



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

16 MAY 1970

In reply refer to  
I-22427/70

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)  
ISCAP No. 2009-080, document 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Briefing for Fulbright Committee

In keeping with what amounts to a power of veto, by virtue of the so-called Ehrlichman memo of 27 April (Tab A), over the information on nuclear weapons to be provided to the Fulbright Committee, we have made the changes as noted on the attached copy of State's proposed presentation (Tab B). According to the Ehrlichman memo, you and Secretary Rogers were to review personally the prepared script after it had been jointly agreed upon by your respective staffs.

It is doubtful if the respective staffs can reach agreement because State chooses to include specific numbers of weapons deployed to specific countries rather than limiting the figures to rounded approximations by region, i.e. Europe and Asia, which Defense understands to be the interpretation of the requirement in the Ehrlichman memo that the briefing will not make substantive disclosure except to the most limited extent.

The changes we have made in the State presentation do not do violence to the objective of a generalized overview of nuclear weapons deployments, and I recommend that you adopt the attached as the Defense position.

State has also prepared a large document consisting of possible questions and suggested answers. Because Defense cannot control the answers which the State Briefer (Robert Spiers) might give and, since this document of questions and answers will not be given to the Committee, there is no obligation for you to review them personally. Stu French has so notified State in the letter at Tab C, a copy of which will be sent to the White House Working Group. We will, however, try to convey, at the staff level, Defense's interpretation of the Ehrlichman memo as related to these questions and answers.

You may receive a call from Secretary Rogers on this subject at which time you might indicate that you are guided by the following criteria:

240-1-6323 Fulbright

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Bureau  
Chief, International Division, WIS

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I-22427/70

Special list has been

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1. The prepared text shall be presented in the most generalized form possible.
2. Disclosure of substance shall be to the most limited extent possible.
3. The agenda of the 10 March meeting of the Kissinger Steering Group is to be used as the basis of determining topics which cannot be discussed under any circumstances even though they may not have been formally adopted by the Group.

*Edw. W. Wright*

Recommend that revised briefing script at Tab B be adopted as the Defense Department position:

Concur

Nonconcur

21 MAY 1970

*But please make sure that technical aspects in the script are checked with Carl Walker before any transmission.*

Attachments

Coordination

ATSD (AE) Informed  
ATSD (LA) Informed

Mr. French/rm/15May70  
SD-15/4E810/72788

Dist:

SecDef  
DepSecDef  
OSD  
ATSD (AE)  
ATSD (LA)  
R&C  
Mr. French Cmbk

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~~TOP SECRET~~ INFORMATION  
COVER SHEET

I 22427/70

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE <del>TOP SECRET</del> INFORMATION COVER SHEET	CONTROL NUMBER(S)	INCLOSURES
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The attached ~~TOP SECRET~~ information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) identified by number above.

Each person receiving the attached ~~TOP SECRET~~ information shall sign and fill in the information required below.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ INFORMATION  
COVER SHEET

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Date: 21

Mr. [unclear] has seen 1 For approval \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Ware has seen 2 For signature \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. French \_\_\_\_\_ For information X

ACTION TO: \_\_\_\_\_

INFO TO: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT: STU FRENCH NOTIFIED.

THIS CAUSES NO PROBLEMS

SINCE MR. LAUSKE COMMENTED

IN THE REPORT BEFORE STU

FRENCH DELETED CERTAIN ITEMS

[Signature]  
Executive Officer [Signature]

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1970

EYES ONLY

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ✓  
RE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT --  
SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE

You may already have a report of the Congressional Conference on National Security Affairs of April 17-18.


There is a short reference to nuclear deployment in the synopsis I received. It is attached.

I wish to reiterate the President's understanding of our mode of procedure in this regard.

- (1) Representatives of Defense and State are to jointly prepare a proposed briefing for the Committee which is satisfactory in content to both Departments. There is to be a presumption in favor of deletion in the event that either Department objects to the inclusion of any item.
- (2) You will both, personally, review the content proposed after it is jointly agreed upon by your Departmental staffs. The President is assuming that any material advanced to the Committee has the joint approval of both Secretaries.
- (3) This briefing is to be essentially pro-forma and will not make substantive disclosure except to the most limited extent.
- (4) Only one transcript of the briefing is to be taken and it will be held in the custody of the Department of Defense.

If we can be of any assistance, please call upon us.

"Sec Def Has Seen  
30 APR 1970

*ISA has dilem'*  
*CSW for sec*  
*14 10222 4/4930*  
  
John D. Ehrlichman  
Assistant to the President



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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

14 May 1970

In reply refer to  
I-3542/70

MEMORANDUM FOR JOE WOLF

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Briefing--Fulbright Committee

In accordance with our telephone conversation this morning, we have reviewed the draft of the briefing presentation on nuclear weapons to be given to the Fulbright Committee on 21 May. This review was undertaken pursuant to, and in accordance with, the White House Memorandum for the Secretaries of State and Defense dated 27 April 1970.

The attached copy of the second working draft of the formal presentation includes the changes agreed to at yesterday's meeting as well as those which have additionally been made to reflect our interpretation of the meaning of pro forma as directed in the White House Memorandum and for which we shall seek the personal approval of the Secretary of Defense as required.

On page 5, we had agreed yesterday to provide the approximate number of weapons deployed "by region and afloat." In view of the fact that tactical or strategic nuclear weapons aboard ships or submarines of our Navy would legally be construed as deployed upon US territory, we have deleted the words "and afloat."

The changes, in addition to those agreed to yesterday, do not do violence to the overall objective of providing the Committee with a generalized presentation on nuclear weapons deployments abroad, and we have no reason to believe that the Secretary of Defense will not approve this draft as submitted.

The questions and answers pose more difficult problems inasmuch as the answers only serve as a rough guide of the response to be given should such questions, or others similar to them, be asked. Moreover, we do not feel that the Secretary of Defense should be called

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pg 1 of 3 sub A

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upon to give his personal attention to such a large compilation of hypothetical questions which may or may not be asked. We will, however, endeavor to provide you with a critique in terms of whether or not, in our opinion, a particular question calls for a substantive response which, if given, would go beyond the restrictions established by the White House Memorandum.

Sincerely,

Stuart P. French  
Special Assistant

Attachment

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~~TOP SECRET~~ INFORMATION  
COVER SHEET

I-22427/70

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET	CONTROL NUMBER(S)	INCLOSURES
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COVER SHEET



WORKING DRAFT  
5/1/70 2nd Draft

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BRIEFING FOR  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman:

With your approval I plan to proceed as follows:

I will first make some general observations regarding our nuclear weapons deployed on foreign territory including the procedures in effect for determining the number and types of weapons to be deployed. I will then discuss more specifically our deployments in the Far East [REDACTED] and Western Europe referring to the relevant agreements as we go along. In discussing NATO I thought you might like to know something of the intensive work in the alliance in recent years regarding the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO. I would plan to conclude by outlining the extensive measures and procedures in effect to insure the safety and security of our nuclear weapons abroad.

Following the presentation, my colleagues and I will, of course, answer to the best of our abilities any questions that the Committee may have.

Portions denied are S-FRD and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

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General Remarks

To set the framework for the more detailed presentation of our nuclear weapons deployment abroad, I would like to make a number of basic points.

First, the storage of United States nuclear weapons abroad, as the storage of other weapons must be viewed in the context of the purposes served by the deployment of our military forces themselves in Europe and the Far East. Essentially we maintain military forces in these areas because it is in the interest of United States security to do so. The events following the end of World War II -- as well as the lessons to be drawn from the causes of that particular conflict -- made it absolutely clear that United States security interests could not be adequately served by withdrawal behind our own borders. The concept of forward defense born of this realization has two objectives closely related to one another.

-- One is to deter aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the United States considers it has a real stake in the security and stability of areas involved;

-- The other is to play an effective military role in the event aggression nevertheless occurs.

Obviously, these two objectives are closely linked. The more clearly effective our forces are militarily the more will their presence contribute to deterrence and the same is true for our allies.

United States nuclear weapons are deployed abroad to give substance and meaning to these two objectives in face of the very considerable non-nuclear and nuclear power available to the USSR and to a lesser degree to Communist China. The United States nuclear shield is particularly significant in light of the fact that -- except for the United Kingdom and France -- our allies in Europe and the Far East have deliberately decided to refrain from developing their own nuclear forces and [ ] rely [ ] on the US nuclear DETERENT. Thus, our arrangements for nuclear weapons deployments abroad -- including those in support of allied delivery forces in the NATO area -- are not only fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty but in support of the objectives of that Treaty.

Second, there is no commitment either explicit or implicit that the United States must use nuclear weapons in case of conflict. Neither would deterrence be served were we to be explicit in publicly stating the conditions under which they would be used. The presence of nuclear weapons

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abroad simply  
/means that the United States has the option of employing these weapons on short notice. The existence of that option contributes to deterrence where deterrence is needed -- and it is needed -- and also provides reassurance to those of our allies who feel themselves threatened by the conventional and nuclear power of either the Soviet Union or Communist China.

Third, the presence of nuclear weapons<sup>abroad</sup>/in support of US forces or alliance forces does not in and of itself create a commitment to the defense of any particular country.

Fourth, let me recall to you that the authority to use nuclear weapons operationally in the event of war is one which each President since 1945 has reserved to himself.

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At this time United States nuclear weapons are deployed in twelve foreign countries and in [REDACTED]

[These countries and] the approximate number of weapons deployed <sup>By REGION</sup> are shown on the map before you.

The United States stores nuclear weapons in foreign countries either under an express agreement or understanding with the host country regarding nuclear weapons or under the more general terms of the military facilities or base rights agreements. <sup>In</sup> The former is the general rule in Western Europe and the latter in the Far East.

As far as United States statutory requirements are concerned, we do not need formal intergovernmental agreements to store nuclear weapons with US forces abroad but do so under the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, we must have intergovernmental agreements under Sections 91c and 144b of the Atomic Energy Act before we can effectively store nuclear weapons abroad for possible use by allied rather than US delivery forces in the event the President should decide to

release the weapons for such use. This type of arrangement is in effect only in the NATO area and I will address it in more detail later on. There are no comparable arrangements in the Far East.

All important plans for deployment of nuclear weapons abroad are carefully reviewed within the Executive Branch and must be approved by the President. The normal procedure is for the major US military commanders abroad to formulate ~~[what they consider to be]~~ their requirements. In the case of NATO Europe, these requirements are formulated <sup>consultation with</sup> by General Goodpaster in / allied officers in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe in Belgium. In the case of Far East, where we do not have allied arrangements comparable to those in NATO, the military requirements reflect the views of US commanders ~~as they see them.~~ In either event the military needs are stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who after review submit them to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense, after making such adjustments as he considers necessary, <sup>COORDINATES THE PLAN WITH THE SEC AND STATE. THIS COORDINATED PLAN IS THEN RECOMMENDED</sup> ~~[submits his recommendation]~~ to the President. ~~[That recommendation includes exact numbers and types of weapons.]~~

~~[their proposed location by country and a statement of the views of the Department of State.]~~ This process takes place on an annual basis or whenever there is a proposal for a significant change in deployment or/a new program for cooperation with one of the allies such as those in effect in NATO.

Far East

Let me now turn to deployments on foreign territory in the Pacific.

We now have about [redacted] nuclear weapons stored in the <sup>FAR EAST</sup> countries shown on the map. This figure includes those weapons now stored in [redacted] but to be removed from there by the time the [redacted]

[redacted] The figure does not include weapons stored on territory under US control such as [redacted]

In addition to the nuclear weapons now stored [redacted]

[redacted] we now maintain some weapons [redacted]

~~[The weapons deployed in these countries consist of nuclear artillery shells, warheads for short range Army missile systems, tactical aircraft bombs, air defense and~~

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~~antisubmarine warfare weapons and atomic demolition munitions.~~ All the weapons in the countries shown are there for use by United States delivery forces provided, of course, that such use is authorized by the President. We do not store in the Far East nuclear weapons for possible use by non-US forces as we do in Europe. We therefore do not need and do not have the intergovernmental agreements under the Atomic Energy Act which would be necessary for the latter purpose as we do in Europe.

The basis for our nuclear storage in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The number of nuclear

weapons [REDACTED] increased steadily from the late 1950s until 1967, [when about [REDACTED] were stored there. In

the last two years this number has been reduced to

[REDACTED]

at this time.]

All the weapons will be

removed by the time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The first nuclear capable US artillery units arrived

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~~Only A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE [REDACTED] and the then Defense Minister were informed prior to this deployment.]~~ The

formal basis for the presence of nuclear and other US weapons is the [REDACTED]

~~Deployment [REDACTED] reached a peak of about 1,000 in 1968. Since then the number has been reduced to about 300 at this time.]~~ All the nuclear capable US military

units are also capable of using conventional ammunition.

Except for a small proportion of the US tactical aircraft in

[REDACTED] the deployment and configuration of the forces assumes the initial use of conventional weapons should an attack occur.

~~[REDACTED] we store about [REDACTED] nuclear tactical aircraft~~

~~Only A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE [REDACTED] were informed of the proposed DEPLOYMENT~~

~~deployment in 1967.~~ The formal basis for the presence

of these and our other forces in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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In [redacted] we maintain [slightly [redacted]  
 nuclear weapons [consisting] primarily <sup>for</sup> [of] air defense,  
 [weapons, antisubmarine warheads] for use by our fleet and <sup>FOR</sup>  
 [a small store of] tactical [aircraft bombs] <sup>FIGHTER/BOMBERS. ONLY A VERY LIMITED</sup> [President]  
<sup>NUMBER OF HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF [redacted] HAVE BEEN INFORMED</sup>  
 [redacted] has been advised] that US nuclear weapons are

[redacted]

[redacted]

Under arrangements between the US [redacted]  
 [redacted] we now have deployed [redacted] <sup>slightly less</sup> ~~than~~  
 [redacted] US nuclear air defense weapons stored there for  
 use by [redacted] if and when the weapons  
 are released to them by the President of the United States.

As the Committee knows, the United States [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] All the  
 nuclear weapons located [redacted] except for the few I  
 will mention next are there in support of [redacted]

[redacted]  
 WE HAVE RECENTLY REMOVED THE  
 [At the moment we also have a small number of] nuclear  
<sup>PREVIOUSLY</sup>  
 [antisubmarine warfare] weapons stored [redacted] for

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use by United States Navy aircraft in the event <sup>e</sup> hostile submarine threat against the US should materialize.

~~[However, the Department of Defense is making certain adjustments in our bases [REDACTED] as a result of which these weapons will shortly be removed from this particular location.]~~

### Europe

Before discussing deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, it is useful to recall the difficult post-war years when our hopes for a lasting political settlement were disappointed, when the rapid withdrawal of American forces from Europe following the end of hostilities was not accompanied by comparable action on part of the USSR, and when the Soviets made it clear both by actions and words that they were determined not merely to consolidate but to extend their domination over Europe if they could. This situation led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Some United States nuclear weapons were first deployed to Europe at about this time to help offset the military and political threat posed by the heavy preponderance of Soviet military power in the area. In the early 1950's these weapons, primarily consisting of aircraft

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the  
bombs and later of some of / first tactical nuclear weapons,  
were deployed only in support of American military forces.

At the conclusion of their meeting in Paris in December 1957, the NATO Heads of Government publicly announced their decision "to establish stocks of nuclear warheads which will be readily available for the defense of the alliance in case of need." At this meeting attended by President Eisenhower along with the other heads of government of the NATO countries, it was also agreed that the deployment of these stocks ~~[and arrangements for their use]~~ would be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. These decisions were incorporated in the Communique issued by the heads of government. They were discussed extensively in public at

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that time. Secretary Dulles met with this Committee in executive session on January 9, 1958 to discuss the NATO Heads of Government meeting.

From the time of this basic decision in 1957, which I want to emphasize again was <sup>A</sup> decision agreed to at the highest level of the NATO governments, the number of nuclear weapons in Europe increased until about 1968. The rate of deployments of nuclear weapons to Europe has been a function of the levels approved under the procedures I mentioned in my introductory remarks and the attainment of the necessary capabilities by allied delivery units. In other words the weapons were deployed to Europe only as the allies bought the delivery systems, such as F 104 aircraft, and achieved the necessary state of training to be effective. ~~In the last two years the total number of nuclear weapons has leveled off and we do not anticipate significant changes in the foreseeable future.~~

Portions denied are S-FRD and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

The present NATO atomic stockpile consists of somewhat ~~██████████~~ nuclear weapons in the NATO countries shown on the map. ~~While there are no nuclear weapons at our ██████████ we do store a small~~

[REDACTED]

As you see on the

chart most of these weapons ~~[slightly less]~~ [REDACTED] are deployed in the area of Allied Command Central Europe, that is in the FRG, [REDACTED]

Portions denied are S-FRD and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

The weapons located in Europe are ~~[in the category of]~~ tactical weapons, <sup>AS DISTINGUISHED</sup> ~~[a term which I use primarily to distinguish the weapons in Europe]~~ from strategic systems, such as ~~[namely]~~ ICBMs, POLARIS missiles and weapons carried by aircraft of the Strategic Air Command. ~~[No weapons in the latter category are located in European countries except insofar as our POLARIS submarines enter European ports temporarily from time to time at the support facilities~~

[REDACTED] ~~[The weapons in the NATO stockpile in Europe include bombs for nuclear capable fighter bombers, warheads for shorter range Army missile systems (such as the PERSHING, SERGEANT and HONEST JOHN), certain nuclear artillery shells, nuclear air defense warheads, and a small number of atomic demolition munitions and antisubmarine warfare weapons.]~~

The ~~[majority of the]~~ [REDACTED] nuclear weapons in the NATO area are held there under stringent security precautions, ~~THE MAJORITY OF WHICH ARE~~

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for use by United States Army, Air Force or Navy units, always subject to the provision that such use is authorized by the President.

Somewhat more than [REDACTED] the total stockpile of [REDACTED] is held -- also under stringent security precautions -- in United States custody but for possible use by delivery forces of certain of our NATO allies. Again, release to the allies can only be on authority of the President of the US.

Many of the delivery systems concerned, both allied and American, are capable of employing either conventional or nuclear ammunition. In fact, in the last five years the United States has steadily urged the allies to avoid one sided emphasis on the nuclear role and to insure that tactical aircraft units especially be fully dual capable. This goal has now been largely achieved.

A small number of weapons systems -- primarily some ~~tactical aircraft~~ <sup>FIGHTER/BOMBERS</sup> and certain missile systems -- are always maintained on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) capable of immediate employment in a nuclear role if the circumstances warrant. The extensive procedural and and the President authorizes their use for this purpose. /

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physical safeguards which have been developed over the years are such as to make unauthorized use of the weapons all but an impossibility. I will return to some of these safeguards towards the end of this presentation.

In order to enable effective participation of the allies in the nuclear capable forces of NATO, we have negotiated with a number of NATO allies agreements for cooperation under the provisions of Sections 91c and 144b of the Atomic Energy Act, which enable the United States to communicate to certain NATO allies certain classified information for the purpose of a) development of defense plans, b) training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons, c) evaluation of capabilities of potential enemies in employment of atomic weapons, and d) development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which could be released to the allies on Presidential authority if necessary.

We now have agreements in this category with Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. We also have a <sup>GENERAL</sup> ~~umbrella~~ agreement of this type with NATO as an organization. Finally,



we still have an agreement with France on the books but it has been inoperative since the French Government withdrew its forces from NATO commitment in <sup>1966.</sup> [1967]. These agreements were all submitted to the Congress under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.

I want to note that with one exception these agreements do not provide for transfer of nuclear weapons design and manufacture information. The exception is the UK to which we have provided certain limited assistance in design of nuclear weapons since the Atomic Energy Act was amended for this purpose in 1958.

#### Coordination with Allies

The extent to which the role of nuclear weapons is and has been the subject of discussion with our allies differs considerably between the Far East and NATO Europe.

There are a number of good reasons for this including the difference in the degree of sophistication of thought on strategic concepts in general and the fact that the threat to the security of the countries in the respective areas as viewed by those countries is one thing in Asia and quite a different thing in Western Europe.

In Europe there has always been a strong interest first in assuring that United States nuclear weapons are available for NATO defense and second in European participation in the planning for the use of these weapons should that ever become necessary. There is also, of course, a relationship between the attitude of most European Governments <sup>toward</sup> the problem of nuclear strategy and their attitude toward non-proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. The fact that United States nuclear weapons are available in NATO under arrangements generally satisfactory to the NATO allies has been an important element in leading to the decision by all the NATO Governments, except France, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thereby forego independent development and manufacture of nuclear weapons, a step which a number of the countries concerned are technically and economically capable of undertaking.

Discussion in NATO of the contribution -- and limitations -- of nuclear weapons to allied defense has progressively deepened in course of the last ten to twelve years. That discussion began with the debates leading to the 1957

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decision of the NATO Heads of Government which I referred to earlier. It took another important step forward in 1962 when Secretaries Rusk and McNamara briefed allied Foreign and Defense Ministers at the Athens meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the facts which at that time were the basis of our own thinking regarding the general nuclear strategic situation and the needs of the alliance in that situation. At the same meeting an understanding was reached on a set of guidelines for the US -- as the principal custodian of NATO's nuclear forces -- on circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used in defense of the alliance.

These guidelines made essentially three points.

First, that in the event of an unmistakable Soviet nuclear attack the alliance forces should respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. It was recognized that in this type of situation the possibilities for consultation would be extremely limited.

Second, in the event of a full scale conventional attack indicating general hostilities, the allies should if necessary respond with nuclear weapons it being anticipated that time in such a situation would permit consultation.

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Third, that in the event of a Soviet attack not meeting these conditions but which threatened the integrity of NATO forces and territory and could not be successfully contained,<sup>a</sup>/decision to use nuclear weapons would be the subject of prior consultation in the North Atlantic Council.

At the same time both we and the British said that we would consult with the North Atlantic Council if time permits concerning the use of nuclear weapons anywhere. I might note that Secretary Dulles speaking for the United States assured the North Atlantic Council as early as 1953 that, time permitting, the US would consult its NATO allies before using nuclear weapons anywhere.

In order to make allied participation in NATO nuclear defense arrangements more meaningful, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group was established in December 1966. In a sense, Nuclear Planning Group is a misnomer since the participating ministers of defense do not develop plans as such but rather discuss among themselves the kinds of conditions and contingencies under which the alliance might have to consider the use of nuclear weapons and the general nature of the forces which should be available. Thus the political guidelines for the possible tactical use of nuclear weapons which the NPG approved at its meeting last November cover a variety of

possible options open to NATO in the event of aggression against the treaty area. The Nuclear Planning Group has been extremely successful to date in building alliance awareness of the implications of nuclear weapons at the top governmental levels where such an awareness is most important.

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Maintaining the Security of Nuclear Weapons

Extensive efforts have been and are devoted toward insuring the safety and security of United States nuclear weapons deployed abroad. These efforts are directed against the dangers of overrun by an enemy force, sabotage or possibly unauthorized use.

The measures in effect are the result of a variety of directives and procedures promulgated and adopted over the years by the Department of Defense and, of course, being carried out as a responsibility of that Department and the military services. However, we in the Department of State are in close touch with the Defense Department on also this aspect of our nuclear deployments abroad and I can describe the existing security practices and measures

in a general way for the Committee. I might also note that members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress and their staff have visited a number of our nuclear storage sites abroad primarily for the purpose of reviewing the existing security arrangements.

The security of nuclear weapons begins with an extensive personnel screening program designed to insure that American military personnel with access to nuclear weapons meet stringent human reliability criteria. Even minor infractions of disciplinary rules are sufficient cause to prevent further access of the individual concerned to nuclear weapons.

When in storage, nuclear weapons are kept in maximum security areas which must meet exacting standards with regard to fencing, floodlights, double locks, and the like. A prescribed number of guards must be present at all times in the storage site and augmentation forces, again in prescribed strength, must be available at the site in fixed time periods beginning within a few minutes of an alert. In those cases where storage sites are intended to support allied forces, American military personnel are responsible for security within the storage sites and allied military

units provide the forces for external defense.

There are procedures and detailed rules which control entry to any storage site as well as so-called "no-lone zones" within which no one may be unaccompanied.

There are also emergency evacuation plans meeting fixed time criteria for the evacuation of weapons from storage sites and from the country. These plans include required airlift and ground transport. Finally, there are emergency destruction plans and procedures accompanied by the requirement that emergency destruction rendering weapons incapable of producing a nuclear detonation must be accomplished in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Drill exercises are regularly held to assure the capability of our forces to meet the set requirements.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(8)

Certain security features are built into the weapons themselves including primarily the so-called Permissive Action Links (PALs) which consist of either elaborate mechanical or electro-mechanical locks which can only be unlocked upon receipt of code designations from higher headquarters.

In those cases in the NATO area where weapons are stored in custody of US personnel but in support of an allied delivery unit, the same physical security, emergency

evacuation and emergency destruction requirements are in effect. The strength of the US custodial detachments varies from [redacted] at the smallest Army installation to as much as [redacted] at a larger storage site such as one which may support an allied tactical aircraft unit. All the weapons in these sites, in fact all nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, are equipped with the Permissive Action Links I mentioned earlier. The US custodial units have direct communication with higher US echelons of command which would have to provide the codes necessary to unlock the mechanical or electro-mechanical devices I have described. Nevertheless, I personally believe the most important restraint against forcible seizure of nuclear weapons by an ally is the fact that doing so would be an act of aggression against the United States.

Except for the physical location of weapons in the storage sites, the same procedures that I have described are in effect for the relatively small number of nuclear weapons systems which are held on Quick Reaction Alert at any one time. US military guards are posted at all such



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weapons systems. The weapons are equipped with Permissive Action Links which can only be unlocked on receipt of the requisite code words. If the weapons system is a tactical aircraft, access to the runway is physically blocked and other suitable technical precautions are taken in the case of other systems.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my presentation. I am available for your questions.

FM/AE:WJLehmann:bpw

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