1. The initial meeting with Mosavat was between just me and Sam on 8 November. It was decided to make a few points to make in this initial meeting. We wanted to make sure that Mosavat is a moderate who has been duped by those around him. It was recommended that we base our judgement on his public statements and not on the media on various subjects. He is well liked by the media, but perhaps his greatest strength is his ability as a public speaker. It was also decided that we would make statements that he is either an admirer of Montazeri or in any way involved with his political activities.

2. At this point I said I wanted to tell Sam that he was to tell the Iranian to have nothing to do with the CIA representative in the group. I indicated that there was some danger in his meeting with Sam.

3. Sam believes that if the new connection comes out again we may have something. He told me that it is essential that we have the Iranian to tell this story again. It is very important that we follow up on this. It is also important that we make sure our sources are willing to continue to cooperate with us. We will have to spend a lot of time together at the next meeting, if there is a next meeting.

4. We are very much concerned about the Gorbachev-Khashoggi-Israel connection. We believe that the intelligence people had taken a hard look at these connections and concluded that Gorbachev is an Israeli agent. There are no plans to do anything about it and we are open to suggestions from you. We are certain that they have decided not to try to push him back to Tehran. It is important to continue to buy some items from him. (Note: This all takes place before the supposed revelations began so there may be a change.) He would like to discuss the Gorbachev problem at the next meeting. Sam pointed out that we should not make things too tough for Gorbachev. He asked if we could do something via the Israelis?

5. I wanted to know that the Shara newspaper in Beirut was under Syrian control. This has led some in Tehran to conclude that the U.S. might have had a hand in the expose. Sam pointed out to him that he had considerable information which clearly indicates that Hizbullah is involved with the newspaper. We had concluded that Hizbullah may have used the newspaper as a means of channeling its leaks.
Later on 8 November, he gave a kind of pep speech to the American delegation in which he emphasized the need to forget the past and move on to a new relationship. He said that because of the nature of the government in Tehran, we should look at things as if we are dealing with a corporate structure. He also said that they were somewhat disappointed in the Frankfurt meetings as they had hoped to move ahead faster on the intel exchange. He also complained about the Israelis and said that we should have moved to get them and Gorbanifar. He argued that the Gorbanifar problem could be making one that we should have solved. He also tried to argue about the leaks that the leaks had started in the West. He even suggested that some of our people thought that the leaks were engineered by CIA for some undefined purpose and this convinced them that CIA did not know what we were doing. In short he tried in the best Iranian fashion to fault our side for everything that had gone wrong. He added that the current situation in Tehran is very fluid and is such that we must understand that it was a near miracle that they had been able to avoid a serious confrontation with the leftist without the celebrations on the occasion of the anniversary of the take-over. He summed up by saying that this was the most difficult task that had ever undertaken. He was under impossible pressure. We must understand that he is the only true friend that we have. We should be sincere with him and develop mutual trust between us. He emphasized teamwork and we should now work together.

On 9 November, North began by saying that he had specific instructions to discuss certain things with you privately. North spent some time in describing the situation in Washington and emphasized that we were doing our best to protect Rafsanjani and the business relationship between our two countries. Press commentary based on these pressures are mounting. Our problem is at one time to find ways to protect Rafsanjani while maintaining a good relationship and at the same time find ways to move it along. We must have better information on what is going on in Iran so that we are confronted with few surprises. One example is the photographic copies of the passports. If these are published we will be in deep trouble. Comment on this was "are you sure that photographs were actually taken?" He said not to worry that he would make sure that no photos were turned over to anyone. He said fine but if all else fails, give us some prior warning.

North stated that we were anxious to go ahead as soon as the hostage issue is behind us. We have a color package, and have also identified a technician. We definitely do not want any of this to appear on television as we do not want to endanger the technician when and if we send him. North added that he wishes to emphasize that he is here at the orders of the President and we still have the same objectives as explained by the Assistant Secretary in Washington and Frankfurt. Our problem as we now see it is that we must get the "yes" votes out in order to get the press off our backs.
10. This led into a long, 4 or 5 hours discussion of the Kuwaiti problem. The problem is that he was holding discussions with us based on a very restricted brief. He insisted that they could not send a senior government official to talk to the Kuwaitis unless they were sure that it would result in the release of the Dawa prisoners. We pointed out that we had done all that was humanly possible by talking directly to the Kuwaitis. We were as sure as we could possibly be that any overall talks with them would be warmly received by the Kuwaitis. Continuing, he stated the need for guarantees, but at the end of the discussion, he strongly recommended that Iran go ahead and dispatch a senior official to discuss the Kuwaiti situation with the Kuwaitis. He ended his comment on the Kuwaiti hostage situation by saying that in their discussions with the Hizbullah about the Kuwaiti situation, they had been hopeful of their early release. He thought that whatever we do we must serve this hope of the Hizbullah. What it boils down to now is that the situation between the Kuwaiti 17 and the rest of the hostages is one political. He said that if the 17 Kuwaiti prisoners were freed there would be talks with the other two hostages.

11. Concerning the discussion, we assured him that we would do our best to assure that nothing was said publicly in Washington that would hurt Rafsanjani. On his part, he tried to explain some of their problems in Lebanon. He pointed out that the Hizbullah was the only real organizational structure. He stated that some of the other organizations, like the Hizbollah, were in reality a loose knit combination of factions who disagree on different issues. They are also a polyglot group in that Iraqi shi'ahs and even some charaks are involved. What control over the Hizbollah that exists, is exercised by the Syrians. He said that the Dawa helped them in getting Jacobian released.

12. On Nov. 10 Sam held a final meeting with which stated that they were in a very precarious situation and were having trouble financing their future shipments. He wondered aloud if we could not do something to alleviate their financial situation with the Israeli connection. He described their problem and said that while it is true that they owe us 10 million dollars, he also owes them 1,000 tons of weapons. He reviewed his item requirements. said that one of the reasons Tehran decided to proceed with this contact is that we differed in our approach to the hostage question. They know that we have been far more honorable than they, and this is appreciated in Tehran. He reviewed his item requirements.

13. The meeting ended with a promise to keep him informed on developments.
I made a final appeal on getting rid of Saddam Hussein. He wanted us to understand that there was no way the war could end with Saddam in power. The breaking up of the 1975 agreement on TV must be avenged.

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