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FROM: CSAF	TO: SAC			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
<p style="text-align: center;">DECLASSIFIED As per instructions on document By <u>RA</u> Date <u>2/2/91</u></p>				<p>DISTRIBUTION:</p> <p>AFCCS 7-3 AFCVC -1 AFXDC -1 AFXOPSM -1 AFXOPX -4 AFORQ -2</p> <p style="text-align: right;">11</p>
<p>SECRET FROM AFCCS 87633.</p> <p>SUBJ: (U) Feasibility of Peacetime Launches from ICBM Operational Sites. This message in four parts.</p> <p>PART I. I share your concern in the development of true reliability factors for our ICBM systems and agree that launching from operational sites is desirable and attainable within the foreseeable future. Be assured that all considerations were carefully evaluated during the intensive study by the Air Staff and by the JCS in their review of your proposed plans. With reference to your proposals concerning liquid fueled systems, their acceptability was based on: the relatively short overflight of land, booster impact in the ocean, the safety afforded by launching into the national missile test ranges, with final approval to be contingent upon</p>				
SYMBOL		SIGNATURE		
AFXOPSM		<i>John K. Hester</i>		
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE		
Maj Cullen/rat		JOHN K. HESTER		
PHONE 75715	PAGE NR. 1	NR. OF PAGES 3		Major General US Air Force
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		Assistant Vice Chief of Staff		
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demonstrated improved reliability and confidence. In the case of your Minuteman proposal, examination of the planned flight profile indicated first stage impact just short of the Canadian Border; second stage in the Hudson Bay; with re-entry vehicle impact in the North Atlantic area off the coast of Greenland. Since a malfunction similar to the failure of thrust termination control experienced on the first Minuteman Operational Test launch could result in overflight of Canada and Western Europe with flight termination in Africa, the political ~~aspect~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{is} of much greater concern. The negative reaction by the Secretary of the Air Force and myself to your Minuteman proposal was based primarily on our concern of possible international and political implications. In my opinion, this consideration remains as the major constraint against launching Minuteman missiles from existing operational sites at this time.

PART II. I am concerned about the realism of the Vandenberg AFB Operational Tests and have recommended to the Secretary of Defense that a Minuteman Unit, of at least squadron size, be provided and suitably located in order that repetitive launching can be made with operational realism. However, the Secretary of Defense is not convinced that the information derived from

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firings from an isolated squadron is sufficiently better than that obtained from Vandenberg AFB tests to justify the increased construction, investment, and operational costs involved. Accordingly, he has deferred action on this proposal until FY 1966.

PART III. With regard to your question concerning the DOD reaction to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on operational site launchings, the Secretary of Defense believes that launching from Malmstrom is not possible at this time but that plans should be continued for the conduct of launchings from operational sites with the Improved Minuteman having a 360° target azimuth capability. Because of the limited record of past performance in liquid fueled systems, he further states that he does not have high confidence that such tests would be completely successful. Therefore, he has decided that it would be premature to approve such a proposal. He has requested QUOTE the plan for firing of Atlas and Titan from operational sites be periodically reviewed for up-to-date applicability, and the subject raised again by 1 November 1964 UNQUOTE.

PART IV. I feel that we should continue to plan for operational ^{SITE} testing to demonstrate Weapon System Reliability at the appropriate time.

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