Sudan has been in conflict with itself for nearly the entirety of its history since independence in 1956. Conflict has been driven by lack of development and marginalization of Sudan’s periphery, with economic and political power concentrated at the center. This dynamic is at the root of historic conflicts in the South, East, and Three Areas and the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Because these conflicts are interconnected, their resolution requires a comprehensive and national approach.

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended more than twenty years of conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan. Although the agreement was reached between just two parties, it was intended to provide national solutions to Sudan’s problems, including a new constitutional framework, reform of national government institutions, and increased representation of marginalized groups in the political sphere. A collapse of the CPA framework would not only drive North and South back to war, it would severely impede the resolution of conflicts in other parts of Sudan, including the conflict in Darfur, and would represent a threat to regional stability. Though the pace of implementation has been slow in many areas, the parties have consistently managed to avoid a complete breakdown of the agreement. That said, implementation of many CPA milestones has lagged, with key decisions being avoided or postponed. In the remaining 20 months of the CPA, the parties must organize elections on six levels, resolve the boundaries of the oil-rich Abyei region, demarcate the North-South boundary, arrange popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and prepare for referenda on Southern Sudan self-determination and the status of Abyei. As guarantors of the CPA, the United States will play a key role in ensuring the CPA is fully implemented, and that arrangements are made for a peaceful post-referenda era.

Between 2002 and 2003, during negotiations to end the North-South conflict, the Government of Sudan’s disproportionate response to rebel uprisings in Darfur resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions displaced in what the U.S government determined to be genocide. After many rounds of negotiations in various locations, one significant rebel movement, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA) – Minni Minawi faction, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the Government of Sudan. The DPA provided a framework for resolution of the Darfur conflict compatible with the CPA, including power-sharing, compensation, and economic development for Darfuris. However, with just one rebel signatory and little implementation by the Government of Sudan, the conflict continued and the DPA garnered little support from the people of Darfur. Since the signing of the DPA, the Darfur factions have further splintered, complicating efforts to negotiate a solution. In 2008, after virtually no DPA implementation and the collapse of October 2007 negotiations in Sirte, Libya, the UN and African Union appointed a joint chief mediator to steer the process. Since his...
appointment in August 2008, the mediator, Djibril Bassole, has succeeded in securing a Goodwill and Confidence Building Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the militarily-significant Justice and Equality Movement, signed in Doha in February 2009. However, several key movements, including the SLA – Abdul Wahid faction, and the SLA-Unity faction, remain largely outside the process. Armed militias and bandits continue to cause significant insecurity.

Further fueling the Darfur conflict has been the negative influence of regional players with ties to the Darfur rebel movements, particularly Chad, Libya, and Eritrea. Chad and Sudan’s historical animosity has long included support for each others’ rebel movements. Chad’s support to JEM has been matched by Sudanese support to Chadian rebels, and ending the proxy war between Chad and Sudan will be key to lasting peace in Darfur. Multiple past agreements between the Governments of Chad and Sudan, including the 2007 Dakar Agreement, have failed to fully end this war, though negotiations between the parties continue under the auspices of Libya and Qatar.

**Strategic Vision for Sudan 2009-2012:**

The United States seeks a politically stable, physically secure, economically prosperous Sudan, on a path to democratic transformation, and at peace with its own people and its neighbors, whether it remains united or becomes two independent countries.

**Strategic Objectives:**

- To support full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to create conditions that support a peaceful post-referenda period.

- To facilitate a political agreement that addresses the underlying causes and consequences of genocide in Darfur, stops ongoing violence, including the proxy war with Chad, and allows the return of displaced persons to their home areas.

- To pursue a national engagement strategy that effectively supports political stability, enhances internal security, improves democratic governance, and promotes economic development for all of Sudan.

  - **North:** To achieve a policy change in Khartoum by presenting the National Congress Party with two paths to US-Sudan relations—one that provides opportunities to improve relations based on verifiable policy changes and actions on the ground in support of these objectives, and another that will result in negative consequences based on no change in policy or no improvement on the ground.

  - **South:** To enable the Government of Southern Sudan to function as a capable, stable governing body either autonomous government within a united Sudan or as an independent country able to protect itself and its people from internal and external threats and play a constructive role in the region.

  - **Three Areas:** To support conflict prevention in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile.
To maintain the fragile peace and provide political and economic opportunities.

- To increase and enhance cooperation with Sudan on counter-terrorism and regional security, to include an end to Sudan’s efforts to instigate crises abroad and align with negative actors.

Assumptions:

- The NCP is primarily motivated by its interest in retaining power but assuming this is not threatened, it also strongly desires to improve its bilateral relationship with the United States and its standing in the world.
- The political, economic and security situation in all of Sudan’s regions are linked and must be considered in a comprehensive and integrated manner.
- Implementation of the CPA is necessary to maintain peace between North and South, but is not sufficient to guarantee peace.
- If the 2011 referenda are credible, the South will vote to secede and Abyei residents will vote to join the South. Secession of the South would require a substantially increased nation-building effort resulting in a high degree of US commitment and leadership.
- Continued humanitarian assistance will be required until stability and security is significantly improved in Sudan.
- Given to current level of progress and international efforts, the security situation in Southern Sudan is likely to get worse before it gets better.

Strategic Approach

- US policy should:
  1. Leverage US relations with the National Congress Party’s allies and foes to achieve our policy goals,
  2. Pursue a national engagement strategy in Sudan that takes advantage of its desire to improved bilateral relations with the United States—at a rate set by Khartoum (i.e., the faster we see real change, the faster we can unwind sanctions and restrictive legislation).
  3. Integrate all elements of US national power in a coordinated and comprehensive manner to achieve strategic objectives, with an emphasis on:
     - Political engagement with all parties to achieve lasting stability,
     - Governance enablers that prevent a failed region and/or state,
     - Security enhancements that benefit all the Sudanese people,
     - Economic development for all regions that result in viability and prosperity.

Strategy for Full CPA Implementation and Post Referenda Peace and Security
To support full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to create conditions that support a peaceful post-referenda period.

Political:
- Conduct trilateral discussions (NCP, SPLM, and United States) to resolve outstanding CPA milestones such as the Abyei border, North-South border and post-referenda wealth sharing, political and security arrangements.
- Prepare for February 2010 elections and January 2011 referenda with internal and external benchmarks for census resolution, legislation, voter registration and education, polling place administration, balloting mechanics, international and local domestic election monitoring.
- Reestablish the “Troika,” consisting of United States, UK, and Norway.
- Organize and conduct CPA Signers Conference to restore the passion of Naivasha and the cooperative attitude of 2005.
- Encourage both parties to create conditions to make unity attractive as required by the CPA.

Governance:
- Support credible national elections that further legitimize the CPA by bringing in additional parties in to the process. Credible elections also provide much needed legitimacy for the Government of Southern Sudan looking toward the 2011 referendum for self-determination.
- Improve civilian law enforcement and justice system.

Security:
- Ensure that Southern Sudan’s security capacity is adequate to deter the North in the wake of a referendum or other Northern aggression.
- Support the integration of the Northern and Southern militaries as called for in the CPA.

Economic:
- Ensure that CPA mechanisms for wealth sharing between North and South, and for Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are maintained between now and the referendum, and help the parties reach an agreement on post-referenda resource issues.
- Demonstrate the value of continued peace through the provision of services and peace dividend particularly in fragile border areas.

Strategy for Darfur
Objective: To facilitate a political agreement that addresses the underlying causes and consequences of the conflict in Darfur, stops ongoing violence in the region, including the proxy war with Chad, and allows the return of displaced persons to their home areas.

Political:
- Support AU/UN Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole’s leadership of the Darfur peace process.
- Support the current round of talks in Doha with facilitation by the Qatari Minister of State Al-Mahmoud, to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and a draft political framework between the GoS and JEM while assisting to unify non-JEM armed movements (SLA/Minni, AW, and others) for more comprehensive negotiations.
- Support the electoral process as a means to achieve power-sharing to compliment what is achieved through negotiations.
- Support the Doha-Libya process to end the Chad-Sudan proxy war.
- Establish a political channel for dialogue with Darfur's Arab tribes independent of the NCP.

Governance:
- Prepare Darfur to participate in national elections and potential power sharing. Design confidence-building steps to implement a negotiated resolution that brings civil society groups and political parties into the electoral process.
- Provide support to help Darfur develop stable governing institutions that are capable of providing for its own people.

Security:
- Work with Libya, Sudan, and Chad to minimize support (especially arms) to rebel groups under their influence.
- Assist UNAMID to fully deploy and strengthen with needed capabilities to protect civilians and deploy a ceasefire monitoring mission.
- Provide direct US support in coordination with the French to enable UNAMID and MINUCAT to monitor the border areas and expand mandates as necessary.

Economic:
- Restore and strengthen NGO operations in Darfur to save lives and to mitigate the humanitarian crisis.
- Prepare for the process of voluntary return or resettlement for displaced Darfuris, reconstruction and development—once security conditions permit.
- Build regional capacity in Darfur as the region transitions from humanitarian to development assistance.
- Encourage economic development by incentivizing a ceasefire with development projects.
- Plan for contingencies in Darfur, and develop appropriate responses which would include deterrents for expected intransigence and implementation failures on the part of the Government of Sudan or the armed movements.

National Engagement Strategy
To pursue a national engagement strategy that effectively supports political stability, enhances internal security, improves democratic governance, and promotes economic development for all of Sudan.

Strategy for North
Objective: To achieve a policy change in Khartoum by presenting the National Congress Party with two paths to US-Sudan relations—one that provides opportunities to improve relations based on verifiable policy changes and actions on the ground in support of these objectives, and another that will result in negative consequences based on no change in policy or no improvement on the ground.

Political:
• To secure a change of behavior by the ruling National Congress Party that results in full implementation of existing agreements and allows for economic and political resources to be more equitably distributed throughout Sudan.

Governance:
• Ensure Northern Sudan with or without the South are on a path toward democratic transformation including legal and institutional reform and an active and competitive political environment.

Security:
• Pressure Khartoum to adopt a policy for dealing with conflicts in marginalized areas through political and economic engagement rather than military means.

Economic:
• Provide increased economic opportunities in Northern Sudan to include diminishing sanctions provided that Khartoum’s policies and actions improve as described above and also open the door for marginalized areas to equally benefit.

Southern Sudan
Objective: To enable the Government of Southern Sudan to function as a capable, stable governing body either autonomous government within a united Sudan or as an independent country able to protect itself and its people from internal and external threats and play a constructive role in the region.

Political:
• Support nascent government of Southern Sudan’s right to exist as either an autonomous region within a united Sudan or an independent state as decided by the people of Southern Sudan.
• Ensure that the results of a credible referendum are accepted by Southern Sudan’s neighbors and the international community.
• Prevent a potential independent Southern Sudan from becoming a destabilizing influence in the region.

Governance:
• Prepare for possible Southern independence by building government institutions and governance capacity building.
• Support South-South conflict prevention and mitigation.

Security:
• Help to build lean, agile, and mobile professional SPLA forces capable of stopping tribal conflicts.
• Increase mil-to-mil cooperation and/or training, especially IMET and senior staff training courses.
• Improve and/or construct C-130 capable runway in key sectors in the north of Southern Sudan.
• Provide a riverine capacity for the SPLA to assist in peacekeeping and governance functions.

Economic:
• Accelerate nation building efforts to prepare Southern Sudan to assume its place within a united Sudan or to function as a stable, independent state that can meet the needs of its people.

**Strategy for Three Areas**
Objective: Support conflict prevention in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile.

**Political:**
• Ensure Abyei residents have the opportunity to vote in their referendum and the results of a credible referendum are implemented.
• Ensure the residents of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile have the opportunity to participate in a meaningful dialogue on their political status through CPA-mandated popular consultations.

**Governance:**
• Support capable governance by the Abyei administration.
• Support the integration of SPLM and NCP controlled areas in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile under a single, capable administration.

**Security:**
• Press the North and South to support conflict prevention in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile.
• Plan for contingencies in the Three Areas and ready appropriate responses to include deterrents for expected intransigence and implementation failures.
• Push for the completion of troop redeployment as per the CPA.

**Economic:**
• Provide economic opportunities that demonstrate the benefit of continued peace.

**Strategy for the East**
Objective: Maintain the fragile peace in eastern Sudan and provide political and economic opportunities.

**Political:**
• Provide an international forum for the airing of Eastern Sudanese concerns and grievances.
• Support Eastern Front (Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions) unity and coordination with the SPLM.

**Governance:**
• Build government institutions and governance capacity building in ostensibly Eastern Front ruled areas such as Kassala.

**Security:**
• Press the NCP to completely fulfill job and assistance guarantees made to former Eastern Front fighters and war wounded in the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA).
• Build up anti-smuggling capacity in Eastern Sudan and regional cooperation against smuggling in the Red Sea.
Economic:
• Provide a tangible peace dividend through the provision of targeted services and development in the East.

Regional Stability
To increase and enhance cooperation with Sudan on counter-terrorism and regional security, to include an end to Sudan’s efforts to instigate crises abroad and align with negative actors:
• Continue counter-terrorism support to the US.
• Prevent Sudan’s strategic alignment toward negative state and non-state actors.
• End or verify the end of Sudan’s support for conflicts to include HAMAS, Chadian rebels, and the Lord’s Resistance Army and.

ATTACHMENTS
1. Incentives and Disincentives
2. Internal and External Stakeholders and points of leverage

ANNEX I
Internal and External Stakeholders and points of leverage

Internal and External Players:

- A workable strategy for Sudan must include a pathway for reconciliation and resolution of underlying issues for the following internal groups:
  - Government of National Unity (National Congress party and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement).
  - Darfur rebel groups (New Justice and Equality Movement, SLA-AW (Abdul Wahid), SLA-MM (Mini Minawi), SLA-Unity).
  - Other armed groups (Chadian rebels in Darfur supported by Sudan, Government-sponsored armed militias (including Janjaweed), autonomous armed groups, and bandits.
  - Other players (Umma party, DUP party, civil society groups, and local tribal councils).

- Many countries in Africa and around the globe have historical ties to Sudan that continue today; others have more recent links based on economic trade and/or arms deals. External linkages that must be factored into the calculus include:
  - Forces in neighboring countries (Chadian military forces and the Lord’s Resistance Army).
  - External support to rebels groups from Chad, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Eritrea.
  - Neighboring states with political ties (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, CAR, Chad, and Libya).
- Regional partners, such as the African Union (Mbeki's group and AU/UN mediator) and Arab League.
- International players, including Qatar (Doha process), EU, CPA signers, and countries with envoys, United Nations (UNMIS, UNAMID, WFP, UNHCR, and OCHA and UNSC), and countries with strong historical and economic ties (e.g., FR, UK, NO, China, and Iran).