Angola: Near-Term Implications of Negotiations

Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

This Memorandum represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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Key Judgments

Whatever the outcome of US-mediated negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, neither the Angolan Government nor the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency is likely to gain a decisive military advantage in the next six to 12 months. Success in achieving an agreement linking Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to independence for neighboring Namibia, while not ending the Angolan civil war, would clear the way for dialogue on an internal settlement. Failure to reach an accord would intensify the Angolan conflict and raise chances for direct clashes between South Africa and Cuba along the Angola-Namibia border.

The acceleration in the negotiations and the willingness of the participants to discuss the issues seriously follow a major change in Cuba’s posture over the past year that has altered the balance of forces in the region and challenged South Africa’s military hegemony. The talks have significantly narrowed differences among the parties, with the remaining issues focused on the timing and pace of Cuban troop withdrawal. To maximize protection of the Luanda regime, Cuba and Angola want a longer timetable than does South Africa, which seeks a rapid Cuban exit.

Objectives
Cuban President Castro believes the negotiations offer him the best chance for an honorable withdrawal from a protracted and increasingly costly war, although his conditions require survival of the Angolan regime and independence for Namibia. The Angolan Government is more hesitant than Havana to take risks with the timing of a Cuban withdrawal, but believes a settlement will put it in a better position to conclude the war on acceptable terms by removing South African support for UNITA.

Pretoria wants to avoid an escalating conflict and believes that the talks offer the least costly way out of Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria is not desperate and is not interested in an agreement that threatens its long-term security interests in the region.

* Due to the sensitivity of ongoing US-mediated negotiations, distribution of this Memorandum has been restricted. Recipients should not give the document any further dissemination.

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Secret
The Soviet Union and UNITA are also key players. The Soviets seek the removal of South African forces from Namibia and a settlement that leaves their Angolan client relatively secure. Such an outcome would be consistent with Moscow’s efforts to reduce costly support to clients fighting insurgencies, improve relations with the United States, and promote a less threatening image internationally. UNITA generally supports the negotiations, but is concerned about how an agreement would affect prospects for its primary goal—an internal political settlement that provides for a power-sharing arrangement with the government.

Alternative Scenarios
Agreement on a regional settlement would gradually take Cuban forces out of the fight, but Cuba and the Soviet Union would rely on military advisers and continued arms aid to ensure that they maintained their influence in Angola. Luanda intends initially to continue military operations against UNITA, pressure on Zaire to sever remaining outside support, and intensification of its clemency campaign. Loss of Cuban support, however, would make Luanda scale back on more ambitious military campaigns. UNITA would sustain its military activity to show it had not been hurt by a settlement and continue pressure on Luanda for reconciliation. South Africa would continue covert materiel support to UNITA.

If the negotiations fail to produce a settlement, Cuba would attempt to step up pressure on South Africa, although short of launching a full-scale attack on Namibia. Castro would seek to limit his risks by encouraging infiltration into Namibia by the South-West Africa People’s Organization and a major Angolan offensive into UNITA-held southeastern Angola. Meanwhile, Cuban forces would be prepared to retaliate if South Africa reentered Angola. South Africa would defend Namibia, but realizes that a preemptive attack on Cuban forces would entail unacceptable costs. Pretoria might hesitate to commit a large force to fight at UNITA’s side again.

Implications for the United States
A successful outcome to the negotiations would enhance the opportunities to promote national reconciliation. Luanda’s attitude would depend on its perception of the military situation, however; if it believed UNITA were gravely weakened by loss of all outside support, it probably would hold back from serious talks. Moreover, if UNITA perceived that it had lost US support, it might reject a US role.

Even if the talks fail, the parties probably would still be interested in an eventual resolution of the conflict short of all-out war and might seek renewal of US-mediated talks at a later date. The parties could, however, look for another mediator and threaten to freeze the United States out of participation in a major regional settlement.
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Discussion

Status of the Negotiations

The US-mediated negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa continue after having made substantial progress through seven rounds. Talks during May in London, followed by rounds in Cairo, New York, Geneva, and lately in Brazzaville, have pushed the process along to where agreement has been reached on a settlement framework that links South African implementation of UNSCR 435 for Namibian independence to a total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The negotiations have established a sequence of key steps and provisional dates for reaching a regional settlement that would culminate in implementation of UNSCR 435 beginning as early as 1 November.

In addition, the parties have agreed to a cessation of hostilities in southern Angola to reduce the chances of an escalation prior to reaching a settlement. South Africa pulled its remaining troops out of Angola and the Cubans promised not to move south beyond their present forward positions. The military standoff is being monitored by a joint military commission (Cuba, Angola, South Africa) from posts along the Angola-Namibia border. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), not a party to the talks, has refused to abide by a cease-fire, but has offered to conclude one with Cuba.

The talks have now come down to the contentious issue of timing and pace for a total Cuban troop withdrawal, which has been the focus of talks in...
proposed. Room for compromise still exists, however, and the parties are considering various formulations.

Other issues have emerged during the discussions or in bilateral contacts, but are not formally part of the agenda. The United States is urging an end to the civil war through national reconciliation and an internal political settlement between the Angolan Government and UNITA. Luanda is pressing Washington to end support to UNITA, and Pretoria has raised concerns about African National Congress camps in Angola, financial costs of a settlement, and modifications to the decade-old UN SCR 435. The ANC issue may have been used as a sweetener in moving toward a settlement.

Objectives of the Players

The recent acceleration in the negotiating process and the willingness of the Cuban, Angolan, and South African participants to discuss the issues seriously follow directly from a major change in the military situation over the past year. In response to the unprecedented scale of South African involvement on the side of UNITA in late 1987, Cuba sent about 15,000 well-equipped and trained troops to Angola—bringing its total to over 50,000 men—and adopted a more combative strategy. This altered the balance of forces in the region and challenged South Africa’s military hegemony (see annex).

Although they are not direct participants in the negotiations, the Soviet Union and UNITA are key players. A Soviet observer has been available at each round of talks and has intervened informally to keep the negotiations on track. UNITA is following the talks, albeit at a distance, and has asserted its presence vocally and by military action to ensure that its interests are taken into account.

Cuba

After 13 years of military involvement in Angola, Cuban President Castro probably believes the current negotiations offer him the best chance for withdrawing Cuban troops under his requirement for honorable conditions. Cuba’s decision last year to reinforce its troop strength in Angola—and go beyond its largely defensive role by moving troops to the frontlines—was motivated by a desire to save Luanda from looming defeat and to force an end to longstanding South African intervention, either by negotiations or direct military action.

A negotiated withdrawal, portrayed as a victory, would provide an escape from a war that was proving unwinnable as long as Pretoria’s involvement continued. In Castro’s view, Namibian independence would effectively end direct South African military intervention on UNITA’s behalf and cut materiel support by isolating the insurgents from their primary backer. Angola is also increasingly unable to pay for Cuban services—its debt may now total some $500 million—and the Cuban population is unenthusiastic about endless foreign adventures.

Nevertheless, Castro’s bottom-line conditions for a settlement require the survival of the Angolan regime along with Namibian independence from South Africa. Castro apparently is under no immediate domestic or foreign pressure to leave Angola short of his objectives. The regime’s propaganda apparatus has been preparing the Cuban population for increased casualties and additional fighting if the talks break down.

Angola

The Angolan Government shares Havana’s basic assumptions about the military situation and the negotiations. Luanda is frustrated by its inability to fight both South Africa and UNITA and sees a regional settlement as the best way to remove South Africa from the scene, even if it eventually loses support from Cuban combat forces. The government urgently sought Cuban augmentation last year and urged the Cubans to take a more direct combat role to drive the South Africans out of Angola. Nevertheless, Angolan leaders also have grown weary of the prolonged, expensive and overbearing Cuban presence.
The Angolan regime—with its own security at stake—is more hesitant than Havana to take risks with the timing of a Cuban troop withdrawal. There have been reports of friction between Luanda and Havana over this issue. Some in the Angolan hierarchy have argued against concessions, but the Angolans probably have little choice but to follow Cuba's lead.

Luanda believes a troop withdrawal agreement that removes South African forces from Namibia would put it in a better position to conclude the civil war on its terms. Luanda agrees that an internal political settlement eventually will be needed to end the war, but has so far proposed only a clemency program for individual UNITA members. The Angolan regime shies from political reconciliation that would involve sharing power with the insurgents or a role for Savimbi, despite counseling from its Cuban and Soviet allies and several African leaders. The government has attempted to defer pressure for reconciliation by arguing that a troop withdrawal agreement must be achieved first.

South Africa

Surprised by the Cuban military moves and the change in the military balance, Pretoria now calculates that it would have to pay a stiff price were it forced into a larger conflict. In addition to increased military risks, high financial costs of Namibian occupation and rising domestic criticism of military operations in Angola have encouraged Pretoria to negotiate seriously.

As a result, many South African officials apparently argue that the time has come to end South Africa's 73-year rule in Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria does not view the current military situation with desperation and is not interested in settling for an agreement that, in its view, threatens its long-term security interests and regional role. South Africa views defense of Namibian territory against possible Cuban aggression as intrinsic to its security and faces little domestic opposition to this position. Moreover, Pretoria is adamant that its participation in the negotiations not be perceived as a sign of military weakness. South Africa has recently strengthened its forces in Namibia to improve its defenses in the event that the talks break down.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union is interested in a settlement as long as it provides for removal of South African forces from Namibia and leaves its Angolan client relatively secure. This approach is in line with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's overall efforts to reduce costs of supporting client states fighting insurgencies, improve relations with the United States by displaying flexibility on regional conflicts, and promote a less threatening image internationally. Moscow expects that a Cuban troop withdrawal will reduce its financial burden, now running at about $1.5 billion annually in arms aid alone.

Continuing Soviet arms deliveries and support for Cuban troop augmentation suggest a calculation that military strength will allow Cuba and Angola to extract as many concessions as possible from the South Africans. At the same time, however, Moscow has given some indication that it wants to avoid the political and economic costs of an escalation in the conflict and has sought to keep the talks from breaking down. The Soviets probably believe that the Angolan Army will be able to cope with UNITA after a settlement and that Luanda will be in a position to deal confidently with UNITA in any internal political negotiations.

UNITA

UNITA's primary goal is to achieve an internal political settlement that provides recognition and a power-sharing arrangement for the movement and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi's immediate objective is to get direct negotiations with Luanda under way while international attention is focused on the US-brokered talks. Savimbi argues that a regional settlement will be unworkable without a total cease-fire and a negotiated end to the civil war. To this end, he is seeking international support for internal reconciliation and engagement of African leaders in mediation efforts.

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1 For a full discussion of Soviet long-term objectives in the region, see Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11/70-85 (Secret) [February 1987, Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activities in Southern Africa Through 1986].
Although Savimbi is generally supportive of the negotiations, he sees both advantages and disadvantages to a regional settlement. Withdrawal of some 50,000 Cuban troops would improve the balance of forces for UNITA, even at the expense of losing South African support.

Neither Savimbi nor UNITA is prepared to quit if a regional settlement reduces foreign involvement but leaves the fratricidal civil war unresolved. Even a substantial loss of outside support would not diminish the movement’s dedication to its goals. Nevertheless, Savimbi’s greatest immediate concern is not that UNITA will be destroyed, but that its prospects of achieving its political goals will recede in the face of another prolonged period of guerrilla war in which UNITA is increasingly isolated and vulnerable.

AlTERNATIVES IF THE NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED

Successful conclusion to the negotiations would involve formal agreement by Cuba, Angola, and South Africa under the principles set in New York and approved subsequent to the Geneva talks. These principles set the date for South African implementation of UNSCR 435, a transition to Namibian independence, and Cuban agreement to begin withdrawal of its military forces from Angola at a specified pace within a set deadline. The parties also accepted other conditions—such as a commitment to cease hostilities and respect borders—intended to build confidence and smooth the way to a final settlement. The agreements do not directly address the civil war and the issue of national reconciliation.

Failure, on the other hand, would entail assertion by any of the participants to the negotiations that no further progress is likely, compromise unattainable, and continued involvement useless. This reaction could be provoked by the belief that other participants are purposefully dragging out the talks or stalling to gain time.

Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, neither the Angolan Government nor UNITA is likely to gain a decisive military advantage in the next six to 12 months. Success would immediately reduce the risk of Cuban–South African conflict along the border but would not necessarily reduce the level of fighting between Angolan forces and UNITA. Failure would risk bringing reinforced Cuban and South African military forces into direct confrontation.

If the Negotiations Succeed

Cuba and South Africa would honor commitments made in the talks, but each would be suspicious of the other and alert for signs of cheating. Signing of a treaty would lead to an almost immediate standoff of South African forces under supervision of UN peacekeeping forces. Cuban forces would begin to pull back from the Namibian border and some would begin preparations for return to Cuba.

Both Cuba and the Soviet Union would seek to maintain their influence in Angola. In any case, Soviet involvement in Angolan affairs would not be seriously affected by a settlement. Moscow provides most of Luanda’s weapons and countrywide airlift, trains most of the senior officers, and has some 1,200 advisers attached to senior and midlevel commands. Although a settlement could lead to a reduction in Moscow’s military support, the Soviets have indicated that they intend to continue aid at a level they deem necessary to support Angolan operations against UNITA. Havana has already begun to assert more control over Luanda’s defense and security apparatus and is increasing its influence within Angola’s Interior Ministry. Castro almost certainly believes that a strengthened advisory presence would sustain Havana’s influence with Luanda after his combat troops depart.

Luanda probably intends, at least initially after a regional settlement, to stay with the general aims of the strategy against UNITA that it already has formulated: continue the war through pressure on...
UNITA-held territory in the southeast and counterguerrilla operations elsewhere; sever UNITA from
outside support by pressuring remaining backers; and
intensify the clemency campaign to split the insurgent
leadership and sow dissent in UNITA ranks.

Nevertheless, many of the departing Cuban troops
would have to be replaced by Angolans, and the
Angolan Army—already stretched thin—would have
to scale back on more ambitious operations to secure
important urban areas, garrisons, and vital economic
targets. Even though capture of Jamba will continue
to be one of Luanda's primary objectives, a force for
such an effort is not currently available for renewal of
a major offensive like the one in 1987. The govern-
ment probably will not be ready until next year, and a
successful campaign to take Jamba probably would,
in any event, entail several years of fighting. Luanda
also may have in mind a series of smaller, more
regionally focused offensives, like the one just con-
cluded at Munhango in central Angola, or other
operations intended to isolate UNITA's regional com-
ponents.
Cuban Troop Repatriation

It is unlikely that Castro would attempt immediately to redeploy large numbers of Cuban troops from Angola to another client state. Rather than involve Cuban troops in another regional conflict, Castro probably would concentrate on absorbing the returning Cuban forces and resolving other domestic problems. Approximately 15,000 of the troops belong to regular military units and would return to their garrisons on the island. Almost all the remaining troops are reservists who would be phased into the Cuban economy gradually over the withdrawal period, although some almost certainly would be converted into advisers and remain in Angola.

In addition, reactivation of the Mariel Accord, which provides for the emigration of up to 20,000 Cubans annually to the United States, also would help offset any problems associated with absorbing large numbers of returnees.

Luanda sees Zaire as the most important regional supporter of UNITA after South Africa and has charged that UNITA’s use of Zairian territory allows the insurgents to support guerrilla operations in the north and to infiltrate supplies. In the aftermath of a settlement, Luanda probably would focus on Zaire as UNITA’s remaining means of access to the outside and use a combination of cajolery, blandishments, and threats to discourage Zairian support for UNITA. For example, the Angolan Government might sponsor infiltration of Zairian disdient factions and even direct cross-border raids.

Luanda probably would drag its feet on an internal political settlement in the hope that its “harmonization” or clemency program would show some progress. The government’s aims are to deny recognition of UNITA as a political movement and reject Savimbi’s involvement in the political process, although it might entertain compromises. Luanda has recently indicated that it is willing to consider a more conciliatory approach and deal with African mediators. Still, Luanda would be likely to keep the military pressure on UNITA to maintain its bargaining position and probably hopes that military gains would enable it to compel acceptance of the harmonization policy. If, on the other hand, government forces fail on the battlefield, Luanda might become more open to African-backed efforts to promote an internal settlement.

For its part, UNITA almost certainly would sustain its military activity to show that it had not been hurt by the settlement and continue pressure to move the government toward reconciliation. The insurgents probably would have stockpiled sufficient supplies to support operations at current levels of activity for a year. UNITA no doubt would, however, closely monitor the levels of outside support, and any suspicion that a support cut was looming probably would lead UNITA to implement organizational changes more in line with a protracted conflict. These might include greater concentration on guerrilla units, a corresponding deemphasis of larger, semiconventional military units, and conservation of resources. Savimbi is loath to give up UNITA-held territory in the southeast or fixed bases, such as the headquarters at Jamba, however, and he would seek to defend the territory for as long as possible.

Although Pretoria would lose the capability for major direct intervention on UNITA’s behalf, it would provide continuing support to UNITA to maintain some influence in Angolan developments. South African logistic support following a settlement would have to be covert, however, and operational limitations would reduce the quantity that could be delivered. Pretoria realizes that substantial Soviet and Cuban military assistance to Angola will continue after a settlement, and has urged UNITA to reevaluate its organization and tactics to cope with government advantages in conventional forces.
If the Negotiations Fail

Failure to reach a negotiated settlement—whether through outright breakdown of the talks or the prospect of their indefinite prolongation—would leave substantial Cuban and South African military concentrations on the Angola-Namibia border, held in check by a temporary cease-fire. Chances of an inadvertent escalation would increase as each side would be uncertain of the other’s intentions and might overreact to perceived threats. Although both Cuba and Pretoria probably are prepared to deal with or even provoke some escalation in the conflict, both sides appear to have put limits on how far they would be willing to carry the fight. Moreover, even if fighting broke out, they both might be willing to return to the negotiations at a later date if no significant advantage were won by either side.

In the near term—notwithstanding the risk of a wider conflict—Havana would not be satisfied with the status quo and would be willing to ratchet up the military pressure on Pretoria to obtain South African withdrawal from Namibia and an improved military position for the Angolan Government. Purely military resolution of the issue through a full-scale Cuban invasion of Namibia does not appear likely, however. Cuban forces at present lack the size and capability for operations on this scale, and we believe Castro would be very reluctant to incur the inevitable costs of major fighting with South Africa.

Instead, Castro likely would seek both to gain the military initiative and to limit his risks by encouraging infiltration of Namibia by the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and an Angolan Army offensive against UNITA. Cuban forces would be prepared to support and assist these operations and strike back if provoked or if South African forces reentered Angola. In Havana’s view, Pretoria is sensitive to increased white casualties and security costs in Namibia. Castro might calculate that SWAPO’s performance—even though it would not seriously threaten South Africa’s hold on Namibia—would raise the political costs to Pretoria of remaining in Namibia. Additional SWAPO units have already been moved into southwestern Angola where they are supported and sheltered by Cuban units.

Moreover, Castro probably would back another major Angolan offensive against UNITA-held southeastern Angola; although this option would not be immediately available. Some Cuban forces specialists, such as pilots, tank drivers, and artillerymen could become directly involved in eventual fighting, but Castro has repeatedly asserted that the fight against UNITA is Luanda’s responsibility. Castro almost certainly would prefer that Angolan troops bear the brunt of combat and order Cuban troops into the fight only as a last resort. More likely, Cuba would keep its forces in reserve, ready to retaliate if Pretoria again intervened on UNITA’s side. Nonetheless, in anticipation of the increased danger of a wider military engagement arising from these initiatives, Havana would be willing to expand its expeditionary force in Angola if required.

For its part, Pretoria is vitally concerned that it avoid any appearance of military weakness and almost certainly would choose to maintain its hold on Namibia, which is too important to be given up without compensation or a fight. South African officials believe they can defend Namibia against Cuban or SWAPO attacks by stopping small incursions on the border or, in the event of a larger attack, by falling back to lure the invader into overextending itself. Although Pretoria has the capability to mobilize rapidly and deploy large numbers of forces, a direct, preemptive attack on Cuban forces in Angola does not appear likely; cooler heads among the South African military realize that a major escalation would entail unacceptable costs. Nevertheless, Pretoria has suggested that the Cubans are vulnerable to attacks along their lines of communication and might consider harassing operations of this sort.

A repeat of South African intervention in support of UNITA would be problematic. Material support almost certainly would be provided, but South Africa might hesitate to send large military forces to fight at UNITA’s side in the event of another major government offensive. Pretoria would be mindful of the vocal
domestic opposition to its last intervention as well as the threat to its flank posed by Cuban troops in the southwest.

Implications for the United States

The United States is inexorably linked to these negotiations, whatever the outcome, and will receive credit for a success or blame for a failure. If the negotiations lead to a regional settlement, the participants would hold the United States responsible for compliance despite the United Nations' official monitoring role, and charges of cheating or other violations would be directed at the United States for answers or resolution. Moreover, continued civil war despite a regional settlement would bring Zaire under increased Angolan pressure to curtail its assistance to UNITA.

A successful outcome, however, also would raise the opportunity to expand a US peacemaking role, and to encourage Luanda to open discussions with UNITA on the unresolved problems of ending the civil war and national reconciliation. The Angolan Government's attitude would hinge principally on its perception of the military situation: should UNITA make gains despite loss of South African support, Luanda probably would become more disposed toward internal negotiations; alternatively, prospects for further curtailment of UNITA's external backing would encourage the government to hold back from serious talks. UNITA's attitude would also be important. Belief that its interests were slighted during the negotiations or that US support was waning might lead UNITA to reject a US role and hold out for direct talks or another mediator.

In the event of a breakdown, the United States might still remain involved. Even with additional fighting, the parties probably would still be interested in eventual resolution of the conflict short of all-out war. Despite occasional complaints about the US role, the participants have acknowledged the utility of US mediation as a useful framework for talks. There would be a danger, however, that the parties might seek another mediator and threaten to freeze the United States out of participation in a major regional settlement, especially if any of the parties perceived that US policy was becoming hostile to their interests.
Annex

The Military Balance

The Cubans
Augmented since late 1987 by about 15,000 combat troops, including some of its most combat-ready regular units and best commanding officers, the Cuban expeditionary force in Angola now totals about 50,000 combat troops and nine tank brigades. At least five of those brigades and support elements—totaling 35,000 men—are located in the south, below the 13th parallel. This includes some 18,000 troops in the southwest who have changed the military balance in the Angola-Namibia border region. Deployed in a defensive posture along an approximately 50-mile front north of the Cunene River, these southwestern forces could easily move forward to prepared positions less than 10 miles from the Namibian border.

Cuban forces in the southwest are organized into 16 tactical groups, each with 600 to 800 troops, and into combined Cuban-Angolan-SWAPO 300-man infantry battalions. Some are deployed in security detachments; others escort convoys. Each tactical group is organized around a tank battalion and a mechanized infantry company, has its own organic antiaircraft, air defense, artillery, and logistic support units, and operates as an independent maneuver element. Cuban air support is provided by one squadron of 12 MIG-23 aircraft operating out of Cabama Airfield. Two additional squadrons of MIG-23s and one of MIG-21s, also located in the south, could deploy within one day to Cabama to reinforce the Cuban ground forces in the southwest.

Meanwhile, Cuba also has 15,000 forces in northern Angola, defending the Cabinda region, Luanda, ports, and airfields; providing convoy escorts; serving in logistic support centers; or serving as advisers to the Angolan Government and military forces. Of those in the north, probably about 10,000 could be deployed to augment forces in the southwest should a critical need arise.

Were the Cubans provoked, they would be capable of launching limited ground attacks into Namibia, but would have difficulty sustaining any prolonged offensive in the face of South African opposition. Cuban aircraft also could attack South African airfields in northern Namibia or specific ground objectives in the border area.

Angolan Government Forces
Currently, the government's forces number over 17,000 men in the south, including most of its mechanized infantry and one-fifth of its entire infantry force. Luanda has deployed seven mechanized and light infantry brigades, numbering between 7,000 and 8,000 personnel, to southwestern Angola. The other 9,000 Angolan personnel, organized into nine light infantry brigades, are heavily engaged in the southeast protecting Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale and countering UNITA.

Angolan Government forces have the capability to conduct large-scale offensive operations (three to six brigades) on no more than two fronts simultaneously. Their strengths against UNITA include Cuban support, greater firepower of their conventional combat equipment, and air support. At present, Cuban assistance helps to alleviate deficiencies in logistics, tactical air support, and air defense. Nonetheless, the Angolans suffer serious morale, discipline, training, and leadership problems.

Should Cuban troops be withdrawn from Angola, government military capabilities would deteriorate. Cuba would focus during the transition period on enhancing Angola's ability to continue fighting and to assume rear area support and point defense roles. The presence of Cuban and Soviet Bloc military advisers and shipments of supplies and equipment would continue. Nonetheless, the government's ability to conduct offensive operations after a Cuban troop withdrawal would decrease. Primary emphasis would be placed on defending key areas.
Table 1  
Balance of Total Forces in Angola and Namibia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total military personnel</th>
<th>In Angola</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
<th>UNITA</th>
<th>In Namibia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>100,000-125,000 (includes 30,000 militia and 2,500 Air Force)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>6,000-8,500</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

**Major ground combat elements**
- 1 mechanized infantry brigade; 65 light infantry brigades
- 9 tank brigades; 24 tactical groups; 4 independent battalions; 3 convoy escort columns
- 1-2 infantry brigades; 4-6 guerrilla battalions
- 5 regular battalions; 38 semi-regular battalions; 21 commando groups; 24 artillery battalions; 40 guerrilla units; 40 specialized units
- 2 mechanized battalions; 1-2 mechanized infantry groups; 12-14 motorized infantry battalions; 1 parachute battalion; 2-3 tank regiments; 7-8 artillery/multi-ple rocket launcher batteries; 8-10 air defense batteries

**Major equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Armored vehicles</th>
<th>Artillery over 100 mm</th>
<th>Air defense guns</th>
<th>SAMs* (launchers)</th>
<th>Combat aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>300+</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>600+</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This includes local Namibian forces but not 3,000 South Africans stationed in Walvis Bay.  
* Does not include manportable SAMs.

Should negotiations fail and were the Cubans to augment their combat forces in Angola, government capabilities would improve modestly. Increased Cuban presence would bolster morale, possibly improve combat effectiveness, and begin to remedy deficiencies in training, leadership, planning, and logistic support. As a result, Angola's ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations would probably improve.

South-West Africa People's Organization

During the first half of 1988, as Cuban tactical groups moved southward, SWAPO guerrilla battalions were repositioned near the Namibia border. Three or four battalions have been colocated with Cuban-Angolan elements and have been augmented with Cuban personnel. The environs of Angolan cities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military personnel</th>
<th>Angola (10,000)</th>
<th>Cuba (20,000-25,000)</th>
<th>SWAPO (4,000-5,000)</th>
<th>UNITA (2,000-3,000)</th>
<th>In Namibia (23,000)</th>
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<td>Major ground combat elements</td>
<td>1 mechanized infantry brigade; 6 infantry brigades</td>
<td>5 tank brigades equal to 16 tactical groups or 19 tank battalions; 7 mechanized infantry battalions; 12 artillery/multiple rocket launcher battalions; 21 air defense battalions; 2 independent tank battalions</td>
<td>1 infantry brigade; 4 guerrilla battalions</td>
<td>1 regular battalion; elements of seven regular battalions</td>
<td>2 mechanized battalions; 1-2 mechanized infantry groups; 8-9 motorized infantry battalions; 1 parachute battalion; 2-3 tank regiments; 7-8 artillery/multiple rocket launcher batteries; 8-10 air defense batteries</td>
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<td>50-100</td>
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<td>Air defense guns</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>SAMs (launchers)</td>
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<td>115</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
<td>16+</td>
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<td>Fixed wing</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12-18</td>
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</table>

- Forces depicted are those present in Military Region 5, Angola, and Sector 10, plus Grootefontein logistic base in Namibia.

Further north contain the remaining concentrations of SWAPO command, administrative, logistic, training, and conventional force personnel.

The current situation, with the Cubans dominating southwestern Angola, allows SWAPO a secure sanctuary and could facilitate increased infiltration into Namibia. SWAPO has attempted to take advantage of these conditions by continuing limited guerrilla activities in northern Namibia, but has met with almost no success.

Should UNSCR 435 be implemented, SWAPO would be required to disarm before returning to Namibia for elections. Should the negotiations fail, on the other hand, SWAPO—with Cuban assistance—would attempt to intensify the level of operations in Namibia. As a result, insurgent operations would pose a significant, although containable, threat to South African and Namibian security forces.
UNITA
Although the withdrawal of South African combat forces from Angola has reduced UNITA's ability to counter large-scale government offensives, continued South African covert logistic support will facilitate its ability to conduct widespread insurgent operations. UNITA's strengths include effective leadership, high morale, and good organization in addition to South African support. Weaknesses include limited logistic and conventional combat capabilities.

Should South African forces withdraw from Namibia, UNITA's military capabilities would not suffer significantly during the first six to 12 months. Over time, however, dwindling fuel supplies would have a detrimental effect on its ability to conduct more conventional operations. Nevertheless, UNITA would retain the ability to conduct insurgent operations throughout the country, using captured and existing stocks.

The South Africans
The unprecedented move of Cuban and Angolan forces to the border area has stimulated a South African buildup on the Namibian side of the border. The strength of South African and local Namibian forces there has increased by 10,000 men since early 1988. The 20,000 troops now there are organized into three task forces. Two are predominantly mechanized-motorized infantry brigade-size organizations. The third is organized around major elements of an armored brigade, which could be used to spearhead any thrust into Angola. The South Africans decided to make. South African forces could be concentrated quickly to achieve local force superiority over Cuban tactical groups, isolate Cuban-Angolan units, and interdict supply and reinforcement activities. For now, however, the deployment is defensive. The South African Air Force — whose aircraft can only be replaced at great expense and difficulty — has the capability to conduct only limited offensive air operations, and would probably devote a majority of its assets to air defense missions. Currently deployed South African air defense weapons would not deter Cuban airstrikes.

Upon implementation of UNSCR 435 and South African withdrawal from Namibia, supply channels to UNITA would be restricted, and would become even more covert in nature. The capability of the South Africans to support UNITA with conventional forces would still exist, but would necessitate use of impractically long air logistic lines or reoccupation of bases in Namibia. The South Africans probably have already found ways to continue special forces advisory and covert resupply activities in support of UNITA, some of which likely include joint efforts with Zaire and the use of Zaire as a conduit.

If negotiations break down, the South Africans could launch a major offensive but would risk significant losses and a protracted conflict with the Cubans. Were the South Africans to decide on such a course, they could deploy to Northern Namibia — on short notice — as many as eight squadrons totaling 170 combat aircraft, including jet fighters and bombers. Five airfields suitable for support of such operations are available within the border area. Ground forces could also be reinforced quickly. South Africa can mobilize approximately 15 conventional force battalions or two brigades, totaling about 11,500 personnel, on the first day of mobilization. Using civilian and military transport aircraft and rail assets, most of these troops could be at the front within four days. Within one month, the South Africans could have a total of 60,000 conventional forces in Namibia, an acceptable force level for offensive operations against the Cubans now present in southwestern Angola.
CALKINH

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Namibia: Military Situation

Guerrilla operations from Angola into Namibia are beginning to increase. The South Africans are strengthening their military forces along Namibia's border with Angola in an effort to stop guerrilla attacks on South African troops. The guerrillas have reportedly slipping behind border defenses with the help of fellow members of the Ovambos tribal group in the border area.

Although more insurgent activity than the South Africans have been publishing, active support for the guerrillas by the Ovambos in Namibia—by way of providing shelter from security forces—would give the insurgents a better base of operations within Namibia. The guerrillas have primarily relied on the Ovambo's support, but are not permitted to operate within Ovambo territory.

So far, the South Africans claim that they are not pursuing the guerrillas into Ovambos' villages without permission from local chiefs, probably because Ovambos support for South Africans plans for Namibian independence in 1978 is considered vital. If the insurgency gathers momentum, the South Africans are likely to take tougher measure to contain it.

The president of the South West African People's Organization, Sam Nujoma, has moved his headquarters to Angola from Zambia, in an effort to gain greater access to the supported areas of Namibia to take advantage of the increased support he is getting from Cuba, Nujoma visited Cuba last October and reportedly was assured that he would receive all the arms and military equipment his guerrillas could use, as well as training assistance at camps in Angola.

Although Cuban advisors have accompanied SWAPO guerrillas on recent raids—early this year one Cuban was captured—the Cubans reportedly have refused to provide any fighting units to SWAPO.

The group's leadership does not wish any foreign troops involved in the guerrilla effort. SWAPO leaders, the Angolans, and the Cubans all probably prefer not to risk the retaliation in Caxito by South Africans troops that would be likely if Cuban troops entered Namibia.
The *Intelligence Checklist* is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA:

Small armed groups of the National Front are still active in the northeast.

Meanwhile, all signs point to a large Cuban presence in Angola for an extended period.

Zairian President Mobutu still allows the Front to maintain a secret headquarters in Zaire, but there is no indication that he is providing assistance to the groups in Angola. They probably are using arms and equipment left behind when the bulk of the Front's forces withdrew from Angola earlier this year.

Some sporadic skirmishing is likely to drag on. The Popular Movement regime will have as much trouble in eliminating the remnants of its former rivals as the Portuguese had in weeding out insurgents before Angola's independence. There are no signs that the regime sees itself as seriously threatened, although it obviously would like to suppress any activities that hamper the establishment of its authority.

* * *

The Cubans are likely to retain a significant number of troops in Angola indefinitely to help control the poorly disciplined Angolan armed forces. The Cubans also are said to be helping establish local administrative bodies in some towns, and Cuban medical teams are working in several provinces to train local personnel as well as to provide medical assistance directly to the people.
National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
28 September 1983
Contents

Cuba-Angola: Possible Increase in Cuban Support
CUBA-ANGOLA: Possible Increase in Cuban Support

Cuba may be preparing to augment its military role in Angola.

Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Alarcon told the press last week that Havana is ready to send more troops to Angola if Luanda requests them. The Angolan Ambassador to Cuba made a similar declaration last week at a press conference in Havana, stating that Luanda would ask for more assistance from its friends if South Africa increased its "acts of aggression." In addition, Havana domestic radio recently quoted Angolan President dos Santos as saying that more Cuban aid would be sought if needed.

Meanwhile, the US Interests Section in Havana says that some Cuban officials are concerned about the growing level of popular discontent over Cuban casualties in Angola. Some Angolan students in Cuba reportedly have been mistreated.

Comment: The statements by Cuban and Angolan officials probably are intended to underscore Havana's continuing commitment to the survival of the dos Santos regime and its willingness to increase assistance. They also may be aimed at preparing the Cuban public in case Havana expands its role in fighting the increasingly effective UNITA insurgents.
Moscow is pushing President dos Santos to call for more Cuban troops. The Soviets reportedly told dos Santos that the move is necessary to stem the deteriorating security situation in the country. The Soviets, however, have not offered to pay for the increase, and dos Santos has resisted Moscow's advice on the grounds that Angola cannot afford additional Cubans.

Comment: //The Soviets may be concerned about UNITA's stepped-up activities in Angola, but an increased Cuban military presence would also serve other Soviet goals such as further complicating the US-sponsored Namibia initiative and derailing efforts at accommodations between Angola and South Africa. Moscow remains uneasy that progress in these areas could involve a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, undermining the Soviet position in the region. The Soviets may have urged Vice President Raul Castro during his visit to Moscow last month to be more responsive to Angolan security needs. In view of UNITA's more aggressive activities, dos Santos could change his mind about additional Cuban assistance.
Namibia: Military Situation

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Although Cuban advisors have accompanied SWAPO guerrillas on recent raids—earlier this year an Cuban was captured—the Cubans reportedly have refused to provide any fighting men in SWAPO.

The group's leadership does not want any foreign troops involved in the guerrilla effort. SWAPO leaders, the Angolans, and the Cubans all probably prefer not to risk the retaliation in strength by South African regulars that would be likely if Cuban troops entered Namibia.
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Top Secret

8 October 1986
Central Angola

Angola: Insurgent Activity

Number of incidents:
- Southeast
- Southwest
- Northwest
- Northeast
- Central

Legend:
- 1,250
- 1,000
- 750
- 500
- 250

Map of Angola showing provinces and major cities.

Angola's Central Region

The four central provinces have been the scene of fighting since before independence in 1975. UNITA's operations are generally concentrated on the highland plateau east of the coastal mountain range.

Importance: The densely populated and agriculturally rich central region is inhabited primarily by the Ovimbundu, who constitute about 37 percent of the population and are the country's largest ethnic group. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is an Ovimbundu, as are the majority of adherents, although UNITA has made substantial efforts to broaden its ethnic base in recent years. Most of UNITA's army is recruited in central Angola, trained in the southeast, and sent to fight throughout the country.

Once Angola's breadbasket and source of its preindependence food exports, the region has been devastated by UNITA, and the country is now dependent on substantial food imports. The region is also an important transportation hub. The port of Lobito is the terminus of the now only partially operational Benguela railway, which prior to independence was the primary carrier of mineral exports from Zaire and Zambia.

UNITA's Strategy: Savimbi has used the region to establish and maintain a military and political structure capable of supporting a countrywide guerrilla force and administering most of rural central Angola. He has also concentrated on disrupting transportation and agricultural production, isolating and harassing government-controlled urban areas, and ambush government sweep operations in the countryside. Military activity peaked in 1982 when Savimbi decided to expand operations in northern Angola and moved substantial guerrilla forces there, leaving much of UNITA's organization in the central province to play a support and administrative role.

8 October 1986
Special Analysis

ANGOLA: Holding the Center

(This is the third in a series of articles analyzing the conflict in Angola’s regions and assessing UNITA’s performance according to several criteria for examining insurgent activity.)

UNITA traditionally has drawn most of its recruits and political support from Angola’s central provinces. It dominates the countryside, but the refugee-swollen urban areas are held by the government. Military activity in the central region has declined since 1982, as UNITA has expanded operations in northern Angola, but the fighting in the center remains vicious and has been sustained longer than anywhere else in the country. Neither side appears to have the ability to change the situation to its advantage.

UNITA has disrupted the agricultural economy, mined and raided key roads and rail lines in the area, ambushed counterinsurgency sweep operations, and challenged government control of towns and villages—including sabotage in Huambo, Angola’s second-largest city. Nevertheless, the level of insurgent activity in the central provinces, as measured by the number of incidents, appears to have declined since 1982. Many insurgent units and commanders now fighting in the north previously were based in the central region, and UNITA’s organization in the region apparently is tasked with supporting northern operations. UNITA still has substantial strength in the central region, including two full-time battalions and several thousand more guerrillas in smaller armed units or in local militias.

Luanda maintains fewer forces in the central region than in the economically vital northwest or in the southeast, where it is conducting a relatively conventional war to regain UNITA-controlled territory. The government uses its regular Army and substantial militia units mainly to guard provincial centers, main towns, and logistically vital roads and bridges. About 5,500 Cuban combat troops supplement government forces in the central region.

Huambo appears to be the government’s principal support base in the region.

continued

Top Secret

8 October 1986
Results of the Fighting

Of all Angola's regions, UNITA is most solidly entrenched in the center, where various sources indicate that a long-established military and party organization supports the guerrillas, providing a shadow government and rudimentary social services. Government counterinsurgency efforts have been ineffective, although Luanda has tried to concentrate peasants in fortified strategic hamlets. UNITA's mining of roads not only hinders movement of military goods and units, but also limits movement between rural agricultural areas and urban markets. As a result, the main towns and cities are nearly isolated and there are major food shortages and increasing civilian casualties.

Huambo is swollen with refugees. The International Red Cross, which has provided relief food for the city, recently stopped its airlift flights because of military activity in the region and has been unable to obtain military escorts for its road convoys.

Luanda's transportation resources are dedicated to supporting military operations and apparently will not be diverted to meet civilian needs. The Benguela railway has long been interdicted by UNITA and provides only limited transport. Heavily defended trains apparently move military cargoes occasionally from coastal ports to garrisons in the interior. Government road convoys and airlifts—supplemented by Soviet transport aircraft—are committed to supporting military operations.

Trends

UNITA's leader Savimbi appears to be holding his own in the central region, but neither side seems able to break the other's grip. The government presence in the population centers has not been projected effectively into the countryside. UNITA probably is not able to increase the level of activity in the central provinces, however, because of its concentration on supporting operations in the north as well as on defending the southeast.
Angola Popular Movement Puts New Pressure on National Union

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola apparently is losing little time shifting its military operations southwest following the collapse of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola in the north. Heavy fighting is taking place in central Angola between the Popular Movement, supported by Cuban troops and artillery, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which has been weakened by the withdrawal of South African troops from adjacent areas.

The National Front in the north is "imminent." There is no evidence, however, that the Popular Movement has won a major victory in the south. The Popular Movement is attempting to capture Luvungi, but the National Union is putting up stiff resistance in Bubango, a key point in the defense of Luvungi.

The Popular Movement is also advancing on Nova Redondo and Cela. Cela was the major base of operations for the South African forces that were withdrawn to Bubango. It is an attempt to lower the visibility of South Africa's role in Angola during the Organization of African Unity/AAU summit meeting earlier this month.

National Union President Jonas Savimbi would not allow his troops to develop a retreat mentality, despite the (See National Union ... Page 4)
National Union...

Chipenda's alliance with the National Front has been nominal at best, and he has operated largely as a free agent, obtaining supplies from South Africa and assistance in the field from Portuguese deserters.

In southern Angola, the National Union has been weakened by clashes with a contingent of National Front forces assigned to assist in operations there. The forces are under the command of Daniel Chipenda, who defected from the Popular Movement a year ago.

From Page 9

Withdrawal of the South Africans. The fate of the National Front in the North has probably stiffened his resolve. Nevertheless, without sizable South African assistance—and the South Africans seem reluctant to become reinvolved—the National Union could well be forced into a slow but steady retreat.

In southern Angola, the National Union has been weakened by clashes with a contingent of National Front forces assigned to assist in operations there. The forces are under the command of Daniel Chipenda, who defected from the Popular Movement a year ago.
National Intelligence Daily

Wednesday
2 September 1981
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Top Secret

2 September 1981
SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Delay in Withdrawal

Precautions by the retiring South African force probably will prolong the incursion into Angola until at least this weekend.

South African vehicles and artillery pieces parked in a convoy headed south at Ondangua, Namibia, indicating that a significant portion of the South African force has already withdrawn.

The South Africans had destroyed a major bridge near Xangongo, obstructing potential pursuit from the north and indicating that Pretoria is not interested in mechanized incursions farther north for the near term.

Four Soviet advisers were killed and one was captured in fighting late last week. Moscow has yet to acknowledge these losses. The Cubans probably also suffered casualties when South Africa struck radars at Cahama and Chibemba.

The Angolans claim to have downed five South African aircraft. Reporting confirms the loss of a South African helicopter and an Impala light-attack fighter.
Soviet Policies in Southern Africa
NIE 11/70-85

SOVIET POLICIES
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Information available as of 13 February 1986 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses Moscow's current policies in southern Africa, the variables which may shape those policies, and the USSR's likely response to various changes and developments over the coming 12 to 18 months. Specifically, it examines:

— Soviet objectives in southern Africa.
— Moscow's response to the military and diplomatic challenge posed by Pretoria, particularly as the challenge affects Angola and Mozambique.
— Moscow's likely response to scenarios that could develop in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and with regional insurgent groups.

The Estimate also discusses the implications of regional developments for the United States. Although this paper discusses Soviet ties to opposition groups in South Africa, it does not examine the domestic situation there or the likelihood of change in South Africa.

For the purposes of the Estimate, "southern Africa" is defined as including the following countries: Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa.
KEY JUDGMENTS

Recent developments in southern Africa pose the greatest challenge to Moscow's position there since the USSR's major entry in the area in the mid-1970s. The USSR's key objectives in southern Africa over the next 18 months are:

- To ensure its continued influence with the governments of Angola and Mozambique.
- To preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.
- To prevent a Namibian settlement linked to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, particularly one that does not provide for a Namibia dominated by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).
- To undermine South African- and US-sponsored regional initiatives with the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from black Africa.
- To encourage black African suspicions of South African and US "perfidy."

The Soviets realize, however, that they have a limited ability to influence events in southern Africa. Moscow appears increasingly concerned that it could be excluded from a regional settlement in Namibia, much as it was in the Lancaster House talks on Rhodesian independence. A significant further diminution of tensions between South Africa and Angola or Mozambique would reduce Luanda's or Maputo's need for additional Soviet military assistance. Moscow's key instrument of influence building. Such setbacks in turn could undermine Soviet efforts to support Namibian and South African insurgents. Diplomatic solutions and reduced security tensions strike at the heart of Soviet vulnerabilities—Moscow's failure to provide significant levels of economic assistance and its inability to play an active and positive role in a regional settlement that includes South Africa.

Moscow's position in southern Africa will continue to depend primarily on the USSR's arms relationships with Angola, Mozambique, and regional insurgent groups. Angola will remain Moscow's main priority in southern Africa. Soviet officials clearly state that Moscow has more credibility at stake in Angola than in Mozambique and that the USSR is in for the long haul in Luanda. In Angola, Moscow's objectives
continue to be well served by the presence of some 30,000 to 35,000 Cuban military personnel who help to prop up the besieged regime. Military and economic assistance also have enabled Moscow, its East European allies, and Cuba to establish a large advisory presence in the region, including some 2,500 military advisers and 13,000 economic technicians, most of whom are in Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, since 1983, the Soviets have delivered some $1.4 billion in military assistance and since 1982 some $430 million in economic assistance, and Cuban combat forces have been augmented by 3,000 troops. Soviet influence is further buttressed by political and ideological accords with the ruling parties in Angola and Mozambique.

The Soviets probably believe that South African intransigence will undermine the recent diplomatic gains engineered by the United States, and that the continuing South African–supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique will sustain the need for Soviet military and security assistance.

The Soviets—whatever the fate of current negotiations—also probably will seek to maintain leverage by ensuring a continued Cuban troop presence in Angola. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) leadership is likely to be susceptible to Soviet arguments that such a presence is needed to guard against US and South African perfidy, to protect the MPLA against insurgent attacks by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and to train Angolan forces in the use of Soviet weaponry.

Should prospects for a negotiated settlement that included a Namibian settlement and Cuban troop withdrawal become more likely in the next 18 months—one of several scenarios—we believe the Soviets, as they have done in the past, would try to derail it. Ultimately, however, we believe that Moscow would accede to Luanda’s wishes for a settlement, working behind the scenes to maintain influence with the MPLA by encouraging Angola’s suspicions of Washington’s and Pretoria’s motives, maintaining a Cuban troop presence, and continuing to supply military weapons. Given the inherent uncertainty of coups, we believe Moscow would be unlikely to encourage a coup by MPLA hardliners.

Under these circumstances, Moscow would seek to make the best of a bad situation. It would claim that Namibian independence represented a victory for the USSR and Cuba. The Soviets presumably would seek to ensure MPLA dominance in the coalition with UNITA and to expand their contacts with at least the MPLA faction in the coalition. They would try to protect their military access to facilities in Angola, to retain the military supply relationship, and to press the MPLA to retain
at least a core Cuban presence of at least 5,000 troops. While continuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention to independent Namibia—assuming a SWAPO electoral win—in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

We believe that the Soviets, faced with a continuing deterioration in the MPLA’s position vis-a-vis UNITA and, or South Africa, with no prospect of a decisive shift in the military balance, would find their options were limited and that Moscow would continue its current tack of bolstering Angola’s defense capabilities.

A steady or more rapid deterioration of the country’s economic infrastructure would create serious problems for the MPLA and its Soviet patrons. The MPLA could face a crisis in confidence within the local populace, if confronted with increasingly successful UNITA sabotage of key economic sectors, such as the Cabinda oil facilities, diamond mining operations, and basic water and power supply sources serving Luanda. Under these circumstances, the Soviets would have almost no choice but to provide technical and training support, perhaps through the dispatch of East European security advisers, to help combat sabotage activity.

A dramatic military shift in UNITA’s favor within the next 18 months, however, probably would force the Soviets to urge the Cubans to assume a more direct role in the fighting as well as to request that additional Cuban forces be dispatched to Angola. In addition, Moscow would be likely to step up deliveries of additional military equipment, such as Mi-24, 25 Hinds and fighter aircraft, in an attempt to reestablish a military equilibrium. The Soviets probably would also increase their advisory presence and play a larger role in the planning and direction of Angolan operations.

A new South African incursion into southern Angola probably would lead the Soviets to respond—as they have in the past—with an upgrading and strengthening of Angolan defense capabilities. The Soviets also would seize the occasion to mount a massive propaganda campaign aimed at exposing South African and US perfidy. They would also step up public demonstrations of support, such as ship visits, to bolster the regime.

A final decision by Moscow on how far it is prepared to go in supporting the MPLA regime probably has yet to be made. Comments from Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not believe Angola is of such importance as to warrant the direct engagement of Soviet combat forces and prestige. Moreover, whatever importance Moscow attaches to Angola, it probably realizes that only massive numbers of Soviet forces
could decisively alter the military balance and even then—as Afghani-
stan has proved—such actions could not guarantee the defeat of UNITA
forces.¹

In Mozambique, the Soviets are unlikely to write off a government
dominated by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FREL-
IMO), although they have been dismayed by the extent of President
Machel’s accommodation with South Africa. Although they have con-
siderably less ability to influence events in Maputo than in Luanda, the
Soviets will seek to exploit Machel’s frustration over the National
Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) insurgency and his continued
need for military assistance. Despite Machel’s turn to the West, for
example, Moscow has continued previously contracted arms deliveries.

Moscow evidently hopes that the process begun by the Nkomati
Accord with South Africa will break down. Soviet propaganda will
continue to focus on the “bankruptcy” of the accord and allegations of
continuing South African support for RENAMO. Over time, Moscow
hopes that the continuing military challenge from the insurgency will
strengthen hardline elements in FRELIMO and cause Machel to reverse
his commitment to Nkomati.

As Machel seeks to expand ties to South Africa, the West, and
China, the Soviets are likely to pressure him by encouraging hardline el-
ements within FRELIMO and disparaging his leadership to other black
African leaders. Moscow, however, probably recognizes that dramatic
changes—such as the ouster of Machel by party hardliners—might
benefit RENAMO and lead Pretoria to renew economic and military
pressures on Maputo. This in turn could prompt requests by Mozam-
bique for major new military and economic aid commitments from the
USSR. We do not believe that Moscow is any more willing than in the
past to meet Maputo’s immediate economic needs or to subsidize its
long-term development programs.

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets will try to foment and ex-
ploit new tensions that will undermine South African and US diplomacy
and sustain the struggle against white minority rule in Pretoria. The
Soviets will seek to channel additional assistance to the Namibian and
South African insurgents whenever possible, though this would be
increasingly difficult without Angolan and Mozambican cooperation.

¹ The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Moscow has not ruled out a more direct
Soviet military role in Angola, although the USSR probably would stop short of sending Soviet ground
combat forces. In his view, if additional Cuban troops and Soviet arms and advisers were used to halt a
further deterioration of the MPLA’s military situation, and its survival become more secure, threats to
the closures of additional Soviet intervention—possibly including air, defense, or military security
forces—would increase. If undertaken, such action would be intended not to defeat the opposition
militarily but to show Moscow’s commitment, in few up additional Angolan Cuban forces for combat,
and to exert pressure on the parties needed to reach a political settlement.
The Soviets will seek to exploit any openings in Zimbabwe stemming from a deteriorating security situation or South African meddling. While President Mugabe would not overcome his general distrust of the USSR, such problems could enhance the appeal of Soviet arms. Similarly, Moscow will continue to try to exploit resentment in Zambia, Botswana, and Lesotho about South African pressures to reach accommodations.

The Soviets will continue to use propaganda and disinformation in their efforts to retain influence. Such efforts will attempt to play on black African fears of Pretoria and to portray the United States and South Africa as partners seeking to impose solutions upon southern African states.

The pressing economic problems of the black African states will continue to work against long-term Soviet efforts to solidify their influence in the region. Moscow's failure to provide meaningful economic and developmental assistance will hamper its efforts to limit South Africa's and the West's roles in the area, and could open new opportunities for expanded Western and US influence.

Any US diplomatic successes also will heighten black African expectations. Washington, for example, will face increased pressure to push for changes in Pretoria's domestic policies and to expand its economic commitments to the southern African states. Failure of the United States to "continue moving ahead" could provide Moscow with new opportunities, as more radical black leaders push for change in South Africa.

Black Africans will look to the West for increased economic assistance. Greater economic involvement with the West could lead Angola and Mozambique to adopt a more truly nonaligned posture, further reducing Soviet influence. However, the political and ideological accords and continued security ties to the USSR are extensive and will assure the Soviets some degree of presence and influence. Short of the demise of the MPLA or FRELIMO governments, this relationship with Moscow is unlikely to change dramatically unless Western powers are willing to provide—on a par with and at competitive terms—the military and security aid currently provided by Moscow, or are successful in reducing the need for such aid.
DISCUSSION

1. Southern Africa remains important to Moscow's image as a global superpower, although it is largely peripheral to core Soviet security interests and of lower priority than, for example, South Asia and the Middle East. Angola, in particular, is a symbol of the USSR's capability and willingness to extend its influence to distant shores. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975-76—coming as it did on the heels of Washington's recognition of Moscow's military parity and equal superpower status during the 1972 U.S.-Soviet summit accord—symbolized Moscow's emergence as a global power asserting its claims to the rights and prerogatives of superpower status. At the same time, Soviet actions in Angola reflected an element of opportunism in Soviet calculations, as Moscow moved to exploit the openings afforded by the collapse of the Portuguese empire.

2. Modern Soviet policy in Africa has evolved since Moscow's initial involvement in the late 1950s and is now aimed at achieving a number of broad objectives:

   - To supplant or undermine Western and Chinese political, economic, and military influence in the region.

   - To threaten, or deny to the West, air and naval access to monitor US military activity; and to facilitate Soviet transport of assistance to friendly regimes.

   - To respond to broader ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism by promoting pro-Soviet or leftist change that in turn supports Soviet claims of a growing shift in "the world correlation of forces" in Moscow's favor.

   - To gain an enhanced role for Moscow in the resolution of regional issues, thereby reinforcing Soviet claims of superpower status and indispensability in the settlement of major international issues.

   - To gain political support and influence among African states for Soviet policies and initiatives in international forums.

   - To enhance over the longer term Soviet access to the region's strategic raw materials and to create the potential to hinder Western access to those resources.

   - To facilitate the polarization of black versus white Africans, and to seek to isolate the United States as the defender of the white South African Government.

To achieve these aims in southern Africa, Moscow has sought to consolidate the regimes in Angola and Mozambique, to bring the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to power in Namibia, and, ultimately, to bring down the white minority regime in South Africa.

3. The USSR's key objectives in southern Africa over the next 18 months are:

   - To ensure its continued influence with the governments of Angola and Mozambique.

   - To preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.

   - To prevent a Namibian settlement linked to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, particularly one that does not provide for a Namibia dominated by the SWAPO.

   - To undermine South African- and US-sponsored regional initiatives with the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from black Africa.

   - To foster black African suspicion of South African and US "perfidy."

4. The Soviets' ability to pursue their objectives in southern Africa is enhanced by a number of advantages including:

   - The fundamental, long-term regional conflict between the black Africans and the white minority regime in Pretoria.

   - The availability of allies and surrogates—such as Cuba—that enable the USSR to play a role without committing substantial resources and personnel.

   - Black African perceptions of a close relationship between the United States and South Africa.

   - The capability to provide quickly and cheaply weapon systems to exploit black African security fears and needs.
An appealing blueprint for action and political organization for newly independent states and liberation movements.

The self-imposed limits on US military and covert involvement in southern Africa.

A number of political instruments and individuals cultivated and developed over a long period of time and generally responsive to Soviet bidding, such as the South African Communist Party (SACP), and pro-Soviet factions and individuals in current and former liberation movements.

5. The Soviets, however, are not without disadvantages, including:

- South Africa's military and economic dominance of the region, including Pretoria's willingness to take military action, directly and through third parties, against black African neighbors.

- Moscow's unwillingness or inability to help address and resolve the fundamental economic dilemmas facing economically beleaguered black African states.

- The recognized failure of the USSR to provide humanitarian relief in response to regional crises on a scale comparable to the West.

- Moscow's unwillingness or inability to respond to emergency famine situations and the clear and damagist comparison with massive US humanitarian assistance.

- The West's continuing dominant economic role in the region.

- Traditional African cultural ties to the West.

- African recognition of Soviet inability to broker negotiated solutions to regional conflicts.

- Unattractiveness of the Soviet economy as a model for African development.

Soviet Involvement in Southern Africa

6. During the 1970s, the Soviets exploited major opportunities afforded by the collapse of the Portuguese empire, black African security fears, and the national liberation struggles in Rhodesia and, to a lesser degree, in Namibia and South Africa. Moscow's efforts are abetted by some 45,000 Cuban and East European military and civilian personnel in the region, primarily in Angola and Mozambique. See the tables on pages 21 through 24 for a breakdown of Soviet-Cuban-East European presence as well as data on Soviet military and economic assistance to the region since 1976. The 30,000 to 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola remain essential to the efforts of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to defend against a growing insurgency threat.

Glossary


FRELIMO Front for the Liberation of Mozambique. Former guerrilla movement led by Samora Machel that currently rules Mozambique.

MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Former insurgent movement that currently rules Angola, led by Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

RENAMO, National Resistance of Mozambique. Mozambican insurgent group formerly backed by South Africa.

SACP, South African Communist Party. A Marxist-oriented party banned in South Africa since the 1960s that has extensive links to the African National Congress.

SWAPO, South-West Africa People's Organization. The major insurgent movement in Namibia.

UDF, United Democratic Front. Legal anti-government multiracial association of some 600 organizations in South Africa formed in 1983.

UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Angolan insurgent movement led by Jonas Savimbi and backed by South Africa.

ZANU, Zimbabwe African National Union. Led by Robert Mugabe, this former guerrilla movement has emerged as the ruling and dominant political party since independence.

ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People's Union. Led by Joshua Nkomo. One of the major guerrilla groups that fought the white minority regime in Rhodesia before independence in 1980. Now an opposition party.

7. Moscow's political and ideological ties to the ruling leftist parties in Luanda and Maputo—formalized under Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation—help to institutionalize Soviet influence and presence.
The sizable Soviet Bloc and Cuban presence—of central importance to Soviet interests and strategies—gives Moscow access to and influence in the military and civilian bureaucracies, in part by creating a dependence on the important technical services provided by these advisers. Various party-to-party accords and cadre training programs, for example, further enable the USSR to identify and cultivate strongly pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).

8. Angola is central to Moscow’s pursuit of its regional objectives. It affords the USSR entire and access to the region’s remaining liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa, serving as a conduit for Soviet aid and training to SWAPO and African National Congress (ANC) insurgents. The Soviets also are capable of monitoring and exploiting or creating, unrest in neighboring Zaire from Angola.

9. The USSR has extensive and regular access to air and naval facilities in Angola, and Luanda provides logistic support to the Soviet Navy’s West Africa patrol and is a staging base for Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Although Mozambique does not permit Moscow as extensive access, Maputo continues to permit Soviet ship visits and port calls.

10. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975-76 marks the start of Moscow’s higher profile in southern Africa. Moscow’s growing regional role was underscored by the development of arms supply relationships with Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, as well as logistical support for guerrillas during the Rhodesian war and for those now operating in Namibia and South Africa.

11. Beginning with the negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian conflict in December 1979, however, Moscow’s regional influence began to level off: relations with Zambia did not appreciably expand, Robert Mugabe’s electoral win over the Soviet-backed Joshua Nkomo checked Soviet inroads in independent Zimbabwe, and arm sales to Botswana failed to gain the Soviets any appreciable influence. Moreover, Pretoria’s tough policies vis-à-vis the region’s remaining national liberation movements further diminished Soviet opportunities. On the plus side, Moscow’s growing involvement in Angola and Mozambique seemingly assured the Soviets of a continuing role in southern Africa.

12. The decisions by Angola and Mozambique in early 1984 to sign military disengagement and nonaggression pacts, respectively, with South Africa cast into question the USSR’s role and influence in its two key

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The Nkomati Accord

On 16 March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed a nonaggression pact stating that neither government would allow its territory to be used to prepare acts of violence against the other. In practical terms, Pretoria agreed to stop supporting the Mozambican National Resistance insurgents in return for Maputo’s pledge to prevent guerrilla attacks from Mozambique against South Africa by the African National Congress.

The Lusaka Agreement

The agreement of 16 February 1984 between Angola and South Africa calls for the ceased withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola in exchange for an Angolan commitment not to allow the Namibian guerrillas of the South-West Africa People’s Organization to operate in the area vacated by South Africa. Pretoria and Luanda agreed to establish a Joint Monitoring Commission to police the demarcation area and prevent SWAPO infiltration of northern Namibia.

13. General Secretary Chernyshev offered the most authoritative Soviet comment on these agreements in March 1984 when he implicitly expressed growing approval of the accords but criticized Washington and Pretoria for exploiting African desires for peace and stability to impose their solutions on the region. Chernyshev voiced doubts as to whether Angolan security and Namibian independence are “truly” guaranteed, and reaffirmed the USSR’s support for Angola, Mozambique, and regional liberation movements. Soviet media commentary further reflect Moscow’s ambivalence. Political analyst Aleksandr Bovin, for example, candidly cited the factors and benefits that had induced Luanda and Maputo to reach agreements with Pretoria. Bovin nonetheless questioned the utility of the accords, saying, it was “trivial” to think that Pretoria’s destabilization efforts could be stopped by “treaties and agreements.”

14. Moscow has seized upon the stalled South African troop withdrawal from southern Angola and continued National Resistance of Mozambique’s (RENAMO) activities in Mozambique to step up criticism of the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords. Soviet commentary has argued that these "violations" reflect Pretoria’s real intention—to bring down the MPLA.
and FRELIMO regimes. These accounts consistently argue that the region’s fundamental problems are all linked to the existence of the white minority regime in Pretoria—implying a need for continued armed struggle.

Angola

15. Angola remains Moscow’s main priority in southern Africa. Soviet officials explicitly state that Moscow has more credibility at stake in Angola than in Mozambique, and that the USSR is “in for the long haul” in support of the MPLA. The Soviets—concerned that the United States seeks to oust the MPLA from power and “cut the USSR out” of southern Africa—have expressed deep suspicions about US motives for wanting to broker a Namibian settlement. Soviet statements about “hanging tough” in Angola for several more years reflect this broader desire to counteract a US administration that the USSR perceives as trying to “push the Soviets back” around the globe.

16. At the same time, Soviet officials repeatedly have argued to US officials that neither the United States nor the USSR has “vital interests” at stake in southern Africa. In this vein, Moscow has further asserted that US-Soviet confrontations in the area need not develop and that southern African issues should not complicate broader, more important issues in US-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Soviet officials have stated emphatically that Moscow has no intention of compromising on such basic positions as its opposition to apartheid and support to the MPLA government.

17. On balance, such comments suggest that the USSR clearly prefers a military stalemate that sustains Luanda’s dependence upon Moscow to a settlement that could be perceived as a Soviet “withdrawal” under US pressure. New Soviet economic and military aid commitments to Angola substantiate Moscow’s professed commitment to preserving the MPLA in power. For example, in 1982 the Soviets agreed to pledge $2 billion in economic aid to Angola, but little has been delivered. On the military side, the Soviets have delivered impressive amounts of military equipment—valued at over $1 billion—since 1983. During this period, the Soviets have upgraded Angolan military capabilities through the introduction of SA-8, SA-6, and SA-2 surface-to-air missile systems, Mi-24 helicopter gunships, MiG-23 fighter aircraft, and SU-22 fighter-bombers into Angola, and deliveries of previously provided weapon systems continue at high levels. In addition, Soviet advisers have assumed a more active role in transport and logistics structures within the country.

18. Moscow probably sees continuing military support as a way to help turn around the worsening security situation and ensure its continued influence in Luanda. Also, this aid demonstrates Moscow’s commitment and will strengthen the Soviet-backed hardliners in Luanda, thereby limiting President dos Santos’s political maneuverability. Furthermore the provision of sophisticated weapon systems to Angola serves to bolster Soviet warnings to South Africa that future South African attacks will have a heavy cost.
22. Although Moscow views the current Angolan talks with the United States and South Africa as a potential threat to its position, it remains convinced that South Africa is unwilling to relinquish Namibia to SWAPO rule and that this will ultimately preclude a settlement even if other related issues are resolved. In addition, the still-incomplete South African withdrawal from southern Angola has somewhat diminished the security threat to the MPLA government—the threat that first prompted the Soviets to send record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. Moreover, though the present situation persists, the Angolans and Cubans would be in a stronger position to focus their energies on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. Finally, while the Soviets may have misgivings about the Lusaka disengagement provisions constraining SWAPO military activity, preserving the regime in Luanda is a more important priority.  

23. In this light, the Soviets continue to call for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, and to condemn any formal “linkage” formula that ties the South African presence in Namibia to the Cuban troop presence in Angola. In reality, however, they have tacitly accepted some linkages by publicizing proposals made by President dos Santos in September 1984—plans which call for a phased withdrawal of some 20,000 Cubans over a three-year period after UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435 is initiated and the South Africans reduce their troop presence in Namibia to some 1,500.1  

24. This is the first time such discourses have appeared in authoritative Soviet and Cuban media, and the disclosures suggest that the USSR and Cuba see several benefits to going public with the “free print” of Luanda’s current proposal. In particular, it places the burden of continuing the Namibian process upon Pretoria, pressures the United States to validate its claim to be an objective broker between South Africa and the black Africans, and enhances Angola’s image by demonstrating Luanda’s willingness to make real concessions—sending home 20,000 Cubans—in pursuit of Namibian independence. As such, Moscow and Havana probably are pleased that dos Santos’s public disclosure makes it more difficult to conduct private negotiations. Moreover, the disclosure forced Pretoria to go public with its counterproposals. Moscow probably hopes the process will be complicated and that each side will find it difficult to make new concessions without losing face. The Soviets and Cubans may believe that these disclosures serve to back dos Santos into his current position and limit his maneuverability as the negotiations develop further.  

Soviet Views on UNITA  

25. Increasing candor in the Soviet press about Angola’s precarious economic condition—caused in part by UNITA activities—further suggests that Moscow recognizes that the MPLA may have to take some dramatic steps to get out of an increasingly untenable position. Recent articles in New Times, Za Radeshun, and Komkomolshda Pravda noted Angola’s alarming predicament: that “60 percent of the country’s bridges and 90 percent of its transport facilities have been destroyed by the aggressors”; that “tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted in January 1984”; that “Luanda is experiencing a shortage of food and other essentials as its population has doubled due to the influx of refugees from the south”; and that “not only the territorial integrity but the independence of the young republic has been endangered.” Such media revelations also probably are designed to signal the long-term nature of the Angolan problem and the continuing need for Soviet support.  

26. The Soviets are wrestling with the question of UNITA’s future role in Angola. During the past year, Soviet officials privately acknowledged for the first time that neither side can prevail militarily and that peace can only be achieved through some form of internal reconciliation. The Soviets have not indicated any willingness, however, to support an MPLA effort to establish a dialogue with the insurgents—chiefly because the MPLA would be at a distinct disadvantage in such a situation because of UNITA’s present military and political strength. Moreover, Soviet officials across the board adamantly reject any MPLA deal with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi who they apparently fear would easily dominate any such arrangement. At this time there is no evidence to indicate that this judgment does not reflect views of the MPLA leadership, particularly among the pro-Soviet faction.  

27. We believe the Soviets thus see the continuation of the military struggle as their only real option until such time as Savimbi is either gone or UNITA’s
strength is otherwise diminished. By the same token, Moscow sees a Cuban troop withdrawal before the military balance shifts in Luanda's favor as simply forcing the MPLA into a suicide pact.

Relations With SWAPO and the ANC

Recent diplomatic moves in Angola have spurred increased Soviet interaction with SWAPO leaders, and Moscow appears to be trying to stiffen SWAPO resolve against any temptation to strike a deal with Pretoria.

Such statements also add to the pressure on Luanda, since SWAPO leaders increasingly express the fear that Luanda will sell out SWAPO to achieve an accord with South Africa. Similarly, Nkosi's two-week stay in Moscow during the US-Angolan talks in October 1984 may have served to remind Luanda that Moscow is intent on protecting SWAPO's interests and stake in the ongoing negotiations.

For their parts, SWAPO and the ANC probably are concerned that Moscow may sacrifice their interests in order to strengthen its position in Luanda and Maputo. Although these liberation movements have been upgrading their ties to the Chinese, they will have little choice but to become more dependent on the USSR should the Angolan and Mozambican agreements with South Africa take hold. Indeed, SWAPO and the ANC probably attach greater importance to Soviet backing than ever before since they may be able to translate Moscow's continued support to Luanda and Maputo into leverage for sustaining assistance to the liberation struggle.

30. Short of implementation of UNSCR 483, the Soviets probably prefer a protracted military stalemate in Namibia so they can establish greater influence with SWAPO. From Moscow's perspective, while a guerrilla strategy offers little hope of near-term success, it does succeed in prolonging regional tensions and black African antipathy toward Pretoria.

Mozambique

31. President Samora Machel's rapprochement with Pretoria in 1984 clearly undercuts Soviet interests and prestige and opens new opportunities for Western intrusion in Mozambique. More important, from Moscow's perspective, it diminishes the already limited capabilities of the ANC and thus obviates the USSR's long-term objective of undermining the white minority regime in Pretoria. Moreover, the Nkomati Accord has significant implications for more important Soviet interests in Angola. One of Moscow's chief concerns about the accord has been that the successful settlement of FRELIMO's insurgency problem through negotiation could encourage the MPLA to do likewise.

Moscow's aid commitments have not matched Maputo's economic needs, however, and the Soviets have shown no inclination to increase economic assistance enough to dissuade Machel from talking with the South Africans. In the past few years, for example, Moscow has failed to respond to Mozambican calls for greater economic aid and has rejected Maputo's application for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

32. Machel's willingness to reach an agreement with Pretoria most certainly was influenced by Mozambique's dismal economic prospects. Maputo's long-standing economic slide has been seriously exacerbated by expanded RENAMO activities and the onset in 1984 of a devastating famine. These security and economic difficulties presented Machel with his greatest crisis since independence, and in the face of Moscow's unwillingness to provide substantial economic assistance left him little option but to seek out new potential sources of help as well as to curtail South African support to RENAMO.

34. The Soviets have acquiesced in Machel's policy shift, at least in part because—according to Soviet officials—Moscow's stake and obligations in Mozambique are less than in Angola, where a Soviet and Cuban intervention brought to power—and sustains—the MPLA. Soviet prestige is not linked as closely to the survival of the Machel regime. Soviet influence is considerably less in Maputo than in Luanda; the Soviets, for example, reportedly were not kept informed about the Mozambican-South African negotiations while they were in progress.

35. Nevertheless, Moscow is unlikely to write off Mozambique. President Machel received high-level attention at the Andropov funeral in mid-February 1984 and the Pretoria account of his meeting with Soviet Premier Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign Minister Belyakov noted that prospects for further development of bilateral relations were favorable. Moreover,
the Soviets are actively cultivating Mozambican military officials. A Mozambican military delegation was warmly received in Moscow in July 1984, and deliveries of previously contracted Soviet military equipment have continued since the accord with South Africa was signed. Moscow also recently agreed to sell Mozambique about half of the oil it requires for 1985.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa

36. The Soviets continue to seek to improve and bolster their bilateral ties with other states in the region. These efforts have taken on added significance since the signing of the Nkomati and Lusaka Accords in early 1984. While many African leaders may view the accords as limited tactical moves and are not inclined to attach broader significance to them,

Zimbabwe

37. The Soviets continue to seek improved ties with the Mugabe government. Still smarting from Nkomati's electoral defeat in 1980, Moscow has gradually expanded ties to Harare since 1981 by concluding a number of media, cultural, and trade accords. In July 1983, an agreement to establish a TASS link in Zimbabwe was signed as part of Harare's effort to present reporting of world events from both Eastern and Western perspectives. After a long delay, Zimbabwe also has opened an Embassy in Moscow. Moreover, after numerous postponements Prime Minister Mugabe may in the near future make his first visit to the USSR.

38. The Soviets are also continuing efforts to exploit and highlight differences between the United States and Zimbabwe. On Moscow's plus side, the Soviets appear encouraged by Mugabe's professed commitment to Marxism-Leninism, and in August 1984 they sent a delegation to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) second party congress—described by Pravda as an “important step for Zimbabwe's development along the path of independence and social progress.” The Soviets also gave great media play to US reduction of economic aid to Harare following its abstention in the UN vote on the Korean Airline shootdown in September 1983.

39. The Soviets will confront longstanding ZANU memories of Soviet support to the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) movement during the liberation struggle. As in other countries, possible Soviet offers of military aid could lead to greater Soviet influence, although the Zimbabwean Government to date has favored British, South Korean, and other suppliers over the Soviets.

Zambia

40. Soviet influence in Zambia remains limited and is unlikely to increase significantly in the short term because of Zambia's need for massive economic assistance and the limited security threat perceived from South Africa. Despite the Soviet arms relationship established with Zambia in 1979-80, Moscow's position in Zambia has not substantially improved. The Soviets maintain an advisory and maintenance presence in Lusaka with regard to MR-21s, but this relationship has not given Moscow significant political influence or leverage. The lesstening of Zambia's external security problems following the conclusion of the Rhodesian war has allowed President Kaunda to pursue his longstanding policy of nonalignment. Indeed, Kaunda's willingness to talk and negotiate with Pretoria—as underscored by his role in facilitating the disengagement accord between Angola and South Africa, as well as similar talks between SWAPO and South Africa—reflects a divergence in Zambian and Soviet interests.

Following Kaunda's hosting of the meeting in May 1984 between SWAPO and the Namibian internal parties, for example, Moscow turned down his request to visit the USSR. Kaunda's desire to play the elder statesman and regional peacemaker has probably further diminished Soviet short-term hopes for greater influence in Zambia.

41. Diplomatically, the Soviets have had limited success establishing links with various groups in Zambia. Apart from the standard Friendship Society set up in Lusaka, the Soviet Communist Party has an interparty accord with Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). This has led to a number of party-to-party exchanges and delegation visits since 1981. In addition, some members of Kaunda's inner circle of advisers are known to be pro-Soviet in outlook. Moscow probably views these links as a useful mechanism for identifying and cultivating individuals within the ruling elite.

Botswana and Lesotho

42. The Soviets have stepped up efforts to cultivate Botswana and Lesotho as well as other states continuing to South Africa. These moves have had only mixed success, however, because of the ties these states have
with the West and their fear of South African reprisals. Moscow attempted to build an arms relationship with Gabonese in the early 1980s, and in 1984 signed a $10 million arms agreement, primarily for armored personnel carriers and SA-7s. However, Botswana’s dissatisfaction with the quality and maintenance of equipment led Gabonese to send the Soviet support personnel home when the one-year service contract expired. Nevertheless, Moscow has succeeded in establishing a large diplomatic presence in Gabonese, there reportedly are some 40 persons at the Soviet Embassy.

45. Future Soviet opportunities may well depend on the state of relations between Botswana and South Africa. Recent South African pressures for a "security" treaty have induced President Machel to avoid antagonizing President Mapetla.

44. Lesotho’s Prime Minister Jonathan has made a somewhat dramatic "turn to the East" since 1983 in order to draw Western attention to his country’s problems with South Africa and to elicit additional foreign aid and assistance from all sources. The Soviets seized on these initiatives to expand their links with Lesotho. A Soviet delegation headed by a member of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations visited Maseru in June 1984 to discuss economic and technical cooperation plans. In August 1984, Lesotho’s Minister for Information signed a media cooperation accord with TASS officials in Moscow. A landline rights agreement for Aeroflot flights is reportedly soon to be concluded as well. The Soviets presumably would post officials and technicians to Lesotho to oversee implementation of these accords in the near future. Lesotho’s Foreign Minister Makabe also visited the U.S.S.R. at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. Prime Minister Jonathan has also acknowledged the departure to the U.S.S.R. of some 35 students in late August 1984.

45. Pretoria probably will move to check the possibility of major Soviet union in Botswana and Lesotho. Pretoria’s preemptive moves against local ANC members in Lesotho leave little doubt about its willingness to take forceful measures to combat perceived security problems in neighboring countries. Moreover, South Africa’s links to local insurgents of the Lesotho Liberation Army probably will deter Jonathan from any major expansion of relations with the Soviet Union.

South Africa

46. Moscow views the undermining of the white minority regime in Pretoria as a long-term proposition. Inasmuch as Moscow has no formal relations with Pretoria, it has no opportunity to use a diplomatic presence to assess the local situation or to contact leftist within the country itself. Nonetheless, the USSR has sought to ensure itself a role by cultivating various groups that seek the violent overthrow of the regime—such as the ANC and the SACP—by providing training and arms.

47. The Soviets probably will demonstrate flexibility in changing, as eager for change, in South Africa. That the USSR is broadening its interest in groups beyond the banned ANC to such organizations as the United Democratic Front (UDF). In this context, it is noteworthy that a Soviet scholarly journal recently described the UDF as being "antagonist in many respects" with the ANC program. The same article argued, moreover, that the reason South Africa had moderated its foreign policy was to concentrate on the growing liberation movement within its borders.

Disinformation and Propaganda

48. In a region where the Soviets have limited influence over events, Moscow has relied heavily on propaganda and disinformation to convince black governments that neither South Africa nor the United States can be trusted. These efforts generally play on black African fears of Pretoria and seek to undermine US negotiation efforts. Over the past few years, Moscow has targeted much disinformation about alleged US-UNITA collaboration at Lusaka, presumably to raise doubts about the intentions of the United States in its dialogue with the MPLA. Most disinformation efforts try to portray Washington and Pretoria as military and political allies. In December 1984, for example, a story—later followed by a denial—was published in the Zimbabwean Herald alleging that the United States planned to test and deploy cruise missiles in South Africa. The Herald also fell prey to a Soviet forgery that indicated that Washington was recruiting helicopter pilots to serve in South Africa. Another forgery claimed that the United States had offered to sell Pretoria F-5 fighter aircraft.

49. As part of this propaganda effort, the USSR has reinforced black African antipathy toward Pretoria by publicizing the various aspects of South African apartheid policies, focusing particularly on those issues.
where they share a common position with the black African states. The Soviets, for example, promoted a joint ANC-SWAPO press conference in Malawi to discuss the plight of blacks in Namibia and South Africa. Soviet media also highlighted the calls of all the black African leaders that South Africa implement the UN plan for Namibia without linking it to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

Regional Developments and Likely Soviet Responses: The Next 18 Months

Angola

50. Scenario: Deteriorating Security Situation. Faced with a situation in which there is a continuing deterioration in the MPLA's position vis-a-vis UNITA and or South Africa, with no prospect of a decisive shift in the military balance, we believe Soviet options are limited and that Moscow would continue its current lack of bolstering Angola's defense capabilities. Since early 1983, for example, impressive deliveries of arms have been delivered by the USSR, and Cuban combat forces have been augmented by at least 3,000 troops.

51. A steady or more rapid deterioration of the country's economic infrastructure would create serious problems for the MPLA and its Soviet patrons. The MPLA could face a crisis in confidence within the local populace, if faced with increasingly successful UNITA sabotage of key economic sectors, such as the Cabinda oil facilities, diamond mining operations, and basic water and power supply sources serving Luanda. Under these circumstances, the Soviets would have almost no choice but to provide additional technical and training support, perhaps through the dispatch of East European security advisers, to help combat sabotage activity.

52. A dramatic military shift in UNITA's favor within the next 18 months, however, probably would force the Soviets to urge the Cubans to assume a more direct role in the fighting as well as to request that additional Cuban forces be dispatched to Angola. In addition, Moscow would be likely to step up deliveries of additional military equipment, such as Mi-24 25 Hind and fighter aircraft, in an attempt to reestablish a military equilibrium. The Soviets probably would also increase their advisory presence and play a larger role in the planning and direction of Angolan operations.

53. A new South African incursion into southern Angola probably would lead the Soviets to respond—as they have in the past—with an upgrading and strengthening of Angolan defense capabilities. The Soviets also would seize the occasion to mount a massive propaganda campaign aimed at exposing South African and US "perfidy." They would also step up public demonstrations of support, such as ship visits, to bolster the regime.

51. A final Soviet decision on how far Moscow is prepared to go in supporting the MPLA regime probably has yet to be made. Comments from Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not believe Angola is of such importance as to warrant the direct employment of Soviet combat forces and prestige. Moreover, Moscow realizes that only massive numbers of Soviet forces could decisively alter the military balance, and even then, as Afghanistan has proved, such actions could not guarantee the defeat of UNITA forces.

The Cuban Factor

55. The Cubans and Cuba's response remain wild cards in all scenarios. Although Havana is likely to accede ultimately to Moscow's wishes, a stepped-up Cuban role does raise the possibility of social and political unrest in Cuba. Such an eventuality, together with bleak military prospects in Angola, could cause Castro to reevaluate Havana's commitment to Luanda.

56. There are indications that Havana is reevaluating the situation in Angola, and some Cuban officials have acknowledged that Havana might be amenable to a withdrawal of some of its forces from Angola if MPLA control were assured. Castro appears sensitive to the domestic liabilities of continued involvement in Angola as Cuban casualties have mounted in recent years. Moreover, in the fall of 1984, authoritative Cuban media released all the details of President Fidel Castro's proposals for a phased Cuban troop withdrawal once the implementation of UNSC 435 is ensured. Such disclosures have heightened popular expectations concerning the return of troops from this increasingly unpopular foreign adventure.

57. At the same time, however, Castro is likely to resist a total withdrawal or other actions that would be...

*The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Moscow has not ruled out a more direct Soviet military role in Angola, although the USSR probably would stop short of sending Soviet ground combat forces. In his view, if additional Cuban troops and Soviet arms and advisers were unable to halt a further deterioration of the MPLA's military situation, and if survival became seriously threatened, the chances of additional Soviet intervention—possibly including an air defense or military security force—would increase. If undertaken, such action would be intended not to defeat the opposition militarily but to show Moscow's commitment, to free up additional Cuban forces for combat, and to exert pressure on the parties involved to reach a political settlement.
perceived as a Cuban "defeat" in Angola. By supporting the Santos's recent proposals for a partial—or phased—withdrawal of Cuban forces from southern Angola, Havana has signaled that it is prepared to "bide its time," at least over the short term, and to hold to maintenance of a significant "residual" troop presence in northern Angola.

58. *Scenario: Diplomatic Breakthrough on Namibia.* An agreement by the dos Santos coalition to a total withdrawal of the Cubans, intended to bring about a broader Namibian settlement, could prompt direct action by the Soviets to derail a settlement. The transfer of most of the Cuban combat troops would ease the Soviets much of their leverage in Luanda—unless the MPLA could persuade them to push for a "military solution" to the UNITA problem that would sustain a high degree of dependence upon the CSSR for military support. Moreover, however, could not be answered about the MPLA's prospects, given Luanda's inability to defeat UNITA even with 30,000 to 35,000 Cubans on its side.

59. If the MPLA reached a consensus to take action on the US Namibian position and come to a "political solution" that included reconciliation with UNITA, the Soviets could:

- Step up disinformation and other active measures to exploit Luanda's fears that Pretoria and Washington are working together to promote a UNITA seizure of power.
- Press SWAPO to increase activity inside Namibia in hopes of turning Pretoria against a Namibian settlement.
- Acquire a MPLA-UNITA reconciliation talks, with the objective of extraditing and eliminating Savimbi and his lieutenant.
- Encourage a coup in Luanda, in hopes that, if the pro-Soviet hardliners came to power, Angola would take a more confrontational approach toward South Africa and the SWAPO issue.

Each of these options has inherent limitations and varying degrees of risk. To the extent the options require African involvement or acquiescence, Moscow has limited ability to influence events. Disinformation could have some impact, given the historical suspicion and distrust between South Africa and its black African neighbors. On the other hand, the involvement of both Luanda and Pretoria was determined to reach a settlement. The Namibian insurgents might welcome additional Soviet arms support to step up their activities, but Moscow would have difficulty supplying SWAPO without Angolan cooperation. Moreover, a Soviet attempt to influence a Namibian accord that ensured the support of most Africans could jeopardize Soviet credibility and equities among other black African states.

60. Elimination of the UNITA leadership seems highly unlikely. Savimbi is unlikely to give opponents such an opportunity, having witnessed MPLA assassination of UNITA officials during the period of the Averaccs in 1975 when both sides ostensibly were cooperating.

61. A coup by MPLA hardliners could bring to power more pro-Soviet leaders dependent on Soviet aid to hold power. Given the complex of factors—economic, tribal, ideological, and personality—that shape MPLA politics, however, Moscow could not be certain that even a successful coup would have the desired result. Tensions between the contrasting MPLA factions could further weaken the military and thus strengthen the hand of Savimbi and his UNITA insurgents. Should the coup fail, Moscow could find itself with almost no influence in Angola. Given these considerations, we believe it unlikely that the Soviets would encourage such a coup.

62. Any measures the Soviets pursue would fall to take Angola beyond the basic dilemmas that prompted Luanda to respond to South African overtures in the first place. The CSSR succeeds in derailing current negotiations. South Africa has the option of resuming pressure on Luanda by reentering southern Angola and stepping up aid to UNITA. This, in turn, would create a security crisis much like the one that prompted Moscow to send record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. While Moscow may be prepared to up its military ante as it forced the South Africans in November 1985, the Soviets—whose financial costs are minimized by Luanda's oil earnings—are unlikely to pick up the economic assistance burden if the Angolan economy becomes a total shambles.

63. On balance we believe that if the Angolans resolve their internal debate on the Cuban withdrawal and decide to proceed with the US package settlement—even if it leads to a reconciliation with UNITA—the Soviets would try to dissuade them, but would ultimately bow to their wishes. Under these circumstances, Moscow would seek to make the best of a bad situation. It would claim that Namibian independence represented a victory for the CSSR and Cuba. The Soviets would presumably seek to ensure MPLA dominance in the coalition with UNITA and to expand their contacts with at least the MPLA faction in the coalition. They would try to protect their military access to facilities in Angola, to retain the military supply relationship, and to press the MPLA to
retain at least a core Cuban troop presence. While continuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention to independent Namibia—assuming a SWAPO electoral win—in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

In Mozambique

64. Moscow's options in Mozambique have been considerably reduced since Machel's dramatic aboutface in his dealings with South Africa. Nevertheless, we believe the Soviets will try to sustain the military assistance relationship—as they have in Tanzania and Guinea—despite the recent setbacks to their interests. The Soviets, for example, accorded Machel a friendly reception during his trip to Moscow in February 1984 and have continued deliveries of previously contracted military equipment, including Mi-24 55 helicopters, since the accords with Pretoria were signed.

65. There are indications that Machel is seeking to further reduce—and perhaps eliminate—Mozambique's dependence on the USSR for military equipment and advisory support.

66. The Soviets are likely to intensify efforts to play on Machel's domestic and external vulnerabilities as he tries to expand his ties to South Africa, the West, and China. The Soviets could threaten a cutoff of military assistance and, while it is unlikely that Moscow would stop the military aid program altogether, this suggestion would serve to remind Machel of the need to reconsider Soviet interests as he proceeds in his diplomacy with South Africa.

67. Moscow is likely to seek to pressure Machel by bolstering and encouraging hardline elements within FRELIMO and disparaging his leadership to other black African leaders.

68. Moscow probably recognizes that dramatic changes—such as the exit of Machel by party hardliners—could benefit RENAMO and lead to renewed South African economic and military pressures on Maputo. While such a move might strengthen the pro-Soviet predispositions of the regime, it could also lead to renewed requests for major new Soviet military and economic assistance commitments necessary to offset potential South African military and economic countermeasures. Given the Soviet's record in Mozambique, we do not believe Moscow would fulfill these requests for major economic aid.

69. Moscow evidently hopes that the process begun by the Nkomati Accord with South Africa will break down. The Soviets have long predicted that South Africa would not cease supporting RENAMO, and they see Maputo's growing frustration over the insufficiency of evidence that the Mozambican are finally realizing that Nkomati is not working to their interests. Soviet propaganda will continue to focus on the "bankruptcy" of the Nkomati Accord and allegations of continuing South African support for RENAMO. Over time, Moscow hopes that the continuing military challenge from the insurgents will strengthenhardline elements in FRELIMO and cause Machel to abandon his commitment to Nkomati.

Possible Openings in Zimbabwe and Zambia

70. Widespread instability in Matabeleland, spawned by well-equipped dissident guerrillas or a perceived increased threat from South Africa, could alter Mugabe's arm's-length attitude toward Moscow. While Mugabe would not overcome his general distrust and wariness of the USSR, stemming from past Soviet support for the rival ZAPU, a deteriorating security situation could enhance the appeal of relatively cheap Soviet arms and fast delivery times. The Soviets reportedly sent one shipment of small arms to Harare in March 1984.

71. Failure to achieve a Namibian-Ankhal settlement would have some effect in Zambia favorable to Soviet interests, as disillusionment with US diplomatic efforts, renewed political support to SWAPO and ANC by Lusaka, and security fears of possible renewed South African paramilitary actions against SWAPO and ANC elements in Zambia could motivate Lusaka to seek additional Soviet military assistance.

Scenarios With SWAPO and the ANC

72. South Africa's diplomatic maneuvers and strains in Soviet relations with Angola and Mozambique will
continue to complicate Moscow's efforts to channel additional assistance to SWAPO and the ANC. Nevertheless, Moscow is likely to encourage SWAPO and the ANC to step up their activities, partly in hopes of silencing South Africa in prospective agreements with Luanda or Maputo.

73. Such efforts have little chance of success; however, if Pretoria and Maputo are intent on reaching a settlement. The Angolans and the Mozambicans are likely to suspect a Soviet hand in any future actions by SWAPO or the ANC—such as terrorist attacks or bombings in Namibia or South Africa—that might undermine their accords with Pretoria. Moscow's public emphasis on the need to continue the liberation struggle is likely to compound such suspicions.

74. Despite the adverse trends of recent years, the Soviets will work actively to maintain their position in Angola and Mozambique while seeking new opportunities elsewhere in southern Africa. As in the past, Moscow's main weapon will be continued military assistance to Luanda and Maputo. Concurrently, the USSR will move quietly, behind the scenes, through pro-Soviet elements in Luanda and Maputo to sow suspicion about South African and US initiatives. This approach reflects Moscow's belief that South African intransigence ultimately will destroy efforts to achieve a regional peace and that serious insolvency problems will sustain Angolan and Mozambican dependence on Soviet military and security assistance.

75. At the same time, the USSR will look for new opportunities to build influence in the region. Given the area's inherent volatility and current economic situation, such openings could develop quickly and with little advance warning. Although recent overtures to Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Lesotho have had only limited success, increased security tensions with South Africa could make these regimes more receptive to Soviet offers of military and technical assistance.

76. On the other hand, continued economic hard times in the area, coupled with Moscow's failure to provide substantive economic assistance, will work against Soviet efforts to solidify long-term influence. Persistent famine in Mozambique—or its equivalent elsewhere in the region—will only serve to highlight for economically beleaguered black African states Moscow's lack of economic help and make more attractive a "turn to the West." As such, the prospect of increased Western economic assistance to and investment in the region will remain perhaps the West's most powerful lure and counter to Soviet moves.

77. To the extent that the black Africans and Pretoria seriously participate in US-brokered solutions to regional problems, Moscow's position will be further undermined. New US and Western operations are not without risk, however, and the collapse or failure of current negotiations could seriously damage US credibility. Washington also will be susceptible to charges that it merely sought to protect its interests in South Africa, and deeply held black African perceptions that the United States exercises considerable leverage over Pretoria will fuel suspicions about US motives should South Africa drag out negotiations or initiate new military pressure to promote its regional objectives. In this situation, the Soviets could find a receptive audience by reminding black Africans of Moscow's earlier warnings about the futility of cooperating with Washington.

78. Any US diplomatic successes also will brighten black African expectations. Washington, for example, will face increased pressure to push for changes in Pretoria's domestic policies and expand its economic commitments to the southern African states. Failure of the United States to "continue moving ahead" could provide Moscow with new opportunities as more radical black leaders push for change in South Africa.

79. Black Africans will look to the West for increased economic assistance. Greater economic involvement with the West could lead Angola and Mozambique to adopt a more truly neutralized posture, further reducing Soviet influence. However, the web of political and ideological accords and continued security ties to the USSR is extensive and will assure the Soviets some degree of presence and influence. Short of the demise of the MPLA or FRELIMO governments, this relationship with Moscow is unlikely to change dramatically unless Western powers are willing to provide—a pari passu with and at competitive terms—the military and security aid currently provided by Moscow or are successful in reducing the need for such assistance.
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* Dashes indicate none.

Note: The only extension of military assistance from Cuba was directed toward Angola, in 1976, 1977, and 1983. The figures for deliveries in these years are $117 million, $14 million, and $22 million, respectively.
### Table 2
Southern Africa: Communist Military Technicians and Troops.
Third Quarter 1984

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* Minimum estimate of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more, rounded to the nearest 5.

### Table 3
Southern Africa: Communist Economic Technicians, 1983

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* Minimum estimates of number present for one month or more, rounded to the nearest 5.
### Table 4
Southern Africa: Communist Economic Extensions, 1975-83

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*Note: Figures for Cuban extensions are not cited, as Cuban aid is negligible.

*NA = Information not available.
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SECRET


FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

ITEMS

1. SOUTH AFRICA: MOVING REINFORCEMENTS TO NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICA'S RECENT DEPLOYMENTS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO NORTHERN NAMIBIA AND ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES TO THE AREA SUGGEST THAT PRETORIA IS PREPARING ITS DEFENSES IN CASE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREED TO IN GENEVA BREAKS DOWN. SOUTH AFRICA HAS DEPLOYED 12 MIRAGE FIGHTERS AND 15 IMPALA GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT TO GROOTFLANSTEIN, WHERE ONLY SEVERAL RECONNAISSANCE OR BOMBER AIRCRAFT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN. PRETORIA HAS UPGRADED ITS GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSES BY DEPLOYING ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS TO NORTHERN NAMIBIAN BASES AND BY CONCENTRATING ITS LIMITED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE ASSETS AROUND THE MAIN FORWARD AIRBASE AT OUDANGWA. SOUTH AFRICA HAS ALSO REINFORCED COUNTERINSURGENCY BATTALIONS IN THE AREA WITH CONVENTIONAL UNITS AND ADDITIONAL ARMOR AND NOW HAS 8,500 TO 10,000
SECRET

SOUTH AFRICA ANNOUNCED MONDAY THAT, IN COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED IN GENEVA LAST WEEK, IT WOULD BEGIN PULLING FORCES OUT OF ANGOLA ON 10 AUGUST AND COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL BY 1 SEPTEMBER.

COMMENT: THE DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT TO GROOTFUNTEIN STILL DOES NOT GIVE PRETORIA REGIONAL AIR SUPERIORITY, AND DESPITE REINFORCEMENTS SOUTH AFRICA REMAINS OUTGUNNED IN SOUTHWEST ANGOLA BY CUBAN, ANGOLAN, AND SWAPO GROUND FORCES THAT NUMBER ABOUT 20,000 TROOPS AND 500 TANKS. ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE PROBABLY CAPABLE OF HALTING A CUBAN-ANGOLAN ATTACK INTO NAMIBIA, PRETORIA'S MILITARY PLANNERS ARE LIKELY TO REINFORCE THE AREA FURTHER, BOTH AS A PRUDENT DETERRENT AND AS A POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE THREAT THAT MIGHT INCREASE ITS NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

SECRET
Angola: Aftermath of Coup Attempt

Angola's President Neto apparently has begun a major purge of the government, the party, and the military following the coup attempt on May 27 to overthrow his government. Some summary executions have been reported in and around Luanda. Although the situation there remains generally calm, sporadic fighting was reported last week in some of the city's slums, where support for the coup leaders is strongest.

More than 300 refugees have been arrested, including many high-ranking military officers in Luanda and in a number of key towns in the interior. According to press reports, Cuban and Angolan troops have launched numerous raids into the slum areas of Luanda during the dusk-to-dawn curfew in search of dissidents, particularly Nino Alves and Jose van Damme—leaders of the May 27 uprising who are still at large.

Several Portuguese citizens were arrested in Luanda as part of a government campaign to demonstrate foreign complicity in the uprising. Neto is rumored to suspect the Portuguese and the Yugoslavs of supporting the Alves faction. He has publicly accused South Africa, Zaire, and France—Angola's more traditional "enemies"—for their alleged involvement.

The government has lost at least 100 troops and about ten of its senior leaders in the fighting. The finance minister, a top inten-
Angolan leader Neto is setting the stage to reduce his reliance on the Soviets and Cubans. In the effort to move toward a non-aligned status, Neto is trying to replace Soviet and Cuban professionals and technicians with Angolans and Portuguese. Neto fears this policy might lead to an attempt against his life and has decided to name five military officers as vice prime ministers in order to assure control of the armed forces.
Government Military Moves, July 1987

Congo
BRAZAVILLE
KINSHASA
Angola
LUANDA
South Atlantic Ocean
Benguela
Main government support base
Mistaguro
LUANDA
Two government brigades
Lussa
Lusaka
Lusaka bent
Lambela N'Gombe
Cuito Cuanavale Field
Cuito Cuanavale
Four government brigades
UNITA-held territory
UNITA headquarters at Lambela
Botswana
Gwango
Kavango
Namibia
Lambela N'Gombe
17 July 1987
ANGOLA: Possible Offensive Under Way

Angola's UNITA insurgents claim the government began its two-front seasonal offensive into UNITA-held territory on Monday. UNITA says two government brigades have crossed the river that had marked their frontline near Lucusse and have moved south about 6 miles (9.6 kilometers) to the next river barrier. The insurgents, though initially surprised at the government advance, claim they have recovered, but so far there has been little direct contact and fighting has been limited to artillery exchanges. At Cuito Cuanavale, four government brigades are said to have pushed east of the town, and UNITA is resisting with rocket and mortar fire.

Comment: There is no other reporting to confirm the scale of the action, but the government has been building up its logistics and preparing its forces for a major offensive throughout the year. This week, Cuito Cuanavale was reinforced with additional Cuban and government troops in a 400-vehicle convoy, and command posts for control of operations were activated recently at Lucusse and Cuito Cuanavale. So far, the government appears to be probing for weaknesses in insurgent defenses. At least in the short term, government forces probably will advance cautiously to avoid exposure to a UNITA counterattack in the expectation that their superior firepower will wear down the insurgents.

17 July 1987
AFRICA REVIEW

4 November 1981

CONTENTS

South Africa - Angola: Regional

Combatants

South Africa's immediate objective is to destroy SWAPO safehaven in Angola, a country that Pretoria regards as its most hostile neighbor.

This publication is produced by the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Some issues contain articles drafted in other offices. Some articles are preliminary or speculative in nature, but the contents normally are coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the views of a single analyst; these items are clearly designated as uncoordinated views.

SECRET
SOUTH AFRICA – ANGOLA: REGIONAL COMBATANTS*

In South Africa's view, Angola is its most hostile neighbor, a doctrinaire Marxist state that hosts large Cuban and Soviet forces, and a source of vital support for the insurgencies of the South-West Africa People's Organization in Namibia and the African National Congress in South Africa. The Botha government's principal near-term objective is to contain SWAPO by attacking its "safeguard" in southern Angola. As a further counter to Angola's support of SWAPO and the ANC, South Africa provides aid to the insurgency waged by Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Pretoria and Luanda have made several clandestine contacts since 1975, but these attempts to iron out differences have yielded few concrete results.

The presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers and soldiers in Angola has important psychological and security implications for South Africa. As long as the Soviets and Cubans remain in Angola, their presence will largely determine Pretoria's attitude toward Luanda. The South Africans were shocked that Soviet-supported Cubans could occupy a neighboring country so quickly and without strong opposition from the West. They are convinced that SWAPO became a significant threat after the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) took over in Angola and the Soviets and Cubans started training and supplying arms to SWAPO. The recent killing and capture of Soviet personnel in southern Angola provided

*This is the first in a series on South Africa's relations with the neighboring black states. It will be followed by a more comprehensive examination of South Africa's regional policy since Prime Minister Botha first enunciated in April 1979 the concept of a constellation of states in southern Africa.

ALA AR 81-038
4 November 1981
SECRET

Approx area of UNITA stronghold
// Approx extent of South African ground operations

4 November 1981
South Africa with "indisputable evidence" verifying long-standing beliefs that the Soviets not only are directing SWAPO's insurgency in Namibia but are directing the activities of the ANC in South Africa as well.

Over the longer term, South Africa fears the Soviets and Cubans will support the ANC from a SWAPO-controlled Namibia in the same manner they support SWAPO in an MPLA-controlled Angola. Until the South Africans are convinced that Namibia cannot do for the ANC what Angola does for SWAPO, they will prefer to fight at the Namibian border rather than at the Orange River.

The Border Conflict

Pretoria's counterinsurgency efforts against SWAPO are being increasingly directed against Angola's ability to support the guerrillas. South Africa has constrained SWAPO's ability to operate in Namibia by conducting aggressive cross-border operations into Angola during the last year and a half. South Africa now appears intent on establishing a de facto demilitarized zone on the northern side of the Namibia-Angola border.

The military operation into Angola in late August was the largest and most ambitious incursion since the intervention during the Angolan civil war in 1975. In addition to the capture and killing of Soviet personnel, the invasion was most notable for the heavy Angolan casualties, at least 50 to 60 percent of the estimated 1,000 killed. Because the South Africans almost certainly knew that SWAPO had moved well to the north, the primary objective probably was to attack Angolan support for SWAPO and reverse the trend of closer Angolan cooperation with the guerrillas.

Pretoria has consistently maintained that its only target is SWAPO and that every effort is made to avoid contact with Angolan forces. Despite an avowed desire to live in peace with its neighbors, including appeals to sign nonaggression pacts, South Africa has warned Angola against interfering with operations against SWAPO and has said that it will continue to take steps to protect the security of the people of Namibia.

Pretoria first began large-scale, search-and-destroy missions against SWAPO bases in Angola in July 1980.

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SECRET

Subsequently, official battle reports included estimates of Angolan casualties, an implicit acknowledgment that the border war was growing.

Angola's response has been largely rhetorical, and has included almost daily status reports on South African actions. After an OAU special committee reported that the objectives of the attacks in 1980 were Angolan social and economic structures, not SWAPO, Luanda has insisted that the invasions are aimed at "destabilizing" the country and at creating a buffer zone for South Africa's "UNITA puppets."

South African Support for UNITA

In return for relatively small expenditures, South Africa benefits considerably from the insurgency being waged in Angola by UNITA. There is no evidence that South Africa and UNITA engage in joint actions against SWAPO, although some coordination of activities, including sharing of intelligence, probably occurs. UNITA's control of southeast Angola denies SWAPO a larger operational area. Savimbi's 10,000 to 12,000 guerrillas tie down Cuban and Angolan resources that otherwise might be used to support SWAPO.

UNITA's presence, however, probably adds little directly to South Africa's fight against SWAPO. Even if UNITA did not exist, Angola and its Cuban and Soviet supporters probably would not be enthusiastic about engaging South African forces.

Although UNITA is well enough entrenched to survive on its own barring new combat involvement of Cuban troops, South Africa supplies it with small amounts of military equipment. It also sells or gives UNITA nonmilitary supplies--including gasoline, food, and medicine--and buys UNITA's diamonds and ivory.

In addition to aiding the Namibian counterinsurgency effort, South Africa's support for UNITA serves Pretoria's regional policy objectives. Using UNITA to close the Benguela railroad to traffic from Zaire and Zambia prevents South Africa's neighboring states from reducing their economic dependence on South Africa. The shutdown of the railroad deprives Angola of more than $50 million.

4 November 1981

SECRET
annually in foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, Pretoria supports UNITA probably for the same reason it supports dissident movements in other neighboring countries—the assistance diverts leaders in these countries away from pursuing the end of white rule in Pretoria and toward maintaining their own power.

Pretoria does not share Savimbi’s hope of forcing the MPLA government to share power with UNITA and would probably prefer to see Angola partitioned by positioning UNITA between Namibia (and South Africa) and the MPLA and its Communist allies. In lieu of this unlikely eventuality, South Africa will continue its limited support for UNITA, ensuring that Savimbi’s group survives as a distraction to Luanda and serves as a de facto buffer zone.

Clandestine Contacts

Although South Africa talks to Angola primarily in the language of war, there have been clandestine contacts since 1975 about which little is known. Discussions on prisoners of war yielded concrete results in September 1978 when three Cuban soldiers were traded for nine South Africans and cash.

Since that time, the South Africans and Angolans have probably met two or three times a year on Namibian political-military issues, particularly on the Angolan proposal for a demilitarized zone separating Angola and Namibia. Occasional reports in the South African press that the Angolans were seeking to trade their support of SWAPO for South African support of UNITA invariably sparked angry denials from Luanda that meetings were taking place. The two sides probably met privately at the Geneva talks on Namibia last January and may have had subsequent meetings despite the increased intensity of fighting in southern Angola.

Outlook

If there is no Namibian settlement, the conflict on the Namibian-Angolan border will become more severe. The South Africans may come to believe that southern Angola must be cleared not only of SWAPO but also of its allies. Thus, the heavy Angolan casualties experienced

4 November 1981
in the recent incursion may foreshadow a South African attempt to create a "no man's land" in southern Angola. Maintaining such a barrier would undoubtedly require preemptive strikes deeper into Angola, further escalating the border war.

A negotiated settlement in Namibia presupposes that South African security apprehensions, particularly those regarding ANC activities, have been met. With an independent, but neutral Namibia, South Africa would seek "normal" relations with Angola. South Africa would probably continue to support UNITA as a counter to Angolan support for the ANC and as a distraction to the MPLA government. The South Africans would be concerned about but would tolerate, a continued Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola, provided Pretoria believed these forces were not moving southward into Namibia. If the latter were seen as imminent, however, South Africa would be tempted to reoccupy Namibia, preferring a surrogate war on Angolan and Namibian territory to an insurgency on their own.
Weekly Review
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA

1. Angola: New Turn; Cuban Involvement

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA: NEW TURN

The recent arrival of substantial amounts of new Soviet and Cuban military aid for the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is beginning to have an impact on the fighting. After suffering military reverses at the hands of its allied foes for the past month, the Movement began this week to battle back.

In the area north of Luanda around Quifangando, where the fighting had been stalemated for some time, the Zairian-supported National Front for the Liberation of Angola appears to be ebbing under growing pressure from the Popular Movement. Front forces may have been forced to give ground. There has also been bitter seesaw fighting some 60 miles from the Front stronghold of Carmona.

In the central sector, the situation is confused with heavy fighting reported between the Popular Movement and the joint forces of the National Front and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola operating near Malanje, Dondo, and Quibala. The Popular Movement appears to be at least holding its own in the sector; it still controls the vital Cambambe dam near Dondo that supplies Luanda’s electric power. According to press reports, National Front - National Union troops spearheaded by South African advisers and white mercenaries, which had been sweeping toward Luanda from the south, have been stalled.

In eastern Angola, a large Popular Movement force moving south from the Movement’s base at Henrique de Carvalho reportedly has advanced to within 65 miles of Luso, a National Union-held city astride the Benguela railway. Guerrilla units of the Popular Movement are said to have appeared near the rail line between Luso and the key railhead of Teixeira de Souza.

On the political scene, the joint regime proclaimed by National Front and National Union leaders on November 11 in opposition to Agostinho Neto’s Luanda-based government finally unveiled a leadership slate of 16 officials this week. The post of prime minister in the coalition regime, which is based in Nova Lisboa, is to be rotated monthly between Johnny Eduardo Pinnock of the National Front and Jose N'Dele of the National Union, the ranking representatives of their respective groups in the Angolan transitional government that collapsed last summer under military pressure from the Popular Front.

Neither National Front leader Holden Roberto nor the National Union’s Jonas Savimbi took positions in their regime, which clearly remains a fragile structure. It has not been recognized by any foreign country. Neto’s regime, on the other hand, has now been formally accepted by 27 states.
Nigeria this week became the eleventh African country to recognize the Popular Movement, citing growing public attention to South Africa’s involvement with the Movement’s opponents as the main reason for its action. Lagos’ example may sway other nonradical African governments to follow suit despite the concern many of them share over Soviet and Cuban support for the Popular Movement.

Meanwhile, the Africans’ dilemma over the Angolan crisis may lead to an emergency summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity. Support for holding such a conference spurted this week and now seems likely to attain eventually the required approval of two thirds of the 46 member states. Backers of the Popular Movement—led by Somalia, Guinea, Congo, and Mozambique—have led the drive, clearly hoping to use the meeting to change OAU policy from neutrality in the Angolan conflict to endorsement of Neto’s group as the country’s sole legitimate government. If a summit is held, it will probably result in open quarreling among the Africans rather than progress toward a settlement in Angola.

Soviet Supplies

During the past week, Moscow airlifted additional military supplies to the Popular Movement.

They could have delivered some 1,000 tons of military cargo. Still more war materiel is now being delivered directly to the Angolan capital by Soviet ships.

Cuban Involvement

As the civil war progresses, the Cubans can expect to find themselves bearing more and more of the burden of combat and will probably want an increasingly greater voice in both military and political decision-making at the expense of Popular Movement leaders. The presence of a rank-heavy command group would give the Cubans that capability and would underscore their determination to see the war through to victory.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Worksheets on Cuban Manpower in Angola

July 27, 1977

1. I am forwarding with this memo the informal worksheets which I described to you on July 26. Rather than attach a lengthy written explanation of our methodology, I would prefer that you call me directly about how we arrived at these estimates.

2. Based on talks with other CIA analysts, I believe that we must still qualify these numbers in some way. I do not know the best way to do this in a written publication as yet, but qualification will be necessary until we get more conclusive reporting on the total numbers of Cuban troops there.

3. Our work on this problem at least makes us more aware of the total Cuban commitment. I have always believed that the total number of Cubans in Angola was on the high side of ranges we have quoted in finished intelligence publications.

4. Perhaps a more significant issue is not whether the number of troops is 15,000 or 16,000 but whether this large investment is still enough to do the job, especially if civilian support of UNITA and other insurgent groups is pronounced and growing.

5. I welcome whatever comments or questions you have on this project. You can reach me on

Attachment: Worksheets

SECRET

SR M 77-10098
CONCLUSIONS

Military Personnel --

12,250 as of March 1977
1,800 in May-June sealift
1,500 in March-June airlift

15,550 total Cuban military personnel in Angola as of late July 1977

Civilian Personnel --

4,300 Cuban civilians, apart from military personnel, performing non-military or paramilitary tasks.

19,850 total Cubans in Angola

Of the estimated 15,550 military personnel, about 12,000 are combat troops who are organized into about 30 battalions. About 400 men comprise a Cuban battalion in Angola, a slightly lower number than the manpower of a battalion in Cuba. The rest of the Cuban military in Angola are evidently general support and training personnel.
SOURCES

- 9,000 operational forces
- 1,300 "law and order" personnel in Luanda
- (1,300) security personnel in Luanda port and airport*
- 650 instructors to MPLA
- 650 logistics personnel
- 650 administrative, commo, and postal workers

12,250 total

- 1,800 on ships during convoy movement of May-June 1977
- 1,500 on flights of March-June 1977 (320 on BB-318s, about 1,180 on IL-62)

15,550 total as of July 1977

- 3,000 civilians
- 1,300 paramilitary forces (listed by the South Africans as military, but are probably subordinate to MININT)

4,300 total as of July 1977

NOTE -- These are only the primary sources used. Other materials used in ——
CUBAN MILITARY STRUCTURE
IN ANGOLA

Luanda HQ

MR I (Uige)
MR II (Cabinda)
MR III (Luso)

MR IV (Malange)
MR V (Huambo)
MR VI (Lubango)

Battalion:

120 men
MR Co MR Co Mech Co Mortar Co AT Bty

Plt Plt Plt

35 men

NOTE -- Each military region in Angola has at least one battalion; most thought to have several
## ESTIMATED DISPOSITION OF CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Region</th>
<th>Estimated Cuban Mil. Manpower</th>
<th>Estimated Battalions</th>
<th>Airfields</th>
<th>Training Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (Uige)</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uige</td>
<td>7 - Negage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negage*</td>
<td>1 - Uige</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Luanda*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sovo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II (Cabinda)</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cabinda*</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>III (Luso)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Luso</td>
<td>2 - Iuso</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Serpa Pinto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (Malange)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Malange</td>
<td>2 - Saurimo</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Saurimo</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cacolo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (Huambo)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Huambo*</td>
<td>2 - Huambo</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bie</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Benguela/Lobito</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI (Lubango)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Luhango</td>
<td>2 - Lobito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mocamedes</td>
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*### SECRET*

**NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**
National Intelligence Bulletin

December 18, 1975

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* JBA-ANGOLA: High-level Cuban visitors to Luanda

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TOP SECRET
CUBA-ANGOLA

Two high Cuban Communist Party officials and an armed forces deputy minister traveled to the Angolan capital via the Cuban troop airlift on December 2, according to a well-placed, reliable source. The three presumably are in Luanda to:

- discuss further Cuban support to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola;
- iron out problems that have arisen following the introduction of large numbers of Cuban troops into the civil war;
- coordinate political and propaganda activities growing out of Fidel Castro's expected explanation of Cuba's involvement in Angola when he speaks before the party congress on Monday.

About 3,500 Cuban troops have been sent by air to support the Popular Movement. Added to the troops who have gone by sea, this brings to over 6,000 the total number of Cubans involved in the fighting. Some of the flights have gone all the way to Luanda via Bridgetown, Barbados; Bissau, Guinea-Bissau; and Brazzaville, Congo; some go only as far as Brazzaville. In the latter cases, the troops are then taken to Pointe Noire, Congo, and moved into Angola from there.

One of the three Cuban officials now in Luanda was identified as Jorge Risquet, a member of the Central Committee's Secretariat. It was Risquet who gave the first public clue that Cubans were involved in the fighting in Angola. In a speech on November 11 at a ceremony marking Angolan independence day, he stated that Cubans were "ready to give their blood" for the Angolans.

The second of the trio is also a member of the Central Committee and has served under Risquet, handling party matters for at least the past year. The third is the armed forces' highest political officer, who may concentrate on bolstering the morale of the Cuban troops in Angola.
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday July 27, 1976 CI NIDC 76-175C

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Top Secret
(Security Classification)
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, July 27, 1976

Classification abbreviations precede each paragraph. The MID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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CUBA: Speeches

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CUBA: Speeches

Fidel Castro, in a speech last night, reiterated his standard pledge that "Cuban military units and the necessary weapons" would remain in Angola until Luanda's armed forces are organized, equipped, and trained.

Castro added that he is withdrawing military personnel not now needed but gave no hint as to the number of troops involved or the pace of the withdrawal. He promised visiting Angolan President Agostinho Neto that Cuban troops would return if Angola were again in need and assured him of Cuba's intention to cooperate in all fields.

For his part, Neto expressed gratitude for Cuban support. He said that large numbers of Cuban troops are no longer required but stressed the need for Cuban technicians.

Judging from the nature of the Angolan delegation, considerable planning for the future Cuban role in Angola probably took place. Neto's party included senior political, economic, and military officials, as well as representatives from local governments, unions, and mass organizations.
LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 83-103 FOR 26 MAY.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

CONTENTS:

1. ANGOLA: AIR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS

2. ANGOLA: AIR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS

SA-8 AND SA-9 MOBILE AIR DEFENSE MISSILE LAUNCHERS AT CAHAMA AND SA-9 LAUNCHERS AT CUVELAI IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE ANGOLANS HAVE MOVED THESE MISSILES TO POSITIONS ON THEIR FORWARD DEFENSE LINE.

COMMENT: //CUBAN AND SOVIET ADVISERS PROBABLY ARE HELPING THE ANGOLANS OPERATE THE WEAPONS, WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE ANGOLAN AIR DEFENSES. THE MISSILES EVIDENTLY WERE MOVED IN RESPONSE TO SOUTH AFRICAN RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS AND AN AIRSTRIKE ON TARGETS NEAR CUVELAI LATE LAST MONTH AND TO THE STEADY AUGMENTATION OF SOUTH
AFRICAN FORCES IN THE REGION. THE SOUTH AFRICANS STILL HAVE A SIZABLE OPERATION UNDER WAY IN THEIR BUFFER ZONE AND HAVE WARNED THEY WOULD NOT TOLERATE A BUILDUP OF ANGOLAN FORCES NEAR THE ZONE.//
SECRET

OUTGOING

SECRET

FRP: . . . . . .

STAFF

OUTGOING

MESSAGE

SECRET

BRIEF

TO: MEA BRIEF

MESSAGE

PAGE 001

86 1006948

AS0

PAGE 001

TOT: 2804142 MAY 86

DIRECTOR 890788

SECRET

BRIEF 200412/ DIRECTOR 890788

TO: MEA BRIEF

MESSAGE

SUBJECT: MEA BRIEF OCPAS MEA 86-123 FOR 28 MAY 1986.

FROM: DD1/0/CPAS

MESSAGE

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MESSAGE

SECRET

2493
AFRICA

A CUBAN COMBAT BRIGADE ALMOST COMPLETE NEAR ANGOLA'S CAPITAL... ELEMENTS BEGAN ARRIVING IN 1984, INCREASES NUMBER OF COMBAT BRIGADES TO 13... WILL IMPROVE SECURITY, FREE ANGOLANS FOR FIGHTING

END OF MESSAGE
STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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December 4, 1975

USSR-US-Angola: Soviets Rap US on Angola . . . . 1

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The Soviet central press is giving heavy play to allegations of extensive US military intervention in Angola on behalf of the Popular Movement's rivals. This may be Moscow's way of responding to Secretary Kissinger's recent public warnings that continued Soviet and Cuban support for the Popular Movement could have serious consequences for detente.

The Soviet media have concentrated on re-playing charges made by various American and African journals. Pravda however, broke stride earlier this week by running an article which asserted that US (and NATO) "servicemen," along with weapons and other military equipment, were being "rushed" to Angola to reinforce the ranks of "foreign interventionists" fighting there.

In an apparent effort to justify Soviet involvement in Angola, Kremlin propagandists are continuing to refer to US-Chinese collusion in the former Portuguese territory. Pravda, for example, has speculated that Angola might be high on the agenda in the talks this week between President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and Chinese leaders in Peking. The Communist Party daily had earlier charged that the Chinese had approached the US to suggest "parallel or joint efforts" against the Soviet-backed Popular Movement.

Soviet commentators are also going to great lengths to emphasize that detente with the West in no way precludes Soviet support for national liberation struggles elsewhere in the world. In an editorial on the limits of detente, Izvestia on December 2 said that "some people would like to have us believe that the process of easing tension in the world and support for the national liberation struggle are incompatible things. They have

December 4, 1975

-1-
tried to assert this in the past but in vain." The editorial closed by noting that "the detente process does not mean—and never has meant—the freezing of the socio-political status quo in the world."

Some of Moscow's East European allies are also weighing in against Secretary Kissinger's remarks on Soviet involvement in Angola. An editorial, for example, in a quasi-official Warsaw newspaper on December 1 portrayed alleged imperialist efforts to counter the Popular Movement regime as part of a strategy of concentrating on "new regions" in the face of defeat in Indochina, the overthrow of "Frankists" in Portugal, and "symptoms of democratic reforms" in Spain. The editorial observed that, at a time when the Secretary is addressing "so-called warnings" to states supporting the Popular Movement, the American press itself is reporting a CIA airlift to Zaire. It concluded by arguing that moral and physical assistance provided to the "Angolan Government" is nothing more than a barrier against "the shifting fronts of militarism and aggression."

Meanwhile, there has been a lull in the Soviet military resupply airlift to Angola which began early last month.
ANGOLA:

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola moved quickly to expand military operations on its southern front following the collapse in the north of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. In heavy fighting in several areas of central Angola during the past week, the Popular Movement met stiff resistance from units of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola that South Africans have been aiding. The National Union's position may soon deteriorate rapidly, however, as a result of the reported decision by Pretoria to withdraw its forces from the Angolan conflict. The number of Cuban troops in Angola spearheading the Popular Movement's drives now probably exceeds 10,000 men.

South Africans Leaving

Prime Minister Vorster's government apparently reached its decision some days ago.
ment in Angola at the recent OAU emergency summit meeting. The National Union itself has neither the technical know-how nor the equipment to compete with the Cuban-backed and Soviet-equipped Popular Movement forces. Its only chance for survival may be to revert to guerrilla tactics.

**Military Situation**

In northern Angola this week, the Popular Movement concentrated on consolidating its position at Ambrizete. It has not attempted to push farther north toward the Zairian border, suggesting that some forces from this sector have already been shifted to operations in the south against the National Union.

The shattered National Front is trying to regroup behind new defensive positions north of the M'Bridge River.

Pretoria's decision was influenced by what the South Africans considered inadequate international—meaning Western—support for the National Union and the National Front. It surely also reflects Vorster's concern over growing domestic opposition to the South African military role in Angola. The country's parliament, which has been out of session since last summer, is to convene this week.

The loss of the South African troops is a major blow to the National Union, which was counting heavily on them to help it cope with expected new drives by the Popular Movement and its Cuban legions. National Union officials apparently had expected Pretoria to step up its assistance in view of the failure of the Organization of African Unity to condemn South Africa's involve-

Reports from central Angola are fragmentary and contradictory, but it is clear that fighting between the National Union and the Popular Movement has intensified. One of the most heavily contested positions was Cela, which Movement troops captured late last week.

In the east, the National Union appears to be maintaining pressure on Popular Movement forces ensconced in the important railway town of Teixeira de Sousa, close to the Zairian border. Last weekend, Popular Movement troops in this battle area were hit from another direction when Zairian jet fighters strafed the Soviet-backed group's positions at two locations. The strikes apparently were in retaliation for the Popular
Movement's earlier destruction of a bridge linking Telixeara de Sousa with Dillio on the Zairian side of the Cassai River; at least one of the strikes may have been coordinated with a ground move by National Union troops.

In midweek, National Union President Jonas Savimbi was reported preparing his forces for an expected three-pronged offensive by the Popular Movement against Luso, Andulo, and the Lobito-Bengoela port and rail complex. If successful, such an offensive would place the Popular Movement well inside the tribal territory of the National Union and in a position to move against Huambo (Nova Lisboa), the capital of the nominal joint government of the Popular Movement's adversaries, and Bie (Silva Porto), the National Union's main staging base in central Angola. Savimbi is also reportedly attempting to reorganize the National Union's military structure by replacing older commanders with younger officers who have shown an ability to adjust to the tactics being employed in the current fighting.

**Political Developments**

The military collapse of the National Front—historically the Popular Movement's most bitter adversary—is stimulating new talk of a possible political settlement between the other two groups. Reports indicating that such a deal was under active consideration have circulated for months; it would probably be favored by most of the 22 African countries that refused to accept Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement regime as Angola's legitimate government at the OAU summit and by at least some of those who supported the Popular Movement. Since that meeting, a new effort is under way to bring about "unity" [Note: Image not fully visible, text not complete.]
between the Popular Movement and the National Union.

The National Union's Savimbi has consistently favored a compromise arrangement that would enable all three Angolan groups to be included in a national unity government as envisaged in the independence agreement they concluded with Portugal a year ago. The National Union formally reiterated this position—rejected by the National Front since last summer—at its annual conference late last month. This week, Savimbi, in Kinshasa for a strategy meeting with President Mobutu, publicly denied current press reports of secret contacts between his group and the Popular Movement looking toward formation of a two-party coalition. Nevertheless, in view of recent military developments, Savimbi might now be willing to conclude such an arrangement.

The real problem, of course, is gaining the agreement of the Popular Movement, which for months has also rejected the unity solution. At present, Neto's regime is publicly proclaiming that the defeat of the Front changes nothing and that no coalition is possible with any of the "lackeys of imperialism."

If key African supporters of the Popular Movement were to press for an accommodation with the Union, political leaders of the Movement might still be amenable. But at this stage the chances that Neto's military hardliners, who are surely anticipating additional major victories for their forces, could be brought into line any time soon seem dim indeed.

Soviets Maintain Uncompromising Line

Moscow is continuing its tough, uncompromising public line on Angola in the wake of the OAU summit.

Pravda, in its weekly roundup of international affairs, poured cold water on the notion of a coalition government as a solution to the Angolan conflict. There is no "realistic" basis for a government of national unity in Angola, Pravda said adding such an idea is obviously the product of "pressure from Western imperialist circles." In an effort to put the best possible face on Soviet disappointment over the OAU's failure to recognize the Popular Movement as Angola's legitimate government, Pravda claimed that the deadlock at Addis Ababa was really a defeat for the
"imperialists," who were unable to "dictate" the course of events in Angola.

In addition to reaffirming strong Soviet and Cuban support for the Popular Movement, Pravda and all other components of the USSR's media have been giving heavy play to the military collapse of National Front forces in northern Angola. The commentaries stress the opportunity this presents for major Popular Movement gains against National Union forces on the eastern and southern fronts.

Despite the Kremlin's hard public line, hints that the USSR's position on Angola may not be entirely inflexible are continuing to come from Soviet officials in Moscow and abroad. There is some talk of a coalition government that is clearly dominated by the Popular Movement.

The idea of a coalition government undoubtedly reflects one strain of Soviet thinking on the Angolan problem, but it is not likely to be in ascendance so long as the Popular Movement and the Cubans appear to have an opportunity to crush their rivals on the ground in Angola. If the National Union collapses as a fighting force and the South Africans pull out, however, it is possible the Soviets will urge Neto to make some gesture of reconciliation to the Savimbi remnants in the interest of gaining stronger control over the Angolan countryside and its divided, tribal populations.
SECRET

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TOT: 260432Z FEB 87
DIRECTOR 315078

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BRIEF 260432Z DIRECTOR 315078
TOT:

DEHOPAS  MEAB 87-046

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST ASIA BRIEF OCPAS MEAB 87-046 FOR 26 FEBRUARY 1987.
FROM: DD1/O/CPAS.

ITEMS

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1. 

SECRET
2. CUBA-ANGOLA: CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY

Cuba's military contingent in Angola has been reinforced during the past year, and elements of its forces there have been redeployed, possibly to newly threatened positions in Northern Angola. Incremental, but relatively steady, increase in troop strength since late 1985. The Cubans have filled out a brigade in Luanda, reinforced Menougue, a key base in the southeast, improved security at the Cabinda oil facilities, and established a new brigade at Kuito in central Angola. Some Cubans probably also have arrived to man additional air- and air-defense equipment supplied by Moscow over the past year.

Cuban troops that had been guarding important transportation routes and a provincial center in north-central Angola have abandoned their garrisons in the last few months.

Comment: Some 1,600 additional Cubans probably have arrived since late 1985, bringing the total number of Cuban military forces in Angola to about 37,500 men. The new arrivals, apparently sent to strengthen defenses at important military and economic facilities, underscore Havana's commitment to the Angolan government's security.
NEEDS. THE CUBAN UNITS THAT REDEPLOYED MAY HAVE MOVED TO THE FAR NORTH TO GUARD POSITIONS AND FREE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS FOR FIELD OPERATIONS IN A REGION WHERE INSURGENT ACTIVITY HAS BEEN INCREASING.
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola During February 1976
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by
Exempt from General Discovery Priorities Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category
§ 581(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on
date impossible to determine
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

SUBJECT: Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola During February 1976

Key Points

The value of support provided the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) by the Soviet Union and Cuba in February 1976 brings total estimated Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA for the year beginning 1 March 1975 to over $400 million.

we believe that the amount of military goods shipped declined. Arms deliveries, however, included the first confirmed shipments of MIG-21 aircraft.

-- A large portion of the February deliveries was foodstuff.

* This memorandum supplements and brings up to date two earlier Interagency Intelligence Memoranda entitled, "Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola from March through December 1975," published on 24 January 1976, and "Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola During January 1976," published on 10 February 1976. It has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the National Security Agency.
-- We believe an additional 1,500 Cubans were sent to Angola in February, raising the total number of Cuban military personnel in country to about 13,500. Since late February the number has probably remained at this level, as further arrivals have been offset by an equal number of troops, including some wounded, returning to Cuba.

-- The airlift from the Soviet Union during February was limited and passenger flights from Cuba were put on a regular every-other-day schedule beginning in mid-month.

-- Sealift operations between Cuba and Angola were increasingly integrated into the Cuban merchant fleet's worldwide schedules.
The Details

1. Soviet and Cuban aid to Angola in February was at a record level.

Sea and Air Deliveries

3. Soviet ships sailed nonstop from the Soviet Union to Angola; from the Black Sea and from the Baltic port of Tallin.

4. The most significant new equipment noted was MIG-21 aircraft.
5. Cuban-owned or controlled ships delivered goods to Angola in February.

6. Besides hauling larger quantities of non-military goods in February, Cuban ships changed their voyage pattern. Rather than waiting for ships to return from Angola to Cuba to take on more Angola-bound cargo, the Cubans assigned more ships to Angolan voyages as they became available in Cuba. These changes enabled more of the ships to resume regular commercial operations after leaving the Angolan region.

7. Airlift activity from the Soviet Union to the Angolan area declined sharply in February.

Cuban Personnel Movements

8. Cuban ships arriving in the Angolan region in February may have carried as many as 1,500 troops in addition to cargo.
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)

22 July 1982
ANGOLA: UNITA Clashes With Cubans

Insurgents of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ambushed an approximately 1,000-man Angolan and Cuban force in southern Angola last month. Several Cubans were killed. This was the first major engagement between Cuban combat troops and UNITA since 1980.

UNITA also may be concentrating on capturing whites to dissuade foreign governments from assisting the Angolan regime. This recent increase in insurgent activity may be an attempt by Savimbi to draw additional attention to his assertions that UNITA will have to be involved in any settlement on Namibia.
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USSR-Angola: Ideas on the Angolan Conflict

Top Secret

26 February 1986
USSR-ANGOLA: Ideas on the Angolan Conflict

The resolution of the conflict in Angola could begin with a dialogue between representatives of the government and the UNITA insurgents. US could start the process by publicly calling for talks. An international conference on Angola could lead to internal reconciliation, that Luanda could share power if UNITA leader Savimbi were not included in the government, and that Soviet advisers and Cuban troops could be withdrawn if a settlement included effective guarantees against South African interference.

Comment: Soviet commitment to Luanda’s pursuit of a military solution to the insurgency has not weakened, and Moscow is not likely to go beyond symbolic proposals for a peace process, at least until after the government’s expected offensive. The remarks go somewhat beyond earlier Soviet proposals but are probably an effort to sound out US thinking on the eve of scheduled US-Soviet discussion on southern Africa and possibly to influence the debate in the US over aid to UNITA.
MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF GC/OS 8390 FOR 02 AUG 82
FROM 01/0/OS/GC/OS.

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1. SOUTH AFRICA = ANGOLA: ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS.

2.

1. SOUTH AFRICA = ANGOLA: ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS.

//SOUTH AFRICA HAS PUBLICLY ADMITTED LOSING 16 MEMBERS OF ITS DEFENSE FORCE WHEN A HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN DURING OPERATIONS AGAINST BASES OF THE SOUTHWEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. PRETORIA CLAIMS THE OPERATION IS STILL IN PROGRESS AND THAT 214 SHARP GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN KILLED. A CONTINUING SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE AT KAGAONDO.

SECRET

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(b)(3)
Cuba: Concern over Prospects in Angola

The Cuban government is clearly worried by the mounting problems it faces in Angola. What appeared last year as a relatively easy triumph for Cuba's "internationalism" is now becoming a foreign policy quagmire. The Cubans, however, are still committed to the regime of Angolan President Neto. They sent 3,000 to 4,000 more troops to Angola in May and Vice President Fred Cuesta pledged continuing support during a visit he made this month.

From the Cuban viewpoint, the difficulties in Angola are many and serious:

- Economic and social conditions are deteriorating.
- Political instability has heightened, and Cuban troops reportedly played a key role in controlling an eruption on May 27.
- Resistance is growing among Angolans against the Cubans.
- The defeat of the Katangans who issued a call for Angola to be freed

fear of a Zairean military retaliation. Cuba's involvement in Angola is extensive. In addition to combat troops, Cuba has provided the Neto regime with a large number of military advisors who are tasked with organizing and training the armed forces, a militia, the national police force, and a secret police force.

Cuban advisors are partially filling the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era. These include agricultural and livestock technicians, medical personnel, merchant marine specialists, educators, and construction personnel.

To help Neto's Popular Movement broaden its political base, the Cubans are also providing assistance in forming mass organizations and a political machine. Home Angolans have apparently been sent to Cuba for training.

As the extensive Cuban presence has become increasingly evident, the image of Cubans as new colonizers has spread. The Angolans frequently criticize the Cubans for being arrogant, for ignoring (See Angola, Page 3)
Angola...

From Page 1

African nations, and for their tendency to take command instead of remaining in the background as advisors.

Angola is also on the Cuban and Soviets for monopolizing the few remaining territories in the country. The failure of the foreigners to bring about any economic progress or to eliminate the insurgencies is another cause of resentment.

The Cuban Response

So far, the Cubans have responded to the mounting problems in Angola by increasing the number of Cuban personnel in the country. In mid-April and early May, the Cuban government began acceleration of its forces in Africa.

Cuban Vice President Raúl Castro training.

Another indication of Cuban concern was the hurry and unannounced trip to Cuba this month by Raúl Castro, the armed forces minister and number-two man in the Cuban leadership. He reportedly inspected the critical military zones, including Cabinda and Angola's borders with Zaire and Namibia. The communiqué issued after his visit pledged continued Cuban support for the regime, suggesting that the Cubans are not yet ready to start looking for a way out.

The fresh troops arriving from Cuba will probably enable the Angolan government to check the insurgency in Cabinda and northern Angola. There have been several recent reports indicating that Cuban troops have moved into Cabinda.

In the south, where insurgency is more widespread, Cuban forces may score some minor successes against the guerrillas led by Jonas Savimbi. Over the long term, however, the Cuban and Angolan forces will probably be unable to neutralize Savimbi's forces without a much larger military force.

The rapid reinforcement indicates that the limits of Havana's support has not yet been reached, Angola still faces the likelihood of a steadily worsening situation, and may press Cuba for additional military and technical support.

Cuban President Fidel Castro would seem to have few options other than to respond positively; he probably would be willing to send additional combat troops.

In the meantime, Cuba will probably press some East European nations and the USSR for additional material aid as well as some African nations for greater moral support.

The Economic Burden

The economic burden of Angola is not an important constraint on Cuban policy makers. The personnel now stationed in Angola represent only a small fraction of Cuba's labor force and a loss in national earnings of about $40 to $50 million annually—only a small amount of gross national product.

The USSR bears almost all the cost of the Cuban involvement, at least indirectly. It has replaced—probably on a grant basis—most of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola. Much of the equipment delivered by the Soviets is in fact newer and more sophisticated than that which the Cubans earlier sent to Angola.

The Cuban government is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over the exaggerated domestic perception of the cost of its involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of their government's overall commitment in Angola, but they are aware that the sizable drain on Cuba's resources is a sharp economic downturn.

Although Cuban leaders maintain—correctly—that the island's economic downturn is due to low world sugar prices, they have apparently failed to convince the public. President Castro, who pays close attention to mass attitudes, has never told the full story of the intervention in Angola.

If it is faced with continued demands for a significant expansion of its forces in Angola, the Cuban leadership may be forced to reassess its policy.
Trends in Communist Media
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CASTRO ANNOUNCES ANGOLAN WITHDRAWAL; WARNS U.S. ON HIJACKING

Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro on 6 June made his first public acknowledgment of a "gradual" withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Castro's reference to Cuban forces in Angola came during a rally speech on the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Interior Ministry, Cuba's chief internal security force, broadcast by Havana's domestic and international radios. Castro noted that the pullout was under way, but declined to give figures on the rate of withdrawal or any date for its completion. Castro said that Cuban forces would remain "until the Angolan People's Army is organized, trained, equipped" and able to defend itself. Castro did not repeat earlier Cuban leader statements indicating that Cuba had no plans for military involvement in Rhodesia; in fact, he declared that aid to Angola was based on Cuba's support for "total liberation in Africa."

Referring to earlier attacks on Cuban fishing boats by "counter-revolutionaries," Castro repeated his 19 April warning that Cuba's continued commitment to the 1973 hijacking agreement with the United States was contingent upon "what the U.S. Government does to prevent such criminal actions." And, in yet another warning to the United States, he added that Cuba had not engaged in terrorism but that "this fact does not mean that we renounce it" for the future.

WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA

Castro praised Cuban forces in Angola, especially the Interior Ministry's "battalion of special troops," which he said were the first regular troops to arrive in Luanda. He added, almost parenthetically, that these troops were now "returning to our country along with other units." As if implicitly responding to charges of a Cuban occupation, Castro said it was "absurd" for anyone to think Cuba had planned to keep troops in Angola indefinitely. He said Cuban forces had "concluded their task" and were "gradually being withdrawn under the agreements between the governments of the People's Republic of Angola and Cuba." But he immediately warned that "the enemy must not reach an erroneous conclusion" and "try to carry out any aggression against the Angolan people," because Cubans would remain in Angola as long as needed. Ignoring Western media speculation on Cuba's rate of withdrawal, Castro said that Cuba's only timetable would be "the time strictly necessary to support the Angolan people against foreign aggression" until they could manage their own defense.
LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA  As in the past, Castro insisted that Cuba sought no material advantage in Angola.

He said Cuba was concerned only with "the success of Angola, the advancement of the revolution in Africa, and the total liberation of Africa." Castro made no other reference to Africa, thus avoiding confirming before a domestic audience earlier Cuban leadership statements—made only to foreign media—vaguely indicating that Cuba did not plan to become militarily involved in Rhodesia. For example, the Politburo's foreign policy expert, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez—in a 20 May Tokyo press conference totally ignored by the Havana media—had said that the Rhodesian situation was "radically different from that in Angola" and that it was "inconceivable" that a situation could again arise comparable to that which led to Cuban involvement in Angola. But Rodriguez had avoided a complete disavowal of future Cuban involvement, saying that Cuba could "send its troops to other countries in case the same conditions do exist."

On 25 May, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós had edged a little closer toward announcing Cuba's intention of staying out of Rhodesia, but also with qualifications. In press conference remarks reported by foreign—but again not Cuban—media, Dorticós said that "we shall continue to aid and support all liberation movements" but added that "Rhodesia and Southwest Africa were "problems that must be solved by the revolutionary movements themselves." Havana's failure to report Rodriguez and Dorticós remarks, followed by Castro's silence on the subject when speaking to a domestic audience, are consistent with well-established and strong sensitivity on the subject of Cuba's future military role in Africa.

HIJACKING AGREEMENT  Castro did not deal extensively with U.S.-Cuban issues, but as in his 19 April Bay of Pigs speech, he again referred to the 1973 hijacking agreement with the United States. Castro said that if "counterrevolutionary worms" led by the CIA continued to carry out terrorist acts such as attacks on Cuban fishing vessels, "our commitment to struggle against plane hijackings will not be eternal." He further warned that Cuba had not yet "responded with terrorism," but that if need be "we believe we would be efficient terrorists."

MOSCOW TREATMENT  Although TASS normally reports Castro speeches promptly, there have been no TASS accounts of this speech. But Moscow radio on 7 June did carry short, virtually identical accounts in foreign-language broadcasts to Africa and the Arab world and in Spanish to South America. Except for the broadcast to Latin audiences, the accounts all cited Castro as saying that "Cuban armed forces have started to leave Angola gradually in
according with the agreement with the Angolan Government." None of the reports mentioned Castro's remarks about the United States or the hijacking agreement.

Moscow's Spanish-language report on the speech differed from the others in that it cited Castro as saying that Cuban forces were withdrawing "according to the treaty [tratado] with the Angolan Government." The other accounts referred to an "agreement" with Angola—not a "treaty." Neither Moscow nor Havana is known to have referred previously to a "treaty" between Cuba and Angola, and it would seem that the Spanish-language broadcast used the word "tratado" inadvertently.

This assessment seems borne out by a 9 June Spanish-language broadcast over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, which reported Castro as saying that Cuban troops were being withdrawn "pursuant to the agreement entered into with the Angolan Government." Radio Peace and Progress used the normal Spanish term for "agreement"—acuerdo.
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MOSCOW SHOWS SENSITIVITY TO CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD

Since Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro first announced the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in his 6 June Havana speech,* Soviet media have repeated several times Castro's assurances that Cuban forces have begun to leave Angola. Havana media, however, have made no further reference to the withdrawal, and neither Havana nor Moscow has mentioned the actual return of Cuban military personnel. Castro in his 6 June speech did note the presence at the rally of 100 Cuban soldiers said to have returned from Angola; the Yugoslav TANJUG agency and Western media subsequently reported, on 10 and 11 June, that at least one detachment of some 500 soldiers had arrived in Havana from Angola.

At the same time, Moscow has been scoffing at reports of a Cuban troop presence in certain Latin American countries such as Panama, and Guyana. For its part, Havana has briefly noted that "imperialism" was using Cuba's "legitimate" aid to Angola in an attempt to "frighten Latin governments with "an alleged Cuban intervention on the continent." But Havana has not referred to the specific charges of Cuban troops in Panama, Guyana or elsewhere.

TROOPS IN ANGOLA  TASS on the 8th complained that Secretary Kissinger had used the rostrum of the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly session in Santiago, Chile, "for attacks on the socialist countries' policy in connection with recent events" in Angola. Deploiring such "hackneyed attacks," TASS noted that they occurred at a time when "Cuban military personnel are being withdrawn from Angola." TASS went on to claim that "FLNA and UNITA rebel gangs" had stepped up their activities, soon after Kissinger's recent visit to Africa. A similar comment broadcast on Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa on the 9th added that the increase in FLNA and UNITA "subversive activity" demonstrated the correctness of Castro's intention to delay complete withdrawal until Angola was able to defend itself.

In discussing the gradual withdrawal, Moscow has been at pains to emphasize that neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union exerted influence over the Luanda government. PRAVDA's Yurii Zhukov, in a 29 May Moscow domestic television program, dismissed the "completely false

* For a discussion of Castro's remarks on this withdrawal, see the TRENDS of 9 June 1976, pages 10-12.
myth" disseminated by "enemies of detente" in the United States about "Soviet-Cuban aggression" in Angola and the notion that the Soviet Union sent Cubans to "capture Angola and convert it into a Soviet-Cuban colony." In rebuttal, Zhukov cited Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento as saying that Cuba did not have a single concession in Angola and would never have any, and that the Cubans "will return home when we want them to."

TROOP PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow has also disparaged recent reports of Cuban troops in some Latin American countries, suggesting concern to head off further U.S. criticism as well as to dispel Latin anxieties. A Kuzminchov article in PRAVDA on 30 May took issue with U.S. reports of Cuban military involvement in Panama. He declared flatly that "it is quite clear that there are no Cuban troops in Panama whatsoever," adding that this had been officially confirmed by leading Panamanian circles." Attributing the "canard" to a U.S. Congressman, Kuzminchov said this was not the first time attempts had been made "from the banks of the Potomac" to "perceive some kind of aggressive intentions by Cuba" toward Latin America, and he recalled earlier rumors about Cuban troops in Guyana.

While Moscow has discounted rumors of Cuban troops in Jamaica and Peru as well, it has particularly decried such allegations related to Guyana. Soviet media have been taking more interest in Guyana in recent weeks, shifting to a cordial approach from the former cool stance toward the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, who came to power in 1966 after outmaneuvering Soviet-backed Cheddi Jagan.

The increased Soviet attention comes against the background of Burnham's rapidly expanding ties with Cuba during the past year or so, coupled with his gradual rapprochement with Jagan. TASS commentator Sergey Bulantsyev on 9 June, claiming that a "hostile campaign against Guyana" had started after the country began nationalizing Western monopolies, deplored the "lies about the alleged presence of foreign military personnel, in particular, Cuban troops," in Guyana. And PRAVDA's A. Grigoryev on 11 June also referred to the rumors about Cuban troops, claiming that Guyana had become a "target of intensive attacks from imperialist circles" because of its "peace-loving and independent foreign policy" and "progressive socio-economic transformations." For North American listeners, a Moscow English-language radio commentary by Berezin on 15 June complained that American newspapers were spreading rumors that Guyana served as a base for Cuban troops. No evidence of this could be found, Berezin said, asserting that "the Cuban side declared officially" that there were no Cuban servicemen in Guyana. No such denial has been heard from monitored Cuban media.
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MOSCOW REPORTS DEATH OF PERSONNEL, AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR ANGOLA

Moscow has belatedly acknowledged that four Soviet personnel were killed and one captured during South Africa's recent incursion into southern Angola. A 19 September TASS report, published in PRAVDA on the 20th, seemed designed to respond to foreign and domestic speculation about Soviet involvement in Angola. It offered Moscow's strongest pledge to date of continuing military and diplomatic support for the Angolan Government. The TASS report, released almost three weeks after Pretoria reported that South African troops had engaged Soviet personnel, read like an official "TASS statement," but Moscow chose not to give the report the authority and commitment that such a designation would convey.

The TASS report was in part a blunt message for South Africa. It warned that "the Soviet side" placed responsibility for the death of the Soviet personnel on the South African Government and demanded "the immediate return" of the captured "engineer" and of the remains of the deceased. Like earlier Soviet statements on the intervention, it demanded an end to South African "aggression" and charged that Pretoria's "patrons" shared responsibility for it.

The report's careful delineation of the role of Soviet personnel in Angola may have been calculated to assuage any concern aroused among the domestic audience by reports of the Soviet deaths broadcast to the USSR by foreign radios. It maintained that Soviet personnel were in Angola only to provide training and technical advice, but it conceded that they were assisting in the defense sector as well as in the economy. It charged that foreign media were exaggerating Soviet involvement to justify Pretoria's attacks on Angola.

While underscoring the limits on the USSR's direct participation, the TASS report at the same time contained a stronger affirmation of Moscow's commitments to assist Angola than that offered by the official TASS statement on the South African incursion publicized on 26 August. Like the TASS statement, the report reiterated the USSR's "solidarity" with Angola and noted the friendship and cooperation treaty signed in 1976. But unlike the statement, it went on to specify that Soviet commitments to the Angolans include assistance in "strengthening their defenses" and promised that the USSR "will continue giving political, diplomatic, and material support both to Angola and to the national liberation movements in southern Africa."
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KOREAN SHIP INCIDENT: North Korea has admitted that a DPRK vessel sunk by the ROK on 15 February had been south of the military demarcation line (MDL), but a KCNA "authorized statement" on 16 February accused the South of a "savage act of piracy" for sinking the ship rather than rescuing it. The statement claimed that the ship belonged to the Chongjin Traffic Control Corps and had been on routine patrol when it went "adrift" on the MDL after "losing its bearings because of inclement weather." A 17 February message from the North's vice chairman of the North-South Coordination Committee (NSCC) admitted the ship had "slightly" crossed the MDL. The KCNA statement accused the South of trying to "aggravate tension" between North and South to divert attention from the "political crisis" in the South following the "referendum farce," a reference to the recent vote in the South on ROK President Pak Chong-hu's policies. The statement demanded that the South "immediately" return the ship's "kidnapped crewmen"; Seoul has announced it holds a single survivor. In the NSCC message, the North called on the South to "punish" those involved in the incident and "formally apologize." It also warned that similar such incidents "could lead to an unexpected grave situation."

MOSCOW ON ANGOLA: Soviet broadcasts to Africa have ceased their bitter criticism of Angolan liberation groups that had been competing with the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), following the 5 January Mombasa agreement reconciling differences among three rival guerrilla organizations. The main thrust of Soviet comment on Angola during the summer and fall of 1974 had been to discredit the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and advocate popular support for the MPLA. Moscow radio commentaries had condemned the FNLA as a regional tribal organization based outside Angola which received CIA funds and fostered racial animosities. Harsh Soviet attacks had been directed at UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi, who was branded as an opportunist, a Maoist, and a traitor in the pay of the Portuguese secret police. By contrast, the MPLA was singled out as a "genuinely representative national organization..." and the "leading force" in the national liberation struggle. After reporting the agreement among the three organizations in the first week of January, Moscow ceased discussing the FNLA and UNITA but continued to praise the role of the MPLA and to cite MPLA leader Agostinho Neto's warnings that "reactionary" forces and the CIA were attempting to halt the process of decolonialization.
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PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: A 29 October Canton report on a local meeting on learning from the model Tachai brigade in agriculture revealed that CCP Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching has been transferred from his post as party chief in Kwangsi to become first secretary of the Kwangtung provincial party committee and chairman of the revolutionary committee there. Wei headed a lengthy list of Kwangtung leaders at the meeting including Canton Military Region commander Su Shih-yu, and Wei delivered the major address at the rally, stressing the need for local party committees "to do a good job of all current work with autumn harvesting, winter cultivation and agricultural capital construction." Wei replaces Chao Chao-yang, Kwangtung's party chief prior to the cultural revolution, who was reinstated in his old job in 1974. Chao last appeared in Peking on 19 October, when he and several other provincial leaders attended the closing session of the national conference on learning from Tachai. Chao had appeared regularly in Kwangtung during the past several months, and there is no evidence that he is under political attack. Wei's move to Kwangtung, which has created a vacancy in Kwangsi, may be part of a larger transfer plan designed to fight provincialism and strengthen central party control. The last transfer of a provincial party boss took place in December 1973, as part of Peking's massive rotation of all military region commanders who were also provincial party chiefs, a device used to strip military leaders of their civil posts and put more provincial party committees under the direct control of civilian leaders.

PEKING ON USSR-ANGOLA: A 5 November Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article has authoritatively lambasted recent Soviet messages on the Angolan issue. The messages have not been publicized by the Soviet media, but according to African reports they were addressed to Zaire officials and the head of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Commentator article attacked Moscow for allegedly planning to recognize Angolan independence under "a single liberation movement." Commentator called the messages "an ominous indication" of Moscow's "further intervention and aggression in Angola," a "wanton slander, threat, and intimidation" against Zaire, and a "threat" to the entire OAU. Commentator "strongly condemned" the USSR's "in the name of the Chinese people, and "resolutely backed" the OAU position, supported by Zaire, calling for unity among the three Angolan liberation groups. Peking's last authoritative comment on Angola, another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 19 September, had attacked Soviet interference in Angolan affairs but had not specifically condemned the Soviet Union in the name of the Chinese people. Peking has attacked Soviet "interference" in the OAU before—most recently in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the conclusion of the 12th OAU summit conference—but not in reference to Angola.
Like previous authoritative comments, Commentator did not specify which Angolan group the Soviet Union supports exclusively, and it repeated Peking's standard line that the "Angolan problem" should be solved by Angolans themselves "through consultations" and under the guidance of the OAU. A Peking in Arabic broadcast at 1630 GMT on 2 November briefly reported that "the Chinese Government issued a statement" on 31 October calling for an end to the fighting among the three competing Angolan liberation groups, a halt to foreign interference, and the withdrawal of "mercenaries" fighting there. Inexplicably, this Chinese statement is not known to have been carried in other monitored Chinese media.
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7 Cuban Presence Abroad

Since our last report, at the end of 1981, the number of Cubans serving abroad has remained fairly constant at around 70,000

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Cuban Presence Abroad

Since our last report, the number of Cubans serving abroad has remained fairly constant at around 70,000. There are several nations, however, where the Cuban presence may change significantly, such as Nicaragua, Iraq, and possibly Ethiopia or Angola, over the near term.

General Trends
Since the beginning of the year, Cuba's Construction Minister, Levi Farah, has traveled to several countries in the Middle East and Africa to discuss bilateral cooperation agreements. Havana is concentrating its efforts in Middle Eastern countries that need skilled workers and are able to pay for them. More than half of Cuba's construction workers abroad now serve in the Middle East. Cuba has signed new economic cooperation agreements with Nicaragua, Mozambique, Madagascar, Angola, Nigeria, and Libya since January.

Africa
Havana's presence in Africa has remained constant since January, probably a reflection of increased Cuban attention to the Middle East and Central America. Although Cuban military forces now appear to be increasing their role in combat in southern Angola, information available suggests no augmentation of personnel, which number 20,000 to 25,000.

The issue of Cuba's military presence in Angola has become a key element of the negotiations related to a Namibian settlement. We foresee no significant change in the number of Cuban forces in Angola in the near term. Havana, which recently reiterated that a withdrawal of its forces will take place only when requested by Angola, shows increasing reluctance to link any drawdown to a Namibian settlement.

A Cuban economic delegation visited Ghana in June, and advisers are expected to arrive before the end of the year. The Ghanaian press indicated areas of cooperation will include agriculture, education, and the sugar industry. In addition, Cuban Airlines announced the inauguration of a monthly flight to Maputo, Mozambique, in June. These flights will be an extra leg from the airline's stop in Luanda, and will allow Havana to rotate on a regular basis its 2,000 personnel stationed in Mozambique.

Western Hemisphere
Although the Cuban presence in Grenada and Guyana has remained constant over the past six months, it has increased in Nicaragua. Since earlier this year, antigovernment activity in Nicaragua has increased significantly along the border with Honduras and along the east coast. Three Cuban teachers have been killed in recent months by anti-Sandinista forces. Havana dispatched 200 to 300 additional military/security advisers to Nicaragua to help in the campaign against counter-revolutionaries, bringing the Cuban military-security presence to an estimated 1,700 to 2,300. We assume that this increase involved members of the elite "Special Troops," who reportedly have been present in Nicaragua for some time. These personnel train Nicaraguan soldiers and advise units in the field. They are counterinsurgency experts, in top physical condition, and trained in a broad range of weapons and tactics.
Underscoring the importance given to the Nicaraguan revolution by Havana, a high-level Cuban delegation visited Nicaragua in May to offer assistance for flood damage. The delegation was led by First Vice President and Minister of Defense Raul Castro, and included the Ministers of Transportation, Education, Construction, Agriculture, and Public Health. Cuba sent humanitarian aid almost immediately and announced that 2,000 additional engineers and construction personnel would be sent to rebuild roads, bridges, and housing. We assume these additional workers have arrived by now, bringing the number of Cuban civilian workers in Nicaragua to just under 6,000.

Havana may have decided to devote even more resources to the rebuilding of Nicaragua. Raul Castro spent almost two weeks traveling throughout the countryside to gain a firsthand assessment of the deteriorating security situation.

Cuba plans to increase its presence by perhaps 8,000—which would double the total Cuban presence.

Havana could reassign recently demobilized troops from Africa to Nicaragua for construction and other nonmilitary activities. These personnel, who have two to three years of military experience, could be easily reactivated and armed to defend the Sandinistas if security conditions deteriorated further.
Eastern Europe
The program to train Cuban midlevel technicians in Eastern Europe continues. Work-study arrangements provide some hard currency for Havana while at the same time they enhance the skills of the Cuban workers. In June the Cuban media announced that several hundred workers had returned to Cuba from programs in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. An equal number have replaced the returnees, so our estimated numbers remain constant. A small-scale program to train Cuban technicians in Hungary began this year. The Cuban press stated that by the end of the year more than 15,000 Cubans will be training in Eastern Europe.

Far East
We have detected no changes in the Cuban presence in the Far East since the beginning of the year.

This article is
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Ukrainian Purge Undermines Shcherbitskiy Rival
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MOSCOW SEES OAU MOVING TOWARD RECOGNITION OF POPULAR MOVEMENT

Soviet media comment since the conclusion of the 10-11 January Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting on Angola continues to accentuate what it describes as the "positive" results of the meeting. The propaganda typically portrays the deadlock at the meeting between advocates of an Angolan coalition and supporters of the Popular Movement (MPLA) as a defeat for an alleged U.S. "pressure" campaign to influence the OAU vote. The comment maintains that the MPLA's People's Republic of Angola (PRA) will achieve eventual recognition, and it has not repeated earlier Soviet hints—made authoritatively in a 3 January Pravda editorial article—that a compromise coalition with some Angolan factions might be possible.*

The notion that the Addis Ababa summit had demonstrated the OAU's inability to solve Africa's problems was rejected by Academy of Sciences Africa Institute Deputy Director Belyayev, speaking on the 18 January Moscow domestic radio international observers roundtable program. Belyayev said that if Ethiopia and Uganda had not abstained from voting the outcome of the OAU summit might have been "quite definite." Playing down the significance of the OAU stalemate, he noted that the organization was scheduled to meet again in June and suggested that Ethiopia's 15 January recognition of the PRA would have a decisive influence on the eventual OAU decision.

Pravda's Angolan observer Ignatyev, speaking on a 15 January international affairs discussion program carried by Moscow's domestic service, appeared to be outlining a dual military-political strategy to be pursued by Moscow in the five months before the next OAU session on Angola. Ignatyev expressed the hope that MPLA forces would succeed in "throwing the interventionists out of the country" by June and noted that a campaign to mobilize worldwide popular support for the MPLA would simultaneously take place, featuring an international "solidarity" conference in Luanda scheduled for early February.

CASTRO ACKNOWLEDGES PRESENCE OF CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA

In a 15 January Havana press conference, as recorded and broadcast by Panama City radio's domestic service, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro for

* The 3 January Pravda editorial article is discussed in the Trends of 7 January 1976, pages 1-2.
the first time directly admitted that "we have Cuban soldiers in Angola." He insisted, at the same time, that "no Cuban military unit had gone to Angola prior to the South African intervention." Castro's press conference, which is not known to have been reported by Havana's own media, took place following the departure from Havana of Panamanian chief of government General Omar Torrijos.*

Castro justified Cuban involvement in Angola as based on "revolutionary and internationalist" solidarity rather than "the search for economic interests and world hegemony," which he asserted had prompted the United States to intervene in the conflict. He condemned both the United States and China for associating with South Africa—"the most hated country in the world"—and, as he had done during the recent Cuban party congress, Castro vowed that he would not restore relations with the United States at the cost of relinquishing his support for Angola and Puerto Rico.

Castro could not be pinned down on the number of Cuban casualties. He said that the question should be addressed to the Angolan government and added that he would not "make the enemy's work easier" by giving out such information. Some details on casualties were recently given, however, by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Castro's foreign policy theoretician who occasionally anticipates the Prime Minister in speaking out on controversial foreign policy matters. As reported by Madrid's EFE agency on 14 January, Rodriguez "refused to release the exact number of Cuban dead but affirmed that it was less than 50."

PEKING SCORES USSR-CUBAN ACTIONS IN ANGOLA, ATTACKS ON ZAIRE

Peking has stepped up its criticism of Soviet intervention in Angola and continues to advocate the establishment of a coalition government to end the conflict there. A 21 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, responding to Zaire charges about Soviet-Cuban hostilities along its border with Angola, has authoritatively condemned Moscow for increasing its "armed intervention" in Angola. The Commentator article followed a statement of Peking reports since the 10-13 January OAU summit on Angola which had called attention to Soviet involvement in the Angola war and, for the first time, noted the Cuban presence there.

* The Cuban-Panamanian communique, which avoided any reference to Angola, is discussed in the Cuban section of this TRENDS.
Citing the alleged destruction of communication links on the Zaire-Angola border and the rocketing of a Zaire town by "joint Soviet-Cuban forces" in Angola, the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator maintained that the Soviet "mad provocation" was an "extension" of its intervention in Angola and a "continuation" of its "threats and intimidation" against Zaire. Peking had previously sided with Zaire against alleged Soviet diplomatic pressure over Angola in a 5 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.* The current Commentator article warned that the Angolan civil war is "expanding steadily" as the Soviet Union has been stepping up its armed intervention since November, and that the USSR "can stir up civil war in Angola today and can stretch its aggressive tentacles to other sovereign African states tomorrow." Like the 5 November Commentator, the current one said the "Chinese people" resolutely support the "just-stand" of Zaire against the Soviet Union.

The Commentator article's reference to increased direct Soviet military intervention in Angola and to Cuban involvement there echoed Peking media reports publicized with increasing frequency since the opening of the OAU special session on Angola. Peking's first reference to Cuban involvement in Angola was in an 11 January NCNA correspondent's "comment" on the January PRAVDA editorial, which charged that the USSR had "dispatched numerous Soviet military personnel and Cuban troops to Angola to take a direct part in the war." Since then Peking regularly referred to Cuba in Angola, usually citing foreign news reports.

Media attention to the OAU special session itself was limited to brief reports on the meeting’s opening and closing formalities, combined with selective citation of comments by African leaders which accorded with Peking's longstanding advocacy of an Angolan coalition government reconciling all three of the contending Angolan groups. NCNA reports on the OAU session gave no indication of the deadlock at the meeting. While NCNA's 14 January report on the session's adjournment reported that the OAU had resolved only to "follow the Angolan problem closely," it also noted favorably that "many African heads of state" had called at the meeting for the three Angolan groups to "realize reconciliation and establish a government of national unity." A 15 January correspondent's report on the session, released by NCNA on the 17th, accused Moscow of attempting to "split the OAU and shatter African unity" and charged that the "Soviet propaganda machines" had smeared the African heads of state who called for an Angolan coalition.

*The 5 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 November 1975, pages 31-32.
This issue includes...

- Sino-Soviet relations
- Cuban-Angolan talks
The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media content and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The information in this document is classified Confidential in the aggregate, individual portions are Unclassified/FOUO as marked.
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Cuba-Angola

Havana, Luanda Signal No Flexibility on Cuban Troops

The joint communique marking Angolan President dos Santos's visit to Havana took note of Luanda's recent talks with Pretoria and Washington. In doing so it reaffirmed both sides' longstanding conditions on the question of Cuban troop withdrawals and opposition to any peace plan that links independence for the South African-held territory of Namibia to the Cuban military presence in Angola.

President dos Santos's 17-20 March "working" visit to Cuba appeared aimed at establishing a joint response to a number of conciliatory gestures made by South Africa toward the Luanda regime last month that are designed to win Luanda's consent to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. While the communique made no explicit mention of Pretoria's recent agreement to a cease-fire with Angola or of the issue of disengaging South African troops from Angolan territory, it did note that dos Santos informed Castro "in detail" about the "conversations" the Luanda government is currently holding with South Africa and the United States in an effort to find a negotiated solution to southern African conflicts.

The communique contained no assessment of Luanda's discussions with Pretoria and Washington. It maintained only that any negotiated solution aimed at eliminating the existing tension between Angola and South Africa must first satisfy the conditions set forth by the Cuban and Angolan Governments. The communique then carefully noted that the joint Cuban-Angolan declaration of February 1982—a document that outlined the conditions under which Cuba would withdraw its troops from Angola—"remains fully in effect." Repeating conditions that were first publicized in the
declaration two years ago, the communique proclaimed once again that Cuba and Angola will “reinitiate” plans for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban military personnel when South Africa:

• “unilaterally” withdraws its troops from Angola,

• ends its “aggression and threats of aggression” against the Luanda government, and

• grants “true” independence to Namibia in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 435.¹

In addition to these conditions, Havana went on record in the communique as supporting Angola’s demand, first publicized by the Luanda regime last August, that Pretoria and Washington “end all aid” to Angolan counterrevolutionaries and “any other puppet organization” that seeks to overthrow the country’s leftist government.

The communique attributed South Africa’s new stance to the “heroic resistance” of the Angolan people, which it said “has obliged the imperialist aggressors to accept negotiations on a new basis.” This assessment of Pretoria’s actions is consistent with the line taken in an article in the Cuban party paper Granma in late February. That article pointed to Angola’s increased military strength, a result of its ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union, as the reason why Pretoria was “forced” to start talks on a negotiated solution to the withdrawal of South African forces from Angolan territory and to Namibia’s independence. (U/FOUO)

¹ The Cuban-Angolan declaration of February 1982 claimed that earlier plans gradually to reduce the Cuban military presence had been obstructed by South African attacks on Angola. The declaration asserted that the Cuban military contingent had been reduced “by over one-third” in 1976, but that this process was halted when “foreign threats” against Angola recurred.
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Angola: Short-Term Military and Political Prospects
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN— Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT— Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN— Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY— USIB Departments Only
ORCON— Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . .— This Information has been Authorized for Release to...
WNINTEL— Warning Notice—Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

ANGOLA: Short-Term Military and Political Prospects**

PREMISE

The prospects for Angola are bleak. The fighting shows every sign of continuing indefinitely. Neither the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) nor its adversaries -- the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) -- can hope to gain effective military control over all of Angola in the near term. Prospects for a political solution are equally remote, since at present there exists no basis for agreement among the three movements for participation in a government of national unity.

The military advantage in Angola already appears to be shifting once again in favor of the MPLA, largely owing to substantially increased foreign military assistance. Angola's strong ethnic and regional divisions, reflected in the three liberation movements and reinforced by the fighting among them, will make it exceedingly difficult for any one movement to gain effective political and military control over the entire country. Nevertheless, it may soon be possible for the MPLA to challenge the FNLA and UNITA in their ethnic strongholds in the north and south and to extend its military presence throughout much of the territory. Even so, the MPLA would continue to be threatened by serious political and military opposition, and its Luanda-based regime would be both politically and economically unstable, possibly for years to come.

* This memorandum was drafted by CIA and was reviewed by representatives of State/INR, DIA, and CIA.

** See also Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: The Short-Term Outlook for Angola, 31 October 1976.
Ideally, some kind of political solution could be found in which all three of Angola's liberation groups could participate in a government of national unity. The major obstacle to a government of national unity is the MPLA, which has arrogated to itself the role of Portugal's successor. It has been encouraged to maintain an uncompromising stand toward its rivals by the massive military and political support it is receiving from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The future of the FNLA and UNITA depends on their ability to force the MPLA, either militarily or politically, into accepting them into a government of national unity. While this seems to be UNITA's preferred option, it is less certain that the FNLA would even now be preparing to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA. Their ability to force a military stalemate depends in part on their obtaining continued military assistance on a par with that provided the MPLA by Moscow and Havana. Without this support FNLA-UNITA strength is likely to erode gradually, leaving them dependent on foreign political pressure to convince the MPLA to agree to a coalition government.

Equally important is the ability of the two movements, which have both suffered serious organizational weaknesses in the past, to survive the likely intensification of MPLA military pressure. Moreover, given the undercurrent of mistrust and suspicion that still exists between the FNLA and UNITA, their continued political and military cooperation cannot be counted as certain.

The MPLA's political dominance is by no means assured. The MPLA's African supporters have mounted a campaign to reverse the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) policy of neutrality toward Angola and gain OAU endorsement of the MPLA. The longer the fighting continues without a political solution in sight the greater will be the pressure within the OAU to grant recognition to the MPLA in order to avoid protracted and acrimonious debate over the Angola problem, which has already placed severe strains on African unity.
Initially, Portugal's refusal to recognize either of the self-proclaimed "governments" in Angola influenced many non-African countries to remain neutral. Leftist pressures in Lisbon and "radical" African pressure on the OAU to recognize the MPLA continue, however. If Lisbon and the OAU, or even significant numbers of OAU members, recognize the MPLA regime, there will be little reason for other countries not to follow suit. If Lisbon refuses to extend recognition, its position eventually will become irrelevant -- if it hasn't already -- and more countries will look to the OAU for guidance on recognition.
DISCUSSION

The Military Situation

1. The current level of fighting is being sustained by foreign involvement with the seesaw pattern of military successes achieved by the warring sides a reflection of the level of foreign assistance. Prior to and after liberation on 11 November, the FNLA/UNITA side had made important advances at the expense of the Popular Movement. The tide has now turned with the MPLA moving on the offensive in a number of fronts.

2. The MPLA's improving military position is the result of a massive resupply effort by the Soviet Union, the presence of Soviet technicians and advisers, and several thousand professional Cuban troops within the Popular Movement's military forces. So far both Moscow and Havana have shown a willingness to continue their support at whatever level is necessary to enable the MPLA to prevail in the military struggle, i.e., more than to match any external assistance given the MPLA's opponents. It is possible, however, that Moscow -- in response to strong diplomatic pressure from Washington or a sharp reversal in the MPLA's military fortunes -- might encourage the formation of an MPLA-dominated coalition government or at least initiate discussions toward some other compromise arrangement such as federation.

3. The FNLA and UNITA cannot hope to match these levels of assistance from any of its African supporters. Pretoria will undoubtedly continue to provide material assistance even though it may withdraw its troops, but cannot hope to match the amount of Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA. Zaire, the other major supporter of the FNLA and UNITA, is undergoing a severe financial crisis which will act as a steady drain on the resources in both men and material that it can provide. China, once a major source of material support for the FNLA, has backed away from any direct assistance in order not to jeopardize its good standing in the broader African community.
4. The MPLA had fallen back about as far as it could afford to and with the unprecedented assistance of the Soviets and Cubans has launched a counteroffensive, which has blunted its rivals' advance on the capital. Employing 122-mm rockets manned by Cubans, the Popular Movement has stopped the FNLA's advance on Luanda, once within ten miles of the city. The MPLA captured the FNLA stronghold of Caxito, some 40 miles from Luanda and may push the FNLA back even further. The FNLA has established a defensive line at the Lifune River, which could be overrun at any time, despite substantial Zairian backing with men and equipment.

5. Thus far, Cabinda and its oil wealth remain firmly under MPLA control. A Zairian-led effort by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda in early November failed. Another attempt is virtually certain but even with a substantially increased Zairian effort, the likelihood of success is problematic. The recent pattern of FNLA and UNITA reversals has given their supporters new grounds for concern over this support -- which is vital if the FNLA and UNITA are to have any prospect of success against the Popular Front.

6. The success of the drive from the south along Angola's coast by the FNLA and UNITA to a point about 100 miles from Luanda can be attributed to the participation of several hundred South African and a few Portuguese professional soldiers who understand the tactics and logistics of such a campaign. Until recently, the campaign was also helped somewhat by the tendency of the MPLA to give ground rather than sustain heavy losses.

7. The intense publicity focused on South Africa's role in Angola has already jeopardized Pretoria's carefully nurtured policy of détente with black Africa and is forcing South Africa to reconsider its involvement. The South African government has implied that it will withdraw its forces rather than risk them in heavy fighting so far north,
where the presence of South African troops cannot be justified to black African nations on Pretoria's pretext that South Africa is protecting its own interests along the Angola-Namibia border. Without South African participation, the FNLA and UNITA cannot sustain their northward advance and may not be able to hold the territory they now have in the face of heavy Soviet weapons manned by Cuban troops.

8. Charges of massive South African involvement are being widely disseminated by the MPLA and its African supporters. In African eyes, the presence of significant numbers of white troops discredits the FNLA and UNITA by lending credence to charges that they are dominated and manipulated by foreigners. Although some African states have been willing to tolerate South African participation so long as it was nominal and reasonably well concealed, they cannot justify open South African participation and may be forced to denounce it.

9. Nigeria, for example, recently recognized the MPLA regime. The Nigerian decision to reverse its position of neutrality toward Angola's liberation groups was taken principally because of the growing attention being given to the presence of South African forces in Angola. Although the Nigerians have serious misgivings about Soviet support for the MPLA as well, and hope the MPLA will not become a puppet of Moscow, those misgivings pale in relation to Nigeria's antipathy toward the white minority regime in Pretoria and its intervention in Angola.

The Political Situation

10. At the present time the MPLA's political future is by no means assured, at least over the short term. It has not been able to gain overwhelming international recognition of its self-proclaimed government. The surge of recognitions from Communist, Third World, and African countries seems to have peaked for the time being, with only 27 countries, including 11 African, recognizing the Neto government as of 25 November. Nigeria's decision on 25 November to abandon its policy of neutrality and recognize the MPLA "government" may, however, be a turning point in the MPLA's favor.
11. If the FNLA and UNITA cannot maintain their military effectiveness, they can only hope that international opinion will uphold their right to participate in an independent Angolan government and convince the MPLA to accept a political compromise. The danger for the FNLA and UNITA is that their military credibility will erode to the point that the MPLA regime will attract broad international recognition as the sovereign power in Angola. This would put the FNLA and UNITA in a position of rebellion against universally recognized authority and make it extremely difficult for them to attract foreign military or political support.

12. Most countries outside Africa are ill-informed on the situation in Angola and they will maintain a wait-and-see policy regarding recognition. Many governments were strongly influenced by Portugal's position when it relinquished sovereignty to the "Angola people," and decided not to recognize either of the "governments" established by the liberation groups.

13. Most African states are supporting the policy of neutrality called for by the Organization of African Unity. At the same time, a drive is underway to win OAU endorsement of the MPLA's regime. Somalia, which has recognized the MPLA, has called for an OAU emergency summit meeting to discuss Angola. The MPLA's African supporters are in the forefront of the drive for the summit and they apparently see a good chance to gain official OAU endorsement of the Popular Movement's regime as the sole legitimate government in Angola. If the drive continues to gain momentum, the summit could be held within a week or so.

14. Many countries fear the effect of airing African differences at a summit, however, and their desire for a Foreign Ministers meeting instead may prevail. In either case, an OAU meeting may not result in an agreed African position. If it fails to do so, some African countries will continue to wait.
for the situation inside Angola to be clarified and the MPLA is likely to be the main beneficiary. Others may feel at liberty to recognize one of the contending regimes.

15. In summary, the prognosis is not good for Angola. Even if the MPLA cannot eliminate the FNLA and UNITA, their influence as a strong force will be diminished in the face of continued MPLA pressure, backed by substantial material and political support from the Soviets' and the latter's allies.
PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: SUMMIT PLANNED.

ANGOLAN PRESIDENT NETO AND PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT EANES PLAN TO MEET THIS MONTH IN GUINEA-BISSAU TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES APPEAR LIMITED TO DISCUSSING TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. BOTH LEADERS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN EXPANDING ANGOLA'S TIES WITH THE WEST, A POLICY THAT MIGHT LESSEN ANGOLAN DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR AND CUBA. THE PORTUGUESE BELIEVE PROGRESS TOWARD THESE GOALS DEPENDS ON NETO'S ABILITY TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION AT HOME AND ON PORTUGAL'S SUCCESS IN ELICITING EARLY WESTERN SUPPORT.

DISCUSSION AND PLANNING FOR A PORTUGUESE-ANGOLAN SUMMIT BEGAN LAST DECEMBER, BUT SEVERAL FACTORS INTERVENED. EACH SIDE HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE OTHER'S MOTIVES IN PURSUING CLOSER RELATIONS. SCHEDULING A SUMMIT WAS COMPLICATED BY NETO'S UNCERTAIN HEALTH AND BY THE TIMING OF PRESIDENT EANES' RECENT VISITS TO BRAZIL, VENEZUELA, AND THE US. IN ADDITION, THE PORTU-
GUESE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT HOLDING A MEETING BEFORE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ZAIRE HAD QUIETED. Y

Y SOME OF THESE OBSTACLES WERE OVERCOME LAST MONTH WHEN MELO ANTUNES, A NOTED LEFTIST AND EANES' PERSONAL EMISSARY, TRAVELED TO ANGOLA TO EXPLORE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT WITH NETO AND OTHER ANGOLAN LEADERS. HIS VISIT WAS FOLLOWED SOON BY A FLURRY OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS--SOME MEDIATED BY LEADERS OF OTHER FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES--THAT CULMINATED LAST WEEK IN THE DISPATCH OF ANGOLA'S FIRST AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL. Y

Y EANES' ABILITY TO DISSOCIATE HIS CURRENT INITIATIVE FROM ANGOLAN INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES WAS ALSO IMPORTANT IN PRODUCING A FAVORABLE CLIMATE. HE WAS PRAISED BY THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ABSTAINING FROM GENERAL WESTERN CONDEMNATION OF CUBA'S MILITARY ROLE IN ANGOLA. THE PORTUGUESE HAVE ALSO ABANDONED THEIR EARLIER INSISTENCE ON PRECONDITIONS FOR ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT--RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NETO AND JONAS SAVIMBI'S REBELS AND A REDUCTION IN CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA.
PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE SUMMIT SUGGESTS THAT THE TALKS WILL FOCUS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PERHAPS WITH SOME DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AID TO ANGOLA. EANES, HOWEVER, SEES FORMAL AGREEMENTS IN THESE AREAS—which could lead to lucrative trade and financial arrangements as well as to the return of badly needed Portuguese technicians to Angola—as minimal objectives. He would also like to discuss the political and military situation in Angola and the prospects for a Portuguese lead in opening Angola to the West.4 The latter objective has intrigued Eanes for some time and remains the major long-term goal of his Angolan policy. He recognizes, however, that such an opening will require both the stabilization of the Angolan military situation and western economic aid that far exceeds Portugal’s limited capacity.
Africa Review
25 July 1983

Articles

Angola and the US Initiative on Namibia:
The View From Moscow

Recent Soviet behavior suggests that Moscow will continue to mix pressure and blandishments to undermine the US initiative on Angola and Namibia.

Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments or queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysts.
Angola and the US Initiative on Namibia: The View From Moscow

Angola's dialogue with the United States over Namibia and related bilateral issues has been a source of concern to the Soviets since Luanda and Washington began talks in late 1981. The Soviet leadership probably views a continued stalemate in Namibia—which helps perpetuate Angola's dependence on the USSR and Cuba—as preferable to a settlement that could be seen as a Soviet "withdrawal" under US pressure.

Moscows greatest fear in southern Africa was that Angola would "sell out" to the West.

The Soviets apparently believe that the establishment of an independent Namibia, between Angola and South Africa, and the departure of the Cuban troops—which Luanda presumably would not favor unless it was confident that the UNITA insurgency was under control—would reduce Angolan dependence on Moscow for military assistance. This in turn would undermine the Soviets' influence in Angola, a country that is important to them in several key respects:

- Angola has been and still is an important symbol of Moscow's willingness and capability to project power to distant shores in support of its friends.
- Angola is currently the only place on the West African coast where the USSR enjoys privileged air and naval access. This ensures Moscow the ability to monitor activity in parts of the South Atlantic, as demonstrated in the Falklands crisis.
- Angola serves as the main Soviet entre into southern Africa. Moscow can funnel support through Angola to SWAPO and, if it decides to do so, to Zaire's Shaban rebels.

The Situation in Angola: Implications for Moscow
Some seven years after Moscow helped bring the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to power, the Luanda government still faces a major threat to its position from UNITA insurgents, despite the support of some 25,000 to 30,000 Cuban military personnel.

Stepped-up UNITA activity during the past year has already led to greater Cuban combat involvement—and a higher number of Cuban casualties. Moreover, the economic burdens of fighting a growing insurgency, maintaining a large Cuban force, and coping with the recent decline in world prices of oil (Angola's principal source of hard currency) have further complicated Luanda's situation.

These problems provide incentives for Angola to resolve its security situation by signing on to a US-brokered Namibia settlement. Soviet concern about this possibility has probably been heightened by political developments in Angola since late last year. Last December, President dos Santos was accorded "emergency powers" by the MPLA Central Committee, ostensibly to help him deal with Angola's economic and security problems. The Soviets may have viewed this move as an enhancement of dos Santos's authority that could prove inimical to their interests. The dismissal in December of several pro-Soviet figures, including Party Secretary for Ideology, Ambroso Lukoki and Ruth Lara—wife of hardline party chief Lucio Lara—probably fueled apprehensions about the MPLA's future direction. Concurrently, the Angolans have maintained their dialogue with the United States; in April, for example, Interior Minister Rodrigues met with Vice President Bush at the White House.
Moscow's Response: Current Tactics
The Soviets have reacted to these developments with a mixture of pressure tactics, continued shows of material support, and some hints of flexibility. For example, during the Angolan President's visit to Moscow in May, the Soviets reportedly told him that Lucio Lara should not be harassed by other elements in the MPLA. The Soviets also have stepped up military deliveries to Luanda over the past year. They have introduced some advanced weapons, such as the SA-8, probably hoping to strengthen MPLA resolve.

At the same time, Moscow apparently recognizes that it cannot afford to antagonize dos Santos totally if it is to retain some influence in the event his diplomacy succeeds in resolving the Namibia question. Thus, during his visit in May the Soviets also expressed some tolerance for his efforts to negotiate a settlement. Apart from reaffirming support for Angola's defense, they acknowledged the importance Angola attaches to the speediest just solution of the Namibian problem and assured Luanda that Soviet leaders would give full support to the search for a settlement.

Such formulations are strikingly different than those offered during Lucio Lara's visit to Moscow in January 1982. At that time, the Soviets made no statements of support for Angolan efforts to negotiate and publicly warned Luanda against doing business with the West.

Prospects
This recent Soviet behavior suggests that Moscow will continue to mix pressure and blandishments in an attempt to undermine the US initiative on Angola and Namibia. It will play on Luanda's security fears and emphasize alleged US-South African collusion designed to bring UNITA to power.

In the event dos Santos assembled a coalition within the MPLA that was prepared to move on the UNITA question and the US package on Namibia, the Soviets probably would pursue other tactics to try to obstruct a settlement. Moscow, for example, could try to:

- Provoke South Africa into scuttling the settlement. Toward this end, the Soviets could press SWAPO or the African National Congress to undertake new military or terrorist activity that would make it politically unfeasible for Pretoria to relinquish Namibia; this, of course, would require the cooperation of SWAPO or the ANC. Short of this, the Soviets could employ such measures as disinformation and forgeries to sour Pretoria on the settlement.

- Directly or indirectly promote a coup by MPLA hardliners against dos Santos, though this seems less likely. If a coup attempt failed, Moscow could find itself with little or no influence within the MPLA. Moreover, given the complex of factors that define Angolan politics—race, tribe, ideology, and personality—the Soviets could not be totally certain of the final outcome in Angola even if a coup succeeded. In addition, a successful coup probably would further split the party and weaken the military, with the attendant effect of strengthening the position of the UNITA insurgents. Disclosure of Moscow's involvement in a coup would also raise doubts and suspicions among Africans and other Third World leaders who have close ties to the USSR.

If the Soviets were convinced that progress toward a settlement was inevitable, they could decide that a constructive tack would be more conducive to their long-term interests. Moscow, for example, might offer its "cooperation" in an effort to extract concessions and assurances from the Angolans and the United States. It would probably insist that the prospective settlement be completed and implemented under the auspices of the UN Security Council so as to ensure a Soviet role in the process. The Soviets presumably would press Luanda for strong assurances about its future political orientation and continued close ties to the USSR. Such assurances could take the form of agreeing to a continued Soviet—and possibly Cuban—advisory presence in Angola and elevating additional pro-Soviet ideologues to key positions in the Luanda government.
Such concessions could somewhat assuage Soviet concern that a Cuban troop departure from Angola would be perceived as a Soviet defeat. Moscow would concurrently try to derive some political and propaganda benefits from a Namibian settlement. The Soviets, for example, would be likely to:

- Point to the MPLA’s continued “leftist orientation”—and US recognition of the MPLA—as evidence that the USSR had not suffered a setback.

- Claim credit for resolving the Namibia problem, particularly if it was ultimately brokered under the auspices of the UN Security Council.

- Cite Moscow’s “constructive” role as evidence of its peaceful intentions.

- Argue that the Cuban departure from Angola was evidence of Havana’s “unnorth” motives in aiding the MPLA and other Third World regimes since 1975.

- Claim a new success in independent Namibia, assuming that SWAPO won the UN-monitored elections; Moscow would claim that its support of SWAPO was vindicated and that its victory was further evidence of the positive shift in the world “correlation of forces.”

Should they opt for a constructive role, the Soviets might also try to exploit the settlement in the US-Soviet bilateral context. For example, they could cite their willingness to “deal with the United States” as a gesture that warranted a reciprocal US move. While Moscow probably would expect little to come of such a ploy, successful Soviet propagandizing of the USSR’s role in a settlement could partly diminish the image of a Namibia settlement as a US diplomatic coup.
Africa Review
4 October 1985

Special Issue: Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa

This issue explores several key active insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa and assesses their prospects. In view of the area's regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages, its severe economic inequities, and the fragilities of many of the area's governments, we foresee long struggles between weak governments and insurgent challengers, with continued appeals from all sides for external help.

Angola: New Challenges for UNITA

The government—helped by increased use of Soviet-supplied aircraft and closer advisory support from the Soviets and Cubans—has demonstrated significantly improved military performance in this year's dry-season offensive against UNITA. The insurgents probably will have to adjust their strategy, perhaps reverting to more classic guerrilla tactics.
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Insurgencies—a broadly defined term as organized, sustained, violent, internal opposition, usually rural based, to established governments—is a widely employed means for contesting and attaining political power in Sub-Saharan Africa. This issue of *Africa Review* explores several key active insurgencies and assesses their prospects.

African insurgencies were instrumental in some independence struggles against European rule—in Kenya and in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, for example—and in ending the white minority regime in Zimbabwe. Insurgencies today, however, are no longer associated almost exclusively with independence, black majority struggles, and radical ideologies. Insurgencies at the heart of regional turmoil in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are themselves directed against radical Marxist black regimes.

Those insurgencies are stalemated, unable to bring down or alter the Soviet-backed governments they oppose, but capable of reverting to flexible guerrilla-style tactics and retreating into the countryside or foreign sanctuary whenever the conventional army goes on the offensive. As a result of the standoffs and their clients’ need for long-term, intensified counterinsurgency help, the Soviets are able to entrench themselves more firmly with the beleaguered regimes.

In southern Africa, the insurgencies that seek to end white minority rule in South Africa and Namibia—ANC, PAC, SWAPO—lack the effective support of neighboring black states, which must deal with insurgents at their own doorstep.

In contrast to Soviet aid to counterinsurgency campaigns, Libyan involvement south of the Sahara currently focuses on the side of insurgencies in southern Chad and Zaire, for example. If it suits Qaddafi’s purpose, however, Libya could weigh in on the side of Sudan’s new government or a successor northern regime dominated by Muslims against southern Sudanese insurgents.

Uganda offers an example of an insurgency that appears to be on the verge of winning a share in government. This success, should it be achieved, would prove illusory, we believe, because it would lead to full-scale north-south civil war and another cycle of instability and appeals for outside intervention.

Several factors ensure that insurgencies will play a prominent part in African politics for the foreseeable future:

- Regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages within and between countries.
- Severe economic dislocations and inequities.
- The fragility of many African governments.
- The vulnerability of many of those governments to externally supported challenges.

In these circumstances, the prospects are for long, draining ceasefires between weak governments and insurgent challengers in several parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, with continued appeals for outside help.
Angola:
New Challenges for UNITA

Angola's civil war has dragged on for 10 years with no end in sight. Until recently, South African-supported UNITA insurgents enjoyed the initiative as the dos Santos regime retained control of the urban centers but was unable to counter UNITA advances in the countryside. However, this year's dry-season offensive demonstrated significantly improved government military performance buttressed by increased use of Soviet-supplied aircraft and closer advisory support from the Soviets and Cubans. UNITA has suffered its first significant military reverse since beginning a push in 1982 to expand operations and to secure more territory.

The regime has received a welcome morale boost and, no matter how temporary present gains may be, probably believes it can repeat its performance in next year's dry-season offensive. UNITA probably will have to adjust its strategy, perhaps reverting to more classic guerrilla tactics. For both UNITA and the Angolan Government, the importance and direct role of their main foreign backers—the USSR and South Africa—seem likely to increase.

A Different Offensive This Year
The military objectives of this year's offensive were roughly the same as those last year, only this time government forces captured Cazombo—held by UNITA since late 1983—and nearly took Mavinga until driven back by South African airstrikes. Cazombo is important to UNITA because it gave control to the insurgents of a small portion of the border with Zaire and served as a support base for northern operations. Mavinga is important because it was the first town of any size to be captured and was the site of the 1982 UNITA Party Congress as well as a way station on UNITA's supply line to the north. It is unclear whether the government plans to hold the ground it has regained or pull back to its original position with the onset of the rainy season that traditionally has given UNITA a seasonal edge.

Luanda's Strategy
Luanda is pursuing a combined military-political strategy that it hopes will ultimately defeat the insurgents in a protracted conflict. In addition to improving the military's performance, Luanda seeks to revitalize the party and reform the government administration to win the "heart and minds" of the population. We believe the military's improved performance during the recent offensive probably will encourage the government to move ahead with some overdue reforms during a scheduled party congress in December.

The government has long refused to enter into a negotiated power-sharing arrangement with UNITA, such an alternative is considered in private only by a small minority, generally when the government has been under extreme military pressure from UNITA. The hostility between the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola ( MPLA) and UNITA is reinforced by ethnic and racial differences, and by Luanda's fear of UNITA commander Jonas Savimbi's leadership qualities and considerable charisma, both markedly stronger than that of President dos Santos. The government's approach to reconciliation is usually limited to offers of amnesty for UNITA's rank and file but not for its leadership.

Growing Government Strength
The government has an armed strength of roughly 100,000 men in the regular Army and other security forces plus another 50,000 or more auxiliaries. There are some 1,200 Soviet advisers. In addition, there is a 35,000-man Cuban military contingent, including some 27,000 combat troops, that backs the Angolan Army, guards rear bases, provides essential support services, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operations.

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
The recent improvement in the Angolan armed forces represents the culmination of the large Soviet military deliveries that began in August 1983 when UNITA took the town of Cangamba, a loss that shocked Luanda and catalyzed its Soviet backers. In addition to defending well-prepared base areas, the Angolan Army has now shown that it can penetrate UNITA-held territory, meet and overcome UNITA conventional forces in a standing battle, and take positions defended by the insurgents.

Angola's better performance is the result of improvements in training and organization as well as more extensive Soviet assistance in planning and directing combat operations. Moreover, the government is now exploiting its advantage in weapons more effectively. Soviet aircraft delivered in 1984 reached the field in significant numbers only in mid-1985, and in the offensive this year, Luanda more extensively sustained use of tactical air support. Substantial Soviet arms deliveries have provided the Angolan Army with the full range of conventional weapons, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery in contrast to the lightly armed insurgents, who have only small arms and other light infantry weapons.

The government holds most of the conventional military advantages. It has a better than two-to-one advantage in manpower and, although many troops are tied down in defense of fixed positions, Soviet and Cuban-flown transport aircraft allow fairly rapid redeployment and concentration of forces throughout the country. UNITA's troops, in contrast, move primarily on foot, and redeployment for them is now a matter of weeks or months.

UNITA's Forces and Center of Support

The insurgents have roughly 20,000 to 25,000 fully armed and trained regular forces organized in battalions, most of whom are deployed in UNITA-held territory. In addition, there reportedly are 30,000 to 35,000 other guerrillas operating in smaller units throughout the country, many of whom are ill armed and ill equipped. In the past, UNITA has had the advantage in quality of manpower, although this edge may be narrowing as government forces improve their military skills.

Until the recent government offensive, UNITA has held the southeastern quadrant of the country, which it defends with regular forces and administrators with a rudimentary but apparently effective civil administration. UNITA-held territory, although sparsely populated and economically unimportant, is significant to UNITA primarily as a sanctuary and support base for supply lines to guerrillas elsewhere in the country. The territory also abuts South African-controlled Namibia, affording the otherwise geographically isolated insurgents easy access to outside support and the protection of South African military forces.

UNITA conducts guerrilla operations throughout most of the remainder of the country but is strongest in the well-populated central highlands centered on Huambo, which is inhabited mainly by the Ovimbundu ethnic group from which UNITA draws its primary support. In the last two years, UNITA has pushed its guerrillas into northern Angola to increase both the military challenge to Luanda and to garner support among Angola's other main ethnic groups.

UNITA has succeeded in maintaining operations in this region despite difficulties in ammunition, these extended forces.

Outlook

The recent government offensive has disabused Savimbi of the idea, expressed frequently earlier this year, that he can achieve a quick win by increasing military pressure on the government and forcing Luanda to the bargaining table. UNITA will have to face the prospect of improving government military performance, the more active use of government superiority in airpower and firepower, and the difficulties of supporting extended guerrilla operations.

Savimbi probably will have to adjust his tactics and strategy. a move we believe he is capable of making. The insurgents may have to cut back on
semiconventional operations in favor of more purely guerrilla tactics. Moreover, the insurgents may conclude that it is better to give ground than to challenge government forces in fixed castles.

Although Savimbi for the present may have been knocked off stride, he is far from beaten, and we do not believe he will pull back from operations in northern Angola or elsewhere in the country with the approach of the rainy season in late October. The necessity of challenging the government throughout the country, distracting Luanda from concentrating on his base area, and expanding his area of support and recruitment probably will compel Savimbi to try to keep up the pressure. Savimbi may even increase bombings in cities and redouble his efforts to knock out Angola's oil facilities in Cabinda and in northern coastal regions to cut Luanda's only reliable source of foreign exchange.

For both UNITA and the government, the importance and role of their main outside backers seems likely to increase. Savimbi probably will seek improved antitank and antiaircraft weapons to compensate for government superiority. South African aircraft intervened at least once on behalf of Savimbi's forces last month, and Pretoria may feel compelled to commit additional forces to defend UNITA's sanctuary and its headquarters at Jamba. The threat of greater South African involvement could prompt new Soviet weapons deliveries and more direct Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angolan air and ground operations.
National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

Thursday
29 March 1984
AFRICA: Reaction to Negotiations in the South

South Africa's negotiations with Angola and Mozambique have been favorably received by African countries outside the region, although most doubt that the talks will lead to a lasting settlement.

Some of the strongest support has come from the other Portuguese-speaking countries—Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome. Their leaders will join Angola and Mozambique at a summit in Maputo on Sunday to take a joint stand in favor of the negotiations.

Some senior officials, including a Nigerian and a Malawian, have expressed appreciation for the US role in facilitating the negotiations.

On the other hand, Zairian President Mobutu, and others have expressed concern that the interests of SWAPO and the ANC will be sacrificed. Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs opposes any agreements that tend to sanction South African aggression.

The Foreign Ministers of OAU countries, who met in Addis Ababa earlier this month, expressed their belief that severe security and economic problems led Angola and Mozambique to enter the negotiations. However, they agreed to change their original draft from a statement of "full support" to an expression of "sympathy and understanding." They apparently acted at the behest of SWAPO, the ANC, and the more radical states.

Comment: Most African countries would like to see the negotiations in southern Africa succeed, but they want to avoid the appearance of giving too much support to a process that they fear could easily collapse. They are also reluctant to say anything that might be interpreted as approving South African behavior, lest they indirectly relieve international pressure on Pretoria to reform its domestic policies.
National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
10 October 1985
Special Analysis

ANGOLA: Implications of the Government Offensive

The Angolan military's much improved performance in the offensive this year against UNITA insurgents underscores the more direct role Soviet advisers have had in planning and directing combat operations. UNITA has been knocked off stride and requires more direct support by South Africa. Foreign support probably will become increasingly important to both the government and UNITA.

Government forces dealt UNITA its first significant reversal since the group expanded operations in 1982 to secure more territory. Since July, the government captured Cazombo and nearly took Mavinga—190 miles (300 kilometers) northwest of UNITA’s headquarters in Jamba—until driven back last month by South African airstrikes. Cazombo gave UNITA access to the border with Zaire and was a support base for northern operations. Mavinga, the first sizable town UNITA captured, was the site of its party congress in 1982 and a way station on supply lines to the north.

Deeper Soviet Involvement

Expanded Soviet involvement in planning and directing Angolan combat operations, together with greater Angolan use of tactical air support, were key factors in Luanda’s gains. Failure to make much headway against UNITA last year probably led Moscow to conclude that a more direct Soviet role was necessary this year.

Luanda used a growing number of Angolan pilots for the increased tactical air support.

Soviet arms shipments have increased since 1983 apparently in reaction to UNITA’s capture of Cangamba, a major government defeat that shocked Luanda and caused Moscow to redouble its military support. Soviet deliveries from late 1983 throughout 1984 included more than 100 fighters, fighter-bombers, and helicopters, plus additional air defense weapons, various armored vehicles, artillery, and other materiel. The Angolan Army has a full range of conventional weapons; the insurgents remain lightly armed.

continued
Outlook

The Soviets are likely to continue their extensive advisory assistance in combat operations, and Moscow probably will provide more air defense weapons and radars in hopes of deterring South African actions. Additional fighters and helicopters may also be delivered.

A more direct Soviet or Cuban role in Angolan air or ground operations in response to future South African intervention on UNITA's behalf cannot be ruled out. Apart from replacing UNITA's equipment losses and resorting to commando operations, there is little Pretoria can do—short of direct intervention—to prevent Angola from repeating its success in the next offensive if UNITA decides to stand and fight again.

Luanda probably believes its better performance can be repeated, and it may even start the offensive earlier than usual next year. Future military strategy no doubt will be addressed during the party congress scheduled in mid-December.

Although not beaten, UNITA leader Savimbi probably will have to cut back on semiconventional operations, and he is sure to seek improved antitank and antiaircraft weapons. He probably will try to intensify guerrilla activity in central and northern Angola just to keep the government off balance. Urban bombings and attacks on administrative and economic targets, including the oil facilities in Cabinda, may increase.
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South Africa–Namibia: Settlement Talks Stir Unease 1

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
SOUTH AFRICA—NAMIBIA:

Settlement Talks Stir Unease

The US-brokered talks on a regional military and political accord in southern Africa—including independence for Namibia—are provoking growing criticism of the Botha government in Pretoria from right-wing South Africans and rising concern among whites in Namibia.

The right-wing Conservative Party, which has rejected UN Resolution 435 as a basis for settlement, is charging that the government is endangering South African security. The party has launched a nationwide campaign against the settlement process in the run-up to local white elections in October. Although many whites have objected to the increase in white South African casualties in the fighting in Angola, opinion polls show that most strongly support South Africa's military role in Namibia.

Meanwhile, the prospect of independence and black majority rule in Namibia has already led some whites there to liquidate their assets and sell their homes, according to press reports. President Botha met with Namibian officials on Monday to discuss the negotiations. The South African-appointed Administrator General for Namibia then announced the government still intends to hold local ethnic elections. In an attempt to prevent economic flight, Namibian officials have called for discussions—to include representatives of SWAPO—to formulate a constitution before UN-sponsored elections.

Comment: Pretoria is stressing the remaining obstacles to independence and South Africa's willingness to fight Cuban forces if they threaten Namibia, in part to defuse right-wing claims that the government is prepared to sell out Namibian whites. At the same time, the government is emphasizing UN guarantees and the saving of $400-600 million per year in direct and indirect subsidies to the Namibian economy. Moves toward Namibian independence enhance the right wing's electoral prospects among South African whites who fear they may soon face the enemy on South Africa's border. The ruling National Party, already facing major losses this October to the Conservative Party in Transvaal and Orange Free State Province, probably will crack down even harder on the black opposition to deepen domestic expectations of change and to reaffirm its commitment to white control.

Botha's prominent meetings with South African-backed Namibian officials probably are intended to counter accusations that they have been shut out of the negotiations on their future. The officials probably hope that local ethnic elections will give them a mandate and enhance their credibility before the UN independence plan is implemented.
ANGOLA:

Military Gains by Government

The government's annual offensive in southeastern Angola appears to be making progress and probably has led South Africa to increase its aid to UNITA. Angolan Government forces late last week had come within 50 kilometers of their apparent objectives at Cazombo and Mavinga. Airstrikes were reported at Mavinga and possibly Cazombo. Government air strength in the region remains high; four SU-22 fighter-bombers at Menongue and four MIG-23s at Luena.

Three C-130 transports and several helicopters at Rundu, a South African base in Namibia, and that airstrips at Mavinga and Lulana—inside UNITA-held territory—have been used recently, probably for resupply flights.

Comment: Reporting on the offensive is sketchy, but Angolan forces moving on Mavinga appear to have penetrated as far as they did in offensives last year; those aiming at Cazombo have come closer than they did in 1984. The improved performance probably reflects greater involvement of Soviet advisers in the operations and government use of Soviet-supplied aircraft. The offensive probably will continue for several more weeks until the beginning of the rainy season.

The level of air activity at Rundu—which has been associated in the past with operations in support of UNITA—is unusual, and the airstrips in UNITA-held territory were not in use last year. The military pressures on the insurgents apparently have prompted Pretoria to increase its assistance to UNITA.

The recent military gains follow the successful staging of the Nonaligned Movement ministerial conference in Luanda last week, which passed without incident despite UNITA's avowed intention to disrupt it. The government successes may have cost UNITA some international standing, even though Luanda has not significantly diminished the insurgents' presence throughout Angola.
Cable
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Angola: Military Activity .................................................. 1
ANGOLA:

Military Activity

Government forces are increasing their efforts in central and southern Angola, but UNITA insurgents continue their own operations elsewhere in the country and more intense fighting probably will continue until the rainy season begins later in the year.

Luanda claims that UNITA is on the defensive in the main area of government operations, apparently in central Angola between Kuito and Luena. In the secondary operations area—between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga—insurgents reportedly are resisting an advance by at least two Angolan brigades.

Both the government and UNITA report that insurgents hold the initiative in other areas of the country. Luanda is encouraging its troops to oppose these insurgent moves but apparently is not committing major forces to operations in these areas.

A buildup of government forces along the border in eastern Angola. Air strength at Luena and Menongue has also been increased since mid-August, and aircraft and helicopters from these bases apparently are flying combat missions.

Comment: The government actions may be early stages of what probably will be a growing effort, and UNITA is likely to continue its stepped-up operations. Neither side has announced that a major offensive is in progress.

Increased air activity requires Cuban assistance, but there is no other evidence that Cuban troops have a major role in the operations other than guarding main provincial centers.
OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF: INFO: FILE

2. CUBA-ANGOLA: CUBA APPEARS TO BE TRYING AGAIN TO EASE CONCERNS ABOUT ITS ROLE IN ANGOLA. IN AN INTERVIEW FOR SWEDISH TELEVISION ON TUESDAY, PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO SAID THAT CUBA IS GRADUALLY WITHDRAWING MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM ANGOLA WHILE INCREASING CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARY COOPERATION WOULD CONTINUE.

CASTRO'S REMARKS ARE SIMILAR TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY CUBAN LEADERS LAST SPRING, WHEN A SLIGHT REDUCTION IN CUBAN TROOPS OCCURRED. BETWEEN 10,000 AND 14,500 TROOPS ARE ESTIMATED.

DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT:
OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF: INFO: FILE

TO REMAIN IN ANGOLA.

A TROOP WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE CUBANS

BECAUSE CASUALTIES IN ANGOLA HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN HEAVY AND

MORALE AMONG TROOPS HAS DECLINED. THE RATE OF DESERTIONS FROM

MILITARY UNITS IN CUBA HAS RECENTLY INCREASED.
Intelligence Daily

Tuesday
20 November 1984

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20 November 1984

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Cuban Troop Withdrawal

Moscow and Havana have implicitly recognized the linkage between a Namibian settlement and the Cuban troop presence in Angola.

Official Soviet and Cuban media—Pravda and Granma—have reported on Angolan President dos Santos's speech to a closed OAU session, in which he offered a partial withdrawal of Cuban troops following implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence and a cutoff of South African support to UNITA. The Granma article, which appeared two days before the Pravda item, acknowledged that the US had passed the Angolan proposals to South Africa but denied that Havana was being excluded from any decisions concerning the Cuban presence in Angola.

The Pravda account also acknowledged the US role in the negotiations, stating that "the US has again been given an opportunity to adopt a serious approach to a regional settlement."

Comment: The dos Santos speech at the OAU probably compelled Moscow and Havana to acknowledge publicly for the first time the recent flurry in diplomatic activity. By tacitly accepting the proposals, the Soviets and Cubans may hope to lock dos Santos into his current position. The media accounts suggest that Moscow and Havana also want to avoid being perceived as obstacles to a Namibian settlement.

The USSR and Cuba probably calculate that Pretoria will not accept dos Santos's proposal and that consequently US diplomacy and South African intransigence will come under international criticism. Nonetheless, they are concerned that US efforts may result in a regional settlement that will undermine their position in Angola.

By emphasizing its total support of the Angolan proposal in the Cuban press, Havana also is trying to ease the domestic impact of a diplomatic setback by conveying the impression that it is intimately involved in the negotiations. In doing so, however, Cuban leaders risk raising popular expectations concerning the return of troops from an increasingly unpopular foreign adventure.

20 November 1984
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Angola: Continuity and Change (U) ......... 1

The death of President Neto provides the Angolan leadership the opportunity to redirect the government's policy objectives.

SECRET
Angola: Continuity and Change

"The Chinese are reported to have a way of writing the word 'crisis' by two characters, one of which signifies 'danger,' the other 'opportunity.'"

Louis Wirth

The death of President Agostinho Neto last month provides the Angolan leadership the opportunity to redirect the government's internal and foreign policy objectives. The Cubans and Soviets—Angola's chief benefactors and guardians of the country's security—also have fresh opportunities to exert their influence. Although it is too soon to determine whether the leaders of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party (MPLA) will depart from the initiatives embarked upon by Neto, there are indications that some changes may be coming.

The Old Order: Deradicalization of the Revolution

By Angolan standards the late President Neto could be characterized as a moderate. Although he continued to declare his allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, Neto generally was a pragmatic socialist who was moving toward the West and was purging the party and the government of those who disagreed with him.

Neto had come to believe that the country's serious economic, political, and social problems could be resolved only through making significant internal and foreign policy changes. His goals apparently included reorganizing the government at the national and provincial levels, accommodating black demands for more power while filling key positions with individuals who shared his views, securing the country's northern and southern frontiers by making accommodations with Angola's neighbors, and possibly seeking a peaceful resolution to the National Union

22 October 1979
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency in the southern part of the country. In the months before his death, Neto also had taken a new interest in internal problems, such as food shortages and corruption, and apparently was becoming more aware of the rising tide of popular discontent.

The deceased President. Will his initiatives be continued?

Some MPLA leaders became concerned that over time the government was losing its revolutionary zeal and that Neto's desire to seek an accommodation with the West represented a betrayal of the Angolan revolution. But there apparently was little overt opposition to Neto's actions within the ruling group—an uneasy coalition of ethnic antagonists with conflicting ideological views. Government officials in recent months also were concerned about their personal positions. Neto's purge in July of the Angolan intelligence service reportedly led to bitter verbal attacks on him during the August meetings of the Central Committee.

The Cubans and Soviets also probably were becoming concerned over Neto's policies, especially his openings to the West. Neto's trip last month to the Soviet Union reportedly was to be used to discuss Angolan-Soviet problems—principally Moscow's notion that Neto was attempting to move Luanda out of the Soviet-Cuban orbit.


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The New Order

Little information is available on the ideological orientation of Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, Angola's new President. Much of the information on him and on other influential members of the country's political elite is contradictory. Although it is generally believed that Dos Santos was associated with Neto's opening to the West, it is also reasonable to deduce from what is known that the new President, a Soviet-educated black, is more left leaning than his predecessor. Dos Santos does not appear to be a hardline Marxist, however, and he apparently is an acceptable choice to Angola's major factions—at least for the time being. The deliberations surrounding his selection took place in accordance with the provisions of the Angolan constitution. The new President is also party leader and commander in chief of the country's armed forces, as was Neto.[__________]

Factions and Power Brokers

Some observers believe that Dos Santos is malleable and can be controlled by party secretary and theoretician Lucio Lara. Lara reportedly was the MPLA Political Bureau's first choice for President, but he declined. Defense Minister Iko Carreira, a moderate mulatto, also may share in control of the government—with Lara possessing the lion's share of


22 October 1979
the power. Lara is believed to have radical tendencies and could use his influence to shift Angola eventually more toward the East. Lara, a longtime associate of Neto and a senior member of the Political Bureau, almost certainly will play a major role in determining Angolan Government policy. Dos Santos' selection as President probably was a compromise.

Luanda reportedly has been calm since Neto's death, but efforts by various factions to gain greater power could give way to violence, especially once the 45-day mourning period is concluded at the end of the month. The role of the Cubans as a stabilizing influence may be critical at this point.

The Uncertain Future

Neto probably was the only Angolan personality with the prestige and authority to bridge successfully the black-mulatto cleavage, a split complicated by ideological divisions that do not neatly break down along racial lines. Apparently neither Dos Santos nor Lara opposed Neto's deradicalization policies while Neto lived. Either--especially Lara--could, however, take advantage of the current situation to reorient Angola's policies and priorities. If Dos Santos is unable to establish his authority as Angola's unchallenged leader, he could turn to Moscow or Havana to bolster his position. Potential rivals or members of the black nationalist Catete Group also could exercise this option. The Angolan military probably will attempt to strengthen its position and could throw its weight behind the black power faction.

Decisionmaking on major issues probably will be slowed, if only because the powers that were concentrated


22 October 1979
in Neto's hands will be more widely dispersed. Forced to govern by consensus, the new leadership probably will not be aggressive, nor will it attempt to proceed too rapidly on Neto's more controversial initiatives. The government's primary concerns will be to maintain the delicate balance and semblance of unity within the party. It may not be able to do any of these.

At the very least, Angola probably will continue to seek contacts with the West, primarily for economic reasons, but the country will remain basically dependent upon the Cubans and the East for security assistance. Although some government officials believe—as Neto probably did—that peaceful solutions to the Namibian problem and to the UNITA insurgency are necessary if the MPLA is to consolidate its rule and get on with the problems of development, the new regime may choose to adhere to a harder line in an effort to demonstrate its ideological purity and unflagging commitment to the revolution.

Nor is it likely that in the short term the new leadership would be willing to negotiate with the UNITA insurgents, as Neto reportedly had decided to do. The MPLA most likely will continue to seek a military victory over the insurgents whether or not a Namibian settlement is reached.

The rapprochement with Zaire is expected to continue, but mutual suspicions between Luanda and Kinshasa probably will be heightened.

22 October 1979
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3. ANGOLA AIR DEFENSE MISSELS

SA-6 MOBILE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AT CHIBERNA MINE AREAS WHERE SOUTH AFRICAN
FORCES HAVE OPERATED. THE COUNTRY'S MAJOR AIR DEFENSES
ARE LOCATED 150 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH ALONG THE
MOCA-OKA-OKOHMUS RAILROAD.

COMMENTS //THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE RAIDED EARLY
WARNING RADAR SITES NEAR CHIBERNA TWICE SINCE LAST FALL.
IF THEY CONCLUDE THAT THE SA-6S POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO
THEIR CONTINUED AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, THEY
PROBABLY WILL ATTACK THE TOWN AGAIN. CUBAN ADVISERS
ASSIST OTHER ANGOLA AIR DEFENSE UNITS AND SOME MAY BE
STATIONED AT CHIBERNA.

///
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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USSR-Cuba: Suslov Heads Delegation to Congress

Senior party ideologist Suslov heads the Soviet delegation that is in Havana for the Cuban party congress.

Angola will almost certainly be high on the agenda of discussion topics. Suslov will no doubt be full of praise for Cuba's contribution to the common effort in Africa, but he will also want to dissuade Castro from thinking that Moscow will express its gratitude in significantly greater economic and military assistance. The Soviets have already sent some additional arms to Cuba to offset Havana's expenditures in Angola.

Suslov is not likely to emphasize, as did Brezhnev when he visited Havana two years ago, the benefits of detente and the gains to be derived from a thaw in US-Cuban relations. The Soviets have a strong interest, now more than ever, in relieving the economic burden they bear because of Cuba's isolation in the hemisphere and hence in better Havana-Washington relations. They must be aware, however, that Cuba's involvement in Angola, along with its position on Puerto Rican independence, would arrest any movement toward rapprochement with the US. Moscow and Havana probably made the hard choice last summer.

The Soviets have new reason to feel that they are getting some pay-off for their investment in Cuba. Last summer, Castro successfully organized a conference of Latin American and Caribbean communist parties in Havana, which the Soviets hope will be a steppingstone toward an international meeting. The conference adopted the Kremlin's line against supporting armed revolution in Latin America, and the Cubans, for the first time, went so far as to sign a document condemning the Chinese communists by name.

December 16, 1975
CIA - CI - BRIEF
76 #052

Secret
3. USSR: Moscow evidently is trying to calm apprehension in the West about future Soviet and Cuban actions in Southern Africa, but without closing any of its options.

The most visible move was to act as an intermediary with Angola in arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory. AL
THOUGH THE SOVIETS ASSUMED NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTCOME, THEY PROBABLY ASSUMED THAT THE STATEMENTS BY THE MPLA ON THE CUNENE PROJECT AND THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA WOULD BE CHALKED UP TO THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE USSR. Y

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARRANGEMENT PROVIDED A FAVORABLE BACKDROP FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S EFFORT IN LONDON LAST WEEK TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE USSR WAS NOT SEEKING A CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST OVER NAMIBIA OR RHODESIA. GROMYKO ALSO ALLUCED TO MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE WITH THE MPLA AND THE CUBANS, SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION OUGHT TO BE CONSULTED REGARDING THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND, LESS CLEARLY, THAT ITS INFLUENCE WOULD BE ON THE SIDE OF MODERATION. Y

3. THIS TONE OF MODERATION ALSO HAS INFUSED THE SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL, WHICH HAS BEEN NOTABLY LOW KEY AND BEREFT
OF THE KIND OF CROWING THAT MIGHT NORMALLY ACCOMPANY
A "VICTORY." Y

DESPITE MOSCOW'S REASSURING WORDS ON SOUTHERN
AFRICA, THERE ARE FEW SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
URGING THE CUBANS TO REDUCE THEIR PRESENCE IN
ANGOLA ANY TIME SOON. INDEED, SOVIET PRESS TREAT-
MENT OF A RECENT SPEECH BY POPULAR MOVEMENT LEADER
NETO HIGHLIGHTED NETO'S REJECTION OF SUGGESTIONS
THAT HE REDUCE HIS DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET AND CUBAN
SUPPORT.