}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} HETAR Repts (recorded on Reflex Movement Log), 15 Nov 62 (3). In 7AD Command Post files.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Hist, 3920 CSG, Nov 62, pp 3-4; Hist, 3909 CSG, Nov 62, pp 2-7.
\item \textsuperscript{116} 3920 CSG Hist, Nov 62; 3909 CSG Hist, Nov 62. Both cited above.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Mag Zippo 11-163, SAC to 7AD, 4 Nov 62 (3). In 7AD Command Post files.
\end{itemize}
proceeded to use its own C-54's for start team purposes throughout the remainder of the emergency, although Operations officers continued to assume that the KC-97's would arrive before the end of the month. 118 (a)

On 27 November, the day SAC dropped to Decon IV, 7AD bases were informed that KC-97 deployment would commence on 30 November, and that alert duty would be assumed on 1 December. 119 (9)

The KC-97's did in fact arrive on 30 November and first went on alert duty the following day. 120 (9)

Alert Force Reliability in the Crisis

Effective Hours. For all 7AD units during the Cuban Crisis, the percent of effective hours was 99.55. For the four days of November subsequent to termination of the Decon III condition, this remarkably high percent of total effectiveness was maintained 121 (a)

For only five days during the period did this effectiveness fall below 99.0 percent,

118. 3920 CSG Hist, cited above.
119. Msg DOROS 15588, SAE to 7AD inter alia, (Movement of KC-97 Aircraft), 27 Nov 62 (9). In 7AD DOPL files.
120. 3920 CSG Hist, Nov & Dec 62, Chronology; 3909 CSG Hist, Nov & Dec 62, Chronology.
121. 7AD Mgmt Summary; Dec 62, p 2 (9). In 7AD Hist files.
or, in terms of aircraft, below 78.2 of the 79 total. These days were 24 and 29 October, and 13, 14 and 22 November. On the other hand, there were eight days in which 100 percent of the force was on the lines. 122 (B)

Downtime. There was no significant departure from normal past experience in causes of downtime during the Cuban Crisis. Systems Maintenance, Preparation Maintenance and Weapons Change were still the main elements of downtime involved in both October and November. 123 (B)

Operational Complications
However, 7AD Controller personnel were also required to serve as members of 7AD control teams. Partly because of this, the manning of 7AD control rooms was insufficient to permit assignment of two officer controllers for a protracted period of time.\textsuperscript{125} (8)

As early as 27 October, Fairford asked that the requirement for two officer controllers to be on duty at all times be waived, in view of (1) the fact that aircraft generation there had been completed; (2) an officer controller could be kept on standby and able to reach the Command Post within ten minutes; and (3) releasing him from controller duty would enable him to teach Positive Control classes.\textsuperscript{126} 7AD headquarters agreed substantially with this request and immediately consulted SAC about it on the "scrambler" telephone. However, SAC refused to waive the condition on the ground that an extra officer controller constituted a precaution against one officer's becoming mentally or physically incapacitated.\textsuperscript{127} (8)

For two weeks, control rooms at all 7AD bases tolerated the situation, but on 13 November the 3919 C30 at Fairford repeated

\textsuperscript{126} Mag Zippo 10-261, Fairford to 7AD, 27 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD Command Post files.

\textsuperscript{127} 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 22 Oct-6 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD Hist files.
This time, Fairford did not make the request unsupported; it was joined by Greenham Common, which asked an identical question. Nevertheless, both requests were denied, this time verbally by the 7AD Commander, who saw no point in reopening a subject already closed by SAC decision. Under these circumstances, the 7AD Commander changed his position on this matter, and on 20 November granted the waiver to all 7AD control rooms. SAC itself recognized this during the Cuban emergency and later waived the requirement for 16AF and overseas air divisions. All that remained to eliminate...
In general, however, nothing could be done to improve crew/aircraft ratios in 7AD during the crisis. Extra crews from theZ1 were simply not available, and the influx of additional aircraft to the command imposed more rigorous duty hours on all personnel.
the problem completely was to revise EACM 55-2A so that the requirement would be deleted for units not controlling a follow-on force.\textsuperscript{132} (b)

\[ \text{Section 6.2 (a)} \]
Announced that flights by Chrome Dome would be in place of Arrow/Crane days. On 29 October, it was announced that flight rotation plans were amended immediately. All procedures to implement the SLG rotation plan were revised and announced immediately. Arrow Rotation by Arrow Dome Aircraft. On 29 October, SLG announced that this was the case. Arrow/Crane/Arrow personnel are now being advised to ensure immediate action.
man at each base was made responsible for coordination of all air-
crew/crew chief rotation requirements for units placed there. 140 (g)

On 30 October, 2AF transmitted a detailed plan for setting
up the rotation scheme, the chief feature of which was that the
parent unit would indicate the number of crews to be made available
to forward areas. 141 According to a plan promulgated by 7AD the
same day, this number of crews would be matched on a one-for-one
basis by the Division. Reflex crew strength was not to be
increased under any circumstances. 142 (g)

The plan worked smoothly from the day it began, 3 November,
until it ended on 23 November. Chrome Dome aircraft arrived
and dropped off replacement crews and other support
personnel, and left for a base in Spain, where similar personnel
were discharged for 16AF. It then became a part of the 16AF's alert force, and was placed on the line. This
relieved another, which came off the alert line and returned
to the ZI. On its way back it landed generally
the day after the deploying crews arrived, and picked up 7AD crews

141. Mag Zippo 10-727, 2AF to Sierra Two, 30 Oct 62 (g). In 7AD
Command Post files, Control No. 39/12.

142. Mag Zippo 10-281, 7AD to Quebec, (Reflex aircrew rotation),
30 Oct 62 (g). In 7AD DCO files; Mag Zippo 11-681, 2AF to
7AD, 3909 CSG, 3918 CSG, 3919 CSG, 2 Nov 62 (g). In 7AD
Command Post files, Control No. 8/17.
for the return trip to the 21. One aircraft therefore served both
16AF and 7AD in this respect.  

Altogether, 1,616 crew members, maintenance personnel, space-
available "hitch-hikers" and others were processed through Base
Operations at Brize Norton for transportation aboard Chrome Dome
aircraft during the period 3-23 November. This number included
personnel inbound and outbound for 16AF as well as for 7AD. In-
bound and outbound, the number of flights totalled 31, including
two special flights.  

Change in Drop-Tank Procedures. On 31 October, SAC notified
7AD that the requirement to drop B-47 tanks while under Positive
Control would be deleted in a forthcoming change to Vol I of SAC
Manual 55-7. This change was to become effective on a date which
would be announced by SAC DOPIM. At the same time that this
notification was made, SAC also announced the immediate end of
B-47 drop-tank training.*  

The next day, 7AD informed the bases of these changes.  

143. 3920 COS Hist, 1-31 Nov 62, pp 11-12.
144.  Ibid.
* The message also stated that War Readiness Material (WRM)
tanks should be retained until the Consolidated Material
Distribution Objective (CMDO) could be changed. This was
not expected to occur before 1 January 1963.
145.  Msg DM-6674, SAC to 7AD, 31 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD DM files,
    Control No. 3866-J.
146.  Msg BCD 153, 7AD to Quebec, 1 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD DM files.
AFM 60-1, which outlined requirements for flying proficiency training, had been put into abeyance so far as 7AD was concerned as soon as the Cuban Crisis came to a head.

Under these circumstances the requirements of AFM 60-1 assumed a renewed importance. (3)

Approximately 60 B-47 flying hours were needed by the 29 pilots assigned to the 7AD program in order to meet the provisions of AFM 60-1, which required them to attain 40 hours by 31 December 1962.

Effective 1500Z hours on 15 November, B-47 flying would resume. (3)

This action, it pointed out, freed four C-54 aircraft for proficiency flying purposes. (3)
MMS Training. During the Cuban Crisis lack of aircraft availability retarded training in weapons loading normally conducted by each Munitions Maintenance Squadron. This training was therefore limited to classroom study and study of T.O.'s. (§).
On that date the USAF Chief of Staff cancelled "Minimize" procedures for all areas except LANTCOM and CARIBCOM,¹⁵⁴ and SAC also confirmed that all restrictions were removed for its telephone and teletype networks.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹. Msg APOAC 30/3 92754, COPS USAF to AFCONSTA, 21 Oct 62 (G). In 7AD Comm Ctr files, Control No. 3051-J.

¹⁵². Msg ALSACOMSTA 99/62, SAC to 7AD, (project Minimize), 24 Oct 62 (G). In 7AD DOC files, Control No. 3258-J.

¹⁵³. Msg 115/62, AF Comm Sta to ALSACOMSTA (Removal of Priority Four Restrictions on Station Calls), 9 Nov 62 (G). In 7AD DAS, DO files.

¹⁵⁴. Mag ALSACOMSTA 117/62, SAC to 7AD et al., 15 Nov 62 (G); Mag ALSACOMSTA 118/62, SAC to 7AD et al., 15 Nov 62 (G). Both in 7AD DO files.
Message Discipline under Minimize. The intent of the restrictions imposed by "Minimize" procedures was of course to eliminate congestion on lines and channels, and confine traffic to more important communications. The effectiveness of the concept depended upon the stringency of its application to all elements of all units. (G)

This message discipline was lax during the Cuban Crisis. 7AD personnel noted that many units and headquarters released administrative messages with a transmission precedence of Operational Immediate or higher, and that these routine messages competed for the limited transmission facilities with truly Ops Immediate communications, to the detriment of the latter. These errors in category violated Paragraphs 7a and 9 of AFM 10-2. 157 (U)

As a result, 7AD recommended that a SAC-wide program be started to educate drafters and releasers of messages in their responsibilities for designing and releasing messages during "Minimize" conditions. 158 (U)

157. P 5, attach 1 to 1tr, Col Edward T. Brown, 7AD GS to SAC (DOHEMA), subj: Problems Associated with Defcon Posture, 10 Jan 63 (g). In Exhibit section, this report.

158. Ibid.
Activation of CAO Circuit to SHAPE. A minor triumph in establishing quickly a vital communications link was achieved by 7AD on 25 October when the SAC Field Representative, Europe, (FRE) requested establishment of the CAO circuit J-20. This circuit would connect FRE directly with the U.S. National Military Representative at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), in Paris, but normally its establishment required a ten-day advance notice. 159 (c)

The requirement for such a long advance notice naturally ruled out the immediate establishment of the primary J-20 circuit, although action was begun for that purpose. However, an alternate J-20 circuit was set up and activated in one hour and 40 minutes from the time of request. This alternate circuit ran from 7AD to Croughton to SHAPE, and required seizure of the Croughton-SHAPE P-55 link. Once the J-20 alternate circuit was established, the P-55 link was allowed to resume its normal operations on the understanding with all agencies concerned that the J-20 circuit would immediately pre-empt it if required. 160 (c)

This alternate circuit served for four days, until 29 October, when the true J-20 circuit was activated at 1200 hours. Six days had been cut from the ten normally required for this action. 161 (b)

* Coordination of Atomic Operations (S)


160. 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 22 Oct-6 Nov 62 (G). In 7AD Hist files; Msg DCGEP 07-10-13, 7AD to USAFE intersect, (activation of J-20 circuit), 27 Oct 62 (G). In 7AD DCGEP files.

161. 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 22 Oct-6 Nov 62 (G). In 7AD Hist files.
Section 6.2 (a)

Other Considerations in Maintenance and Material

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M. Zappo 10-25. 740 to Quebec, (Letters to File in Case of Jamming), 27 Oct 62. (Exhibit)
This guidance from SAC was forwarded to 7AD bases for compliance on the same day, and monitorship of base actions in this respect was begun by the 7AD Base Capabilities Division. With the approval of 7AD headquarters, however, schedules were so arranged by the bases that engines were able to be run up once every seven days rather than once every 14 as originally required. A similar program was established for C-54 aircraft, and continued until 16 November, when C-54 proficiency flying was resumed. Accordingly it was retained until those exercises could be resumed—something which had not yet occurred by the end of November. 

Pre-redeployment Operational Flight Checks. On 20 November, 7AD received word from SAC that T.O. 1-1-300 did not require operational flight checks "as a result of the long stand-down." At that time, SAC gave permission for local flights for aircraft about to be redeployed, in the interest of flight safety or for aircraft commander currency qualification.

164. Msg DM, 118, 7AD to Quebec, 27 Oct 62 (C). In 7AD DM files; 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 22 Oct-6 Nov 62 (G). In 7AD CS files.

165. 3920 OSD Hists, Oct 62, p 7; Nov 62, p 17.
These directions were immediately forwarded to all bases by 7AD, \(^{169}\) and four flights, two each by the 3909th CSG and the 3920th CSG, were made as directed. Maintenance write-ups on all flights showed no irregularities which could be attributed to the stand-down, and no extraordinary maintenance items were recorded.

Checks in the interest of flight safety and crew currency far beyond the end of the Cuban Crisis. Plans called for them to continue until 21 December 1962, when the last of the aircraft involved in the emergency would have been redeployed to the 21.\(^{171}\) (9)

171. 3920 CSG Hist, cited above.
Parachute Packing. Directives governing parachutes and parachute packing continued to apply during the Cuban Crisis. Among other things, these directives required that parachutes aboard B-47 aircraft be re-packed at intervals of no more than 60 days. (U)

From time to time during the emergency, on-base replacements for parachutes whose expiration date was approaching became in short supply, and base supply officers obtained appropriate numbers of newly-repacked parachutes from the 7AD Consolidated Parachute Packing Facility at Greenham Common. This facility, which because of the long alert had been relieved of its normal workload of repacking parachutes for redeploying Belflex aircraft, was easily able to meet the requirements of the Command. (U)

Aircraft Lacking Anti-Ice Modification:

This technical order required modification of the B-47 anti-ice system. (S)

172. Ibid.
173. Interv, 7AD Historian with SSgt Robert L. Diamond, Actg NCOIC, Consolidated Parachute Pkg Facility, RAF Greenham Common, 15 Feb 63. (U)
Before then, however, they were designated by 8AF\textsuperscript{174} and 7AD\textsuperscript{175} to be the first aircraft redeployed when the crisis closed, so that the modification could be carried out by the parent units.

On 28 October, however, SAC inquired about the status of these aircraft, and thus indicated that a new EWO assignment was being considered for them.
Realizing this, 7AD informed SAC DMGA about the specific ECM antenna requirements of these aircraft on 30 October, 177 and SAC replied immediately that steps were being taken to locate such equipment. 178 This information was passed on promptly by 7AD to the 3920th CSO at Brize Norton in a message which not only stated that SAC action to obtain the ECM equipment had been begun, but also directed that the 3920th designate a project officer to monitor, receive, insure bench check and assign this equipment to the aircraft when it arrived. 179 Brize Norton put this arrangement into effect almost at once, and acknowledged its...
compliance on 1 November.\(^{180}\) (S)

The next day, two ALA-15 ECM antenna systems for the B-47’s at Greenham Common and Upper Heyford were received at Brize Norton from Second Air Force. One of these, however, was found to be defective during bench check, and SAC was immediately notified.\(^{181}\) On the same day 2AF notified 7AD that replacement ECM equipment was programmed for shipment to Britain,\(^{182}\) but no significant action followed. (S)

On 5 November 7AD finally asked for shipping data on the promised ECM equipment and antenna systems for the B-47’s.\(^{183}\)

On 6 November, SAC relayed this request for data to Warner-Robins Air Material Area (WRAMA), asking urgent action by WRAMA to provide the information 7AD desired.\(^{184}\) Although eventually word was received that the equipment would shortly be sent to the UK through Dover AFB, in fact no delivery was made. The urgency of the Cuban Crisis had long since passed when it at last arrived, in the first week of December.\(^{185}\) (S)

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180. Msg BDCM 7-11, 3920 CSG to 7AD, 1 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DM files.
181. Msg BCD 165, 7AD to SAC DM3A, 2 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DM files.
182. Msg DMQ1A2, 2AF to SAC (info 7AD), 2 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DM files.
183. Msg BCD 176, 7AD to SAC, 5 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DM files.
184. Msg DMQ1A2 100342, SAC to WRAMA, 6 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DM files.
185. Interv, 7AD Historian with Maj Hiram L. Snowden, C/Aircraft Maint Br, 7AD Dir/Mat, 20 Dec 62. (S)
Greenham Common Pipeline Project. Excessive amounts of water and rust had been discovered in JP-4 jet engine fuel received at Greenham Common from the Aldermaston pipeline as far back as August 1962, and later examination established that the pipeline itself was the cause of contamination. It had never been cleaned since its installation. In September, a decision was made to clean the line the following month. Projected date was 10 October, but this date slipped somewhat and the Cuban Crisis meanwhile arose.

On 5 November, 7AD requested SAC permission to postpone this badly-needed pipeline cleaning project in view of the activity generated by the Cuban emergency. However, SAC declined to approve the request, pointing out that adequate fuel stocks even for EWO operations were on hand at Greenham Common. Instead of agreeing to postpone the cleaning project, SAC emphasized that it should be undertaken as soon as possible.

Since the Cuban emergency had caused further slippage in the planned date for the project, 7AD immediately undertook to establish a new date. This date was discussed with Third Air

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186. 1909 CSG Hist, 1-30 Nov 62, p 11, et seq.
187. Ibid.
188. Msg BCD 178, 7AD to SAC DMG, 5 Nov 62 (S). In POL files, 3909 GSG.
189. Msg D/CF 8844, SAC to 7AD & USAFE, 6 Nov 62 (S). In 7AD DM files, Control No. 412-X.
Force and the 3909th CSG at Greenham Common over the telephone, and agreement was achieved by the same means. By pure coincidence, the cleaning operation was set for 28 November, one day after the return to Defcon IV. 190

Accordingly, the pipeline was secured free of some 6,000 pounds of corrosion and impurities on 28 November 1962. 191

190. Interv, 7AD Historian with Capt P. Kirkhorn, G/Fuels Br., Supply Div, 7AD Dir/Mat, 7 Mar 63 (S).

191. 3909 CSG Hist, 1-30 Nov 62, cited above.

192. Mag DM 8471, SAC to 7AD and Quebec, (WRM review), 26 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD DM files.

193. Mag BC-128, 7AD to SAC, (WRM stocking), 26 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD DM-1 (BCD) files.
195. Not used.

196. Not used.

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This policy continued from 24 October under mid-November, when SAC, after first announcing that commanders could grant leaves of absence at their discretion if it would not detract from their ability to maintain the required Defcon posture, finally authorized all leaves of absence regardless of type to resume on a normal schedule on 15 November. Later, 7AD questioned the wisdom, not of the recall action, but of the way it was conducted. Personal and financial hardship was caused to some 7AD personnel, especially lower-grade airmen, who were at the time on emergency leave to the ZI. These airmen were required to return to 7AD bases at their own expense.

197. Mag DF 98017, SAC to 7AD, 23 Oct 62 (S). In 7AD DF files, Control No. 3063-J.

199. Mag DF 101564, SAC to 7AD et al., 8 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DF files.

200. Telecon, 7AD DP & SAC DP, 13 Nov 62 (U); 7AD Action Summary, "Cuban Situation," 13 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD Hist files.
and this often required a long overland and transatlantic commercial flight. Accordingly, 7AD recommended that in the future it undertake to brief its personnel before departure that military transportation should be used in case of a national emergency. If delays occurred, leave personnel would be required to contact the nearest SAC installation and inform their home Base Commander of their whereabouts. 201 (U)

be authorized each base to send two crews and five TDY airmen personnel in rotation to London for a 24-hour period of recreation. Only the Columbia Club for officers or the Douglas House for airmen was to be used as a billet for this purpose; there they could be quickly contacted at a central point. 202 (U)

General Eisenhart's decision preceded by one day SAC's announcement that commanders could grant leaves of absence at

201. Pp 1-2. Atch 1 to ltr, Col Edward T. Brown, 7AD CS to SAC (DCHMA), 10 Jan 63, cited above.
Relations with the British

Bomber Command Notification. Following the loss over the Barents Sea of a SAC B-52 and four of its six-man crew while on a reconnaissance mission from Brize Norton in 1960, Parliamentary attention turned sharply to the question of British control over USAF operations from UK bases. At that time, the Prime Minister, Parliament, press and people of Britain all expressed their desire to possess such control. 212 (U)

At that time, 7AD was chosen as the agent through which notice of such operational activity was to be made available to the RAF Bomber Command, and through it, to the British Air Ministry. The 7AD Command Post was instructed to advise Bomber

* See p 29.

212. 7AD Hist, 1 Jul 69-30 Jun 61, pp 136-149.

213. Ibid.
Flying Status of Non-Crew Airmen. Certain airmen in SAC—e.g., crew chiefs—enjoyed the privileges and pay of flying status in spite of the fact that they were not crew members. To qualify for flying pay, these airmen had to accomplish a minimum of four hours' flying time per month. (U)

However, the advent of the Cuban Crisis, which kept actual flying activity to a minimum, made it impossible for many of these airmen to qualify for flying pay in October, and for some of them, a financial hardship was imminent. (U)

On 31 October, therefore, SAC authorized those airmen on non-crew-member flying status beyond the end of that month to make up the flying time lost in October by accomplishing the minimum requirement in November, provided that normal flying schedules were resumed in that month. This information was relayed to all bases by 7AD the next day, and although truly normal schedules were not resumed until after a return to Defcon IV on 27 November, much of the required flying time was achieved before the end of the month, when a kind of round-Robin of C-54's

210. Msg DP 99845, SAC to 7AD, 31 Oct 62 (U). In 7AD DP files.

211. Msg DPP 1428-11, 7AD to Quebec, 1 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DP files.
Mission Support Flying Requirements. On 27 October, the USAF Chief of Staff granted authority to all major air commanders to use Code 3 or 4 officers in mission support flight requirements associated with the Cuban Crisis if they were critically needed.

On 30 October, SAC gave authority to each base commander to select those Code 3 or 4 officers desired for such mission support flights. However, the commanders were to make their selections from a list previously approved by both SAC and 7AD headquarters. By 1 November this list had been compiled and had met with the approval of SAC and 7AD. Bases were informed, and advised that unless selections were made from this list, clearance would have to be obtained from the Commander at Upper Heyford for officers scheduled to fly in C-54 aircraft, and from

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208. Msg DPM 99412, SAC to 7AD inter alia, 30 Oct 62 (U). In 7AD DP files, Control No. 3852-J.
On 13 November SAC widened its previous authorization, and permitted all leaves of absence regardless of type to resume on a normal schedule on 15 November, subject to the discretion of commanders.204

The maximum recreational time permitted was thus extended to 48 hours, or two nights "in town" at these hotels.205 (U)

Even inter-base sports competition could be resumed as of 14 November. 7AD delegated to commanders the right to make decisions on participating in these games, which if already scheduled could proceed provided no risk ensued to the maintenance of the Defcon in effect at the time.206 (U)

203. Mag DF 101564, SAC to 7AD et al., 8 Nov 62 (U), cited above.

205. Mag DF 1436-11, 7AD to Quebec, 14 Nov 62 (U). In 7AD DF files.
Command promptly of any change, among other things, in alert posture or defense readiness condition; Bomber Command would undertake to notify Air Ministry. These arrangements were confirmed in writing by the 7AD Commander* to Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Cross, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, with the provision that the information be given the degree of protection and restricted dissemination required by its security classification. In early September, 1960, Air Marshal Cross accepted these arrangements and the procedure was put into effect.**

** At the time, Maj Gen Charles B. Westover.

Ibid.

Newspaper reports later indicated that Bomber Command had advanced its own alert condition on 20 October, well ahead of SAC. (See Newsclip and Photo Supplement, this report.)

Interv, 7AD Historian with CMS James D. Wixson, NCOIC 7AD Command Post, 7 Dec 62. JS Appeal 3.3(1) 50x1.

50x5, 50x6

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Section 6.2 (a)
As a matter of course, the 7AD Commander took steps to honor his obligations under the agreement. The information was transmitted at that time, and its integrity, as agreed between General Westover and Air Marshal Cross in 1960, was most carefully protected. 217 (3)

Experience during the Cuban Crisis indicated that in spite of the fact that they had been introduced by political considerations, the notification procedures imposed upon 7AD in 1960 were flexible enough to be operated under even the most restrictive circumstances by intelligent people intent upon cooperation. (U)
Section 6.2 (a)

Exactly one week after Mr. Khrushchev gave assurance that the Cuban weapons would be withdrawn. (JS-NOFORN)

However, none of these considerations, including Khrushchev's promise to withdraw, carried much weight with the United States.
Parliamentary Repercussions. As in 1960, when the RB-47 incident produced a similar reaction, Parliamentary concern over the Cuban Crisis centered about the question of whether or not effective independent control was being exercised by H.M. Government over British foreign policy and defense, or whether this control in reality was being wielded by the United States. (U)

Crucial to this issue was the question of whether or not H.M. Government had been consulted before the decision to quarantine Cuba had been taken by President Kennedy. Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Opposition, first put this question to Mr. Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons session of 25 October, asking:

...Were Her Majesty's Government consulted before the decision by President Kennedy to institute a blockade of Cuba was taken? If they were consulted, what advice was taken? If they were not consulted, is it not a very unsatisfactory state of affairs that one member of an alliance can take unilateral action even though this may clearly involve the gravest danger to other members of the alliance?.... (U)

This first query was answered by Mr. Macmillan to the effect that he had received a personal message and a visit to explain the situation which had arisen, and he attributed these unusual measures to the degree of speed necessary under the circumstances. 

However, Mr. Gaitskell returned to the subject on 30 October,


235. Ibid.
pointing out that while he understood the exigencies of the situation, including the necessity for prompt action, the fact remained that Europe had been put in danger by virtue of a unilateral decision made by the United States. He called upon the Prime Minister to make arrangements for better consultation in the future.236 (U)

Mr. Macmillan would not accept the thesis that the United States had acted without regard for its allies. Again he referred to the time available, pointing out that the President had reached his decision on Sunday, 21 October, and that arrangements had been made immediately to inform allied Governments. The broad account was given to the British as soon as possible, he said, and he himself was informed on the morning of 22 October. "It seems to me, therefore," he concluded, "that having regard to the rapidity with which the crisis was developing the American Government not only preserved diplomatic propriety but maintained the closest possible co-operation with their allies."237 (U)

All shades of Opposition opinion, from right-wing Laborites to near-Communists, marshalled their questions for the big Parliamentary debate of 31 October. At this session, H.M. Government was represented by Mr. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, and the major Opposition viewpoint was stated by Mr. Harold Wilson. *(U)


237. Hansard cited above, Col 36.

* In early 1963 elected leader of the Labor Party after the death of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell.
By that time, the urgency of the crisis over Cuba had subsided somewhat, but the urgency of the question of consultation remained. Mr. Wilson observed, among other things, that:

...few explanations of the lack of consultation have been thinner than those of the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon. He told us that he knew on Monday morning, twelve hours or more before. Why then did the Foreign Secretary say on TV on Monday night that there was no time for consultation? There were twelve hours or more... There was time in any case to brief Mr. Dean Acheson and fly him to Paris. Was the position that the Prime Minister was just told, or was he consulted? Was he given the opportunity of commenting, or advising, or warning, of supporting?...

In saying all this about consultation, what we are concerned with here is not the conduct of the United States but the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. We are concerned not with the actions of our allies but with the functioning of our alliance...

There is another question. It is not the question why the United States failed to consult Britain. It is why we apparently now count for so little that she did not feel under any obligation to consult us...

...How often have we been told that Britain must have the so-called independent nuclear deterrent so that we shall be there when the vital decision is taken. We have a special relationship. We are not as other men are—we are a nuclear power! Does the Rt. Honorable Gentleman still maintain this thesis? (U)

Answering this, Mr. Heath for the Government, again referred to the deception of the Soviet government, the circumstances of its revelation, and the time available in which to take effective counter-action. Presumably, he said, the Opposition was replying that President Kennedy should have

occupied the little time available with full consultation with
the whole of the alliance before he took the action he did take.
This he rejected out of hand.\textsuperscript{239} (U)

We believe\textsuperscript{239} that the time element was
important—so important that it justified the
action which the President took. He imposed a
limited quarantine on the sea, ... and limited
the use of the quarantine only to preventing the
build-up which was then rapidly going on. He
took the matter at once to the Security Council
... at once obtained support from the Organisation
of American States and from all his
European allies...

I think that it has always been made clear
that we were informed of the action which the
President of the United States proposed to take.
That has never been questioned...

has asked whether there was
consultation after we were fully informed about
the action which was to be taken. As I have
said, on informing his allies and the Organisation
of American States the President obtained
full support from all of them. There was then
full consultation with NATO through the NATO
Council during the events of the crisis through
Mr. Acheson and Mr. Finletter. After that there
was consultation with us and with other allies
who must, of course, speak for themselves. As
far as we were concerned there was consultation
which gave us all we wished for in our relations
with the United States and our position in the
alliance.\textsuperscript{*} (U)

Essentially, these were the Opposition's point and the
Government's rebuttal, although debate on this and a variety of
associated subjects continued until 10 p.m. on the evening of
31 October, and re-appeared sporadically in subsequent minor

\textsuperscript{239}. Hansard cited above, Cols 171-172

\textsuperscript{*} Emphasis is that of the historian.
Questions in the House during November.

Reaction of Press and Public

As in the rest of the world, the sudden advent and dramatic character of the Cuban Crisis produced black headlines in the British press on 23 October. Editorial comment, which followed the day after, revealed mixed reactions, ranging from firm support by the Daily Express and Daily Mail through querulous foreboding by The Times, to near-hysteria by the Daily Sketch and Daily Herald. The last two newspapers seemed to want Britain to opt out of her association with the United States in the Cuba action.240 (U)

Letters to the editor written in these early days of the Crisis also reflected the tendency on the part of many people to doubt the wisdom of the action, and let America go it alone.241(U)

However, as time passed and thermonuclear warfare began to appear unlikely, confidence grew. Editorials on 25 October

240. See extracts from these newspapers of 24 Oct 62, Newsclips and Comment section, this report.

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reflected a calmer and more deliberate appraisal of the situation, with a growing conviction evident that the United States had been correct in adopting the position it took. The Daily Mail even expressed a heartfelt gratitude that American bases existed in other lands. Nevertheless, opinion was widespread that some sort of a "deal" should be made with Khrushchev about Cuba, to eliminate the possibility of war. Foremost among proposals was to reduce U.S. bases in return for the elimination of offensive weapons in Cuba. U.S. missiles in Turkey were spoken of by many papers as being suitable material for this kind of "bargain." (U)

As even more time passed without Armageddon, the press began to settle for its old issues. The Sunday Express, for example, had reverted to form by 28 October, complaining about the lack of consultation with the British before the fact of Cuban action. "As far as influencing the issues of war or peace is concerned," it held, "we might as well be Tristan da Cunha." (U)

By 2 November, when the crisis peak had passed, the press and public had settled back gratefully to appraise the situation in the light of success. "Don't 'Knock' the Yanks—After All, They Saved Our World" proclaimed a Member of Parliament in the Evening News. "Britain Was Ready to Mobilize," declared the


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Sunday Telegraph Military Correspondent in a dispatch printed on
4 November. On 14 November, the Daily Telegraph must have
restored British pride somewhat with its assertion that "Bomber
Command's ability to destroy a given number of Russia's largest
cities regardless of counter-action may well have been a critical
factor in deciding that an attack on the West was not worth
while." (C-NOFORN)

Like Americans, people in Britain lived under extreme tension
during the first days of the Cuban Crisis. Left-wingers and pro-
fessional demonstrators of course held rallies in front of the
American Embassy, but these were generally treated with tolerant
contempt by both news media and the man-in-the-street. Press and
public alike compared the Cuban emergency grimly with Suez, whether
for or against that action themselves, but the people of
Britain did exactly what people anywhere would do—hang on, and
hope for the best. (U)

The later discomfiture of certain Russians in Britain—
notably the London correspondent of Izvestia, interviewed about
the Cuban Crisis over the BBC on 12 December—may have been some
small recompense to many for the anxiety of the early days of the
emergency. (U)

* Articles cited are contained in Newsclip section, this report.
244 Editorial, "Kennedy's Suez?", Daily Herald, 24 Oct 62. In
Newsclip section, this report.
245 Tape recording of BBC interview with Vladimir Ossipov,
London correspondent for Izvestia, 12 Dec 62. In Newsclip
and Comment section, this report.