

October 31, 2012

Executive Secretary
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
Attn: Mandatory Review Appeals
c/o Information Security Oversight Office
National Archives and Records Administration
7th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 500
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Panelists,

This is a formal appeal of a denial of mandatory review for declassification in accordance with Article 8 (A)(3)(b)(i) of ISCAP Bylaws, which states that ISCAP will consider appeals in the event that the appellant has not received "an initial decision on the request for mandatory declassification review from the agency within one year of its filing."

On October 31, 2011, I filed an MDR with the Bush Library for the folder titled "Reports to the President – War Scare Report 1990." The OA/ID box number is CF01830-020, and totals 110 pages. My request was acknowledged by the Bush Library (2012-0238-MR) on February 22, 2012, at which point I was informed that the request was forwarded to another agency. Since then I have received no further correspondences from either agency.

In contemplating this appeal, please consider the following arguments:

First and foremost, 50 USC 431 (d)(3) specifically provides that "records in exempted operational files that have been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not exempted under subsection (a) and which have been returned to exempted operational files for sole retention shall be subject to search and review." Documents on Able Archer 83 and the 1983 "War Scare" have already been released from the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA. Thus, the information I am requesting regarding ABLE ARCHER has already been publically disseminated.

- A CIA SNIE about the 1983 "War Scare" (SNIE 11-10-84/JX, "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities") has already been declassified. **(Attachment 1)**
- In 2003, one of the SNIE's authors, former CIA officer Fritz W. Ermarth, wrote about the document in question ("Report to the President – War Scare Report 1990"). He wrote, "If it hasn't been, her report should be declassified as much as possible." Please consider Mr. Ermarth's recommendation for declassification. **(Attachment 2)**
- Unclassified and declassified CIA articles from the journal, *Studies in Intelligence* have been released to the public. These articles describe in detail the events surrounding the "War Scare" of 1983, including psychological operations conducted against the Soviet Union by American military and intelligence agencies. **(Attachment 3 and 4)** They also describe in detail the Soviet espionage Operation RYaN (or VRYaN). The operation has also appeared expensively in

literature. Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher Andrew have written extensively on the subject in *Instructions from the Center* (in which they reproduce Soviet Memos on Operation RyAN) (**Attachment 5**) and *KGB: The Inside Story its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. Former CIA Director Robert Gates, also wrote about Soviet espionage activities in his book *From the Shadows* (**Attachment 6**).

- In a Declassified Defense Department Report Soviet Generals spoke candidly on their perceptions of the "War Scare." This report has been declassified and released (**Attachment 7**).
- The Air Force has declassified various after action reports of Able Archer 83 (**Attachment 8**).
- Many former US officials have written about the 1983 "War Scare," and much of the classified information is already in the public domain. See, for example: Jack Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*; Robert McFarlane, *Special Trust*; George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*; Robert Gates *From the Shadows*; and Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition*.
- Please also note that the Reagan Presidential Library has declassified documents containing reports from sources within the Soviet Union describing the 1983 "War Scare" (**Attachment 9**). I do not object to the withholding of source names, but please release the content of source observations.


Additionally, in regard to those documents or portions of documents denied under (b)(1), as the existence of these records has been acknowledged by the aforementioned agencies, it is difficult to imagine how the entirety of these records could be exempt from disclosure. The Freedom of Information Act specifically requires that all reasonably segregable, nonexempt material in a document be released. Please conduct a line by line review for segregability, as names of officials or other identifying agency information could be deleted while declassifying other portions of the documents.

Lastly, in consideration of this appeal please note that Executive Order 13526 states that "no information may remain classified indefinitely." Certainly documents about a Cold War "War Scare" which occurred nearly 30 years ago should be considered ripe for declassification and will benefit the public's interest.

I have included my correspondence with the Bush Library for your convenience.

I look forward to receiving your response.

Sincerely yours,



Lauren Harper

Bush Library Correspondence



Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com>

1990 PFIAB FOIA request - sent October, 2011

6 messages

Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com>

To: Library.Bush@nara.gov

Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 1:18 PM

Good Afternoon,

My name is Lauren Harper, and I spoke to several people two weeks ago regarding the status of an MDR request I sent to your office in late October, 2011.

The subject of the request was for a folder titled "Reports to the President - War Scare Report 1990". The OA/ID box number is CF01830-020, and totals 110 pages.

I believe you received the request by the beginning of November, and I am wondering if you can please confirm a few things for my records. If you could, please let me know:

- 1) the date you received my request on,
- 2) what the reference number is for my request, and
- 3) what agency maintains the documents (I believe the person I last spoke with - Richard, I believe - said the documents were with another agency).

Thank you very much in advance for all your help, it's much appreciated. Please don't hesitate to contact me for any clarifications, etc. regarding this request.

Best,

Lauren

Zachary Roberts <Zachary.Roberts@nara.gov>

To: leharper@gmail.com

Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 2:09 PM

Cc: Library Bush <Library.Bush@nara.gov>

Ms. Harper,

I have put a call into the ISCAP office and the agency in which we forwarded the request to for information. I am trying to determine whether you can appeal the non-action from the date that we received the request from you or the date in which the agency we forwarded it to received the request. I am sorry for the slow response, but I wanted to have as much information as possible before I replied to you. Under Article VIII of the ISCAP bylaws, you have appeal rights under (MDR) when:

3. The appellant has (a) Received a final agency decision denying his or her request; or (b) Not received (i) an initial decision on the request for mandatory declassification review from the agency within one year of its filing, or (ii) a final decision on an internal agency appeal within 180 days of the filing of the appeal;

At that point you have 60 days to file an appeal. I will contact you as soon as I have an answer on which date to use for the one year filing deadline for an agency response. Again, I apologize for the delay in response and please let me know if you have any other questions.

Sincerely,

Zachary Roberts
Mandatory Review Archivist
George Bush Presidential Library
National Archives and Records Administration

>>> Library Bush 2/22/2012 12:49 PM >>>
Zach or Liz,

I'm not sure who would be able to help Ms. Harper. The # is 2012-0238-MR and the date it was processed is 10/31/11. I don't have the other info. If you'd like me to respond please let me know!
thanks
Rachael

>>> Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com> 2/22/2012 12:18 PM >>>
[Quoted text hidden]

Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com>
To: Zachary Roberts <Zachary.Roberts@nara.gov>

Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 2:12 PM

Dear Zachary,

Thank you very much, I appreciate your response and look forward to hearing from you regarding the date.

All the best,

Lauren

[Quoted text hidden]

Zachary Roberts <Zachary.Roberts@nara.gov>
To: Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com>

Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 11:46 AM

Ms. Harper,

I have talked to the ISCAP and they have informed me that the date you made the request to the library will be used as the deadline for filing an appeal as a result of a non-response. Therefore, your MDR appeal can be filed during the 60 day window after October 31, 2012. Please let me know if you have any other questions and I apologize for the delay in corresponding with you.

Sincerely,

Zachary Roberts
Mandatory Review Archivist
George Bush Presidential Library
National Archives and Records Administration

>>> Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com> 2/22/2012 1:12 PM >>>
[Quoted text hidden]

Lauren Harper <leharper@gmail.com>
To: Nate Jones <foiadesk@gwu.edu>

Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 11:51 AM

Director of Central Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



Special National Intelligence Estimate

Implications of Recent Soviet Military- Political Activities

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

~~Top Secret~~

SNIE 11-10-84/JX
~~TCS 6347/84~~

18 May 1984

Copy 7 1

~~Top Secret~~

SNIE 11-10-84

IMPLICATIONS OF
RECENT SOVIET MILITARY-
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

~~TCS 6347 84~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; new military measures termed responsive to NATO INF deployments; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

- We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues. There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet "war scare" propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.
- We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

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- The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.
- Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which have become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.
- In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about the increased danger of nuclear war. This theme has appeared in public pronouncements by Soviet political and military leaders, in statements by high officials targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, in internal communications, and in other channels. Soviet authorities have declared that Washington is preparing for war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSR will not give in to nuclear blackmail or other military pressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleled the Soviet campaign to derail US INF deployment. It continues to this day, although at a somewhat lower intensity in recent months than in late 1983.

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces, large-scale military exercises, and several other noteworthy events:

- *INF response*: Start of construction of additional SS-20 bases following Andropov's announcement on 24 November 1983 of termination of the 20-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments opposite NATO; initiation [] of patrols by E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines off the US coast; [] forward deployment [] of long-range missile-carrying D-class SSBNs; and the start of deployment [] of 925-km range SS-12/22 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and continued propaganda and active measures against INF deployment.
- *Response to NATO exercise*: Assumption by Soviet air units in Germany and Poland [] of high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces as NATO conducted "Able Archer-83," a nuclear release command post exercise.
- *Soviet exercises*: Large-scale exercise activity during spring 1984 [] featuring the multiple launches of SS-20s and SLBMs; survivability training including the dispersal of [] operational Northern Fleet SSBNs supported by

a large number of ships []

- *Berlin air corridors*: Periodic Soviet imposition beginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flight altitudes for the entire length of one or more of the Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change in the rules governing air access to Berlin.
- *Afghanistan*: Deployment in mid-April of several airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of a major spring offensive into the Panisher Valley, and initiation on 21 April for the first time of high-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over 105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in the USSR.
- *East Asia*: Deployment in mid-November 1983 of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for the first time; positioning of both Soviet operational aircraft carriers for the first time simultaneously in Asian waters in March 1984; and the first joint Soviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exercises on the coast of Vietnam in April.
- *Caribbean*: A small combined Soviet/Cuban naval exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban antisubmarine drills.
- *Troop rotation*: Initiation of the airlift portion of Soviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe 10 days later in April than this has occurred for the past five years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk about the increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Soviet military activities listed above constitute a pattern of behavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals.

Possible Explanations

3. Specifically, in examining the facts we address five explanatory hypotheses:
 - a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the military activities have been consciously orchestrated

across the board to achieve political effects through posturing and propaganda. The object has been to discredit US defense and foreign policies; to put Washington on notice that the USSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even dangerous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming; to maintain an atmosphere of tension conducive to pressure by “peace” groups on Western governments; and, if possible, to undercut President Reagan’s reelection prospects.

- b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington’s rhetoric, US military procurement and R&D goals, and US military exercises and reconnaissance activities near Soviet territory—which have excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscow to flex its own military responsiveness, signaling to Washington that it is prepared for any eventuality.
- c. Moscow itself is preparing for threatening military action in the future requiring a degree of surprise. The real aim behind its recent actions is not to alarm, but to desensitize the United States to higher levels of Soviet military activity—thus masking intended future moves and reducing US warning time.
- d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeying in the Soviet leadership have lessened policy control at the top and permitted a hardline faction, under abnormally high military influence, to pursue its own agenda, which—intentionally or not—looks more confrontational to the observer.
- e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linked with the talk about war and are basically unrelated events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War

4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarmist statements and propaganda about the danger of nuclear war provides a starting point for evaluating recent Soviet military activities.

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestionably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

- To create a tense international climate that fosters “peace” activism in the West and public pressure on Western governments to backtrack on INF deployment, reduce commitments to NATO, and distance themselves from US foreign policy objectives.

- To elicit concessions in arms control negotiations by manipulating the anxieties of Western political leaders about Soviet thinking.
- To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pact and reinforce Soviet pressure for higher military outlays by non-Soviet member states.

The overall propaganda campaign against the United States has recently been supplemented with the boycott of the Olympic Games.

6. The talk about the danger of nuclear war also has a clear domestic propaganda function: to rationalize demands on the Soviet labor force, continued consumer deprivation, and ideological vigilance in the society. This message is also being disseminated [

[] within the Soviet and East European [] bureaucracies, []

7. The central question remains: what are the real perceptions at top decisionmaking levels of the regime? Our information about such leadership perceptions is largely inferential. Nevertheless, we have confidence in several broad conclusions.

8. First, we believe that there is a serious concern with US defense and foreign policy trends. There is a large measure of agreement among both political and military leaders that the United States has undertaken a global offensive against Soviet interests. Central to this perception is the overall scope and momentum of the US military buildup. Fundamentally, the Soviets are concerned that US programs will undercut overall Soviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in this context, Moscow condemns INF deployment as a telling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at “regaining military superiority.” *The threat here is not immediate, but longer term.* However, the ability of the United States to carry out its longer term plans is questioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassure domestic audiences but also because they genuinely see some uncertainty in the ability of the United States to sustain its military effort.

9. Secondly, in our judgment *the nature of the concern is as much political as it is military.* There is a healthy respect for US technological prowess and anxiety that this could in due course be used against the USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that the United States might pursue an arms competition that could over time strain the Soviet economy and disrupt the regime’s ability to manage competing military and

civilian requirements. More immediately, the Soviets are concerned that the United States could achieve a shift in the overall balance of military power which, through more interventionist foreign policies, could effectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence in world affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains. From this perspective, the United States' actions in Central America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southern Africa are seen as a token of what could be expected on a broader scale in the future.

10. Third, and most important for this assessment, we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees an imminent threat of war with the United States. It is conceivable that the stridency of Soviet "war scare" propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about a near-future attack on them. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions in Washington combined with elements of their own military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of war more forcefully than others, suggesting that there may have been differences on this score—or at least how to talk about the issue—over the past half year.

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to be very strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leadership does not perceive an imminent danger of war. Our reasons are the following:

- The Soviets have not initiated the military readiness moves they would have made if they believed a US attack were imminent.
- In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscow over the past six months the Soviets have neither made any direct threats connected with regional or other issues nor betrayed any fear of a US attack.
- Obligatory public assertions of the viability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled by private assertions within regime circles by Soviet experts that there is currently a stable nuclear balance in which the United States does not have sufficient strength for a first strike.
- In recent months top leaders, including the Minister of Defense and Politburo member Dmitriy Ustinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclear war danger, noting that it should not be "overdramatized" (although Ustinov's recent Victory

Day speech returned to a somewhat shriller tone). At the same time, high foreign affairs officials have challenged the thesis that the United States can unleash nuclear war and have emphasized constraints on such a course of action.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is at present far from having accomplished all of its force buildup objectives.

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. *Intimidation?* It is possible that some of the Soviet military activities listed above were intended, as ancillary to their military objectives, to intimidate selected audiences:

- The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment of strike aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exercises have displayed military muscle to China.
- The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could be seen not only as an operation against the insurgency but also as an implicit threat to neighboring countries—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.
- In mounting large-scale and visible exercises (such as the March-April Northern and Baltic Fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea) Moscow would understand that they could be perceived as threatening by NATO audiences.

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have also been designed to convey an impression to the West that the world is a more dangerous place following US INF deployment and that the USSR is making good on its predeployment threats to counter with deployments of its own.

14. There is uncertainty within the Intelligence Community on the origins of Soviet behavior with respect to the Berlin air corridors. It is possible that Soviet action was a deliberate reminder of Western vulnerability. Alternatively, airspace requirements for exercises may have motivated this move. The low-key manner in which the Soviets have handled the issue does not suggest that they have been interested in squeezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process of unilaterally changing the corridor flight rules and thereby reminding the West of their ultimate power to control access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in late April and early May, the Soviets declared new air corridor restrictions, indicating that this effort contin-

ues. In a possibly related, very recent development, the Soviets declared tight new restrictions on travel in East Germany by allied missions located in Potsdam.

15. In a number of instances we have observed the Soviets avoiding threatening behavior or propaganda when they might have acted otherwise, perhaps in some cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommitment. For example, they:

- Never publicly acknowledged the incident in November 1983 in which a Soviet attack submarine was disabled off the US coast as it attempted to evade a US ASW ship, and moved the sub quickly out of Cuba where it had come for emergency repairs.

—

- Took no tangible action in March when one of their merchant tankers hit a mine off Nicaragua.
- Notified Washington of multiple missile launches in early April as a gesture of "good will."

16. *Reaction to US actions?* The new Soviet deployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coasts and the forward deployment of SS-12/22 missiles in Eastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INF deployment, which the Soviets claim is very threatening to them—although the threat perceived here by Moscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclear attack.

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimes embody a "reactive" element.

A key issue is whether this counterexercising takes on the character of actual preparation for response to a perceived threat of possible US attack.

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to "Able Archer-83." This was a NATO command post exercise held in November 1983 that was larger than previous "Able Archer" exercises.

The elaborate Soviet

reaction to this recent exercise included:

the placing of Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland in heightened readiness

Alert measures included increasing the number of fighter-interceptors on strip alert,

Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack.

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoing US military activities, such as exercises and reconnaissance operations, depends on how they assess their scope, the trends they may display, and above all the hostile intent that might be read into them. We are at present uncertain as to what novelty or possible military objectives the Soviets may have read into recent US and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operations because a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red" and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. The Soviets have, as in the past, ascribed the same threatening character to these activities as to US military buildup plans, that is, calling them preparations for war. But they have not charged a US intent to prepare for imminent war.

20. *Preparation for surprise military action?* There is one case in our set of military activities that might conceivably be ascribed to the "masking" of threatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in five years, the airlift portion of the troop rotation in Eastern Europe began on 25 April rather than 15 April. This may have reflected a change in training and manning practices or the introduction of new airlift procedures. The change of timing of the airlift portion of the annual troop rotation could also be a step toward blurring a warning indicator—a comprehensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations which would prevent degradation of the forces by withdrawing trained men. But the rail portion of the rotation began ahead of schedule and, in any event, the pattern of rotation was within broad historical norms.

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assemble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military

District, there was some concern that it might represent masking of preparations for operations against Pakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the most obvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the force is clearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was never suitably deployed for use against Iran. We believe that, although the force could be used against Pakistan, a major air offensive against Pakistan without forewarning or precursor political pressure would serve no Soviet purpose and is extremely unlikely.

22. [

23. *Policy impact of leadership weakness or factionalism?* The Soviet Union has had three General Secretaries in as many years and, given the age and frail health of Chernenko, yet another change can be expected in a few years. This uncertain political environment could be conducive to increased maneuvering within the leadership and magnification of policy disagreements. Some have argued that either the Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy faction led by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influence than it could were Chernenko a stronger figure. Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy great authority in the regime and military priorities remain high for the whole leadership, we do not believe that the Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusually heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do we believe that any faction is exerting influence other than through Politburo consensus. Consequently we

reject the hypothesis that weak central leadership accounts for the Soviet actions examined here.

24. *A comprehensive pattern?* In our view, the military activities under examination here do tend to have their own military rationales and the exercises are integrated by long-term Soviet force development plans. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. The different leadtimes involved in initiating various activities argue against orchestration for a political purpose. A number of the activities represent routine training or simply refine previous exercises. In other cases, the activities respond to circumstances that could not have been predicted ahead of time.

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. At the same time, Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalate tensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confrontation with the United States.

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorates and political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect on various audiences (notably INF "counterdeployments," the naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia).

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nuclear war and Soviet military activities indicates a very low probability that the top Soviet leadership is seriously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclear war, although it is quite possible that official propaganda and vigilance campaigning have generated an atmosphere of anxiety throughout the military and security apparatus. The available evidence suggests that none of the military activities discussed in this Estimate have been generated by a real fear of imminent US attack.

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises combine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heighten overall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely that they are intended to mask current or near-future preparations by the USSR for some directly hostile military initiative. Moreover, we are confident that the activities we have examined in this Estimate would

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not successfully mask all the extensive logistic and other military preparations the Soviets would have to commence well before a realistic offensive initiative against any major regional security target.

29. Both the talk of nuclear war and the military activities address the concerns of a longer time horizon. Moscow's inability to elicit major concessions in the arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—most important by far—the long-term prospect of a buildup of US strategic and conventional military forces, have created serious concern in the Kremlin. We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeed believe that the United States is attempting to restore a military posture that severely undercuts the Soviet power position in the world.

30. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term Western arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the military challenge posed by the United States. Warning of such actions could be ambiguous.

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject to three main sources of uncertainty. We have inadequate information about:

- a. The current mind-set of the Soviet political leadership, which has seen some of its optimistic international expectations from the Brezhnev era disappointed.
- b. The ways in which military operations and foreign policy tactics may be influenced by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin.
- c. The Soviet reading of our own military operations, that is, current reconnaissance and exercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

~~Top Secret~~

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②

Observations on the „War Scare“ of 1983 From an Intelligence Perch

By Fritz W. Ermarth

We are “celebrating” the 20th anniversary of the “war scare” of 1983, one of the most fascinating and enigmatic episodes of the Cold War. This has occasioned a number of commentaries, publication of newly available documents especially from the Eastern side, and recollection of previous histories on Johnsons Russia List, the Parallel History Project, and others. Numerous writers have characterized the “war scare” as the most dangerous period in the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis.

My view of this episode is somewhat different as I shall explain below. I apologize to historians who already know this material; but I think it may be new to many interested readers, and, I hope, contains some fresh points of use to historians.

On 2 January 1984 I rejoined CIA after some years at the NSC staff and in private industry to become the NIO/USSR. Almost immediately, I was directed by Robert Gates, then holding the positions of Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, to undertake a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on all aspects of the palpably tense situation in US-Soviet relations, focusing primarily on a variety of unusual or potentially threatening military activities by the Soviet side.

Doing this SNIE provided most of my perspective on the “war scare”, then and now. Entitled “Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities” (SNIE 11-10-84/JX, dated 18 May 1984), this document has since been almost entirely declassified. From the main text, numerous short passages have been excised because of sensitivity with respect to intelligence sources and methods. Still, it displays the broad range of issues we addressed: military moves, but also propaganda trends, diplomatic developments, Soviet leadership perceptions; and amply discloses the evidence and reasoning that led to our conclusions. The Key Judgments presenting those conclusions have been declassified entirely. They represent the burden of my case, and deserve citation in full:

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues. There have been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet "war scare" propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.

We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.

Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions – even at some heightened risk – that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decision making processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and – to some extent – more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.

Some further comments and observations are in order:

When I started to preside over this estimate (the real work and expertise came from analysts all over the intelligence community, including in this case overseas commands), I had been detached from the details of our intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces since the mid-1970s. I was astonished and enormously gratified to learn how much it had improved in the intervening years. Some recent commentaries (notably in PHP) on the “war scare” have revealed how much the East knew about NATO war plans and posture. In January 1984, I learned that we knew a lot about Soviet and Warsaw Pact war plans. In effect, we had many of their military cook books. This permitted us to judge confidently the difference between when they might be brewing up for a real military confrontation or, as one wag put it, just rattling their pots and pans. It allowed us to distinguish between isolated if purposeful military moves, mere anomalies, and real military preparations for large scale warfare. As the Key Judgments make clear, we saw the former, not the latter.

For intelligence history buffs, it is worth noting that this was an episode where classical human intelligence operations (espionage) contributed crucially to the vital cause of keeping the Cold War cold. Much of our knowledge was based on documentary materials collected by spies. Another point of possible interest to his-

torians: Note that the date on this SNIE is 18 May 1984 (11-10-84/JX is a serial number, not a date). By this time, the judgments in this estimate had long since been reported to and ingested by the leadership of the intelligence community and by top policymakers. And the “war scare” had largely passed. In a sense, the document itself, as are many nation intelligence estimates, was somewhat for the record. In cases like this, the process of producing such estimates is what is important. That process double checks data, triple checks judgments, and surfaces disputes which need to be scrubbed down. Had the analysts around the community on whose judgments and expertise this estimate rested been more alarmed, we would have produced it much faster.

In later years, I got personal confirmation that our conclusions were on the mark, namely that what animated Soviet behavior and discontent was not fear of an imminent military confrontation but worry that Soviet economic and technological weaknesses and Reagan policies were turning the “correlation of forces” against them on an historic scale. This was the essence of a long conversation I had, after he’d come in from the cold, with Oleg Gordievskiy, who had been a very worried observer in 1983. He noted, interestingly, that intelligence professionals on the Soviet side did not take seriously the much ballyhooed warning system called VRYAN or RYAN; it seemed more like a political instrument to energize the geriatric Politburo.

At the close of the decade, while researching his book on the end of the Cold War, Don Oberdorfer interviewed the late Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. The Marshal reported that he’d never heard of “Able Archer”, the NATO nuclear CPX that supposedly triggered the alerting of a nuclear-capable strike fighter regiment in the GDR and is widely cited as the peak of the “war scare.” At the time Akhromeyev was chief of the main operations directorate of the Soviet General Staff. If it had been cause for serious alarm, he above all people would have known about it and been in the chain of command that ordered a response. I understand that Ray Garthoff drew similar blanks from interviews with senior Soviet political figures in his researches. Evidently, the “war scare” did not involve real fear of war on the Soviet side, as we indeed concluded.

One of the more worrisome features of this whole affair is alluded to in the last paragraph of the Key Judgments cited above: “...our inability...to conduct a detailed assessment of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations.” We had an abundance of intelligence on the Red side, but our ability to assess it was hampered by lack of knowledge about potentially threatening Blue activities we knew or suspected were going on. This is a classic difficulty and danger for

Soviet internal weaknesses throughout this period. Before long this process produced Gorbachev, uskoryeniye, perestroika, glasnost, and the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Bloc, and the USSR.

So I contend, we got it right: The US did not intend to attack the USSR, and Moscow perceived no such intention. Moscow did not intend to attack nor start a confrontation that could lead to war. Our getting it right was important and had important consequences. Had we got it wrong by letting all the sound and fury of the time distract us from the hard facts, we might have had a real war scare and possibly worse.

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intelligence, particularly at the national level. Our leaders in intelligence and defense must strive to overcome it, particularly in confrontational situations.

In the late 1980s, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) directed a thorough, highly classified review of the case. It was conducted by a very able young lady named Nina Stewart. It was lengthy and concluded by indicting us, the authors of the SNIE, for being dangerously relaxed. I retorted that we were being indicted for being right, alas, not the first or last time this has happened in intelligence work. If it hasn't already been, her report should be declassified as much as possible. I'll stick by the conclusions of the SNIE. But the historical work done since then suggests Nina had a point, and it is worth pursuing further.

Although the "war scare" was not, in my view, as scary as it seemed at the time or as depicted in belatedly-revealed contemporaneous materials (themselves artifacts of the misplaced "scare"), it was still a seminal and very interesting period of the Cold War.

On the US side, it definitely helped persuade Ronald Reagan that the time had come for a new opening with the Soviets and new probes for what he called real détente. He made his first move in a major speech in early January 1984. This was reciprocated by Chernyenko in March. Later that year, Gromyko came to Washington and a whole new ball game commenced.

Some have written that this change of tack by Reagan was the product of pressuring by the First Lady and Michael Deaver with an eye to the up-coming elections. My own sense of the President from later interactions was that it was more the product of his own actor's sense of timing. By early 1984, he'd turned the rhetorical and ideological tables on Moscow, had got America "standing tall" again in terms of military image (e.g., budgets, SDI, etc), and concluded the time had come to start looking for deals that would make the relationship with the Soviets saner and safer. His ear for domestic politics surely played a role. But his eye was on the strategic competition.

I suspect that the "war scare" played an even more important role on the Soviet side by intensifying the leadership's introspection and debates about the need for and possibility of internal reforms that would restore the competitiveness of the Soviet system, and also the need for foreign policy moves that would mute or keep at bay the American challenge. Marshal Ogarkov was sounding the tocsin about the military dangers of

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Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm?

The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations

Ben B. Fischer

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Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation in the world as explosive, and hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 1980s.

*Mikhail Gorbachev,
February 1986*

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Reagan was repeatedly
compared to Hitler and
accused of “fanning the
flames of war”—a more
sinister image than
Andropov as a Red Darth
Vader.
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US-Soviet relations had come full circle in 1983. Europeans were declaring the outbreak of a Cold War II, and President Mitterrand compared the situation to the 1962 Cuban crisis and the 1948 Berlin blockade. Such fears were exaggerated. Nowhere in the world were the superpowers squared off in a conflict likely to erupt into war. But a modern-day Rip Van Winkle waking up that year would not have noticed much change in the international political landscape or realized that a substantial period of détente had come and gone while he slept.

The second Cold War was mainly a war of words. In March, President Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the “focus of evil in the world,” as an “evil empire.” General Secretary Andropov suggested Reagan was insane and a liar. Then things got nasty. Following Andropov’s lead and no doubt in his direction, the Soviet media launched a verbal offensive of a kind not seen since Stalin that far surpassed Reagan’s broadsides. Reagan was repeatedly compared to Hitler and accused of “fanning the flames of war”—a more sinister image than Andropov as a Red Darth Vader.

The Soviet War Scare

Such rhetoric was the consequence rather than the cause of tension, but frightening words masked real fears. The Hitler analogy was more than an insult and may have been a Freudian slip, because war was on the minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow was in the midst of a “war scare” that had two distinct phases and two different dimensions—one concealed in the world of clandestine intelligence operations since 1981, and the other revealed in the Soviet media two years later.

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And, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet leader was telling the Soviet people that the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust.

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in relation to the activity of the adversary's armed forces.

The KGB assessment was more of a storm warning than a hurricane alert. But Politburo forecasters reached a stark political judgment: the chances of a nuclear war, including a US surprise nuclear attack, were higher than at any time during the entire Cold War. In May 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev and then KGB chief Andropov briefed the Politburo assessment to a closed KGB conference. Then Andropov took the podium to tell the assembled intelligence managers and officers that the KGB and the GRU were being placed on a permanent intelligence watch to monitor indications and warning of US war-planning and preparations. Codenamed RYAN, this alert was the largest Soviet peacetime intelligence effort.

During 1982, KGB Center assigned RYAN a high, but not overriding, priority. Then, on 17 February 1983, KGB residents already on alert received "eyes only" cables telling them that it had "acquired an especial degree of urgency" and was "now of particularly grave importance." They were ordered to organize a permanent watch using their entire operational staff, recruit new agents, and redirect existing ones to RYAN requirements. A circular message from the Moscow Center to all KGB residencies put on alert status stated:

Therefore one of the chief directions for the activity of the KGB's foreign service is to organize detection and assessment of signs of preparation for RYAN in all possible areas, i.e., political, economic, and military sectors, civil defense and the activity of special services. Our military neighbors (the GRU) are actively engaged in similar work

Moscow's urgency was linked to the impending US deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range missiles in West Germany. Very accurate and with a flight time under 10 minutes, these missiles could destroy hard targets, including Soviet command and control bunkers and missile silos, with little or no warning. Guidance cables referred to RYAN's critical importance to Soviet military strategy and the need for advance warning "to take retaliatory measures." But Soviet leaders were less interested in retaliation than in preemption and needed RYAN data as strategic warning to launch an attack on the new US missile sites.

The overt war scare erupted two years later. On 23 March 1983, President Reagan announced a program to develop a ground- and space-based, laser-armed, anti-ballistic-missile shield designated Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) but quickly dubbed "Star Wars" by the media. Four days later—and in direct response—Andropov lashed out. He accused the United States of preparing a first-strike attack on the USSR and asserted that Reagan was "inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it." The war scare had joined the intelligence alert.

Andropov's remarks were unprecedented. He violated a longstanding taboo by describing US nuclear weapons' numbers and capabilities in the mass media. He referred to Soviet weapons and capabilities—also highly unusual—and said explicitly that the USSR had, at best, only parity with the United States in strategic weaponry. And, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet leader was telling the Soviet people that the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust. If candor is a sign of sincerity, Moscow was worried.

The War Scare as an Intelligence Issue

The Soviet war scare posed two questions for the Intelligence Community: was it genuine, that is, did the Soviet leadership actually believe that the United States might attack? If so, why had the Kremlin reached that conclusion? If the alarm was not genuine, then what purpose did it serve?

By and large, the Community played down both the intelligence alert and the war-scare propaganda as evidence of an authentic threat perception. It did so in part because the information reaching it about the alert came primarily from British intelligence and was fragmentary, incomplete, and ambiguous. Moreover, the British protected the identity of the source—KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, number two in the London residency—and his bona fides could not be independently established. US intelligence did have partially corroborating information from a Czechoslovak intelligence officer, but apparently it was not detailed enough or considered reliable enough to confirm what was coming from Gordievsky.

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Searching for an
explanation of the war
scare, intelligence analysts
and other interested
observers offered three
answers: propaganda,
paranoia, and politics.
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The Intelligence Community continued to scoff at the war scare even after Gordievsky defected—factually, after MI6 exfiltrated him from the USSR—and was made available for debriefing.² But intelligence analysts were not alone in their skepticism. For example, one critic who attributes many of the problems in US-Soviet relations to the Reagan administration concluded 10 years later and with the benefit of hindsight: “Above all, the idea that the new American administration might actually attack the Soviet Union seems too far out of touch with reality to have been given credence.”³ A Soviet émigré scholar who wrote the most perceptive article on Soviet war-scare propaganda found the analytic task so daunting that he refused to speculate on *why* the Kremlin had adopted this line or *to whom* the message was directed—West European governments, the US electorate, or the Soviet people. ☐

Searching for an explanation of the war scare, intelligence analysts and other interested observers offered three answers: propaganda, paranoia, and politics. ☐

The consensus view regarded RYAN and the war scare as grist for the KGB disinformation mill—a sophisticated political-psychological scare tactic operation. Who was the KGB trying to scare? Answers differed. Most agreed that the Soviets wanted to frighten the West Europeans and above all the nervous West Germans into backing out of an agreement to deploy US intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles on their territory. Besides, Moscow was engaged in an all-out, go-for-broke propaganda and covert action program that was flagging and needed a boost. ☐

Some observers, however, believed that the campaign was inwardly, not outwardly, directed toward the Soviet people. There was evidence to support this interpretation. Andropov had launched an anticorruption and discipline campaign to get the long-suffering proletariat to work harder, drink less, and sacrifice more while cutting down on the theft of state property. War scares had been used in the past to prepare people for bad times, and, with ideology dead and consumer goods in short supply, the Kremlin was trotting out a tried and true mobilization gimmick. ☐

A second explanation argued that the war scare was clearly bogus but potentially dangerous because it was rooted in Soviet leadership paranoia. Paranoia is a catchall explanation for Russian/Soviet external behavior that goes back to early tsarist times. But it was given credence. This was how Gordievsky explained the war scare, and the advanced age and poor health of Andropov and the rest of the gerontocracy suggested that the leadership's debilitation might be mental as well as physical. ☐

The third explanation held that the war scare was rooted in internal bureaucratic or succession politics. The military and intelligence services might be using it as a form of bureaucratic turfbuilder to make their

budgets and missions grow at a time when the competition for resources was fierce. Or the war scare might have been connected in some way—a debate over foreign and defense policy?—to a succession struggle that was continuing despite, or because of, Andropov's poor health. Explanations were plentiful, but evidence was scarce. ☐

Although quite different, these explanations had much in common. Each started from the premise, whether articulated or not, that there was no objective threat of a US surprise attack on the USSR; therefore, the war scare was all smoke and mirrors, a false alarm being used for some other purpose. In most instances, outside observers did not give the war scare credence, refusing to imagine that the Soviet leadership could view the United States as the potential aggressor in an unprovoked nuclear war, because they themselves could not imagine the United States in that role. This idea was “too far out of touch with reality.” Reagan was not Hitler, and America does not do Pearl Harbors. ☐

US perceptions of the US-Soviet balance of strategic power also weighed against the idea that the war scare could indicate genuine, even if greatly exaggerated, concern on Moscow's part. The United States was in the midst of the largest military buildup in its history whose aim was to close a perceived “window of vulnerability” in the mid-1980s created by US loss of superiority in delivery vehicles and then counterforce capabilities. The buildup had begun during the previous administration, but was greatly accelerated during Reagan's first term in the belief that the USSR might exploit a temporary advantage—appropriately called a

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1 window of opportunity—to engage in adventuresome behavior, use nuclear blackmail, or even perhaps attack the United States. Moreover, Soviet claims about the “irreversibility” of changes in the “correlation of forces” in the 1970s—a reference to both Soviet gains in the Third World and achievement of “robust parity” in strategic power with the US—did little to allay US concerns.

US observers were half right in dismissing the war scare as groundless, but also half wrong in viewing it as artificially contrived. Moscow apparently was worried about something.

Evidence From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

For a long time, Gordievsky was the only publicly acknowledged source of information on RYAN.

Meanwhile, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin and ex-KGB officers Oleg Kalugin and Yuriy Shvets have published memoirs that dovetail with Gordievsky's account. We know a lot more than we did about the war scare, even though a complete understanding is still elusive.

Gordievsky, the original source, is also the most prolific. Almost a decade after he arrived in London, he and British coauthor Christopher Andrew published a sheaf of KGB

cables that describe the alert and collection requirements. No one in the US, British, or Soviet/Russian intelligence communities has questioned these documents, so silence is tantamount to authentication.

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a small circle of White House and Pentagon aides—and, of course, the Kremlin. "It was very sensitive," recalls former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle. "Nothing was written down about [redacted] there would be no paper trail." [redacted]

[The PSYOP was calculated to play on what the White House perceived as a Soviet image of the President as a "cowboy" and reckless practitioner of nuclear politics. US purpose was not to signal intentions so much as keep the Soviets guessing what might happen next:

Spooking the Russians

During the first Reagan administration, US policy toward the Soviet Union was conducted on two tracks. The first encompassed normal diplomatic relations and arms control negotiations. The second was a covert political-psychological effort to attack Soviet vulnerabilities and undermine the system. According to a recent account based on interviews with Reagan-era policymakers, it was a "secret offensive on economic, geo-strategic, and psychological fronts designed to roll back and weaken Soviet power."³ For most of 1981-83, there were more trains running on the second track than on the first. [redacted]

RYAN may have been a response to the first in a series of US military probes along Soviet borders initiated in the Reagan administration's first months. These probes—called psychological warfare operations, or PSYOP, in Pentagon jargon—aimed at exploiting Soviet psychological vulnerabilities and deterring Soviet actions. The administration's "silent campaign" was also practically invisible, except to

"Sometimes we would send bombers over the North Pole, and their radars would click on," recalls Gen. Jack Chain the former Strategic Air Command commander. "Other times fighter-bombers would probe their Asian or European periphery." During peak times, the operation would include several maneuvers a week. They would come at irregular intervals to make the effect all the more unsettling. Then, as quickly as the unannounced flights began, they would stop, only to begin a few weeks later. [redacted]

Another participant echoes this assessment:

"It really got to them," recalls Dr. William Schneider, Undersecretary of State for Military Assistance and Technology, who saw classified "after-action reports" that indicated US flight activity. "They didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight at Soviet airspace, and other radars would

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*lights up and units would go on alert. Then, at the last minute, the squadron would peel off and return home."*⁸

The Navy played an even bigger role than SAC after President Reagan authorized it in March 1981 to operate and exercise in areas where the US fleet had rarely—or never—gone before. Major exercises in 1981 and 1983 in the Soviet far northern and far eastern maritime approaches demonstrated US ability to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups close to sensitive military and industrial areas without being detected or challenged.⁹ Using sophisticated and carefully rehearsed deception and denial techniques, the Navy eluded the USSR's massive ocean reconnaissance system and early-warning systems.¹⁰ Some naval exercises included "classified" operations in which carrier-launched aircraft managed to penetrate Soviet shore-based radar and air-defense systems and simulate "attacks" on Soviet targets. Summing up a 1983 Pacific Fleet exercise, the US chief of naval operations noted that the Soviets "are as naked as jaybird there [on the Kamchatka Peninsula], and they know it."¹¹ His remark applied equally to the Kola Peninsula in the far north.

Was there a connection between PSYOP and RYAN? There clearly was a temporal correlation. The first US missions began in mid-February 1981; Andropov briefed RYAN to the KGB the following May. Moreover, when top officials first learned of RYAN, they reportedly connected it to the Soviet border probes, noting that the Soviets were "increasingly frightened by the Reagan administration."

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Andropov's advisers urged him not to overreact, but overreact he did, accusing the President of “deliberately lying” about Soviet military power to justify SDI.
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The Intelligence Community, not clued in to the PSYOP program, could be forgiven for not understanding the cause-and-effect relationship. This is a reminder of a perennial problem in preparing estimates that assess another country's behavior in terms of its interaction with the United States and in response to US actions. The impact of the action-reaction-interaction dynamic is often overlooked or neglected, not because of analytic failure or conceptual inadequacy, but for the simple reason that the intelligence left hand does not always know what the policy right hand is doing.

There may have been another problem in perception that affected policymakers as well as intelligence analysts. While the US probes caught the Kremlin by surprise, they were not unprecedented. There was a Cold War antecedent that Soviet leaders may have found troubling. From 1950 to 1969, the Strategic Air Command conducted similar operations, both intelligence-gathering and "ferret" missions aimed at detecting the location, reaction, and gaps in radar and air-defense installations along the USSR's Eurasian periphery in preparation for nuclear war.¹³ It is possible, though not provable, that the Soviets remembered something the American side had already forgotten.

1983 Through the War-Scare Prism

Despite their private assessment, Soviet leaders maintained a public posture of relative calm during 1981-82. Even Reagan's erstwhile Secretary of State Alexander Haig gave them credit, saying "[t]he Soviets stayed very, very moderate, very, very responsible during the first three years of this administration. I was mind-boggled with their patience." But that patience wore thin as 1983 wore on. In September, Andropov would officially close off an internal debate over the causes and consequences of the collapse of détente in an unusual foreign policy "declaration." In it, he limned the outline of the war scare:

The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining the policy of states, of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current United States administration. In brief, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace.... If anyone had any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the policy of the present American administration, recent events have dispelled them once and for all [emphasis added]

What were those "recent events"?

SDI. The SDI announcement came out of the blue for the Kremlin—and most of the Cabinet. Andropov's advisers urged him not to overreact, but overreact he did, accusing the President of "deliberately lying" about Soviet military power to justify SDI. He denounced it as a "bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face

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of the US nuclear threat." Space-based defense, he added,

... would open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive. Such is the real significance, the seamy side of, so to say, of Washington's 'defensive conception'.... The Soviet Union will never be caught defenseless by any threat.... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane.... Washington's actions are putting the entire world in jeopardy. []

SDI had obviously touched a sensitive nerve. The Soviets seemed to treat it more seriously than many US scientists and even some White House aides did at the time. There were two reasons. First, the Soviets, despite their boasting in the 1970s, had practically unlimited faith in US technical capability. Second, SDI had a profound psychological impact that reinforced the trend predicted by the computer-based "correlation of forces" model. In a remarkable tête-à-tête with a US journalist and former arms control official, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, first deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff, assessed the symbolic significance of SDI:

... We cannot equal the quality of United States arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based on technology, and technology is based on computers.

In the United States, small children... play with computers.... Here, we don't even have computers in every office of the

Defense Ministry. And, for reasons you know well, we cannot make computers widely available in our society.

... We will never be able to catch up with you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution. And the question is whether we can have an economic revolution without a political revolution. []

Ogarkov's private rumination is all the more remarkable because in his public statements he was a hawk's hawk, frequently comparing the United States to Nazi Germany and warning of the advent of new weapon systems based on entirely "new physical principles." The duality, even dichotomy, between Ogarkov's public stance calling for continuation of the Cold War and his private acknowledgment that the USSR could not compete may have been typical of other Soviet leaders and contributed to their frustration and anxiety []

KAL 007. At 3:26 a.m. Tokyo time on 1 September 1983, a Soviet Su-15 interceptor fired two air-to-air missiles at a Korean Boeing 747 airliner, destroying the aircraft and killing all 269 crew and passengers. Soviet air-defense units had been tracking KAL Flight 007 for more than an hour as it first entered and then left Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The order to destroy the aircraft was given as the airliner was about to leave Soviet airspace for the second time after overflying Sakhalin Island. The ill-fated Boeing 747 was probably downed in international airspace. []

[] the White House learned about the shootdown within a few hours of the event and, with Secretary of State Shultz taking the lead, denounced the Soviet act as one of deliberate mass murder of innocent civilians. President Reagan called it "an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations." []

Air Force intelligence dissented at the time of the incident, and eventually US intelligence reached a consensus view that the Soviets probably did not know they were destroying a civilian airliner. The charge should have been criminally negligent manslaughter, not premeditated murder. But the official US position never deviated from the initial assessment. The incident was used to keep up a noisy campaign in the UN and to spur worldwide efforts to punish the USSR with commercial boycotts, law suits, and denial of landing rights for Aeroflot airliners. These various efforts focused on indicting the Soviet system itself and the top leadership as being ultimately responsible []

Moscow's public response to the incident came more than a week later on 9 September in the form of an unprecedented two-hour live press conference conducted by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov with support from Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kornienko and Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the Central Committee's International Information Department. The five-star spin-doctor's goal was to prove—despite 269 bodies to the contrary—that the Soviet Union had behaved rationally in

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deciding to destroy Flight 007. At first, Ustinov said the regional Soviet air defense unit had identified the aircraft as a US intelligence platform, an RC-135 of the type that routinely performed intelligence collection operations along a similar flightpath. In any event, Ogarkov asserted, whether an RC-135 or a 747, the plane was unquestionably on a US or joint US-Japanese intelligence mission, and the local Soviet commander had carried out the correct order. The real blame for the tragedy, he argued, lay with the United States, not the USSR.

Remarkably, a classified memorandum coordinated by the Ministry of Defense and the KGB shows that privately the Soviet leadership took pretty much the same view as their public pronouncement on KAL 007. Released in 1992, the secret memorandum was sent to Andropov by Ustinov and KGB Chairman Chebrikov. It claimed that:

... We are dealing with a major, dual-purpose political provocation carefully organized by the US special (intelligence) services. The first purpose was to use the incursion of the intruder aircraft into Soviet airspace to create a favorable situation for the gathering of defense data on our air-defense system in the Far East, involving the most diverse systems, including the Ferret reconnaissance satellite. Second, they envisaged, if this flight were terminated by us, using that fact to mount a global anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union

Soviet angst was reflected in the rapid and harsh propaganda reaction,

with Andropov once again taking the lead rather than remaining silent. He moved quickly to exploit KAL 007, like SDI before it, for US-baiting propaganda. Asserting that an "outrageous military psychosis" had overtaken the United States, he declared that:

The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes as all preventing it from crossing the point at which any sober-minded person must stop. (emphasis added)

the Soviet air-defense commander made an honest, though serious, error because the entire air-defense system was on high alert and in a state of anxiety. He claims this was a result of incursions by US aircraft from the Pacific Fleet in recent months during a joint fleet exercise with the Japanese. He could not provide details, but he did know that there was concern about both military and military reconnaissance aircraft.

The specific incident to which he almost certainly was referring occurred on or about 4 April, when at least six US Navy planes from the carriers Midway and Enterprise flew simulated bombing runs over a heavily fortified Soviet island in the Kuril chain called Zeleny. The two carriers were part of a 40-ship armada that was patrolling in the largest-ever exercise in the north Pacific. According to the Soviet démarche protesting the incursion, the Navy aircraft flew 20 miles inside Soviet airspace and remained there

for up to 20 minutes each time.¹⁴ As a result, the Soviet air-defense organization was put on alert for the rest of the spring and summer—and perhaps longer—and some senior officers were transferred, reprimanded, or dismissed.

Andropov himself issued a "draconian" order that readiness be increased and that any aircraft discovered in Soviet airspace be shot down. Air-defense commanders were warned that if they refused to execute Andropov's order, they would be dismissed. There is corroborating information for this from a curious source—an apparent KGB disinformation project executed in Japan and then fed back into the USSR. A *Novosti* news agency pamphlet entitled *President's Crime: Who Ordered the Espionage Flight of KAL 007?* revealed that two important changes—one in Article 53 of the Soviet Air Code on 24 November 1982 and the other in Article 36 of the Soviet Law on State Borders on 11 May 1993—in effect had closed Soviet borders to all intruders and made Andropov's shoot-to-kill order a matter of law, changing the Soviet (and internationally recognized) rules of engagement.)

This incident raised Soviet fears of a possible US attack and made Moscow more suspicious that US military exercises might conceal preparations for an actual attack. Within weeks, Soviet intelligence would react in exactly that way to a US-NATO exercise in Western Europe—with potentially dangerous consequences.

Able Archer 83. The second significant incident of 1983 occurred during an annual NATO command post exercise codenamed Able Archer 83.

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The Soviets were familiar with Able Archer from previous years, but the 1983 version included several changes. First, in the original scenario that was later changed, the exercise was to involve high-level officials, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in major roles with cameo appearances by the President and Vice President. Second, the exercise included a practice drill that took NATO forces from the use of conventional forces through a full-scale mock release of nuclear weapons. []

The story of Able Archer has been told many times, growing and changing with each retelling. The original version came from Gordievsky, who claims that on the night of 8 or 9 November—he cannot remember which—Moscow sent a flash cable from the Center advising, incorrectly, that US forces in Europe had been put on alert and that troops at some US bases were being mobilized. The cable reportedly said that the alert may have been in response to the recent bombing attack on a US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, or related to impending US Army maneuvers, or the US may have begun the countdown to a surprise nuclear war. Recipients were asked to evaluate these hypotheses. At two airbases in East Germany and Poland, Soviet fighters were put on alert—for the first and last time during the Cold War. As Gordievsky described it:

In the tense atmosphere generated by the crises and rhetoric of the past few months, the KGB concluded that American forces had been placed on alert—and might even have begun the countdown to war.... The world did not quite reach the edge of the

nuclear abyss during Operation RYAN. But during Able Archer 83 it had, without realizing it, come frighteningly close—certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. [emphasis added] []

British and US journalists with inside access to Whitehall and the White House have repeated the same story.¹⁶ Three themes run through it. The United States and USSR came close to war as a result of Kremlin overreaction; only Gordievsky's timely warning to Washington via MI6 kept things from going too far; and Gordievsky's information was an epiphany for President Reagan, who was shaken by the idea that the Soviet Union was fearful of a US surprise attack. According to US journalist Don Oberdorfer:

Within a few weeks after...Able Archer 83, the London CIA station reported, presumably on the basis of information obtained by the British from Gordievsky, that the Soviets had been alarmed about the real possibility that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack against them. A similar report came from a well-connected American who had heard it from senior officials in an East European country closely allied to Moscow. McFarlane, who received the reports at the White House, initially discounted them as Soviet scare tactics rather than evidence of real concern about American intentions, and told Reagan of his view in presenting them to the President. But a more extensive survey of Soviet attitudes sent to the White House early in

1984 by CIA Director William Casey, based in part on reports from the double agent Gordievsky, had a more sobering effect. Reagan seemed uncharacteristically grave after reading the report and asked McFarlane, "Do you suppose they really believe that?"... I don't see how they could believe that—but it's something to think about," Reagan replied. In a meeting that same day, Reagan spoke about the biblical prophecy of Armageddon, a final world-ending battle between good and evil, a topic that fascinated the President. McFarlane thought it was not accidental that Armageddon was on Reagan's mind.¹⁷

For all its drama, however, Able Archer seems to have made more of an impression on the White House than on the Kremlin. A senior Soviet affairs expert who queried Soviet political and military leaders reported that none had heard of Able Archer, and all denied that it had reached the Politburo or even the upper levels of the defense ministry.¹⁸ The GRU officer cited above said that watch officers were concerned over the exercise. Tensions were high as a result of the KAL 007 incident, and Soviet intelligence always worried that US military movements might indicate war, especially when conducted during major holidays.¹⁹ Other than that, he saw nothing unusual about Able Archer.

The Iron Lady and the Great Communicator

Did Gordievsky's reporting, especially his account of the KGB Center's reaction to Able Archer,

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influence US attitudes toward the Soviet Union? Gordievsky and coauthor Andrew believe so and have repeated the story dozens of times in books, articles, and interviews. The British agent's information, Andrew noted, "was of enormous importance in providing warning of the almost paranoid fear within some sections of the Reagan leadership that President Reagan was planning a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union."²⁰

But did the British go further and put their own spin on the reporting in an effort to influence Reagan? Analysts who worked with the Gordievsky file during the war scare think so, and their suspicions are supported, if not confirmed, in British accounts. Prime Minister Thatcher was engaged in an effort to moderate US policy toward the USSR, convinced that the US hard line had become counterproductive, even risky, and was threatening to undermine the NATO consensus on INF deployments. She also was mindful of the growing strength of the peace movement in Britain and especially in West Germany.

Thatcher launched her campaign to modify US policy, appropriately enough, in Washington at the annual dinner of the Churchill Foundation Award on 29 September, where her remarks were certain to reach the White House and attract US media coverage. Her theme—"we live on the same planet and must go on sharing it"—was a plea for a more accommodating alliance policy that she repeated in subsequent addresses. As her biographer notes, Thatcher did not make an urgent plea or sudden flight to Washington to press her views, rather:

“
Stalin's heirs decided that
it is better to look through
a glass darkly than through
rose-colored glasses.”

... the essence of the [Thatcher-Reagan] partnership at this stage was that the two governments were basing their decisions on much the same evidence and on shared assessments at professional [sic] level. In particular, both governments would have had the same intelligence. A critical contribution in this field was made over a period of years by Oleg Gordievski [sic]....²¹

British intelligence sources confided to a US journalist that London used the Gordievsky material to influence Reagan, because his hardline policy was strengthening Soviet hawks:

Since KGB reporting is thought to be aimed at confirming views already held in Moscow—to bolster the current line—the British worried that the impact on Moscow of the bluster in Washington would be enlarged by the KGB itself. They had cause to worry.²²

The question is: how much spin did MI6 use? Unfortunately, Gordievsky did not include the KGB Center's flash message on Able Archer in his otherwise comprehensive collection of cables published in 1992. Gordievsky's claim to fame for influencing White House perceptions of Soviet "paranoia" is probably justified, but his assertion that a paranoid Kremlin almost went to war by overreacting to Able Archer is questionable.

RYAN and the Soviet Pearl Harbor

A Czechoslovak intelligence officer who worked closely with the KGB on RYAN noted that his counterparts were obsessed with the historical parallel between 1941 and 1983. He believed this feeling was almost visceral, not intellectual, and deeply affected Soviet thinking.

The German invasion was the Soviet Union's greatest military disaster, similar to—but much more traumatic than—Pearl Harbor. It began with a surprise attack that could have been anticipated and countered, but was not because of an intelligence failure. The connection between surprise attack and inadequate warning was never forgotten.

The historical example of Operation Barbarossa may account for the urgency, even alarm, that field intelligence officers like Gordievsky and Shvets attributed to Kremlin paranoia. This gap in perceptions may have reflected a generation gap. The Brezhnev-Andropov generation had experienced the war firsthand as the formative experience of their political lives; for younger Soviets, it was history rather than living memory.

The intelligence "failure" of 1941 was a failure of analysis, not collection.²³ Stalin received multiple detailed and timely warnings of the impending attack from a variety of open and clandestine sources. But he gave the data a best case or not-so-bad case interpretation, assuming—incorrectly—that Hitler would not attack without issuing an ultimatum or fight a two-front war while still engaged in the West. Stalin erred in part because he deceived himself and in part because German counterintelligence also deceived him. Stalin's heirs decided

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“ What the Soviets feared most was that they were losing the Cold War and the technological arms race with the US. ”

that it is better to look through a glass darkly than through rose-colored glasses. This was probably one reason why RYAN employed an explicit worst case methodology. ☐

RYAN appears to have incorporated—or misappropriated—another lesson from 1941. Despite the prowess of his intelligence services, the ever-suspicious Stalin ironically distrusted clandestinely acquired intelligence, including agent reporting and even communications and signals intercepts. He did so because he believed that all sources could be controlled by the enemy and corrupted by disinformation, leading him to reject both accurate and inaccurate information. As a corrective, he insisted that Soviet intelligence select indirect indicators of war planning that could not be concealed or manipulated. His chief of military intelligence had the idea of surveying mutton prices in Nazi-occupied Europe, arguing that the Germans would need sheepskin coats for winter campaigning in Russia, and, by buying up available livestock supplies for skins, they would flood the market with cheap mutton.²⁴ This deceptively simple indicator turned out to be simply deceptive. Hitler believed he could defeat the Red Army by fall and did not prepare for wintertime operations. ☐

RYAN requirements reveal the same kind of unorthodox thinking. For example, the KGB residency in London was instructed to monitor prices paid for blood at urban donor banks. The Center assumed that prices would increase on the eve of war as the banks scurried to stockpile supplies. But there was a problem: British donor banks do not pay donors, all of whom are volunteers. Another example: the London

residency was told to visit meat-packing plants, looking for signs of “mass slaughter of cattle and putting of meat into long cold storage” in preparation for RYAN. The parallel with 1941 is so close as to suggest that some of the RYAN requirements were dug out of the NKVD and GRU files. ☐

Finally, there is another plausible, but unprovable, lesson learned from 1941. The prewar intelligence failure was Stalin's, but he blamed the intelligence services. This left an indelible stain on Soviet intelligence that Andropov, as KGB chief and later party chief, may have been determined not to let happen again. Soviet intelligence certainly had a vested interest in promoting a dire threat assessment of US intentions, but bureaucratic self-interest may not have been as important as professional, not to say hurt, pride. ☐

Conclusion

RYAN was for real. Skeptics should consider Dobrynin's response to a doubting Thomas TV interviewer: “Make your conclusions from what he [Andropov] said in telegrams to his residents.” The KGB-GRU—or more appropriately the joint Warsaw Pact—alert was a crash effort to build a strategic warning system by substituting manpower for technology, HUMINT for satellites and sensors. Soviet actions were panicky, but not paranoid or unprecedented.

As one historian noted, even under the tsars Russian strategists were often quite fearful when confronted by superior Western military technology, but their fears, while exaggerated, were scarcely insane.²⁵ Dobrynin claims that Andropov worried because President Reagan was “unpredictable.” But this places too much weight on a single personality. What the Soviets feared most was what their “correlation of forces” calculations told them—that they were losing the Cold War and the technological arms race with the US. ☐

The real war scare almost certainly was not the one the Kremlin envisioned. The presumed threat of a US surprise nuclear attack was nonexistent. The possibility of Soviet preemptive strike may have been more likely. Well-informed observers like Gyula Horn, the last Communist foreign minister and current Prime Minister of Hungary, revealed in his memoirs that Soviet marshals, fortified with a little vodka, openly advocated an attack on the West “before the imperialists gain superiority in every sphere.” The information is anecdotal, but there is a certain grim logic to it.

The war scare was the last paroxysm of the Cold War. It was a fitting end. ☐

NOTES

1. This was a reference to the 1973 overthrow of Marxist President Salvador Allende.
2. According to interviews conducted by Murray Marder, “[m]any senior administration officials scoff now, as they did then, at the suggestion that the Soviet Union was genuinely alarmed by US military moves or

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- public statements, or that Moscow had any justification for feeling vulnerable. The "war scare" in the Soviet Union in 1982-83 was deliberately engineered for propaganda purposes, these officials maintain—a pretext to create a siege mentality in the Soviet Union and to frighten the outside world about US intentions. ("Defector Told of Soviet Alert; KGB Station Reportedly Warned US Would Attack," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1986, p. A1.)
3. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 60. Garthoff carefully considers all the details surrounding Gordievsky's recruitment and espionage for British intelligence, his bona fides, and his defection, but still questions whether the Soviets could have really believed in the war-scare scenario. Garthoff states, wrongly, that Gordievsky's information on RYAN was given to US intelligence only after his defection in May 1985. The British shared the information—in sanitized form to conceal the source—contemporaneously with the United States. Garthoff speculates that the British had some doubts about Gordievsky's reporting and did not want to offend the Reagan administration with intelligence that might suggest that its hardline policies were raising Soviet anxiety to an unusually high level. In fact, one reason the British pressed Gordievsky's information on US intelligence was precisely to influence Reagan's views on the USSR.
 4. Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 33 (September-October 1983), p. 88.
 5. Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. xvi.
 6. *Ibid.*
 7. *Ibid.*
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. See Gregory L. Vistica, *Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 105-108, 116-118, and 129-135, *passim*.
 10. Equally important, the Navy was able to offset the Soviets' ability to track the fleet by reading naval communications, which the KGB had been able to decrypt since the late 1960s, thanks to ex-sailor John Walker and his spy ring. The FBI arrested Walker in 1985.
 11. As cited in Seymour Hersh, "The Target is Destroyed": *What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What Americans Really Knew About It* (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 18.
 12. Schweizer, *Victory*, p. 190.
 13. In 1970, the United States abandoned the risky practice of flying into Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean airspace to provoke reactions by radar and air-defense installations. For recently declassified information on the US overflight program, see "Secrets of the Cold War," *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol. 114, No. 10 (15 March 1993), pp. 30-50.
 14. This incident is recounted in Seymour Hersh, "The Target is Destroyed", chapter 2, *passim*. The Soviets saw both political and military machinations in the overflight, because Zeleny is one of several islands that comprise the so-called northern territories that have been in dispute between Moscow and Tokyo since the Soviets seized them in 1945. The United States does not recognize the Soviet claim to the islands and supports Japan. The Soviets viewed the overflight as provocative and a challenge to their sovereignty over the islands. Hersh notes on p. 18 that the "Navy never publicly acknowledged either the overflight or its error; it also chose to say nothing further inside the government."
 15. This strange pamphlet was issued by a one-room Japanese "publishing" firm in editions of 1,000 each in English and Japanese. However, *Novosti* "reprinted" 100,000 copies in Russian. This suggests two things: the pamphlet was intended primarily for the internal Soviet audience, and the Soviet people did not believe their government's explanation of the KAL 007 tragedy. See Murray Sayle, "Closing the File on Flight 007," *The New Yorker*, Vol. LXIX, No. 42 (13 December 1993), pp. 90-101, especially 94-95.
 16. The two British accounts of Gordievsky's role and how British intelligence used him to influence President Reagan's thinking on Soviet policy are: Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: The Dramatic Stories of the Top Soviet Spies Who Have Defected Since World War II* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), chapter 18, *passim*; and Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pp. 122-23. See also Nicholas Bethell, *Spies and Other Secrets: Memoirs from the Second Cold War* (New York: Viking, 1994), p. 191. Brooke-Shepherd received assistance from British and US intelligence. Smith's book is an "authorized" inside account of its subject. Bethell is a Tory MP and friend and fan of Gordievsky's. The US version, which is identical in many respects, is Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 67.
 17. Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, p. 67.
 18. Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, p. 139, n. 160.

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19. Able Archer coincided with October Revolution Day, the USSR's national holiday. Holidays turned into national drinking binges that incapacitated practically the entire country. This is an interesting bit of mirror-imaging, because NATO military planners almost certainly did not factor the holiday into Allied war plans.
20. Christopher Andrew, "We Will Always Need Spies," *The London Times*, 3 March 1994, Features, p. 1
21. Smith, *Thatcher and Reagan*, p. 122.
22. John Newhouse, *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 338.
23. For a discussion of the wealth of accurate information that was available to Stalin, see John Cosrello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions: The KGB Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993), pp. 85-90. This analysis is based on declassified Soviet intelligence reports from the KGB archive. See also Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1973), which details more than 80 indications and warnings received by Soviet intelligence.
24. Viktor Suvorov, *Icebreaker: Who Started World War II?* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990), pp. 320-321.
25. William J. Fuller, Jr., *Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 12.

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CSI

A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare

By Benjamin B. Fischer

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Summary

Soviet intelligence services went on alert in 1981 to watch for US preparations for launching a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR and its allies. This alert was accompanied by a new Soviet intelligence collection program, known by the acronym RYAN, to monitor indications and provide early warning of US intentions. Two years later a major war scare erupted in the USSR. This study traces the origins and scope of Operation RYAN and its relationship to the war scare.

Some observers dismissed the alert and the war scare as Soviet disinformation and scare tactics, while others viewed them as reflecting genuine fears. The latter view seems to have been closer to the truth. The KGB in the early 1980s saw the international situation--in Soviet terminology, the "correlation of world forces"--as turning against the USSR and increasing its vulnerability. These developments, along with the new US administration's tough stance toward the USSR, prompted

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Operation RYAN



OPERATION RYAN, a newly devised acronym for *Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie* ('Nuclear Missile Attack'), was the largest peacetime intelligence operation in Soviet history. Its purpose was to collect military strategic intelligence on the presumed (but non-existent) plans by the United States and NATO between 1981 and 1984 to launch a surprise nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. The origins of RYAN lay in a potentially lethal combination of Reaganite rhetoric and Soviet paranoia. During the American presidential election campaign in 1980, Moscow had expected the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the victorious Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, to mellow once he had been elected. It did not do so. In May 1981 the ageing Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev denounced Reagan's policies in a secret address to a major KGB conference in Moscow. The most dramatic speech, however, was given by Yuri Andropov, the Chairman of the KGB, who was to succeed Brezhnev as General Secretary eighteen months later. The new American administration, he declared, was actively preparing for nuclear war. To the astonishment of most of his audience, Andropov then announced that, by a decision of the Politburo, the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence) were for the first time to cooperate in a worldwide intelligence operation codenamed RYAN. Though the main American experts in the Centre did not doubt Andropov's genuine alarm at Reagan's policies, they believed that pressure for Operation RYAN originated within the high command. Its leading advocate in the Politburo was probably the Minister of Defence, Marshal Dmitri Fyodorovich Ustinov, who had been Stalin's Armaments Commissar as far back as 1941. He would also prove to be one of Andropov's key supporters in the struggle to succeed Brezhnev.¹ During 1981 the former Soviet spy in the Foreign Office, Donald Maclean, who had defected to Moscow thirty years before, became aware of a dangerous change of mood among the Soviet leadership. He wrote a secret memorandum expressing alarm at the way the Soviet Union appeared 'hypnotised by the size and variety of American nuclear forces', and at the influence on the Kremlin of the high command.²

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О постоянном действующем задании
по выявлению подготовки НАТО к
ракетно-ядерному нападению на СССР

В связи с возрастанием важности решения задачи своевременного выявления подготовки противника к ракетно-ядерному нападению (РЯН) на СССР Вам направляется постоянное действующее задание (ПДЗ) и организована по этой проблеме.

Цель ПДЗ - обеспечить систематическую работу резидентуры по вскрытию планов подготовки главного противника к РЯН и организации постоянного слежения за признаками принятия им решения о применении ядерного оружия против СССР и осуществления непосредственной подготовки к ракетно-ядерному удару. Выполнение ПДЗ является лишь одним, хотя и крайне важным, аспектом деятельности резидентуры по военно-стратегической проблематике. Работа в этом направлении должна вестись наряду с решением других, ранее поставленных задач по добыче военно-стратегической информации.

По мере поступления сведений по проблеме РЯН Центр предлагает вносить в данное ПДЗ соответствующие дополнения и уточнения.

Информацию, добытую резидентурой в соответствии с заданиями разделов I и II (ближайшие и перспективные задачи), направлять в Центр с индексом "И-ВН", который предусматривает рассылку телеграфной информации по разветке: руководство службой, подразделения, информационная служба и обязательную передачу почтовой информации в информационную службу. Для уточнения линии, работником которой добыта информация, можно указывать после индекса "И-ВН" дополнительный индекс (ПР, ЮР, Х и т.д.).

ПДЗ (приложение № I) должно быть проработано всем оперативным составом резидентуры. Конкретные предложения и соображения резидентуры, направленные на максимально эффективное выполнение ПДЗ, доложить в Центр до 31 марта 1983 года.

Хранить ПДЗ в резидентуре постоянно в особой папке резидента.

Примечание: 1) В 374/ПР/52, на 4 листах, сов.секретно, ЛН. 102
2) В 6282/ПР/52, на 9 листах, сов.секретно, ЛН. 103

While the GRU was made responsible for detailed monitoring of the (non-existent) military preparations for a Western first strike, the KGB's primary task was to provide advance warning of any decision by the United States and its NATO allies to launch a nuclear attack. The Centre entrusted the planning of Operation RYAN to the FCD Institute for Intelligence Problems, established in 1978-9 to work on 'the development of new intelligence concepts'. The basis of the RYAN 'concept' developed by the Institute was the belief that deviations from peacetime routines in a wide variety of spheres - military, political, economic, health administration, civil defence - could provide preliminary warning of Western preparations for a first strike. In November 1981 the Centre despatched individual instructions to Residents in all Western countries, Japan and some states in the Third World. All were required to submit fortnightly reports on Western plans for nuclear war.

When he arrived to take up a post at the London Residency in June 1982, Gordievsky discovered that all his colleagues in the PR line viewed Operation RYAN with some scepticism. They were, and remained, less alarmist than the Centre about the risks of nuclear war. None, however, was willing to put his career at risk by challenging the FCD's assessment. RYAN created a vicious circle of intelligence collections and assessment. Residencies were, in effect, required to report alarming information even if they themselves were sceptical of it. The Centre was duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more.

In February 1983 Residents were sent new and detailed instructions which reflected the Centre's belief in the steadily increasing nuclear threat and 'the growing urgency' of discovering the West's non-existent plans for a first strike. The importance of the directive was further indicated by the fact that it was addressed to each Resident by name, was marked 'strictly personal', and was ordered to be kept in the Resident's special file.

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Copy No 1
London

Comr[ade] Yermakov (A. V. Guk)
(strictly personal)

Permanent operational assignment
to uncover NATO preparations for
a nuclear missile attack on the USSR

In view of the growing urgency of the task of discovering promptly any preparations by the adversary for a nuclear missile attack (RYAN) on the USSR,

we are sending you a permanently operative assignment (POA) and a briefing on this question.

The objective of the assignment is to see that the Residency works systematically to uncover any plans in preparation by the main adversary [USA] for RYAN and to organise a continual watch to be kept for indications of a decision being taken to use nuclear weapons against the USSR or immediate preparations being made for a nuclear missile attack. Carrying out this assignment is only one aspect, albeit an extremely important one, of the Residency's activity in connection with matters of military strategy. Work in this sector must be carried on side by side with the other tasks previously set for obtaining information on military strategy.

As information is obtained on the question of RYAN, the Centre proposes to supplement and clarify the permanent assignment accordingly.

Information obtained by the Residency relating to the assignments in sections I and II (immediate and future tasks), is to be sent to the Centre indexed 'I-VN', which will provide for distribution of telegraphic information as marked to: heads of service, subsections, information service; and see that information by bag is transmitted without fail to the information service. In order to specify the line of the official by whom the information was obtained, additional letters (PR, KR, X and so on) may be shown after the letters 'I-VN'.

The permanent operational assignment (POA) (Attachment No 1) must be studied by all operational staff of the residency. Specific suggestions and ideas evolved by the Residency with a view to carrying out this assignment as efficiently as possible, should reach Centre by 31 March 1983.

At the Residency, the POA must always be kept in the Resident's special file.

- Attachments: 1) No 374/PR/52, 4 pages, Top Secret, PN 102
2) No 6282/PR/52, 9 pages, Top Secret, PN 103

THE first part of the POA sent to Residents in NATO capitals laid down seven requirements (with time limits for fulfilment) for the collection of intelligence on likely indicators of preparations for nuclear attack, ranging from increases in the price paid to blood donors to heightened activity by Western intelligence and security services. (The Centre had failed to grasp that British blood donors are unpaid.) The second section of the POA instructed Residencies on how to carry out their assignments. Most of the instructions about the recruitment and use of KGB agents were fairly conventional. But the POA also reflects the Centre's sometimes bizarre conspiracy theories about the clerical and capitalist components of Western imperialism. It suspected that

Church leaders and heads of major banks might have been informed of plans for a nuclear first strike, and ordered Residencies to investigate.

Reference No 373/PR/52

Top Secret
Copy No. 1
Attachment 1

Permanent Operational Assignment
to discover NATO Preparations for
a Nuclear Attack on the USSR

Section 1 - Immediate tasks of Residencies for Collecting Information and Organising their Work

1. Collect data about places where Government officials and members of their families are evacuated. Identify possible routes and methods of evacuation. Make suggestions about ways of organising a watch to be kept on preparation and actual evacuation. Time limit: 3rd quarter [by 30 September 1983]

2. Identify the location of specially equipped Civil Defence shelters or premises which could if necessary be used as shelters (underground garages and depots, basements, tunnels) and arrange for a periodical check on their state of preparedness to accommodate the population at a particular time.

Time limit: 3rd quarter [by 30 September 1983]

Report to Centre immediately if shelters are being taken out of storage or a start is being made on preparing certain premises for accommodation of the population.

3. One important sign that preparations are beginning for RYAN could be increased purchases of blood from donors and the prices paid for it and extension of the network of reception centres, since the treatment of burns (the most widespread injury in a nuclear explosion) requires blood transfusions in very considerable quantity. In this context, discover the location of several blood-donor reception centres, and find out how they operate and the price of the blood donated, and record any changes.

Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]

If there is an unexpectedly sharp increase in the number of stationary and mobile blood donor centres and in the prices paid, report at once to the Centre.

4. Put forward proposals for organising a watch on individual civil defence installations. Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]

5. Identify several places which are most frequently visited outside working hours by employees of institutions and installations connected with taking and implementing decisions regarding RYAN, including military personnel. Put

forward your views about the possibility of regular observation of the places selected. Time limit: 2nd quarter [by 30 June 1983]

6. Keep under regular observation the most important government institutions, headquarters and other installations involved in preparation for RYAN. Send a list of immediate targets of observation to the Centre. Ascertain the 'normal level of activity' of these targets in and out of working hours, i.e. the outward signs of their daily activity in a normal situation (differences in the number of cars collected there in the daytime and the evening, and in the number of lighted windows in and out of working hours, and activity round these targets on non-working days). Find out, on the basis of the 'normal level' ascertained, any changes in the indicators during special conferences, when there is a crisis situation (cars collected there out of hours, an increase in the number of lighted windows at night in comparison with the 'normal level', or increased activity on non-working days).

7. Set a regular watch for any significant changes in the police administration system and the activity of the special [i.e. security and intelligence] services in regard to Soviet citizens and institutions, which may be associated with preparation for RYAN.

On points 6 and 7 inform Centre of the existence or absence of any changes of this kind regularly – once every two weeks.

Section II – Principal Prospective Directions for the Residency to Pursue its Work of Collecting the Information Needed to Discover the Adversary's Preparations for RYAN

1. Detailed description of the nature of measures being carried out in your country of residence by NATO headquarters and agencies, American representations and military installations located there at a time of immediate preparation by the USA and NATO for RYAN.

2. Analysis of the possibility of co-opting existing agents to work on uncovering preparation for RYAN and of using all available resources for this purpose.

3. Identifying and studying with a view to subsequent cooption for collaboration, a cadre of people associated with preparing and implementing the decision about RYAN, and also a group of people, including service and technical personnel, who might be informed of the fact that this or that measure is being taken in preparation for RYAN, even if they do not know its objective or purport (the official chauffeurs of individuals involved in the decision about RYAN, those working in the operating services of installations connected with processing and implementing the decision about RYAN, and communications staff involved in the operation and interaction of these installations).

4. Studying the possibilities of organising systematic observation of persons

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the United States continued its participation in both the INF and START talks, despite strong opposition from a number of people in and out of the administration. In fact, apart from rhetoric, the U.S. response was largely limited to multinational retaliation in the civil aviation arena. Even so, the Soviets thought the U.S. reaction—especially the rhetoric about their barbaric behavior—had been “provocative.”

While U.S. official actions in response to the shoot-down were fairly restrained, the powerful public reaction in the United States and official rhetoric added further stresses to an already very strained relationship. Early in 1983, there had been some tentative but behind-the-scenes moves to ease tensions and begin to move forward on issues of mutual interest like arms control. But SDI, KAL-007, and then the deployment of INF and Soviet walkout from the arms control talks all together put U.S.-Soviet relations in the deep freeze. Worse than that, there was real fear building on both sides that the situation was so bad, armed conflict was possible.

“ABLE ARCHER”

One of the potentially most dangerous episodes of the Cold War was prompted by a NATO command post exercise during the period November 2–11, 1983. The exercise, to practice nuclear release procedures, came at the moment of maximum stress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship described above. But it also came against the backdrop of Andropov’s seeming fixation on the possibility that the United States was planning a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

What we know about this is primarily—but not exclusively—from the KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. He has written that in May 1981, Andropov told a KGB conference that the United States was actively preparing for nuclear war. Those in the KGB familiar with the United States thought this was “alarmist” and suggested that Andropov’s “apocalyptic vision” originated with the Soviet military high command and, specifically, Andropov’s close associate Defense Minister Ustinov. As early as 1981, directions were sent from KGB headquarters (the Center) to its residencies in NATO capitals and in Japan calling for “close observation of all political, military, and intelligence activities that might indicate preparations for mobilization.” This program was called “RYAN”—the Russian acronym for “Nuclear Missile Attack.” This was the KGB’s top

priority in 1982. Andropov's elevation to General Secretary only added to the priority given RYAN.

The threat of a U.S. preemptive nuclear strike, according to intelligence sources, was still taken "very seriously" in Moscow in mid-1983 and even into 1984. Our sources claimed to have seen documents that betrayed genuine nervousness that such a strike could occur at any time, for example, under cover of an apparently routine military exercise. According to one source, "Few officials with direct experience of life in the West took the threat of a U.S. first strike seriously, but in senior party circles such an eventuality was widely perceived."

The Soviet propaganda apparatus cranked up in October 1983, and actually produced a war scare in the USSR. The official line to party and public alike was pessimistic about the chances for arms control, and promoted the notion that the deployment of INF would worsen relations with the United States, which seemed bent on world domination. Personal attacks on Reagan were extraordinary.

All this was even before "Able Archer" began on November 2. According to Gordievsky, the exercise especially alarmed Moscow because (1) the procedures and message formats used in the transition from conventional to nuclear war were different from those used before, and (2) in this exercise the NATO forces went through all of the alert phases from normal readiness to general alert. Further, he says that alarmist KGB reporting persuaded "the Center" that there was a real alert involving real troops. Also, surveillance around U.S. bases in Europe reported changed patterns of officer movement. Thus "the KGB concluded that American forces had been placed on alert—and might even have begun the countdown to nuclear war." This kind of reporting continued throughout the exercise.

But it wasn't just the KGB. Casey met with Reagan on December 22 and advised him that we had learned that in November there had been a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) instruction to all posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by the actual threat of war. All posts were to try to determine "the enemy's" intentions and actions. Finally, GRU elements were to create new agent groups abroad with the capability of communicating independently with GRU headquarters. The DCI told the President on that December day that the KGB and GRU information "seems to reflect

a Soviet perception of an increased threat of war and a realization of the necessity to keep intelligence information flowing to Moscow during wartime or after a rupture in diplomatic relations."

Despite Casey's December briefing of the President, we in CIA did not really grasp how alarmed the Soviet leaders might have been until some time after the exercise had concluded—in fact not until our British colleagues issued an assessment in March 1984 saying that the Soviets had thought nuclear war might have been imminent during "Able Archer." The British reviewed Gordievsky's reporting and added that the threat of a preemptive strike was taken very seriously in Moscow in mid-1983 and early 1984.

The assessment noted that in mid-1983, a Czech intelligence officer had confided to a Warsaw Pact³⁰ colleague that about a year earlier a requirement had been placed on his service to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. There was also an exceptional requirement to monitor with special care major NATO exercises. He continued that the increased state of alert of U.S. bases observed in early November 1983 (very likely due to heightened concern about terrorism after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in late October) in connection with "Able Archer" had given rise to "exceptional anxiety" within the Warsaw Pact. A genuine belief had taken root within the leadership of the Pact that a NATO preemptive strike was possible.

We later learned more about the Soviet military reaction during "Able Archer." Between November 2 and 11, there had been considerable activity by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces in the Baltic Military District as well as by East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak forces in response to preparations for the exercise and the exercise itself. Elements of the air forces of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany had gone on heightened alert because, according to the commander, of the increase in the threat of possible aggression against the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies during the exercise. Soviet military meteorological broadcasts were taken off the air during the exercise. Units of the Soviet Fourth Air Army had gone to increased readiness, and all combat flight operations were suspended from November 4 to 10.

Because of all this reporting, and the strongly held views of one of our allies, we prepared a special national estimate in May 1984, "The Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activity." The general view of CIA and U.S. military intelligence was

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that the heightened Soviet concerns were caused by the deployment of INF; it was acknowledged that the reduced warning time caused by the Pershing IIs "could not but have created apprehension" that Soviet vulnerability would increase, thereby forcing the Soviet leadership to seek a means of negating the potentially debilitating effect of reduced warning time. They wrote that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the Soviets had been worried about a possible attack because of "Able Archer," and said that Moscow's reactions were likely due to military prudence and precautionary measures to ensure that proper readiness levels were maintained.

We wrestled with this controversy for another year, with our own experts divided. The issue was terribly important. Had the United States come close to a nuclear crisis the preceding fall and not even known it? Was the Soviet leadership so out of touch that they really believed a preemptive attack was a real possibility? Had there nearly been a terrible miscalculation? To what degree was our skepticism about the war scare prompted by the fact that our military didn't want to admit that one of its exercises might have been dangerously if inadvertently provocative, or because our intelligence experts didn't want to admit that we had badly misread the state of mind of the Soviet leadership?

Information about the peculiar and remarkably skewed frame of mind of the Soviet leaders during those times that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union makes me think there is a good chance—with all of the other events in 1983—that they really felt a NATO attack was at least possible and that they took a number of measures to enhance their military readiness short of mobilization. After going through the experience at the time, then through the postmortems, and now through the documents, I don't think the Soviets were crying wolf. They may not have believed a NATO attack was imminent in November 1983, but they did seem to believe that the situation was very dangerous. And U.S. intelligence had failed to grasp the true extent of their anxiety. A reexamination of the whole episode by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1990 concluded that the intelligence community's confidence that this all had been Soviet posturing for political effect was misplaced.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



22 September 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: John Hines' Report -- *Soviet Intentions 1965-1985*

I originally initiated this project to exploit the opportunity afforded by the collapse of the USSR and what I expected to be a relatively short window of opportunity to interview effectively key Soviet military officers and defense officials. I hoped to understand how key US and Soviet senior defense officials viewed and assessed the military balance and associated doctrines and force postures. Also, the methods of assessment used were of special interest to me.

This effort was able to identify and compare differences (and similarities) in US and Soviet assessments of the military balance and to analyze the two very distinct ways in which Washington and Moscow developed and operated their nuclear arsenals. Of particular interest may be the evolution of Soviet views on the utility of nuclear warfare, the relationship between their military doctrine and actual force deployment decisions, and the complex, antagonistic relationship between Moscow's military and defense industrial establishments.

The report, however, leaves some questions unanswered. The failure to complete the report prior to John Hines' departure from BDM resulted in some unresolved issues. Thus it remains for other analysts to determine if it was the General Staff or the defense industrialists who drove the Soviet strategic force deployments. Questions of the disconnect between Soviet doctrine and observed force structure, or the claimed fear on the part of the Soviet leaders of falling behind remain to be answered.

Nevertheless, the report is quite interesting. In particular, those who worked on the military balance issues in the past will be particularly interested in the views held by their Soviet counterparts in the not too distant past. Ongoing developments in Russia, make it appear that the opportunity to interview key participants and to freely obtain data on relatively sensitive issues is rapidly closing, if it has not already closed.

A. W. Marshall
A. W. MARSHALL

Attachment



BDM Federal, Inc.
1501 BDM Way
McLean, VA 22102

SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965-1985

Volume I An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Assessments During the Cold War

AUTHORS:

John G. Hines, Senior Author
Ellis M. Mishulovich
John F. Shull

BDM FEDERAL, INC.

September 22, 1995

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OSD-NET ASSESSMENT

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SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965-1985

Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence

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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Subject: Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev

Position: Personal National Security Advisor to President Gorbachev
Chief of the Soviet General Staff, 1984-1989; First Deputy Chief
of the Soviet General Staff, 1979-1984; Chief of the Main
Operations Directorate of the General Staff, 1974-1979

Location: Akhromeev's Office in the Kremlin (Room 409)

Interviewer: John G. Hines

Date/Time: February 8, 1991, 4:00-5:30 p.m.

Prepared: Based on notes

By the mid-1970s, both the U.S. and USSR had established the technically advanced command and control systems needed to give them confidence in central control over nuclear weapons. From the early 1970s to 1986-87, the General Staff focused on ensuring absolute control over nuclear weapons to prevent any unauthorized use by having the missile arsenal "in hand" [*v rukakh* - he gestured as if holding the reins of a horse] through strong C³ systems. These efforts, by the mid-1970s, led to stability, which greatly reduced the likelihood of nuclear use. He said he believed the U.S. also had the necessary technical control over nuclear weapons only in the mid-1970s. Until then, there was a higher risk of an error on both sides.

In the European TVD² from 1972-87, the balance was good. The Soviets had a high level of readiness but were non-threatening. Akhromeev was very distrustful of U.S. intentions until he had the opportunity actually to meet his American counterparts on the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1988. The first and several subsequent meetings reassured him that the joint chiefs were thoughtful and responsible people. The mutual understanding that came from face-to-face discussions helped to create a fairly stable situation in Europe. The intentions ascribed for many years by each side to the other were incorrect.

What caused much tension in the General Staff were the many U.S. air and naval bases encircling the USSR, and the listening posts surrounding the USSR, as well as the constant use of air reconnaissance along the Soviet borders. This is how the Korean airliner got shot down.

The increased readiness of both sides usually was prompted by distrust. Each side made a tremendous misreading of the other side's intentions, which led to a greater possibility of accidental strikes. Nonetheless, there was not a very great danger of war during the period 1970-87.

At no time did the USSR ever intend to make first use of nuclear weapons. In a military sense, the side that attacked preemptively would win, but in practical terms

² TVD — *Teatr voennykh deistvii* — Theater of (Strategic) Military Action, for example, Central Europe from Ukraine to the western shore of Ireland.

neither side would win. Even to the General Staff it was clear that nuclear weapons were not really military weapons but were political tools.

In 1962, the USSR could not respond massively to a U.S. attack. Only in the late 1960s did the USSR acquire the capability to respond, which provided some stability. Neither side could consider selective nuclear use until the 1970s because technology and control systems before that could not support limited nuclear options (LNO).

In the early 1970s, within the military leadership, even the more conservative generals' understanding of nuclear weapons had matured to the point that they believed that nuclear weapons had no real military utility. Once a nuclear balance was established then deterrence [*sderzhivanie putem ustrasheniia*] was true of both sides. Solution of the question of control at the strategic level left unresolved the problem of positive control of nuclear weapons at the tactical level. By the late 1970s, both sides essentially had solved the question of control of tactical nuclear weapons.

Nuclear use had to be avoided if at all possible. Preemption was technically not even possible until very recently. In any case, the decision would take so long to make that the USSR would be stuck with a responsive strike.

[KGB defector] Oleg Gordievsky's revelations about the RIA-N [*Raketo-ladernoe Napadenie*]³ crisis of 1983 were self-serving falsifications. I'll explain why. There is the KGB over here [he placed an imaginary box on the table to his right] and the General Staff over there [he gestured far to his left]. The CIA is here [he gestured to my left] and the Joint Chiefs of Staff--The Pentagon--over here [on my right]. The KGB and CIA have more in common and more exchanges than do the General Staff and KGB. We in the General Staff probably would not brief a KGB officer on such secrets, especially if he was being posted to a Western embassy. Gordievsky did not know what the General Staff was doing. He told such stories to improve his standing in the West. War was not considered imminent.

SDI really can affect the future of warfare and greatly destabilize strategic relations. The side that achieves invulnerability will press this advantage. If the U.S. pursues SDI, the USSR can find cheap ways of countering the defenses, but this would undermine stability. If SDI is not included in START, then the USSR will announce unilaterally that Soviet agreement on START II will be conditional on the U.S. renouncing development of BMD.

Though the U.S. has precision weapons, technological countermeasures will be developed, e.g., to make tanks invisible. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq had no electronic countermeasures but after 5,000 U.S. sorties it still had 1,000s of tanks intact. The U.S. may be overestimating the effectiveness of precision weapons because they are being used in the Gulf War without opposition. A technologically sophisticated opponent will develop ways to counter this U.S. capability.

³ RIA-N was an acronym that the Soviets used to describe a special period of tension between 1980 and 1984 when they reported greatly heightened expectations of a nuclear attack from the U.S. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), pp. 501-507.

RECORD OF INTERVIEW

Subject: Gen.-Lt. Gelii Viktorovich Batenin

Position: Gen. Batenin began his career as an artillery officer and transferred in the 1960s to the Strategic Rocket Forces. In the late 1970s and through the mid-1980s, General Batenin worked for Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev in various roles when the latter was chief of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate and then as First Deputy Chief of the General Staff under Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.

Date: Friday, August 6, 1993

Place: McLean, VA

Interviewer: John G. Hines

Language: Russian

Prepared: Based on notes

Q: Over the past 3 years or so, I have interviewed several senior military people as well as from military industry and the Central Committee.⁴ I was able to interview your former chief, Marshal Akhromeev twice and met several times with General Danilevich.

A: Danilevich? You know, he wrote the three-volume work for the General Staff on the Strategy of Deep-Operations, or at least he was responsible for the work. He directed the effort, very actively. The book covered everything, the entire picture of possible future war. It began with the anti-space operation [*protivo-kosmicheskaya operatsiia*] against incoming missiles, the anti-air operation [*protivo-vozdushnaya operatsiia*] against your bombers and then the deep operations against NATO to the full depth of the theater. "Operational-strategic depth" referred to the entire 1,200 km depth of the European theater, to the beaches at the western edge of the continent. The theory of deep operations in Danilevich's work envisioned great depths of military action [*voennye deistviia*] because of the range of weapons, weapons platforms and the speed of movement of the forces. The initial operation was expected to take 5 to 7 days and to carry the counter-offensive 500 km. At that point we expected that we would have lost half of our tanks and that half of the remaining force would have outrun its logistics support. Because so much of the force would be exhausted, early, decisive success over the enemy was very important.

Q: What scenarios for the beginning of war were assumed in the book on strategic operations?

A: Missile strikes from the U.S. and the initiation of an offensive by NATO. The main objective of initial operations by Soviet Forces and the Warsaw Pact were to break up [*sorvat'*] the NATO offensive throughout the depth of NATO's forces and NATO's rear. Included in the concept of breaking up and stopping NATO's offensive was the

⁴ Central Committee will be either spelled out or abbreviated as CC throughout the interviews.

preemptive destruction of as many launch systems and aircraft as possible as well as associated control systems.

Q: Was the preemption to be with the use of conventional or nuclear weapons?

A: That would depend. We expected NATO to launch nuclear strikes at some point. If we did not detect preparation on the part of NATO to launch nuclear weapons immediately, we would attack launch platforms and storage using conventional weapons. If we detected preparation by NATO to launch nuclear strikes, and we believed we would know when this was happening, we would want to strike NATO's launch and control systems with nuclear strikes of our own. We had confidence in our knowledge of when NATO was preparing for nuclear launch. We would detect mating of warheads to missiles and uploading of nuclear bombs and artillery. We listened to the hourly circuit verification signal on your nuclear release communications systems and believed we would recognize a release order. Under these conditions when we detected NATO actually preparing to launch, we would want to preempt your launch with our own nuclear strikes.

Q: Did the General Staff consider selective use of nuclear weapons [*vyborochnye udary*] under these conditions, especially if it was clear that NATO would be attacking with only a few, say ten, nuclear weapons?

A: This would be very difficult to execute. It would be difficult just to launch on time against NATO preparation even with a strike against all or most of your nuclear capable systems and it is doubtful that we would attempt to restrict the strike under those conditions. More important, Ogarkov was very much opposed to the idea of limited nuclear war [*ogranichennaya iadernaya voyna*] in any form because he believed it would benefit NATO.

Q: How?

A: By making nuclear strikes more likely, by making NATO believe that the Soviet Union might fight a limited nuclear war. A limited nuclear war was more likely to occur than an unlimited nuclear war. And Ogarkov believed that, once begun, limited nuclear use would almost certainly escalate to massive use. He tried to maintain, therefore, the posture that in the event of war massive use of nuclear weapons was both undesirable but unavoidable once any nuclear weapons were used. Akhromeev, by the way, was more open to at least considering situations where selected strikes might be made.

Q: Where did this grand concept of the strategy of deep operations come from?

A: I believe the SS-20 made it possible, that the SS-20 created the environment in which strategists could think about war on such a large scale. The SS-20 had a very low vulnerability, high accuracy and a great range, not only over all of Europe but over the Middle and Near East and much of the Mediterranean. Under the roof of the SS-20 it was possible to think about deep operations. There was a certain irony in that by 1987, many in the General Staff thought that all of the components necessary for conducting deep operations were in place at last, that we were ready that spring. We conducted games and exercises. At the same time, in December of that year we signed the INF Treaty. Gorbachev had his agenda and the General Staff its agenda. Gorbachev had seen General Danilevich's three-volume book on strategy. He even had a copy but he never read it. He was moving in another direction, eliminating the weapons that were the basis for executing such a strategy.

Q: When did these various elements come together, that is, the capabilities of the SS-20 and the development of the strategy of deep operations?

A: The late 1970s, it began to take shape in the late 1970s. The SS-20 was being deployed and Danilevich and others in his collective were developing concepts.

Q: Ogarkov took over in 1977?

A: Yes, this was important. Ogarkov fostered this kind of thinking, very actively.

Q: Relations between Ogarkov and Ustinov. Marshal Akhromeev wrote in his book, *Through The Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat*, that by 1982 relations were so bad that it was difficult for the General Staff to function effectively.

A: Yes, relations by 1982 were extremely strained. A major issue was PVO [*protivo-vozdushnaia oborona*—Air-Defense]. Ogarkov wanted to eliminate the PVO as a service, put the air element in the Air Forces and subordinate ground elements to the Ground Forces. He believed Ground Forces PVO [*PVO sukhoputnykh voisk*] was an effective arrangement that provided reliable air defense of forces under an integrated command. He wanted to broaden that principle. He also believed he could thereby eliminate an entire service headquarters apparatus. Ustinov wanted to retain that old structure.

Q: Was this the only disagreement?

A: No. There were broader differences. Ogarkov believed that the types and numbers of weapons produced should be determined by the military customers [*zakazchiki*] and Ustinov believed that such decisions were the business of the Communist Party,⁵ Defense Council, and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), that is, the industrialists.

Q: Was the General Staff-MoD deadlock as bad as was described by Akhromeev?

A: Absolutely. Things got done, in fact, because Ustinov treated Akhromeev as the *de facto* Chief of Staff. After 1982 he acted, in effect, as the Second Chief of the General Staff rather than as the First Deputy. Ustinov would communicate with Akhromeev rather than with Ogarkov. Akhromeev tried to keep Ogarkov informed, at first, and then told him less and less because it caused more problems than it solved. I was with Akhromeev in his office once when Ogarkov called to ask about some decision he had heard about from another source. It related to a change in organization in the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces Germany) as I recall. Akhromeev, who was involved in the decision by Ustinov, was very uncomfortable. I heard him confirming the decision and explaining why he had not informed Ogarkov, that he had intended to brief him but other events had intervened, etc. This was a very difficult situation.

Q: There have been various reports, the most well known from former KGB agent Oleg Gordievsky and published openly in England, that there was a period of great tension in the Soviet Government in the early 1980s. Specifically, between about 1981 and 1984, the MoD, KGB, and others, believed that there was a high probability that the U.S. and NATO were preparing to attack the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, including with

⁵ Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be either spelled out or abbreviated as CPSU throughout the interviews.

nuclear weapons. The whole problem of increased threat was identified under the acronym RIaN [*Raketno-ladernoe Napadenie*].⁶

A: Yes. I am very familiar with RIaN. There was a great deal of tension in the General Staff at that time and we worked long hours, longer than usual. I don't recall a period more tense since the Caribbean Crisis in 1962.

⁶ RIaN was an acronym that the Soviets used to describe a special period of tension between 1980 and 1984 when they reported greatly heightened expectations of a nuclear attack from the U.S. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), pp. 501-507.

RECORD OF INTERVIEW

Subject: Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev

Position: Former Senior Advisor (1967-1985) to the Chairman of the Central Committee Defense Industry Department (Renamed "Defense Department" in 1991) of Central Committee of CPSU responsible for strategic arms and defense policy, arms control negotiations, and military doctrine

Location: Institute for Defense Studies (INOBIS), Moscow

Interviewer: John G. Hines

Date/Time: June 23, 1993, 3:30 p.m.

Language: Russian

Prepared by: John G. Hines, based on notes

Note: Also present: Viktor Popov, former senior staff member of the Central Committee Defense Industry Department.

Q: In your narrative discussion, you indicated there was no formal structure for political-military decision making but that a "troika," or perhaps a foursome of top officials actually made such decisions; the Defense Minister, the Central Committee Secretary for defense industries, the Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), and the Secretary, I assume General Secretary, of the Central Committee. In our earlier discussion you and Viktor Popov mentioned the "piaterka" [the five] who had the final say on defense issues. The five you mentioned were: Smirnov, Chairman of the VPK; Ustinov, the Minister of Defense and Secretary for Defense Industry; Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Andropov, the head of the KGB, and Brezhnev, the General Secretary.

A: The broader "piaterka" with Andropov and especially Gromyko was more likely to be involved on defense questions that went beyond the interests of only the military or the industrialists, questions related to doctrine and high-level, international decisions related to arms-limitation negotiations.

Q: It has come up in earlier discussions that the Chelomei missile [SS-19] presented for decision in Yalta in July 1969 was assessed to be less reliable than the Iangel' missile [SS-17]. What determined the reliability [*ustoichivost'*] of a missile system?

A: First of all, Chelomei's missile had a low survivability [*zashchitnost'*] rating, low reliability [*ustoichivost'*] rating, and an overall reliability [*obshchaia nadezhnost'*] rating of 90%. (The Minuteman was rated between 70% and 80%.) The overall reliability is the product of several factors—the missile's inherent stability and the hardness of onboard control and launch systems, the silo, the local control system, the central control system, especially to include its survivability and the survivability of the control links under nuclear attack (including Electromagnetic Pulse, EMP)—that would affect a missile system's ability to launch and strike its target in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. Kataev made clear that, by Soviet criteria, the Minuteman was systematically less reliable

under or after attack than the SS-19 (even though, in the late 1960s, Minuteman was hardened to 20 kg/cm² [284 psi] versus the Soviet Union's 2 kg/cm² [28 psi]).

Q: In your calculations, what assumptions did you make about U.S. intentions and capabilities to launch against the Soviet Union?

A: We assumed that the U.S. would launch first and, given your focus on accuracy and relatively smaller yields per warhead, that you intended to strike our weapons and control systems in an attempt to disarm us.

Perhaps the single most important factor affecting our calculations was the accuracy of your strategic missiles. In our estimation, the U.S. began its pursuit of very high accuracy in 1963 in what we called the MX program. Your determination to increase warhead accuracy led us to be more and more concerned about the survivability of our systems. By 1965 we had decided to develop mobile ICBMs. By the early 1970s, we were to have tested the first rail-mobile system. Grechko, however, canceled the mobiles program.

Nuclear power [*iadernaia moshch'*], in our assessments, is a function of yield, number of weapons, and accuracy. Accuracy can have a decisive effect as a multiplier to greatly increase the effective power of a nuclear missile. Several factors, especially accuracy, for example, increased the power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal by a factor of three in the years leading up to difficulties associated with RlaN [*Raketno-Iadernoe Napadenie*—nuclear missile attack] in the early 1980s.

Q: Could you expand on the role of the "Dead Hand" missile communications system?

A: "Dead Hand" represented one of two trigger mechanisms on a basic system of command missiles [*komandnye rakety*] designed to launch Soviet ICBMs. The basic command-missile system is comprised of a command missile or missiles deployed near, but not in, clusters of silos. The command missiles are well concealed, physically hardened well beyond the hardening of weapons launch platforms and especially well hardened against damage from electro-magnetic pulse [EMI—*elektro-magnitnyi impul's*]. Each command missile is linked in its communications package with a specific set of launch platforms. Upon command, the missiles are launched into near space from which each missile transmits launch orders to that cluster of ICBMs to which it is linked. (The scenario under which the system would be used assumes that all ICBMs are retargeted from enemy missiles to objectives that have economic and infrastructure value.)

There are two means by which each command missile might be launched to transmit its message to the ICBMs. The first is under positive control from the central control system. The decision is taken to launch and the time before impact of the enemy's strike is seen to be insufficient to permit normal launch procedures. The second is the "Dead Hand" launch mechanism. Under the "Dead Hand" mechanism, the decision maker at the center unblocks [*razblokirovat'*] the no-fire mechanism at the center, thereby releasing launch control to local automatic triggers associated with each command missile. The triggers, fed by numerous sensors, will launch its local command missile and, in turn, its associated cluster of ICBMs once the sensors are excited by the light, or seismic shock, or radiation, or atmospheric density associated with an incoming nuclear strike.

Q: Were the missiles operational by 1981?

A: Yes, definitely operational by the early 1980s.

It is important to understand that unblocking of "Dead Hand" assumes the scenario of a situation that is extremely threatening to the political and military leadership of the state. The basic expectation is that all decision makers are dead when the command missiles automatically fire.

Q: I would like to touch once more on the question of selective strikes.

A: We never accepted a limited strike option, not in the Central Committee, not as an element of the military policy of the CPSU [*Voennaia Politika KPSS*].

Q: But very well informed generals in the General Staff claim that they analyzed limited options of various kinds, and, under some conditions, would be prepared to implement them.

A: Of course the military played with this inside their own little box to which they would then pull down the cover, shutting themselves in the dark away from exposure to what was really going on. [He formed a box around his eyes with his hands and then pulled an imaginary cover out and down over his eyes]. Even though the military looked at limited options I know, personally, that they were not accepted. I attended many very high-level [the Defense Council supported by Central Committee Defense Industrial Department] meetings where major weapons and other development and procurement decisions on missile systems were debated and made. At many if not most such meetings, the doctrinal and strategic rationale for such force development decisions were reviewed and sometimes challenged. At such meetings selective use was occasionally raised as a possible option and was always rejected. Selective use was not approved, even for the tactical level.

Q: It seems to me that holding on to a position that "one little nuclear weapon from the enemy will end the world," was designed to deter [*sderzhat'*] the U.S.

A: (Kataev and Viktor Popov, with recognition and enthusiasm): Of course. Exactly so!

Q: All right, what if for some reason deterrence failed and the Americans did what General Korobushin said we exercised in the mid-1980s, two or three nuclear missiles on remote military facilities in Siberia—or even seven to twenty tactical nuclear strikes from NATO in Europe against Soviet Forces in the course of an ongoing war? What would the Politburo do—in the 1980s or 1970s? End the world by retaliating with a massive strike? Ignore the strike? Respond with limited strikes and negotiate?

A: [After a fairly lengthy and very serious pause] I just don't know. That would be a very tough decision. [Viktor Popov also thought that the actual response would be very difficult and very hard to predict. Both seemed to be caught by surprise by the question—as if they actually had never considered it before.]

28 October 2009

Pamela N. Phillips
Chief FOIA/AP Officer
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755

Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal of Case: 56741D

Dear Ms. Phillips:

This letter constitutes an administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6). I am writing to appeal the determination by the National Security Agency with regard to FOIA request 56741D, which requested "documents relating to Soviet and Warsaw Pact espionage activities against the United States and NATO beginning in 1981," especially "activities...codenamed Operation RYAN (Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie - nuclear missile attack) by the KGB and GRU [including monitoring American and European facilities for a possible first strike."

By a letter dated 15 September 2009, the National Security Agency denied 81 documents in full. Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) were the justifications for the denial (*Attachment A*).

First, I ask for further review that all reasonably segregable material in these documents has been released. It is unlikely that - at a minimum - the dates, titles, and COMINT contained in the documents, are not segregable.

Second, I believe that the documents in question can be released without "constitut[ing] a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" by the excision of names, addresses, and other "harming" information. **I contend that the (b)(6) exemption does not justify withholding the documents in full.**

Third, I also ask the reviewers of this appeal to take into account previously declassified information which is directly relevant to the withheld documents.

I question whether information about Soviet Espionage in the early 1980s must remain excised to protect US national security, justifying a (b)(1) exemption. No Soviet decision maker remains in power, the Cold War has ended, and the Soviet Union no longer exists. Consider that Soviet documents announcing Operation RYAN to KGB and GRU agents serving abroad have already been published in full in *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files from the KGB's Foreign Operations*, written by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (*Attachment B*). Likewise, numerous Soviet, American, and other intelligence officials have acknowledged, written about, and analyzed Operation RYAN. The most prominent of these may be former Deputy Director of Intelligence, Robert Gates who wrote about

Operation RYaN in *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (Attachment C)*. Because information about Operation RYaN is in the public domain, it seems unlikely all 81 documents meet qualifications for continued classification.

Finally, I contend that material in Operation RYaN previously declassified by the Department of Defense makes it possible to release the withheld documents. On 17 June 2009 the DOD declassified a two-volume study, *Soviet Intentions 1965-1985*, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (segments in *Attachment D*) in which the authors interviewed "key Soviet military officers and defense officials" to describe how the officers "viewed and assessed the military balance and associated doctrines and force postures" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The declassified study included summaries or transcripts of interviews with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev, Gen.-Col. Adrian A. Danilevich, Gen.-Col. Igor V. Illarionov, Gen.-Lt. Geli V. Batenin, Gen.-Maj. Iuri A. Kirshin, Gen. Makhmut A. Gareev, and Dr. Vitalii N. Tsygichko. In the interviews, the Soviet leaders recounted their candid opinions on Operation RYaN.

As you review my appeal, please consider the recent Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act issued by President Barack Obama on January 21, 2009, which directs all agencies to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure" and apply this presumption "to all decisions involving FOIA."¹ In his March 19 guidelines, the Attorney General likewise directs agencies to make discretionary disclosures and segregate information for disclosure whenever possible. Under this new Department of Justice (DOJ) policy, which rescinds Attorney General John Ashcroft's 2001 FOIA memorandum, DOJ "will defend a denial of a FOIA request only if (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law."² Thus, agencies should be in a position to clearly articulate a reasonably foreseeable harm or a basis for mandatory withholding before deciding to withhold records; this includes exemption (b)(3). Pursuant to this new executive branch policy, I ask that you consider whether some or all of the information withheld in response to my FOIA request should be released in light of the new presumption of disclosure. If your review of this case suggests that there would be no foreseeable harm from disclosing the requested record(s) or that any potential harm would be limited in comparison to the public interest in disclosure, please exercise your discretion to release this information.

Thank you for your consideration of this appeal. I look forward to a prompt response. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me by phone (970.690.9645) or email (natebjones@gmail.com).

Sincerely,



¹ President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009)

² Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (March 19, 2009).

Nate Jones



Enclosures:

Attachment A – National Security Agency's letter of 15 September 2009.

Attachment B – Top Secret Files from the KGB's Foreign Operations, written by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky.

Attachment C – From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War written by Robert Gates.

Attachment D – Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull, released on 17 June 2009 by the Department of Defense.


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SEVENTH AIR DIVISION



HEADQUARTERS

7th AIR DIVISION (SAC)

RAMSTEIN AB, GERMANY

140000
16 December 1968

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Ex 28

SACEUR Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83 (U)

After Action Report (U)

I. (U) General.

A. ~~(S)~~ ABLE ARCHER (AA) is an annual SACEUR-sponsored Allied Command Europe CPX to practice command and control procedures with particular emphasis on the transition from purely conventional operations to chemical, nuclear and conventional operations. It is the culmination of SACEUR's annual AUTUMN FORGE exercise series.

B. ~~(S)~~ ABLE ARCHER 83 was conducted 7-11 Nov 83 with three days of "low spectrum" conventional play followed by two days of "high spectrum" nuclear warfare. Due to the low spectrum lead-in for AA 83, SAC was invited to provide liaison officers/advisors to observe and comment on operation of B-52 and KC-135 assets in accordance with SACEUR OPLANs 10604, FANCY GIRL and 10605, GOLDEN EAGLE.

C. (U) SAC Participation (Background)

1. ~~(S)~~ SAC participated in a previous AA with two observers. Due to the nature of the exercise and the possible political implications or inferences of B-52 involvement, future SAC participation was discouraged.

2. ~~(S)~~ SHAPE announced that AA 83 scenario had been changed to include three days of low spectrum activity and requested that SAC take an active part in the exercise. SAC proposed sending a team of two observers to each MSC, SHAPE and UK RAOC. SHAPE accepted this proposal, with the understanding that personnel were to act as observers/advisors to the staff at each level. A description of ADVON activities at these locations is contained in Section II.

D. (U) SAC objectives for ABLE ARCHER 83 were to:

1. ~~(S)~~ Observe NATO play of B-52 and KC-135 employment in accordance with SACEUR OPLANs.

2. (U) Determine if future participation is warranted, and if so, to what extent.

3. (U) Interface with SACEUR and MSC War Headquarters' staffs for mutual education.

4. (U) Update location guides.

E. (U) SAC ADVON composition for ABLE ARCHER 83 was as follows:

1. (U) AFNORTH:

Maj Paul J. Erbacher, 7AD/DOO, Bomber Planner
Maj Arunas Siulte, 7AD/DO8, Tanker Planner

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Ex 287

2. (U) AFCENT:
Lt Col Arthur J. Lindemer, HQ SAC/DOO, Bomber Planner
Maj Ronald J. Valentine, HQ SAC/XOO, Tanker Planner
3. (U) AFSOUTH:
Lt Col Michael J. DePaul, 8AF/DOX, Bomber Planner
Lt Col John P. Bateman, 8AF/DOX, Tanker Planner
4. (U) SHAPE:
Lt Col William N. Maxwell, 7AD/DOX, Bomber Planner
Maj Peter W. Hardin, 8AF/DOO, Tanker Planner
5. (U) UK RAOC:
Maj Geoffrey C. Wenke, 15AF/DOXX, Tanker Planner

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Ex 287

II. (U) ADVON OBSERVATIONS

A. (U) SHAPE

1. (S) GENERAL. ABLE ARCHER is too short for ADVON training or participation. The level of play PSC to MSC only dilutes the B-52 targeting process and the allocation of support packages. The level of SAC procedures training is almost nonexistent. Since ABLE ARCHER is primarily a nuclear procedures exercise, the viability of SAC play also comes into question. The AA Ops Order excepted SAC as players and stated they would act as observers (TAB C to APP III to Annex C). SAC observers at SHAPE were forced into playing SAC ADVON roles because there was no coordinated starting position for SAC assets. Each PSC was directed by SHAPE Op Order to develop unique Air Directives prior to SAC observer arrival. SHAPE started with full SAC force of bombers and tankers. Since the PSCs had developed their Air Directives for the first exercise day and published day two Air Directive at exercise initiation there were no requirements for B-52 allocation requests for days one and two. The underlying reason for the delay was a SACEUR B-52 allocation message for real-world tasking that had exercise information as the last paragraph. The last para (in summary) stated "Allocation from SACEUR was good for 48 hours." Thus, there were no requests from the PSCs for 7 and 8 Nov. However, CS SHAPE (Gen Dalton) wanted B-52 play. So the observers became ADVON players by default.

2. (S) ADVON OBSERVATIONS. Because of the level of play and the individual PSC scenarios only the bomber monitor had activity. The tanker planner at SHAPE had almost no activity due to use of SACEUR OPLAN, GOLDEN EAGLE, preallocations and no SACEUR direction to reallocate. The bomber observer acted as an advisor to the Air Operations Officer. Slides reflecting bomber beddown were initiated and updated with aircraft available daily. Since the USAFE OSC was not playing and units were not playing, a "Best Estimate" on bomber availability was made daily by the bomber observer. Attrition was neither planned for nor expected to be played, however, Southern Region reported one loss. During nuclear strikes SACEUR would only deconflict B-52s and strike assets plus or minus two hours of the TOT. The bomber planner also had to review B-52 targets for deconfliction with strike targets. SHAPE is the only place this can be done totally. PSCs can deconflict targets in their regions but a bomber strike near the border between two regions cannot be deconflicted at the PSC level. SACEUR bomber allocation messages were drafted and finalized for the Air Ops Officer. One mining request was received from AFNORTH but time lines would have made the mission occur after ENDEX. The request was denied because the TOT requested was far ahead of mine availability. An AFCENT request to disperse KC-135s to other UK bases was not acted upon due to SHAPE scenario inputs for chemical attacks and airfield attacks on the requested bases.

3. (S) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. SAC ADVON participation is not recommended for future AA exercises because the duration of play is too short for training; the exercise is primarily designed to exercise nuclear release procedures; the level of play does not allow the full target request allocation process to be exercised; the OSC does not play for logistics support; response cell and unit reports are not available and each region designs its own scenario.

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4. ~~(S)~~ OTHER COMMENTS. An interesting sidelight was a request by SACEUR's Action Cell to provide a real-world type answer to a scenario situation. The problem was to relieve pressure on northern Norway. B-52 capabilities and F-111 capabilities were briefed to the team for their knowledge and consideration. The area to be targeted would have been the Kola Peninsula. Based on the scenario, the massed troops and mobile defenses coupled with static defenses made high altitude attacks highly questionable and low altitude better. However, the F-111 with 24 bombs and hard TFR would be the optimum air delivery vehicle. (My opinion).

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Ex 287

B. (U) AFCEM.

1. ~~(S)~~ GENERAL. NATO was heavily engaged in conventional warfare at STARTEX. In the Central Region (CR), ORANGE (OR) forces were attacking along the entire German border with air attacks against BLUE (BL) airfields in Germany. OR attacks on UK airfields disrupted B-52 and KC-135 operations as well as destroying some aircraft. OR conducted chemical attacks throughout the exercise. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY. ADVON observer activities during AA 83 included:

(a) (U) Inputting correct data into the CCIS data base.

(b) (U) Observe the exercise and provide assistance. ERWIN desired 24-hour bomber and tanker coverage but it was impossible with two players. The 0600 to 1800L time frame was covered. We performed ADVON functions of drafting bomber request/allocation messages, tanker FCE allocation requests and coordinated on Air Directive inputs.

(c) ~~(S)~~ On E+1, we were directed to go to the Alternate War HQ (CREST-HIGH) which was located, for this exercise, at Heinrich Hertz Kaserne in Birkenfeld. The alternate staff desired SAC force expertise while they were in charge of OR operations which lasted all day E+1.

(d) (U) Helmets, gas masks and chemical suits were required. Gas masks were used by players at CREST HIGH for several hours after an OR chemical attack.

(e) (U) ERWIN was sealed for several hours during the evening of E+2.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) ~~(S)~~ Bomber Operations. SHAPE MSG 040900Z Nov established the initial CR bomber allocation at nine sorties per day along with tactical control for use against mobile targets. Nine sorties were also allocated for 8-10 Nov. The 11-12 Nov allocation was 18 sorties. B-52s were allocated to 2ATAF and 4ATAF to apply almost exclusively against mobile troop concentrations by using the target change tactic. There was incomplete information at AAFCE to determine the exact targets or the results of the attacks.

(1) (U) The B-52s were not included in the initial AAFCE data base and were added 7 Nov.

(2) ~~(S)~~ AAFCE did not receive any bomber request messages from 2 and 4ATAF even though they were requested several times. The ATAFs were addressed on the SHAPE message providing the initial allocation and new

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procedures. As a result, the AAFCE players examined the battle situation and made the bomber request to SACEUR as well as the subsequent suballocation to 2/4ATAF. The ADVON observer assisted with the process. Bombers were included in the Air Directive.

(3) ~~(S)~~ It is extremely difficult for the ATAFs to identify a mobile target in the detail requested by SHAPE for them to base the B-52 allocation. This may be the reason the ATAFs did not submit request messages.

(4) ~~(S)~~ A major BL counterattack was planned and conducted by 2ATAF. They requested 30 B-52s to provide support of their objectives. SACEUR denied the request because of heavy commitment of B-52s to the Northern Region. Nine sorties previously allocated were employed in the counterattack.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Tanker Operations. In the STARTEX AAFCE Air Directive the KC-135 force was suballocated to 2ATAF and 4ATAF by base. The status of the allocated force, with pre-exercise scenario attrition, was as follows:

BEDFORD	13	2ATAF
GREENHAM COMMON	26	2ATAF
BRIZE NORTON	12	4ATAF
FAIRFORD	<u>17</u>	4ATAF
TOTAL	68	AAFCE

Tankers were employed at an average sortie rate of 1.0 due to sortie generation degrade at all tanker bases IAW exercise scenario, high daily first-wave sortie requirements, and DISTAFF OPSTAT inputs. On E+2 AAFCE planners realized that the remaining allocated tankers would not meet their planned air refueling requirements on E+3 and 4. The refueling requirements increased due to increased effort given to air defense and OCA. AAFCE requested from SACEUR allocation of FCE assets from Mildenhall to provide 20 additional sorties for the next two days. SACEUR allocated 15 aircraft from Mildenhall to satisfy this urgent requirement. On E+3 AAFCE sent request to SACEUR/USCINCEUR/USAFE/3AF for authorization to use civilian UK airports Gatwick and Stanstead for gas and go operations. This request was prompted to increase survivability and sortie offload capability. By ENDEX this proposal was not approved.

4. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION. Future CR SAC ADVON participation in ABLE ARCHER is recommended only with the following stipulations:

(a) (U) Scenario must include at least three days of conventional activity.

(b) (U) Two bomber and two tanker planners participate at ERWIN/2ATAF/4ATAF (six personnel) for 24-hour coverage.

(c) (U) No B-52 fragging of sorties.

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(d) (U) Two DISTAFF representatives (24-hour coverage) are provided to input unit reports.

(e) (U) SAC ADVON bags are complete and available at 7 AD so minimum preparation is required.

(f) (U) ADVON players must be experienced.

(g) (U) ADVON support is strongly desired by COMAAFCE/SACEUR.

5. (U) OTHER COMMENTS. This exercise again reinforced the need to improve the SAC ADVON capability to conduct wartime operations. Emphasis must be placed on completing the following:

-- CINCSAC OPLAN 4102

-- SAC ADVON bags built/maintained and in readiness for real-world crisis situations.

-- SACR 55-7 Vol VII/VIII (staff conventional directive)

-- Integration of B-52/KC-135 reporting procedures into the NATO system.

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C. (U) AFNORTH

1. (U) GENERAL.

(a) (U) The AFNORTH staff received the SAC ADVON with great enthusiasm but were somewhat disappointed when we were unable to provide 24-hour coverage. It was finally agreed that we would cover the day shift, since it would provide the majority of our activity.

(b) (U) The tanker representative took up a position in the RAOC (Regional Air Operations Center). The bomber representative was asked to divide his presence between the Targets Division and the RAOC, since his expertise and coordination would be required in both areas.

(c) ~~(S)~~ The target staff at AFNORTH appeared to be perfectly willing to manage the bomber allocation, select targets, and make request to SHAPE, in accordance with SHAPE message. They were relieved to have the SAC ADVON, since they were unsure of the mechanics to make such a request. Had the SAC Reporting Guide been available to them, they could have accomplished necessary messages.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITIES.

(a) ~~(S)~~ The bomber representative was involved in the Target Action Group Meeting, as an observer, since this dealt primarily with the deconfliction of NATO nuclear strikes and B-52/other aircraft conventional attacks. Both representatives attended Shift Changeover/Update Briefing, and Air Resources meeting. Level of questions for ADVON could have easily been answered by AFNORTH target staff.

(b) ~~(S)~~ With PSCs at COMNON, COMSONOR, and COMBALTAP at minimal manning levels, requests from AFNORTH staff for B-52 target nominations went unanswered. COMBALTAP did make one request for attacks and implementation of "EBB HORN" mining in COMLAND ZEELAND area.

(c) (U) Overall activity for the ADVON in the exercise was extremely limited.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) (U) BOMBER

(b)(5)

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and execution time, and lack of escort on a heavily defended target, support could not be provided.

(b) (U) TANKER

(1) ~~(S)~~ AFNORTH was allocated 20 tankers to support operations in the Northern European Command (NEC). These were all used at a sortie rate of 1.5 each day. On 8 Nov AFNORTH requested that five KC-135s be positioned at Sola Airfield in Norway. These were used to provide more responsive refueling to marine and air defense aircraft in region. They also became an integral part of massed raid to extend range of F-111, F-4 and F-16 aircraft involved.

4. (U) FUTURE PARTICIPATION.

(a) ~~(S)~~ With PSCs at COMNOR, COMSONOR, and COMBALTAP operating at minimum manning levels, requests from AFNORTH for target nominations for all aircraft went, for the most part, unanswered. What did filter up was oriented to the nuclear/chemical aspect of the exercise. The low play level at these locations did not allow for the feedback that should be available. Without increased NATO and US manning at all levels, we cannot justify expanded SAC ADVON participation.

(b) ~~(S)~~ As cited in paragraph 1c, the AFNORTH staff was willing to try operating without the SAC ADVON. Since in an actual conflict, the SAC ADVON may be delayed in arrival at locations, ABLE ARCHER would give NATO staffs an opportunity to at least become familiar with operations without SAC ADVON assistance. A small ADVON DISTAFF Cell at SHAPE could monitor inputs and act on them accordingly.

(c) ~~(S)~~ The presence of the SAC ADVON, especially in large numbers for an exercise of this nature, raises a sensitive, political issue concerning the role of the B-52. One may see an implication or make the inference that if B-52 aircraft are present in a nuclear scenario exercise, are they being used to perform strike missions? Numerous times during the exercise, the word "strike" was used in reference to B-52 sorties. While this is an obvious slip of the tongue and was quickly corrected, in most cases, it does serve to fuel any inference should a remark be made in a nonsecure environment. A large, if not fully manned, ADVON team which would be required to properly support ABLE ARCHER, being deployed to the many locations would only again give rise to speculation about the B-52 role.

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D. (U) AFSOUTH

1. (U) GENERAL.

(a) (U) MG Brown (AIRSOUTH C/S) (USAF) was briefed on the capabilities and tactics for the B-52 and KC-135. The briefing was based on the WINTEX 83 briefing in the "RED BOOK" updated for B-52G only operations. The briefing was then given to LG Brown (COMAIRSOUTH) (USAF) who later offered the briefing to Admiral Small (AFSOUTH) (USN) and his C/S LG Blont (USA).

(b) ~~(S)~~ Due to the numerous new personnel in AIRSOUTH, the published timelines were modified to gain maximum training to all personnel involved in B-52 operations. MG Brown was particularly helpful in guiding the AIRSOUTH planners to select targets that not only provided optimum utilization of the B-52, but also had significant impact on the overall war plan.

(c) ~~(S)~~ We worked with AIRSOUTH personnel to encourage composite attack profiles for maximum disruption of enemy air and mutual support for Allied aircraft. A coordinated attack against Verna and Burgas Harbors (B-52s), airfields in the harbor areas (fighters) and F-111 airfield attacks on the Crimean Peninsula were planned providing maximum mutual defense. Support packages utilizing F-4Gs, EA-6Bs and fighter cap were included in the attack. NOTE: The harbor attacks were planned three days earlier. Unconventional warfare personnel were inserted into the area two days prior to pass the updated DMPI to the planners for maximum effectiveness of the sortie. Beacon bombing was also discussed, but not used.

(d) ~~(S)~~ The level of play required us to be more than advisors and observers. To provide the coordination required we split into two shifts shortly after arrival. We had to press people to get the required data. This was an artificiality created since the ATAFs did not have SAC ADVON representation. AFSOUTH is extremely interested in B-52 operations and the added capability it presents. Personnel participating in Dense Crop need to aggressively justify B-52 allocation requests to insure AFSOUTH has proper representation during the allocation cycle.

(e) ~~(S)~~ AFSOUTH needs data to update DIRE JUMBO. Recommend aircraft location and timelines be sent from HQ SAC to Maj Richard M. Meeboer, AIRSOUTH Plans and Policy (AIRSOUTH/PPPL). Also need a remark about E-3A refueling support, i.e., SHAPE will allocate E-3s and direct PSC/MSC to support.

(f) ~~(S)~~ Recommend "Red Book" be sent to US plans shops, PSCs and MSCs. The "Red Book" needs to be releasable to NATO (Print on cover). Also NATO Reporting Guide needs to be sent to PSCs and MSCs.

(g) ~~(S)~~ There is no set procedure for the AIRSOUTH/AFSOUTH staffs (OPS, IN, TGTS, ADVON) to get together to review the ATAF bomber requests, to have a coordinated, prioritized listing to send to SHAPE NLT 1100Z. There is little collective memory in the AIRSOUTH staff, even from the last WINTEX, hence it's been an education process to attempt to try to get the staffs together. The appearance is that the ATAFs sent their priority

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lists to AFSOUTH, who passes it to AIRSOUTH and it comes down to the AIRSOUTH Intel, Ops and SAC ADVON to select the targets. The targets are then selected by the Ops Chief who was at the AFSOUTH briefing (in most cases the targeting philosophy is different). As a result target nomination lists are late or not sent and the only request sent is the BOMREQ, which does not provide SACEUR with the required data to make proper allocations.

(h) ~~(S)~~ A complete review of COMAIRSOUTH OPLAN 45604, "DIRE JUMBO" was completed. The COMM, Restricted areas, ECM, safe passage, emergency fields, procedures, etc. should be reviewed for possible inclusion in SAC 4102 or a SACR. This also applies to review of all MSC/PSC/SACEUR plans impacting SAC 4102. 45604 also requires backup targets from the ATAFs. It was explained that this should be removed from their plan.

(i) ~~(S)~~ We received only one written answer to the BOMREQ during the exercise. This mission was coordinated requiring all aircraft in the same time block. As it turned out half of the aircraft were in a different time block, and during daylight hours (SHAPE MSG 081315Z Nov for 10 Nov allocation). For staff training, to keep from destroying the combined, coordinated attack on Vara and Burzan we flew as planned.

(j) ~~(S)~~ No message allocation for 11 Nov was received. Telecon received on morning of 10th from Col Brown (SHAPE) out the precoordinated number with LTC Hass from 15 to 9.

(k) ~~(S)~~ E-3A refueling were coordinated at the AFSOUTH level. I feel the refueling should be handled at the ATAF level to afford the tanker scheduler the opportunity to manage his scarce refueling assets. Each E-3 is using one and one half tankers (three sorties) each per day. We consistently had one in FIVE ATAF and one in SIX ATAF. At one point we had one in each ATAF, which would be a heavy load on the AFSOUTH tankers.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY.

(a) (U) Attend TGT selection meeting (held one in AIRSOUTH last day).

(b) (U) Prepare slides for AIRSOUTH update briefing 1900L/0900L.

(1) (U) BDA (yesterday's missions).

(2) (U) Bomber activity (Today--actually next morning).

(3) (U) Bomber activity (Tomorrow--actually two days away).

(4) (U) Tanker activity.

(c) (U) Prepare TGTs message.

(d) (U) Prepare BOMREQ.

(e) (U) Prepare SUBALL.

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- (f) (U) Prepare TFG tasking to ATAFs (artificial due to exercise).
- (g) (U) Tanker messages to support E-3 (artificial due to exercise).
- (h) (U) Input to COMAIRSOUTH ASSESSREP due by 1700L.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

(a) ~~(S)~~ Bomber. A total of 71 sorties were requested, 59 scheduled (based on final allocation) 50 of the 59 were flown by ENDEX. A total of four aircraft were lost due to ground and shipborne SAMs. Targets attacked included massed troops, soft armor, choke points and supply routes. One three-ship sortie was against a helicopter landing area prior to ADVON arrival (a total of on three helos were destroyed on that mission).

(b) ~~(S)~~ Tanker. The only tanker involvement was with E-3A refueling. We received sporadic tanker inputs from ATAFs due to no SAC participation at that level.

4. ~~(S)~~ FUTURE PARTICIPATION. With only a few locations with a SAC ADVON, too many simulations are required. It is confusing to the MSCs because they expect it to work like WINTEX. Recommend SHAPE allocate the B-52s and KC-135s to the MSCs at start of exercise and the MSCs work the exercise without the SAC ADVON.

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E. (U) UK RAOC

1. ~~(S)~~ GENERAL. I was in place at exercise location at STARTEX. I visited 3 AF Liaison Cell, DISTAFF, and RAF tanker personnel to determine level of exercise play. Although the Master Scenario Events List indicated a significant requirement for KC-135 air refueling support of UK Air Defense operations and multiple vertical dispersals, UK AIR staff personnel viewed ABLE ARCHER as a "nuclear procedures" exercise and chose not to play actively from the ADOC and SOCS during the conventional phase (7-9 Nov). The first KC-135 air refueling missions took place at 0600Z on 9 Nov. Since the ADOC and SOCS are the prime employers of air refueling and direct vertical dispersals their lack of participation left little requirement for SAC participation in this exercise.

(U) I spent the majority of my time learning how to use the Air Staff Management Aid (ASMA) computer system, becoming familiar with the RAOC layout and what each cell does, and discussing present and future concepts with RAF and 3 AF liaison personnel.

2. (U) ADVON ACTIVITY. The following represents Tanker ADVON duties based on my WINTEX 83 participation at UK RAOC:

(a) (U) Coordinate KC-135 allocation to the SOCS with the ADOC.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Prepare ATOs for TPW. (NOTE: This is only done for planned missions such as E-3A support or fighter deployments. OPCON of UK tanker assets supporting Air Defense rests with the SOCS and they launch the tankers unless sufficient warning is available, then the tanker cell will direct the launch by telecon. In lieu of an ATO for Air Defense we pass an alert response condition (60 min, 30 min, or 15 min) for the required number of KC-135s for a time block and the controlling SOCs.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Coordinate dispersal bases for all U.K. based airborne KC-135s and vertically dispersed KC-135s with 3 AF Liaison Cell, Ground Defense Cell, Contingency Plans Cell, and the Operations Support Cell when under air attack.

(d) ~~(S)~~ Coordinate air refueling requirements with the Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO) Cell.

(e) ~~(S)~~ Provide backup to 3 AF Liaison Cell in notifying TPW response cells of airborne dispersal when directed by ADOC.

(f) (U) Provide 3 AF Liaison Cell with a daily operations summary for CINCUKPAIR's daily briefing.

As noted in para 1f only a limited amount of item 1 was played during ABLE ARCHER 83 due to reduced play by UKRAOC cells.

3. (U) OPERATIONS.

~~(S)~~ KC-135 Activity

<u>DAY</u>	<u>NO. OF SORTIES</u>	<u>TOTAL FLY TIME</u>	<u>NO. RCVRs</u>	<u>TOTAL OFFLOAD</u>
7 Nov	0	0	0	0

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<u>DAY</u>	<u>NO. OF SORTIES</u>	<u>TOTAL FLY TIME</u>	<u>NO. RCVRs</u>	<u>TOTAL OFFLOAD</u>
8 Nov	0	0	0	0
9 Nov	8	24.0	32 F-4	192.OM
10 Nov	11*	39.0	12 F-4	72.OM
11 Nov	0	0	0	0
<hr/>				
TOTAL	19	63.0	44	264.OM

*Eight KC-135s launched for survival.

4. ~~(S)~~ FUTURE PARTICIPATION. The CINCUKAIR Staff's decisions not to man all RAOC cells or actively respond to exercise events during ABLE ARCHER 83 made it non cost effective for SAC ADVON participation. CINCUKAIR personnel view this exercise as strictly a nuclear procedures CPX. A SACEUR decision (sometime between EXORD development and STARTEX) to reduce the level of nuclear exchange between Blue and Orange cancelled most of the British interest in ABLE ARCHER. The British also view that if Blue is resorting to the use of nuclear weapons to stop the Orange advance, then most of their Air Defense assets have been lost (fighter and tanker) and there is no requirement for air refueling. Also, the lack of unit response cell play (BOTH US TPWs, and RAF SOCS and tanker bases) makes SAC ADVON play unrealistic. The tanker advisor is reduced to simulating all coordination required between TPWs, SOCs and the UKRAOC cells on ATOs, airborne dispersal, and daily Ops summaries. This is not a good exercise for SAC ADVON training if procedural play by participants does not change for future exercises.

(U) SAC ADVON participation at UKRAOC for future ABLE ARCHERS should be eliminated unless the following conditions can be met:

(a) ~~(S)~~ Full manning and active participation by UKRAOC cells in ADOC, Ground Defense, Tanker, USAFE, and contingency plans.

(b) (U) Active response cell play from the SOCs and a TPW for UKAIR allocated KC-135s.

(c) (U) 7 AD, 306 SW or 11 SG provide the tanker advisor to reduce the cost of sending CONUS-based ADVON personnel and provide flexibility if UKAIR reduces its enthusiasm during future exercises.

5. (U) OTHER

(a) (U) Tanker beddown in UK.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Discussion: I was briefed we would use the CRESTED EAGLE 84 tanker beddown for ABLE ARCHER. The MSEL called for a beddown based on the ENDEX position for WINTEX 83 which was based on FY 82 UK beddown. This caused concern among several strike command personnel over (1) the use of Scampton by both RAF Victors and US KC-135s (they claim Scampton can't

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support both); (2) The ability of Cottesmore to support KC-135s presently (they are delighted that UKAIR-allocated KC-135s are not collocated with other MSCs' assets) and (3) that the 84 position was not officially sanctioned or approved. I had a long discussion with SQ LDR John Ward, CINCUKAIR/Contingency Plans about future initiatives for US COBs in UK. Basically they are as follows: (1) Replace Scampton with Elvington, (2) move US A-7s from Finningly to Manston opening up Finningly for KC-135s, (3) reduce the base loading at Fairford, Greenham Common, and Mildenhall by using other UK airfields not specifically identified for KC-135. NOTE: SQ LDR Ward's views, however, may only be Strike Command's position and not that of MODUKAIR or USAFE.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Recommendations: (1) More preexercise coordination between SAC and 7 AD and UKAIR ADVON players on tanker beddown to be used. It would also be helpful if RAOC ADVON players were given as much background information as possible on the actual tanker beddown status of negotiations to preclude future embarrassment. (2) None. SQ LDR Ward's comments are provided for your information.

(b) (U) Status of CINCUKAIR Air Refueling Plan.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Discussion: The CINCUKAIR Air Refueling Plan is still in the conceptual stage. SQD LDR Graham Lanchbury has been the only tanker planner assigned to Strike Command/Plans since March 1983. His daily involvement with the Ascension Island to Falkland Islands refueling missions has precluded any work on the MSC plan. FLT LT Paul McKernan has recently been assigned to Strike/Plans on a temporary basis until a permanent second position is filled (in about three months). He has been given the MSC refueling plan as his top priority. I spent an entire day with him over GOLDEN EAGLE, COTTON CURE and AFNORTH's BENT BOOM (Draft), providing recommendation on plan format and content, and providing points of contact at 11 SG and 7 AD to get assistance in plan development. I recommended he use BENT BOOM as a model since operations to be conducted in AFNORTH are the most similar to UKAIR. The unique procedures used by UKAIR in Command control, airborne dispersal/survival scramble, enroute communications, and air refueling during hostilities required they be formulated into a written plan for use by our TPWs and all MSC tasking UK-based KC-135s as soon as possible.

(2) (U) Recommendation: That 7 AD actively monitor the progress of CINCUKAIR's air refueling plan and provide any expertise in tanker operations/command control required by Strike Command to expedite plan completion.

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III. FUTURE PARTICIPATION

A. (S) The preceding section contained the critiques written by the ADVON representatives. Due to travel restrictions, only an informal meeting was held at 7 AD, which not all members were able to attend. The comments and observations are printed virtually verbatim--only editorial changes made--from the reports received. The critiques were prepared in isolation, yet the same themes occur in all. These themes are: short duration of exercise does not allow for real allocation cycle to be played; time lines are unrealistically reduced; short duration demands experienced personnel since there is no time for training; low level of play at most headquarters does not allow for realistic play or appraisal; and the sensitive issue of B-52 operations being conducted in conjunction with an exercise primarily designed to test nuclear release procedures.

B. (U) Based on above comments and our participation in ABLE ARCHER 83, 7AD recommends no further SAC ADVON participation in the ABLE ARCHER series of exercises.



GARY G. DURKEE, Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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APO NEW YORK 09012.....5
7AD DOO-1
HO-5

BARKSDALE AFB, LA 71110.....2
8AF DOX-2

MARCH AFB, CA 92508.....1
15AF DOX-1

OFFUTT AFB, NE 68113.....2
HQ SAC DOO-2

TOTAL	10
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9
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: American Academic on Soviet Policy

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I. It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

Among the source's conclusions were:

--Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

--A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

--The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

--There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow telegram 15409 of December 10, 1983.

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NARA DATE 12/1/85

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EX015
E O 343503 DECL OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC POLICY

1. ☒ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AN AMERICAN ACADEMIC WITH EXCELLENT ENTREE
TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE BRIEFED EMBASSY ON HIS
DISCUSSIONS HERE NOVEMBER 24-DECEMBER 8. HE BELIEVES
BASED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS THAT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT HAS
TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET THINKING AND ATTITUDES, ESPECIALLY
TOWARDS THE U.S. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS. WHERE
EARLIER SOVIET DECISION-MAKING WAS FOUNDED ALMOST
EXCLUSIVELY ON PRAGMATISM AND REASONED CALCULATION,
ARE NOW ENTERING INTO PLAY. THE ACADEMIC PERCEIVES A
GROWING PARANOIA AMONG SOVIET OFFICIALS, AND SEES THEM
LITERALLY OBSESSED BY FEAR OF WAR. HE BELIEVES THAT
THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE CENTRAL
DETERMINING FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

3. THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTED, FURTHER, A CERTAIN SENSE
OF LEADERLESSNESS AND A LACK OF AN INTEGRATED FOREIGN
POLICY, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO ANDROPOV'S LENGTHY
ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE AND THE UNCERTAINTY THIS HAS
GENERATED. HE FEELS THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP, PARTICULARLY ON
DOMESTIC POLICY, AND PINPOINTS THE LOWER PARTY ORGANS
AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL AND THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES
AS THE MAJOR SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S DOMESTIC
PROGRAMS. AND ANTICIPATES THAT ANDROPOV WILL SHORTLY
ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THIS OPPOSITION THROUGH WIDESPREAD
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND AT
LOWER PARTY LEVELS. ALTHOUGH THE ACADEMIC SENSED THE
SAME WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION AMONG HIS INTERLOCUTORS
AS HE HAD DURING A PREVIOUS VISIT IN MAY OF THE NECESSITY
FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE, HE DETECTED MUCH LESS OPTIMISM
THAT THE KIND OF CHANGE REQUIRED TO BREAK OUT OF THE
CURRENT IMPASSE COULD BE REALIZED. HIS OWN BELIEF
IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE
TO PURSUE OTHER THAN A GRADUAL, INCREMENTAL APPROACH
TO ECONOMIC CHANGE, AND THAT EACH SMALL STEP WILL BE
APPROVED BY THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN REFORM IT.

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DTG: 101001Z DEC 83 PSN: 074632

4. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANDRUSOV HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALBERT ON A SOMEWHAT LIMITED SCHEDULE. THE ACADEMIC GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT USTINOV HAD STOOD IN FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY DURING THE LATTER'S ABSENCE. CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. END SUMMARY.

5. THE ACADEMIC IDENTIFIED THREE MAJOR CURRENTS IN SOVIET THINKING THAT HAD EMERGED SINCE HIS VISIT HERE IN MAY.

-- A GENUINE SENSE OF CONCERN OVER TRENDS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE AND A FEAR OF WAR THAT SEEMED TO BE SHARED BY SOVIET CITIZENS GENERALLY. THE OFFICIAL LINE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS GENERALLY BELIEVED BY THE POPULACE.

-- A GROWING CLIMATE OF NEO-STALINISM, PARTICULARLY EVIDENT AT THE RAION (DISTRICT) LEVEL AND AMONGST THE YOUNGER GENERATION. FED BY STRONG FEELINGS OF PATRIOTISM AND EVEN CHAUVINISM. THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING PUSHED AROUND BY THE U.S., AND THAT RESOURCES MUST BE MOBILIZED TO COUNTERACT THIS THREAT. UTILIZING THE ADVANTAGES WHICH A CENTRALIZED ECONOMY POSSESSES IN THIS REGARD. THE COROLLARY TO THIS IS THAT DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CHANGES CANNOT BE AFFORDED AT THIS TIME.

-- A HIGH DEGREE OF PARANOIA AMONG HIGH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THE ACADEMIC SPOKE. NOT UNLIKE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIRTY YEARS AGO. SINCE HIS MAY VISIT, THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTICED THAT ATTITUDES HAVE BECOME MORE PERSONAL AND EMOTIONAL, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S., AND HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRRATIONAL ELEMENTS IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. HE CITED THE STRAIGHTFACED CLAIM MADE TO HIM BY ONE OFFICIAL THAT THE KAL FLIGHT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY STAGED BY THE U.S. -- NOT AS AN INTELLIGENCE FLIGHT -- BUT TO PROVOKE THE USSR AND ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS IN THE WORLD.

6. THE ACADEMIC DECLARED THAT THE STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY BRIZZINSKI THAT THE SOVIETS "WOULD CRAWL BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE" WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT BT



National Security Archive National Security Archive <nsa.foiamail@gmail.com>

Request for Prioritization and Additional Information to ISCAP Appeal 2013-15

Harper, Lauren <leharper@email.gwu.edu>

Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 1:07 PM

To: ISCAP <iscap@nara.gov>, National Security Archive National Security Archive <foiamail@gwu.edu>, National Security Archive National Security Archive <foiadesk@gwu.edu>

20150082NLB001

NLB

RECNO:50653

SEQCOR:182466

FOISG: Harper, Lauren

Able Archer PFIAB report

Dear Nina and Meredith,

I am aware that it can be a burden to add germane information to ISCAP appeals, but I nonetheless request that you add the following information to ISCAP appeal 2013-15 as it is the most important document for my research at the National Security Archive. I hope you are having a good new year and this is not too onerous. Please don't hesitate to email or call me if you have any questions, concerns, or I can make this easier for you.

Addition 1: The ISCAP homepage (<http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/status-log-description.html>) states that ISCAP does weigh "declassification breakthroughs" for "the relative importance of the content of the requests; an appeal containing an issue not addressed by the ISCAP before may be prioritized over one containing a topic frequently adjudicated." Please consider that this President's Intelligence Advisory Board retroactive report on one of the last Cold War "mysteries" is certainly a **declassification breakthrough** that ISCAP has not adjudicated before. Many public figures, including former CIA director Robert Gates have cited the paramount importance of this still-classified report's importance and analysis of the 1983 "War Scare." I also note that "Able Archer 83" was listed in the Public Interest Declassification Board's recent report on items which it believes should receive prioritized declassification (<http://www.archives.gov/declassification/pidb/recommendations/setting-priorities.pdf>).

Furthermore, per ISCAP guidelines, the **"size and complexity" of this appeal is likely relatively minimal**. It is a single, almost-25-year-old (historic) paper document which likely does not require consultation with agency technical specialists.

Finally, I have consulted with the leadership of the National Security Archive, which agrees this appeal is extremely important. As such the National Security Archive requests **that it be prioritized as the most important of our appeals**, and requests that it be given a review as soon as possible, before our other appeals.

Additionally, while this document has been in the ISCAP queue, more information has been declassified which should aid in this report's declassification. The National Security Archive has recently published more than 1,000 pages of declassified documents about the Able Archer 83 "War Scare" (though none as comprehensive and retrospective as this report). These declassified documents can be found at <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ablearcher/>.

I would also like to add the following germane information to this case.

Addition 2: A summary of comments made by Michael Herman, head of the Soviet Division at Government Communications Headquarters from 1977 to 1982 about Able Archer 83, in which he recommends further declassification of remaining information about the topic.

Addition 3: An unclassified NATO SHAPE command document acknowledging the existence and nuclear

aspect of Able Archer 83.

Addition 4: An unclassified summary of this PFIAB report by one of its authors.

Addition 5: Recently declassified British Cabinet documents revealing that British intelligence first observed "an unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 and other reports of alleged concern about a surprise NATO attack." This led senior British ministers and intelligence chiefs to "urgently consider how to approach the Americans on the question of possible Soviet misapprehensions about a surprise NATO attack." (More at <https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/11/04/british-documents-confirm-uk-alerted-us-to-danger-of-able-archer-83/>)

And **Addition 6:** Recently declassified Joint Staff documents containing real time reporting on Soviet and Warsaw Pact activities and SIGINT monitoring during Exercise Able Archer 83.

A sincere thank you for adding this information to this case (I know it is a burden!) and for considering its prioritization.

Sincerely,

Lauren Harper

5 attachments

 **Addition 2.pdf**
48K

 **Addition 3.pdf**
292K

 **Addition 4.pdf**
66K

 **Addition 5.pdf**
1319K

 **Addition 6.pdf**
237K

Berlin2014-04

Conference on the Able Archer crisis, 1983, Berlin May 2014

I was the head of the Soviet Division at GCHQ for five years, from 1977 to 1982, but by the time of Able Archer I had moved to do something else, so my knowledge of it is second-hand, based on conversations with Harry Burke who died some years ago. Harry was a member of GCHQ who was seconded to become a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee's Assessments Staff in London and who in a sense 'discovered' the whole Able Archer crisis.

His family – then Burkovitch – had come to Britain before the war as Jewish émigrés from what was then Yugoslavia. He went to a good London school, served in the RAF at the end of the war, and read Serbo-Croat and Russian at Cambridge. He joined GCHQ as an analyst in the early 1950s and had a successful career, mainly though not entirely on Soviet targets. He had considerable presence in a British public school-Oxbridge style, allied with a determined, disputatious Slav temperament; he was not easily put down. With his background it is not surprising that he was suspicious of Soviet moves and motives.

He had worked for me in the past, and I eventually managed to get him made my deputy, effectively as the chief Soviet analyst. He was a great strength in the period 1980-81, of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact preparations for military moves against Poland that were eventually abandoned in favour of Polish martial law. In 1982 the JIC considered the Nicoll report with its criticisms of the committee's earlier warning record, plus the lessons of the Falklands invasion, and Sir Antony Duff, its Chairman and Intelligence Coordinator, had Harry appointed to the Assessments Staff with special responsibility for warning.

That was the background to Able Archer as Harry subsequently related it to me. He was aware of Gordievsky's reports on RYAN, but his moving force as described to me was the unusual activity described in some of the Sigint reports. Apparently this had not been highlighted by the Sigint agencies. He put this together with Gordievsky's evidence to argue for the evidence of Soviet fears of Able Archer. He then fought single-handed against almost everyone to get this set out as a JIC report some time later. If my memory is correct Harry also told me that the JIC produced another more general report on Soviet views of the West, and that the two reports went to high levels in Washington. On his final visit to Washington in 1990 Harry was invited to discuss Able Archer with the PFIAB (the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), presumably in connection with the Board's re-examination of Able Archer, and its conclusion that intelligence's previous confidence about Soviet posturing had been misplaced.

I have only one other piece of evidence. Some years ago I was shown a redacted copy of the JIC's Able Archer report by the then GCHQ historian. My recollection is that it was much more tentative than I expected from Harry's account; but the weakness was consistent with his account of the scepticism within the committee, presumably leading to compromise wording. I have tried to get a sight of this and the other JIC report under the Freedom of Information Act, but failed.

My own comments include the following

1. The most surprising thing about the whole episode was that Burke, usually the arch-hawk in his Soviet judgments, was arguing for Soviet fears. It is a striking example of professional conscience. There are morals here for the staffing of the top-level assessment units.

2. It is surprising that Gordievsky's evidence of RYAN, plus the Soviet speeches from 1981, did not lead to an earlier assessment of Soviet fears. The UK view of the Soviet Union had got into a rut: the JIC machinery had only one Soviet expert, and it had perhaps become preoccupied with Afghanistan and Poland. A weakness in the UK was that the assessors didn't know the extent of US confrontation/provocation in Reagan's first administration. The Russians were quite right to be frightened!

3. But how big was the crisis? Until all the evidence is declassified how do we judge? Gates's listing of military actions (p272 of his softback edition) is impressive; but in reviewing Cold War crises there was always a risk of sweeping quite innocent activities into the picture. On the other hand the patterns of valid Soviet indicators could have a patchiness about them. I recall a complete stand-down in Soviet flying in August 1969 that was part of preparations for military action against China, but there were none of the other military indicators one might expect. Perhaps the Soviet military system was less closely orchestrated than we sometimes think.

Michael Herman

16 May 2014

28 March 2013

Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83: Information from SHAPE Historical Files

Exercise ABLE ARCHER was held from 7-11 November 1983. It was an annual Command Post Exercise (thus involving only headquarters, not troops on the ground) of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE), and it was designed to practise command and staff procedures, with particular emphasis on the transition from conventional to non-conventional operations, including the use of nuclear weapons. Overall responsibility for the exercise lay with the Supreme Command Allied Powers Europe (SACEUR). The participants in the exercise were SACEUR's own headquarters SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe), its immediate subordinate headquarters known as Major Subordinate Commands, their subordinates known as Principal Subordinate Commands, and other lower-level War Headquarters throughout ACE.

One of the goals of Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83 was to practice new nuclear weapons release procedures, which had been revised as a result of ABLE ARCHER 82. The exercise scenario provided for less nuclear exercising than in the previous ten years and was designed to concentrate on decision-making processes. However, this was a purely military exercise and NATO Headquarters – thus the Alliance's political authorities – did not participate in ABLE ARCHER 83. Instead the exercise's Directing Staff (DISTAFF) simulated the NATO political authorities. There was also no involvement of national leaders in the exercise, and no such involvement was ever planned, despite some recent allegations to this effect. National involvement was limited to two small Response Cells at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Ministry of Defence in London, whose role was to simulate the nuclear powers' political authorities. Thus all participants in the exercise were military personnel, some of whom simulated the political authorities at NATO headquarters and in the national capitals.

The exercise scenario began with Orange (the hypothetical opponent) opening hostilities in all regions of ACE on 4 November (three days before the start of the exercise) and Blue (NATO) declaring a general alert. Orange initiated the use of chemical weapons on 6 November and by the end of that day had used such weapons throughout ACE. All of these events had taken place prior to the start of the exercise and were thus simply part of the written scenario. There had thus been three days of fighting and a deteriorating situation prior to the start of the exercise. This was desired because – as previously stated – the purpose of the exercise was to test procedures for transitioning from conventional to nuclear operations. As a result of Orange advances, its persistent use of chemical weapons, and its clear intentions to rapidly commit second echelon forces, SACEUR requested political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons early on Day 1 of the exercise (7 November 1983).

By the evening of 7 November the situation of the Blue forces had deteriorated further, particularly in the northern region, and increased Orange use of chemical weapons had been reported. On the morning of 8 November SACEUR requested initial use of nuclear weapons against fixed targets in Orange satellite countries. SACEUR's request was agreed late on 8 November and the weapons were fired/delivered on the morning of 9 November.

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Blue's use of nuclear weapons did not stop Orange's aggression. Therefore, SACEUR requested follow-on use of nuclear weapons late on 9 November. This request was approved in the afternoon of 10 November and follow-on use of nuclear weapons was executed on the morning of 11 November. That was the final day of the exercise, which ended in accordance with the long-planned schedule, not early as has sometimes been alleged. An after action report noted that because the exercise scenario began at a low crisis level, there was actually less nuclear play than in previous years.

In 2006 the SHAPE Historian interviewed a number of senior participants in Exercise ABLE ARCHER 83. None of them recalled any "war scare" or even any unusual Soviet reaction to the exercise. Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, the Deputy SACEUR who played the role of SACEUR during ABLE ARCHER 83, stated quite categorically that "no such scare arose at that time."

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Gregory Pedlow".

Dr. Gregory Pedlow
SHAPE Historian

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Exercise Scenario

Change in leadership in ORANGE in February 1983. Criticism of policies of old government for allowing West to gain new influence in the Third World, especially the Gulf states and for failing to prevent the BLUE decision to modernise Western theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

March 1983: Continuing Iran-Iraq War, with ORANGE providing political support and some arms deliveries to Iran. Also arms deliveries to Syria and South Yemen. US expresses deep concern.

April 1983: Gulf States feel threatened by growing ORANGE involvement in the area, seek US military aid. US sends military advisors and increases naval presence.

May 1983: growing unrest in Eastern Europe

June 1983: ORANGE unable to keep its economic aid promises to Eastern Europe. Unrest increases. Also pro-ORANGE political party and pressure groups in Finland campaign against the government's policies and calls for closer alignment with ORANGE.

July 1983: ORANGE steps up propaganda campaign against the West.

August 1983: ORANGE condemns US military presence and naval deployments in the Gulf area.

August 1983: Internal situation in Yugoslavia worsens; central government faces strong challenges from pro-ORANGE elements. Major disturbances take place in Kosovo, with strong indications of an Albanian role in this unrest. Yugoslav Government approaches several Allied countries with requests for economic and military assistance.

Worsening political situation is matched by considerable increase in ORANGE military activity after the new government comes to power in February 1983. Frequent field training exercises, stockpiling of equipment, increased activity in naval dockyards, factories go on round-the-clock production.

September 1983: heavy ORANGE pressure on Finland, Northern Region NATO countries and Yugoslavia.

18 September: mobilisation exercises begin in ORANGE.

Early October – forward deployment of military aircraft. ORANGE forces around Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are at high state of readiness.

31 October – ORANGE and ORANGE Bloc forces invade Yugoslavia.

3 November – ORANGE forces cross the Finnish border.

4 November (E-3 = Three days before start of the exercise) massive air and naval attacks against BLUE installations and ORANGE invades Norway. ORANGE forces also

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cross Inner German Border, and ORANGE forces also cross into Greece while naval forces conduct attacks in the Adriatic, Mediterranean and Black Seas.

5 Nov (E-2) ORANGE leadership decides to use Chemical weapons against BLUE on 6 Nov (E-1).

6 Nov (E-1) Due to strong resistance by BLUE, ORANGE initiates selective use of chemical weapons by ORANGE.

7 Nov – **Exercise begins.** Increased use of ORANGE chemical weapons is reported.

8 Nov – E+1 (morning): SACEUR requests initial limited use of nuclear weapons against pre-selected fixed targets. Request is approved by political authorities (being simulated by response cells) in the evening, and the weapons were employed on the morning of 9 Nov (E+2). ORANGE aggression continued, so SACEUR requested follow-on use late on E+2. Approval was granted on the afternoon of E+3 and execution took place early on E+4. The exercise ended at mid-day on E+4.

No further details are available on the actual course of the exercise – the various incidents that were simulated, the messages sent/received - because this kind of exercise material was not preserved in the archives. All I have is the brief summary of the major events which I have given you in the above paragraph.

Participants in the Exercise (all are headquarters, not troop units, because this was a Command Post Exercise, not a Field Training Exercise)

SHAPE

AFNORTH (Allied Forces Northern Europe)

HQ NON (North Norway)
HQ SON (South Norway)
HQ BALTAP (Baltic Approaches),

AFCENT (Allied Forces Central Europe)

HQ NORTHAG (Northern Army Group)
HQ CENTAG (Central Army Group)
HQ AAFCE (Allied Air Forces Central Europe)
HQ 2 ATAF (2nd Allied Tactical Air Force)
HQ 4 ATAF (4th Allied Tactical Air Force)

AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe)

HQ LANDSOUTH (Land Forces Southern Europe)
HQ LANDSOUTHEAST (Land Forces Southeastern Europe)
HQ AIRSOUTH (Air Forces Southern Europe)
HQ 5 ATAF (5th Allied Tactical Air Force)
HQ 6 TAF (6th Allied Tactical Air Force)
HQ NAVSOUTH (Naval Forces Southern Europe)
HQ MARAIRMED (Maritime Air Mediterranean)

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HQ SUBMED (Submarines Mediterranean)
HQ STRIKFORSOUTH (Strike Force South)
CTF 502 (Combined Task Force 502)
HQ HFA (Hellenic First Army)
HQ HTAF (Hellenic Tactical Air Force)

HQ UKAIR

JCS Washington (Response Cell)
MOD UK (Response Cell)

SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) - just the Allied Command Europe representatives there.

CINCHAN – Commander in Chief Channel Command) - just the Allied Command Europe representatives there.

NATO Headquarters did not participate in the exercise; it was simulated by the DISTAFF (Exercise Directing Staff). Nations did not participate in the exercise, with the exception of the small response cells in Washington and London.

Responses to your queries

Exercise scenario (see above)

Course of exercise (see above)

Units participating (see above)

Involvement of politicians (see underlined material on page 1)

I am not aware of any units moving into the field to simulate sending message from the battlezone, and I do not believe that any such movements took place because this would not be necessary. Simulation of message traffic from the “battlezone” can be done just as easily from a headquarters as from the field.

There was apparently some movement into the field – or at least into an alternate location (where, I do not know) - by the SHAPE Alternate War Headquarters. I suspect that this was not actually the “field” because the after action reports talks about some new testbed equipment used in the exercise as being “non-ruggedised” and “non-transportable”. The ADP system was something known as Lena, which I have never heard of before, but I am not an expert on 1980s ADP equipment. The report mentioned problems with the computer’s paper tape reader due to a dusty environment. One of the things that was practiced during the exercise was shifting command from the Permanent War Headquarters to the Alternate War Headquarters.

I have no idea of what kind of signals equipment was used during the exercise and we have no records on this subject (this is a strategic level headquarters). Perhaps the Royal Signals museum (whose location I do not know) can help you.

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The SHAPE Headquarters Building has not changed much since 1983, except for the addition of many more national flags in front. I am sure that you could arrange a visit to do some filming through our PIO office.

I have no knowledge of any other ABLE ARCHER exercises being postponed and do not have the time to check all of their records.

Interview with former ~~XXXXXX~~ hand, at Madison, May 22,
1990

SNIE's of May and August 1984, essentially reached conclusion that the war scare of 1983-4 was part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter it from deploying improved weapons, arouse opposition in US and Western Europe to US foreign policy objectives. If this so, not of crucial significance.

Another potential conclusion partially adopted is that the war scare also reflected an internal Sov power struggle between conservatives and pragmatists or an effort to avert blame for economic failures by pointing to military threats. If so, events could not be ignored but would not imply a fundamental shift in strategy.

Third conclusion, not adopted at the time but closer to the retrospective view of PFIAB, that war scare was an expression of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing Sov military to prepare for this eventuality, for example by readying forces for a Sov preemptive strike. If so, war scare a cause for concern.

In SNIE's, intell comty believed Sov actions were not inspired by and Sov leaders did not perceive a genuine danger of imminent conflict with US. Sov statements to the contrary were judged to be propaganda.

But PFIAB said 2/90 that Sovs perceived "correlation of forces" turned toward USA, and were convinced that US was seeking military superiority, and thus chances were growing for US preparedness to mount a preemptive 1st strike vs USSR.

Gordievsky info was very closely held at the time but there was some consciousness at top of the general upshot of it.

US intel knew that Sovs had mounted a huge collection effort to find out what Amers were actually doing. They were taking actions to be able to sustain a surprise attack, especially increased protection for their leadership in view of reduced warning time of P2s etc. Improved bunkers, special communications etc.

Gordievsky said they had set up a large computer model in the Min of Defense to calculate and monitor the correlation of forces, including mil, econ, psychological factors, to assign numbers and relative weights.

At time US saw:

Evidence of Sov collection effort.

Placing of Soviet aircraft in Germany and Poland on a higher alert status, readying nuclear strike forces, in period of 2-11 Nov. 83.

In 1984, (JUNE) failue to send the trucks as usual from military to help with the harvest. 85 send them but not from forward areas.

An ominous list of indicators in early 1984. Some from warning people in Pentagon. David McManis, one of thse in charge. Also psb see Gen. Perroots, was DIA director; John McMahon, was DDI and later deputy director CIA.

~~SECRET~~

(b) (3)
10 USC 424
Per DLA

IMMEDIATE
O 101545Z NOV 83
FM CDSZ WFO BOMF GE//
TO DIA-WASH DC// (b) (3) per DIA

DA WASH DC//JPMI-TS//
CINCUSARMC WEIDELBERG GE//AFMGB-C(EE)//
CINCUSARMC WEIDELBERG GE//AFMGB-PD-COR//
COR 66TH MI GP-MUNICH GE//IAGP-60-ICC//
OCSB USCOB BERLIN GE//
EUCOMCOM 3-2-VATHINGEN GE//ECZ//
CINCUSAVLUR LONDON UK//M2//
COR V CORPS FRANKFURT GE//ACTVGB//
COR VII CORPS MOERHUSEN GE//ACTVGB//
COR USATAC AUS VA//JAX-TA-H// CIA WASH DC//OSR/TR//
HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AR GE//IWOBR/INM//
ZEM/OCA AMEMBASSY BONN GE//MR b6 V//
ZEM/OCA AMEMBASSY BONN GE//MR b6 V//
ZEM/PATT AMEMBASSY BONN GE//MR b6 V//

THE COMMAND ACTIVITIES WHICH ELMS OF THE CGF HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN
STAGING IN NORTHWESTERN BORNEA SINCE 01 NOV CONTINUED ON 09 NOV.
POLAND
COMMAND ACTIVITIES IN BGF ELMS THAT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED SINCE 02 NOV
STILL CONTINUED.

THE AIR FORCES IN THE FORWARD AREA CONDUCTED FLIGHT TAG ACTIVITIES AT LOW LEVEL. THIS WAS ON THE ONE HAND DUE TO THE FACT THAT FLIGHT ACTIVITIES HAVE NOT YET BEEN RESUMED AT FULL LEVELS FOLLOWING CELEBRATIONS ON THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND ON THE OTHER CAUSED BY HEAVY FOG WHICH IMPERD FLIGHT ACTIVITIES.

D. NAVAL FORCES IN THE BALTIC

- NORMAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BALTIC APPROACHES. ADDITIONAL RECCO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY ONE SIGINT SHIP IN THE CENTRAL BALTIC AND PRESUMABLY ANOTHER ONE IN THE WATERS OFF THE SEAM.

- FOUR MEDIUM-SIZED FROG-CLASS LANDING SHIPS AND THREE AUXILIARIES OF THE GDR NAVAL FORCES WERE OBSERVED AT THE ACTIVITIES EAST OF BERGEN.
- THE EMPLOYMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS ELMS AND GUNBERY EX ACTIVITIES IN THE PONTERRIAN BAY WERE OBSERVED IN THE POLISH NAVY, ASK-AND SWEEPERS WERE ADDITIONALLY OBSERVED IN THE GULF OF GOSNICK.

1. FINAL ASSESSMENT
THE CONTINUED LOW LEVEL OF EX AND TRG ACTIVITIES IN THE WP GROUND,
AIR AND NAVAL FORCES OVERALL REVEALS NO INTELLIGENCE INDICATING ANY
CHANGE IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE THREAT.

3. 463-LOGISTICS, TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
USSR
DURING A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF COMECON AIRLINE COMPANIES IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE BOTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LUTVISHIN ENGINEERING
AGENCY, THAT AGENCY'S CHIEF DESIGNER G. ROMIZHILOV ANNOUNCED THAT A
LONG-RANGE VERSION OF THE CAMBER 71-98 IS BEING DEVELOPED.

HE DISCLOSED THE FOLLOWING DATA:
 RANGE: UP TO 8 000 KM
 TAKEOFF WEIGHT: 230 TONS (APPROX 30 TONS ABOVE THAT OF THE IL-86
 PROTOTYPE)
 WINGSPAN: 50 M (AN INCREASE OF 10 M IN COMPARISON TO THE BASIC
 VERSION)
 PASSENGER CAPACITY: 300
 COPIES
 THIS AIRCRAFT IS PROBABLY THE IL-95 WHICH HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN ALLUDED
 TO FOR SOME TIME ALREADY.

A NEW ENGINE DEVELOPMENT IS ALSO TO BE EXPECTED SINCE THE PROGRAM CANNOT BE REALIZED WITHOUT MORE POWERFUL DUCTED-FAN TURBINE ENGINES. THE USE OF FOREIGN DUCTED-FAN TURBINE ENGINES IN THE IL-86 ALREADY FAILED AND IS HARDLY LIKELY TO BE ENVISAGED SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE USSR.

THE STEADY DELIVERY OF CAMBER AND THE PLANNED LONG-RANGE VERSION WILL
RESULT IN NOT ONLY THE REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS
OF SOVIET AIR TRAFFIC THAT ARE OF ECONOMIC RELEVANCE BUT ALSO IN AN
ENHANCED CAPABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY THE NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC
POTENTIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.
THE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE 30 CAMBER TYPE A/C ALREADY HAVE ENOUGH LEFT
CAPACITY FOR TRANSPORTING MORE THAN 7000 TROOPS INCLUDING PASSENGER
AND SMALL ARMS IN ONE WAVE OVER A MAXIMUM DISTANCE OF 7000 KM,
ASSUMING THAT 70 PERCENT OF THE A/C ARE READY FOR TAKEOFF.
COMMENTS: (U) ONLY IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE AND FACT OF BI-LATERAL
ADVANCE RELEASE TO U.S. REQUIRE WFOFN CAVET. SOURCE RELEASES THIS
INFORMATION TO NATO AS NATO REQUEST.

PROO: (U) 911500
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) US, NO
PREP: (U) (b)(6) & (b)(7)(E)
APPR: (U) GS GN-14, UO NONE
EVAL: (U) NO, AIL TO: NONE
JENCL: (U) NONE
DISSEM: (U) N/A
WARNING: (U) NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
OCEL: CLEAR RT

(b) (3)
10 USC 424
Per DLA

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IR 7 196 0592 83
PASS: (U) D1A5---- FOR COL b6

COUNTRY: (U) USSR (U); EAST GERMANY (GE); CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CZ);
POLAND (PL); ROMANIA (RO); BULGARIA (BU); HUNGARY (HU).
SUBJ: (U) IR 7 196 0592 83/DAILY INTCON

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTTEL.
DOI: (U) 63110
REQ: (U) (b)(7)(E)

SOURCE: (U) 7210-0098, A GE MILITARY STAFF AGENCY WHICH CONSIST-
ENTLY PROVIDES RELIABLE ASSESSMENT INFORMATION, DETAILED INTELLI-
GENCE STUDIES AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY: (U) ~~MEMOFORM~~ REPORT IS ADVANCE BI-LATERAL RELEASE TO U.S. OF SOURCE'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON DAILY BASIS WHICH COVERS WARSAW PACT FORWARD AREA, CRISES AREAS, AND SPECIAL SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

TEXT: (U) (S)
1. HIGHLIGHTS
- CONTINUED WP SIGINT MISSIONS TO MONITOR NATO EK (CF. PARA 2.A.)
- USSR IS DEVELOPING NEW LONG-RANGE VERSION OF THE IL-66 CAMBER (CF. PARA 3.1):
2. MAINTENANCE (PARA) WP MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE USSR AND IN THE FORWARD AREA
A. ARMED SERVICES
BORDER-CROSSING AND OVERLAPPING ACTIVITIES
NO CHANGE IN MISSIONS BY SIGINT ELMS TO THE GSPF AND CGF AS WELL AS THE GDR ARMED FORCES ALONG THE INNER GERMAN BORDER. ELMS OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES WERE ONLY OBSERVED ON 08 NOV.
ACT OF THE SAF IN THE GDR AND THE SOVIET BALTIC FLEET WERE ADDITIONALLY EMPLOYED OVER THE GDR AS WELL AS THE JALISC.
IT IS FURTHERMORE POSSIBLE THAT THE EMPLOYMENT OF SIGINT SHIPS IN THE BALTIC SERVED TO GATHER ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES MAY HAVE BEEN TARGETTED AGAINST THE NATO CPTX "ABLE ARCHER B3".
B. GROUND FORCES
GDR
THE COMMAND ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN THE GSPF, ITS SUBORDINATE ARMIES AND IN SOME INSTANCES ALSO IN THE SUBORDINATE

ACTION DC-1(1) (U,P,T,F)
 INFO
 *ISOS(1) JS:NMIC(1) JS(2) SECDEF:(1) SECDEF(9)
 *ISDP(15) ASD:PAE(1) OF-1(3) NMIC(1) AJS-29(1)
 *IS-10(1) OS-1(3) NMWS(1) JSI(1) JSI-SB(2) DC-1/OCF(1)
 *AT-2(1) AF-6(1) AJS(1) DIOG(1) DC-3(1) NM-10(1) (P)
 *DB-10(1) DB-10(1) DB-1P(1) DB-10(1) DB-3(2)
 *DB-SB(1) DB-1E(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1) DT-3(1)
 *FMO WASHINGTON DC
 *CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 *SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 *CMC DC WASHINGTON DC
 *DTNRA FT. GEORGE G. MEADE MD
 *CMC WASHINGTON DC
 *SAFE

(b) (3) USDP(15) ASD-PAGE(1) OI-1(2) NMIC(1) RT-29(1)
10 USC 424 OS-10(1) OS-1(1) NWS(1) JSI(1) JSI-5B(1) DC-1/CEFF(1)
Per DIA AT-2(1) AT-4(1) AT3(1) DIO(1) DE-3(1) DE-10(1) [REDACTED]

MCN=83314/04252

TCR=83314/1656Z

TAD=03314/1657Z

CDSN#MIA173

SECRET

• PAGE 1 OF 1
101945Z JAN 75

1

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
7 November 2014
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCE MESSAGE CENTER

IMMEDIATE
D 141215Z NOV 83
FM JCST BLO BOMH GE//
TO DIA WASH DE// (b)(3) per DIA
DA WASH DE//DAW-15H// HQ ESC KILLY AFB TX//IN//
CINCUSARUR HEIDELBERG GE//AAGS-CAR//
CINCUSARUR HEIDELBERG GE//AAGS-PO-CAR//
CDB 66TH MI GP MUNICH GE//TAGPE-OG-1EC//
DCST USDOB BERLIN GE//
CINCEUCOM J-2 VAHINGER GE//EC32//
CINCUSARUR LONDON UN//N2//
CDB V CORPS FRANKFURT GE//AETVGB//
CDB VII CORPS MOERHINGEN GE//AETSG3//
CDB USATAC AHS VA//IAK-16-III CJA WASH DE//OSR/VE//
HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//THOIB/INRMH//
ZEN/CCA AMEMBASSY BOMH GE//NR b6//
ZEN/CCA AMEMBASSY BOMH GE//NR b6//
ZEN/CAIT AMEMBASSY BOMH GE//COI b6//

(b)(3)
10 USC 424
Per DIA
SERIAL: (U) IR 2 196 0596 55
PASS: (U) DIA- POP COL b6
COUNTRY: (U) USSR (UM); EAST GERMANY (GC); CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CZ);
POLAND (PL); ROMANIA (RO); BULGARIA (BU); HUNGARY (HU).
SUBJ: (U) IR 2 196 0596 83/DAILY INTSUM
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.
DOI: (U) 831114
REQS: (U) (b)(7)(E)
SOURCE: (U) 2210-0092, A G MILITARY STAFF AGENCY WHICH CONSI-
STENTLY PROVIDES RELIABLE ASSESSMENT INFORMATION, DETAILED INTELLI-
GENCE STUDIES AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.
SUMMARY: (U) (b)(7)(E) REPORT IS ADVANCE BI-LATERAL RELEASE TO U.S.
OF SOURCE'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON DAILY BASIS WHICH
COVERS WARSAW PACT FORWARD AREA, CRISES AREAS, AND SPECIAL SIGNI-
FICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

TEXT: (U)
(U) (b)(7)(E) PAR 1: WF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE USSR AND IN THE
FORWARD AREA
1. ARMED SERVICES
WP ARMED FORCES
WP SIGINT ELMS DISCONTINUED THEIR MISSIONS TO MONITOR
THE NATO EL "ABLE ARCHER 83" ON 11 NOV.
GDR
TRANS 68/83 AND 69/83 WERE LIFTED.
2. GROUND FORCES
GDR
COMMAND TROOPS ACTIVITIES CONTINUE TO BE OBSERVED IN THE
3 (URISA AND BUDRIGA ALTHOUGH THE LEVEL OF INTENSITY HAS BEEN
GREATLY REDUCED. MOVEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE ARNSTADT AND
ERFURT AREAS HAVE ADDITIONALLY BEEN OBSERVED IN THE BUDRIGA.
CDB
COMMAND ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN THE CSSR ARMED
FORCES SINCE 11 NOV.
THESE ACTIVITIES ARE POSSIBLY IN PREPARATION OF A BILATERAL
EX TO BE STAGED BY ELMS OF THE CSSR AND HUNGARIAN ARMED
FORCES.
3. AIR FORCES

ACTION DC-4(1) (U,P,7,F)
INFO RIDS(1) J3:NMCC(1) J5(1) SECDEF(1) SECDEF(1)
USDP(1) ASD-PAC(1) D1-1(1) NMCC(1) NTS-2(1)
DS-19(1) DS-1(1) NMS(1) J5(1) J51-5(1) DC-T/CEP(1)
AT-7(1) AT-4(1) AISC(1) DIO(1) DE-1(1) DR-1(1)
DB-18(1) DS-1D(1) DB-1(1) DB-1G(1) DB-3B(2)
DB-5B(1) DB-1E(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1) D1-5(1)
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+DIE CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+SAFE

SUMMARY
THE AIR FORCES IN THE FORWARD AREA OF THE USSR CONDUCTED
FLIGHT ACTIVITIES INCLUDING ROUTINE COMBAT TRG AT VARYING
LEVELS OF INTENSITY ON 11 AND 12 NOV.
THE CUSTOMARY SUNDAY FLIGHT TRG STANDOWNS WERE OBSERVED
ON 13 NOV.
GDR
ELMS OF THE RESPECTIVE DIVS WERE OBSERVED TO ENGAGE IN
GENERAL FLIGHT TRG ACTIVITIES IN THE SCOPE OF PILOT
CATEGORIZATION MEETINGS AT THE MIRON, DAMGARTEN AND ZEREST
AIRFIELDS ON 11 NOV.
4. NAVAL FORCES IN THE BALTIC
- NORMAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BALTIC APPROACHES. ONE
SIGINT SHIP EACH ADDITIONALLY RECONSIDERED IN THE
SKAGERRAK AND KRIEGERSFLACH.
- THE THREE WP NAVIES CONDUCTED ACTIVITIES AT LOW LEVEL
ONLY
5. FINAL ASSESSMENT
EX AND TRG ACTIVITIES IN THE WP ARMED FORCES IN THE FORWARD
AREA AND WESTERN MOS OF THE USSR WERE MAINLY CHARACTERIZED
BY A LOW LEVEL OF INTENSITY WITH ACTIVITIES AS EXPECTED STILL
FOCUSSED ON THE TRG/FAMILIARIZATION OF NEWLY ROTATED
COMMAND TROOPS PERSONNEL.
NOTHING HAS BEEN OBSERVED INDICATING ANY CHANGE IN THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE THREAT.
COMMENTS: (U) ONLY IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE AND FACT OF BI-LATERAL
ADVANCE RELEASE TO U.S. REQUIRE WFOFORM CAVERT. SOURCE RELEASES THIS
INFORMATION TO NATO AS NATO-SECRET.
PROJ: (U) 911500
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) US, AN
PREP: (U) (b)(6) & (b)(7)(E)
APPR: (U) b6 GM-14 ULO BOMH
EVAL: (U) NO, REL TO: NONE
ENCL: (U) NONE
DISSEM: (U) N/A
WARNING: (U) NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
DECL: GDR BT

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MCN=83318/01772 TOR=83318/12552 TAD=83318/12552 COSN=MIA329
PAGE 1 OF 1
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7 November 2014
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
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10 USC 424
Per DIA

THREAT:
O 050630Z OCT 84
FM CDSJ ULO BOWH GE//
TO DIA WASH DC// (b)(3) per DIA
USCOM JAMES VAHLINGEN GE// DA WASH DC//CAMP-1SH//
HQ ESC KELLY AFB TX//JW//
CINCUSARLUM HEIDELBERG GE//NEMAR-C//RE//
CINCUSARLUM HEIDELBERG GE//NEMAR-PO-CUR//
COR BETH NS GP NUTCH GE//JINGPE-O ICC//
BEST USCOM BERLIN GE//
CINERCOM J-2 VAHLINGEN GE//ECJ2//
CINUSARLUM LONDON UK//JW//
COR V CORPS FRANKFURT GE//JW//
COR VII CORPS WORMS GE//JW//
COR USAFAC AHS VA//JW-P-CT// CIA WASH DC//OSR/1//
HQ USAF EAMSTEIN AD GE//JW//
ZEU/CA AMEMBASSY BOMB GE//HR//
ZEU/CA AMEMBASSY BOMB GE//HR//
ZEN/DATT AMEMBASSY BOMB GE//JW//

(b) (3)
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Per DIA

NOFORN
SERIAL (U) 1R 2 196 0493 84
PASS (U) DIA (U) FOR COI (b)(6)
COUNTRY (U) USSR (U), EAST GERMANY (G) CZECHOSLOVAKIA (C)
POLAND (PL) ROMANIA (RO) BULGARIA (BU) HUNGARY (HU)
SUBJ (U) 1JR 2 196 0493 84/DAILY INTSUM
WARNING (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
COI (U) (b)(6)
SOS (U) (b)(6)
SOURCE (U) 2210-0009, 0 GE MILITARY STAFF AGENCY WHICH CONSIST-
ENTLY PROVIDES RELIABLE ASSESSMENT INFORMATION UTILIZED INTEL-
IGENCE STUDIES AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY (U) (b)(6) REPORT IS ADVANCE BI-LATERAL RELEASE TO U S
OF SOURCE'S LATEST INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON DAILY BASIS WHICH
COVERS EASTERN FRONT FORWARD AREA CRISIS AREAS AND SPECIAL SIGNIFI-
CANT DEVELOPMENTS

THAT (U) (b)(6)

HIGHLIGHTS

-THE ADDITIONAL SIGNANT ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE NATO E3S
HAVE CONTINUED TO A LESSER EXTENT
-UP MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN THE FORWARD AREA
ABAND SERVICES
REAR CROSSING ACTIVITIES
IN PREPARATION OF THE FALL TROOP ROTATION VIA AIR (TROOP ROTATION
2784), POSSIBLY NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES HAVE BEEN CALIBRATED ON
AIRFIELDS IN THE GDR AND IN THE CSSR ACCORDING TO REFERENCES
OBTAINED IN THE USFG AND IN THE GDR, THE FIRST RETURN TRANSPORTS
PROBABLY WILL BE EFFECTED ON 14/15 OCT THE AIRLIFT PHASE IS EX-
PECTED FOR THE PERIOD FROM 16 OCT THROUGH 01 NOV
GDR/CSSR
THE ADDITIONAL SIGNANT ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE AUTUMN
FORGE NATO EXERCISES CONTINUED TO BE CONDUCTED ONLY BY GSG
FORCES FROM AREAS ALONG THE INTRA-GERMAN BORDER AND BY MEANS OF
RECEI MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE AIR FORCES OVER THE GDR AND THE

CSSR
B GROUND FORCES

SUMMARY
IN ADDITION TO THE CONTINUOUS EX AND TRG ACTIVITIES IN VARIOUS
DIVISIONS OF THE FL ARMO FORCES, NO PECULIARITIES WERE OBSERVED
IN THE REMAINING GROUND FORCES

POLAND
THE TRG ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY FORCES OF THE 41PLARD (SILESIAN
MD) IN THE LUSKO AREA PROBABLY ENDED ON 01 OCT ADDITIONAL ELS
OF THIS DIVISION CONTINUE TO BE IN THE ZAGAN KARLIK AREA
-FORCES OF THE 81PLARD (POMERANIAN MD) CONTINUE TO BE IN THE
DRANSKO - POMORSKE AREA
-THE FORCES OF THE 11PLARD (VARSAN MD) OBSERVED IN THE DEBA -
BOJANOW AREA SINCE 27 SEP HAVE CONTINUED THEIR TRG ACTIVITIES

E AIR FORCES

SUMMARY
-AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH, MOSTLY MEDIUM-HIGH TRG FLIGHT ACTI-
VITIES WITH ROUTINE COMBAT TRAINING WERE CONDUCTED IN THE FORWARD
AREA
CSSR/USSR

-TEN 1-39/ALBATROS WERE DELIVERED BY THE VVOCHODNY/CSSR AIRCRAFT
PLANE TO IVANO-FRANKOVSK (CARPATHIAN MD)

B NAVAL FORCES IN THE BALTIC

ONE SIGINT SHIP OF THE SOVIET BORTHURN FLEET CONDUCTED ADDITIONAL
RECEI ACTIVITIES IN THE BALTIC
-TWO LACERIN OF THE BALTIC NAVAL DOUBER MD (SOVIET BALTIC FLEET)
ENTERED VIA POLAND INTO THE NORTHERN GDR AND THERE CONDUCTED SE-
MULATED AIR/SURFACE MISSILE FIRING ACTIVITIES WITH AS 4 (BUTCHER)
MISSILES

E FINAL ASSESSMENT

THE CA AND TRG ACTIVITIES OBSERVED IN THE WP FORCES CORRESPONDED
TO THE TYP AND CONDUCT TO BE EXPECTED AT THIS TIME ACCORDING TO
THE TRAINING YEAR RHYTHM
REMARKABLE ARE THE CONTINUOUS GROUND-BASED AND AIRBORNE SIGINT
ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST "AUTUMN FORGE"
THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE INDICATING ANY CHANGE OF THE THREAT

POSED

COMMENTS (U) (b)(6) ONLY IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES AND FACT OF BI-LATERAL
ADVANCE RELEASE TO U S REQUIRE NOFORN COVER SOURCE RELEASES THIS
INFORMATION TO NATO AS NATO SECRET

PROD (U) DISSEM
COI (U) NONE
TMT (U) US NO
PRP (U) (b)(6) & (b)(7)(E)
APP (U) (b)(6) ULO BOWH GM-14
EVAL (U) NO FTL TO HOME
ENCL (U) NONE
DISSEM (U) N/A
WARNING (U) NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
DECL GADR BI

ACTION DC-4(1) (U P, 7 1)
INFO (JCS(4) CDSJ (1) HTOS(1) JS(2) SECDEF (1) SECDEF(8)
USDP(14) ASD PASSE(1) USDP DSAA(4) DI-1(1) DMIC(1)
MIS-28(1) OS-1B(1) OS-1(1) NWS(1) JS(1) JST-5B(1)
DC-1/CEP(1) AT-10(2) AT-2(2) AT-4(1) DIO(1)
WP-PDO(1) DE-1(1) OS-3B(1) OS-10(1) OS-1P(1)
OS-10(1) OS-3B(2) OS-5B(1) OS-1E(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)
BT-5(1) DC-4(2) DC-4A(1)
+DCA WASHINGTON DC
+LNO WASHINGTON DC
+ESAF WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+OSD CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
+TMC WASHINGTON DC
+EDSHP-310P BN FT BRAGG NC//AFVS-PCS-DO//
+SAFE

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IMMEDIATE
O 100510Z NOV 83
FM ODCSI ULO BOMH GE//
TO DIA WASH DC// (b)(3) per DIA
DA WASH DC//JAHM-15H// HQ ESC KELLY AFS TX//IN//
CINCUSAREUR NEIDELBERG GE//AENGH-C(RE)//
CINCUSAREUR NEIDELBERG GE//AENGH-FO-CUR//
COR 65TH MI GP MUNICH GE//TAGPE-DO-TCC//
DCSI USCOS BERLIN GE//
CINCUSCOM J-2 VAHNINGEN GE//ECJ2//
CINCUSAREUR LONDON UK//IN//
COR V CORPS FRANKFURT GE//AETVGR//
COR VII CORPS MOEBLINGEN GE//AETSGB//
COR USATAC AHS VA//TAX-TA-B// CIA WASH DC//OSHT//
HQ USAF RAMSTEIN AB GE//THOIR/INHH//
ZEN/OCA AMEMBASSY BOMH GE//NR [b6]//
ZEN/OCA AMEMBASSY BOMH GE//NR [b6]//
ZEN/OATT AMEMBASSY BOMH GE//COL [b6]//

(b) (3)
10 USC 424
Per DIA

SECRET MOFORM
SERIAL: (U) IR 2 196 0590 83
PASS: (U) DIA: [b6] FOR COL [b6]
COUNTRY: (U) USSR (U); EAST GERMANY (GC); CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CZ);
POLAND (PL); ROMANIA (RO); BULGARIA (BU); HUNGARY (HU); LIBYA (LV).
SUBJ: (U) IR 2 196 0590 83/DAILY INTSUM
VARIING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.
DOI: (U) 831109
REQS: (U) (b)(7)(E)
SOURCE: (U) 2210-0099, A GE MILITARY STAFF AGENCY WHICH CONSIST-
ENTLY PROVIDES RELIABLE ASSESSMENT INFORMATION, DETAILED INTELLI-
GENCE STUDIES AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.
SUMMARY: (U) MOFORM REPORT IS ADVANCE BI-LATERAL RELEASE TO U.S.
OF SOURCE'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON DAILY BASIS WHICH
COVERS WARSAW PACT FORWARD AREA, CRISES AREAS, AND SPECIAL SIGNIF-
ICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

TEXT: (U) 1. HIGHLIGHTS
- ALONG THE INTRA-GERMAN BORDER, SIGINT FORCES OF THE WP
ARE CONTINUING THEIR SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
DIRECTED AGAINST THE EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER 83* (CF. PARA
2.A.).
- TWO ADDITIONAL TRAS HAVE BEEN IMPOSED IN THE GDR
(CF. PARA 2. GDR).
- RE ROMANIAN-LIBYEN RELATIONS ARE BEING INTENSIFIED
(CF. PARA 3.).
(S/E)2. WARSAW PACT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION
AND IN THE FORWARD AREA
A. ARMED SERVICES
MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITIES
- THE SIGINT ACTIVITIES OF FORCES OF THE 2(UR) SA AND OF
THE 3(UR) SA OBSERVED SINCE MID-OCTOBER HAVE BEEN CON-
DUCTED BY GC AND CGF FORCES SINCE 7 NOV. SINCE 8 NOV
THEY HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ALSO BY C2 FORCES.
THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES ARE PROBABLY DIRECTED AGAINST
THE NATO CPG "ABLE ARCHER 83".
GDR
- TWO ADDITIONAL TRAS (70/83 AND 71/83) HAVE BEEN IMPOSED

ACTION DC-4(1) (U,P,T,F)
INFO NIDS(1) JS-MNCE(1) JS(2) SECDEF(9) USOP(15)
ASD-PARE(1) DI-1(1) NMIC(1) EIS-2B(1) OS-1B(1)
OS-1(1) NWS(1) JSI(1) JSI-5B(1) DE-1/COF(1) AT-2(1)
AT-4(1) AT-5(1) AIS(1) DIO(1) DE-1(1) DE-4(1)
OS-1A(1) OS-1B(1) OS-10(1) OS-1F(1) OS-1G(1)
OS-3B(2) OS-3C(3) OS-5B(1) OS-5D(1) OS-3E(1)
DT-1(1) DIA(1) DT-5(1)
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
+CME WASHINGTON DC
+SAFE

IN THE GDR FOR THE PERIOD FROM 08 THROUGH 15 NOV. TRA
70/83 CORRECTS THE TWO PREVIOUS RESTRICTED AREAS OF
GOTHA AND WEIMAR. TRA 71/83 IS SITUATED BETWEEN THE
PRAS OF JUETERBOG AND DUESEN.
SO FAR, NO EX PREPARATIONS OR TRG ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN
OBSERVED IN THE TWO TRAS.

6. GROUND FORCES
GDR
- THE BRISC AND ACTIVITIES OBSERVED IN THE GSFG AND ITS
SUBORDINATE ARMIES IN THE WESTERN GDR AND IN ITS DIVISIONS
SINCE 02 NOV HAVE CONTINUED ON 08 NOV.
THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES PROBABLY INVOLVE TRAINING AND
PRACTISING OF THE NEWLY INDOCTED PERSONNEL.
CSSR
- THE TRG ACTIVITIES OF CGF COMMAND TROOPS IN NORTHWESTERN
BOHEMIA OBSERVED SINCE 07 NOV HAVE CTD. ON 08 NOV.
POLAND
- ON 08 NOV, CND TROOPS IN THE NSG HAVE CTD. THEIR TRG
ACTIVITIES WHICH THEY HAD STARTED ON 02 NOV.

C. AIR FORCES
SUMMARY
- OWING TO THE FESTIVITIES ON THE OCCASION OF THE
ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, THERE WERE
NO FLIGHT TRG ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET AIR FORCES
ON 08 NOV.

IN THE AIR FORCES OF THE NSWP COUNTRIES, THERE WERE
LOW TO MODERATE FLIGHT TRG ACTIVITIES - TO SOME EXTENT
IMPAIRED BY BAD WEATHER.
D. NAVAL FORCES IN THE BALTIC
- THE WP NAVIES CONDUCTED NORMAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE
BALTIC APPROACHES.

E. FINAL ASSESSMENT
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CONTINUING TRAINING ACTIVITIES
OF COMMAND TROOPS, THERE WERE VERY LOW INTENSITY EX
ACTIVITIES AS FAR AS TYPE AND EXTENT ARE CONCERNED.
THIS CONDUCT CORRESPONDS TO THE POINT OF THE TIME OF THE
TRAINING HALF-YEAR.

THERE WERE NO REFERENCES INDICATING ANY CHANGE OF THE
THREAT.
3. ECONOMY, RESEARCH, ARMAMENTS
ROMANIA/LIBYA (NC)
HEADED BY DEFENSE MINISTER COLONEL GENERAL OLTEANU, BY THE
DEP. CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL CIOROIARIU, AND BY THE CHIEF OF
THE DIVISION FOR AIR FORCES MILITARY TECHNIQS GENERAL PETRICOA,
A HIGH RANKING ROMANIAN MILITARY DELEGATION TRAVELLED TO
LIBYA ON 06 NOV.

COMMENT
THIS VISIT SERVES TO CONFIRM THE INTENSIVE RELATIONS EXISTING
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE MADE A TREATY ON FRIEND-
SHIP AND COOPERATION AS EARLY AS 24 JAN 83.
IN ADDITION TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF ROMANIAN MILITARY ADVISERS
IN LIBYA, ALSO AN AGREEMENT MADE THIS YEAR ON THE PURCHASE
OF ROMANIAN TR-77 BATTLE TANKS HAS BECOME KNOWN.
IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT ALSO ADDITIONAL ARMS DELIVERIES AND
THEIR FINANCING WILL BE NEGOTIATED ABOUT.

IN THIS CONNECTION, ROMANIA PROBABLY WISHES TO MAKE BARTER
DEALS, E.G. OIL AGAINST ARMAMENTS.
COMMENTS: (U) ONLY IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCE AND FACT OF BI-LATERAL
ADVANCE RELEASE TO U.S. REQUIRE MOFORM CAVEAT. SOURCE RELEASES THIS
INFORMATION TO NATO AS NATO-SECRET.

PROJ: (U) 911500
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) JCS NO
PREP: (U) (b)(8) & (b)(7)(E)
APPR: (U) [b6] EN-14, ULO BOMH
EVAL: (U) NO, REL TO: NONE
ENCL: (U) NONE
DISSEM: (U) N/A
VARIING: (U) NO; RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
DECL: CDDR ST

MCN=83314/02441 TOR=83314/10402 TAD=83314/10402 CDSN=MIA360

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PAGE 1 OF 1
100510Z NOV 83

INTELLIGENCE STAFF
IN CHARGE
(C) ASSISTANT
DEFENCE
-8 MAY 1984
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Page No 1 of 6
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SOVIET UNION: CONCERN ABOUT A SURPRISE NATO ATTACK

I INTRODUCTION

1. This paper considers whether specific options exist for minimising the risk of Soviet misinterpretation of NATO Command Post Exercises (CPXs), particularly nuclear ones. Although it has been prepared in the context of an unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 and other reports of alleged concern about a surprise NATO attack (JIC(84)(N)45), the paper examines the inherent advantages and disadvantages of prior notification of nuclear CPXs as an overall Confidence Building Measure (CBM).

2. [REDACTED]

3. Although the JIC reached no firm conclusion, we cannot discount the possibility that at least some Soviet officials/officers may have misinterpreted Able Archer 83 and possibly other nuclear CPXs as posing a real threat. Quite apart from their reaction to Able Archer and [REDACTED] If their response involves the taking of actual precautions against what

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they judge to be threatening and ambiguous warning indicators, should we seek to establish a system which makes the holding of high level nuclear CPXs subject to an obligation to notify in advance? Should the practice of promoting military transparency through Confidence Building Measures be extended from field exercises and the movement of actual forces to CPXs themselves? Provided a proposal can be assembled which does not constrain nuclear CPX activity, (which is militarily vital for the training of commanders and their staffs in extremely complicated procedures), could there be advantage in exploring this with the Russians?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

II SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION

4. While an element of uncertainty is implicit in the concept of deterrence, it is assumed that there is mutual benefit in ensuring that each side does not misconstrue the other's CPXs as posing a real threat. Since certain notification measures relating to test ICBM launches already exist for reducing the possibility of misinterpretation (SALT II, Chapter XVI) there seems no inherent reason why similar procedures could not be devised which extended to certain nuclear CPXs as well. Prior warning of field exercises has become an accepted feature of the conventional arms control process, and as such, could be capable

of expansion, although not perhaps within existing fora (see paragraph 7 below). It is for discussion whether notification of nuclear CPXs would have to be balanced (the reciprocal nature of conventional notification is an important factor which needs to be taken into account) or whether notification might be asymmetric or even unilateral.

5. It is also for discussion what CPXs might be notified and the extent of information which might be provided. It may for example be asked whether awareness of the existence of a nuclear CPX would of itself generate confidence. In our view simple notification could indeed be effective in reassuring the other side if it was given sufficiently far in advance to make it clear that such exercises formed a normal pattern of activity and took place in relative isolation from the changing temperature of political relationships between the major powers. It might prove possible to construct notification in such a way as to avoid giving details of particular scenarios or inhibit in any way US or NATO exercises.

6. Although the Russians appear to have reacted in an unprecedented way to the NATO exercise Able Archer 83, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This, coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union is the only nuclear power in the Warsaw Pact, indicates that super-power nuclear CPXs should form the centrepiece of any notification procedure, supplemented perhaps on the West's side with notification of NATO-wide exercises involving a substantial American nuclear role. We do not consider that every exercise

/involving

involving simulated nuclear release would require notification

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In the immediate future it might
be enough to attempt early discussions with the Russians, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

III FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION

7. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] There may
be a requirement for speed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This effectively rules out most of the existing arms
control negotiations as suitable fora since discussion of CBMs
in any of these is likely to be unduly prolonged (MBFR),
complicated by an involvement of extraneous participants (CDE,
CSCE) or indefinitely delayed (START). A number of existing
bilateral US/USSR agreements theoretically provide a framework
(‘hotline’ agreements 1963/71, Article XVI of SALT II or
Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement 1973), but none of them seem
easily adaptable to current requirements.

8. An ad hoc forum may therefore be required. A special
contact between the US and the USSR seems the most practical

option in terms of speed, simplicity and security. Although it was a NATO CPX about which the Soviets appear to have been concerned, prior consultation within a NATO forum, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Although we could fully justify attempts to increase confidence about nuclear matters and anticipate considerable support for such efforts, on balance the search for CBMs is likely to be more effectively pursued [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

However recent experience suggests that a bilateral discussion involving possible notification of NATO and US national nuclear CPXs is unlikely to cause problems within the Alliance [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] strengthen the case for discussion of CBMs relating to Command Post Exercises, specifically nuclear ones, to be conducted bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9. The President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Report, 21 March 1984) proposes a bilateral exchange

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information between US and Soviet Defence officials about steps which could be misconstrued as indications of an attack. The Report proposes that a variety of measures should be constructed to improve communication and predictability which would 'contribute to stability by improving mutual understanding and reducing surprise and misinterpretation'. It is our view that [REDACTED] should be acted upon as soon as possible.

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