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7 Cuba: Political and Economic Costs of African Involvement

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
The costs to Cuba of its interventions in Africa have been offset to a considerable extent by Soviet aid and so far have not caused serious economic, materiel, or political problems for the Cubans.

Cuba: Political and Economic Costs of African Involvement

As long as the USSR continues to underwrite most of the economic and materiel costs of Cuban involvement in Africa, Cuba can continue to carry out—and probably increase moderately—its commitments there without seriously damaging its economy or its perceived defense needs. The political costs to Cuba, domestically and internationally, are potential constraints on Cuban policy in Africa but do not seem compelling factors right now.

Cuba now has 42,000 to 46,000 military and civilian personnel in Africa, including 24,000 to 26,000 in Angola, 16,000 to 17,000 in Ethiopia, and much smaller numbers in several other countries. The totals represent about 1.6 percent of the Cuban labor force and an estimated loss in national output of about $130 million annually.

The loss of workers has caused disruption in several sectors of the economy, but the impact has been minimized by a rapidly expanding labor force, increased mechanization of the sugar harvest, and the widespread use of student labor in other areas of agriculture.

Cuba has a relatively large and rapidly expanding young population. Of its 9.7 million people, 53 percent are under 25 years old, the result of a "baby boom" in the 1960s. The labor force will grow annually by an average of at least 93,000—43 percent above the 1971-1977 average annual increase—through 1982; the growth will be even more rapid if, as is likely, the rate of female participation rises.

Unless Cuban economic growth accelerates over this period, the government may have difficulty providing productive employment for these people. Cuba thus will not only have the capability but perhaps also the incentive to increase moderately the size of its military and civilian forces overseas.

Soviet Assistance

Cuba's economic costs have been offset to a significant degree by increased Soviet assistance. Soviet support has increased sharply in the past two years and will amount to the equivalent of $2.3 billion in
sugar and petroleum subsidies this year. In addition, the USSR will purchase some 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar outside the Cuban-Soviet trade protocol and will pay for it in hard currency. It will also supply Cuba with an additional $200 million worth of capital goods to help offset lagging Cuban imports from the West.

The USSR covers virtually all of Cuba’s material costs in Africa. Soviet-made equipment is either transshipped from Cuban inventories—as has largely been the case in Angola—or shipped directly from the USSR, as it has been to Ethiopia. By the end of 1977, about three-quarters of the military equipment shipped from Cuba to Angola had been replaced in Cuba with new and in some cases more modern Soviet weapons. The remainder is likely to be covered by further Soviet deliveries.

Western Economic Ties
Some lenders in world financial markets are growing concerned about Cuba’s involvement in Africa, but so far Cuban commercial relations with major industrial countries have not been significantly affected. In recent months, Cuba has received financial credits from banks in Japan, Italy, and West Germany to help finance purchases from those countries. Most Western lenders continue to base their decisions regarding Cuba largely on economic factors. They consider Cuba a good credit risk because of its impeccable repayment record with the West and, in many instances, bankers believe the USSR is the ultimate guarantor of loans to Cuba. Although some lenders are becoming reluctant to be involved in publicized syndicated loans, this has apparently not precluded direct private placements.

Cuban involvement in Africa has adversely affected Western development aid programs, but this assistance is much less important than Cuba’s hard-currency borrowings. West Germany canceled its projected aid in early 1976, and Canada and the Netherlands have indicated this year that they will terminate their aid programs by the end of the year. Belgium and Sweden are considering similar steps.

Cuban interventions in Africa have stalled efforts to normalize relations with the US, but the cost—at least for the short run—has been negligible to Cuba. If commercial relations with the US had been normalized, Cuba’s severe hard-currency shortage would have held net economic gains to a minimum, and most Cuban trade with the US would have merely been shifted from other developed Western countries.

Potential Political Costs
While the real economic costs directly attributable to Cuban involvement in Africa continue to be relatively small, the Cuban Government is concerned about the public’s perception of the extent of this involvement. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of their country’s commitment in Africa, but the people in general are aware that the growing Cuban involvement has coincided with cutbacks in rations and with major downward revisions in Cuba’s first five-year plan.

No organized opposition exists in Cuba, and protests so far have apparently been limited to private grumbling. A sharp rise in Cuban casualties in Africa could, however, increase public disaffection and eventually pose a constraint on Cuban policymakers.

Internationally, Cuba is aware of mounting criticism of its military involvement in Africa by nonaligned nations and developed Western countries. Cuban leaders place a high value on the country’s position in the nonaligned movement and hope to play an even greater role next year when the nonaligned summit meeting is to be held in Havana.

Cuba has launched a diplomatic offensive to reassure other countries in the movement, and few critics were prepared to confront the Cubans directly during a recent meeting in Havana of the nonaligned movement’s coordinating bureau. Continued success in limiting diplomatic damage depends, however, on Cuba’s ability to overcome a growing perception among the nonaligned that it is acting as a Soviet puppet.
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The WEEKLY REVIEW issued every Friday morning by the Current Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence, and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.

11 Angola: Frictions with Cuban and Soviet Allies

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
Havana's and Moscow's extensive assistance to President Neto's Marxist regime has been accompanied by tension between the Angolans and Cuban and Soviet personnel.

Angola: Frictions with Cuban and Soviet Allies

Cuban troops and Soviet and Cuban civilian advisers in Angola have played a vital role in countering the guerrilla threat to the regime of President Agostinho Neto and in providing sorely needed technical expertise. At the same time, their activities have provoked considerable Angolan resentment.

The Cuban troops have been accused of thievery, smuggling, black marketeering, and avoiding combat with insurgent forces. Cuban civilian advisers, for their part, have had a number of policy disputes with Angolan authorities. The even less popular Soviets are regarded as neocolonialists, wanting only to exploit the country's resources.

Difficulties regarding civilian advisers have generally been resolved when top political leaders have stepped in, but antipathy in the Angolan armed forces toward the Cubans is hurting morale and impeding military efforts against the insurgents.

The strains between the Angolans and their Cuban and Soviet advisers are not unusual in client-patron relationships. Angolans, like many other recipients of foreign assistance in the less-developed world, complain that their benefactors assume they know more than the Angolans, that they insist on unnecessary changes, and that they disregard local customs.

Role of Advisers

The estimated 5,000 Cuban civilian advisers in Angola fill much of the vacuum created by the departure of the Portuguese managerial and technical personnel of the colonial period. The advisers are developing a national educational system, running the public health service, assisting in coffee and sugar harvests, and reconstructing roads and bridges destroyed during the civil war. Another 5,000 Cuban advisers, mostly teachers and construction workers, are due by the end of the year.

The Soviets have approximately 1,000 advisers in Angola. In recent months, they have been moving into key financial and commercial positions, particularly in the Finance Ministry and the central bank. They apparently have also been replacing Cubans in the Transportation, Fisheries, and Trade Ministries.

A major dispute arose last year with Cuban advisers in the Angolan Labor Ministry, when the advisers pressed for the unionization of the entire Angolan labor force. The Angolans flatly rejected the plan on cultural and political grounds.

Another dispute arose after the Cubans tried to introduce a rationing system to cope with Angola's severe food shortages and were rebuffed by Angolan officials. Cuban President Castro apparently had to intervene, and he ruled in favor of the Angolans.

The Soviet advisers, for their part, almost never mix socially with the

Indicative of Cuban sympathies, a billboard in Havana reads, "Africa is not alone in its fight"

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Angolans assert that Soviets take substantial amounts of Angolan coffee crop, some of which is shown drying

Angolans, who consider them arrogant. Part of the beach at Luanda, for example, is reserved for the exclusive use of the Soviets.

Many senior Angolan officials suspect that the USSR is interested primarily in exploiting Angola's resources. They assert that substantial quantities of sugar, coffee, and diamonds have been sent to the USSR to pay for military aid, and that the Soviets have monopolized fishing off Angola.

Soviet fishing fleets allocate 10 percent of their catch to Angola and 20 percent to Cuba, and send the remainder to the USSR. Much of the Soviet share is then processed and re-exported to Angola, which must pay for it in hard currency.

Cuban Soldiers

There are now an estimated 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. Indications are that the number may increase somewhat in the near future.

In early March, a customs inspector at Luanda Airport stopped 100 Cubans leaving Angola for home and discovered suitcases full of contraband watches, imported food, clothing, and US dollars.

Cuban soldiers virtually strip areas they occupy of valuable items, even home furnishings, and ship them to Cuba as personal property.

Imported goods appear to be a prime target of the Cubans. In one recent instance, a riot ensued after it was discovered that Cubans had stolen part of a shipment of clothing intended for sale to Angolan workers at reduced prices.

One-fourth of all goods shipped to Angola are stolen off the docks by Cubans, and that Angolan officials make off with another fourth.

The system of keeping well-stocked stores in major towns for the exclusive use of Cubans and senior Angolan officials is deeply resented by most Angolans, who have to wait in long lines for food and consumer goods. A Cuban soldier was assaulted after he tried to sell some items to Angolans waiting in one such line at triple the price he had just paid for them.

At the Front

The war against the insurgents of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola is causing growing strains between Cuban and Angolan forces. Morale is low because they have been unable to stamp out UNITA, and each partner says the other is not doing its part.

Angolan Defense Minister Carreira has complained that during several recent drives Cuban soldiers stayed in the rear and forced the Angolans to do most of the fighting.

There are some reports that Cuban units have refused to go on patrol in areas where UNITA is active, and that both Cuban and Angolan units have refused combat assignments against other Angolan insurgents. The Cubans' reluctance stems from the knowledge that they are the insurgents' highest priority target and their fear that, if captured, they might be tortured. For their part, the Cubans assert that the Angolans are poor soldiers and afraid to fight the insurgents.

The use of Cuban soldiers to enforce discipline has also generated much tension. Cuban soldiers have executed Angolans for cowardice in the field.

There have been occasional reports of fights between Cuban and Angolan soldiers—and even among Cubans themselves—resulting in casualties.

The Future

Angolan President Neto knows that the introduction of more foreign troops and advisers into Angola will heighten tensions, but he has little choice given the immensity of his problems.

Growing friction between Cubans and Angolans in the military probably poses the most serious problem for the Neto government. The tensions apparently have already forced some changes in military tactics. If morale continues to deteriorate, military effectiveness will be further reduced, casualties could increase, and even larger numbers of Cuban soldiers will be needed to contain the insurgents. In recent months, both Cubans and Angolans have expressed doubt that UNITA can be defeated militarily.

Angola's difficulties with its foreign patrons have encouraged Neto to look to the West, specifically to Portugal, for technical and economic assistance. His success will depend on how receptive the
West is to his approaches and how effective the pro-Soviet faction in the Angolan leadership is in blocking such efforts.

In addition, Angolan disenchantment with the Cubans may have led Neto to make some cautious approaches to UNITA for some sort of accommodation. It is unlikely, however, that such contacts could move beyond exploratory stages for some time.

The more Neto's problems with the Cubans and the Soviets grow, the greater will be the pressure on him to pursue this option. UNITA leader Savimbi knows this and will no doubt continue to insist that no solution is possible without total Cuban withdrawal.
Soviet influence in Angola is undiminished and may even be increasing, despite signs of growing popular resentment.

Angola: The Soviet Role

The USSR continues to play a major role in Angola, despite speculation that its influence had waned as a result of its alleged involvement in the abortive attempt last May by a disdissident leftist faction of the ruling Popular Movement to overthrow President Neto. Soviet advisers—probably totaling about 500—are placed in all important Angolan Government offices as well as in the police and the military.

At least in public, Neto has always praised the Soviets, as he has the Cubans, for their commitment to Angola, absolving them of any complicity in the attempted coup. Nevertheless, he has repeatedly stated that foreigners were involved in the plot, and these statements have led to persistent rumors that Neto suspects that the Soviets—probably operating through the Portuguese Communist Party—were behind the uprising.

Neto has in fact told several Western officials in recent months that he suspects the Soviets want to depose him. He claims that during his trip to Moscow in October, he cautioned Brezhnev against further Soviet interference in Angola's internal affairs, and told him Angola would pursue an independent foreign policy.

Although the Soviets probably had been in contact with some dissident leaders prior to the coup attempt, there is no hard evidence either that they encouraged the dissidents or that they had prior knowledge of the plot.

the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Luanda were taken by surprise by the move against Neto.

By spreading the word that he harbors suspicions of the Soviets, Neto may hope to project a more nonaligned image and thereby increase chances of attracting Western economic and technical assistance for his beleaguered regime.

Undiminished Soviet Presence

In any event, Neto apparently has made little effort to reduce Soviet influence in Angola; it may even be growing. The Soviets are playing an increasingly important role in the government having virtual control of the police, the army, the railroads, aviation, and fishing.

The Soviets may also be improving their position in the military command structure.

In addition, the Soviets reportedly run the Luanda naval base, where their naval, merchant, and fishing ships enter and depart at will. Since December 1976, the Soviets have stationed a large repair ship at the base, ostensibly to repair Angolan patrol boats.

Some Soviet personnel are also located at Luanda airfield.

Russians Unpopular

The Soviets have sought to maintain a low profile in Angola. They are even less popular than the Cubans, although their presence in the country is less visible—particularly outside the capital.

Soviet and Cuban monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in Angola is greatly resented. The Soviets tend to keep to themselves—even when appearing in public—and are frequently criticized for their arrogance and for ignoring African sensitivities.

Angolan resentment of the Soviets and Cubans probably also stems from the fact that the substantial Communist presence has not resulted in economic progress or in the neutralization of the threat from insurgent guerrillas. No significant Soviet financial aid for development has been forthcoming, and even Moscow's technical assistance must eventually be repaid in hard currency. The realization that increasing numbers of Communist advisers and soldiers may be necessary to guarantee the future of the Neto regime has only reinforced Angolan frustrations.

Some Angolans now see themselves as victims of Soviet exploitation, often citing as an example a major fishing agreement concluded earlier this year that permits Soviet boats to retain most of what they catch in Angolan waters. The Angolans complain that only the poorest part of the catch is delivered to them.

Military and Economic Agreements

Since 1975, the USSR and East European countries have signed agreements with Angola worth over $350 million for
all types of arms and equipment. About three-quarters of this hardware was delivered in 1975 and 1976—the years when the Popular Movement fought and won a conventional civil war for control of Angola and sought to consolidate its power. Agreements concluded thus far in 1977, valued at about $40 million, cover helicopters, transport aircraft, several thousand motor vehicles, and quartermaster supplies. Most of this equipment has been delivered.

A recent trip by Angolan Defense Minister Carreira to Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia—reportedly to purchase trucks, ammunition, light arms, and spare parts for heavier military equipment—may reflect an attempt by the Soviets to shift some of the assistance burden from themselves and the Cubans onto the East Europeans. Moscow urged the Angolans to seek assistance from the Poles—and urged the Poles to provide it—as part of an overall effort to increase East European involvement in southern Africa. In so doing, the Soviets presumably hope to reduce their own visibility there.

Almost every East European state is now providing some support to the Neto government, particularly technicians to replace the Portuguese who fled during the 1975 civil war. The East Germans are playing a leading role in providing technical assistance, followed by the Bulgarians. East Germany is training the police and has shipped $10 million in relief goods to Angola. In addition, about 600 young East German Communist Party members reportedly went to Angola recently, probably to assist in the coffee harvest.

Yugoslavia, one of the first countries to recognize the Neto regime, has recently concluded a number of economic, technical, and military assistance agreements with Angola. Neto probably would like to project a nonaligned image similar to President Tito's. Given his increased dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans, however, he probably lacks the freedom to move very far in this direction.
ANGOLA-CUBA

Cuba has agreed to send additional civilian advisers and technicians to Angola—some 2,600 more according to press reports—to supplement the estimated several thousand already there. Morale among those now serving in Angola is generally low and some Cubans have shown reluctance to join them. The Castro government is making it difficult for those selected to refuse the assignment.

Cuba and Angola agreed on an increase in Cuban assistance during a recent meeting of their joint commission on economic cooperation. Cuban President

Castro had already promised to send 1,000 more teachers to Angola by next March.

Havana has consistently played down the number of its nationals in Angola. The official who headed the Cuban delegation to the recent meeting of the commission told the press there are only about 2,000 Cuban technicians there now. In fact, there are probably at least twice that many. Most of the civilians are apparently military reservists. The Cuban troop total is probably about 19,000.

The Cuban civilian advisers reportedly are disillusioned by bad health conditions, poor food, and by what they perceive as the ingratitude of Angolan officials. Their resentment over being uprooted from comfortable jobs at home and their belief that Cuba is being deprived of badly needed personnel have led many of them to doubt the value of Castro's commitment to Angola.

The Castro government is taking strong measures to demonstrate that service in Angola is vital to future careers. Civilians who refuse to go apparently are denied promotions, refused desirable jobs, and subjected to harassment by the state security service and the local Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

Communist Party members who refuse service in Angola can expect to lose their membership, while some balky military personnel have been jailed. With Castro clearly very sensitive on the subject, few Cubans are expressing open opposition.

SECRET

Page 4  WEEKLY SUMMARY  18 Nov 77
ANGOLA - CUBA

Cuban forces supporting Angolan President Neto's regime are intensifying their efforts against insurgent guerrillas of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in the south. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi recently indicated that since early November about 5,000 additional Cuban troops have joined the fighting, bringing the total number of Cubans operating against his forces to between 12,000 and 13,000—about two-thirds of the Cuban troops estimated to be in Angola. The Cubans have made no significant progress against UNITA guerrillas over the past year, and this new offensive does not appear to represent much more of a threat.

Cuban forces are attempting to refine their tactics. Although they tend to operate in groups of at least 100 men in other areas of Angola, those recently sent to Huambo were organized into groups of 50 each—an attempt to respond to UNITA's use of mobile units of 10 to 15 men, which have been successful in eluding Cuban sweeps.

The Cubans' new effort, which is taking place in Cuando Cubango Province, reportedly will be conducted without the aid of Neto's troops, a change Savimbi attributes to Cuban desires to tighten security and to improve combat performance. This approach probably also reflects a lack of confidence on the part of the Cubans in the discipline and effectiveness of Angolan troops.

Cuban casualties reportedly have increased with the scale of the effort. Savimbi stated in mid-November that 61 Cubans had been killed in engagements with UNITA guerrillas since August; 43 were apparently killed during October and early November. UNITA also claims it has seven Cuban prisoners.

The casualties have helped demoralize the Cubans, but other factors have contributed.

most Cuban civilian advisers in Luanda believed their country's heavy involvement in Angola to be a mistake; low morale to homesickness, poor food, worry over tropical diseases, and the side effects of medicines necessary to cope with conditions in Angola. A key factor is Angolan resentment of the Cuban presence.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 24, 1977

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

ANGOLAN PERCEPTIONS OF CUBAN AND SOVIET
INvolvements IN ANGOLa

Angolan dissatisfaction over Cuban and Soviet involvement there has grown in recent months. Although Angolan President Neto probably has good relations with the top Cuban and Soviet leadership, their substantial and continued presence in Angola has led to increasing frictions at lower levels of the Angolan government and society. We estimate that there are 10,000 to 14,500 Cuban military and civilian advisors in Angola; three convoys carrying additional military personnel are now reported to be heading for Angolan waters. Several hundred Soviet advisors and sizeable contingents from several other East European states are also in Angola.

The Cuban presence has become increasingly evident throughout the country and their image as a new breed of colonialists has spread. The Cuban

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency.

Classified by

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Automatically declassified on December 31, 1995

(1) (2)
and the Soviets are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for being too quick to take command of a given situation instead of remaining in their role as advisors to their Angolan counterparts. The Cubans tend to be more open and gregarious than the Soviets who usually keep to themselves—even when appearing in public.

Cuban and Soviet monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in the country has also created resentment. Angolans complain that the advisors are ill-trained and unqualified, but they still receive exorbitant salaries, enjoy good housing, and eat the best foods—including meat and vegetables which are rarely available to most Angolans.

Angolan resentment also stems from the fact that the Cuban and Soviet presence has not resulted in economic progress or the elimination of the insurgent threat in southern Angola and the exclave of Cabinda. While Neto is undoubtedly aware of the problems caused by the continued Cuban and Soviet presence, he simply cannot afford to reduce their role given Angola's current economic difficulties and his increasing dependence on the Cubans to maintain internal security and keep the government functioning.

The Cubans reportedly are also frustrated by the enormous economic problems that face Angola and by the persistence of the insurgent threat which continues to take Cuban lives. Cuban troops reportedly have been reluctant to actively pursue the insurgents and this has created frictions with the Angolans.

President Castro, however, remains committed to the preservation of the Neto regime. Despite the frustrations expressed by both sides, continuing instability in Angola will probably assure that Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola will continue at similar, or possibly higher, levels for several years.
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CUBA: The Africa Corps

Cuba's armed forces are a key element in President Castro's efforts to increase his influence in Africa. Cuban leaders foresee a long-term role for their country in Africa and have relied heavily on their military personnel to support this role. We generally doubt that Cuba foresees itself as a combat intervention force and believe that this role in Angola may have been a one-time occurrence. Nevertheless, Cuban forces have given aid short of combat intervention to other African states and liberation movements both before and after Cuba's active involvement in the Angolan war.

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Top Secret

April 14, 1977

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
The major impact of Cuba's military presence in Africa is political. Successful combat aid to the Marxist MPLA in Angola boosted Cuba's standing among socialist states; never before had Castro's troops played such a direct role to ensure the victory of friendly socialist forces.

Most African leaders accept as a matter of course that Cuba will play a role in future events in Africa. Cuba has more military personnel in Africa than any other non-African nation—about 10,000 in Angola and roughly 2,000 distributed among several other nations.

Other African leaders, viewing Cuba's ability to sustain military operations in Angola—even with substantial Soviet support—have expressed concern over the possible replication of that venture or less direct Cuban involvement in their countries.

An Indirect Role

Cuba will not hastily commit its forces to another open-ended conflict like Angola. Instead, President Castro will probably seek to expand Cuba's military influence in Africa through advisers and arms shipments. Although direct intervention with combat troops remains an option that cannot be ruled out, the Cubans view their more modest military and civilian aid programs as their principal method for attaining influence in Africa.

Cuban advisers can provide skilled instruction in conventional operations, offensive guerrilla warfare, and counter-insurgency as well as technical training on Soviet-built equipment. Some serve as bodyguards for African chiefs of state. Others perform civilian tasks with little military significance. Most Cuban "military personnel" in Guinea, for example, are construction workers.

Cuba's commitment to friendly African states or liberation movements is substantial, but its faltering...
economy cannot support open-ended commitments of combat troops. Direct Cuban intervention would require explicit Soviet backing, Castro's conviction that the outcome would be successful, and, according to Cuban leaders, an invitation from the host government or liberation movement.

Havana's Recent Focus

In early 1977 the possible dispatch of Cuban forces to several African states drew the attention of the intelligence community.

Zaire. Cuba probably indirectly aided Katangan forces which invaded Zaire in early March. Cuban forces have trained the Katangan troops and possibly supplied them with some weapons from Angola.

Mozambique. Cuba has long monitored developments in the Rhodesian conflict and is now taking a more active role assisting Mozambican forces. Cuban advisers are training Mozambican armed forces and Rhodesian black nationalist guerrillas. have helped airlift add.

The contingent in Mozambique is the largest Cuban military force in East Africa, about 500. Cuban aid to Rhodesian guerrillas was probably discussed during Castro's recent visit to Mozambique, and aid could increase with escalation of Rhodesian combat operations.

Ethiopia. Ethiopian leaders apparently asked Cuba for military assistance to counter the insurgent Eritrean

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Liberation Front during the visit of a high-ranking Cuban delegation in late February. Cuban leaders are evidently impressed by the new Ethiopian regime and have agreed to dispatch small arms and advisers to the beleaguered Ethiopian armed forces.

Libya. President Castro reportedly agreed to send about 1,000 Cuban military personnel to Libya during his recent visit there in mid-March. Libyan President Qadhafi asked for Cuban technicians to man installations along the borders of Egypt and Tunisia; he also requested a Cuban bodyguard force. We believe that most, if not all, of any Cuban contingent would serve only as advisers to help Libyans man and maintain their vast supplies of military equipment.

Angola

The number of Cuban forces in Angola reached a peak early last year when over 20,000 were stationed there. Since then the Cubans have withdrawn several thousand, and the total Cuban presence is estimated to be 10,000 to 15,000 of which 4,000 to 5,000 are civilians.

A continuing influx of civilians with military backgrounds has offset troop withdrawals. Cuban combat capabilities in Angola have probably remained about the same. Many civilians sent to Angola have had military training or are military reservists; other civilians there are probably soldiers who were demobilized in place.

Cuban troops are still engaged in combat and will be needed until forces of the Marxist MPLA can pacify the countryside—about half of which is contested by antigovernment insurgents. Cuban military advisors will be

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needed to establish, equip, and train an Angolan army capable of defending the MPLA regime.

The Cubans apparently view Angola as their major base in southern Africa. They supply selected guerrilla groups with equipment from Cuban stocks in Angola, and some of their military advisers with previous experience there have travelled to other African countries.

The Momentum of Angola

The Angolan war not only earned the Cuban armed forces new stature around the world as a fighting force, but also gave them valuable combat experience. Seven top officers were sent from Cuba to Angola in late 1975, and troops have rotated there from Cuba. A significant proportion of Cuban military forces, probably at least one-fifth of active ground forces personnel, have served in Angola or other African countries. This experience has probably led to a qualitative improvement in personnel through promotion of combat-tested officers.

Cuban military leaders are buoyed by their success in the conventional phase of the war which ended with the Marxist MPLA victory one year ago. During a Havana parade in December 1975, troops who served in Angola were given a place of honor and special mention.

The Price of Angola

The benefits the Cubans attained through their role in Angola cost a high price. We believe that total Cuban casualties number over 1,000 killed and wounded. Cuba has never announced the casualty figures.

This high casualty rate could be affecting Cuban combat performance.
forces sometimes have not pursued enemy guerrilla units. Moreover, friction and even clashes apparently occur between the Cuban and their MPLA allies. Cubans reportedly rarely venture out of garrison except in substantial numbers. Anti-government UNITA forces hope to exploit this friction to divide and weaken their common enemy.

While popular civilian opposition in Cuba to the Angolan war has been muted, some reaction against this venture has probably occurred within Cuban military forces. During the rapid troop transfer to Angola in November 1975, an extended discussion of disciplinary measures occurred in Cuban military publications, suggesting possible troop insubordination. Military units in Cuba have experienced a high number of desertions since November 1976, when casualties in the Angolan pacification campaign had reached significant proportions.

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Top Secret April 14, 1977
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3 March 1973

7 Cuba: Domestic Impact of African Involvement

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
The growing Cuban involvement in Africa, while far from popular with many Cubans, is not yet causing the Castro regime any significant problems on the home front.

Cuba: Domestic Impact of African Involvement

The political, military, economic, and social costs to Cuba of its expanding role in Africa are still well within manageable limits and are not a significant constraint on Cuban policymakers. Only heavy Cuban casualties would be likely to present the Castro regime with difficult political problems.

Reaction to the country's extensive involvement in Africa is mixed among the Cuban people. Pre-regime activists openly support the African commitments, but many people are convinced that the country's current austerity is caused by the involvement; in fact, it stems largely from low world sugar prices. No organized opposition exists in Cuba, however, and without planning, coordination, and leadership, those who oppose Cuba's role in Africa have little impact on regime leaders. So far, opposition is limited to grumbling among friends and family of ordinary Cubans sent to do service in Africa.

As is his custom during periods of flagging popular support, President Fidel Castro has spent a good deal of time since mid-1977 traveling through the country trying to bolster morale. Castro is keenly aware of—and exploits—the considerable capacity of the Cuban people to endure hardships. His normal reaction is to manufacture both a reason to suffer and a scapegoat to hate. A master of media manipulation, he has little trouble refocusing public anger and generating renewed revolutionary momentum.

Castro is probably not yet overly concerned about public attitudes. The numerous speeches and heavy media treatment in the last six months are, in effect, preemptive moves to head off disaffection. Castro doubtless knows that the current level of discontent is well within tolerable limits and that by careful persuasion he can keep it far short of the point where outright repression might be required.

Military Costs

Cuba now has 30,000 to 33,000 military personnel in Africa, including 19,000 to 20,000 in Angola and an estimated 10,000 to 11,000 in Ethiopia. Most were mobilized from Cuba's ready reserves, in part to spread the effects throughout the island and in part to avoid weakening Cuba's defenses by drawing from active-duty personnel. The USSR has supplied about 30 Soviet fighter pilots to take the place of Cuban pilots flying combat missions in Ethiopia.

Provided the USSR continues to underwrite important aspects of the Cuban effort, Havana probably could increase significantly its commitment in Africa without seriously damaging its economy or defense capabilities.

For example, a 50 percent increase in Cuban military personnel in Africa—to about 50,000—would impinge on Cuba's military capabilities, but the impact would probably be manageable. Cuba's armed forces total about 180,000 personnel, including some 60,000 ready reservists who can be mobilized within 24 hours.

In addition, there are another 210,000 reservists who have undergone basic training and who could be on active duty within 20 days. Cuba's population is relatively young—53 percent of its 9.65 million people are under 25 years of age, with some 550,000 males between 18 and 24.

Economic Costs

The loss of skilled and unskilled workers has caused disruption in several sectors of the economy, but the costs to the economy in general have been relatively small. The loss of unskilled workers has been minimized by increased mechanization of the labor-intensive sugarcane harvest and the widespread use of student labor in agriculture.

Logistic costs have been limited to a relatively small portion of the Cuban merchant fleet at any one time and a small number of aircraft. This cost of diversion has amounted to only about $15 million annually at most and has not seriously disrupted Cuban trade patterns or commercial airline schedules.

Cuba's economic growth rate apparently slowed in 1976, but the slowdown was primarily the result of a small decrease in that year's sugar harvest and a decline in investment. Nonsugar agriculture registered small gains, as did industry, although output was impaired by a reduction in raw material imports from the West. In neither case did a shortage of labor significantly affect output. Although
production data for 1977 are not yet available, it is unlikely that gross national product was any more affected in 1977 by Havana's involvement in Africa than it was in 1976.

While Cuba supplies much of the subsistence and salary costs for its military forces in Africa, the cost of virtually all the equipment and supplies used by the Cubans, as well as by the Africans being supported is borne by the USSR.

The Angolan Government also apparently is sharing the cost of the Cuban presence in that country. The Angolans probably pay for the food and lodging of Cuban civilian advisers, and perhaps part of the subsistence costs for Cuban military personnel.

The direct costs of maintaining Cuban military personnel in Africa is estimated at about $5 million to $6 million annually. The total estimated $70 million to $75 million annual bill, including the cost of diverting Cuban ships and planes to the effort, represents only about 0.9 percent of estimated 1976 GNP. The share of Cuba's labor force represented by its military personnel in Africa equals about 1.1 percent.

Outlook

The political and economic costs of Cuban involvement in Africa will probably remain manageable for Havana, at least for the near term. A deepening popular disaffection, stemming from an exaggerated perception of financial costs, could pose a constraint on Cuban policymakers, however, should the number of casualties the Cubans suffer increase rapidly.

Reporting on the number killed or wounded in Angola and Ethiopia is spotty at best and the regime does not announce casualty figures; estimates of Cubans killed in Angola since late 1975 range between 600 and 2,000. If there were a surge of casualties the regime would probably be unable to manage the domestic impact sufficiently to prevent open disaffection.

In such circumstances, the Cuban populace might resort to passive protests. Such measures would not be unprecedented in recent Cuban history. Worker slowdowns and widespread absenteeism occurred in the early 1970s when supplies of consumer goods failed to improve after the record 1970 harvest. These protests, together with strong pressures from the USSR, caused the government to institute major economic policy changes—some of which went against its basic ideological tenets—in an effort to increase economic production.

The Cuban people's demonstrated capacity for endurance and sacrifice may be further enhanced by the government's propaganda machinery. In the end, however, the extent and duration of Cuba's involvement will depend mainly on the degree of its leaders' dedication to African policy. All indications so far suggest that they are prepared to pay whatever price.
Note: As a result of a reorganization, effective 11 October 1977, intelligence publications formerly issued by the Directorate of Intelligence and by the National Intelligence Officers are now being issued by the National Foreign Assessment Center. Publication covers and titles have been adjusted to reflect this change. This publication was formerly titled Weekly Review.
The Angolan units have not had much success anywhere.

UNITA has been able in fact to infiltrate forces and conduct operations in new areas of Angola over the past several months. The guerrillas still operate primarily in the south and east, but are now carrying out raids and ambushes in the central region and even in parts of the north.

One of Savimbi's main military objectives in the coming months is to gain control of the Cazombo salient in eastern Angola. Tribal leaders in that area have become increasingly dissatisfied with the government in Luanda, and many are now cooperating with the guerrillas. A strong position in the Cazombo salient would facilitate the receipt of arms and other supplies provided by foreign supporters.

Savimbi, meanwhile, recently completed a foreign trip during which he won pledges of continued support from the leaders of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Togo, and Liberia. Most of the leaders offered either to provide UNITA with modest financial or military assistance or to lobby in its behalf among better off West European and Arab states.

Angolan Government troops have been busy for some time pursuing Savimbi's guerrillas in Huambo and Bie Provinces and recently made a number of small-scale forays in Mexico Province.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
20 April 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Angola: UNITA’s Situation and Prospects

Because of Jonas Savimbi’s effective leadership, UNITA now can field a force of about 18,000 trained guerrillas and 5,000 irregulars (see table); the guerrillas move freely within and are supported by tribal kinsmen in an area of southern Angola comprising roughly one half of the country’s territory. (See map, Disposition of UNITA Forces in Angola.) Although Cuban and Angolan troops still move about in much of the region in armed convoys, for the most part they have kept to the major towns which have remained under government control.

Since last summer, UNITA reportedly has expanded its operations into parts of northern and eastern Angola and along portions of the southwestern coast. UNITA claims to have small units operating along the Zairian border, in north central Angola around Nova Gaia, and to control a section of the coast north of Lobito. UNITA maintains that it enjoys the support of most of the people in these areas and that it has won over many of the traditional tribal leaders. We are unable to verify such claims, but they suggest that Savimbi is making a serious attempt to broaden the base of tribal and popular support for his movement.

Although previous large-scale operations have failed to dislodge Savimbi in the south, Angolan and Cuban forces early last month began yet another major offensive against UNITA forces in southeastern Cuando Cubango Province. The offensive probably had four objectives:

RP M 78-10176C
--to encircle and neutralize a large UNITA force that was preparing to attack several major towns in the region.

--to isolate UNITA headquarters and capture Savimbi.

--to deprive UNITA of airfields where it has recently received military supplies and equipment flown in from Zaire.

--to free some southern border areas for use by SWAPO guerrillas operating into northern Namibia.*

Savimbi claims this was the most difficult offensive UNITA had experienced and that Cuban and Angolan forces, supported by Cuban-piloted fighter aircraft and helicopters, almost accomplished the first two objectives. UNITA apparently avoided serious reverses, and it now appears that Cuban and Angolan forces have withdrawn to the larger towns in the region.

The recent offensive probably was the major factor behind Savimbi's departure for Kinshasa last week. He apparently hopes to expedite the delivery of already promised military assistance and possibly to secure new aid commitments. Since the Angolan civil war, UNITA has depended primarily on weapons and supplies that were cached during the fighting and equipment that was subsequently captured from Cuban and Angolan forces. The expansion this year of UNITA's area of operations and the marked increase in the number of trained guerrillas operating in the field, together with critical food shortages in many rural areas, have forced UNITA to look increasingly to foreign suppliers.

Since January, about 130 tons of food, medicine, clothing, small arms, ammunition, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, and anti-aircraft weapons have been delivered to UNITA guerrillas in southern Angola. Savimbi hopes

UNITA's activities in southern Angola have prevented SWAPO guerrillas from operating across much of Angola's southern border with Namibia. In addition, UNITA units in northeastern Angola have impaired the activities of anti-Mobutu rebels operating into Zaire.
to receive another 100 tons in the next few months, that will enable UNITA to field some 2,000 additional trained guerrillas.

Savimbi is particularly anxious to acquire anti-aircraft weapons to counter the growing use of Cuban-piloted helicopters and fighter aircraft against his guerrilla forces. Although some guerrilla units in southern Angola recently acquired SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, Savimbi says they are inoperable due to mishandling.

If Savimbi acquires the anti-aircraft weaponry he is seeking, it will still take some time before his forces can be trained to use it effectively.

Savimbi hopes the anti-aircraft weapons will not only provide protection for his guerrillas but give them an important psychological advantage over the Cubans. Savimbi doubts his forces could withstand a concerted air and ground attack, but hopes that by downing several helicopters and fighter aircraft, Cuban pilots will become reluctant to engage his forces.

Savimbi knows he cannot defeat the Neto regime militarily so long as Cuba maintains its strong presence. For this reason, UNITA's prime objective is to inflict as many casualties on the Cuban forces as possible in the hope of undermining their morale and possibly creating pressures in Cuba to reassess its military commitment.

Savimbi has often toyed with the idea of capturing and holding several key towns in southern Angola. His African supporters have strongly argued against such action, however, because they see it as a step toward establishing a secessionist government. While they may be willing to provide clandestine support to a guerrilla movement that claims to represent the Angolan people, they would have considerable difficulty justifying their support for a secessionist regime before
the OAU's longstanding position that all African borders are inviolable.

A decision to escalate the guerrilla struggle to the conventional level would cause similar problems for Savimbi's West European and Arab backers. Such a decision would require a greater and more visible commitment from them which they probably would be reluctant to make.

An escalation of the fighting to the conventional level would also pose major risks to Savimbi. In effect, Savimbi would be attempting to beat the Cubans at their own game. In so doing, he would not only greatly increase his dependence on foreign supporters, but expose his forces to the possibility of a major battlefield defeat.

In Sum...

We foresee a prolonged guerrilla struggle in Angola. As long as Cuban maintains its substantial military presence in Angola, the conflict will remain basically stalemated.

Although it is conceivable that Neto and Savimbi might at some point be willing to discuss a political reconciliation, neither leader appears ready to accepting the other's conditions. Savimbi wants the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola, and he is unlikely to favor an accommodation so long as his base of operations continues to expand and the Luanda government is beset by growing internal problems. Neto has long maintained that reconciliation with UNITA is possible, but that neither Savimbi nor his top military leaders are acceptable to the Luanda regime.

A substantial increase in Cuban troop levels, particularly if coupled with an enhanced air strike capability, could force Savimbi into an extremely defensive posture. Even if the Cubans doubled their forces, however, it is highly unlikely UNITA's guerrilla forces could be effectively neutralized.
### Military Forces in Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Combatants</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Estimated Force Strength</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angolan Armed Forces.</td>
<td>FAPLA</td>
<td>30,000-50,000</td>
<td>Agostinho Neto</td>
<td>Formed from MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) cadre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban forces.</td>
<td></td>
<td>@ 19,000-20,000 plus 5,000 civil-</td>
<td>Brig. Gen. Menendez</td>
<td>Mostly reservists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.</td>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>18,000 plus 5,000 recruits</td>
<td>Jonas Savimbi</td>
<td>Operate in southern and eastern Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola.</td>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>3,000-5,000</td>
<td>Holden Roberto</td>
<td>Operate in northern Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Exclave of Cabinda.</td>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>@ 500</td>
<td>N’Zita</td>
<td>Now strongly fragmented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other Liberation Forces in Angola:

- **South-West Africa People’s Organization.**
  - SWAPO: 2,000-3,000 plus 5,000 trainees
  - Sam Nujoma
  - Fighting for liberation of Namibia; other forces in Zambia and Namibia.

- **National Front for the Liberation of the Congo.**
  - FNLC: @5,000
  - Nathaniel Mbumba
  - Fighting for the overthrow of Zairian President Mobutu.

- **Zimbabwe African People’s Union.**
  - ZAPU: @2,000
  - Joshua Nkomo
  - Fighting for the liberation of Rhodesia; other forces in Zambia.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
National Foreign Assessment Center  
January 10, 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Angola: The Party Congress and Beyond

Key Judgments

--The transformation of Angola's ruling Popular Movement into a Marxist-Leninist party has improved President Neto's political position.

--More blacks and military officers, presumably loyal to Neto, have been brought into the mulatto-dominated party leadership.

--This should give a more militant, and possibly more nationalist, cast to the party, while weakening the influence of those generally sympathetic toward the West and opposed to radical socialist solutions to Angola's problems.

--Neto's overall position, however, remains fragile given Angola's serious economic and social problems and the continuing insurgent guerrilla threat.

--Angolan and Cuban troops have contained other guerrilla groups in the north, but little

This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and was coordinated within CIA. The judgments reached are based on limited information and, therefore, should be viewed as tentative.
progress has been made against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces, which operate freely over the southern half of the country. It is unlikely UNITA will make any major gains, however, given the substantial Cuban presence in the country.

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---Internal and external pressures on the regime have forced Neto to rely increasingly on the Cubans and the Soviets to prop up his government.

---Although Soviet influence in Angola is extensive, Neto is unlikely to shut the door to the West.

---The West's potential to influence Neto, however, is probably diminished now that Angola has committed itself more firmly to a Marxist-Leninist course.
The Party Congress

President Agostinho Neto has emerged from Angola's first party congress (held early last month) with a much stronger personal power base. The congress marks the culmination of an intensive effort to consolidate his position in the party following the abortive attempt by a dissident leftist faction to overthrow the government in May 1977.

The highlight of the congress was the transformation of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola into a vanguard working class party guided by a Marxist-Leninist ideology—the MPLA-Labor Party. A three year economic plan calling for the nationalization of agriculture and industry was approved as well as a reorganization of the country's defense and security forces that includes a stronger role for the party.

One of the first acts of the new party was to establish a control commission "to enforce ideological cohesion". All former MPLA members will be screened by the commission before they are allowed to join the Labor Party. Although this requirement was imposed ostensibly for ideological reasons, it is expected that past loyalty to Neto will be a major criterion for admission.

Outlook. Neto's choice to rule Angola by means of a tightly controlled Marxist-Leninist party will probably give him greater control over the party, the military, and the government. At the same time, however, he will probably be forced to rely increasingly on the Soviets and the Cubans to implement the party program, thus reducing some of his flexibility. Those within the government who have resisted radical socialist solutions to Angola's problems most likely will become increasingly isolated from the decision-making process.

The New Party Leadership

A major effort was made at the congress to shed the MPLA's image as a mulatto-dominated, Luanda-based organization. The leading role played by better educated mulattoes in the Movement has always been a major source of friction with the blacks. In fact, black resentment of the disproportionate share of power and the sweeter fruits of the revolution gained by the mulattoes was a major factor behind the May uprising.
Black representation in the party was increased substantially—37 of 45 Central Committee members and 6 of 11 Politburo members are black. All five members of the control commission are black, suggesting that their role in the new party may be greatly enhanced.

The congress also moved to bring the military into the political mainstream of the party, presumably both to ensure their continued loyalty to the Neto regime and to improve geographical representation in the party. Over 40 percent of the Central Committee members and a third of the Politburo were drawn from military ranks.

Most of the blacks and the military officers who were brought into the party leadership fought beside Neto, a black, in the early years of the liberation struggle. This should give him a broader base of support, while diluting the influence of the Luanda faction which is comprised mostly of people who served under the colonial Portuguese administration.

Some black delegates reportedly tried to persuade the congress to exclude all mulattoes from the leadership. The mulattoes, while somewhat reduced in number, nevertheless appear to have retained their strong position in the Politburo; they also continue to control most of the top spots in the government. Henrique Carvalho dos Santos, a mulatto who effectively runs the internal security service, emerged from the congress as one of the more powerful new faces in the party. Educated in Cuba, he is regarded by some as Havana's man in Angola.

Outlook. By bringing more blacks and military officers into the party leadership, Neto undoubtedly has strengthened his political position. Even if many of them are not totally loyal to Neto, he is clearly in a better position to control their activities. Increased black and military representation will give the party a more leftist, militant, and possibly more nationalist cast. The mulattoes, nevertheless, will probably continue to play a leading role in the party and in the government because of Angola's dire need for their talents.

Pressures on the Regime

Although the development of a stronger party structure should reduce some of the political pressures on the regime,
Neto's position is still very fragile. Despite the major investment Cuba, the USSR, and other socialist countries have made in Angola, little if any progress has been made toward solving its economic and social problems or in meeting the increasingly serious insurgent guerrilla threat.

The importation of large quantities of goods has done little to improve the economic situation. Meat, vegetables, clothing, and consumer goods remain in short supply; critical food shortages exist in some rural areas, and transportation and distribution networks are still far from adequate.

While the influx of more blacks into the party should improve the racial balance, black nationalist rhetoric appears to be growing in the urban slums. The regime must also cope with growing antagonism toward foreign advisers—chiefly the Cubans and the Soviets—whose presence has become more and more visible throughout the country. Neto undoubtedly realizes that a growing reliance on foreign advisers will add to racial tensions, but there is probably little he can do given his other problems.

Outlook. Although Neto appears to have made substantial progress toward controlling dissension within his party, the possibility of a popular uprising or a "revolt" by those who have recently lost power in the party cannot be dismissed entirely. But so long as Neto continues to enjoy the full support of the Cubans and the Soviets, he should have little difficulty in retaining power. Even should Neto become incapable of governing, other party leaders would probably step in and, at least initially, follow much the same policy as Neto.

The Insurgent Threat

Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas probably pose the most serious political and military threat to the Neto regime. Cuban and Angolan troops appear to have contained other insurgent guerrilla groups in northern Angola and in the exclave
of Cabinda. This has permitted the government to concentrate its forces on UNITA in southern and eastern Angola, but they have met with only limited success.

Although heavy fighting in the south has produced some tactical gains for the Neto government, UNITA's ability to wage guerrilla warfare has not been seriously impaired. UNITA may have even succeeded in consolidating its position in some of the more remote areas of southern Angola. In most parts of the country, travel outside the major towns is still dangerous. UNITA, and to a lesser extent the other guerrilla groups, can launch ambushes almost at will against most major roads and rail lines.

Cuban forces, in order to improve their combat performance against the guerrillas and to tighten security, have begun to operate more independently. This shift in tactics appears to have had no significant impact on UNITA, but it has resulted in a greater number of Cuban casualties.

The presence of thousands of South African troops in northern Namibia and about 10,000 Zairian troops in the Shaba Region is also of major concern to Neto. Both the South Africans and the Zairians have occasionally violated the border, and the threat of a major strike should the political situation in Angola deteriorate dramatically has always loomed large in Neto's thinking. Although Neto's fears of a South African or Zairian attack are overdrawn, he will continue to cite the presence of foreign troops on his borders as further justification for Cuba's military presence in Angola.

Outlook. Given Cuba's substantial military commitment in Angola, the conflict with UNITA is likely to remain stalemate for some time. Unless UNITA develops the capacity to wage a conventional war—still some time off—it is unlikely to expand appreciably the territory under its control. At the same time, Neto and his Cuban benefactors are not likely to make significant progress in rooting out UNITA forces.

Prospects that either Savimbi or Neto would agree to some sort of accommodation are exceedingly slim. Each man believes his position is improving, and it is doubtful that sufficient external pressures could be brought on either to force a rapprochement.
Foreign Relations

Neto appears to have moved closer to the Soviets since his visit to Moscow last September. Although following the May uprising he suspected Soviet complicity in the attempt to depose him, little or no effort apparently has been made to restrict Soviet activities in Angola.

In fact, a substantial number of Soviet advisers—about 500—are in the country, and they have assumed an increasingly important role in the military and the government. Several high-level Soviet delegations have recently visited Angola. First Deputy Defense Minister Sokolov led a military delegation to Angola late last month, and Politburo member Kirilenko, who is General Secretary Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, headed the delegation attending the party congress.

The Cubans, also, attached great importance to the congress, selecting Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro to head their delegation. Although the Soviets and the Cubans exerted major influence over the congress, they did not control the proceedings. For example, of the candidates whom the Soviets reportedly had sponsored for membership on the Central Committee, six ultimately were not selected.

Those advocating closer ties with the West emerged from the congress in a weakened position. Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge—who has led the recent drive to establish relations with more Western and non-aligned states and to improve ties with Portugal—was elected only as an alternate member of the Central Committee. Justice Minister Diogenes Boavida, a moderate thought to be secure in his government post, failed to make either list. Both men are non-blacks, however, and this may have contributed to their poor showing.

Resolutions passed by the congress setting domestic policy were strongly Marxist, but the foreign policy section was much more balanced. The congress went on record as favoring strict non-alignment for Angola based on the Yugoslav model, the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries, and opposition to any foreign bases on Angolan territory.

These themes were repeated by Neto in a speech he gave to the Luanda diplomatic corps on 3 January. In the speech,
presumably targeted for Western consumption, Neto emphasized Angola's right to determine its own political orientation and cautioned against any attempt to interfere in its internal affairs. The commitment to establish relations with all countries, however, was qualified to exclude certain European states that are providing assistance to the Angolan insurgents.

Given Angola's serious economic problems, Neto probably would like to maintain contact with the West. The Angolan economy is almost completely dependent on revenues stemming from Western exploitation of the Cabindan oil fields, and Neto has privately encouraged additional Western exploration and exploitation off Angola's northern coast. Neto realizes that his country desperately needs the economic assistance and technical expertise that the West can best provide. He may also hope that in the process of getting more Western and non-aligned states to recognize Angola the legitimacy of his regime will be enhanced.

Outlook. The Soviets probably would not oppose a somewhat expanded Western role so long as it were limited to economic and technical assistance programs tightly controlled by the party. Opposition may come from within the party, however, if the new and more militant Central Committee members gain influence.

Now that the Labor Party has been established, Neto will probably announce some cabinet changes. His selections for key posts should provide a good indication of where Angolan foreign policy is headed. For example, any change in the status of Foreign Minister Jorge, a white who is pro-Western, or First Deputy Prime Minister Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, a black who is highly regarded by the Soviets, would be significant.

Although Neto's dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans is likely to grow, he will probably not shut the door to the West entirely because of the economic and political benefits that might accrue from increased Western involvement. Moreover, it is still possible that Neto has only reluctantly accepted a major Soviet role in his country and he may believe a continued Western presence would increase his flexibility with Moscow. Nevertheless, Angola appears
to have set itself more firmly on a Marxist-Leninist course and the chances now are dimmer that increased Western involvement in Angola would facilitate a shift to a more moderate approach in foreign and domestic policies.
Latin America
Review

Supplement
20 December 1985
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Cuba's willingness to defend its Angolan ally remains strong despite the unpopularity of the cause at home, and Havana could decide to increase its military presence in Angola—now some 36,000 personnel—even further.

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Cuba: Military Commitment in Angola

Both Havana and Luanda appear convinced of the need to maintain a large Cuban military presence in Angola, where the Cuban military contingent has grown to some 36,000 personnel. While mounting Cuban casualties probably remain politically and militarily acceptable to the Castro regime, any measurable increase in Cuba's participation could heighten the war's unpopularity at home, where economic and political incentives must be used increasingly to entice recruits into serving in Angola. Even so, Cuban willingness to defend its Angolan ally remains strong, as reflected by recent public reiterations of Havana's commitment. Moreover, some growth in Cuba's military presence seems possible as Cuban units obtain their full complement of personnel and new Soviet equipment deliveries require additional Cuban advisors.

Havana's intent to maintain its sizable military presence in Angola was underscored in early November by Cuban Communist Party Politburo member Sergio del Valle, who stated that Cuban forces would remain in Angola until the Luanda regime decides that "the aggressions against its sovereignty and territorial integrity have ceased." Moreover, Cuban President Fidel Castro asserted in late May, during UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's visit to Havana, that "300,000 Cubans have already gone to Angola, and if another 200,000 must go, they will." Some Cubans never cease to believe that it is Havana's "internationalist duty" to help the Angolans, who are considered "political adolescents" by the Cubans.

Castro's resolve probably has been strengthened recently by developments in southern Africa, visits to Havana by leaders of the Frontline States, the repeal of the Clark Amendment prohibiting US aid to the
President dos Santos's visit to Cuba last October, Castro publicly proclaimed that the "new strength" of Angolan and Cuban forces coincided with the "irreversible crisis of apartheid in South Africa."

Cuba's Current Military Posture
The breadth and depth of Havana's involvement in Angola remain high, as indicated by an estimated total presence of some 42,000 civilian and military personnel. Approximately 28,000 Cuban combat troops are currently stationed there.

In addition, there are 8,000 Cuban military advisers believed to be attached to various Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) units, bringing Havana's total military presence to some 36,000 personnel.

There are indications that Cuban forces probably played a more visible role in the recently concluded FAPLA offensive against the forces of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Government operations near Cazombo in eastern Angola also reportedly included the use of Cuban-managed tanks. A senior UNITA official told the US Embassy in London that perhaps as many as 3,000 Cuban troops took part in the FAPLA operations, but added that no major Cuban combat units were involved in the actual fighting.

Cuban personnel also play a key role in Angola's growing air defense network, operating and providing technical expertise to Luanda's mobile and fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries and air warning radar sites, most of which are located in southern Angola along the Namibe-Menongue rail line. Havana also is involved in an effort to upgrade the air defense of its forces in Angola.
1978, when the majority of combat responsibilities were turned over to Angolan Government forces, the spread and intensification of UNITA guerrilla activity since 1982 appears to have again accelerated Cuban losses. According to an intelligence defector, Cuban troops are ill-prepared for their involvement in Africa, where malaria, primitive living conditions, heat, and isolation have been serious problems. Heavy casualties also reportedly are exacted on the Cubans by insurgent mines, and Cuban troops routinely use underground shelters to avoid UNITA and South African missiles.

Recent Intelligence Community estimates place the total number of Cubans killed and wounded at some 4,000 to 5,000 since 1975, but data on Cuban casualties remain imprecise and Havana’s losses could be higher. Community analysts, for example, calculate that several thousand Cubans probably have died as a result of accidents and disease. In addition, Cuban deaths in Angola exceed 10,000.

Cubans are frequently accused by Angolans of being poorly treated in many areas—as responsible for many of their food and commodity shortages. One unconfirmed UNITA press report claims, for example, that seven Cubans were killed last October when Angolan Government forces marched against them. In addition, a Cuban defector who fled recently to Cuba claims that their Cuban counterparts are undisciplined, given too little training, and are ineffective in combat.

Correspondingly, the Cubans suffer from low morale, in part because of growing frustration over their containment to largely defensive functions in rear areas.

The growing number of casualties and other deprivations suffered by Cuban military personnel is also likely to influence Havana’s thinking with regard to any further combat commitment by its Ground Forces. Although Cuban casualties declined after the return of combat responsibilities to Angolans, they have not declined to levels achieved during the 1975-82 period...
Incentives are used increasingly by Havana to entice new recruits or additional service from its officer corps for overseas duty. For example, "internationalist duty" is used to accrue benefits at home, such as permission to buy major appliances or obtain an apartment. Following the expulsion of Cuban forces from Grenada in October 1983, Castro offered veterans who survived the US intervention an opportunity to recoup their prestige and rank—stripped by Castro after the hostilities ended—by serving a tour in Angola.

Outlook
Some modest growth in Cuba's military presence is possible over the next six months to a year as newly formed units are brought up to full manning levels, and as the arrival of new military equipment from the Soviet Union—such as air defense systems—necessitates the deployment of additional Cuban advisors.

We believe Havana probably would commit additional resources if it appeared the Luanda government was in danger of falling to UNITA forces.

In our judgment, however, Havana is most likely to continue its policy of defensive rear-guard operations, and—at a minimum—its present level of involvement in air and air defense operations in support of its Angolan ally. We anticipate that Havana will consider its support to Luanda on a case-by-case basis, to provide Cuban decisionmakers the widest flexibility, but we conclude that there is little prospect for a withdrawal of Cuban troops in the near future. Indeed, we believe it unlikely that Havana would significantly reduce its military presence even if Angolan forces were to make measurable gains against UNITA in the coming months.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

15 November 1978

MEMORANDUM

ANGOLA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Relations between Luanda and Moscow are generally good, with no indications of serious policy differences. Nevertheless some strains remain. The Soviets are not well liked in Angola. Many Angolans regard them as neocolonialists interested primarily in exploiting Angolan resources for the benefit of the USSR. Moreover, Angolans are disappointed with the failure of their Soviet and Cuban allies to halt the downward slide of the economy or to suppress UNITA.

Complaints about poor Soviet performance in the economic sphere are common in sub-Saharan Africa and in the case of Angola are probably not taken too seriously by the Soviets. Of more concern to the Soviets is the belief, held by some members of the Angolan elite including Neto, that the Soviets were behind the Alves coup attempt in May 1977. We know of no evidence to support the charge but it persists despite repeated Soviet demonstrations of support for Neto.
Despite these points of friction, both sides continue to observe the provisions of the Soviet-Angolan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was signed in October 1976. The treaty follows the general format and substance of other Soviet treaties with third-world states, outlining a commitment to cooperate in a wide variety of fields. It provides for the strengthening of military cooperation on the "basis of corresponding agreements which are being concluded..."

The Soviets reportedly run the Luanda naval base with their naval, merchant, and fishing ships entering and departing at will. Since December 1976 an AMUR-class repair ship has been stationed at the base, ostensibly to repair Angolan patrol boats, but the support ship has also serviced Soviet naval ships and has provided hull maintenance for the Soviet diesel submarine on patrol in the area. This naval contingent routinely numbers some eight to ten ships usually consisting of one or two destroyers, an amphibious ship, a mine sweeper, a diesel-powered torpedo attack submarine, and various support ships. Since early 1977 Soviet TU-95 long-range aircraft have been periodically deployed to Luanda airfields for reconnaissance operations over the South Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope.

We have no evidence that the Soviets have attempted to block Neto's continuing efforts to normalize relations with the United States, although they are certainly monitoring them closely. For a variety of reasons the Soviets probably do not see improved US-Angolan relations as a serious or immediate threat to their influence in Angola.

The Soviets—and Neto—realize that military assistance is the foundation of Soviet influence in Angola and Neto is likely to remain dependent on Soviet and Cuban military support for some time. The Angolans cannot handle the UNITA insurgency by themselves and neither the United States nor other Western countries are likely to provide the type of assistance Neto needs to suppress the insurgents. As long as Neto needs the Cubans to deal with UNITA, he will need Moscow.
The Soviets also probably believe that the large number of Angolans trained in the USSR and other communist countries will be more receptive to Soviet than Western influence. Last year alone some 2,000 Angolans went to the USSR for training and large numbers went to Cuba, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In addition, Soviet and Cuban personnel provide training in Angola as do contingents from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria.

Soviets have also moved to make their influence felt in key financial and commercial ministries, particularly in the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank and have reportedly replaced Cubans in the Transportation, Fisheries and Trade ministries. Soviets in these ministries will be in a good position to monitor contacts between the West and Angola and perhaps to influence developments in ways favorable to the USSR.

In sum, the prospect of improved US-Angolan relations is probably not a major source of concern to the Soviets, or at least not of great enough concern for them to threaten their position with Neto by trying to thwart his efforts. Moscow nonetheless will be alert for any sign of a significant US presence aggravating existing difficulties in the Soviet-Angolan relationship.
Strategic Intelligence
Monthly Review

January 1978

This publication of the Office of Strategic Research contains substantive findings and analytical judgments that are preliminary in nature and have not been formally coordinated with other CIA and Intelligence Community components.

Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcomed. They may be directed to the person named following each item.
Cuba's Angolan Venture Stagnating

Cuban forces and their Angolan Government allies are still unable to neutralize antigovernment guerrillas, especially those of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). Thus the most likely prospect for Havana is for at least another year of military stalemate.
Cuba's Angolan Venture Stagnating

The Cuban armed forces made no progress in Angola last year. What had appeared as a relatively easy victory in 1976 has become a military quagmire. It now appears that without further substantial reinforcement, Cuban and Angolan Government forces will be unable to neutralize antigovernment guerrillas, especially those of the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). The most likely prospect for Havana is at least another year of military stalemate.

Havana dispatched about 4,000 additional troops in May and June, offsetting earlier reductions. At least three of the six merchant ships sent from Cuba at that time carried troops as well as military equipment. Havana also airlifted soldiers on Soviet-piloted IL-62 jets and Cuban Britannia turboprop transports. Cuba now has an estimated 19,000 to 20,000 military personnel in Angola. Some 4,000 to 5,000 Cuban civilians, some with military backgrounds, also are there.

This augmentation, however, has not yet paid off. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces, which contest about one-half of the Angolan countryside, constitute a formidable enemy, now totaling about 12,000 guerrillas and 8,000 trainees. UNITA has often seized the initiative, relying heavily on small unit tactics. It enjoys widespread support among the Ovimbundo, a tribe of 5 million persons inhabiting the south.

One measure of UNITA's effective resistance is the mounting Cuban casualty rate. The Cubans lost more men in late 1977 than during the early part of the year, largely because of campaigns against UNITA. Havana has never provided casualty figures, but Cuban casualties since Havana's initial involvement probably total at least 1,500 dead—a high proportion of the Cuban force that has served in Angola.

Other factors besides the casualty rate have eroded morale. ____________

__________________________

the low morale resulting from homesickness, poor
food, worry over tropical diseases, and the side effects of medicines necessary to cope with conditions in Angola. Stories circulating among Cuban troops about UNITA atrocities have probably contributed to low morale, as has widespread Angolan resentment of the Cubans, regarded by some as an occupation force.

The latest Cuban response to the guerrilla resistance is a series of large-scale offensives in south-central Angola. UNITA chief Savimbi recently indicated that about 5,000 additional Cubans have moved south since early November, bringing the number operating against UNITA forces in the area to at least 12,000. These offensives, however, probably do not pose much more of a threat to UNITA than did previous Cuban operations.
ANGOLAN PERCEPTIONS OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENTS IN ANGOLA

Angolan dissatisfaction over Cuban and Soviet involvement there has grown in recent months. Although Angolan President Neto probably has good relations with the top Cuban and Soviet leadership, their substantial and continued presence in Angola has led to increasing frictions at lower levels of the Angolan government and society. We estimate that there are 10,000 to 14,500 Cuban military and civilian advisors in Angola; three convoys carrying additional military personnel are now reported to be heading for Angolan waters. Several hundred Soviet advisors and sizeable contingents from several other East European states are also in Angola.

The Cuban presence has become increasingly evident throughout the country and their image as a new breed of colonialists has spread. The Cuban

This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency.
and the Soviets are frequently criticized for being arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for being too quick to take command of a given situation instead of remaining in their role as advisors to their Angolan counterparts. The Cubans tend to be more open and gregarious than the Soviets who usually keep to themselves—even when appearing in public.

Cuban and Soviet monopolization of the few remaining luxuries in the country has also created resentment. Angolans complain that the advisors are ill-trained and unqualified, but they still receive exorbitant salaries, enjoy good housing, and eat the best foods—including meat and vegetables which are rarely available to most Angolans.

Angolan resentment also stems from the fact that the Cuban and Soviet presence has not resulted in economic progress or the elimination of the insurgent threat in southern Angola and the enclave of Cabinda. While Neto is undoubtedly aware of the problems caused by the continued Cuban and Soviet presence, he simply cannot afford to reduce their role given Angola's current economic difficulties and his increasing dependence on the Cubans to maintain internal security and keep the government functioning.

The Cubans reportedly are also frustrated by the enormous economic problems that face Angola and by the persistence of the insurgent threat which continues to take Cuban lives. Cuban troops reportedly have been reluctant to actively pursue the insurgents and this has created frictions with the Angolans.

President Castro, however, remains committed to the preservation of the Neto regime. Despite the frustrations expressed by both sides, continuing instability in Angola will probably assure that Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola will continue at similar, or possibly higher, levels for several years.
Latin America Review

Special Issue: Cuba—Castro's Revolution Running Out of Steam?

21 April 1989
The capabilities of the Cuban military should improve with the return of at least 50,000 Cuban troops and much of their equipment from Angola over the next two years.
Scope Note

This edition of the Latin America Review is the second in an occasional series of special issues over the next several months, each devoted to Latin American areas or topics of current interest. In this issue, we analyze a number of key political, economic, and security issues and trends affecting Fidel Castro's troubled regime in Cuba. The Castro government, which marked 20 years in power this January, faces a deepening economic crisis, Soviet pressures for economic reforms, and growing disillusionment at home.

Several articles present preliminary findings from research for intelligence assessments that are planned for later this year, while others update subjects covered in recent current intelligence articles. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-Cuba Division, or...
The Post-Angola Military

The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR) should improve with the return of at least 50,000 Cuban troops and much of their equipment from Angola over the next two years. The FAR tested several organizational and tactical innovations in Angola and will bring back to Cuba additional military hardware used by its forces there. Havana is portraying the Angolan experience as a major victory for its Armed Forces, but, despite the honors bestowed on the FAR, it is unlikely to seek increased political power or favor new foreign adventures.

The Military Benefits of Angola
Not only will the returning units fill the gaps created in Cuba's defenses by the augmentation of its forces in Angola early last year, but they will also upgrade substantially the island's defensive capabilities. upgraded. In addition, some older equipment may be sold for hard currency, given to Cuban militia units, or provided to Nicaragua or Panama to further Cuba's regional political goals. Despite the troop withdrawal from Angola, the overall size of the FAR—estimated at 255,000 regulars and ready reservists—will remain constant because reservists returning to civilian life will be replaced by recruits called to active duty in Cuba for their mandatory military service.

The Angolan conflict appears to have spurred Havana's efforts to reorganize its forces and to revise its military doctrine, a process that has been under way since the early 1980s.

As a result of the successes in Angola, Havana now may move faster to convert its armor regiments on the island to armor brigades. In addition, the Cuban Air Force appears to be incorporating more realistic air intercept training into its programs. This development is a departure from standardized Soviet practices which deemphasize pilot initiative and rely on strict ground control. If this trend continues, the Air Force will improve its capabilities to successfully engage enemy aircraft.

The Future Role of the Military
Despite the attention focused on the military as a result of its victory in Angola, its role in the political process is unlikely to change in the post-Angola era. The military, heavily represented in senior party and government bodies, has long been a political force in Cuba. There is little reason to believe that the military as an institution or individual senior officers will attempt to parlay enhanced prestige into increased political power or influence. The senior officers are long-time Castro loyalists—most were revolutionary comrades of
The Withdrawal Timetable

The December 1988 Peace Accords signed between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa call for the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola over a 30-month period. In January of this year approximately 3,000 troops left for Havana, fulfilling the first stage of the withdrawal plan. The second phase calls for the return of 25,000 Cubans between 1 April and 1 November 1989. We estimate that approximately 3,000 have left in April, and the drawdown is continuing.

The remainder of the timetable is:

* By 1 April 1990, two-thirds of the Cuban troops are to have left Angola.
* By 1 October 1990, 76 per cent of the troops are to have departed.
* By 1 January 1991, no more than 12,000 Cuban troops will remain in Angola.
* By 1 July 1991, the remaining Cuban forces will be gone.

We believe that the last troops to leave Angola will be the regular Army forces that deployed there in late 1987-early 1988.

Cuba's military leaders are likely to lobby against future foreign adventures on the scale of Angola, believing the cost of the 13-year conflict outweighed the gains. Some of Castro's senior officers opposed involvement in the Angolan conflict because it diverted the military from its primary mission of defending the island. As the war deepened, morale within the Cuban military fell, especially among the reservists who pulled most of the duty in Angola. Most of the Cuban troops were not CUBAN. Instead, they were mercenaries, and faced primitive living conditions in Angola. The military command also was increasingly concerned over the growing desertion rate among draftees and reservists assigned to Angola. Although all of these problems were manageable, they served, in our view, to lessen the military's appetite for foreign adventure.

Fidel--or they are subservient to him and realize their rank and privileges emanate from Castro. Castro rewards officers who support his policies with promotions and other benefits, thereby further ensuring their loyalty.
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs 

SUBJECT: Information on Soviet and Cuban 
Military Activities (S) 

Attached is information requested by you in your 
memorandum of 12 September 1979 -- on Soviet arms supplies 
to Cuba, arms used by the Cubans in Africa, Soviet arms 
shipments to Vietnam, and Soviet naval and air deployment 
in Vietnam. (S) 

STANFIELD TURNER 

Attachment: a/s 

Downgrade to SECRET when removed from attachment
Question 1. Provide a breakdown by category and, if possible, year of total arms supplies to Cuba.

Overview

1. The USSR has supplied almost all the military equipment Cuba has acquired since the early 1960s. In value terms, total Soviet arms shipments to Cuba from 1961 through yearend 1978 equals $1.55 billion,* including about $150 million in 1978. On a volume basis, annual arms deliveries to Cuba in the six years following the 1962 missile crisis fluctuated widely, ranging from a low of 6,200 tons in 1968 to a high of 41,100 tons in 1967. (see Table 1.)

2. In the six-year period following the 1968 low, Soviet

* All values are expressed in Soviet trade prices and include only weapons systems and support material delivered to Cuba, virtually all of which was destined for the Cuban armed forces. It does not include the costs of developing and maintaining Soviet facilities and personnel in Cuba or Soviet technical advisory assistance to the Cuban armed forces. If the USSR's arms shipments to Cuba during the 18-year period were valued at US costs of production (costs of producing comparable weapon systems and support items in the United States) instead of Soviet trade prices, the estimate would increase to $2.1 billion and $225 million for 1978 alone.
Table 1

Major Soviet Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba, 1962-78*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Ships</th>
<th>Thousand Metric Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962**</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>250.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-August</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This numerical tabulation of annual arms shipments is based almost solely on military equipment carried to Cuba on Soviet merchant ships carrying exclusively military cargoes. These seaborne deliveries, which in most years accounted for over 95 percent of the identified military shipments to Cuba, provide the most definitive year to year comparisons of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. Deliveries of naval combatants that sail or are towed to Cuba, as well as transport aircraft flown to Cuba for transfer to the armed forces, are excluded from the quantitative analysis. Figures for 1979 are preliminary.

** Mid-July to mid-October 1962: Estimate.
Breakdown by Category

3. The current inventory by selected major categories and types of Soviet military hardware which have arrived in Cuba since 1962 is shown in Table 2. Highlights include:

-- About 280 fighter aircraft, about half of which are MIG-21 Fishbeds;

-- About 100, mostly small, naval craft, including 18 Komars of unknown condition, 24 P-4s and P-6 patrol boats, 6 of the OSA II guided missile patrol boats, and one Foxtrot class submarine;

-- A wide variety of ground force equipment including some 210 T54/55 tanks, 660 armored personnel carriers, 200 85 mm field artillery and at least 40 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.

Confidence in the Estimate

4. We have a high degree of confidence in the accuracy of the overall tonnage of Soviet military equipment delivered to Cuba.
5. Soviet arms carriers are closely monitored around the world by the Intelligence community.

6. Higher profile deliveries such as aircraft and naval craft can be more easily and accurately monitored than most ground equipment. The aircraft and some of the smaller naval Larger patrol boats such as the OSA's are towed -- a slow and obvious process.

7. Identification of the types and quantities of ground forces equipment is far less certain. Almost all such equipment is carried in the holds of the ships and is rapidly deployed and camouflaged,
Question 2: Provide a breakdown of the arms used by the Cubans in Africa (are such arms provided directly from the Soviet Union or do the Cubans bring such arms from their stock in Cuba?)

Overview

1. In Angola, a large portion of the arms used by Cuban ground forces was Soviet supplied equipment shipped from Cuba. In contrast, the Cubans fighting in Ethiopia received almost all of their equipment directly from the USSR, by sea or airlift. Although many of the same classes of weapons were used by Cuban troops in both Angola and Ethiopia, the Ethiopian campaign was characterized by the employment of more and better armor and air defense systems, and combat sorties flown by Cuban pilots using high-performance MIG fighters. (See the table for details on the types of military equipment delivered to Angola and Ethiopia, 1975-78.)

The Cubans in Angola

2. As the Cuban troop levels in Angola rose in the last quarter of 1975, there was a corresponding increase in seaborne deliveries of military equipment from Havana to Luanda. Indeed, in many instances troops sailed on the same ships which were carrying their equipment. Following the initial arrivals of two Cuban ships carrying troops and equipment in September 1975,
the pace of deliveries picked up. Eleven military-related voyages occurred between October and December 1975, followed by 10 in January 1976 and 13 in February 1976. Soviet ships sailing from the USSR to Angola during this period carried some 23,000 tons while cargoes carried in the airlift added another 2000 tons and supplies. The Cubans also drew heavily from the Soviet deliveries, particularly for ammunition and other expendable items.

**Soviet Offsets to Cuba**

4. By yearend 1978, the Soviets had provided replacement military equipment for almost all the arms shipped to Angola by Cuba. Indeed, Soviet arms shipments to Cuba began to pick up concurrent with Cuban involvement in Angola. After more than four years of deliveries of between 10,000 to 12,500 tons a year, Soviet arms shipments rose to 14,500 tons in 1975, with most of the increase occurring in the last quarter. Soviet arms deliveries continued to rise each succeeding year to a decade long high of 22,400 tons in 1978. As the offset program slowed, the Soviets began to accelerate the overall modernization of
each of Cuba's armed forces.

Trends Since the War

5. Since the spring of 1976, when major fighting in Angola subsided, the overall level of Cuban shipping activity to Angola slowed. The Cuban ships which did sail to Angola during this time carried primarily commercial goods. However, a few Cuban ships did continue to deliver modest amounts of military equipment including tanks and self-propelled assault guns, on an intermittent basis. The pattern of mostly commercial shipment to Angola has continued to the present time as the economic links have expanded between Havana and Luanda.

The Cubans in Ethiopia

6. In sharp contrast to Angola, the Cuban forces in Ethiopia were supplied almost entirely with Soviet arms brought directly from the USSR by sea and air. A total of 52 Soviet ships delivered some 80,000 tons of military equipment to Ethiopia between November 1977 and April 1978, while a well-organized Soviet airlift delivered some 1,300 tons of arms. In addition, Soviet passenger ships transported the initial contingent of between 2,500 and 4,000 Cuban troops from Cuba to Ethiopia followed up by an airlift of Cuban troops.

7. The more mechanized and mobile Cuban/Ethiopian campaign in the Ogaden called for much greater use of more modern Soviet
Question 3: Provide a breakdown of Soviet arms shipments to Vietnam for the last two years.

Soviet seaborne military deliveries to Vietnam have increased dramatically since the Sino-Vietnamese border war in February 1979.* Through August 1979, 53 Soviet ships have delivered around 110,000 tons of military equipment to Vietnam. These deliveries were augmented by a two month long airlift following the fighting. In addition, smaller amounts of military support equipment have arrived on ships carrying primarily commercial cargoes. This activity contrasts sharply with 1978 when total Soviet military deliveries reached 32,000 tons.

Discussion

In 1978, 28 Soviet ships delivered approximately 32,000 tons of military and military-associated equipment to Vietnam. Major items included:

-- Two MIG-21 jet fighters
-- One KA-26 and one MI-10 helicopters
-- Two Petya class frigates
-- Three Zhuk class patrol boats
-- Two unidentified motor torpedo boats and
-- Over 135 trucks, bulldozers and cranes.

* The data in this section are based on a ship by ship analysis of Soviet arms carriers delivering military hardware to Vietnam. The data is derived from a variety of sources, including the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC).
The Petya frigates, Zhuk patrol boats and motor torpedo boats — all new to the Vietnamese inventory — represented the first deliveries of Soviet naval equipment since 1974.

**Trends in 1979**

During the first eight months of 1979, Soviet military deliveries to Vietnam rose threefold compared to all of 1978. Through August, 53 Soviet ships have delivered around 110,000 tons of military cargo to Vietnam, an increase of some 78,000 tons over 1978.* Another 20 ships arrived with military-related cargo, including more than 4,000 trucks.

Included in the military equipment delivered to Vietnam thus far in 1979 are 12 T-4 landing craft; four Shershen class motor patrol boats, 102 T-54/55 medium tanks; 98 amphibious tanks (PT-76); 120 MIG-21 Fishbed aircraft crates, 40 MIG-17 Fresco aircraft crates; 26 MI-8 HIP helicopter crates; four MI-24 (HIND) helicopter crates; 33 130 mm field guns (M-46); 94 SU-85/100 assault guns; 132 100 mm anti-tank guns (T-12/12A); 42 rocket launchers (BM-14/24); 30 surface-to-air missile-associated vans; 162 SA-3 missile canisters; at least nine SA-3/GOA 4-rail missile launchers; 84 heavy amphibious ferry units (GSP); and around 4,000 GAZ-66, ZIL 133 and 131, and assorted other trucks.

* The early parts of the pickup in seaborne deliveries was augmented by a Soviet airlift from the USSR to Vietnam. The airlift began on 22 February and ended on 18 April 1979 and consisted of 53 flights — 34 by AN-22 heavy turboprop transports, five by IL-76 heavy jet transports, and 14 by AN-12 medium transports. Twelve of the AN-12s have remained in Vietnam and are being used for liaison and logistic support flights in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.
Question 4: Provide information on the frequency and character of Soviet naval and air deployment to Vietnam.

1. Major Soviet surface combatants have made four port calls at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam -- all since the end of the Sino-Vietnamese war in February 1979. An additional visit was conducted by a submarine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port Calls</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 March - 3 April</td>
<td>Kresta-class cruiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 March - 5 April</td>
<td>Kotlin-class destroyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May - departure unknown</td>
<td>F-class submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 August - 10 August</td>
<td>Kotlin-class destroyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 September - 10 September</td>
<td>Sverdlov-class cruiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kotlin-class destroyer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These port calls apparently serve only as a demonstration of the Soviet presence because the ships do not appear to take on water or POL.

2. In addition to the port calls at Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet naval TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft have deployed to Da Nang airfield three times.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flights</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 April - 26 April</td>
<td>2 TU-95 Bear Ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May - 23 May</td>
<td>2 TU-95 Bear Ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 September -</td>
<td>2 TU-95 Bear Ds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These flights appear to be navigational training flights and in each case flights both to and from Vietnam have been conducted on Wednesday, a normal training day for the aircraft involved. During the April deployment three flight operations were conducted over the China Sea.
3. Last March the Soviets also sent 12 AN-12 (Cub) transports to Vietnam for use in shuttle and resupply support of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. These aircraft are rotated back to the USSR every three months.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  

Attached is the information you requested on recent Soviet initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. If you have any further questions please contact

Office of Economic Research

ER M 76-10736
7 December 1976

Date 7 December 1976

ER M 76-10736

(7 Dec. 1976)
Soviet Military Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1976

Continuing Soviet support to Sub-Saharan African governments in 1976 reconfirmed Moscow's commitment to the region. Although reduced tensions in Southern Africa led to a tapering off in new assistance, the rate of Soviet military deliveries to Sub-Saharan in the first 9 months of 1976 were second only to the 1975 record. Moscow again allocated a larger share of its total military aid to Black Africa than before -- 15% compared with less than 5% in 1958-74. Despite the resolution of the Angolan conflict, Angola continued as Moscow's ranking Black African arms client. Military shipments to Angola this year surpassed the 1975 crisis levels, with the bulk received during the first six months of 1976.

Deliveries

Thus far in 1976, the USSR has delivered at least $140 million worth of military equipment to Sub-Saharan countries. With $155 million of military orders still to be shipped under existing contracts, we expect 1976 deliveries may yet exceed the 1975 record of $220 million.

Nine months shipments to Angola totaled $75 million compared to last year's $56 million. Angola accounted for a larger share of Moscow's deliveries to Black Africa this year than last -- more than one-half, compared with one-fourth in 1975. The step-up in 1976 -- apparently fulfilling the $131 million military agreement signed in 1975 -- replenished stocks depleted during the conflict. Several new weapons systems, including MIG-21s, T-54 tanks, and SA-7 missiles, were introduced. President Neto's
recent trip to Moscow and the signing of a 20-year Friendship Agreement that promised continued military cooperation, have probably set the stage for another round of military deliveries to begin in the next several months. These deliveries are not expected to parallel the past two years unless major fighting erupts.

Soviet arms shipments to other Sub-Saharan states thus far in 1976 have trailed 1975 levels and have gone to a wide range of clients. Nigeria, Somalia, and Uganda, which together received 60% of the total in 1975, fell to a 13% share this year; only Somalia received sizable shipments ($20 million). Tanzania joined the roster of major recipients with deliveries of $20 million. Major weapons provided this year include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>10 MIG-21s, 100 SA-7 Grail missiles, 75 T-54 tanks, 4 MI-8 helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>9 MIG-17s, 1 MIG-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>1 MI-8 helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>MIG-21s, 15 T-34 tanks, 40 armored personnel carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>T-34 tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>SS-N-2 STYX and SA-2 Guideline missiles, 10 heavy artillery pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>10 MIG-17s, 2 MIG-15s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3-5 surface-to-air missile battalions, 1 MI-8 helicopter, 200 trucks, vans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>8 T-54 tanks, 20 armored personnel carriers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congo and Mozambique, with outstanding 1975-76 orders of $70 million, probably will receive additional military equipment before the end of the year. Tanzania also awaits delivery of more than $40 million of equipment under 1974 accords.

**Outlook: New Agreements**

The number and size of 1976 military aid agreements dropped well below 1974-75 levels, when Moscow reasserted an active interest in the Sub-Sahara for the first time in almost a decade. By the end of October 1976, new Soviet arms agreements were running about $6 million a month, compared with a $20 million monthly average in 1974-75. The drop can be explained by a decline in the immediacy of African requirements and by a large unfulfilled commitment to these countries from 1974-75. It also reflects in part a lull usually needed to assimilate new equipment into military organizations.

Soviet military agreements this year were highlighted by:

- A Soviet-Angolan 20-year Friendship Pact that included a military commitment of unknown size.
- A $35 million arms deal with Mozambique.
- A Soviet agreement to replace Ugandan MIG-21s lost during the Israeli raid on Entebbe last July.
- A tentative agreement to provide Nigeria with air defense equipment, probably to include additional MIG-21 and SAMs.
Elsewhere this year, Benin negotiated its first agreement to acquire Soviet military hardware with the purchase of two YAK-40 transports. Congo signed a $15 million contract in June for 10 MIG-21s, 60 anti-aircraft guns and 60 other heavy weapons. The Malagasy Republic ordered two MI-8 helicopters, and Zambia bought tanks and armored vehicles valued at $1.6 million.

The degree of Soviet involvement and the size of its military commitment in Southern Africa for the rest of 1976 and for 1977 is expected in part to depend on the outcome of the Geneva negotiations on Rhodesia. Barring a resumption of open hostilities in the area, the flow of Soviet arms is expected to decline from the extraordinarily high levels of the past two years.
### Soviet Technicians in Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mid-1976</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>300-400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon &amp; Gambia</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>..</td>
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<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Africa Weekly Review

19 May 1978

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AFRICA WEEKLY REVIEW

19 May 1978

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Angola: The New Neocolonialists? ........................ 1

The substantial Cuban and Soviet presence has
become a major source of friction with the
Angolan people, and while these frictions
have been easily resolved at the top, they
could reduce the military effectiveness of
Angola and its allies in the continuing
guerrilla conflict.

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional
contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center.
The Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit
comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in
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articles or to

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Angola: The New Neocolonialists?

The substantial Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola has become a major source of friction with the Angolan people. The Cubans are accused of corruption, stealing, government meddling, and avoiding battle with the guerrilla insurgents. Many Angolans suspect that the Soviets, who are even less popular, want only to exploit the country's resources. Both the Cubans and the Soviets are resented for the special treatment they receive. Although there are no signs of serious strains in relations at the top policymaking levels, growing disenchantment with the Cubans in the military poses a serious problem for the government. Increasing frictions already have reduced the effectiveness of Angolan and Cuban forces, and there appears to be a growing awareness that the guerrilla conflict cannot be resolved by military means alone.

The presence of 19,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers and about 5,000 civilian advisers has led to mounting popular criticism of Cuban activities in Angola. The expected arrival by the end of this year of another 5,000 civilian advisers—mostly teachers and construction workers—probably will aggravate the problem.

While relations generally are good between Cuban civilian advisers and their Angolan counterparts, conflicts inevitably arise, given the large number of Cubans assigned to the various government ministries. The Angolans complain, in particular, that the Cubans assume they know more than the Angolans, are ignorant of how things are done, and usually insist on making unnecessary changes.

A major dispute broke out in the Ministry of Labor last year when the Cubans proposed to unionize the entire Angolan labor force and create a volunteer work force drawn from all sectors of society. The Angolans flatly rejected the plan, arguing on cultural and practical grounds that the current system of selective unionization was sufficient.

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The Cuban Ministry of Interior reportedly tried to impose a rationing system to cope with Angola's severe food problems, but local officials refused. The conflict apparently had to be resolved by Cuban President Castro, who ruled in favor of the Angolans. Castro reportedly was also forced to intervene last year when Cuban advisers working in the Transportation Ministry insisted on changing traffic control patterns. Castro accepted Angolan arguments that such changes were unnecessary and would produce undue confusion among the local population.

Dislike of the Soviets

the Soviets keep to themselves and usually behave like "neocolonialists." The Soviets—who number about 1,000—live completely apart from the Angolans and almost never mix socially; part of the beach in Luanda is reserved exclusively for them. Most senior Soviet military officers are said to live aboard a large ship anchored at the naval base.

In recent months, Soviet advisers have been moving into key financial and commercial positions, particularly in the Finance Ministry and the central bank. They apparently have also been replacing the Cubans in the Transport, Fisheries, and Trade Ministries.

Many senior Angolan officials suspect the Soviets are interested primarily in exploiting Angola's natural resources. They claim that large amounts of sugar, coffee, diamonds, and other commodities are being exported to the USSR to pay for Soviet military aid to Angola. Soviet monopolization of Angola's fishing resources is particularly resented by the Angolans. Soviet fleets, assisted by some Cuban boats, now take almost all the Angolan catch. The Soviets reportedly allocate 10 percent of the catch to the Angolans, 20 percent to the Cubans, and keep the remainder. Much of the Soviet portion then is processed in the USSR and reexported to Angola, which must pay for it in hard currency.

19 May 1978
Problems in the Military

Cuban soldiers are often accused of stealing, smuggling, and black market activities. A customs inspector at Luanda airport stopped 100 Cubans on their way home and discovered suitcases filled with contraband watches, imported food, clothing, and US dollars. Cuban soldiers have virtually stripped areas they were occupying of all valuable items, shipping them back to Cuba as their personal property. The Cubans have appropriated automobiles, machinery, and even furnishings from private homes including refrigerators, light fixtures, furniture, and carpeting.

Imported goods appear to be a prime target of the Cubans. Fourth of all goods shipped to Angola are stolen off the docks, and another fourth are skimmed off by Angolan officials. A recent example was a shipment of clothing that arrived in Lobito intended for eventual sale to Angolan workers at reduced prices. That evening the warehouse was raided, and on the following day boxes of clothes that obviously had been part of the shipment were observed being loaded onto a Cuban ship. A riot ensued, and government authorities had to step in to restore order.

The maintenance of well-stocked stores in major towns for the exclusive use of Cubans and senior government officials is also deeply resented by most Angolans who have to wait in long lines hoping for the chance to buy limited amounts of food and other scarce consumer goods. One day a Cuban soldier ignored the queue, walked into the store, and purchased some goods, and then tried to sell them at triple the price to Angolans waiting in line. The Angolans apparently assaulted the Cuban, who fled.

Serious strains are also developing in relations between Cuban and Angolan forces. Both forces are suffering from severe morale problems, and each claims the other does not do its share of the fighting against the various guerrilla groups.

Angolan Defense Minister Carreira

19 May 1978

3

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
recently said that the Cubans do not want to fight and that they prefer to stay in the cities. Carreiria complained that during several recent offensives most of the Cuban soldiers stayed in the rear, forcing the Angolan soldiers to do most of the fighting. Cuban artillery, tank, helicopter, and commando forces, however, performed well.

Some Cuban units apparently have flatly refused to go on patrol in territory held by the insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). There have also been unconfirmed reports of Cuban, as well as Angolan, military units refusing to fight in Cabinda and in other parts of Angola. Cuban reluctance to fight probably stems in large part from the belief, rightly, that the guerrillas’ first priority is to kill Cubans. Reports of captured Cuban soldiers that were horribly tortured and killed have also had a devastating effect on Cuban morale.

The Cubans, on the other hand, constantly complain that the Angolans make poor soldiers and that they are unwilling to engage the guerrillas—particularly UNITA, which has become an increasingly formidable opponent. Relations between Angolan and Cuban soldiers have deteriorated to the point that joint operations against UNITA are rare.

The use of Cuban soldiers to enforce discipline on the Angolans has further increased tension. UNITA claims that Cuban soldiers executed 57 Angolans in January because they refused to fight against UNITA. There have also been occasional, but unconfirmed, reports of fights breaking out between Cuban and Angolan soldiers or among the Cubans themselves. Angolan and Cuban troops stationed at a major town in southern Angola exchanged fire last January, resulting in several killed and wounded on both sides. Some of the Angolan soldiers involved in the incident deserted to UNITA.

Outlook

Angolan President Neto knows that the introduction of more foreign troops and advisers into Angola will only heighten these tensions, but he has little choice, given

19 May 1978
the immensity and immediacy of his problems. The Angolans probably will remain dependent on the Cubans, the Soviets, and other foreigners for many years to provide stability, security, and sorely needed technical assistance.

Over the long run, growing popular resentment of the Cuban presence could play into the hands of radical black nationalists who have been gaining influence in the military and the party. If the radicals choose to challenge the mulatto-dominated leadership in Luanda, they probably could effectively use this issue in rallying support to their cause. Such a campaign, however, could backfire because the Soviets—who are highly regarded by many of the radical leaders—would be vulnerable to similar attacks.

Most of the conflicts involving Cuban and Soviet advisers appear to have been resolved fairly easily, particularly when the top political leadership becomes involved. Relations generally are very good at the top, and it would require extraordinary circumstances for any significant differences to emerge.

Increasing friction in the military, however, poses a much more serious problem for the Neto government. Tensions between Angolan and Cuban soldiers apparently have already forced some changes in military tactics. If morale continues to deteriorate, military effectiveness will be further reduced, casualties could increase, and even larger numbers of Cuban soldiers will be required to contain the guerrilla insurgencies.

Disenchantment with the Cubans had grown to the point of open discontent and violence in the Angolan armed forces. Many senior military officers had come to believe that true independence cannot be achieved until the Cubans leave Angola and that most of the armed forces—including the militant blacks—would support a move to ask the Cubans to leave "at the proper moment."

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Angolan dissatisfaction with the Cubans reflect a growing concern in the military over the Cuban "problem." In recent months, both the Angolans and the Cubans have expressed doubts that they will be able to defeat UNITA militarily. There have also been some indications recently that Neto may be seeking some sort of political accommodation with UNITA.

Its leader, Savimbi, has shown little interest in a rapprochement, however, insisting that a reconciliation is impossible until all Cuban troops are withdrawn from Angola. Savimbi believes his position is growing stronger, but he may be willing to consider exploratory talks if it appears the Angolans are prepared to make some concessions, particularly with regard to the Cuban military presence.

19 May 1978
Africa Weekly Review

11 November 1977
AFRICA WEEKLY REVIEW

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Africa Weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to
Angola: Additional Cuban Advisers

Cuba has apparently agreed to send an additional 2,600 civilian advisers and technicians to supplement the estimated 4,000 to 5,000 already in Angola. The activities of the Cubans in Angola highlights their generally low morale. Havana is putting a high price on any refusals to serve in Angola.

Cuba and Angola agreed on an increase in Cuban assistance during the recent meeting of the joint Cuban-Angolan commission to plan economic cooperation for next year. Cuban President Castro had already promised earlier this fall to send 1,000 more teachers to Angola by next March.

Ramiro Valdes, who headed the Cuban delegation to the meeting, told the press that there are only about 2,000 Cuban technicians now in Angola. His remarks are in line with Havana's effort to play down the number of Cubans in Angola. However, there were actually 4,000 to 5,000 Cuban civilians serving in Angola as of March.

Some 600 of the Cuban civilians now in Angola are reportedly serving as advisers with various government ministries in Luanda. Another group of about 600 work as mechanics and drivers, and some 600 Cubans are technicians in the construction industry. In addition, 500 Cuban medical personnel are involved in public health activities and 100 agricultural specialists are assigned to rural areas to help increase food production. We do not know the responsibilities of the remainder. Most of the civilians are apparently military reservists.

The Cuban advisers reportedly are disillusioned by bad health conditions, poor food, and by what they perceive as the ingratitude of Angolan officials. Their resentment over being uprooted from comfortable jobs in Cuba and their belief that their own country is being deprived of badly needed personnel have led many of them to doubt the value of Cuba's commitment to Angola.
The Castro government is dealing with the morale problem by taking strong measures to demonstrate that service in Angola is vital to future careers. Civilians who refuse to go are apparently denied promotions, refused desirable jobs, and subjected to harassment by the state security service and the local Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

Communist Party members who refuse to go to Angola can expect to lose their membership, while military personnel have been jailed for refusing. As a result, relatively few Cubans have expressed open opposition to Cuba's Angolan adventure.
<table>
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<th>Contents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Angola-USSR: dos Santos's Visit</td>
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</table>

18 May 1983
ANGOLA-USSR: Dos Santos's Visit

There have been no open signs of disagreement during Angolan President dos Santos's current visit to Moscow, but the Soviets seem concerned about maintaining their influence in Luanda.

This is the Angolan leader's first working visit to the USSR since 1979. It has included a personal meeting with General Secretary Andropov and discussions with other key officials.

A party-to-party cooperation accord and a cultural and scientific agreement have been signed. Although the Soviets have not made an explicit public pledge of increased military or economic support, Andropov did promise "further support" to defending Angolan independence.

Comment: The Soviets apparently have warned the Angolans against developing ties with the US and other Western countries or taking part in the US-sponsored diplomatic Initiative on Namibia. Premier Tikhonov, at a dinner for dos Santos on Monday, warned that the US was using all available leverage to achieve the ultimate aim of toppling the Marxist regime in Angola. Dos Santos responded by praising Soviet military and economic assistance to Angola and criticizing US efforts to link Cuban troop withdrawals to a settlement on Namibia.

Moscow almost certainly will seek to link new aid to Luanda's firmness on Namibia and the Cuban withdrawal issue. There has been no suggestion to date, however, that Moscow is resorting to pressure tactics...
SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

86 201006B ASO TOT: J00803Q AUG 06 DIRECTOR 036517

MEB 86-203

SUBJECT: MEA BRIEF OCPAS MEA 86-203 FOR 30 AUGUST 1986.
FROM: DD1/O/CPAS
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1. ANGOLA-CUBA: CUBAN FORCES INCREASING SUPPORT

1. ANGOLA-CUBA: CUBAN FORCES INCREASING SUPPORT ROLE

THEIR FORCES IN KAMBILA NO THEY CAN BETTER SUPPORT ANGOLAN ARMY

SECRET

0491

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
SECRET

COMMENT: THE REDEPLOYED CUBAN UNITS WILL PROBABLY BE USED TO GUARD ANGOLAN GARRISONS AND TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE COVER FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S COMBAT OPERATIONS.

entarios will be able to concentrate on escorting government convoys and conducting counterinsurgency sweeps. These developments will allow Luanda to strengthen its forces fighting near Muhango and Cuuto Cuanaule.

1.

2.

3.
Latin America Review

20 October 1982
Cuban Chronology

September 1982

1 September
Havana press announces that close to 12,000 children from Nicaragua, PDRY, and 10 African countries will study on the Isle of Youth, 2,000 more than last year.

Cuban authorities request their main Western bank creditors to defer repayments for up to 10 years on the principal due on its hard currency foreign debt of $3 billion.

3 September
In an article in Foreign Policy Magazine, former chief of the US Interests Section in Havana, Wayne Smith, accuses the US of ignoring Cuban desires for a political settlement in Central America.

4 September
La Prensa Grafica in San Salvador reports that Cuba's interference with US radio stations is being heard in El Salvador on various medium-wave frequencies from very-high-powered transmitters.

5 September
Two US broadcasters, owners of the Quality Media Corporation of Columbus, Georgia, begin building their own radio station on South Caicos Island to beam news to Cuba.

7 September
Foreign Minister Malmierca tells newsmen in Manila that Cuba had encountered a "noncooperative attitude" from the US in the past when it attempted to normalize diplomatic relations.

USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolechev discusses trade and economic ties in Moscow with Cuban National Bank President Raúl Leon and Foreign Trade Minister Cabreras.

9 September
Foreign Trade Minister Cabreras arrives in Tokyo and meets with Shintaro Abe, International Trade and Industry Minister.

Acting Foreign Minister Viera and Grenadian Foreign Minister Unison White- man sign a bilateral air services agreement.

10 September
Pelotiburo member Jorge Risquet and his delegation arrive in Maputo to discuss economic cooperation with Mozambican leaders.

11 September
Foreign Minister Malmierca, the first Cuban Foreign Minister to visit Japan, arrives in Osaka; he tours Kyoto on 12 September and Hiroshima on 14 September.
12 September
Angolan President dos Santos, speaking at a rally in Huambo, says that Cuban troop contingents in Angola will be reduced when South African aggression against Angola stops.

13 September
Speaking at a public meeting in Pretoria, South African Prime Minister Botha says that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola precludes any settlement of the South-West Africa/Namibia problem.

16 September
Foreign Trade Minister Cabrita discusses trade, especially in sugar and seafood products, with Japan's Minister of Agriculture Tazawa and meets with the president of the Bank of Japan.

During their meeting in Tokyo, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Sakurada calls on his Cuban counterpart Isidoro Malinierca to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola.

National Bank President León arrives in Paris, where he describes as "positive" the reception given by the French economic authorities to Cuba's proposal to renegotiate its medium-term debt.

17 September
Minister-President of the Cuban State Committee for Technical and Material Supply Irma Sanchez and Argentine Foreign Minister Lanari sign a trade agreement covering agricultural foodstuffs.

21 September
Cuban exile leader Haber Matos tells a press conference in Miami that he plans a 10-station network based in Latin American countries to beam programs to Cuba.

21-25 September
Osmani Cienfuegos, Manuel Pineiro, and Jose Naranjo visit Panama to discuss bilateral relations and the Central American situation with President Ricardo de la Espriella.

22 September
Cuba's UN Ambassador Raul Ros Kouri explains to Latin American members why Havana has requested the inclusion of Puerto Rico on the agenda.

23 September
Luanda press reports that during Angolan party leader Lopo do Nascimento's trip to Cuba, he visited several agricultural complexes, industrial centers, and educational institutions.

24 September
The UN General Assembly defeats a Cuban attempt to include the question of Puerto Rico on its agenda as a colonial issue.

27 September
Angolan party leader Lopo do Nascimento and Hector Rodriguez Llopart sign mutual aid agreements on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

29 September
During meetings in Havana, Lopo do Nascimento says, "There is no relation between the independence of Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola."
SECRET

TO: MEA BRIEF.

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF OCPAS MEA 90-012 FOR 16 JANUARY 1980.
FROM: OD1/O/CPAS.

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2. USSR: ASSESSING ADHERENCE TO NAMIBIAN ACCORDS
3. 
4. IN BRIEF

SECRET
2. USSR: ASSESSING ADHERENCE TO NAMIBIAN ACCORDS

THE SOVIET, CUBAN, AND ANGOLAN MILITARY CHIEFS OF STAFF MET IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK TO ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA. A SOVIET COMMENTARY ON THE MEETING NOTED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS GENERALLY MET ITS OBLIGATIONS TO STOP MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UNITA AND LET THE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE PROCESS GO FORWARD. THE COMMENTATOR CONTRASTED SOUTH AFRICAN BEHAVIOR WITH THAT OF THE US, WHICH HE SAID HAD INCREASED ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE ANGOLAN REBELS. A SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENIED US ALLEGATIONS THAT SOVIET ADVISERS HAVE A COMBAT ROLE IN THE CURRENT ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AND CALLED CONTINUING US MILITARY AID TO UNITA THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A SETTLEMENT IN ANGOLA.

COMMENT: THE MEETINGS IN MOSCOW ALMOST CERTAINLY INVOLVED DISCUSSIONS OF THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AS WELL AS THE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. IN PORTRAYING THE US AS THE PRIMARY STUMBLINGBLOCK TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN ANGOLA, MOSCOW IS PARTLY SHOWING PIQUE WITH US ALLEGATIONS OF A SOVIET COMBAT ROLE AND CONTINUED INTEREST IN GRADUALLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

4. IN BRIEF
3. USSR - SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: SOVIET WARNINGS

SOVIET PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WARNINGS TO PRETORIA AGAINST MILITARY ACTION IN ANGOLA UNDERSCORE MOSCOW'S GROWING SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME IN LUANDA.

AN AUTHORITY TASS STATEMENT ACCUSES SOUTH AFRICA OF TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT. MOSCOW 'RESOLUTELY DEMANDS' THAT PRETORIA HALT ITS MILITARY ACTION AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM THE AREA IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA THAT IT OCCUPIES AS A BUFFER FOR NAMIBIA. THE STATEMENT DOES NOT THREATEN ANY SOVIET ACTION BUT CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA.

AN UNUSUAL PRIVATE WARNING TO SOUTH AFRICA IN NOVEMBER, REVEALED BY PRETORIA ON WEDNESDAY, HAD CITED THE USSR-ANGOLA TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. THE SOVIETS SAID MOSCOW WOULD GIVE LUANDA ALL THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO PROTECT ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. RECENT PRESS COMMENTARIES HAVE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE USSR 'WILL NOT LEAVE THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE IN THEIR TIME OF TROUBLE.'

COMMENT: THESE WARNINGS REFLECT SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN ANGOLA. MOSCOW AND HAVANA HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DELIVERIES OF MILITARY AID FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENSE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS AND SOUTH AFRICAN -BACKED GUERRILLAS. THE TASS STATEMENT, WHICH WAS PROMOTED BY THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN OFFENSIVE IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, PROBABLY WAS AUTHORIZED BEFORE PRETORIA REVEALED THE PRIVATE SOVIET APPROACH.

THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND THEIR MILITARY DELIVERIES FURTHER AND PERHAPS TO ENDORSE SENDING ADDITIONAL CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS. EVERETELESS, MOSCOW PROBABLY IS WORRIED ABOUT THE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE LUANDA REGIME AND ABOUT THE INCREASING COST OF SUPPORTING IT. THE SOVIETS ALREADY FLY LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN ANGOLA, BUT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO ASSUME A DIRECT COMBAT ROLE. CUBANS CAN OPERATE THE MOST ADVANCED SOVIET WEAPONS LIKELY TO BE NEEDED IN ANGOLA.
THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN OFFENSIVE CAME AFTER THE PRIVATE SOVIET WARNING IN NOVEMBER. PRETORIA IS UNLIKELY TO BE INTIMIDATED BY THE SOVIET WARNING YESTERDAY.

END OF MESSAGE
MARKED INCREASE IN THE FORCE GARRISONED AT MENONGUE. THE GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS IN THE SOUTHEAST.

//TRANSPORTATION LINKS TO MENONGUE HAVE BEEN IMPROVED AND SECURED. THE RAILWAY FROM MOÇANDEZ TO MENONGUE REPORTEDLY IS OPEN TO CUCHI WHERE CARGO IS TRANSFERRED TO TRUCKS.

//NUMEROUS VILLAGES IN THE REGION HAVE BEEN ABANDONED AND SOME HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE FORTIFIED TOWNS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED ALONG THE MAIN ROAD NORTH FROM MENONGUE AND ALONG THE RAILWAY ARE PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENT UNITS.

COMMENTS //THOSE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE ANGOLANS, WITH CUBAN SUPPORT, HAVE STRENGTHENED THE DEFENSES OF MENONGUE AND HAVE Laid THE GROUNDWORK FOR GOVERNMENT OFFENSIVES.

//CUBAN TROOPS ARE LIKELY TO PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN FUTURE OPERATIONS. AT LEAST, ONE OF THE BRIGADES IN MENONGUE PROBABLY IS CUBAN. INCREASES IN CUBAN MEDICAL EVACUATION FLIGHTS FROM THE SOUTH DURING THE SUMMER INDICATE THE CUBANS HAVE ALREADY PARTICIPATED IN CONFLICT.

//ONE TARGET IN THE UNITA AREA MAY BE MAVINGA, WHICH IS THE LARGEST TOWN HELD BY THE INSURGENTS. IF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH SERIOUSLY THREATEN UNITA-HELD TERRITORY OR MOVE CLOSER TO THE NAMIBIAN BORDER, SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES MIGHT REACT.

SECRET
MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF OPAS MEAS 83-082 FOR 11 MAY

FROM:   DDI/D/OPAS.

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1. SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: MILITARY ACTIVITY

2. SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: MILITARY ACTIVITY

//THE SOUTH AFRICANS CONTINUE TO MOVE THEIR FORCES NORTHWARD IN NAMIBIA AND COULD HAVE AS MANY AS 3,500 MEN IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. A SMALL MECHANIZED INFANTRY AND ANTI-TANK UNIT AND A LARGE SUPPLY CONVOY OF ABOUT 50 TRUCKS HEADING NORTH FROM OMADEGA. A MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION WAS SEEN AT CALUQUE, AN IMPORTANT CROSSING POINT OVER THE CUNENE RIVER. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SAY THAT DEFENSE MINISTER MALAN, WHO WAS IN NAMIBIA LAST WEEK, WAS OVERSEEING OPERATIONS IN THE CUNILEA AREA AGAINST SWAPO GUERRILLAS.

COMMENT: //PRETORIA'S REPEATED ALLEGATIONS OF A NEW SWAPO ATTACK AND A RECENT ANGOLAN-CUBAN BUILDPUP IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE NOW CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DEEP INTO ANGOLA WITH LITTLE WARNING. ALTHOUGH AN INCURSION COULD ALREADY BE UNDER WAY, THE MIRAGE FIGHTER-BOMBER'S THAT NORMALLY WOULD PROVIDE AIR COVER STILL HAVE NOT BEEN SEEN IN NAMIBIA.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Attached is the data you requested on Soviet-Cuban activities in selected African countries for the Director's NSC Briefing. If you have further questions please contact Office of Economic Research

Attachment
As stated: ER M 78-10635

Date 25 September 1978

Distribution: ER M 78-10635
Orig. -- Addressed
1 -- CH/D/S
1 -- D/OER, DD/OER, EXO/ER
1 -- PPG
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1 --
2 -- S/TA

(25 September 1978)
Angola

Military

I. Angola has become Moscow's second-largest (after Ethiopia) arms client in sub-Saharan Africa.

A. Since Angola's independence in 1975, Moscow has agreed to provide over $300 million in arms, including large quantities of sophisticated ground, air, and naval equipment.

B. Deliveries have included over 30 MIG fighters, almost 200 tanks, and surface-to-air missiles.

II. During the same period, Cuba has provided some $160 million worth of arms, mainly Soviet-made ground equipment.

III. Soviet and Cuban military personnel in Angola now total about 20,000.

A. The number of Soviets -- who mainly oversee training given by Cubans and perform logistic functions -- doubled last spring to about 1,000.

B. The most important function of the 19,000 Cuban troops -- about the level maintained since mid-1977 -- is to fight with Angolan troops against insurgent forces, although they also perform maintenance and training functions.
Economic

I. Angola has not benefited greatly from its economic relations with the USSR or Cuba.

A. Since Angola's independence, the USSR has committed only about $11 million in aid funds to Luanda, mostly for agriculture, education, and public health projects.

B. In 1976, Cuba signed a general economic agreement to assist fishing, construction, education, public health, and agriculture.

C. The only significant ongoing Cuban-Soviet development program is in fishing, where Soviet and Cuban trawlers operate in Angolan waters.

II. Technical services remain the bulwark of Soviet and Cuban support to Angola.

A. At least 300 Soviet technicians are serving in Angola as doctors, teachers, geologists, and economic advisers. Soviets reportedly are taking over important Angolan ministry positions from Cubans.

B. At least 7,200 Cuban technicians are working in housing, transportation, rural development, public health, and education.

III. Communist technicians have been unable to stem the deterioration in the Angolan economy resulting from the departure of 400-500,000 Portuguese.
Military

I. Moscow became Mozambique's major arms supplier following independence in June 1975.

A. Under arms agreements totalling more than $60 million concluded during 1975-1977, the Soviets have delivered over 100 medium tanks, large numbers of heavy artillery, and surface-to-air missiles.

B. Moscow also has channeled large amounts of arms to Rhodesian guerrillas through Mozambique.

II. More than 200 Soviet and as many as 600 Cuban military advisors now are in Mozambique.

A. The largest buildup in the Soviet presence occurred in 1977, when over 150 advisors were sent mainly to support Mozambican units on the Rhodesian border.

B. Most Cuban personnel are advisers, instructors, and technical specialists to the Mozambican army, although 100 troops arrived from Ethiopia in mid-September to strengthen border defenses.
Economic

I. Mozambique's economic ties with the USSR and Cuba have been distinctly secondary to the military relationship.
   A. Little of Moscow's $52 million in economic assistance has been disbursed and a fishing program is the only active project.

II. Technical services, largely in administrative and technical jobs vacated by the Portuguese, comprise Moscow's and Havana's most important economic programs.
   A. An estimated 300 Soviet experts are employed in Mozambique as doctors, teachers, geologists, and in other fields.
   B. Cuba has sent 300-350 civilian personnel to assist in fisheries, public health, education, and construction.
Military

I. In 1974, Tanzania shifted to the USSR from China as its main supplier of military equipment.
   A. Agreements since then have totalled well over $300 million.
   B. Delivered equipment includes sub-Saharan Africa's first SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missile systems and MIG-21 jet fighters.
   C. Tanzania also is an important conduit for Soviet arms deliveries to Rhodesian insurgents.

II. About 120 Soviet military personnel are now in Tanzania, down from 200 last year.
   A. The number of Soviets, however, is expected to grow soon as more SA-6 equipment is delivered.
   B. There presently are no Cuban military personnel in Tanzania.
Economic

I. The Soviet economic program in Tanzania has never been important even though a new Soviet credit of $18 million last year brought total pledges to nearly $40 million.

A. Only about $8 million, for a few small rural projects, has been delivered.

B. About 100 Soviet economic personnel were present in 1977, half of them teachers and doctors.

II. Cuba, as a result of agreements concluded in 1974, has been more active in Tanzania than the USSR.

A. Havana has sent about 350 technicians free of charge to work in agriculture, public health, and education. In addition, the Cubans have provided about $15 million worth of equipment and materials, probably as a grant.
Weekly Review
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorates of Science and Technology.

Contents

October 13, 1976

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Review.
ANGOLA - USSR

The USSR gave an enthusiastic welcome to Angolan President Agostinho Neto last week during the African leader’s first trip to the Soviet Union since the establishment of his government. The visit was highlighted by the signing of a 20-year friendship and cooperation treaty. The victory of Neto’s Popular Movement in Angola’s civil war was one of Moscow’s most visible foreign policy successes in the past few years. By further cementing their ties with Neto, who recently joined the ranks of the “front-line” black African leaders, the Soviets hope to expand their influence in postwar Angola as well as among the southern African national liberationists, especially in Namibia.

General Secretary Brezhnev, at a dinner in Neto’s honor, underlined the Soviet Union’s continuing support to the liberationists when he gave Moscow’s most authoritative criticism of those who “are attempting to substitute a fictitious liberation...for a true one.”

The Soviet Union has concluded “friendship” treaties with only a few third-world countries—India, Egypt, Iraq, and Somalia. The text of the Angolan treaty resembles the format and substance of the other treaties, outlining a commitment to cooperate in a wide variety of fields, including defense.

The treaty provides for the strengthening of military cooperation—implying continued Soviet military aid. Under this clause, the Soviets could try to gain access to military facilities in Angola, but we doubt Neto would agree. Indeed Neto turned down a Soviet request to establish “bases” in Angola.

Neto’s talks in Moscow apparently focused on party ties and the needs of Angola’s economy. At the end of Neto’s stay, the Soviets announced the signing of a cooperation agreement between the Popular Movement and the Soviet Communist Party as well as a protocol to an economic and technical cooperation agreement concluded during Prime Minister Nsasimento’s visit last May. The Angolans seem anxious to see the USSR play a greater role in their economic development, but Angola needs access to the West if it is to benefit fully from its oil, agricultural, and mineral resources.

Neither side mentioned it, but Neto probably extended a personal invitation to his Soviet hosts to attend the first anniversary celebration of Angola’s independence on November 11. Should a top Soviet leader attend, he would be the first high-ranking Soviet to visit a southern African country.

WEEKLY REVIEW Oct 15, 76
ANGOLA

The Neto government is carrying out military operations against National Union insurgents in southern Angola near the Namibian border. Government forces are being supported by Cubans and apparently also by some guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization.

The operations sparked serious unrest late last month among the population on the Angolan side of the border between Calqueque and Pereira de Eca.

The Angolans, however, disputed news stories in the South African media indicating that the operations have resulted in widespread killing of innocent persons.

The South African government confirmed in late September that construction has been suspended at two key points—Calqueque and Ruacana—of the joint Angolan-South African Cunene hydroelectric project. Work at Calqueque was halted at the request of the Angolan government.

The Angolan-Namibian border area is likely to become the scene of increasing military activity in the months ahead. The Neto regime is anxious to extend its authority to the border and, with Cuban help, has established a number of garrisons in the area.

SWAPO would like to step up its incursions into Namibia from Angola, especially now that South Africa's control over the territory is attracting international attention. Until recently, SWAPO conducted its limited guerrilla operations mainly from Zambia.

The South Africans, who have been concerned over the border area for some time, apparently believe the present operations in Angola are designed to provide support for future SWAPO incursions into Namibia.

South African military officials offered the National Union military supplies if it would resume military operations against the Popular Movement and Cuban forces in the border area. National Union president Jonas Savimbi is said to be studying the South African proposal.

South African forces have apparently been carrying on limited operations of their own in southern Angola with the assistance of anti-Neto Angolans. Neto's forces captured a South African soldier and three Angolans in southeastern Angola in late August.
Latin America

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Secret

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RP ALA 77-036
10 May 1977

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Cuba: The Campaign in Southern Angola*

The Cubans encountered natural obstacles which hampered their mobility and forced them to move equipment in stages, not all at once. Roads running through dense jungle were narrow, and the breakdown of a single vehicle would have been sufficient to halt an entire column. The columns drove south day and night with no resistance from UNITA or South African forces.

Cuban forces occasionally used existing railway lines for some of their movements. For example, two trains transported the 1,200-man reinforced regiment from Lobito to Huambo. We believe that Cuban troops used railways only in areas they considered relatively safe from ambush.

Cuban forces also experienced equipment breakdowns throughout the campaign. The unit lost 8 of its 24 T-34 tanks due to equipment failures. The unit could not perform major repairs on the tanks and had to ship them to Luanda for this purpose. While supply was seldom a problem in Cuba, it was a "disaster" in Angola. Unit anticipated getting Soviet vehicles early in the campaign in southern Angola, but they never arrived.

Cubans and Angolans sometimes participated in joint operations, but we do not believe this cooperation was widespread. A joint group of MPLA forces and a Cuban transportation unit was formed.

*Listed in contents but not included in Latin America
RP ALA 77-035, 5 May 1977.

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to provide added mobility for a Cuban infantry unit. In addition, the major striking force in the southern campaign was composed of a joint Cuban-MPLA unit to seize the Cunene Dam—then in South African hands. Nevertheless, Cuban forces were largely contemptuous of the fighting capabilities of MPLA troops and avoided contact with them.

The Cuban general staff in Luanda planned a major offensive against the South Africans to capture the Cunene hydroelectric dam in late March 1976, using MIGs for close air support as well as an armored division and the reinforced regiment. The planned operation against the South Africans, however, never occurred. Cuban troops became preoccupied with some 1,200 local UNITA guerrillas, and the South Africans evacuated the Cunene Dam on about April 6.

The South Africans evacuated the area after reaching an agreement with the Cubans and Angolans that South Africa would still have access to the hydroelectric project. The South Africans apparently were concerned that local military action would damage the Cunene Dam, and they faced mounting diplomatic pressure to withdraw their forces.

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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7 April 1977

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Castro's Trip and Its Implications

Fidel Castro's activities during his month-long trip to the Middle East and Africa have a number of implications for the likely direction of Cuba's foreign policy during the next two years:

--The Cuban leader is intent upon expanding Cuba's influence in this region, particularly in the Horn of Africa, among the front-line nations, and in the guerrilla campaign against Rhodesia and South Africa.

--Africa will be the key element in his effort to achieve recognition as a principal leader of the nonaligned movement before its next summit conference in Havana in 1979.

--Cuba's presence in Africa is commensurate with Cuban objectives, even though a number of Castro's actions in the region have almost certainly been
undertaken on Moscow's behalf and with Moscow's cooperation. Castro hopes his efforts will give him greater influence with the Soviets.

--Castro remains interested in improved relations with the US but will not restrict Cuban support for leftist governments or liberation movements in order to achieve a rapprochement.

--As the process of normalizing relations with the US progresses, Castro will feel compelled to continue, or perhaps even increase, an aggressive foreign policy or risk damaging his revolutionary credentials.

Castro's trip enabled him to make a personal assessment of the political situation in the region and to ascertain attitudes toward Cuban assistance. It permitted him to assure the region's leaders that Cuban actions will be in concert with their own policy goals. Finally, it enabled Castro to enhance his public image as a major Third World statesman.

Castro's tour took him to Algeria (twice), Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola (see map). After leaving Africa, he traveled to East Germany and the USSR. His first stop in Algeria was very brief, apparently little more than a refueling stop. During his second stop in Algiers, he and President Boumediene probably discussed the results of Castro's travels, as well as their plans for this week's nonaligned meeting in New Delhi.

Castro's lengthy stay (10 days) in Libya showed that the old wounds caused by Qadhafi's criticism of Castro during the 1973 Nonaligned Conference have healed. Castro agreed to a Qadhafi request to send about 1,000 Cuban military technicians to Libya. We believe many of these Cubans will provide training for Libya's armed forces, which cannot man or maintain their vast quantities of Soviet-supplied military equipment. Some may also advise Qadhafi's personal bodyguard force.

Castro and Qadhafi probably explored ways to coordinate their assistance to Ethiopia in its struggle against
separatist guerrilla forces. There is evidence that Cuba is prepared to provide Ethiopia with some form of military assistance. A high-level Cuban military officer, who is noted for arranging Cuban military assistance programs, visited Ethiopia from February 20-28.

Castro's objectives during his visit to the Horn of Africa were:

--To reduce the hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia and to prevent the latter from being won over by the moderate Arab nations.

--To assist the Ethiopian government in its struggle against Eritrean guerrillas.

Castro was able to arrange a meeting between Ethiopian leader Mengistu and Somali President Siad in Aden on March 17. Attempts by Castro and South Yemeni President Ali to promote a reconciliation reportedly were a failure. In fact, the meeting may have done more harm than good. Four days later, Siad publicly attacked Ethiopia for its "continued colonization of Somali territory," his first public mention of the issue for some time.

Although there is no firm evidence the Cuban leader was acting at Soviet behest in this matter, his efforts were clearly in line with Soviet policy objectives. Recent Soviet efforts to assist Ethiopia have upset the Somalis. Following the abortive meeting in Aden, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the number three man in the Cuban leadership, flew to Moscow to meet with General Secretary Brezhnev. Rodriguez, who had accompanied Fidel on the first part of his tour, presumably briefed the Soviet leaders on the results of Castro's efforts.

It seems highly likely that the Cubans will send some form of assistance to Ethiopia, probably military and civilian advisors.
The main purpose of Castro's visits to Tanzania and Mozambique was most probably to explore options for Cuban assistance to the guerrilla organizations operating against Rhodesia and South Africa. Castro is aware that African leaders, particularly Tanzanian President Nyerere, are opposed to the presence of foreign troops. The Cuban leader probably raised other alternatives such as military training, technical or medical assistance, and propaganda support. A few Cubans have reportedly been sent to Tanzania to train members of the Zimbabwe People's Army, the principal black Rhodesian insurgent group.

Castro's last stop in southern Africa was in Angola. His talks with President Neto certainly included the continuing insurgency problem. Cuban troops, together with Angolan soldiers, have sustained substantial casualties over the past year but have made little headway in reducing guerrilla activity. The two leaders also discussed the progress of Cuba's extensive nonmilitary assistance programs in Angola. Havana is deeply committed to the Angolan struggle and will go to great lengths to help guarantee the survival and consolidation of the Neto government.

Castro publicly raised the Angolan factor in US-Cuban relations during a speech on March 27. He declared that he would reject any attempt by the US to include Cuba's military and civilian aid to Angola as a subject of negotiation. Although his remarks were partly intended to reassure the Angolans, his statement was clearly aimed at Washington.

While in Angola, Castro met with the three leaders of the guerrilla organizations fighting against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia immediately after their talks with Soviet President Podgorny in Lusaka, Zambia. One of the leaders, Sam Nujoma of the South West African People's Organization, told the press on April 1 that Castro had promised "material assistance" to all three leaders.

Although final decisions concerning the nature and level of Cuba's future activities in Africa and the Middle East will not be made until after Castro's return to Havana, an increase in Cuban efforts during the next two years seems assured.
The WEEKLY REVIEW issued every Friday morning by the Current Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence, and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA

The Angolan government's inability to deal with a worsening economic and military situation has aggravated ideological and ethnic divisions within the ruling party and apparently has helped prompt Cuba to send more troops.

At a major political rally in Luanda last week, President Neto denounced those who were creating splits within the ruling Popular Movement and announced that Nito Alves, a leading black radical and an outspoken critic of Neto, would be ousted from the party along with four other members of the party's central committee.

Neto had dropped Alves from his cabinet last December in a move to strengthen his control of the Popular Movement; Alves' ouster from the party is probably designed to strengthen the President's hand in dealing with the
party’s black radicals. Alves has a substantial following among blacks in the military and with unemployed black Angolans. There is widespread support for Alves’ contention that blacks are not represented adequately at the upper levels of the government and the party.

Cuba, which last month reportedly suspended the gradual reduction of its combat troops in Angola, may now be increasing its military presence there. The Cubans probably are motivated by the Neto government’s inability to suppress insurgent groups in southern Angola and the Cabinda exclave, as well as by the continued success of Zairian and Moroccan forces against the Katangans who invaded Zaire from Angola.
Weekly Review
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June 3, 1977

2 Africa
Angola:

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA

The abortive coup last week against President Neto reflects rising discontent in Angola over deteriorating economic and social conditions, corruption, and political repression. Factions in both the ruling party and the military are considering further moves against Neto.

In the coup attempt, dissidents loyal to former interior minister Nito Alves attacked the presidential palace and army headquarters and freed Alves and another dissident leader, former armed forces chief Jose van Dunem, from prison. They also seized control of Radio Luanda for several hours and proclaimed the installation of a "revolutionary dictatorship of the exploited classes."

According to press reports, more than 100 people were killed as government troops put down the rebellion, and hundreds more have been arrested. The government announced that the dissidents
killed the finance minister, four other members of the central committee of the ruling Popular Movement, and a senior official of the internal security forces. Alves and van Dunem, who were jailed after Neto dropped them from the central committee last month, apparently escaped.

There are some indications that Cuban troops participated in the recapture of the radio station and in patrolling the city afterward. There is no firm evidence, however, of either Cuban or Soviet involvement.

Alves' faction has been critical of Neto's go-slow approach toward converting Angola into a radical socialist state ever since early 1976, when the Popular Movement gained control of Angola. Alves also contends that blacks are underrepresented at the upper levels of the regime, an attitude that has won substantial support among black radicals in the army and unemployed blacks in the slums of Luanda.

The Alves faction may now seek allies among other dissidents in the military and the party.

representatives have approached members of the Active Revolt, a more moderate dissident group within the Popular Movement whose supporters are among the better-educated members of the party.

The Active Revolt has been gaining strength in recent months, and many believe it is the only workable alternative to the Neto government. The Active Revolt may have disseminated anti-Neto pamphlets that appeared in Luanda in April.

Members of the Active Revolt charge that corruption has become a way of life among top party leaders, including Neto, and that the government is torturing political prisoners. They hope to open an exterior branch to publicize these conditions and seek support from moderate African states such as Senegal and Ivory Coast.

Dissatisfaction with the Neto regime is also growing in the upper ranks of the military.

many senior officers resent the fact that people who were not involved in the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese received high government positions. They would also like to rid the government of those said to be guilty of blatant corruption and of alleged crimes against the Angolan people committed during the guerrilla struggle.

These officers resent what they see as Cuban domination of most civilian and military command positions. The Cuban refusal to fight antigovernment insurgents, except in Cabinda, has added to the friction. The dissident military officials reportedly would like to move against Neto and are willing to ally themselves with the Active Revolt or with Alves' faction.

Insurgent Gains

The Neto government is also under severe strain in the south from the insurgent National Union forces of Jonas Savimbi. Recent reports indicate that the guerrillas have succeeded in their strategy of isolating population centers and disrupting the movement of food supplies.

venture out on patrol for fear of ambush. The lack of Cuban support has angered and demoralized government troops, and incidents between Angolans and Cuban soldiers are reportedly on the increase.
Latin America Review

18 May 1984

Cuba: Trying To Exploit the Hamebo Incident

Havana's media treatment of the recent bombing of a Cuban workers' habitation in Angola indicates the leadership is trying to deflect domestic criticism of its international involvement and focus resentment on the United States.
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.

Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Cuba: Trying To Exploit
the Huambo Incident

Antigovernment guerrillas detonated a bomb in Huambo, Angola, near a building housing Cuban “internationalist” workers on 19 April, destroying the building and causing many casualties. The Cuban media ignored the incident until six days later when the party’s daily newspaper, in an unprecedented display of candor about casualties in Angola, announced that the blast had killed 14 Cuban civilians and wounded 66 others. The unusual decision to go public with the casualty list, undoubtedly made by President Castro himself, solaced our belief that Cuban losses overseas have become a major public concern and that the Castro regime realizes the subject can no longer be swept under the rug.

Havana probably had several aims, the most important of which was preventing a recurrence of the public dismay in many parts of Cuba in the days immediately after the invasion of Grenada last October. The initial confusion over what was going on, fed by news stories about fierce fighting, led many Cubans to believe that the entire Cuban contingent there had been wiped out. The Grenada experience sensitized the Cuban public to the human cost of Cuba’s overseas activities.

The announcement of the Huambo casualties also was intended to deflect popular criticism from the Cuban leadership and focus it on the regime’s main enemy, Washington. During the Grenada invasion, significant public hostility in Cuba was directed not so much at the invading forces as at Havana for not withdrawing the civilians when it became clear an invasion was imminent and for ordering a fight to the death. At the time, a group of Cubans reportedly tried to hold a demonstration in Havana calling for the withdrawal of all Cubans from Grenada and Nicaragua, but it was dispersed quickly by authorities. Havana wanted no repetition of such activities and saw the United States as a convenient scapegoat, accusing it of responsibility for the Huambo incident.

Moreover, Havana wanted to dispel any impression that it had suffered a military defeat in Angola. The armed forces are still smarting from the blow to their image wrought by the Grenada experience and want no further diminution of their prestige, especially when there is persistent talk in the international press of a possible withdrawal from Angola. Havana’s announcement was careful to note that all of the Cuban casualties were civilian workers in construction, education, and public health, thus helping the Castro regime to portray the incident as an atrocity rather than a military defeat.

In addition, Havana probably hoped that giving publicity to the bombing would help to maintain a warlike atmosphere in Cuba and generate popular support for the military preparations the leadership believes are necessary if the United States is to be deterred from intervention. Judging from statements by the Cuban leaders, Havana assesses the US threat to be greater now than at any time since 1962 and believes its best defense lies in convincing Washington that an invasion would cause too many casualties to justify.

In taking its case against the United States to international public opinion through the media and by means of a protest to the United Nations, Havana appears to believe it has an opportunity to detract from whatever international prestige may accrue to the United States as a result of Washington’s longstanding effort to bring peace to southern Africa. Havana does not want openly to oppose negotiations that seem to be improving chances for a peaceful settlement in the region, but neither does it want Washington to get credit if the talks prove successful. By attributing the Huambo disaster to the CIA, it hopes to equate the United States with violence. In fact, many in the Cuban leadership may have convinced themselves that the United States did indeed engineer the attack.
Many Cubans probably will accept the government's explanation of the bombing as a US plot, but they nevertheless are likely to question the need for risking noncombatants on a mission that has no apparent connection to Cuba's vital interests. Whatever increased antipathy toward the United States is aroused probably will be matched by a heightened fear of volunteering for service abroad. Cuban workers, with Grenada and Huambo on their minds, are likely to avoid projects in countries harboring active insurgencies.

The Castro regime's sensitivity to the Huambo incident is certain to be reflected in increased security measures wherever large numbers of Cubans are stationed abroad. Havana probably sees groups of Cubans housed together as particularly vulnerable and requiring special protection. Security was tightened in some Cuban enclaves abroad after the Grenada intervention last October, and new restrictions are likely to cause alarm among Cubans on internationalist duty. Havana, however, cannot afford another incident in which it must justify further casualties to the people at home.
CONTENTS

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May 20, 1977

17 Angola: Severe Problems for Neto

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly.
President Neto's regime has made little progress in easing Angola's severe economic and social problems and remains heavily dependent on its Cuban and Soviet supporters to help run the government and contain the threat from several insurgent groups.

Angola: Severe Problems for Neto

Angolan President Agostinho Neto has made little progress in resolving the political, economic, and racial problems that beset his regime. Although Neto's personal popularity remains high, his government has come under increasing attack for its failure to deal effectively with a worsening economic situation—including a critical food shortage. The high level of Cuban, Soviet, and East European involvement in Angola is also causing increased public dissatisfaction, but Neto cannot afford to reduce their presence given the growing threat from insurgent forces in widely scattered parts of the country.

Neto enjoys the full support of the central committee of his Popular Movement party and is in firm command of the government. Rivalries exist, however, at lower levels between advocates of a Marxist state closely aligned with the USSR and Cuba and other party members who want to preserve and strengthen Angola's ties with the West. Although Neto himself would like to improve relations with the West, he is almost totally dependent on the USSR and Cuba for economic and military aid. He has been reluctant to take any action that would jeopardize their support.

Neto's opponents within the regime, notably former minister of interior Nito Alves, continue to accuse him of giving the most important government jobs to Europeans and mulattos at the expense of black Africans. The Soviets also are pressing him to integrate Angolans of all regional and racial backgrounds into his government. Neto has strongly resisted moving in either direction because he believes such action would weaken his control.

Economic stagnation poses a more immediate concern. Oil exports from production in Cabinda by Gulf Oil Corporation are Angola's only significant source of income. Unemployment is high, yet many small factories are closed because of a serious shortage of skilled and semiskilled labor.

80 percent of the trucks and buses recently imported are out of commission because of a lack of spare parts and qualified mechanics.

Food and clothing are in extremely short supply in the major cities. Most shops are empty, many restaurants and hotels are closed, and the food shortage in the cities is worse than it was during the 1975 civil war. Pork, beef, and vegetables are scarce, and chicken is only occasionally available. Fish is the main staple and much of it must be imported from Cuba.

Government services in the cities generally have broken down, although electricity is available most of the time. The water is polluted, dysentery is endemic among the poor, and sanitation is almost nonexistent.

The food shortage has been aggravated by the activities of Jonas Savimbi's National Union guerrillas. In early March, Savimbi began a campaign to disrupt the supply of food to the major population centers in the hope that this would force Neto to seek an accommodation with the Union. The insurgents' plan is to concentrate attacks on farms and transport facilities managed principally by Cubans. The attacks are to be stepped up during the summer harvest season.

The Cubans, citing the growing political unrest that the food shortage has caused in the major cities, are pushing the Angolans to concentrate on achieving self-sufficiency in food production. Cubans in Angola now must import much of their own food, and they would like to reduce these costs considerably by getting more locally produced food.

The National Union forces reportedly have decided to step up their campaign to isolate the eastern and central regions of Angola from each other and the coast. Special sabotage units have been sent out to destroy as many bridges on the Benguela railroad as possible and to attack the main roads and rail lines connecting Mocamedes and Benguela with the interior. In the past, the guerrillas had sought to avoid destroying fixed installations or taking measures that would seriously affect the civilian population.

In his May Day speech, Neto admitted that guerrilla efforts had severely hurt the economy and contributed to splits within the government leadership. As a result,
Cuban troops reportedly are now organizing search-and-destroy missions in the guerrilla-dominated regions and are attempting to create a network of "protected hamlets."

Zambian President Kaunda's economic adviser said last month that several of the front-line African leaders have urged Neto to reach an accommodation with Savimbi. They argued that the insurgency has prevented Neto from giving full attention to Angola's economic problems. The front-line leaders hope that an end to the insurgency will bring a reduction in the number of Cuban troops in Angola.

The Zambians have long advocated a negotiated settlement in Angola. The military situation in the exclave of Cabinda is deteriorating. Several Angolan army battalions were reported to have revolted last month. In addition, insurgent forces have mounted several successful raids from bases in Zaire and captured Soviet-made rocket launchers as well as mortars, guns, and ammunition.

On May 1, the Cabinda insurgents announced the formation of a multiracial provisional government on "liberated territory" in the interior. Their efforts to free Cabinda from Angolan rule, however, will probably continue to be frustrated by the sizable Cuban military presence there.

Holden Roberto's National Front guerrillas are keeping up their sporadic attacks on Cuban and Angolan troops in northern Angola. Some fighting in the area, however, has been attributed to renegade Angolan soldiers. There are also reports of friction between Cuban and Angolan troops, stemming in part from the Cubans' lack of interest in actively pursuing the insurgents.

Foreign Assistance

Neto is heavily dependent on other countries for economic assistance and receives substantial economic and technical support from Cuba, the USSR, and several East European and Western states. In his travels—most recently to Yugoslavia, Poland, and Libya—he has continued to push for new aid commitments. It is unlikely, however, that such agreements will contribute much toward resolving Angola's economic difficulties.

Angola now has more foreign advisers than can be effectively integrated into the economy. The continued influx of foreign technicians, moreover, will add to the severe financial strain on the government because many new arrivals expect to be paid half in local currency and half in foreign exchange.

The number of Cuban troops in Angola has not increased, but the total number of Cubans—estimated at 10,000 to 14,500 earlier this year—may have risen. Newly arrived civilians are mostly technicians or advisers, and their presence has become increasingly evident at all
levels of government in Luanda. The Soviets are just as unpopular as the Cubans but are much less numerous and less visible. They prefer to keep to themselves, even in public, and generally avoid mixing with the Cubans or the Angolans.

Dissatisfaction over the Soviet and Cuban presence continues to grow. The Soviets are frequently criticized for being oblivious to African sensibilities, and the image of the Cubans as surrogate colonialists has spread. Although Neto is certainly aware of the problems caused by the presence of the Cubans and Soviets, he cannot afford to reduce their role because of his dependence on them to maintain internal security and keep the government functioning.
Weekly Review
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

9 Angola: Insurgent Activity
Continuing insurgent activity is complicating the Neto government's efforts to restore economic and social order. Living conditions are harsh, and the regime remains dependent on a sizable Cuban troop presence to maintain security.

Angola: Insurgent Activity

Angola's festering insurgency, involving three disparate anti-government groups in widely scattered parts of the country, is complicating efforts by President Agostinho Neto and his Cuban allies to restore economic and social order. Despite substantial foreign economic and technical aid, Neto's government has been unable to reestablish even basic services. Oil is its only significant source of revenue.

Guerrillas belonging to Jonas Savimbi's National Union are interfering with government efforts to reopen the Benguela railroad and are also harassing Cuban and Angolan government troops in the central and southern sections of the country. Guerrillas last month attacked a town in central Angola astride the Benguela rail line and the main east-west road. The Union reportedly plans to isolate the nearby town of Luso and prevent the reopening of the railroad.

The Union was planning a major attack on the city of Huambo early in 1977 so that Savimbi could claim some control over Angolan territory before departing on an overseas trip. Although this seems beyond Union capabilities because of the Cuban military presence in Huambo, these plans are indicative of the guerrillas' aggressive mood.

Other raids have been staged on the railroad farther west, and government units have reported substantial casualties. Union forces also staged raids north of Huambo in December.

Activity in the North

In northern Angola, activity by guerrillas belonging to Holden Roberto's National Front may temporarily increase because Zaire has deported most Front personnel to Angola as part of President Mobutu's policy of reducing his overt support for the Angolan guerrillas and improving his relations with Neto. Front guerrillas were active in December in Uige Province and in the Ambriize area, where government control is tenuous.

In the exclave of Cabinda, guerrillas reportedly had some success in November but have since been denied direct support from Zaire. The Cabindan insurgency has forced Luanda to keep a sizable force of Cuban troops there to protect oil production facilities. Virtually all of Angola's oil deposits are located in Cabinda.

The Neto government still relies on Cuban troops to establish and maintain security throughout the country. Several joint operations have been carried out in the Huambo area and in southern Angola. However, the Cubans are increasingly unhappy because of their high casualty rate and generally poor living conditions.

Cuban Difficulties

In some areas, Cuban troops rarely venture out of their garrisons except in substantial force, and there are reports of increasing friction with Angolan troops because the Cubans are not actively pursuing the insurgents. The Cubans have been particularly hard hit near the Namibia border by National Union guerrillas who are receiving some assistance from the South Africans. Havana is said to be trying to conceal the extent of its casualties so that Cubans will continue to be willing to serve in Angola.

Even considered a reported Nigerian offer to send troops as an alternative. It is unlikely, however, that Nigeria would send troops to fight other blacks in what is essentially an internal Angolan problem.

A number of travelers have commented on the poor quality of Cuban assistance. Many of the technicians are young and inexperienced, and they lack the expertise of Angola's former Portuguese rulers. For example, many Cubans assigned to help re-establish the banking system apparently were drafted from small enterprises or farms and received only a two-week course before coming to Angola. The Angolans themselves reportedly are proving difficult to train for skilled jobs.

The total number of Cuban military and civilian personnel in Angola remains between 12,000 and 15,000, and the government realizes it will have to rely on Cuban or other foreign assistance for a
Living conditions in Angola, which became harsh during the civil war, do not appear to have improved and may even be deteriorating. Severe shortages of food exist in most urban areas as a result of the large-scale abandonment of agriculture by the Portuguese and a near-total breakdown of the transportation system in most areas of the country.

The situation in Luanda may be approaching a critical stage. Large numbers of poor Angolans are being forced to scavenge for food in the countryside,

where subsistence agriculture continues. Street crime and break-ins are widespread. Angolan government troops ostensibly searching for arms reportedly are looting in the slum areas.

A police force is only in the formative stages. As an interim measure, the government reportedly has authorized the establishment of citizens' groups to combat growing lawlessness; this could create additional problems for the regime.

Buses, taxis, and private automobiles are disappearing from the streets of Luanda, as they have in most other Angolan cities, because of the shortage of spare parts. Essential government services are sporadic or nonexistent. The port of Luanda continues to operate relatively smoothly, partly because of Cuban administration and a decline in shipping.

Other cities are probably in worse shape than Luanda, which is the center of Cuban and other foreign assistance. Much of the civilian population of Huambo reportedly has gone into the bush, while the cities in the north and the towns along the Benguela railroad are continually threatened by guerrilla action. The railroad carries government shipments sporadically because of guerrilla activity.

The most stable conditions appear to be in the southern towns of Mocamedes and Lubango, where training activities are remote from guerrilla base areas and the food supply is adequate.

Neto's Position

President Neto moved late last year to consolidate his political control over the Popular Movement and does not now appear to have any meaningful opposition from that quarter. There have been scattered indications that he would like to reduce the level of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola and seek broader Western—including US—assistance.

Because of the insurgency, as well as his policy of supporting Namibian guerrillas, Neto will have to rely on the Cubans for internal security until a trained Angolan army can be established. He will probably be unable to open the door to the West very far.

Top Secret

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Intelligence Checklist

On Friday, five AN-22 heavy transport aircraft flew directly from Conakry, Guinea, to the Angolan capital, Luanda. They unloaded and continued on to Brazzaville, Congo. Some of these aircraft stayed to fly supplies previously airlifted to Brazzaville on to Luanda.

There are no indications that the Soviets plan more flights from the USSR to Africa at this time. We cannot confirm recent press reports from Luanda claiming that 400 Soviet "troops" have arrived there. Some Soviet military advisers and civilian technicians probably will turn up in view of the sizable amounts of materiel Moscow is providing the Popular Movement.

On the military front, forces of the National Union reportedly have captured the railroad town of Teixeira de Sousa. This gives the National Union control over the entire Benguela railroad.

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Intelligence Checklist

In the enclave of Cabinda, the Popular Movement has repelled an invasion launched from Zaire early this month. The forces of a separatist group backed by Zairian President Mobutu have withdrawn after heavy fighting.

An unknown number of Zairian troops who accompanied the separatists apparently are still in Cabinda, and have requested reinforcements from Kinshasa. Mobutu may prefer to hang back for now, however, in view of growing Soviet and Cuban support for the Popular Movement. He may hope that military pressures in Angola proper will eventually force the Movement to withdraw from Cabinda.

The enclave's oil production, entirely from offshore wells operated by Gulf, has not been seriously affected by the military situation. Cabinda's wells provided half of Angola's revenues last year. At current prices, Cabinda's output is worth about $500 million annually.
Intelligence Checklist

December 3, 1975

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Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA: The growing publicity over South African military support for the National Front and the National Union is becoming a liability for the two liberation groups. Many African nations also are seriously concerned about Soviet involvement in Angola, but they view it as a logical extension of long-standing Soviet support for the Popular Movement during the insurgency against Portugal. Their

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Intelligence Checklist

concern over the Soviet role is outweighed by their traditional antipathy toward Pretoria.

Twelve of the 46 member states in the Organization of African Unity now recognize the Popular Movement. Their lobbying for the Movement, combined with continued publicity on the South African presence in Angola, could well convince other African countries to recognize the Movement in the hope that, in the long run, it will prove resistant to Soviet influence.
Intelligence Checklist

November 14, 1975

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Intelligence Checklist

At ANNEX, we discuss the increasing Cuban military support for the Popular Movement.

Should a Committee Member wish to discuss a CHECKLIST item in greater detail or be briefed on any current situation, such a briefing may be arranged by contacting the CIA Office of Legislative Counsel on [ ] Members also are invited to suggest subjects they would like covered in the CHECKLIST.
Intelligence Checklist

CUBA'S MILITARY ROLE IN ANGOLAN WAR HAS GROWN

Some time during the summer, Cuba's leaders apparently decided to take on a major role in the Angolan civil war. The Cubans probably were under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union and the Soviet-supported Popular Movement to become more directly involved.

Cuban assistance to the Popular Movement, which dates back more than a decade, has surged during the past six weeks and the number of Cubans in Angola has risen to perhaps 2,000 men.

The Cubans apparently are, or soon will be, providing heavy-weapons support to front-line forces, manning portions of the defensive lines around Luanda, and piloting Soviet-supplied aircraft. They may be preparing to support a Soviet airlift of supplies directly into Angola now that the Portuguese have left.

At the time the Cuban decision was made to increase its role in Angola, probably in July or August, the prospects for a Popular Movement victory seemed good. The radical leftists in a strong position within the government in Lisbon seemed disposed to hand independence directly to the Popular Movement on November 11, and the Movement had gained a distinct military edge over its two opponents, the National Front and the National Union. Now, largely as a result of foreign support for its rivals, the Popular Movement is on the defensive.

The Cuban Buildup

Contacts made with the Popular Movement probably set the stage for the Cuban decision to increase support. In late July, 42 Cubans reportedly arrived in Congo to help assemble Soviet weapons sent there for the Popular Movement. In August, a Cuban delegation is said to have met with Movement representatives and pledged to increase the number of Cuban military advisers to 200, if that many were needed.

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Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Intelligence Checklist

At about the same time, a group of Cuban "journalists" arrived in Luanda, and the Cuban press began stressing the theme of foreign intervention in Angola by the US, South Africa, and Zaire, and by Portuguese mercenaries bent on defeating the Popular Movement.

The Cuban Role

In Angola, the Cubans appear to be:
--Preparing anti-aircraft defenses in Luanda.
--Staffing a former Portuguese air base.
--Serving as advisers with Popular Movement units in the field.

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Intelligence Checklist

--Providing medical assistance to Popular Movement forces.

They are probably also maintaining and manning weapons and equipment unfamiliar to the Popular Movement troops.

In Congo, the Cubans are:

--Training Popular Movement troops.

--Standing by to pilot MIG fighters that recently arrived in Congo for the Popular Movement.

The Cubans are doubtless working closely with the Soviets in the operation.

It will probably also be the Cubans' task to help defend important cities and transportation centers. The Cubans tried unsuccessfully to defend Lobito and reportedly suffered many casualties when the city was overrun early this month.

Friction between the Cubans and their Angolan clients will probably grow if the Cubans find themselves increasingly bearing the brunt of battle. There have already been some signs of friction;

What Cuba Expected

Last summer, when the prospect for a Popular Movement victory seemed brighter, Havana thought it had much to gain from a major role in the struggle. Havana expected:

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Intelligence Checklist

--To make points with Moscow for supporting forcefully a Soviet policy.

--To ensure the installation of a government in Angola favorable to Cuba.

--To bolster Cuba's image among third world leaders.

--To improve Cuba's standing among revolutionaries, particularly those in Latin America who have become disillusioned by Havana's rejection of violent revolution in favor of Moscow's so-called via pacifica.

--To gain a beachhead for further meddling in Africa.

--To help to reduce, or at least to counter, US influence in black Africa.

Castro probably also saw some domestic gains to be made from a successful venture in Angola. It would help allay the fears of those Cubans who have become wary of Castro's professed willingness to improve relations with the US.

Cuban support for revolution in Angola, particularly when aimed against forces Havana believes are supported by the US, would reinforce faith in Castro's leadership and reassure the doubters that he was not going "soft on imperialism" in response to pro-detente pressures from Moscow.

Outlook

The tide has turned at least temporarily against the Popular Movement, but the flow of support from Cuba and the USSR shows no signs of abating. Havana probably reasons that the regular supply of men and arms and the sight of Cuban-piloted MIGs providing aerial support will restore the sagging morale of the Popular Movement and demoralize its opponents.

Castro is gambling that the Popular Movement's fortunes have not already passed the point of no return. A Cuban withdrawal under pressure of defeat would most likely incur the contempt of...

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Intelligence Checklist

many third world countries, precipitate a severe setback—if not the collapse—of the Popular Movement, provoke the the wrath of Moscow, and leave Castro with the problem of explaining at home why men and materiel were spent in a lost cause.

Castro will therefore most likely strengthen his already heavy commitment in the hope that even larger Cuban losses will be made bearable by an eventual victory.

Should the operation eventually fail—and especially if Cuban losses are heavy—there would be serious domestic repercussions for Havana that would require a response. The response almost surely would be a new surge of rhetoric against the US that would mean an end to Castro's efforts to improve relations with the US, probably for the duration of the present US administration.
### Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE**

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**Tuesday 5 September 1978**

CG NIDC 78/207

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**Warning Notice**

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
National Intelligence Daily  
Cable for Tuesday, 5 September 1978  
Classification abbreviations precede each paragraph. The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

BRIEFS:  

Angola - South Africa
Angola released eight South African prisoners of war on Saturday in exchange for three Cuban soldiers captured during fighting in Angola three years ago. All the prisoners received good treatment while in captivity and were in good health. One other South African soldier, captured by guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization earlier this year, is still being held in Angola.

South African and Angolan officials present at the exchange took the occasion to discuss other matters of mutual interest--most likely the return of refugees who fled to Namibia to escape the fighting in Angola.

Angolan and South African officials have met secretly on several occasions in the past to discuss this issue as well as the possible creation of a security zone along the Angolan/Namibian border. Angola broke off the last round of talks for unspecified reasons last fall.
**BRIEFS**

**USSR-Angola**

A Soviet delegation headed by First Deputy Defense Minister Bolday arrived in Angola yesterday. The visit follows recent high-level contacts between Moscow and Luanda. President Nito met with President Brezhnev in Moscow last month, and Politburo member Khrushchev attended the recent congress of Angola's ruling party.

The Angolans are also hosting a senior Cuban delegation that reportedly is to work out details of a recent agreement providing for a major increase in Cuban economic aid to Angola.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

**TOP SECRET**

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Angola

The Angolan Government has reportedly established a detention camp in eastern Angola to hold those arrested following the attempted coup to overthrow the Hake regime.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

"About 2,000 members, including a large number of senior military officers, reportedly were under detention there. Most of the prisoners were transferred to the camp from other parts of Angola within the past two months."

Ghana

The government of Ghana late last month abruptly canceled the inauguration of a political organization that was to have mobilized support for General Acheampong's plan to retain the country in civilian rule in 1970.

The Ghana Patriotic Movement was to have been headed by an older leftist politician who had been close to former President Nkrumah. In recent months, Acheampong has estranged Nkrumah and allied himself with the Kumahs, hoping to use them to engineer his election as president of a civilian government. The Kumahs are factionalized and maneuvering against one another.

The US Embassy in Accra believes Acheampong may well have concluded that the Kumahs—despite their professions of support—were really planning to use the organization to advance their own political fortunes and would eventually dump him. If Acheampong has concluded to trust with the Kumahs, he will have to find some other political group to help him drum up public support for his civilian government proposals, which will be subject to a referendum next March. (S FWICD)
ANGOLA

Results of Party Congress

The transformation of Angola's ruling Popular Movement into a Marxist-Leninist party has imposed President Agostinho Neto's political control, although his overall position remains tenuous because of the country's severe economic and social problems and the continuing insurgent threat. Cuban and Soviet influences in Angola are extensive, but Neto is unlikely to shut the door to the West. Angola's commitment to a Marxist-Leninist course, however, will limit the West's opportunities to influence Neto.

Neto emerged last month from Angola's first party congress with a much stronger personal power base. The congress was the culmination of an intensive effort to consolidate his position in the party following the attempt by a dissident leftist faction to overthrow him last May.

The highlight of the congress was the transformation of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola into the MPLA-Labor Party. One of the new party's first acts was to establish a central commission "to enforce ideological cohesion." The commission reportedly is to screen all members of the old party before they are allowed to join the Labor Party. This requirement has been imposed ostensibly for ideological reasons, but past loyalty to Neto will probably be a major criterion for admission.

The congress also approved a reorganization of the country's defense and security forces, giving the party a stronger role, and endorsed for three years an economic plan calling for the nationalization of agriculture and industry.

The New Party Leadership

A major effort was made at the congress to shed the MPLA's image as a petitio-dominated, Landau-based organization. The leading role played by better educated militants in the movement has always been a source of friction with the blacks. Black representation in the party's leadership was increased substantially—of 45 Central Committee members 37 were black.
AFRICA

Angola...

From Page 1

Internal and external forces are at work in Angola. The Congolese also moved to enhance the military role in the party. Over 60 percent of the Central Committee members and a third of the Politburo were drawn from military ranks.

Most of the new party leaders fought with Nito, a black, in the early years of the liberation struggle. This should give him a broader base of support, while diluting the influence of the Luanda faction, which contains mostly of people who served under the colonial administration.

The military, while somewhat reduced in number, still appears to be in a strong position in the Politburo. They also continue to control most of the top posts in the government. Hervé Carvalho dos Santos, a minister who runs the internal security service, emerged from the Congolese as one of the more powerful members of the party. Educated in Cuba, he is regarded by some as Havana's man in Angola.

Preserves the Regime

The development of a stronger party structure should reduce some of the political pressures on the regime, but Nito's position is still fragile. Despite the major investment that Cuba, the USSR, and other Communist allies have made in Angola, little if any progress has been made toward solving Angola's economic or social problems or in meeting the increasingly serious insurgent threat.

Imports of large quantities of goods have not significantly reduced continued shortages of meat, vegetables, clothing, and other consumer goods. Cubans and shortages exist in some rural areas. Transportation and distribution networks are not adequate in many places.

Resilience appears to be growing in the urban slums. The regime must also cope with growing antagonism toward foreign leaders. Since the Cuban and the Soviet—those presence has become more and more visible throughout the country.

The probability of a popular uprising or a revolt by those who may have recently lost power in the party cannot be dismissed entirely, but as long as Nito maintains the full support of the Cuban and the Soviets, he should have little difficulty in sustaining power.

The Insurgent Threat

Guerrillas of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola probably pose the most serious threat to the regime. Cubans and Angolan forces appear to have contained other insur- gent groups in the north and in the enclave of Cabinda. This has permitted them to concentrate on UNITA in the south and east.

Heavy fighting in the south has produced some tactical gains for the government, but UNITA's ability to wage guerrilla warfare has not been seriously impaired. It can stage ambushes almost at will among most major roads and rail lines in the area.

The presence of South African military forces on Angola's southern border and about 10,000 Zambian soldiers on the northern border is also of major concern to Nito. The threat of a military strike, should the political situation in Angola deteriorate dramatically, has always loomed large in Nito's thinking. Although his fears are overdrawn, he will continue to cite the presence of foreign troops on his borders as one justification for Cuba's military presence in Angola.

Foreign Relations

Nito appears to have moved closer to the Soviets since his visit to Moscow last September.

About 500 Soviet advisors are in the country, and they have assumed an increasingly important role in the military and the government. Soviet Politburo member Krivulko, who is General Secretary Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, headed the delegation attending the party congress.

The Cubans also attached great importance to the congress and sent First Vice President Raul Castro to head their delegation. Although the Soviets and the Cubans exerted substantial influence during the congress, they did not control it. Of the candidates whom the Soviets reportedly had sponsored for membership on the Central Committee, six ultimately were not selected.

Angolans who had advocated closer ties with the West emerged from the congress in a weak position. Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge—who led the recent drive to establish relations with a greater number of Western and nonaligned states and to improve ties with Portugal—was elected only as an alternate member of the Central Committee. Justice Minister Deringer Bemba, a moderate thought to be severe in his government post, failed to make either the Politburo or the Central Committee. Neither man is a black, which may have contributed to their poor showing.

Resolution passed by the congress setting political policy were strongly Marxist, but the foreign policy series was more balanced. The congress went on record as favoring strict nonalignment based on the Yugoslav model, the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries, and opposition to any foreign bases on Angolan territory.

Given Angola's serious economic problems, Nito probably would like to maintain contact with the West. The economy depends minimally on revenues from Western oil—"the Cabinda oil fields, and Nito has privately encouraged Western oil operations off Angola's northern coast. Nito realizes that his country desperately needs the economic assistance and technical expertise that the West can best provide. He may also hope recognition of the changes by more Western and nonaligned states would enhance its legitimacy.

The Soviet bloc does not oppose a somewhat expanded Western role if it were limited to economic and technical assistance programs tightly controlled by the party. Opposition may come from within the party, however, in the more militant Central Committee members gain influence.

Outlook

Establishment of a more highly controlled government and the inclusion of more blacks and military officers in its leadership will probably give Nito more power. This, if many of the new members are not totally loyal to him, is probably in a better position to control their activities.

Increased black and military representation will give the party a more solid, more militant, and possibly more nationalist cast. The militaries, nevertheless, will probably continue to play a leading role in the party and government because their talents are sorely needed.

The conflict with UNITA is likely to remain unresolved for some time. Unless UNITA develops the capacity to wage conventional war, it is unlikely to expand appreciably the territory under its control. At the same time, Nito and his Cuban benefactors are not likely to make significant progress in rooting out UNITA forces.

Now that the Labor Party has been established, Nito will probably announce some cabinet changes. His selections for key posts should provide a good indication of where Angolan foreign policy is headed. For example, any change in the status of Foreign Minister Jorge, a white who is pro-Western, or First Deputy Prime Minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos, a black who is tightly regarded by the Soviets, would be significant.

Although Nito's dependence on the Soviets and the Cubans is likely to grow, he will probably not shift the door to the West entirely. It is still possible that Nito has only reluctantly accepted a major Soviet role in his party, and he may believe a continued Western presence would increase his flexibility with Moscow.

President Nito
Angola: Insurgent Campaign in Cabinda

Spokesmen for the guerrillas seeking independence for the Angolan province of Cabinda have once again threatened to attack Gulf Oil Corporation installations there. The insurgents have stepped up their guerrilla campaign in recent months, which has undermined the morale of Cuban and Angolan troops. Recently reinforced government forces, however, appear to have checked the insurgents' progress.

The insurgents have said they will destroy Gulf facilities in Cabinda with ground-to-ground missiles "either tomorrow, or in one, two, or three months" if Gulf does not evacuate its personnel from Cabinda and halt all operations there immediately.

Although the liberation front has issued three such ultimatums in the past month, there is no evidence that any direct action is about to be taken against Gulf.

The threats against Gulf were only a bluff, indicating that their real intent was to elicit US and Gulf assistance for the liberation struggle.

The Gulf installation is protected by Cuban troops. While most production platforms are located offshore, some onshore processing facilities are extremely vulnerable to attack. Two small guerrilla teams Armed with rocket-propelled grenade reportedly damaged Angolan fuel storage facilities north of the Gulf compound in Cabinda in January.

Despite statements by insurgents (See Angola...Page 2)
Angola...

From Page 2

The number or disposition
between guerrillas and Cuban or Angolan
troops has probably risen over the past
few months, however, and the guerrillas
seem to have scored a few successes,
especially including the occupation of
towns and an airfield near the Zairian
border.

The insurgent campaign is character-
ized largely by ambushes, harassment,
and road mining. The major exception to
this pattern appears to be the guerrilla's
attempts last month to surround and cut
off the garison towns of Dungu. Cuban
troops reportedly relieved Dungu in

mid-May, although there still appears to
be some fighting in the area.

On May 1, the liberation front an-
nounced the establishment of a
provisional government in the interior of
Caconda. The front probably enjoys the
support of most of the local population,
and it claims control over three fourths
of the countryside. In light of the
government's apparent success, Dungu,
such claims appear to be exaggerated.

Much of the area is probably controlled
by both sides rather than controlled by
one of the other. The dense vegetation and
climates of Caconda hinder large-scale
military operations.

There may be between 1,000 and 2,000
insurgents, probably less than half of whom
are engaged in operations in Caconda. The
insurgents face several thousand
Angolans and about 3,000 Cubans, who
have been reinforced recently.

Some 500 additional Cubans reportedly
arrived in Congo in late April and were
sent to reinforce the border with Ca-
conda.

Additional Angolan security
forces were sent to Caconda to protect
the oil facilities following the unsuccessful
attack on May 21.

1,000 to 1,200 Cubans were shifted
from Caconda to Angola following the
contra attempt.

The ability of the guerrillas to sustain
an effective threat has seriously affected
the morale of the Cubans and Angolan
troops. Angolan troops, in particular,
have complained of a lack of food,
clothing, and other supplies, and rein-
f orcements were sent to Caconda last
month to replace troops who had
mutilated in late April.

In Caconda, the number of casualties
has averaged six to seven a week over
the past few months. Cuban
north outside of Caconda City, where
the Cuban oil installations are located, have
been reduced because of the increasing
number of casualties.

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Angola: Sarumbi Seeking As
Angola: Savimbi Seeking Aid

Angolan insurgent leader Savimbi, who has been traveling abroad in search of new military aid, is hoping the US administration will provide him with moral, financial, and military support.

Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is a dedicated and relatively well-disciplined force that has survived numerous Angolan-Cuban military offensives. It continues to attack a variety of targets in southern and central Angola. Savimbi himself has been a key factor. He is an inspirational leader and has also proved adept at acquiring foreign military and financial aid. France, South Africa, and Morocco have been his most important foreign benefactors.

Savimbi hopes that factional rivalries in the ruling Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) will eventually create opportunities for UNITA to gain allies in Luanda and inclusion in a national government. The MPLA is split between a faction led by mulattoes, whose continuing dominance depends on the heavy Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola, and a black nationalist faction. The regime’s problems are being aggravated by deteriorating economic conditions, including food shortages, that could trigger major disorders. The economy’s only bright spot is the petroleum industry.

US support would encourage other countries to help UNITA, and Savimbi believes that sharp increases in outside aid would lead to military successes that would force the MPLA to seek a political accommodation. Although his hopes may prove correct over the longer term, we believe the short-term results of US aid to UNITA would be different. The Soviets and Cubans would not accept such a setback and would probably respond to stepped-up aid to UNITA by increasing their own backing for the regime.

US aid to Savimbi would also be likely to spark Angolan threats to withdraw support from a negotiated settlement on Namibia, although fear of South
African military incursions might inhibit the Angolans from actually renouncing the negotiations. If US support for Savimbi were not accompanied by strong reaffirmations of commitment to Namibian majority rule, the willingness of other African countries, notably the Nigerians, to cooperate with the US would be likely to erode. US assistance to UNITA probably would also lead the Angolans and their Soviet and Cuban backers to take a more active role in supporting Angola- and Zambia-based Zairian dissidents.
Angola: Savimbi Seeking Aid

Angolan insurgent leader Jonas Savimbi has recently been on one of his periodic aid-seeking missions to various countries in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Despite his disappointment at not being able to visit the US, Savimbi evidently remains hopeful that the US administration will obtain repeal of the Clark Amendment, which bars US military assistance to Angolan insurgents, and will then resume aiding his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). He has been hoping that the US will provide both financial and military assistance, particularly surface-to-air missiles, antitank weapons, and field artillery.

Savimbi's UNITA rebels have been fighting the ruling Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—which has extensive Cuban and Soviet backing—since 1975. His 15-year-old organization has some 10,000 to 12,000 combatants in the field. The guerrillas move relatively freely in the rural areas of southern Angola, a region that comprises nearly half the country and contains about 45 percent of the population. The insurgents are generally supported by the inhabitants of this region, with whom they have ethnic ties.

UNITA has proved to be a dedicated and relatively well-disciplined force that has survived numerous Angolan-Cuban offensives. Despite logistic problems and periodic shortages of arms and materiel, it has continued to harass government and Cuban forces, to attack important targets such as the Benguela Railway in central Angola, and to carry out acts of sabotage in urban areas.

Savimbi has been a key factor in UNITA's ability to operate against the more numerous and better armed government forces. The 47-year-old UNITA leader is a strong-willed and inspirational figure who has proved adept at obtaining military and financial aid from abroad, although this assistance has declined in the last two years.
Savimbi believes that factional strife in the ruling party will eventually create opportunities for UNITA to gain allies in Luanda and inclusion in a national government. The MPLA is divided between a dominant faction, led by pro-Soviet militics, and a black nationalist faction. But the ideological differences do not break down neatly along ethnic lines. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, a Soviet-educated black, is a member of the dominant group but has had some success in maneuvering between the two factions.
so doing he has managed to continue the late President Neto's policies of seeking closer economic ties with the West and supporting a negotiated settlement on Namibia.

The mulattoes depend on the Cubans and Soviets to remain in power:
- The Cubans have approximately 19,000 military personnel in Angola and roughly 6,000 civilian technicians.
- There are around 1,400 Soviet and East European advisers and technicians in the Angolan armed forces, some government ministries, and the intelligence and security services.
- The Soviets and Cubans are generally disliked by the Angolans, who are dissatisfied with the quality and cost of Communist assistance.

The regime's problems are being aggravated by deteriorating economic and social conditions. Shortages of food and other necessities are frequent, and rationing is common. The population is becoming increasingly restive, and disorders could occur with little warning. Angola was once nearly self-sufficient in food production and is potentially one of the richest countries in Africa.

The economy's only bright spot is the petroleum industry, which, with the participation of US firms, is Angola's principal foreign exchange earner. Oil production has recently regained pre-1975 levels.

By contrast, production in other key sectors of the economy—coffee, diamonds, and iron ore—is significantly below preindependence levels and probably will not improve so long as the insurgency continues. UNITA's attacks on the Benguela Railroad have cost the government more than $50 million annually in lost foreign exchange earnings because of interruptions of shipments of Zairian and Zambian minerals through Angola.

Support from Washington would encourage other countries to aid UNITA. Savimbi argues that a sharp increase in outside aid would lead to military successes that would force the MPLA to seek a political accommodation with UNITA.

Although this may prove correct over the longer term, we believe the short-term results of US aid to UNITA would be quite different. The Soviets and Cubans, rather than accept such a setback, would probably respond to stepped-up aid to UNITA by increasing their own backing for the Luanda regime. Moreover, none of the leaders in Luanda seems politically strong enough to seek an accommodation with Savimbi. Most MPLA leaders do not want to see the charismatic UNITA chief gain a role in Luanda under any circumstances.
Savimbi has long relied on portable weapons appropriate for guerrilla warfare. Acquiring heavier weapons would improve UNITA’s ability to counter government offensives and defend rear base areas but would also impede mobility and increase the guerrillas’ vulnerability to government airstrikes.

Savimbi, nonetheless, plans to create several new conventional battalions in preparation for assaults against government strongholds. This represents a turnabout for UNITA, which, in the past, has recognized the liabilities of conducting conventional operations. Savimbi may be trying to elicit US support by portraying his forces as prepared to expand their operations.

Given its array of foreign backers, its ability to capture arms, its ethnic cohesiveness, and the relatively high quality of its forces and leadership, UNITA probably will remain a thorn in Luanda’s side—and by extension in Moscow’s and Havana’s—even without new aid. But without a significant infusion of military assistance, there is little chance that the insurgents could bring sufficient military pressure on the Cuban-backed MPLA to force it to seek a settlement.

If it appears that the US is moving to renew support to Savimbi, the pro-Soviet faction in the MPLA will probably be strengthened further at the expense of the nationalists, who would like to see a reduction in Cuban and Soviet influence and an improvement in relations with the West. The regime already almost certainly believes there is a connection between the debate in Washington over the repeal of the Clark Amendment, South Africa’s current refusal to cooperate in seeking a solution to the Namibian problem, continued South African military raids into southern Angola, and a recent visit to Washington by a military delegation from Pretoria. The Angolans do not believe US statements that repeal of the Clark Amendment will not automatically lead to a resumption of US aid to UNITA.

In addition to spurring increased Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola, US aid to Savimbi would be likely to:

- Put an end to Angolan expressions of interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the US. The Angolans have hoped such ties would lead to extensions of US economic and technical assistance, which the Soviets have been unable or unwilling to provide.

- Lead Angola to threaten to withdraw its support of a negotiated settlement on Namibia. Fear of stepped-up South African military incursions, however, might inhibit the Angolans from actually renouncing the negotiations.
- Tempt Luanda to embargo oil sales to US firms or nationalize their holdings.

- Cause the Angolans and their Cuban and Soviet backers to take a more active role in supporting Angola- and Zambia-based Zairian dissidents. These rebels invaded Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba region in 1977 and 1978 and are considering attempting new operations there if they can obtain sufficient foreign assistance.

- Spark sharp criticism of the US among some African countries and elsewhere in the Third World. Many African leaders who would like to see a reduction of the Cuban presence in Angola continue to believe that the US should concentrate its efforts on seeking a settlement of the Namibia problem. Some US allies in Western Europe are also uncomfortable over the prospect of US assistance to UNITA.

Nigeria would interpret US backing for Savimbi as clear evidence of US sympathy for South Africa. Lagos has sided with the MPLA ever since Pretoria's intervention in UNITA's behalf in the Angolan civil war in the mid-1970s. Nigeria, moreover, sees the MPLA regime's support for black nationalists in Namibia as a key factor in the campaign for black majority rule there—a top priority Nigerian foreign policy objective.

Unless US aid to Savimbi were accompanied by strong reaffirmations of Washington's commitment to Namibian majority rule, Nigeria's willingness to cooperate with the US would be likely to erode into hostility. The Nigerians' revenue needs would probably inhibit them from taking extreme steps such as embargoing oil sales to the US, but at some point they might impose other measures such as selective restrictions on oil production or on purchases by US companies, or nationalization of the companies' equity. Gulf Oil Company, which operates in Angola and is heavily dependent on its Nigerian operations, is particularly vulnerable to Nigerian retaliation.
National Intelligence Daily

Friday
30 October 1987

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
ANGOLA:

Diminished Air Support for Luanda

The reluctance of the Angolan Government and of Cuba to commit combat aircraft in the recent offensive against UNITA forfeited a tactical advantage over the insurgents and weighed heavily in the government defeat.

Although the Angolan Government has more than 150 combat aircraft in its inventory, it deployed relatively few aircraft—four to six MiGs and even fewer helicopters—at its main forward base during most of the offensive. The Angolan Air Force flew few missions and was not a factor in the fighting.

The insurgents' improved air defense capabilities forced Angolan pilots to fly at excessively high altitudes during attack missions, resulting in inaccurate targeting. Not only were Angolan airstrikes less effective than in earlier campaigns, but there also were no air penetrations deep into insurgent territory as there were in previous years.

Comment: Soviet shipments of more than three squadrons of MiG fighters to Angola over the past two years suggest that Luanda intended to be more aggressive in the air this year. UNITA's air defenses—especially the Stinger surface-to-air missile—and South African fighter aircraft activity in the combat area, however, probably deterred the Angolan and Cuban Air Forces from participating in the offensive. Even during a major defeat, neither Angolan nor Cuban aircraft came to the aid of Angolan ground troops. The number of aircraft lost to Stingers is difficult to verify, but the missile effectively forced the government to curtail its use of airpower, previously one of its greatest advantages over the insurgents.

30 October 1987

Top Secret

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Monday
2 November 1987

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Special Analysis

ANGOLA: Implications of Government Reverses

The Angolan Government’s retreat from Mavinga signals the end of the seasonal offensive for this year. The regime is not immediately threatened by its reverses, but its hopes for a significant military success have been dashed, and it may now consider other options, short of political reconciliation with UNITA. UNITA now has the initiative and probably recognizes the need to expand the guerrilla war if it is to build on its success.

Government forces that had begun to push toward Mavinga in mid-August have retreated back toward their starting point at Cuito Cuanavale. UNITA, with substantial South African ground and air support, has pursued the withdrawing government forces, and not all government units are out of danger. South of Lucusse—the second front of the two-front offensive—government forces still hold positions captured in early August, but are far short of their objectives at Cuanambo and Lumbala N’Gualuma. The government brigades are digging in, with no apparent intention to continue their advance soon.

By any measure, the offensive has been a major setback for Luanda, which recruited, armed, trained, and planned for two years with the expectation of capturing and holding key positions in UNITA-held territory. Government leaders were confident that the Army could seize Mavinga, an important step in the government’s goal of conquering the UNITA-held southeast and ultimately capturing UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba.

Luanda and Its Backers

The government is trying to play down the magnitude of the failure, characterizing the fighting in press reports as a routine sweep operation that would have succeeded had Pretoria not intervened. President dos Santos is likely to deflect criticism of his role, but the defeat will sour new infighting among the fractious leadership. The search for scapegoats has already begun, with most of the finger pointing aimed at the military.

continued

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2 November 1987
Moscow and Havana have condemned South Africa's involvement in the fighting, but neither is likely to see a need for drastic action. The regime in Luanda is not immediately threatened by military reverses in the isolated southeast, and there probably is little that Moscow and Havana can or would do militarily in the near term to rectify the situation.

UNITA and Pretoria

UNITA's ability, albeit with South African support, to frustrate two years of preparation by Luanda, inflict significant losses, and seize the initiative in the southeast is a major success for the insurgents. UNITA leader Savimbi's decision to pursue withdrawing government forces back to Cuito Cuanavale reflects his interest in building on a successful defense by turning the withdrawal into a rout.

South Africa's intervention with both air and ground forces played a key role in UNITA's success. By committing its forces, Pretoria not only demonstrated the extent to which it is willing to support Savimbi, but also showed that a South African-backed UNITA can block Luanda's aims even when the government forces are equipped by the Soviets and backed by Cuban garrison troops. Continued South African airstrikes on the retreating government forces indicate Pretoria backs Savimbi's bid for a larger victory.

Outlook

Although its defeat is not sufficiently threatening to push Luanda toward reconciliation with UNITA, Luanda may try to improve its military prospects by limiting Pretoria's ability to intervene in future fighting. The government may show more interest in pursuing a negotiated end to South Africa's occupation of Namibia by trading off a Cuban troop withdrawal. Luanda might also consider restricting its operations to regions in Angola sufficiently far from Namibia to make South African intervention more difficult and costly.

Savimbi probably realizes that a battlefield victory in the southeast will not by itself force the government to pursue his goal of political reconciliation and power sharing. He has won some relief from government attack in the southeast for the next few months and is now likely to intensify his countrywide guerrilla operations, particularly in northern Angola where the government is most sensitive to military pressure.
Cuba: Domestic Impact of African Involvement

The political, military, and social costs to Cuba of its expanding role in Africa are still well within manageable limits and are not a significant constraint on Cuban policymakers. The USSR is underwriting almost all the material costs. Whether Cuba's political costs become severe depends largely on the extent of the fighting in Angola and Ethiopia. Heavy Cuban casualties could present the regime with difficult problems.

Service in Africa is apparently meeting with a mixed response among the Cuban people. Pro-regime activiasts openly support the regime's African commitments, but many people are concerned that the regime's current austerity, which stems largely from low world sugar prices, is caused by Cuban involvement in Africa.

No organized resistance exists in Cuba. However, and without planning, coordination, and leadership from those who oppose Cuba's role in Africa have little impact on regime leaders. So far, they are apparently limited to grumbling among friends and family.

As is his custom during periods of flagging popular sentiment, President Castro has spent considerable time since mid-1977 traveling through the country trying to bolster morale. Castro is keenly aware of—and exploits—the considerable capacity of the Cuban people to endure hardship. His normal reaction is to manufacture both a reason to suffer and a scapegoat to blame. A master of media manipulation, he has little trouble refocusing public antipathy and generating renewed revolutionary momentum.

Castro is probably not overly concerned about public attitudes. The numerous speeches and heavy media treatment in the last six months are, in effect, pre-emptive moves to head off disaffection. Castro doubtless knows that the current level of discontent is well within tolerable limits and that a careful persuasion he can keep it far short of the point where outright repression might be required.

Military Costs
Cuba now has 25,715 to 22,375 military
(See Cuba. Page 2)
Cuba...

From Page 1

Cuba's involvement in Africa, including 15,000 to 20,000 in Angola and an estimated 10,375 to 13,375 in Ethiopia. Most were mobilized from Cuba's ready reserves, in part to spread the risks throughout the island and in part to avoid weakening Cuba's defenses by drawing from Cuba's active-duty personnel. The USSR has supplied about 30 Soviet fighter pilots to take the place of Cuban pilots flying combat missions in Ethiopia.

If the USSR continues to underwrite the material costs of the Cuban effort, Cuba could probably increase significantly its commitment in Africa without seriously damaging its economy or defense capabilities.

For example, a 20-percent increase in Cuban military personnel in Africa to about 70,000 would impose on Cuba's military capabilities, but the impact would probably be manageable. Cuba's armed forces total about 180,000 personnel, including some 60,000 ready reserves who can be mobilized within 24 hours.

In addition, there are another 210,000 reservists who have undergone basic training and who could be on active duty within 30 days. Cuba has a relatively large and expanding young population—23 percent of 20 million are under 25 years of age—including some 35,000 blacks between 18 and 30.

Economic Costs

The loss of skilled and unskilled workers has caused disruption in several sectors of the economy, but the costs to the economy in general have been relatively small. The loss of unskilled workers has been minimized by increased mechanization of the labor-intensive sugarcane harvest and the widespread use of student labor in agriculture.

Logistical costs have been limited to no more than 10 percent of the Cuban merchant fleet at any one time and a small number of aircraft. This cost of diversification has amounted to only about $1.5 million annually at most and has not seriously disrupted Cuban trade patterns or commercial staffs schedules.

Cuba's economic growth rate apparently slowed in 1976, but the slowdown was primarily the result of a small decrease in this year's sugar harvest and a decline in investment. Non-sugar agriculture registered small gains, as did industry, although output was limited by a reduction in raw material imports from the West. In neither case did a shortage of labor significantly affect output. Although production data for 1977 is not yet available, it is unlikely that gross national product was any more affected in 1977 by Havana's involvement in Africa than it was in 1976.

While Cuba supplies the bulk of the manpower and much of the subsistence and salary costs for its military forces in Africa, virtually all of the material costs have been borne by the USSR. Most of the Soviet-made military equipment being used in Ethiopia is sent directly to Africa from the USSR. About three-fourths of the equipment sent from Cuba to Angola has already been replaced by newer and, in some cases, more sophisticated weapons, and the remainder is likely to be covered by further Soviet deliveries.

The USSR has also provided planes and pilots to facilitate Cuban logistics between Havana and Luanda. In addition, at least three Soviet passenger ships have been utilized to transport many of the Cuban combat personnel now in Ethiopia. The Angolan and Ethiopian Governments are sharing the cost of the Cuban presence there as well. Weekly flights between Havana and Luanda by the Angolan airliner and daily flights between Luanda and Addis Ababa by the Ethiopian airliner are offsetting a portion of the logistic cost. The Angolan Government is probably also paying for the food and lodging of Cuban civilian advisers, and perhaps part of the subsistence costs for Cuban military personnel.

The direct cost of maintaining Cuban military personnel in Africa is estimated at about $15 million to $20 million annually. The total estimated $70 million to $12 million annual bill, including the cost of directing Cuban ships and planes to the effort, represents only about 0.9 percent of estimated 1976 GNP. The share of Cuba's labor force represented by its military personnel in Africa equals about 1.5 percent.

Outlook

The political and economic costs of Cuban involvement in Africa will probably remain manageable, at least for the near term. A deepening popular dissatisfaction, stemming from an exaggerated perception of the financial costs, could pose a constraint on Cuban policymakers, however, should the number of casualties the Cubans suffer rapidly escalate.

Reporting on the number killed or wounded in Angola and Ethiopia is spotty at best and the regime does not announce casualty figures. Estimates of Cuban killed in Angola range between 600 and 2,000. If there were a surge of casualties the regime would probably be unable to manage the domestic impact sufficiently to prevent open dissatisfaction.

In such circumstances, the Cuban population might resort to passive protest. Such measures would not be unprecedented in recent Cuban history. Worker slowdowns and widespread absenteeism occurred in the early 1970s when supply of consumer goods failed to improve after the record 1970 harvest. These protests, together with strong pressures from the USSR, caused the government to institute major economic policy changes—some of which reversed its basic ideological tenets—in an effort to increase economic production.

The Cuban people's demonstrated capability for endurance and sacrifice may be further enhanced by the government's propaganda machinery. The bottom line, however, will depend on the extent of political will on the part of Cuba's leaders. All indications are that they are prepared to pay a heavy price.
USSR-ANGOLA

Deliveries of Heavy Military Equipment

The Soviets have resumed shipments of heavy military equipment, including tanks, to Angola. Most deliveries made during the past year from the USSR and Eastern Europe consisted of trucks and other transport vehicles rather than armor. Transport vehicles are also used in place of the rail system that the guerrillas have successfully penetrated.

-43 medium tanks, eight tank destroyers, and two amphibious transport vehicles in the Luanda port area where military equipment from the USSR has previously been seen. These vehicles were probably carried by two Soviet cargo ships that arrived two days before. This is the largest Soviet military equipment delivery to Angola we have ever seen.

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The deliveries will give Angola a force of more than 200 T-55 and T-62 medium tanks—an increase of almost 25 percent. Some of the older vehicles are probably unserviceable. Besides these and the weapons taken from the Portuguese at independence, the Angolans have obtained from the Soviets about 20 light tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers, over 200 scout cars, considerable artillery and antiaircraft weaponry, and at least 12 Mi-4 helicopters and 34 MiG fighter aircraft.

This is the first known Soviet shipment of armored vehicles to Angola since 1975 and was probably designed to improve the conventional capabilities of the Angolan Army and to make up for equipment lost through attrition. The new equipment does not, however, appear to be suited to Angola's counterinsurgency requirements. The greater need is for transport vehicles for use in the continuing campaign against antigovernment guerrilla movements.

(See USSR, Page 8)
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Thursday 10 November 1977 NIDC 77/261C

Warning Notice
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 10 November 1977

Classification abbreviations precede each paragraph. The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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CUBA-ANGOLA: Civilian Advisers

Cuba has apparently agreed to send an additional 2,600 civilian advisers and technicians to supplement the estimated 4,000 to 5,000 already in Angola. Recent reporting on the activities of the Cubans in Angola highlights their generally low morale. Havana is putting a high price on any refusals to serve in Angola. //

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commission to plan economic cooperation for next year. Cuban
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Ramiro Valdes, who headed the Cuban delega-
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Friday
4 December 1987
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South Africa: Implications of Angolan Intervention

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Special Analysis

SOUTH AFRICA: Implications of Angolan Intervention

South Africa’s intervention to help UNITA defeat the Angolan offensive highlights the magnitude and importance of Pretoria’s commitment to the insurgent group and may presage more active support in the future. Pretoria’s public disclosure of its involvement has embarrassed and angered UNITA leader Savimbi, but neither South Africa nor UNITA is likely to allow the admission to alter their fundamental relationship.

South Africa’s decision to intervene with artillery and air support before Mavinga, a UNITA stronghold, was directly threatened suggests Pretoria suspected UNITA would be hard pressed to turn back the Angolan advance.

The Angolan Government’s crossing of the Lomba River—the last physical barrier before Mavinga—was the tripwire for South African intervention.

Justifying the Action

In an effort to stem domestic press speculation about South African activities in Angola, Pretoria in mid-November admitted that 30 white soldiers have been killed in Angola since September. It has deflected most domestic criticism and won national support for continued assistance to UNITA by portraying the offensive as the first step in a Soviet scheme to invade South Africa. Pretoria did not coordinate this admission with UNITA and probably believed that the first priority was to explain to the South African public why its citizens were dying in combat.

Savimbi, who several times over the past month denied South African involvement in the fighting, was angered by Pretoria’s admission and its failure to consult with him. He refuted claims that the intervention saved UNITA from defeat and stressed that UNITA remains politically and militarily independent. Although Pretoria does not appear to have deliberately tried to embarrass Savimbi, President Botha’s statements probably will complicate Savimbi’s efforts to distance himself from his backers. Potential West European and African supporters will be reluctant to offer assistance because of the renewed publicity on UNITA-South African ties.

continued
Pretoria’s Commitment

South Africa’s actions reflect not only its military prowess and its commitment to UNITA but also the extent of its support for UNITA’s military endeavors. South Africa at first limited its air and artillery attacks for fear of provoking a Cuban or Soviet counterstrike; but, when it was clear that Angola’s backers would not play an active combat role, Pretoria increased both artillery and air support.

Pretoria employed the towed G-5 and self-propelled G-8 artillery guns—South Africa’s newest and most advanced artillery—in the fighting.

Outlook

Pretoria probably believes its actions have sent a clear message to Western governments that a successfully negotiated settlement requires South African approval. Although UNITA and South Africa’s interests diverged on the issue of going public, both parties’ longer term objectives clearly require close cooperation, and a serious rift is unlikely.
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11 December 1987

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ANGOLA:

UNITA Forces Changing Tactics

Angolan forces at Cuito Cuanavale appear to be holding their positions as South Africa begins to withdraw its troops from the battle area, and UNITA reportedly is shifting its efforts to cutting government supply lines leading to the town. Government units in and around Cuito Cuanavale continue to come under heavy shelling, and government forces have destroyed a major bridge on the approach to the town from the southeast. Insurgent forces are now moving battalions from the Cuito Cuanavale area to the road between the town and Menongue to prevent government supplies from getting through.

A government convoy on that road recently came under attack, and statements from Luanda allege the South African Air Force recently attacked an Angolan column along this route.

The chief of the South African defense force said last week that South African and Namibian troops were withdrawing from southern Angola. The Namibian 101st Battalion and part of the 32nd Battalion—previously deployed in southeastern Angola—have returned to their garrison in northern Namibia, indicating that at least a partial withdrawal has begun.

Comment: UNITA's attacks on supply lines—a return to its tactics before the offensive—and the start of a South African withdrawal signal an end to major fighting. The destruction of the bridge outside Cuito Cuanavale was probably an attempt by government forces to protect themselves from a major attack. The closure of the Cuito Cuanavale airfield because of heavy artillery fire and UNITA efforts to block the Menongue-Cuito Cuanavale road will test Luanda's ability to resupply its beleaguered forces.

Pretoria probably wants to have the majority of its troops home by Christmas. Some South African forces will remain to provide assistance to the insurgents, and South African air activity in northern Namibia will probably continue at least until all South African forces have left Angola.
ANGOLA:

Fighting at Cuito Cuanavale

UNITA and South African forces have launched a major effort to drive Angolan Government forces from the east bank of the Cuito River.

UNITA forces staged simultaneous attacks on two of the three Angolan units east of the river, capturing and destroying large quantities of equipment and forcing government troops to retreat toward the river. The South African Defense Force plans to help UNITA dislodge the Angolans remaining in defensive positions on the east bank through a direct assault supported by artillery fire and airstrikes.

The three Angolan brigades on the east bank of the river—supported by Soviet and Cuban advisers—have been reduced in strength from 1,000 to 400 men each by casualties and inadequate resupply in recent weeks. Repairs to the Cuito River bridge are continuing and that amphibious ferries are involved in resupply operations. Photography also shows a convoy of more than 175 vehicles is heading toward Cuito Cuanavale from Menongue.

Comment: As long as the Cuito River bridge—destroyed by artillery early last month—is closed, Luanda will be dependent on helicopters and ferries to resupply its forces on the east bank, limiting its ability to move in reinforcements and creating a serious bottleneck in the event of a retreat.

Government positions east of the river now appear untenable and will either to be reinforced or abandoned. Most of the 2,000 Cuban ground troops sent to Cuito Cuanavale in the past two months are probably not heavily engaged in the current fighting. Although Cuban crews have been integrated into an Angolan tank battalion on the east bank, the major Cuban units are probably located on the west bank to defend the town itself.

20 February 1988

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Latin American Trends

STAFF NOTES

Secret

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SECRET

LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

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May 19, 1976

Cuba-Venezuela: Repairing the Damage . . . . . . . 1

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Cuba-Venezuela: Repairing the Damage*

The Castro regime has begun efforts to repair the damage involvement in Angola has done to its relations with Venezuela, until recently one of the most influential proponents of reintegrating Cuba into Western Hemisphere activities.

Through a number of channels, Castro has tried to assure President Perez that he wants to return to the former relationship, which though still in the formative stages seemed to hold out prospects for substantial diplomatic cooperation and increased economic ties. When Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito visited Venezuela in mid-March, he reportedly conveyed Castro's assurances that Cuba would refrain from military intervention in the hemisphere. Then, in an interview published in early May in the widely read Venezuelan magazine "Bohemia," Castro took pains to emphasize that "no country in Latin America, whatever its social regime may be, should have anything to fear from the Cuban armed forces."

May 19, 1976

*This is the first of two articles analyzing the impact on Cuba's Latin American relations caused by its intervention in Angola.

SECRET

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Cuba's efforts have had some effect in the economic field. An agreement announced in early May calls for Cuban purchase of $1.6 million in petroleum by-products from one of the Venezuelan state-owned petroleum companies. Caracas is reportedly negotiating with Cuba and other countries for the purchase of 100,000 tons of sugar.

Castro has not yet been able, however, to restore Cubana airline's charter service to Caracas. Flights were suspended indefinitely in early April by Venezuela on grounds that Cuba was trying to bring unauthorized persons into the country and circumventing customs inspections. Meanwhile, Venezuelan tourists—who made up a large percentage of the passengers on the Cubana flights—appear to be traveling to Cuba via Panama.

Perez' distrust of the Castro regime is likely to be enduring. The Angolan intervention has revived his memories of Cuban activities in Venezuela when he was interior minister in the 1960s, and this is likely to increase his willingness to believe unconfirmed press allegations that Cuban military personnel are training Guyanese forces in military installations near the Venezuelan border.

May 19, 1976
Angola has long talked about economic reform but has done little to implement changes that would boost economic performance. The limited action that Luanda has taken so far has been designed to gain IMF membership and needed Western aid and debt rescheduling.
Africa Review

Articles

Angola: Dithering on Economic Reform

Angola has long talked about economic reform but done little to implement changes that would boost economic performance. The limited action that Luanda has taken so far has been designed to gain IMF membership and needed Western aid and debt rescheduling. Barriers to economic reform include opposition from hardline Marxist government officials, probably supported by Cuban advisors, who are unwilling to reconcile socialist principles with economic necessity. Liberalization of the economy would also undercut privileges enjoyed by the ruling elite. Moreover, the government is currently preoccupied with negotiations aimed at the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and independence for Namibia. Nevertheless, President dos Santos is committed to the idea of economic reform, despite ambivalence about how far it should go, and we believe Luanda will implement at least a watered-down reform program by sometime next year.

Background

Angola's economic reforms, still largely in the planning stage, are intended principally to improve management and production efficiency in agriculture, manufacturing, and distribution. Devised by the second party congress of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in December 1985, the reform program was virtually moribund for more than a year thereafter because of opposition by hardline Marxists and halfhearted support from dos Santos and key members of the government's economic team, such as Minister of State for Production van Dunem Loy. In mid 1987, however, dos Santos began to try to breathe new life into the program to offset the impact of the slump in prices for oil--Angola's principal export--at the beginning of 1986.

Dos Santos's effort led to the initiation in January 1988 of a two stage Economic-Financial Reorganization (Sanamiento Economico Financiero, or SEF) program, the first stage of which is scheduled to be completed by 1990. Although the Peoples Assembly subsequently passed five measures to lay out guidelines for the program, they remain unsigned by dos Santos, and action has been limited to ancillary programs to gain IMF membership and acquire needed Western aid and debt rescheduling.

Why Economic Reform?
"You can't have products without producing them." -- Minister of Internal Trade Joaquin Guerreiro Dias.

The push for economic reform grew out of the Angolan government's belated recognition that the longstanding war with UNITA is only partly responsible for the non-oil economy's dismal record since independence. Despite sharp increases in oil production in recent years, data in the press indicate that all non-oil sectors have contracted virtually nonstop since independence in 1975.

The MPLA government cited declining living standards, low labor productivity, huge public domestic and foreign debt, and scarcities of foreign exchange in November 1987 as reasons for implementing the SEF. The SEF draft document also admitted that the government was ill-equipped to monopolize economic activity. Dos Santos declared last May that Angola must stop using the "old alibi" of the war to explain economic failures, and "admit courageously...the excessive centralization...of socialist planning, bureaucratization.
of economic management, disorganization and poor management of enterprises, and galloping indiscipline and corruption.

We disagree with a more cynical view expressed by some observers in Luanda that the SEF is designed solely as a ploy to attract IMF approval of Angola's membership bid, and that Luanda has no intention of implementing the program. Sketchy reporting indicates that the SEF draft proposals roughly parallel measures often associated with IMF conditions for standby loans, including devaluation, reduced budget deficits, tightened credit restrictions, an expanded role for private enterprise, and a sharp increase in efforts to attract foreign investment. Statements by MPLA officials also seem to bear out both the purposeful modeling of the program after IMF conditionality and the claim that the government hopes that the program will be helpful in attracting IMF support. We believe, however, that the abundance of high-level, credible public debate and discussion about the SEF lends credence to the argument that the government's purpose—in addition to attracting IMF support—is also to improve economic performance.

The SEF Program—More Debate than Action
"The issue centers on the one hand, the need for the economy to be efficient so socialism can be built and, on the other hand, the need to preserve the ethical principles of socialism to protect the worker." —An Angolan official.

Before the program was started last January, press accounts stressed that it would be modeled after reformist patterns of East European socialism—particularly that of Hungary—rather than Western capitalism. These accounts said that the program would be put under the direction of a technical team established within an Angolan-Hungarian secretariat, and that the Hungarians would be the chief advisers on its implementation.

However, indicate that the model that dos Santos and other supporters of the SEF have in mind remains similar to the East European reformist economies, in which major industries deemed to be "strategic" are maintained under government control and operation, and activities such as retail trade, handicrafts, and small farming are open to individual enterprise.

Despite extensive rhetorical support for reform, Luanda has not undertaken any modification of its socialist system so far, and the government and the black marketeers remain the only actors in the economic arena. There have been no moves toward devaluation, credit control, privatizing government corporations, and increasing financial incentives:

- No date has been set for devaluing Angola's currency,
- Some official rhetoric appears to pinpoint a number of economic sectors—retail and transit trade, transportation, construction, agriculture, and handicrafts—as "areas favorable to development of the private sector," but other discussions by dos Santos note that the intention of the SEF is "not to reprivatise," but only to introduce financial incentives in order to make management more efficient.
- Which state corporations would be privatized and what degree of direct government control would be maintained over those remaining in the state sector also are being defined and debated, and technocrats are still working on new labor laws, banking legislation, and rules for management of treasury assets.

Nevertheless, ancillary measures have begun to pay off for Luanda in its push for debt rescheduling from Western countries and for IMF membership. Following dos Santos's trip to Western Europe in late 1987, Luanda reached debt rescheduling agreements with France.
Angola: The "Candonga"

The four major black markets in Luanda are known as the "Tourada," "Roque Santeiro," "Cala A Bocu," and "Tira Biguina," according to press reports. They are headed by Angolan refugees from Zaire ("Zairistas"), and are located in the vicinity of the city's large dumps. Likened to "poison mushrooms in the Angolan economy" by government officials, they are not subject to price control, taxation, or policing. Although illegal, they are not actively impeded by the government, and are accepted by the citizenry as necessary to daily survival. Similar markets exist in Angola's other principal cities, such as Huambo, Lubango, and Menongue.

Press reports indicate that, in contrast to bare government stores, virtually any item, from peanuts to television sets, can by purchased at the black markets, but that prices are extremely high. A sample of recent prices at the official exchange rate, for example, indicated average levels of about $270 for a pair of pants, $500 for a pair of men's shoes, $32 for a kilogram (2.2 pounds) of corn flour, $17 for a tube of toothpaste, and $5,900 for a bicycle.

1 Roughly translated, "Tourada," which may be derived from the term for bullfighting, is related to the concept of fierce competition where elbowing and pushing is required to have success; "Roque Santeiro" is the name of a character suspected of dealing in the black market in a popular Brazilian soap opera shown on Angolan TV; "Cala A Bocu" stems from the idea that if someone does something for you, you must "keep your mouth shut"; and "Tira Biguina," arises from the perception that prices are too high and bargaining so ruthless that one runs the risk of being kicked out of their underwear (bikini).

($105 million), the United Kingdom ($48 million), Austria ($11 million), Denmark ($8 million), and Belgium ($5 million). These were followed more recently by an agreement with Brazil ($63 million).

Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Portugal also are rescheduling repayments. Angola has applied for IMF and World Bank membership, and expects to discuss membership and loan eligibility with missions from these two institutions later this year.

The potential for improved economic performance on the premise that the SEF program will be implemented probably has helped attract foreign aid and investment. Major recent aid commitments include $30 million for agricultural projects from France, $300 million over three years for irrigation, fisheries, and transport from Italy, and $75 million for emergency food aid from the EC. In addition to heavy investment in oil production, sketchy press reporting indicates some foreign interest in such diverse projects as pharmaceutical processing and storage complexes (Indian, British, and French companies), and truck assembly and repair (Brazil).

Obstacles to Implementation

"The major risk is eclecticism, improvisation's twin sister." — MPLA Central Committee Secretariat.

Luanda faces major obstacles to implementing the portions of the SEF program that would turn the domestic economy toward liberalized socialism. Many hardline government officials, probably with the support of Cuban advisers, are unwilling to reconcile socialist ideals with economic practicalities.

Although dos Santos has come out strongly in favor of the program in numerous speeches, his actions so far reflect ambivalence on how much reform he is willing to tolerate. Soon after he initiated the SEF program, dos Santos fired its leading opponent—Maria Mambo Cafè—
and assumed her portfolio as Minister of State for Economic and Social Affairs himself. More recently, however, he fired one of the chief architects of the program, Jose Manuel Cerqueira, and the director of the technical team charged with implementing SEF measures, Mario Nelson Maximilo, (both described as "Angolan yuppies") on the grounds that they were too outspoken in their support for change and were deviating too much from socialist principles.

The loss of Cerqueira and Maximilo will aggravate the severe shortage of qualified technicians and managers and further impede implementation of the program, in our judgment. The dearth of capable people already has contributed to imprecision and muddled language that have forced several revisions in early drafts of the SEF guidelines. Press reporting indicates confusion and uncertainty among MPLA party officials about many practical issues likely to be raised by reform. Debate is continuing, for example, on the problems of dealing with unemployment that would likely result from forcing enterprises to operate efficiently, and on whether and how to lure existing black market businesses into legal operations so they would be subject to government taxes and regulations.

Other issues still under discussion in official circles relate to devaluation, rationing, and hoarding:

- Any large devaluation apparently would have serious—but undefined—consequences for Luanda's earnings from oil exports under the terms of existing contracts with the Western oil companies operating the oil wells, according to press reports. The SEF program, however, has little chance of being effective without devaluation, in view of current black market exchange rates that range as high as 70 times the official rate—more than 2,000 kwanzas per $1 versus an official rate of 29.68 kwanzas per $1.

- Whether, and how soon, the "food basket" system of rationing should be dropped in favor of market distribution is another point of contention because the existing system apparently favors ruling Party officials.

- Debate also is continuing on how to tax large stocks of kwanzas accumulated by individuals from black market activities.

**Outlook**

We believe that Luanda will implement at least a watered-down version of the SEF program, but that this may not occur until 1989. Pressure for fast action has been relieved somewhat by increased foreign exchange earnings from oil exports, up from about $1.9 billion in 1987 to nearly $2.4 billion this year. Angolan policymakers also may hope that pressures for economic reform may be eased if a settlement can be reached with South Africa in US-brokered talks that would lead to a phased Cuban troop withdrawal and would lessen the costs of prosecuting the civil war. In any case, the need for Luanda to focus diplomatic resources on peace talks with Pretoria almost certainly has pushed the SEF program onto the back burner, and may even have led dos Santos to shelve the issue temporarily.

Nevertheless, officials at the head of the reform effort, including van Dunem Loy, appear to remain hopeful that implementation measures will be approved and published this fall. Although dos Santos is preoccupied with negotiating an end to the war, we believe that he continues to support the SEF, and will try to mend the damage done by firing Cerqueira and Maximilo as soon as it is politically feasible. Moreover, if the IMF moves to accept Angola's membership application, it could induce Luanda to accelerate the pace of reform, in our judgment.

*This article is Secret*
Military Developments

STAFF NOTES
CUBA: Plan for Troop Withdrawal from Angola

Cuba reportedly plans to begin a major withdrawal of troops from Angola, thousands of Cuban troops would leave Angola within the first quarter of 1977.

Cuban leaders last spring and summer made public statements that a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, ranging from 200 to 250 men a week, had begun or would occur. Although the number of Cuban troops in Angola has declined slightly, we estimate that 10,000 to 14,500 troops remain.

There are several reasons why a troop withdrawal from Angola might be attractive to the Cubans. Cuban casualties in the ongoing pacification effort are reportedly heavy, although Havana has not admitted it publicly. The risk of casualties in these counter-guerrilla operations is high and probably has contributed to growing morale problems among troops in Angola and to the recent increase in desertions from Cuban units there.

It will be some time, however, before Marxist MPLA forces are able to operate effectively without Cuban assistance. Active participation of Cuban troops will be needed until MPLA forces can pacify the country-side—about half of which is still contested by antigovernment insurgents.
Weekly Summary
CONTENTS (February 13, 1976)

MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA

1 Angola: Movement Onslaught

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary.

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
ANGOLA: MOVEMENT ONSLAUGHT

The Popular Movement, spearheaded by Cuban troops using Soviet-supplied armor, scored major gains this week against the forces of its adversaries, who appear unlikely to be able to wage conventional warfare much longer. With the Movement on the way to occupying the remaining population centers, African states that had resisted the Luanda regime's push for acceptance as the government of Angola at the OAU meeting last month are jumping on the bandwagon. Many African states, including some that came out for the Popular Movement before it established its ascendancy, are looking for ways to promote a political accommodation between the Movement and its two rivals, but so far Movement leader Agostinho Neto has shown no willingness to listen.

Military Situation

Huambo, Angola's second largest city, was taken early on February 9 by a Popular Movement force that reportedly consisted of several thousand Cubans backed by T-34 tanks, helicopters, and 122-mm. rockets. Huambo had also served as the capital of the nominal joint government proclaimed last November by the National Union and National Front; the few "administrators" in residence evacuated the city in advance of its fall. In acknowledging the loss of Huambo, a spokesman for the southern-based National Union indicated publicly this week that his group would not be able to field a conventional force for long and would have to revert to the guerrilla tactics it had long employed against the Portuguese. He vowed, however, that the Union would fight on. National Union forces that had been defending Huambo withdrew to Ble, the group's main military headquarters. That city fell on February 11, and Union President Savimbi has withdrawn to the remote southern town of Vila Serpa Pinto.

The Popular Movement's drive into the National Union's tribal territory made progress along the coast, too. On February 10, a Movement force apparently occupied the vital Benguela-Lobito port and rail complex. Union troops in the area were reportedly ordered last weekend to begin withdrawing southward. Neto's forces may next concentrate their main efforts on extending and consolidating their hold over the populous central area and the Benguela Railway lifeline. Luso, in eastern Angola, is sure to be an early target.

In northern Angola, tank-led Cuban and Popular Movement forces advancing from Ambrazete took Tomboco and the coastal port of
Santo Antonio do Zaire last weekend. The Front has apparently also evacuated Maquela do Zombo and will probably soon abandon Sao Salvador, its last position of any size. Most of the Front's forces have retreated into Zaire.

Political Developments

Cameroon extended official recognition to the Luanda regime last week, and Uganda, Togo, Gabon Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta followed suit this week. The Neto regime now has been formally accepted by 30 of the 46 member states of the Organization of African Unity. Most, if not all of the rest, are likely to fall into line before long; even Zairian President Mobutu, Neto's long-time enemy, is apparently trying to work out a modus vivendi with the Popular Movement. In any event, the Movement's new diplomatic gains ended any doubts about whether it would be seated as the government of Angola at the OAU ministerial meeting that is apparently still scheduled for later this month.

Uganda's action gave the Movement a special boost, inasmuch as President Amin had played an important role in his capacity as OAU chairman in the effort to check the Neto group's drive for acceptance as the sole government of Angola. In a telegram to Neto, Amin explained that Uganda was extending recognition because the Popular Movement had been endorsed by a majority of OAU states and thus was "automatically entitled" to full OAU membership.

With the deterioration of its military and political position, the National Union has stepped up its efforts to get talks going with Neto on a possible coalition government for Angola. An approach last month to Kenya to act as go-between got nowhere; Nairobi recently informed Savimbi that Neto was unresponsive to its overtures.

The Union is now looking to Nigeria. Although Nigeria recognized the Popular Movement regime last November and has given it strong diplomatic support, Lagos has continued to favor some kind of accommodation between the warring Angolan groups.

The Nigerians agreed last week to relay to Neto a message from Savimbi proposing discussions in Lusaka, Zambia. There are some signs that the Nigerians are becoming increasingly anxious to end the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola and consider a reconciliation between the Popular Movement and the National Union as a necessary precondition. Neto, however, is apparently still adamantly resisting all efforts to move him toward any coalition arrangement, even one limited to the National Union as a decided junior partner.

Nigerian Connection

Nigeria's commitment to the Popular Movement is underscored by a tentative new aid agreement negotiated last month with the Neto regime. Nigeria has already provided some $22 million in economic aid. Under the new agreement, Lagos would:

- Send small contingents of army and police officers to help train Popular Movement troops and internal security forces.
- Assist in establishing military and civilian medical facilities.
- Make a large financial grant to assist the Popular Movement in Angola's postwar rehabilitation.

With its new aid offer, Nigeria may also be trying to show the Movement that it does not have to look exclusively to the Soviet Union and Cuba, but can count on other sources of assistance. The Nigerians accepted the extensive Soviet and Cuban role in Angola in recent months as a necessary expedient but are concerned lest the Popular Movement find itself so dependent on Moscow and Havana that its freedom of action is circumscribed.
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*Staff Notes: Military Developments* are prepared for the internal use of CIA and reflect the immediate views of analysts in the Office of Strategic Research. Observations and queries may be directed to the analyst named following each item.
CUBA-ANGOLA: No Progress Against UNITA

Reporting by a US journalist who accompanied National Union (UNITA) guerrillas in southern Angola for seven and one-half months clearly states most completely in open sources to date that Cuban troops have not pacified the countryside and that Havana's forces face a deteriorating military situation throughout the country, especially in the UNITA strongholds in the south.

Cuban troops have been put on the defensive by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas and have made no inroads into territory under the influence of that group.

UNITA, expanded to about 10,000-12,000 guerrillas and 8,000 trainees, enjoys the widespread support of most of the five million Ovimbundo tribe inhabiting the south, and has seized the initiative in the struggle. Havana dispatched an additional 3,000-4,000 troops to Angola in May and June, bringing total Cuban manpower there to between 17,000 and 20,000 military and civilian personnel. The new troops, however, will still probably not be enough to reverse the momentum of the counter-insurgency campaign. Moreover, it appears uncertain whether even a further reinforcement of the same number could permanently quell the armed resistance from UNITA and the other anti-government guerrilla groups.

The Cubans have not conducted an effective anti-guerrilla campaign, according to many observers. The journalist's UNITA sources remarked that some of the heavy Cuban weapons, presumably tanks and large-caliber artillery, are unsuited for counterinsurgency operations and that Havana's forces do not employ small unit tactics, thereby forfeiting the element of surprise.

Throughout most of this year Cuban forces have been reluctant until recently to move out of larger cities and pursue the guerrillas.

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September 1, 1977

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Cuban troops have, however, recently increased their activities in southern Angola. Over the past month, the great majority of Cuban and Soviet support flights within Angola have been concentrated in the south, coinciding with the campaign against UNITA.

Havana's forces face especially difficult obstacles in the south. Logistical support from cities in the north—a problem under the best of circumstances—is now more sporadic as UNITA has cut many supply lines. Moreover, any government or Cuban drive would be hampered by lack of support from the local population which increasingly regards Havana's troops as an occupation force.

Nevertheless, further Cuban operations may be mounted against the guerrillas, possibly including increased use of close air support as well as further heliborne and mechanized operations. Defense minister Raul Castro visited Angola last week, probably to assess for himself the military situation. President Neto accompanied Raul Castro back to Cuba, reportedly to discuss the problem of UNITA resistance. No evidence of a further Cuban troop buildup exists, and the continuing airlift between Cuba and Angola is simply to rotate personnel.

The pressures which UNITA and other groups have placed on Cuban units make it unlikely that President Castro would open a second front in Africa with combat troops, although he has publicly stated that Cuba would help the "front-line" states—if asked—in the event of a major Rhodesian attack against them. Reinforcement in May and June probably has allowed a small number of Cuban personnel, however, to be freed to train forces elsewhere in Africa.

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[Staff Notes: Military Developments are prepared for the internal use of CIA and reflect the immediate views of analysts in the Office of Strategic Research. Observations and queries may be directed to the analyst named following each item.]

Top Secret

September 1, 1977

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
In their advisory role in Angola the Cubans have not succeeded in their attempts to turn the Angolan troops into a credible force. They are disillusioned with the Angolan forces and regard them as primitive and reluctant to fight. While shortcomings of MPLA forces could be more a measure of Angolan ineptitude than Cuban training, it is now an open question whether Havana's military aid programs ensure the transformation of a trainee/recipient force into an effective fighting unit.

The Cubans continue to pay a high price for their efforts in Angola. The most recent campaigns in Bie, Benguela, and Huambo provinces have cost the Cubans 30 killed and five captured. Their casualties since involvement in the struggle are probably at least 2,000 killed, wounded, and missing. UNITA has claimed that its forces killed about 1,000 Cuban troops in 1976, although this figure could be exaggerated. Whatever the number, Cuban officials have never announced the casualty rate. These casualties as well as the extension of tours of duty in Angola from 12 to 16 or more months have also had a negative effect on Cuban morale.
ANNEX

Angola

I. FAPLA Strength

We estimate Angola has some 30,000 men in its army (roughly double the number in the insurgent forces) and almost 1,000 each in the navy and air force. In addition to small arms, we estimate that Angola's military inventory includes nearly 200 Soviet medium tanks and at least 25 operational fighter aircraft. Despite its superiority in manpower and weaponry, Luanda has not been able to contain the guerrilla insurgency.

II. UNITA Strength

About 15,000-20,000 trained National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrillas are operating in south and central Angola. The insurgents lack effective air defense weapons and heavy equipment to combat government forces. Foreign military support to UNITA, much of it from France and Arab countries, has included mainly light weapons and ammunition.
### III. Angola: Cuban Advisors

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<td>26,500-27,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>19-20,000</td>
<td>15-16,000</td>
<td>19-20,000</td>
<td>19-20,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,000</td>
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At least 3,000 Cuban troops departed in mid-1976, but were replaced in 1977.

### IV. Angola: USSR and Cuban Military Aid

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<td>Deliveries</td>
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<td>117</td>
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V. Angola: USSR Economic Aid

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1. No data is available on Cuban economic aid to Angola.

VI. Angola: Population, by Tribal Groups (Mid-1978)

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<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>Black Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ovimbundu</td>
<td>1,999,000</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakongo</td>
<td>1,483,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kimbundu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lunda-Chokwe</td>
<td>451,500</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
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<td>Mestizo</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Soviets</td>
<td>Cubans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,890-3,090</td>
<td>35,675-37,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>19,000-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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1 Preliminary data.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet and Cuban Civilian Presence, 31 December 1977

<table>
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<td>5,885</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
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<td>400</td>
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Ethiopia: Economic Aid

Communist donors committed $500 million in aid to Ethiopia in 1954-78 -- the USSR $105 million; Eastern Europe $300 million; and the PRC $100 million. Despite recent rumors of large new Soviet credits for development, new Communist assistance since 1974 has been limited to $270 million from East Germany and Czechoslovakia. At year-end 1978, about $400 million was still outstanding for delivery. Soviet drawings on commitments have lagged, particularly in recent years, averaging less than $2 million, although in 1978 deliveries could have risen as high as $10 or $15 million. In addition, a trade deficit of nearly $30 million in the Soviet-Ethiopian account in 1977 may have been funded by the Soviets. East European deliveries have been similarly low, about $2 million annually, except for relief deliveries totaling $6 million in 1977. China's deliveries have averaged about $5 million a year resulting in a 20% drawdown of its aid.

Reports indicate few new Western undertakings since 1977 although existing commitments were being honored. Until last year Western nations had been the principal mainstay of Addis Ababa's economy, with $150 million deliveries per year.

#### Military

**Soviet Military Advisors/Technicians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-country yearend 1977</td>
<td>400-600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-country yearend 1978</td>
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**Ethiopian Military Trainees sent to USSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Number of Persons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(air) (250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ground) (175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(naval) (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(air) (125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ground) (700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(naval) (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economic

**Soviet Civil Technicians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present 1977</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present 1978</td>
<td>600</td>
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**Ethiopians sent to the USSR for training**

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Total</td>
<td>1,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free World Total</td>
<td>310</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA**</td>
<td>203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* 1978 data are preliminary estimates and may be considerably higher.
** Fiscal year figures.
SECRET

BRIEF TO: DIRECTOR 168501

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF OCPAS MEA 80-173 FOR 26 JULY 1990.

FROM: DDI/0/CPAS.

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST AREA BRIEF OCPAS MEA 80/173 FOR 26 JULY 1990.

CONTENTS

5. USSR: MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA CRITICIZED
6. USSR: MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA CRITICIZED

IZVESTIYA HAS DENOUNCED THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. IN THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES CRITICAL OF MOSCOW'S MILITARY SUPPORT TO THIRD WORLD REGIMES, IT FAULTED ESPECIALLY THE ROLE SOVIET ADVISERS PLAYED IN HELPING PLAN THE RECENT NAMIBA OFFENSIVE, WHICH "SHARPLY EXACERBATED" THE SITUATION. CALLING THE WAR SENSELESS, THE AUTHOR WONDERED HOW SOVIET EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SQUARE WITH THE USSR'S INVOLVEMENT WITH AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION. HE LAMENTED THE SECRECY SURROUNDING THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY AID GIVEN TO ANGOLA AND URGED THE US AND SOVIETS TO HELP PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

COMMENT: THE SOVIETS HAVE 1,100 TO 1,200 MILITARY ADVISERS IN ANGOLA AND SHOW NO SIGN OF DRAWING THEM DOWN, AS THEY HAVE FROM ETHIOPIA AND MOZAMBIQUE. THE IZVESTIYA PIECE APPEARS MEANT TO SPUR PUBLIC AND LEGISLATIVE DEBATE ON THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING MILITARY SUPPORT TO ANGOLA IN AN ERA OF CONSTRAINED RESOURCES AND AS MOSCOW PROMOTES REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS. IZVESTIYA HAS ALSO HARSHLY CRITICIZED SOVIET MILITARY AID RELATIONSHIPS WITH ETHIOPIA AND SYRIA; IT HAS REVIEWED MORE FAVORABLY THE USSR'S PROFITABLE ARMS RELATIONS WITH