Africa Review

10 June 1968
The strategic balance in southern Angola appears to have shifted in favor of Luanda, which has been helped by the unprecedented buildup of Cuban forces in the southwest, but in northern Angola, UNITA guerrilla forces have been increasingly successful.
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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.*
Angola: New Strategic Balance Emerge

The Angolan conflict threatens to become a conventional war in the south, where over the past six months the strategic balance appears to have shifted in favor of Angolan Government forces, while a guerrilla war continues throughout the north, where UNITA insurgents in the past months have had increasing success. Cuban forces in Angola have been augmented and are playing a more direct combat role in support of government troops. An unprecedented Cuban buildup in southwestern Angola—an area where the South Africans traditionally have operated with impunity against Namibian insurgents—has raised the prospects for a major Cuban-South African confrontation.

The Conventional War in the South
Fighting in the southeast continued throughout the December-to-April rainy season. After defeating the government offensive last fall, insurgent forces, with significant South African assistance, laid siege to the government-held town of Cuito Cuanavale. Cuban troop reinforcements and Angolan defenses held against heavy artillery barrages and repeated South African and UNITA attempts to overrun Angolan positions on the east bank of the Cuito River, and by late March Pretoria had decided to pull back most of its troops. The siege of Cuito Cuanavale forced the Cubans—who traditionally have served as a defensive reserve—to assume a more active combat role. Cuban ground forces and advisers were attached to Angolan brigades and Cuban pilots flew combat missions in the area.

In recent months, the balance of forces in southern Angola has shifted dramatically following the unprecedented deployment of Angolan and Cuban combat forces to Cunene Province in the southwest. Since November, Havana has augmented its contingent in Angola by 6,000 to 8,000 men—including some of Cuba’s finest units—and garrisons in Cuba suggest preparations were being made in May to send additional reinforcements. Most of these forces have been deployed to the southwest, where Cuba has moved over 11,000 troops and 220 tanks to positions as close as 40 miles from the Namibian border since early March. The Cubans also have completed an airstrip at Cunene that can handle jet fighters, and are backing their contingent in the southwest with a substantial air defense system. The Cubans have not hesitated to defend their new positions, and there have been several skirmishes with lightly armed South African reconnaissance patrols.

Southwestern Angola has long been of concern to South Africa because it is used by the South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) to infiltrate Namibia. Since the early 1980s, South African counterinsurgency forces operated freely against SWAPO insurgents inside a 25-mile no-man’s land north of the Namibian border. Although South African forces continue to conduct prepotent strikes and hit-and-run raids against SWAPO, the new Angolan-Cuban deployments have constrained Pretoria’s ability to act with impunity in the area. SWAPO infiltrations into Namibia may have marginally increased this year because of the Cuban and Angolan troop presence.

The size and strength of Cuban forces in southwestern Angola and uncertainty about Cuban intentions limits South Africa’s immediate military options. A major
Cuban Troop Movements, Mid-May 1988

Angola

Former Cuban garrisons

Cuban/Angolan airfields

Cuban/Angolan airfield and garrison

11,000 Cuban troops
200 tanks

Current Cuban brigade positions

Kampala

Cuban garrison

Lusaka

Malabo

Luanda

Cuban/Angolan garrison

Cuban garrison

South African garrisons

South African airfields

UNITA

Field

Namibia

Secret

0630
military operation to dislodge Cuban and Angolan forces probably would entail significant manpower and materiel losses that Pretoria thus far has sought to avoid. Failure to respond at all to the Cuban threat would be a setback for South African military interests in the regime and probably would increase right-wing criticism of South African President Botha. South Africa would be forced to respond, however, to a Cuban advance into Namibia or an attack against the South African-occupied Cuito-Cuanza/Rukwana Dam area.

The Guerrilla War
In late December, UNITA--using both conventional and guerrilla tactics--launched an offensive of its own along the Benguela railway line in central Angola, capturing strategic locations along the insurgents’ supply route to the north and isolating the government garrison at Cuito Cuanza. UNITA for the first time deployed captured tanks during the fighting, albeit with limited success. Government reinforcements stabilized the situation in early March, and by late May, Angolan forces had regrouped and were preparing to recapture positions lost to the insurgents. Guerrilla activity in central Angola remains widespread, however, particularly in populous Huambo Province and in the Caxito-Bubac area.

UNITA, meanwhile, continues its guerrilla campaign in the northern provinces and in the past few months has increased attacks on urban targets. Insurgent sabotage destroyed power stations outside Luanda in early May, leaving the capital without electricity for at least four days. According to press reports, UNITA also destroyed a hydroelectric complex that supplied electricity to Luanda and fuel tanks in Malange that reportedly contained reserves for government forces. UNITA leader Savimbi believes that aggressive guerrilla tactics--particularly in the north--are needed to maximize pressure on Luanda. He calculates that, given the forces, stretched thin by operations in southern Angola, will be hard pressed to contain small-scale UNITA attacks against a variety of targets. Expanding UNITA activity in the northern province is fueling Angolan Government accusations that neighboring Zaire is providing assistance to the insurgents.

More Interest in Negotiations
The Cuban buildup in the southwest has provided new impetus to negotiations. Pretoria, evidently surprised by the magnitude of Cuban moves near the Namibian border--participated last month in US-brokered talks with the Angolans and Cubans. Pretoria and Luanda subsequently held bilateral talks in Brazzaville to discuss regional issues, including Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence.

Negotiations are likely to continue, but major obstacles continue to hinder a settlement. Luanda’s difficult security situation and the growing combat role of the Cubans probably will constrain Luanda’s ability to offer a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal that would satisfy South Africa. Pretoria, for its part, probably remains unwilling to agree to the longstanding preconditions to a settlement established by Luanda, Havana, and Moscow, including the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, the end of aid to UNITA, and Namibian independence under the provisions of UN Resolution 435.

Luanda’s continued refusal to enter reconciliation talks with UNITA also remains a serious obstacle to a settlement. Angolan President dos Santos reportedly recognizes the need to negotiate with the insurgents, but refuses to deal with UNITA President Savimbi and instead prefers to talk individually with other UNITA leaders in an effort to co-opt them and undermine insurgent unity. Pretoria has insisted that UNITA be part of any settlement.

Outlook
The insurgents probably will seek to expand guerrilla activity throughout Angola in the next six months, particularly against military targets in provincial capitals and key economic facilities. Although Luanda itself has remained relatively isolated from the fighting, UNITA’s ability to create a blackout there suggests the insurgents will continue efforts to bring the war closer to the
capital. Expanding UNITA operations in the north probably will worsen relations between the Angolan government and Zaire.

The government's stand at Cuito Cuanavale and the active involvement of Cuban combat forces, particularly in the southwest, has bolstered the morale of government forces following the failure of the 1987 offensive. The Angolans probably will expand their defensive perimeter around Cuito Cuanavale in the next few months to remove the threat from artillery batteries that continue to shell positions in the town. Such a move would allow the repair of the Cuito River bridge and the reactivation of the Cuito Cuanavale airfield, both of which had been put out of operation by artillery fire during the siege of the town. The bridge and airfield would facilitate future operations directed at UNITA's southeastern stronghold.

By increasing its troop contingent, becoming more directly engaged in the fighting, and deploying troops near the Namibian border, Havana dramatically changed the strategic balance that earlier this year appeared to be favoring UNITA and the South Africans. Although Cuba's ultimate intentions remain unclear, the immediate effect of the growing Cuban role will be to strengthen Lusaka's bargaining power at the negotiating table. Pretoria might not tolerate further Cuban advances in the southwest, however, and the possibility of a major military confrontation remains.
STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union
Eastern Europe

Top Secret
November 4, 1975
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Soviet Media Focusing on Angola.

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Soviet Media Focusing on Angola

The Soviet media are devoting increasing attention to Angola as the scheduled date for independence, November 11, draws near.

Several recent major commentaries in Pravda, Izvestia, and Red Star portray the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as a group of beleaguered patriots struggling against an alignment of forces—Communist Chinese, American, and South African, among others—bent on reversing Angola's movement toward independence and retarding Africa's decolonization process.

Pravda comes down particularly hard on Peking, charging that Chinese military instructors are working "side by side with CIA advisers" in an effort to suppress the Angolan people. The Soviets clearly are attempting to embarrass the Chinese in Africa by such assertions. But Moscow is also using the Angola case to support a long-standing propaganda theme that the Chinese have aligned themselves with reactionaries and in some cases are cooperating directly with the US.

Although the articles end on an upbeat note by citing the optimistic view of Popular Movement leader Agostinho Neto that his group will eventually prevail, they clearly reveal Moscow's nervousness over the serious military reverses sustained by the movement in recent weeks. The Kremlin could be preparing its domestic audience for a setback to a client that Moscow has touted as a successful pro-Soviet liberation movement.

By emphasizing foreign intervention on behalf of the Popular Movement's adversaries, Moscow may be attempting to justify to a foreign audience its own stepped-up assistance to the Popular Movement. The USSR has recently carried out a substantial airlift of military supplies to West Africa which are almost certainly destined for Neto's forces.

November 4, 1975
Cuba: Costs in Angola Minimal

The Cuban military presence in Angola thus far has not constituted an important economic burden for Havana. Direct costs of transporting and supporting the estimated 10,000-man Cuban expeditionary force have been only about $10 million (excluding military equipment), at least part of which probably is being underwritten by Moscow. Practically all of the estimated $25-$30 million in military equipment sent to Angola from Cuba was originally supplied Havana by the USSR on a grant basis. The manpower commitment has not taxed the Cuban labor force, which exceeds 2.5 million. Use of Cuban commercial aircraft and merchant vessels to transport troops and equipment has caused only minor disruptions to Havana's airline schedules and trade patterns.
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2. CUBA: PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO'S LACKLUSTER DEFENSE OF CUBA'S MILITARY ROLE IN ANGOLA SUGGESTS HE IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH WHAT HAS PROVED TO BE AN UNPOPULAR AND COSTLY POLICY. HE SPEAKING BEFORE FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN HAVANA ON JANUARY 15, HE ACKNOWLEDGED DIRECTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME THE PRESENCE OF "CUBAN SOLDIERS" IN ANGOLA AND APPARENTLY MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CLOAK OFFICIAL SPONSORSHIP BY CLAIMING THAT THEY WERE VOLUNTEERS. HE ALSO ADMITTED
That his troops had suffered casualties, but he would not elaborate. As other official spokesmen have done, Castro described Cuba's involvement as a reaction to South Africa's intervention. He said that Cuba is in Angola fighting alongside revolutionaries who are combating the US and South Africa. He claimed that no Cuban military units had gone to Angola prior to the South African "invasion" on October 23. In fact, 1,500 or more Cuban military personnel had arrived prior to that date.

Although only an incomplete text of Castro's remarks is available so far, it is clear that he views an improvement in relations with the US as impossible under present circumstances. He claimed that Cuba is "in favor of peace, the policy of detente, and coexistence between states with different social systems," but he insisted that Cuba would not be diverted from support of the Puerto Rican independence movement or the popular movement in Angola as the price for improved US ties. He reiterated his oft-stated, uncompromising demand that "for negotiations with us, the economic blockade must be unconditionally lifted."
CASTRO'S USE OF A PRESS CONFERENCE RATHER THAN A SPEECH TO GET HIS MESSAGE ACROSS IS SIGNIFICANT; HE USES HIS TECHNIQUES TO KEEP FROM THE CUBAN PEOPLE THOSE MATTERS HE BELIEVES MUST BE ADDRESSED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE BUT ARE TOO SENSITIVE FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. HIS CAUTION ON THIS OCCASION TENDS TO CONFIRM ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL REPORTING THAT THE ANGOLAN WAR AND CUBA'S ROLE IN IT ARE UNPOPULAR SUBJECTS AMONG THE POPULATION.
Intelligence Checklist

January 28, 1976
24

CI IC 76-019 JX
The Intelligence Checklist is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA: Forces of the Popular Movement, aided by Cuban troops, apparently are increasing pressure on National Union positions in central Angola. National Union President Savimbi reportedly believes that the next two weeks will be critical.

The National Union is moving its headquarters from Huambo, the capital of the Union-National Front government, to the Union's main military base at Bie. A Popular Movement military spokesman announced yesterday in Luanda that his organization has mounted a three-pronged offensive against Huambo, Bic, and Lobito. Popular Movement troops evidently are now 50 miles north of Huambo.

Meanwhile, Savimbi is hoping that his forces will be able to capture Teixeira de Sousa in eastern Angola to show that the Union can maintain its military strength without South African support. Savimbi also hopes he can tie down the Movement's advances by reverting to guerrilla tactics.

**continued**
Intelligence Checklist

The Soviet military airlift to Angola also is continuing.
Soviets Weigh Angola Role Against Arms Accord

V. V. Zhurkin, a prominent Soviet academician who closely follows Moscow's relations with Washington, has said concern is growing in the USSR that Soviet actions in Angola could prejudice chances for a second strategic arms limitations agreement.

He remarked that some influential Soviets have begun to consider seriously US warnings about the potential ramifications of the Angolan affair. Zhurkin is a deputy director of the USA Institute and is sensitive to the impact of such a situation as that in Angola on US-Soviet relations.

Zhurkin, nevertheless, defended Soviet assistance to the Popular Movement and reiterated Moscow's standard position that the USSR will not sacrifice its policy of support to national liberation movements for the sake of detente.

He was confident that detente would continue despite periodic setbacks and inevitable debates within Western countries. He echoed the opinion that Western criticism of Soviet support for the Popular Movement would eventually subside.

He did acknowledge that Western public opinion on Angola could affect Soviet policy, especially if public opinion were to jeopardize chances for US Congressional ratification of a new strategic arms limitations agreement. Progress toward such an agreement remains the linchpin of improved US-Soviet relations, he said, both because of its intrinsic importance and because of the impetus it would give to other negotiations like the START force reductions talks.
Pravda Article Defends Soviet Role in Angola

Under Kremlin-Backed Signature of ‘Observer’

Pravda yesterday published a long, authoritative “Observer” article on Angola destined in part to refute US criticism of Moscow’s role in the former Portuguese territory.

The article is Moscow’s most complete and authoritative statement on Angola to date. It is confident about the situation in Angola itself, exercising the rest of Africa, and almost prophesying in rejecting the notion that the USSR has anything to apologize for in its Angolan policy.

The text cites a Secret of State Kissinger’s speech in San Francisco last week. It said the Secretary was “obviously out of tune with the facts” and was attempting to “whitewash” long-standing US “acts and covert Interference” in Angola.

“Observer” emphasized that detente does not signify “freedom of action for aggressors.”

Moscow has also displayed considerable sensitivity to the Secretary’s congressional testimony on Angola, but this is the first time that a high-level Soviet rebuttal has appeared.

Earlier Pravda articles directly criticized President Ford as well as Secretary Kissinger for allegedly “distorting” the Soviet and Cuban role in Angola, but balanced these barbs with positive comments on the accomplishments of detente.

The “Observer” article mentioned neither Cuban aid to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola nor the activities of the Soviet navy off West Africa. It did, however, admit openly that the USSR and its allies have given Angola “weapons.”

Perhaps by way of additional justification for Soviet activities in Angola, the “Observer” article went further than the Soviets had done heretofore to widen the scope of the “imperialist opponent.” It stated that the mercenaries who have fought against the Popular Movement were recruited in the US, West Germany, the UK, and other Western countries.

(USSR, Cuba Sharply Increase Aid for Angola During January)

The amount of military support provided the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola by the Soviet Union and Cuba increased markedly in January, according to a new report.

The report, which is being widely circulated in the Soviet and Cuban press, states that Cuba has increased its military aid to Angola by about 25% during the past month. The aid includes weapons, ammunition, and training for the Popular Movement.

(Zairian President Said Reassessing Policy on Angola)

Zairian President Mobutu is reassessing his policies in light of the Popular Movement’s military successes in Angola and Zaire’s own steadily mounting problems. Mobutu is anxious to put Angola behind him by arranging an accommodation with the Popular Movement. Mobutu reportedly plans to send a secret mission to Luanda to open talks with Movement leaders.

(U.S.S.R., Cuba Sharply Increase Aid for Angola During January)

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Angola.

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Mobutu maintained some time ago that the National Front was collapsing in Angola. The poor showing of Zairean forces sent to support the Front also raised doubts in his mind about the army's ability to deal with internal disturbances in Zaire. Zairean dissidents are already allying the Popular Movement in support of an insurgency from Angola against the Zairian government.

Early this month, Mobutu signed his intention to break with past policies by carrying out significant changes in his government. He dropped his foreign minister and his chief defense advisor, reallocated economic responsibilities, and tightened the structure of the official party's political bureau.

Changing foreign ministers gives Mobutu new flexibility for dealing with Angola. The departure of defense advisors may be a signal to Nketa that Mobutu is preparing to forge a new military movement against the Popular Movement. It reflects at a minimum Mobutu's desire to do something about the weakness of the Zairian army.

The redistribution of economic portfolios permits Mobutu to claim he is taking a fresh approach toward Zaire's many economic problems.

National Union Near Collapse in Angola War

National Union forces in south-central Angola appear on the verge of collapse in the face of a major assault by Cuban-backed Popular Movement troops.

A National Union spokesman confirmed yesterday that the Popular Movement had captured Bié (Silva Porto), which the Union established as its headquarters after the fall of Huambo last weekend.

The Union's only chance for survival to regroup at Villa Serpa Porto, where many civilians will impede the Popular Movement. Even there, however, it is unlikely the Union can join in an effort aimed at regrouping. Enemy combatants are not well prepared, and the terrain is also conducive to guerrilla warfare.
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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Increasing Military Activity

South African military activity in southern Angola and northern Namibia is again on the upswing.

Angola claims that South African aircraft recently bombed Cahama. South Africa has used such aircraft in the past to bomb southern Angola.

South Africa alleges it detected a Cuban reconnaissance team operating on 13 September near Mupa, an area in the northern part of the buffer zone in Angola that Pretoria controls. A spokesman for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola has claimed—in a charge also broadcast on South African-controlled radio—that Cuban and Angolan forces are preparing for a major offensive against UNITA insurgents in southern Angola.

Comment: The South Africans probably bombed Cahama—which they last attacked in mid-July—to discourage Angola from setting up a forward radar base. The recent increased activity could be associated with operations against Cubans near Mupa or against SWAPO or Angolan targets.
National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
6 February 1986
ANGOLA:

Soviet and African Reaction to Savimbi's Visit

*The reaction to the visit of UNITA leader Savimbi to the US is predictably negative, with only a handful of moderate black African officials quietly expressing sympathy with him.*

The Soviets publicly raised the possibility of increasing military aid to Luanda, signed an economic protocol with visiting Angolan officials, and gave the Savimbi trip broad press coverage, allowing that the US had already decided to grant UNITA $300 million. The Soviets have not ruled out further Angolan participation in US-sponsored negotiations on Namibia.

Angola and South Africa took advantage of the visit to reiterate longstanding differences on regional negotiations. The Angolans said they want further talks, but they stressed their unwillingness to negotiate with Savimbi and their continued need for Cuban troops. South African President Botha emphasized that a Cuban withdrawal from Angola remains a prerequisite for carrying out UN Resolution 435 and for reducing South African troops in Namibia. Pretoria has made no official mention of Savimbi’s US visit.

South African black leaders Winnie Mandela and Bishop Tutu have joined the Frontline States, the OAU, and other black African regional groups in criticizing Savimbi’s visit.

Some states that support Angola—Libya, Tanzania, and Ghana, for example—have been highly critical, while others—including Ivory Coast and Gabon—express quiet support for Savimbi.

**Comment:** The announcements by the OAU and the Frontline States criticizing Savimbi’s visit are designed to discourage any break in African ranks against UNITA. Most Africans will either duck the issue or follow the lead of the OAU by giving verbal support to Angola but little else. Only a handful of moderates are likely to sympathize with Savimbi, with even fewer joining Zaire in extending behind-the-scenes support for UNITA.
National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
22 March 1984
Angola

Disengagement area

Top Secret

22 March 1984
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Troop Withdrawal To Resume

South Africa informed Angola on Monday that it would resume the phased withdrawal of remaining forces from southern Angola in the next few days.

Pretoria also agreed that the Joint Monitoring Commission could move its headquarters from Cuvelai to the next monitoring site at Mupu. The pullout is now scheduled to be completed by 15 April.

South Africa is satisfied with Angola’s efforts to remove SWAPO guerrillas from the disengagement area. Pretoria also accepts Luanda’s promise to request South African help if it cannot control SWAPO insurgents trying to infiltrate Namibia. Nevertheless, the South Africans have told the Angolans that the continued presence of SWAPO units near Cahama could again delay the withdrawal.

Cuban President Castro and Angolan President dos Santos issued a communique on Monday following their meeting in Havana. The document states that a gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops will begin after the South African forces have left Angola. The UN plan for Namibian independence is carried out, and all outside support to UNITA is ended. The communique characterizes the South African Government as "repugnant."

South African Foreign Minister Botha denounced the communique and repeated Pretoria’s position linking Namibia’s independence with the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops from Angola. He demanded that Luanda restate its willingness to abide by the troop disengagement agreement.

Comment: South Africa probably will continue the withdrawal despite its anger at the Angolan-Cuban communique. The communique and the South African reaction show that neither side has changed its public position on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
CUBA-ANGOLA

Size of Military Presence

Despite recent reports that the Cuban government has sent an additional 4,000 men to Angola, there has been no strong evidence of a substantial increase in the Cuban presence there since spring, when Havana reportedly sent an estimated 3,000 or 4,000 soldiers. The recent reports have been prompted by in-country troop movements related to the current offensive, now in southern Angola.

According to several recent reports, approximately 4,000 Cuban soldiers had recently arrived in Angola. In addition, the number of Cuban troops in Angola had been increased by 4,000 during July and August.

The reports of a recent Cuban buildup may have been sparked by the offensive launched by Cuban and Angolan forces in southern Angola last month. The leadership of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola reportedly learned in early August that 4,000 Cuban troops had disembarked from two Cuban ships at two ports in southern Angola.

Cuban President Castro reportedly is planning to travel to the USSR in November to attend the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He apparently will stop briefly in East Germany on route. Castro traveled to both countries last spring following a month-long tour of Africa and the Middle East.

Castro's presence at the celebrations will symbolize the continuing close Soviet-Cuban relationship. While in East Germany, he will probably continue Havana's campaign to solicit additional assistance for Angola.
Military Developments, 18 September

- Increased readiness at South African airbases
- Government advances
- UNITA-held territory
- Possible South African ground combat elements

Top Secret

19 September 1987
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Increased Support for UNITA

what appears to be a South African ground combat unit deployed at Mavinga in southern Angola. The Angolan press claims the South Africans are conducting air and ground attacks throughout the area.

Comment: The deployment of a combat unit suggests that the South Africans are committed to helping UNITA defend Mavinga, as they did in 1985.

It may, however, be part of the 32nd Battalion—South Africa’s "Foreign Legion"—which is currently not in garrison and has reportedly operated in Angola in the past. Although nearly 50 South African combat aircraft remain deployed at bases in Namibia, there is no indication of South African airstrikes against Angolan Government troop positions near Mavinga.

Top Secret

19 September 1987
Angola: Benguela Railroad

The Angolan Government faces numerous economic and logistic problems in fulfilling its commitment to reopen all of the Benguela Railroad.

The most serious immediate threat to the rail line, however, comes from insurgents of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola who apparently are determined to keep it from operating completely. The government probably cannot restore full service in the short to medium term.

Various sources confirm that UNITA has stepped up its attacks against the railroad—much of which passes through territory in which the insurgents continue to operate. We believe UNITA will retains the capability to attack trains or to sabotage the line at will along lengthy sections of the 1,670-kilometer route.

The insurgents already have had a significant effect on military supplies inside Angola. UNITA probably believes that its inability—both in Luanda and internationally—to disrupt rail operations would be damaging if it did not impede military operations. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi is concerned over the Angolan Government's recent diplomatic and political gains and may opt to inflict further damage on the railroad. Savimbi believes his position is deteriorating.

Continued UNITA attacks on the rail line could lead Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos to change that offer. Zairean President Mobutu or Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda is using the railroad. If he makes changes against Zairians, he would jeopardize the

We doubt that the Benguela Railroad can be restored to full use until the Angolan Government reaches a modus vivendi with UNITA or defeats the insurgents militarily—either of which appears likely in the near future.
Latin America

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
LATIN AMERICA
10 May 1977

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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

RP ALA 77-036
10 May 1977
Cuba: The Campaign in Southern Angola

The Cubans encountered natural obstacles which hampered their mobility and forced them to move equipment in stages, not all at once. Roads running through dense jungle were narrow, and the breakdown of a single vehicle would have been sufficient to halt an entire column. The columns drove south day and night with no resistance from UNITA or South African forces.

Cuban forces occasionally used existing railway lines for some of their movements. For example, two trains transported the 1,200-man reinforced regiment from Lobito to Huambo. We believe that Cuban troops used railways only in areas they considered relatively safe from ambush.

Cuban forces also experienced equipment breakdowns throughout the campaign. The unit lost 8 of its 24 T-34 tanks due to equipment failures. The unit could not perform major repairs on the tanks and had to ship them to Luanda for this purpose. While supply was seldom a problem in Cuba, it was a "disaster" in Angola. The group anticipated getting Soviet vehicles early in the campaign in southern Angola, but they never arrived.

Cubans and Angolans sometimes participated in joint operations, but we do not believe this cooperation was widespread. A joint group of MPLA forces and a Cuban transportation unit was formed.

*Listed in contents but not included in Latin America
RP ALA 77-036, 5 May 1977.

RP ALA 77-036
10 May 1977
to provide added mobility for a Cuban infantry unit. In addition, the major striking force in the southern campaign was composed of a joint Cuban-MPLA unit to seize the Cunene Dam—then in South African hands. Nevertheless, Cuban forces were largely contemptuous of the fighting capabilities of MPLA troops and avoided contact with them.

The Cuban general staff in Luanda planned a major offensive against the South Africans to capture the Cunene hydroelectric dam in late March 1976, using MIGs for close air support as well as an armored division and the reinforced regiment. The planned operation against the South Africans, however, never occurred. Cuban troops became preoccupied with some 1,200 local UNITA guerrillas, and the South Africans evacuated the Cunene Dam on about April 6.

The South Africans evacuated the area after reaching an agreement with the Cubans and Angolans that South Africa would still have access to the hydroelectric project. The South Africans apparently were concerned that local military action would damage the Cunene Dam, and they faced mounting diplomatic pressure to withdraw their forces.
Latin America

REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Secret

RP ALA 77-041
26 May 1977
NOTE: The twice weekly Latin America Regional and Political Analysis will be published once a week on Thursday beginning June 2.

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

RP ALA 77-041
26 May 1977
Cuba: Castro's Perception of Cuba's African Policy

Cuban leader Fidel Castro called government and party officials together on April 19 in Havana to convey his impressions of his trip to Africa. Castro had also spoken on the same subject before an audience at Lomonosov University in Moscow before returning to Cuba.

Castro was very impressed with several of the leaders he met and generally pleased with his reception in Africa. He felt the trip, which he called a "personal success," gave him a chance to become more familiar with the continent.

Ethiopia

Castro seems to have been most impressed by his visit to Ethiopia and by its leader Chairman Mengistu whom he called a "true Marxist revolutionary." The Cuban leader applauded Mengistu's zeal and leadership qualities. In Castro's opinion, Ethiopia offers the greatest hope for socialism in Africa.

The relationship between the two countries is at all time high. The Cuban public health minister and a large delegation visited Addis Ababa this week and signed a health cooperation agreement. Cuban arms, ammunition, and military training equipment reportedly arrived in Assab by ship in early May. There are reportedly between 60 and 75 Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia now and that number will undoubtedly increase.

Somalia

Castro was critical of President Siad of Somalia. (Meetings between the two leaders have been described as "bitter.") Castro's attempt to get Siad and Mengistu to iron out their bilateral problems fell flat. The Somalis have been offended by Cuba's activities in Ethiopia and recent Ethiopian arms purchases from the Soviet Union. The Somalis reportedly have not been pleased with the Cuban advisers in Somalia. There are probably no more than 200 Cuban advisers there at present, and what number may decrease as Cuban support for Ethiopia becomes more open.

RP ALA 77-041
26 May 1977
Mozambique

Castro catalogued most African leaders he met as "progressive" but singled out for special praise President Machel of Mozambique along with Mengistu. Cuban assistance to Mozambique consists of several hundred military advisers and a few dozen civilian technicians. If the military situation worsens, the Cubans would probably offer additional personnel.

Angola

In Castro's opinion, President Neto proved himself a "socialist revolutionary" in the Angolan civil war. Considering the vast Cuban commitment to Angola and the toll it has taken, Castro did not devote much attention to the subject in his talk. The Cuban leader probably believes things are going as well as can be expected, but he is probably concerned over the inability of the Cuban and MPLA forces to make significant headway against the insurgency. In fact, the Cubans are apparently augmenting their military presence in Angola. The Cubans are proud of their success in Angola and do not want to see it tarnished.

Castro did not carry away a favorable impression of all the African leaders he met.

--He does not trust President Nyerere of Tanzania. He referred to Nyerere as a "progressive" but was suspicious of the Tanzanian leader's being alternately influenced by the PRC and the US.

--Castro finds recent events in the Congo puzzling and thinks it is too early to tell what direction the new government will take.

--He strongly stated that Zaire would have to be "destroyed," even though getting rid of President Mobutu would not be an easy task. (There was little discussion of the Katangan incursion into Shaba. Castro would only say that he did not fully trust the Katangans.)

--No mention was made of Zambia nor was there any explanation for the cancellation of Castro's visit.

RP ALA 77-041
26 May 1977
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DIRECTOR 886751

SECRET
BRIEF
TO:

CTA/CPAS
MEAB 89-246

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEF OCPAS MEA 89-246 FOR 23 OCTOBER 1989.

FROM: DD1/D/CPAS.

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AFRICA

[Missed text]

ELEMENTS OF FINAL CUBAN COMBAT
UNIT SOUTH OF 13TH PARALLEL CONTINUING NORTH, TO ARRIVE LUBANGO,
ANGOLA. ON SCHEDULE TO COMPLETE MANDATED 1 NOVEMBER WITHDRAWAL
NORTH OF 13TH PARALLEL.
Weekly Summary
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary.
ANGOLA: NEW TURN

The recent arrival of substantial amounts of new Soviet and Cuban military aid for the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is beginning to have an impact on the fighting. After suffering military reverses at the hands of its allied foes for the past month, the Movement began this week to battle back.

In the area north of Luanda around Quifangando, where the fighting had been stalemate for some time, the Zairian-supported National Front for the Liberation of Angola appears to be coming under growing pressure from the Popular Movement. Front forces may have been forced to give ground. There has also been bitter seesaw fighting some 60 miles from the Front stronghold of Carmona.

In the central sector, the situation is confused with heavy fighting reported between the Popular Movement and the joint forces of the National Front and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola operating near Malanje, Dondo, and Quibala. The Popular Movement appears to be at least holding its own in the sector; it still controls the vital Cambambe dam near Dondo that supplies Luanda's electric power. According to press reports, National Front - National Union troops spearheaded by South African advisers and white mercenaries, which had been sweeping toward Luanda from the south, have been stalled.

In eastern Angola, a large Popular Movement force moving south from the Movement's base at Henrique de Carvalho reportedly has advanced to within 65 miles of Luso, a National Union-held city astride the Benguela railway. Guerrilla units of the Popular Movement are said to have appeared near the rail line between Luso and the key railhead of Teixeira de Sousa.

On the political scene, the joint regime proclaimed by National Front and National Union leaders on November 11 in opposition to Agostinho Neto's Luanda-based government finally unveiled a leadership slate of 16 officials this week. The post of prime minister in the coalition regime, which is based in Nova Lisboa, is to be rotated monthly between Johnny Eduardo Pincock of the National Front and Jose N'Dele of the National Union, the ranking representatives of their respective groups in the Angolan transitional government that collapsed last summer under military pressure from the Popular Front.

Neither National Front leader Holden Roberto nor the National Union's Jonas Savimbi took positions in their regime, which clearly remains a fragile structure. It has not been recognized by any foreign country. Neto's regime, on the other hand, has now been formally accepted by 27 states.
Nigeria this week became the eleventh African country to recognize the Popular Movement, citing growing public attention to South Africa's involvement with the Movement's opponents as the main reason for its action. Lagos' example may sway other nonradical African governments to follow suit despite the concern many of them share over Soviet and Cuban support for the Popular Movement.

Meanwhile, the Africans' dilemma over the Angolan crisis may lead to an emergency summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity. Support for holding such a conference spurted this week and now seems likely to attain eventually the required approval of two thirds of the 46 member states. Backers of the Popular Movement—led by Somalia, Guinea, Congo, and Mozambique—have led the drive, clearly hoping to use the meeting to change OAU policy from neutrality in the Angolan conflict to endorsement of Neto's group as the country's sole legitimate government. If a summit is held, it will probably result in open quarreling among the Africans rather than progress toward a settlement in Angola.
CIACPAS NID 82-185JX
09 August 1982

ANGOLA: Air Defense Buildup

Angola is constructing an SA-3 surface-to-air missile site at Chibemba in southern Angola. About 18 South African Mirage fighter aircraft remain in northern Namibia, and one Canberra bomber has been spotted at Mpacha airfield in the Caprivi Strip.

Comment: SA-9 mobile surface-to-air missiles were identified at Chibemba in April, but this is the first time an SA-3 site has been detected south of the Mocamedes-Menongue railway. It probably will be manned by Cuban advisers. The South Africans have carried out airstrikes against radar sites at Chibemba at least twice since last fall, and they are likely to attack the new site.
SECRET

BRIEF 122255Z DIRECTOR 680461
TO: EUROPEAN BRIEF.

EUROPEAN BRIEF OCPAS EUR 83-177 FOR 12 SEPTEMBER.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

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5. ANGOLA: NEW AIR DEFENSE MISSILES

THE DELIVERY TO MOCAMEDES OF 16 MOBILE LAUNCHERS FOR THE SA-6 TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE MISSILE
SECRET

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIETS HAVE SUPPLIED THIS WEAPON TO ANGOLA. TANZANIA IS THE ONLY OTHER RECIPIENT SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, ALTHOUGH THE SA-6 HAS BEEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR OVER A DECADE AND WAS DELIVERED TO CUBA IN 1981.

EARLIER THIS YEAR, MOSCOW ALSO PROVIDED ANGOLA WITH EIGHT SA-6 LAUNCHERS, WHICH ARE SLIGHTLY MORE ADVANCED. THEY ARE NOW BASED AT CAHANA AND CHIBEMBA.

SOVIET MILITARY AID SHIPMENTS TO ANGOLA HAVE INCREASED IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, AND A HIGH-LEVEL ANGOLAN DELEGATION WENT TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK. ANGOLA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES WEAPONS AND MI-24 ATTACK HELICOPTERS. IN AUGUST, THE SOVIETS ALSO FLEW SIX HEAVY TRANSPORTS TO LUANDA.

COMMENT: // THE SA-6S, WHICH PROBABLY WILL BE DEPLOYED IN FORWARD POSITIONS WILL FURTHER IMPEDE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR OPERATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Possible Soviet Objectives in Angola ........ 1

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Possible Soviet Objectives in Angola

More than just Soviet interest in Angola was involved when Moscow moved quickly last week to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as the sole legitimate governing authority in the former Portuguese territory and to establish diplomatic relations with it.

At the same time recognition was being extended, Moscow was undertaking the second phase of an airlift of military equipment to the Popular Movement that was the most extensive ever conducted by the Soviet Union south of the Sahara. Recognition also got the Soviets in on the ground floor in Luanda, and their diplomats are pressing hard, particularly in Africa, to persuade other states to establish relations.

The high visibility of the Soviet role is a break with the past; only three years ago Moscow seemed to be losing interest in the Popular Movement. Divided by factional strife within its own organization and unable to speak as the unchallenged leader of the liberation struggle, the Popular Movement did not appear to have any immediate prospects for overthrowing Portuguese rule. But all that changed with the fall of the Caetano regime, and the Soviets suddenly found themselves with an opportunity to exploit a relationship with the Popular Movement that stretched back to the mid-1950s.

Military Aid

When independence for Angola became a certainty, Moscow's first order of business was to strengthen the military capabilities of the Popular Movement. Military shipments to the movement began to increase sharply in late 1974, and have accelerated ever since. In addition to training MPLA troops, the Soviets have provided it with an impressive array of military hardware. The movement's arsenal is well stocked with a

November 20, 1975
variety of small arms, including machine guns and
grenade launchers, along with some heavier items,
such as 82-mm. mortars, B-10 82-mm. recoiless rifles,
and 122-mm. rockets. Recent deliveries have added
armored cars, trucks, armored personnel carriers,
rocket launchers, and anti-tank weapons to the MPLA's
inventory. As a result, the movement is far and away
the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.

Two major Soviet airlifts have been operated this
month—one before Angolan independence on November 11
and one after. The cargo undoubtedly included heavy
equipment as well as arms, munitions, and, possibly,
MIG fighter aircraft.

Moreover, for the first time, AN-22 heavy trans-
ports participating in the latest airlift flew directly
from Conakry to Luanda. They also shuttled supplies
previously airlifted to and stockpiled in Brazzaville
direct to the Angolan capital.

The Soviets may also have made their first direct
seaborne delivery of military equipment to the move-
ment last weekend.

Given the substantial amount of fairly sophisticated
weaponry that Moscow is now providing the Popular Move-
ment, it would not be surprising to see Soviet military
advisers and technicians turn up in Luanda. Moscow,
however, would almost certainly prefer to avoid—or
at least limit—the involvement of its own military
personnel in Angola by relying on Cubans to support
the Popular Movement in the field.

Reaction to Soviet Involvement

For their assistance to the Popular Movement,
the Soviets have had to pay the price of at least a
temporary setback to their relations with other
African states.

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Not surprisingly, the strongest negative reaction to Moscow's heavy-handed involvement in Angola has come from sub-Saharan Africa. A number of these states were particularly upset over the Kremlin's decision to get out in front of the Organization of African Unity on the Angolan recognition issue.

--Soviet pressure on Uganda to recognize
the Popular Movement badly ruffled OAU
chairman Idi Amin's feathers

--Nigeria has publicly criticized the
Kremlin's "flagrant interference" in
the affairs of Angola

--The already tenuous relations between
the USSR and Zaire, which supports
one of the Popular Movement's rivals
in Angola, have become even more seri-
ously strained, and President Mobutu
appears to be considering breaking or
at least suspending diplomatic ties
with Moscow. Kinshasa sees the sub-
stantial Soviet military buildup in
Angola and in neighboring Congo as a
direct menace to Zai'ian security and
is actively seeking to have this threat
brought to the attention of the UN Se-
curity Council.

--Tanzania's President Nyerere, who has
been a staunch supporter of the Popular
Movement, is said to be re-evaluating
his position as a result of the large-
scale Soviet involvement in Angola.

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which he has publicly deplored.

--Kenya's President Kenyatta views Moscow's role in Angola and its recognition of the Popular Movement as "gross interference" in African affairs and a direct affront to Nairobi, which had been working hard to cement relations among the rival Angolan factions.

Thus far, the reaction outside of sub-Saharan Africa has been more muted. The Soviets clearly will be discomfited if the issue is brought before the UN, and may have some concern that their action in Angola will be cited as behavior not in accord with Moscow's professed commitment to relaxation of tensions. But much, if not all, of this negative reaction was predictable, and it seems likely that when Moscow made a decision to pull out the stops for the Popular Movement, it was based on the calculation that prospective Soviet gains were worth the price.

Soviet Interests and Objectives

A conventional, one might even say old-fashioned, explanation can be made for the Soviets' desire for a favorably disposed, perhaps even client, regime in Luanda. Economically, Angola is a potentially rich prize compared with the other former Portuguese African territories; it has such resources as oil, coffee, and mineral wealth. The Soviets have no compelling need for these resources, but they might want, for example, to use Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European clients. They may also want to hinder Western access to minerals in the area.

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Strategically, Angola could be of some significance to the Soviets if they are contemplating expansion of their naval activities in the South Atlantic.

Politically, an Angola that was working in concert with the Soviet Union could be a platform from which the Soviets might hope to expand their influence into adjacent areas, particularly southern Africa and, perhaps eventually, Zaire.

None of these interests will be served overnight, nor does Moscow necessarily expect a quick return on the investment it has made in the Popular Movement. Insofar as Moscow is motivated by these interests in Africa, it is in the longer term.

But there has always been a exogenous factor in Moscow's policy with respect to Angola and the other former Portuguese territories. The specter of China has loomed large in Soviet thinking, and Moscow clearly wants to put the lie to Peking's assertions that it, rather than the Soviet imperialists, acts in concert with the interests and the aspirations of third world. The Soviets are also sending a message to would-be revolutionaries that association with Moscow pays off, and that the Soviet Union does not stint in supporting its friends.

A related message may be intended for the US—that the USSR has the will, and the capability, to compete with the US for influence in peripheral areas of the globe.

The heavy domestic coverage the Soviet press has given Angola also raises the possibility that there are internal political reasons for Moscow's increasing support of the Popular Movement.

It may be that Angola provides an opportunity for the Kremlin leaders to demonstrate adherence to

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and support for revolutionary movements, detente notwithstanding. More important, if things go reasonably well, Angola can be cited as tangible evidence that the correlation of forces in the world arena, despite some setbacks, is moving in ways favorable to the Soviet Union.

November 20, 1975
USSR Monthly Review

January 1984
The USSR Monthly Review is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors whose names are listed in the table of contents.
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The socialist and often authoritarian character of African regimes and the persistence of anti-Western attitudes in former colonial states give the USSR important advantages in its African policy. The Soviets are well-equipped to meet African demands for arms and military support, but they are much less willing and able to provide the economic aid required over the longer term. As a result, Moscow's success in Africa has been mixed, and its prospects are unclear.

The Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship: Strong Ties Despite Difference  5

Soviet pressure for increased access to Ethiopian naval facilities, Ethiopia's requests for additional military assistance, and its inability to meet its debt payment schedule are causing increased squabbling between the USSR and its key African client. Still, the relationship remains strong because of Ethiopia's importance to the USSR and Moscow's crucial role as arms supplier. In Addis Ababa's war against various insurgent groups.

The USSR's Growing Military Involvement in Southern Africa  9

The Soviet position in Angola and Mozambique is being challenged by worsening security and economic situations that are partly caused by South African pressure. While unwilling to provide meaningful economic aid, Moscow is prepared to provide more weapons rather than risk its regional role.
The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa

The USSR has used military assistance extensively in Sub-Saharan Africa to build influence with governments, to affect the outcome of conflicts, and to secure access to naval facilities and airfields. To accomplish these objectives, it has provided $5 billion in arms and military equipment to African nations since 1978. Nearly 5,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently in Africa.

Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

Economic relations between the USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa have expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s, reflecting the USSR's greater involvement in the region. Because Moscow prefers to rely on its military assistance program rather than economic aid to project its presence in the region, its ability to expand relations through economic ties is probably limited.

Other Topics

Soviet Security Policy on the Chinese Border

Despite recent improvements in Sino-Soviet political relations, prospects for a reversal or even a significant relaxation of the Soviet military buildup opposite China appear slight, at least during this decade. In its political and military dealings with China since the early 1960s, Moscow has judged that a strong military posture is indispensable to its security. In addition, the military strategy that Moscow has adopted against China, coupled with the geopolitical situation in East Asia, leaves little room today for major force reductions.

Soviet-Peruvian Military Relations and Political Ties

Lima's financial problems and Moscow's continued willingness to provide attractive financing are likely to ensure the USSR's position as Peru's primary source of weapons over the next few years. In light of the Peruvian military's rightist views and the Belaunde government's hostility toward the USSR, however, Moscow probably will be unable to translate this position into political gain in the near term.

SECRET
Soviet Educational Reform: To Accent Vocational Training

Largely motivated by the labor shortage, a Politburo-sponsored commission has drafted proposals for changing Soviet general education. The proposals recommend placing greater emphasis on vocational education, particularly at the secondary level, and lowering the school entry age to six years.

Briebs

- Efforts To Spur Labor Brigades
- Retail Price Cut
- Commitment to Five-Day Workweek
- Soviet-Japanese Relations
- Soviet Pledge on Nuclear Missile Targeting

Viewpoint

- Soviet Views on Relations With the United States

A debate in recent months over the prospects for US-Soviet relations under the Reagan administration reveals pessimism regarding any significant breakthrough. The door remains open, however, for maintaining a dialogue on secondary issues while awaiting a new US initiative on arms control.
The USSR and Africa:
Policies and Prospects

Perspective

The socialist and often authoritarian character of African regimes and the persistence of anti-Western attitudes in former colonial states give the USSR important advantages in its African policy. The Soviets are well-equipped to meet African demands for arms and military support, but they are much less willing and able to provide the economic aid required over the longer term. As a result, Moscow’s success in Africa has been mixed, and its prospects are uneven.

Soviet leaders are driven by a mixture of motives in Africa. They are influenced by their perception of trends in their rivalry with the United States and their view of the Soviet Union’s rightful role in the world. They also welcome an opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with the self-proclaimed Marxist regimes in the region and thereby encourage the growth of similar regimes elsewhere in the area. These factors reinforce one another and impart considerable momentum to the Soviet commitment to the African countries where Moscow’s presence is greatest—Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

The USSR, however, has no vital security interests at stake in the region; indeed, its military objectives in Africa are—aside from Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf concerns—of a regional rather than strategic character. (See the article “The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.”) Nor do economic considerations play a significant part in Soviet policies toward Africa. (See “Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa.”) The Soviets already possess adequate domestic resources of most of the strategic raw materials found in the region, and any attempt to interrupt deliveries of South African strategic materials or Persian Gulf oil would bring the USSR into an unwanted confrontation with the West.

Secret

SOVIET OF THE USA
January 1984
Arms sales and associated training and advisory packages are the longest standing instrument of Soviet policy in the Third World and continue to be the USSR's major means of influence in Africa. As discussed in the article on Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the USSR has used these tools and exploited foreign and insurgency threats in Ethiopia to develop a strong position in Addis Ababa with little likelihood of any serious setback in the next few years. Despite such gains, the Soviets have reason to be concerned that their future role in Africa is highly dependent on the security situations that prevail in such key states as Angola and Mozambique.

It is not certain to what lengths the Soviets might go to maintain the MPLA in power in Angola, but, as the article on Soviet prospects in southern African states, the USSR has escalated its military support to Luanda over the past year, assumed a more active advisory role, and endorsed a greater Cuban troop presence to halt and reverse the momentum of the UNITA insurgents. Recently delivered Soviet equipment will improve Luanda's capability to conduct a counterinsurgency, protect its garrisons, and develop a more adequate air defense against South African attacks on newly arrived weaponry and associated personnel. Soviet advisory personnel are also playing a more active role in Angola, operating a squadron of AN-12 transport aircraft and upgrading communications with Moscow.

Security problems in Mozambique are less critical than Angola's, but Soviet military officers in Maputo have helped to plan operations and to operate transport aircraft for internal military use. Moscow's major success in Africa has been in Ethiopia, where Soviet military assistance has sustained a pro-Soviet regime in Addis Ababa and led to access to naval facilities on the Horn of Africa. Whereas Soviet transfers of military aid can affect the outcome of internal or regional conflicts, as in the Angolan Civil War or the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, it is extremely difficult to alter the basis of African politics and garner genuine political influence.

The USSR does not have a commensurate economic penetration of even those African states with which it has close political and military ties. Continued Soviet reluctance to extend significant economic assistance to even its closest clients, in fact, could create strains in bilateral relations in Africa and could limit Soviet opportunities to exploit certain Third World situations. The Soviet hard currency position is better than it has been for the past several years because of increased oil exports, the stabilization of oil prices, and the leveling off of imports, all of which make the "cost of empire" more manageable. Nevertheless, aid has been a sore point in relations with Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, whose leaders have
been unhappy with Soviet willingness to meet their demands on development and have been looking elsewhere. Soviet military assistance will remain crucial to those regimes, but Soviet restraint in the economic sphere could provide openings for Western nations.

Soviet prospects in Africa are uneven, and successes will depend largely on the tendency of African leaders to acquire as much weaponry as possible, regardless of the level of threat, and on the impact of South Africa’s policies on other black African states. Persistent ethnic, religious, ideological, and territorial conflicts within and between states will provide many opportunities for the USSR. The Soviets will be particularly successful in states such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique where their clients face serious insurgent threats.

Nevertheless, the Soviets are probably concerned by the possibility of a Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, US success in gaining military facilities in Kenya, the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and their general inability to offset Western economic influence. Soviet officials have acknowledged, moreover, that the USSR’s poor domestic performance is undermining the credibility of the socialist model abroad. Moscow has no illusions about its ability to capitalize on uncertain situations in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Whatever their disappointment, however, the Soviets are content to play a waiting game, taking whatever opportunities arise to increase their influence and meddle in African affairs.
The USSR's Growing Military Involvement in Southern Africa

Since the mid-1970s the USSR has established a significant political and military presence in southern Africa by providing military aid to the victorious Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Soviet weapons, some of them manned by Cubans, and Soviet military planners now play major roles in defending both Luanda and Maputo. Arms and related training and advisory services form the main component of Moscow's involvement in Zambia and its efforts to establish a presence elsewhere in the region.

Soviet activities in southern Africa are intended to weaken Western political and economic influence while enhancing Moscow's credentials as a supporter of Third World aspirations and black African grievances. The USSR also seeks to use its position in Angola and Mozambique to advance Soviet interests in nearby countries, particularly in support of black nationalist groups seeking to overthrow white minority rule in Namibia and South Africa. Moscow has obtained the use of military facilities in Angola for occasional naval reconnaissance flights and a continuous warship patrol, but it has no interest in significantly expanding the activities of its own forces in the region.

The Soviet position in southern Africa faces a serious challenge in the months ahead from a deteriorating security situation and faltering economies in both Angola and Mozambique. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has, with South African backing, steadily expanded its power and reach, achieving major gains in the past year. This has forced Moscow to counter with more weapons, logistic support, and other help to protect its political position in Luanda. In Mozambique, another South African-backed insurgency, by the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), has prevented Maputo's consolidation of control and similarly forced the Soviets to increase military aid.

In both countries, increasing reliance on Soviet weapons will preserve Moscow's position for the time being. The future outlook, however, may be cause for Soviet concern. Both Luanda and Maputo may ultimately be forced to explore a negotiated settlement that the Western Powers are in the best position to mediate. Moreover, the deteriorating economies in Angola and Mozambique are already prompting both countries to look increasingly to the West for economic aid that they have been unable to obtain in adequate quantities from the USSR.

Roots of Soviet Influence

Moscow's position in southern Africa developed out of its support for black nationalist aspirations during and immediately after decolonization. The collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the spillover of the Rhodesian civil war into Zambia created turbulent conditions that Moscow played to its advantage. A major Soviet-Cuban intervention brought the MPLA to power in Luanda, and the USSR displaced China as the main Communist benefactor of FRELIMO. Soviet-supplied air defense equipment somewhat reassured Zambia after it had been vulnerable to Rhodesian air raids on guerrillas operating from Zambia.

The successful establishment of Soviet-backed regimes in southern Africa enhanced the USSR's status as a superpower. It showed that Moscow could overcome its inability to project meaningful power deep into Africa, which was evident during the turmoil in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s. In Angola and Mozambique the Soviets established themselves as benefactors of states more distant from the USSR than any except Cuba yet influenced by Communist power. The Soviet role was formalized in friendship treaties signed with Angola in 1976 and with Mozambique in 1977.

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Support for Angola

The Soviet commitment to Angola’s defense has been underscored by a substantial increase over the past year in the pace of deliveries of military equipment to counter insurgent incursions and South African invasions. Deliveries in 1983 included MIG-21 fighters, MI-8 transport helicopters, MI-24 helicopter gunships, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and more advanced antiaircraft missiles. Moscow has also put a dozen Soviet-trained transport aircraft at Luanda’s disposal and otherwise helped make its forces and the Cuban troops in Angola more mobile. While the number of Soviet military advisers in Angola is believed to have remained in the range of 1,000 to 1,300, they may be assuming greater command and control functions. There are 30,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, of whom 22,000 to 23,000 are combat troops.

Angola’s leaders are divided over relations with the USSR, and the Soviets are concerned about the durability of their political position in Luanda. Contacts by President dos Santos with the West have worried Moscow, which is apparently relying on a pro-Soviet faction in the MPLA to protect its interests.

The growing UNITA threat may have made dos Santos more amenable to Soviet concerns because the survival of his regime now more obviously depends upon Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers.

Soviet statements on the situation in Angola have shown increasing alarm about the security situation and have reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to assist the regime. Press commentaries this past fall have portrayed the insurgency as threatening the “independence of Angola.” A TASS commentary in early November warned that “the USSR and other countries of the socialist community will not leave the Angolan people in the time of trouble and will continue to support them in every way.” This is the strongest public statement of support that the USSR has made so far. A more authoritative “TASS statement” on 5 January accused South Africa of trying to overthrow the Angolan Government but stopped short of promising support to prevent it.

Despite their military largesse, the Soviets apparently remain unwilling to offer significant economic aid. With Angola’s oil income largely devoted to paying for military help, its diamond exports undamaged by UNITA operations, its main agricultural areas caught in guerrilla raids, and its industry slowed by chronic shortages of spare parts and raw materials, Luanda is moving toward economic collapse. In January 1983 Moscow and Luanda signed an agreement for $2 billion worth of long-term projects, but the Soviets have not provided the kind of short-term assistance that could help check a decline in living standards. As a result, Angola has turned to the West for aid but has found potential donors reluctant to plunge into such an unsettled situation.

Aid to Mozambique

Mozambique faces a problem less critical than Angola’s, but it nonetheless has serious difficulties with RENAMO. Although RENAMO lacks a cohesive leadership or wide popular appeal, South Africa has used it successfully to prevent President Machel’s FRELIMO government from consolidating its political or economic position.

The USSR has supplied Maputo with basic military equipment and training since 1975, but as RENAMO has become stronger the Soviets have also sent increasingly sophisticated weapons. During 1983 these included MIG-21 fighters and MI-24 helicopter gunships. The Soviets also supplied transport aircraft, including two Soviet-operated transports for internal military use. As in Angola, Soviet military officers help plan operations and Cubans provide technical services such as flying fighters and helicopters. The Soviet and Cuban military presence in Mozambique is much smaller than in Angola—about 800 Soviet military personnel and an estimated 800 to 1,000 Cubans.
The USSR has been no more generous with economic aid for Mozambique than for Angola, and Maputo’s problems are equally severe—perhaps worse now as a result of prolonged drought. Like Angola, Mozambique suffers from economic mismanagement, declining industry, and a disrupted agricultural economy. Machel’s disappointment with Soviet support was indicated by his visit to Western Europe in October in search of economic aid and alternative sources of arms.

**Soviets and Namibia**

Moscow supports the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO), which claims to be the representative of the Namibian people. The Soviets provide financial assistance and weapons to the organization, scholarships in the USSR, and diplomatic support in world forums. SWAPO’s leadership is divided in attitudes toward future relations with Moscow, however, and the Soviets probably are uncertain what influence they might have if a Namibian settlement put SWAPO in power.

The USSR would prefer a peaceful Namibian settlement rather than prolonged war if the problem could be separated from the Angolan conflict. But Moscow wants a settlement to be achieved without a Western mediation role that would give credit to the United States and its allies in the eyes of black African countries. When the five-nation contact group appeared to be making progress toward a settlement in 1981, the Soviets encouraged the Frontline States—countries representing black African interests in Namibia—to stiffen settlement terms in order to obstruct that progress. Although settlement efforts are now moving slowly, the USSR would be expected to try in the future to block any arrangement worked out primarily by the West.

**Other Countries**

Military assistance is Moscow’s linchpin in the region, and, indeed, in the Third World generally. In southern Africa as a whole, arms aid has won the Soviets little political influence beyond Angola and Mozambique, since other countries lack the same dependence on continuing Soviet supplies.

The USSR began selling MiG fighters and other military equipment to Tanzania in the mid-1970s. By the early 1980s, Dar es Salaam found itself in debt for equipment that was scarcely usable, and it was unhappy with the military training provided by the Soviets. At the same time, Moscow has been unresponsive to pleas for help in meeting Tanzania’s large Western debt.

Zambia turned to the USSR for aid after Rhodesian raids on guerrilla camps around Lusaka during the latter stage of the Rhodesian civil war. But the Zambians soon became disillusioned with the capabilities of the equipment and advisers they obtained. A few officials sympathetic to the USSR remained in high positions in Lusaka, but the relationship has cooled while Moscow still tries to collect the bills from the near-defunct Zambian enclaves.

In Zimbabwe, Moscow has not yet been able to overcome the results of its support for Prime Minister Mugabe’s rival, Joshua Nkomo, during the independence struggle.

So far, however, Mugabe has failed to respond when he indicated last autumn that he might be interested in visiting Moscow—partly to offset visits to the West and demonstrate his nonalignment—Moscow reportedly rebuffed him with a ham-handedness that further strained relations.

The other three countries of southern Africa—Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho—are too conscious of their vulnerability to South African pressure to countenance much Soviet activity. Moscow has supplied some third-hand armored equipment to Botswana, reportedly offered free weapons, and tried to gain access through sports programs and the cultivation of
The USSR is less deeply committed in material or prestige to the Mozambique Government but faces a similar situation there. For the time being, RENAMO is unlikely to mount a major threat to the government, but its steady pressure is eroding Maputo's strength. Moscow's inability to provide the kind or quantity of assistance that could effectively counter RENAMO's challenge makes the FRELIMO regime another seemingly endless burden on the Soviets. Moscow might, therefore, eventually welcome a deal between Maputo and Pretoria to reduce guerrilla pressure, even though this would hamper Mozambique's support for black nationalist organizations harassing South Africa. For the moment, however, Moscow seems prepared to put more weapons into southern Africa rather than risk its present position there.
The Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa

The USSR has used military assistance extensively in Sub-Saharan Africa to build influence with governments, to affect the outcomes of conflicts, and, most importantly, to obtain access to naval facilities and airfields in the region. To accomplish these objectives, the Soviet Union has provided nearly $5 billion in arms and military equipment to countries in the region over the past five years (see table), responding quickly and massively at critical junctures to support governments with which it is allied. Nearly 5,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently in Sub-Saharan Africa, and about 2,000 African military personnel are in training courses in the Soviet Union. In addition, there are more than 30,000 Cuban soldiers in Africa, principally in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviet Navy routinely operates off the eastern and western coasts of the continent.

Where Third World governments perceive internal or external threats, they are often vulnerable to a Soviet program of inducements that typically encompasses weapons deliveries, naval visits, and a military advisory presence and is likely to lead to pressures for access to facilities. This has been the case in Africa, although Moscow's efforts to parlay military assistance into military privileges there have met with mixed success. They have led to an extensive military presence and substantial political influence in Angola and Ethiopia, and access to facilities in both. In Somalia, however, despite massive military assistance, the Soviets in 1977 lost access to facilities they had developed, and their use of Guinean facilities has been sharply curtailed.

Soviet presence and facilities in West Africa have developed separately from those in East Africa and, to a large extent, are oriented toward a different set of problems.

Soviet Military Activities in West Africa

Soviet naval presence off West Africa originated as a response to local crises and opportunities. Initially, in 1969-70, there were in Guinea and Ghana. During the mid-1970s, with major Soviet assistance during the Angolan civil war and constraints on the use of facilities in Guinea, the Soviet focus shifted south to Luanda.

Angola. A surge in Soviet deliveries of arms to Angola in 1983 reflected Moscow's growing concern about the deteriorating security situation there. There was a substantial increase in the number of sea deliveries, and for the first time since the mid-1970s—numerous air deliveries. The new supplies (see table) included systems more sophisticated than the Angolans had previously received, such as Mi-24 helicopter gunships, which should improve the effectiveness of government forces against the insurgents, and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, which could make South African air attacks more costly for Pretoria. The Soviets also increased their AN-12 transport aircraft in Angola from two to 12 during 1983 and upgraded communications capabilities between Moscow and the 1,500 man Soviet Military Assistance Group in Luanda. This surge in assistance probably is geared more to protecting Moscow's equities in southern Africa than to gaining additional military facilities in the region.

The small Angolan naval base at Luanda can provide replenishment services, but the Soviets must maintain a repair ship there to maintain and repair their surface ships and submarines. Pairs of TU-126 Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft periodically deploy for several weeks to Luanda, from where they fly surveillance missions over the South Atlantic.

Guinea. Despite the loss in 1977 of access to Conakry for maritime reconnaissance aircraft, limitations on the use of port facilities, and a substantial drop in the Soviet military presence in Guinea, the Soviet Navy continues to use Conakry regularly.
Soviet Military Assistance to Selected Sub-Saharan African States, 1978 to Mid-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value of Total Deliveries, 1978 to Mid-1983 (million US $)</th>
<th>Principal Aid Items, 1982-83</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Thai H-class missile patrol boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 MIG-21 fighter aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 MIG-21 helicopter gunships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 SA-3 and 20 SA-6 surface-to-air launchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 SA-9 launchers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 T-62 medium tanks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100 armored personnel carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Includes states that did not receive substantial assistance in recent years.

To President Toure to allow construction of a new, secure naval facility near Conacry, part of which would be reserved for use by the Soviet Navy. Moscow also has repeatedly raised the question of new Bear D deployments. Thus far, Toure has refused such requests, although military transports continue to use the airfield regularly. Given the lack of an internal or external threat to the Guinean Government, the Soviets probably do not have much leverage on Toure at this time.
Soviet Military Presence in Africa

NAVAL PRESENCE, WEST AFRICA
1 cruiser or destroyer
1 diesel attack submarine
1 mine sweeper
1 amphibious ship
3 auxiliaries
1 research ship

South
Atlantic
Ocean

Soviet military advisor
Number in parentheses
Naval support facility
Port of call
Airfield/Naval reconnaissance aircraft

NAVAL PRESENCE, INDIAN OCEAN
2-3 general purpose submarines
3 major surface combatants
1 mine warfare ship
1-2 amphibious ships
15 auxiliaries
4 research ships

Scale: 1,000 miles

15

Secret
Other States. Moscow has put considerable effort into developing relations with a number of other West African states—recently Ghana, Congo, Benin, and Nigeria—and has shown interest in their naval facilities. The Soviets have not undertaken an intensive campaign to gain access to port facilities in any of these countries, but during 1983 they were successful in obtaining at least one stopover for transport aircraft in Nigeria and Ghana.

Soviet Military Activities in East Africa

Naval facilities in East Africa are used to support the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, whose principal operating area is the western Arabian Sea and southern Red Sea. These operations are chiefly supported from Ethiopia and South Yemen. In addition, Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft are stationed in South Yemen and Ethiopia for monitoring US and other Western navies in the northern Arabian Sea.

In recent years the Soviet Navy has been more active in the southern Indian Ocean. In each of the past three years Soviet naval vessels visited the Mozambican ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala more than 20 times, and they have operated more often in the Mozambique Channel. Major Soviet task groups transiting the region—including a recent one led by the Kiev-class aircraft carrier Novorossiysk—also make official calls in Mozambique and Seychelles.

Whereas the naval presence off West Africa seems largely responsive to regional interests and contingencies on land, the Soviets probably view their ships in the Indian Ocean as a counter to US and French influence. The Western naval presence there has been relatively large since the US-Iranian crisis in 1979, and the Soviets view US facilities at Diego Garcia and along the rim of the Indian Ocean as providing important military and political advantages to the United States. The USSR also has used its Navy effectively as a tool to build political influence with East African governments.

Ethiopia. Large-scale Soviet support to Ethiopia began in 1977, during the Ogaden conflict, with an impressive air and sea delivery of arms and high-level Soviet military direction to assist Addis Ababa in defeating a Somali invasion. Ethiopia has received some $2.6 billion in weapons and equipment since then. Last year this assistance included advanced MIG-23 Floggers, a Petka II-class light frigate, and two maritime reconnaissance and ASW aircraft (see table). The USSR has a substantial military advisory presence in Ethiopia—currently some 1,700 men whose efforts are abetted by some 6,000 to 9,000 Cuban advisers and combat troops. During the last two years, the Soviets have been deeply involved in supporting Ethiopian operations against insurgents in northern Ethiopia. Top-ranking Soviet officers, such as Ground Forces Commander in Chief General Petrov, have been sent in at key junctures to review and supervise operations.

At the same time, there are problems in the relationship, particularly due to Soviet pressure for increased access to Ethiopian facilities, irritations over Soviet unwillingness to notify Ethiopian officials when Soviet naval ships enter Ethiopian waters, and resentment over conditions for military assistance. (See article on Soviet-Ethiopian relations.)

The only "Soviet facility" in East Africa is located on Ethiopia’s Dahlak Island, where Soviet ships appear to have virtually unimpeded access (see inset).

Mozambique. Since the mid-1970s Moscow has supported Mozambique against South Africa and its client insurgents. The Soviets responded with increased arms shipments as the threat to Maputo grew severe in mid-1982. They accelerated delivery of this aid with the first military transport flights to that country and may even have diverted a seaborne shipment of arms destined for Mali to Mozambique last January. More recent shipments included the first MIG-21 fighter aircraft and MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships; the helicopters especially should improve Mozambican capabilities for countering rebel activities. The Soviets recently installed in Mozambique a signal intelligence system that probably improves their capability to monitor military activity in southern Africa and naval activity throughout the southwestern Indian Ocean. Two Soviet AN-12 military transports also are stationed in Mozambique to provide logistic support.
Soviet Naval and Air Access in Ethiopia

Soviet interest in access to naval and air facilities in Ethiopia dates back to 1977, when large-scale Soviet military assistance to Addis Ababa began and Somalia broke with Moscow. Instability in Eritrea and the insecurity of Asmara and Massawa may have prompted Moscow to press for more modest facilities in one of the isolated islands of the Dakhla Archipelago. Work on Dakhla Island began in April 1978 with the arrival of an 8,500-ton floating drydock that had been in Somalia. The Soviets subsequently improved these facilities, adding housing for some 200 personnel, two floating piers, fuel storage tanks, and helicopter pads. We believe that Moscow and Addis Ababa have a mutual understanding giving the Soviets nearly exclusive use of this facility, which provides the bulk of the support and maintenance required by the Indian Ocean Squadron.

Since 1980 the Soviets also have stationed two IL-38 maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare aircraft in Asmara; these are supported by a pair of AN-12 Cub transport aircraft. Soviet naval and air access to Madagascar, although it has received substantial Soviet assistance over the past several years, the Malagasy Government does not allow forces from outside the Indian Ocean to call at its ports or use its airfields for purposes other than assistance to Madagascar. Deliveries of weapons and military equipment have dropped sharply over the past two years, probably in part because Madagascar’s economy is in such desperate shape it cannot pay for those it has already received. Nearly one-quarter of some 200 Soviet military advisers departed in June 1983. Nevertheless, President Ratsiraka has allowed the establishment of three satellite intelligence sites with direction-finding antennas similar to the one in Mozambique.

Seychelles. By repeatedly sending ships to provide security on request when President Rene feels threatened or is leaving the country, the Soviet Navy has played a key role in developing influence in Victoria. In addition to port calls, the Soviets for the first time last year received permission to land military transports en route to Madagascar and Mozambique. The Soviet Navy also may be interested in securing contingency basing facilities in Seychelles. Last summer, Soviet personnel reportedly investigated the possibility of restoring five old naval fuel storage tanks on Ste. Anne Island in Victoria Harbor.

Outlook

Moscow’s interest in increasing its influence in Africa and in retaining and expanding its access to military facilities there is unlikely to diminish. The Soviets will continue to seek additional access to regional facilities, using a combination of inducements—primarily arms shipments and other types of military assistance—probably with mixed success.

We judge that the USSR’s access to port facilities is sufficient to support its current naval presence off East and West Africa. The Navy would no doubt prefer some additional access, or at least a more isolated and secure facility, but it is quite capable of managing, given typical Soviet operating practices (low activity levels and reliance on port facilities), with those it currently uses. We do not believe that the level of Soviet naval activity in the waters off West Africa would justify development of a facility even on the limited scale of the Dakhla Island complex.

17

SECRET
The situation with respect to airfields for deployment of maritime reconnaissance aircraft or stopovers by military transport aircraft is different. Soviet access to such facilities has been limited, and Moscow probably places a high priority on obtaining additional rights. In West Africa, Lusaka is too far south to serve as a base for covering all the Central Atlantic sea lanes in which the Soviets probably are most interested. Consequently they are likely to continue to press for Bear deployments in Conakry, and we are likely to see initiatives elsewhere in West Africa.

In the Indian Ocean, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flying out of South Yemen and Ethiopia can cover much of the northern Arabian Sea area in which the US carrier groups operate. Nevertheless, Moscow probably would like to monitor Western naval movements elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, and it may well judge that developments in southern Africa will pose such requirements in the future. They probably are interested in obtaining access to at least one airfield in the southern Indian Ocean that would support reconnaissance flights. The Soviet use of several new airfields in East and West Africa as transit points for military transports en route to southern Africa may well represent a more vigorous effort to establish precedents for reconnaissance access in the future, as well as a variety of contingency-annexation points that would facilitate arms deliveries.
Soviet Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa

Soviet trade with and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have expanded rapidly since the mid-1970s, reflecting the USSR's greater involvement in the region. Moscow's willingness and ability to meet the military needs of key clients—especially Ethiopia and Angola—are the overriding factors determining Soviet presence and influence in the region. Soviet economic assistance is minimal, especially in comparison with Western aid. Precisely because Moscow prefers to rely on its military assistance program rather than economic aid to project its presence in the region, its ability to expand relations with Sub-Saharan Africa through economic ties is probably limited.

Recent Trends in Trade

Soviet trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding deliveries of most military equipment, grew from relatively meager beginnings in the early 1970s to more than $1.1 billion in 1982 or about 7 percent of total Soviet trade turnover with the LDCs (see table 1). Most of this expansion occurred in Soviet exports to key client states, mainly Angola and Ethiopia. The value of imports declined after 1980, reflecting sharply falling commodity prices and Moscow's efforts to curb hard currency purchases in 1981 and 1982. Soviet exports and imports are limited to a relatively small number of trade partners and commodities.

Between 1975 and 1982 Soviet exports to Sub-Saharan Africa grew at an annual rate of almost 25 percent, accounting for 11 percent of total reported Soviet exports to individual LDCs. This expansion has resulted entirely from increases in exports to four African countries—Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Exports to other Sub-Saharan countries declined by 50 percent between 1975 and 1982. Soviet trade reporting for the first nine months of 1983 indicates that these trends continued last year.

Soviet trade expansion with Nigeria—the region's only major oil producer—is the result of large Soviet contracts won in the latter part of the 1970s, in the heyday of OPEC spending. These multibillion-dollar contracts, which call for the USSR to build two oil pipelines and a steel mill, have earned substantial amounts of hard currency and probably will continue to do so over the next eight to 10 years. The expansion of Soviet exports to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique appears to be driven largely by political and strategic considerations. This is not to say these exports are free—for its commodities Moscow demands cash on delivery or extends credits, which it expects to be repaid.

Soviet exports to Sub-Saharan Africa consist primarily of machinery and equipment, crude oil, and petroleum products. The combined share of these commodities in total exports to the region grew from 39 percent in 1970 to 90 percent in 1982. If deliveries to Nigeria for the pipelines and the steel mill projects are excluded, about half of Soviet machinery and equipment deliveries consist of transport vehicles and aircraft, many of which are intended for military use. Most of the remaining machinery exports are connected with various Soviet development projects. Almost all of the petroleum exports have gone to Ethiopia.

The pattern of Soviet imports from the region differs sharply from export trends. Since the early 1970s these imports have grown at half the rate of overall Soviet imports from the Third World. In part, this reflects the inability of the African countries to supply Moscow with critical agricultural products—grain, meat, sugar, and vegetable oil. Nor has the USSR...
Table 1

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<td><strong>Total Non-Communist LDCs</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>7,340</td>
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* May underestimate the actual level of trade with this region as a result of exclusion of data in official Soviet trade statistics for a number of countries since the late 1970s.


became an important importer of Sub-Saharan non-agricultural raw materials. Imports of these commodities have stagnated at a level under $100 million since 1980.

More important, between 1980 and 1982, the value of Soviet imports from the region fell by over 40 percent—partly because of Moscow's efforts to reduce overall hard currency expenditures by cutting back on nonessential purchases such as coffee, cocoa, and wood products. In the case of coffee, the Soviets diverted purchases to Latin America. In addition, falling world commodity prices further reduced the value of imports from Sub-Saharan Africa, including those from Ethiopia and Angola. While a strengthened Soviet financial position and slightly higher world commodity prices appear to have contributed to an increase in the overall value of imports from the region during the first three months of 1983, imports for the year will remain substantially below the 1980 level.

**Military Trade and Aid**

As with Soviet trade in general, military agreements and deliveries have expanded rapidly since 1975 with most of the growth in sales and deliveries to Ethiopia and Angola (see table 2). Through 1975, Soviet military sales and deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 5 percent of all sales agreements and deliveries to the LDCs. Between 1975 and 1982, however, this share rose to 12 percent. About 60 percent of this trade has gone to Ethiopia and Angola to support the Marxist regimes in these
Table 2
USSR: Military Agreements and Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-82

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<tr>
<td>Total Non-Communist</td>
<td>78,477</td>
<td>86,381</td>
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<tr>
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<td>218</td>
<td>294</td>
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<td>1,554</td>
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Moscow is equally hard-nosed about debt servicing and rescheduling.

The USSR suspended deliveries of military equipment to Zambia in early 1983 when that country suspended payments for arms already delivered. When necessary, the USSR will reschedule debt payments, but usually only after protected haggling. It prefers to negotiate barrier arrangements. In the past, it has accepted Zambian cobalt in lieu of cash payments.

Angola recently agreed to supply 40,000 barrels of crude oil per day to the USSR in Eastern Europe in repayment for military purchases.

The Economic Aid Program
Of the estimated $23 billion of Soviet economic aid disbursed since the program began in the mid-1950s, only about $3.5 billion has gone to Sub-Saharan Africa. As with Soviet trade and military sales, this aid is concentrated on a few countries and most has been extended since 1975 (see table 3). About 70 percent—almost $2.5 billion—has gone to Nigeria (principally for the steel plant mentioned above), Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Other relatively large aid recipients—those receiving $100-250 million in aid—include Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal.

Most of the aid to these four countries as well as other, smaller recipients was extended during the 1960s and early 1970s, however, and Soviet economic involvement in these countries has since dropped considerably.

Soviet financial terms with other Sub-Saharan countries are less generous, though much more so than Soviet sales to OPEC arms clients in the Middle East, where most sales are made for cash with substantial downpayments. Generally, the terms of Soviet credits are for 10 years with interest rates of 2 to 4 percent, but few price discounts or deferred payments are granted. Moreover, Moscow usually demands cash payments in advance for spare parts and services. It does not hesitate to pressure even key client states, such as Angola and Mozambique, to make the required payments. According to US Embassy sources in Maputo, for instance, half of Mozambique’s aircraft were grounded in late 1982 because of a lack of hard currency to purchase the required spare parts.
Table 3
USSR: Economic Agreements and Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1954-82

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The level of Soviet economic assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is paltry in comparison with Western aid. In most instances Soviet largesse does not begin to supply the levels of aid required to spur economic development for even the USSR's largest aid recipients. Only a small portion of this aid consists of food grants, generally in 2,000- to 5,000-ton donations of grain with occasional grants of up to 25,000 tons. Mostly, Soviet assistance consists of long-term credits (10 years at an annual interest rates of 2 to 3 percent) tied to Soviet exports for specific projects. As with the military aid effort, Soviet economic aid to Ethiopia is the notable exception to these general terms. Most of the USSR's support to Ethiopia since the mid-1970s has been commodity credits and grant aid, mostly in the form of oil subsidies and credits.

Mill in Nigeria and preliminary work on the construction of the Kunamba dam and hydropower station in Angola.

Although the USSR's economic assistance program in Sub-Saharan Africa is small, it does provide Moscow with a useful, low-cost tool to project its presence in the region. Enhancing the program's usefulness to the Soviets are an estimated 10,645 Soviet economic technicians—25 percent of all Soviet technical advisors currently in the Third World. These technicians are concentrated in Nigeria (5,000), Angola (1,200), Ethiopia (1,000), and Mozambique (1,000). Except for a few doctors and teachers provided free, the Soviets charge heavily for their services—over $50,000 a year for project managers and nearly as much for geologists, interpreters, and other less senior personnel. Thus, these technicians not only increase the Soviet presence in Africa, but also provide Moscow with an additional source of hard currency.

Prospects for the Future

Despite the stringency of Soviet economic aid and a generally hard-nosed attitude toward financing arms sales, those African states that have become tied to the USSR are likely to remain so because of noneconomic factors. Moscow's willingness and ability to respond quickly to meet the military needs of key regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are the overriding factors influencing the closeness of their relationship to the USSR. This Soviet responsiveness has most recently been demonstrated by stepped-up military deliveries in 1983 to bolster the Angolan armed forces. The presence of surrogate forces and advisers—mainly Cubans and East Germans—increases Moscow's ability to aid its African clients. As long as the Marxist regimes of Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are threatened by insurgent forces, the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa will remain strong.

Whether Moscow's position would remain as strong with an improvement in the security situation in these countries is less clear. Moscow makes no secret of its unwillingness and/or inability to supply the Third

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World with the types and large amounts of aid required by the region or supplied by the West. Mozambique, disappointed with the low level of Soviet aid, has adopted a policy of expanding economic ties with the West. In addition, several African countries once close to the USSR—including Guinea, Benin, and Congo—have become disillusioned with Moscow's assistance programs and are strengthening their Western ties.

For these reasons, the Soviet ability to expand relations with this region through economic ties is probably limited. Moscow is well aware of the limited catalogue of goods the Sub-Saharan countries can offer. The USSR cannot export the food and consumer goods needed in these countries; nor is Soviet equipment, with its reputation for poor performance, particularly attractive to African countries. Thus, military trade appears to be the primary means of expanding Soviet presence and influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in situations where Moscow can capitalize on instability within the region.
The *Intelligence Checklist* is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA: Popular Movement forces, heavily backed by Cuban troops, are meeting scant resistance from the National Front's demoralized forces in northern Angola.

The Front's defenses in northern Angola have collapsed, and it is highly unlikely it will be able to resist further advances by the Popular Movement.

Meanwhile, reports that Soviet fighter aircraft have been delivered to the Popular Movement continue to be received.

The Popular Movement may have the services of one or two jet reconnaissance aircraft left behind by the Portuguese.

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Top Secret
Intelligence Checklist

OAU/ANGOLA: The emergency session of the Organization of African Unity adjourned early this morning without reaching any new decisions on Angola.

An official OAU spokesman announced only that the summit had requested the interim standing committee of OAU heads of state to "continue to follow the Angolan problem closely."

The outcome is something of a victory for the National Front and the National Union in that it denies OAU recognition to the Popular Movement. At the same time, it probably precludes any OAU effort to promote a coalition government in Angola.

In effect, each OAU member now has a free hand on the recognition issue. So far, 21 African states have recognized the Movement's government; none has recognized the Front-Union coalition.

--continued

Top Secret
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An Analysis of Cuban Military Intervention in Angola and Ethiopia

Key Judgments

In this paper, we have tried to piece together the definitive story of Cuba's actions in Angola and Ethiopia. Enough time has elapsed since the high point of conflict in both theaters for us to profit from a re-examination of some of our earlier hypotheses, to take into consideration additional information and to put Cuba's foreign adventures into better perspective. In general, our research has turned up few surprises, but some of our earlier judgments that were a bit tentative have been strengthened.

This Executive Summary is a précis of a longer paper to be issued separately. It was prepared in the Cuba Analytic Center, Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to the authors.

RP M 78-10404C
Cuba decided to intervene in Angola and Ethiopia for these reasons:

--The conviction of Cuban leaders that the US, with its recent Vietnam experience, was not prepared to intervene militarily in Africa as a counterweight to Cuba.

--The serious dedication of Castro to worldwide revolution and the cause of "international proletarianism." Castro undoubtedly saw military assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and later to the Ethiopian government as a way to enhance his and Cuba's revolutionary credentials, which had been somewhat tarnished by Cuban failures in Latin America in the 1960s.

--The fact that Cuba was "invited in" by a group that had the trappings of legitimacy (Angola) and a "progressive" Third World government (Ethiopia).

--The Cuban perception that by giving substantive support to Soviet goals in Angola and Ethiopia, Cuba would be assured of continued Soviet economic assistance and would perhaps receive modern equipment for its military inventory.

--The calculation that Cuban intervention would guarantee victory for the MPLA and the Ethiopians.

--The concern among the Cuban leadership that the current generation of Cuban youth had not experienced its own "trial by fire," that it had not paid its revolutionary dues. Active involvement in Angola would help guarantee the continuation of the revolutionary process in Cuba itself.

Cuba's interventions in Africa demonstrate that Castro's leadership style continues the pattern of daring and bold actions that has characterized his administration since the early 1950s.

--Despite many setbacks in the past, Castro has consistently approached major decisions as a compulsive man of action.
The hard liners in the leadership are more influential than those who argue for less stridency around the world.

The success of the interventions has strengthened the military's voice in policy-making decisions in Havana.

The Cubans' behavior in Angola and Ethiopia gives us a framework for predicting their future policies.

Cuba has no "Grand Design" for Africa; it will exploit targets of opportunity as part of Castro's long-held strategy of causing maximum difficulties for the US and other "imperialist powers." But Havana clearly sees southern Africa as a promising arena for successful meddling, and the presence of sizable Cuban military contingents in Angola and Ethiopia makes the use of Cuban troops elsewhere in Africa a realistic option.

Although so far Havana and Moscow have been following complementary policies in Africa, Havana's commitment to revolutionary actions is likely eventually to conflict with Moscow's more pragmatic needs and interests.

When competing claims arise, such as whether to improve relations with the US or to support revolutionary states or groups in the Third World, Havana will sacrifice better relations with Washington.

The Cubans have yet to suffer the kinds of casualties that would give them pause in considering future interventionist actions. They have paid some political costs—especially in the nonaligned movement—but on balance, their image in southern Africa has been significantly strengthened. Havana may well undertake tactical shifts, such as reducing its troop strength abroad, to undercut Third World critics and minimize domestic concern. In the long run, however, the major thrust of Cuban foreign policy is likely to be a continued commitment to international activism.
Cuban Involvement in Africa: Background

Cuban foreign policy during the first nine years of the Castro regime--1959 through 1967--concentrated primarily on promoting revolutionary movements bent on repeating the Cuban experience, i.e., attaining power through violent revolution.

Under certain conditions, however, Havana also aided incumbent governments. Cuban armored, artillery, and air units were sent to support the Algerian government in 1963, and a Cuban VIP bodyguard unit prevented the overthrow of Congolese President Massamba-Debat in mid-1966. Cuban military support to legitimate governments drew far fewer headlines and less international reaction than did Cuban paramilitary support for groups subverting legitimate governments. Moreover, world attention focused mainly on Cuban activities in Latin America despite the far greater investment in Cuban personnel in Africa than in Latin America.

When the sterility of its policy of fomenting revolution abroad finally became obvious to Havana, the Castro regime shifted gears and entered a period in which its main aim was to overcome Cuba's isolation by expanding ties with legitimate governments. Support for revolutionary movements was by no means abandoned, but Havana revised its criteria and became much more selective in deciding which rebel groups to back. It was in this policy setting that the Cuban leadership made its initial decision in mid-1975 to intervene in Angola.

Castro had long expressed an affinity toward and an identification with Africa. Cuban involvement in Africa dates from 1961 when the Cubans extended limited guerrilla warfare training to a few African extremist groups connected with revolutionary movements. The MPLA was among these groups. For more than a decade, the Cubans sent small amounts of arms and supplies, as well as a few advisers, to MPLA bases outside Angola, trained MPLA insurgents in Cuba, and gave the MPLA strong propaganda support. Prior to 1975, however, the number of Cubans supporting the MPLA never exceeded a few hundred and probably averaged between 20 and 40. Cuban support for Neto remained constant.
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, even when the Soviets backed one of his rivals from 1972-74.

The Soviets, too, had at first proceeded cautiously in Angola. They had been supplying the MPLA with modest amounts of arms, money, and military training since 1961, but they were not prepared to increase their support to the MPLA until September 1974, when General Antonio de Spinola was replaced as President of Portugal by a radical junta. When the new government openly embraced Neto's MPLA, Moscow quickly--probably by November 1974 at the latest--stepped up its aid to the Angola insurgency. By March 1975, it was shipping large amounts of war materiel to Angola.

The MPLA asked the Soviets for troops in late July or early August 1975--after Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) had begun a drive toward Luanda. The Soviets refused on the grounds that if Moscow sent in combat troops, the US would be almost certain to intervene. They suggested that the MPLA approach the Cubans for assistance.

The Process

To understand how Cuba came to provide mass support to the MPLA, and later to Ethiopia, knowledge of the Cuban decisionmaking apparatus is needed. This is not easy to determine in a closed society, so the appraisal that follows must be to some degree speculative.

Decisionmaking in Cuba has had a personalistic bent over the last 19 years, with President Fidel Castro taking an active and deeply personal role in the process. Because Castro regards foreign policy as his particular domain, the bureaucratic organs that handle foreign affairs in Western countries and play a large role in formulating foreign policy hold very little weight in Cuba. Fidel, however, has increasingly listened to advice from other members of the Cuban leadership and from experienced foreign leaders and officials as well.
Three main bureaucratic interest groups make up the Cuban power structure today: the technocrats, the "raulistas," and the "fidelistas."

---The technocrats-pragmatists--primarily concerned with the efficient running of the Cuban economy and with the acquisition of needed industrial goods from the West and the US market--have as their chief spokesman Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

---The "raulistas"--the top echelons of the military-security establishment and those who also seek close collaboration with Moscow--are led by Castro's younger brother, Raul.

---The "fidelistas"--close associates of Fidel's from the days of the guerrilla struggle against Batista--tend to be the most nationalistic and--along with the "raulistas"--the most aggressively anti-US of the regime's hierarchy. Osmani Cienfuegos and Juan Almeida are representative spokesmen.

The military has had an increasingly large role in decisions on Cuban involvement in Africa, and its importance is likely to continue as long as Cuba is active in southern Africa. The influence on Cuban foreign policy of Raul, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, has grown considerably. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a traditional formulator of foreign policy in the West, finds itself not only subordinated to the military in decisionmaking but also to the Cuban Communist Party's (PCC) Political Bureau and its various geographic departments. In effect, the Foreign Ministry is virtually excluded from the decisionmaking process.

At the national level, the PCC Central Committee is, in theory, the highest policymaking entity in Cuba, but, in practice, it is largely a rubber stamp for the Political Bureau, headed by Castro. The Political Bureau is the heart of the party and of the regime leadership, and from it stem all major policy decisions. The party Secretariat, however, has assumed increasing authority and responsibility since 1970. It has acquired a support structure of more than a
dozen specialized departments to develop policy options, lay out specific courses of action, and monitor policy implementation by appropriate offices and agencies.

The small group of key Cuban officials who formulate and carry out Cuban policy toward Africa include Fidel Castro; his brother Raul; Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of the Council of Ministers; Raul Valdez Vivo, the PCC Secretariat member responsible for liaison with foreign communist parties; and Osmani Cienfuegos, former head of the PCC Africa/Middle East Department and currently secretary of the Council of Ministers Executive Committee.

The Evolution of the Angola Decision

It is our judgment that the Cuban leadership did not anticipate a major commitment in Angola. Instead, Havana's involvement evolved through a series of three relatively distinct phases.

--May/June 1975 - a decision for a moderate increase in the number of Cuban military technicians.

--August/September 1975 - a decision to send 2,000-3,000 military support personnel to help the MPLA.

--Late October/early November 1975 - a decision to reinforce with combat troops to confront a South African invasion and successful offensives by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the FNLA.

We presume that the decision in May/June 1975 to increase the number of technicians was treated as a fairly routine matter. The issue of sending even a relatively small number of military support personnel to Angola, however, undoubtedly sparked debate in Havana. The following arguments were probably presented by various Cuban officials, with Castro being the final arbiter:

--The technocrats, the strongest opponents to a substantial commitment to Angola, probably contended that the economic costs of such an adventure would be more than Cuba could bear without a
firm assurance of Soviet recompense. They may also have voiced concern over the strains this commitment might put on Cuban manpower, productivity, and morale. Any direct economic benefits to be derived from assistance to Angola, they probably asserted, would be of little immediate benefit and could have undesirable repercussions, such as setbacks in the Western financial community and damage to the progress of normalization of relations with the United States.

--Other, less cautious officials probably argued that this was an excellent opportunity for Cuba to gain leverage with the Soviet Union. By taking the initiative in Angola with a relatively small commitment, they may have contended, the Cubans would gain increased foreign policy flexibility and have a base of operations for further moves in southern Africa.

--The military most likely pointed out that an Angolan campaign would provide needed combat experience for Cuban troops and would give the Soviets cause to replace Cuba's aging military equipment with more modern arms.

--Other supporters of Castro undoubtedly felt that involvement in Angola would provide an opportunity for Cuba to show some independence of the Soviet Union by taking an active role in Angola as possible. They also may have argued that the war in Angola provided a good chance to push "the revolutionary line."

Once Castro had listened to the arguments and weighed the other factors involved, he came to the conclusion that the advantages of increased involvement in Angola outweighed the disadvantages. From then on there was no turning back. Cuba moved in decisively, prepared to offer substantial assistance to ensure an MPLA victory.
Havana dispatched troops when it became evident to both Cuba and the Soviet Union that an MPLA victory could not be attained merely by continuing to pump more Soviet military equipment into Angola. Combat forces were needed that could handle the equipment and perform as cohesive units on the battlefield. In August 1975, Havana decided to send a contingent of about 2,000 troops to Angola, not to save Angola itself or black Africa from the invading South Africans—as Havana now claims—but to sway the outcome of an internal African power struggle.

The MPLA was only one part of a three-faction coalition—also including the FNLA and UNITA—technically representing the legal government of Angola. Before 11 November, the date Portugal turned over control of Angola to the MPLA, the Cubans, therefore, had no grounds for claiming they were asked into Angola by a legitimate government.

Havana's decision in July and August 1975 to reassess and restructure Cuban involvement in Angola resulted from a variety of factors. The most basic one was a direct request from the MPLA for increased assistance. Also important was the Cubans' conviction that the US would not make a major military effort to thwart their activities. Cuban decision-makers believed that the United States was too torn apart domestically by the Vietnam experience for Washington to generate support for an African military commitment. They also reasoned that the upcoming US elections posed an additional constraint on such a major commitment.

The Cuban leaders' serious dedication to worldwide revolution and the cause of "international proletarianism" also played a key role in the Angolan decision. Castro undoubtedly saw his military assistance to the MPLA as a means of enhancing his and Cuba's standing in the Third World as well as burnishing Cuba's revolutionary credentials, somewhat tarnished by Cuban failures in Latin America in the 1960s.

Moreover, the MPLA was a reasonable candidate for aid, given the Cuban policy of supporting viable national liberation movements; in addition, Castro probably felt that it was Cuba's duty to provide the MPLA with enough assistance to
ensure its consolidation of control. Anything less might be regarded by others in the Third World as Cuban betrayal of the MPLA, since if the MPLA's rivals were to triumph, Angola would fall into "imperialist" hands.

There is no hard evidence on the precise Soviet-Cuban relationship at this point--whether Moscow pressed the Cubans into the Angola conflict. Clearly, however, Soviet and Cuban policy interests in Africa were in tandem; by supplying trained and experienced personnel capable of operating Soviet-provided equipment, the Cubans were able to demonstrate their support for overall Soviet policy in Africa. The Cuban leaders most likely concluded that this Cuban involvement would help to ensure a continuation of the Soviet economic assistance upon which Cuba is so heavily dependent, and could induce the Soviets to replace and modernize military equipment in the Cuban inventory.

The military situation in Angola was no doubt another factor in Cuba's decision.

The first major outbreak of hostilities between the groups vying for control in Angola in March 1975 was most likely initiated by the FNLA, which hoped to seize the initiative on the battlefield. But, bolstered by Soviet arms, the MPLA then launched an offensive to drive FNLA and UNITA forces out of Luanda, leading to MPLA control of the capital by mid-July. A total MPLA victory seemed close at hand.

Foreign allies of the FNLA, however, became alarmed by the upsurge of MPLA fortunes.

A reinvigorated FNLA, in a drive toward Luanda, took the strategic town of Caxito on 23 July 1975 and the momentum shifted, temporarily at least, to Holden Roberto's FNLA forces.
Finally, there had been concern among the Cuban leadership that the current generation of Cuban youth had not experienced its own "trial by fire," that it had not paid its revolutionary dues. Active involvement in Angola would, it was felt, provide Cuban youth with a previously lacking sense of participation in the revolution; this, in turn, would help guarantee the continuation of the revolutionary process in Cuba.

The Ethiopian Decision

Although Cuba had demonstrated in Angola that it was willing to undertake a major overseas military campaign, the Castro regime's decision to repeat this action in Ethiopia less than two years later took most observers by surprise. While much remains to be learned about the forces that drive and inhibit Cuban military activism, the following paragraphs attempt to outline the reasons we now perceive for Cuba's decision to dispatch troops to Ethiopia. They will seek to answer questions such as: What did Cuba perceive as its basic interests in the area? Did Cuba's intervention in Ethiopia, like that in Angola, represent a convergence of Cuban and Soviet interests? Or was Ethiopia a clearcut case of Havana doing Moscow's bidding? Did Cuba, as in Angola, get drawn gradually into military conflict to protect an initial investment or did the Castro regime opt from the outset for an open-ended commitment?

The Castro regime has consistently rationalized the sending of its troops to Ethiopia on ideological grounds. It interprets the struggle in the Horn of Africa as part of the larger global conflict between the socialist camp and "imperialism" and contends that it came to Chairman Mengistu's defense to prevent the Ethiopian revolution from being strangled in its infancy.

This argument has merit but is not totally persuasive. Havana welcomed the takeover of a leftist government in Addis Ababa in February 1977, seeing this as a significant addition to the spread of radical socialist regimes that it was working to foster in the Red Sea Basin. Even though the ties to Mengistu were newly formed, Fidel Castro clearly
felt a strong personal and ideological affinity with the Ethiopian leader and was greatly impressed with the revolution he was trying to carry out.

Castro's first-hand look at the situation in Ethiopia in March 1977—just six weeks after Mengistu had taken control of the government—had a strong impact on the Cuban leader and reinforced his desire to assist. Even at that early date the Cubans talked of sending troops if the situation became critical.

For the next seven months, however, Castro seemed content to have Cuban military personnel help Mengistu try to consolidate his hold by training a militia force to combat the various insurgencies. This limited role was very much in keeping with Cuban activities in South Yemen and Somalia—the two other countries in the region where Cuba had established a presence. By late October there were still only 160 Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia. Some of them were providing combat support against Somali forces that had invaded Ethiopia in July in a drive to annex the Ogaden region.

Increasingly concerned about the military situation, Mengistu traveled to Cuba and the USSR at the end of October to ask for stepped-up military assistance. While the Cubans were not yet ready to make a major combat commitment, it is clear in retrospect that the visit led to serious Cuban-Soviet consultation. Cuban Armed Forces Minister Raúl Castro traveled to the Soviet Union on the heels of Mengistu's trip accompanied by two Cuban generals who later were to have major responsibilities in the Ogaden campaign.

A retrospective analysis confirms our earlier judgment that the Cuban decision to intervene almost certainly came as a result of Soviet General Petrov's trip to Ethiopia beginning 17 November. Two factors were paramount in leading to the Castro regime's decision to commit combat troops. First, the military situation was becoming critical. Somalia was threatening to capture Harar and Dire Dawa—Ethiopia's remaining footholds in the Ogaden—and the military efforts of the Eritrean separatists had reached a highwater mark. The loss of these regions would have been disastrous to the prestige of Mengistu and would have imperiled his continued rule.
The second crucial factor for Havana was that major Soviet strategic interests were threatened. On 13 November, Somalia closed its military facilities to Soviet personnel, thereby depriving Moscow of its window to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; Moscow's policy toward the Horn of Africa was in a shambles. The Soviets were faced with a situation in which they had been tossed out of Somalia and risked losing potential replacement facilities if Ethiopia became truncated, as appeared increasingly possible.

In Ethiopia, in contrast to Angola, Soviet desires were doubtless a vital—and perhaps a decisive—consideration in Havana's policy calculations. The USSR had substantially more at stake than did Cuba—greater material investment, a vital strategic interest, and the need, as a great power, to salvage its pride. From the beginning of Cuba's involvement in Ethiopia, the Castro government had closely coordinated its actions with the Soviet Union. At every critical juncture in Cuba's deepening involvement, Cuban officials traveled to Moscow to consult. The Cubans' close working relations with the USSR in Ethiopia made it all the more difficult for Castro to turn aside a Soviet request for Cuban combat involvement.

This is not to say that the Cubans were forced into action against their will. Cuba and Ethiopia were linked by leader-to-leader ties and by the Castro regime's genuine commitment to revolutionary solidarity. Like Moscow, the Cuban leadership not only prized Ethiopia as a foothold for radical socialism in a vital strategic area, but recognized that its importance far exceeded that of Somalia because of its much larger population. Moreover, the Cuban leadership was no doubt glad to seek revenge against Somali President Siad, who had not only undermined Cuban attempts to promote a federation of radical states in the region but had then turned to the "reactionary" Arabs and the West for military support. In addition, after the relatively easy victory during the conventional stage of the Angolan war, the Cuban leadership doubtless welcomed the opportunity once again to demonstrate the prowess of its military forces, especially since it believed that Cuban assistance could be decisive.
Havana probably decided from the outset that if it were going to send troops to Ethiopia, a large expeditionary force—on the order of that then in Angola—would be needed.

For the second time in a little over two years, Cuban troops demonstrated the impact that a relatively small force of highly motivated, well-trained, and well-equipped troops can have on a conventional, set-piece campaign against a large but less professional African army. The importance of the Cuban role was far greater than its size suggests. Despite the fact that only one Cuban division fought in the Ogaden, alongside at least five Ethiopian divisions, the Cuban contribution was decisive in permitting Ethiopia to gain its swift victory.

Outlook

Cuba's military successes in Angola and Ethiopia have convinced the Castro regime that its forces can play a decisive role in the African struggle—the key theater for Cuban activism abroad. The Cubans have been seriously threatened only by the South Africans and then only briefly. The cost so far to Cuba in terms of casualties has apparently been within acceptable limits. We estimate that 1,500 to 2,000 Cubans have been killed in Angola since the fall of 1975, and Cuba may have lost a few hundred men in Ethiopia.

Mounting evidence indicates, however, that continued responsibility in Angola's counterinsurgency effort is not sitting well with Havana. The Castro regime does not seem to be psychologically equipped to handle the slow but apparently endless hemorrhaging resulting from this campaign. Consequently, until recently the Cubans were careful to avoid being saddled with a similar role in the Ogaden against Somali-backed guerrilla groups.
Cuba's military successes have given Armed Forces
Minister Raul Castro and his subordinates a greater position
of authority from which to argue for continued military
activism. The increased influence of the "Raulistas" bodes
ill for reducing tensions with the US. Among Cuban elite
groups, the Raulistas have retained the most deeply in-
grained animosity toward the US and have been the least
inclined to alter their behavior in Africa in order to reach
an accommodation with Washington.

Cuba's policy of military activism has had political
costs, mainly in alienating a number of important nonaligned
governments. Some difficulties have also been incurred in
its relations with its natural allies—those governments
with shared ideologies but competing interests. In Ethio-
pia, for example, Cuba risks antagonizing Mengistu if it
does not cooperate against the Eritrean rebels. By helping
to suppress the Eritreans, however, Cuba would jeopardize
its ties with important friends among the radical Arab
states and tarnish its image among world revolutionaries who
believe that the Eritreans are fighting a legitimate libera-
tion struggle.

The Cubans are learning that the nationalistic sensi-
tivities of local leaders such as Mengistu can preclude
unfettered Cuban political influence. Nevertheless, despite
some serious disagreements with the Mengistu government—
especially over the composition of a new ruling party—there
is as yet no indication that Havana believes that its troops
have shed their blood in vain.

On balance, Cuba has no doubt that the political gains
resulting from its military activism far outweigh the costs.
When the decade began, Cuba was a pariah in the Western
Hemisphere. Even in the Caribbean Basin—where Havana could
most naturally expect to project its influence—not a single
country except Mexico had diplomatic relations with the
Castro regime. Now Cuba is a force to be reckoned with in
international politics; it plays an important role from one
end of the African continent to the other, and—as develop-
ments in South Yemen indicate—on the Arabian peninsula as
well. Cuba has also become a major leader of one camp
within the nonaligned movement.
The thrust of Cuban foreign policy for the foreseeable future has, therefore, been established. Castro is well aware that southern Africa, especially, is passing through a critical stage in its development, and, with an eye to his own place in history, he wants Cuba to play a heavy role in that "liberation struggle." The Cuban leadership has set in motion such a massive propaganda effort to prepare its people for continued sacrifice that only a decisive reversal—probably on the battlefield—would be likely to cause the regime to change course. Although Havana's goal is likely to remain steadfast, it may well be willing to undertake tactical shifts in response to heavy pressure, especially from key nonaligned countries or from the Soviet Union.

The extent to which Cuba can continue to pursue a policy of military activism will depend, of course, upon its own resources. So far the 35,000 to 38,500 Cuban troops serving in Africa account for less than 10 percent of Cuba's military. Moreover, Havana is using Angola and Ethiopia as staging areas for military actions in the surrounding regions and could draw on its forces in those two countries for a variety of military tasks short of full-scale confrontations without having to bring in additional troops from Cuba.

Moscow's willingness to offset the costs of Cuba's military actions abroad will be a crucial determinant for future Cuban activism. The Soviets, in addition to providing the bulk of the military equipment Cuba used in Angola and Ethiopia and deferring part of the logistics costs, have also increased its economic aid to Cuba. This year Soviet economic support for Cuba will rise to the equivalent of at least $2.3 billion in sugar and petroleum subsidies. This figure represents an increase of about 45 percent over last year and is more than triple the 1975 level when large-scale subsidization first began.

The USSR has also increased its military assistance to Cuba. Since Cuba's involvement in Angola in 1975, Soviet arms deliveries have risen steadily; they reached 1,600 tons last year, about double the 1969-74 annual rate. Moreover, Moscow is helping to modernize and upgrade the Cuban Air Force. For example, Cuba recently received about a dozen MiG-23s and is awaiting delivery of as many as three dozen additional such aircraft.
Nonetheless, the Cubans realize that Africa has a lower priority for Moscow than it does for Havana, and the Castro regime doubtless worries that in response to other concerns Moscow may opt for a less aggressive policy in Africa. The Cubans, moreover, have never lost their fear that Washington and Moscow will strike a deal that undercuts Cuban interests.

When it halted its aggressive effort to export its revolution to Latin America in the late 1960s, Cuba showed that it can abandon a policy that seems bound to fail. As long as the Cubans believe "imperialism" is in retreat, however, and that their support can be decisive in aiding the cause of radical socialism, the Castro regime's commitment to "proletarian internationalism" is likely to remain undiminished.
Intelligence Checklist

January 23, 1976
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The Intelligence Checklist is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

January 23, 1976
ANGOLA: Popular Movement forces have gained new ground in central Angola.

The Movement has reported the capture of three towns, including Cela—where National Union troops fought hard before withdrawing. Farther to the east, other Union forces still plan to advance on Teixeira de Sousa, near the Zairian border. Zairian jet fighters this week carried out strikes around Teixeira de Sousa, destroying its airfield's runway.

No major military developments were reported in northern Angola during the past week. The Movement seems satisfied that the National Front no longer poses a threat in that area.

On the political front, Union President Savimbi was due to meet in Zaire with Front leader Roberto and Zairian President Mobutu in a bid to try to transform the Union-Front political alliance into a viable government. It may be too late for such a transformation, however. Military pressures on both groups will not allow them much time for political activity, and the Front may well have lost its credibility as an effective nationalist group.
ANGOLA: Possible Reduction of Cuban Troops

A reduction of Cuban troop strength in Angola was a major topic of discussion during President Neto's visit to Cuba that ended Monday. Although the Angolan Government apparently is not opposed to the reduction of Cuban forces, neither Luanda nor Havana wants a substantial withdrawal that would jeopardize Angola's ability to deal with perceived threats from South African incursions or from Angolan insurgents.

Neto and some members of the ruling political party--with an eye toward the nonaligned summit scheduled for September in Havana--believe a Cuban drawdown will lessen criticism of Angola by Nigeria and other African moderates. Other Angolan Government officials fear, however, that the US may interpret the troop reductions as knuckling under to US pressure.

Luanda is disillusioned because there has been no positive US gesture toward Angola following visits by Assistant Secretary of State Moos and Senator McGovern. He added that until diplomatic relations are established, Angola probably will not accept any more visits by US officials to discuss bilateral affairs, although Angola would still be willing to discuss southern African problems.

We believe Cuba would limit any withdrawal to a few thousand of its estimated 19,000 to 20,000 military personnel in Angola. Notwithstanding Neto's decision to establish relations with China, Cuba has a heavy stake in the Neto government. Moreover, with the breakdown of efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rhodesia, Cuba anticipates mounting pressure from Mozambican President Machel for protection against Rhodesian strikes and would probably want to maintain a large presence in Angola to meet this contingency.
Cuba-Angola-Mozambique

after Angolan President Neto's visit ends on 30 January, Havana expects to withdraw some troops from Angola.

If the South Africans were to carry out another strike into Angola, Cuban troops might accompany Angolan forces on a retaliatory raid into Namibia. This contingency would seem to argue against a substantial reduction of Cuban forces in Angola.

A sharp increase in fighting in Rhodesia is likely unless a peaceful solution favorable to the Patriotic Front is found soon. Havana now probably will provide other "supplies" to Patriotic Front elements being armed and trained by Cuban advisers in Mozambique. Havana does not yet seem to have decided on a heightened Cuban presence in Mozambique.
Intelligence Checklist

CUBA/ANGOLA: The Cubans continue to ferry troops to Angola. At least 7,500 are estimated to be there now.

The latest flights have used the Azores as a refueling stop. The last flight through Guyana was on December 22.

The Cubans doubtless would prefer the more direct route through Guyana. The government of Guyana, however, apparently has not made a final decision on Cuban use of the airport at Georgetown.
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military Presence (U)

Summary

We estimate that there are approximately 4,900 Soviet civilian and military advisers, instructors, and technicians located in 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. There has been a steady increase since 1975, when there were less than 1,000 Soviets in the region. Nearly 85 percent of the Soviets are in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. Also, an estimated 610 military logistics, maintenance, and security personnel—an increase of at least 200 since late 1981—support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments and raise the total Soviet military presence to 5,510. In one instance, a Soviet naval infantry company provides security at a Soviet installation in Ethiopia. (S)

Reasons for the growth in the Soviet presence are:

- The delivery of more sophisticated weaponry.

Information available as of 12 January 1985 was used in this report. (U)
- Increases in total arms deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Increases in the number of Soviet-manned aircraft deployed in Africa.
- Construction of signals intercept facilities in Madagascar and Mozambique in 1983. (S NF)

Despite the recent setbacks, the Soviets will continue to have a strong interest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of past commitments and the political image they have at stake. However, it will be more difficult for them to protect and foster their interests than it has been in the past. They will probably have to increase deliveries of advanced and complex equipment—the traditional Soviet method of gaining and maintaining influence. If this occurs, there will be a corresponding rise in the number of Soviet personnel needed to assemble the new equipment and to train operators and maintenance personnel. We also expect the Soviets to put a high priority on expanding their presence in the Indian Ocean, especially in Seychelles and Madagascar, in response to the US presence in the region. The Soviets will also continue efforts to regain basing rights in western Africa. The most likely prospect is Guinea, where they lost basing rights in 1977. (S)
Introduction

The Soviet Union's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa has its roots in the support the Soviets gave to the anticolonialist and pro-socialist factions that sprang up in the decade between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. Several of the factions--such as those in Angola and Mozambique--eventually came to power, lending the Soviets a measure of prestige in the Third World. The Soviets have traditionally used their aid programs--especially military--as a means of establishing relationships with these countries as well as other African nations. The Soviet military presence developed from these relationships. As many as 4,900 Soviet military advisers and technicians have been introduced into Africa's military establishments, and in Angola and Ethiopia the Soviets have acquired rights to use military bases for their own aircraft and ships. (C)

The establishment of a Soviet military presence in an African nation generally follows a pattern. Initially the Soviets sell arms--often at concessionary rates--to a nation to help it counter a real or perceived threat. Soviet military advisers accompany the weapons systems in order to teach Africans to operate and maintain the new equipment. Moreover, the usually low level of technical proficiency of the Africans requires that Soviet maintenance and technical personnel remain on hand to ensure that the equipment is operational. Delivery of the equipment and personnel is made by special Soviet ship or aircraft visits that over time may evolve into regularly scheduled Aeroflot or military aviation (VTA) flights and merchant ship visits.¹ (S)

The first part of this memorandum examines the current status of the Soviet military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa--its size, location, and function--and looks at how that presence has changed, primarily since early 1982. It also examines possible future trends in the Soviet military posture in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second part describes the Soviet military presence on a country-by-country basis. This section concentrates on Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, where 85 percent of all Soviet military personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa are located. Other countries discussed are: Benin, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia. (S)

¹A byproduct of this pattern may be the permanent stationing of Soviet combat troops in a country. A Soviet combat unit is stationed at Dehalak Island, Ethiopia; it is the only known Soviet naval infantry unit permanently deployed overseas. (S)
The Soviet Status in Sub-Saharan Africa

Current Military Posture
A Soviet military presence exists in 15 of the 41 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1). We estimate that as of December 1984 the Soviet Union had established a military advisory presence of about 4,900 men in Sub-Saharan Africa (see table). This figure does not include the additional Soviet personnel needed to support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments. A close examination of the number of Soviet ships and aircraft that use Sub-Saharan facilities and of the frequency and length of their visits indicates that about 610 Soviet military personnel are present in addition to the advisers. These additional personnel raise the estimated total Soviet military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa to about 5,510. Facilities for some of the Soviet naval and air support personnel have been identified. Descriptions of these facilities and the estimated number of Soviets present at them are included in the second part of this memorandum. (S

Soviet military advisory personnel function in the following capacities:
- Training African military personnel in the use of equipment and for combat and support duties.
- Directing and advising Africans on combat operations.
- Teaching military and political theory classes.
- Overseeing arms deliveries.
- Assembling equipment, such as aircraft and helicopters.
- Maintaining the more sophisticated technical equipment provided by the Soviet Union.
- Supporting signals intelligence collection operations as advisers, technicians, or equipment operators.
- Commanding radar, communications, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.

Soviet military support personnel sustain Soviet deployments in Sub-Saharan Africa. They engage in the following activities:
- Supporting Soviet aircraft deployments, both temporary and long-term.
- Supporting Soviet naval deployments, both temporary and long-term.
- Performing security duties at facilities which support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments. (S

4

Top Secret
Figure 1
Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa
**Soviet Military Personnel Estimated to be in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 1984**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Advisory Personnel</th>
<th>Military Personnel Supporting Soviet Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,905</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>280(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)This number may have been temporarily, and possibly permanently, reduced after an insurgent attack on two Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance aircraft at Asmara, Ethiopia, in May 1984.

This table is Secret
Recent Trends

Prior to 1975, there were less than 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa. In that year the Soviets began providing large quantities of equipment to Angola and to Cuban units fighting in Angola. Since then, the Soviet presence has steadily increased to its current level throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. This increase has included both military advisers and the personnel supporting aircraft and ship deployments, and is largely due to the growing number of newer and more sophisticated Soviet weapons delivered to Africa. Additional advisory personnel have been needed to assemble and maintain the equipment, as well as to train the Africans to operate it. More personnel have been needed to carry out advisory functions within newly equipped African military units. Other personnel have deployed with aircraft Moscow has recently stationed in Africa. Examples of recent activities that have required additional personnel include:

- The deployment of 10 Soviet-manne AN-12 Cubs to Luanda, Angola, since October 1983, increasing the total to 12 aircraft; the deployment of two Cubs to Maputo, Mozambique, since January 1983; and the deployment of two Cubs to Antananarivo, Madagascar, in 1978. Each aircraft has deployed with an aircrew, including extra pilots, of about six men; and a ground support crew of about six. In addition to the 12 air and ground crew per aircraft, the unit deployed to Angola probably has about 60 command, intelligence, and unit support personnel with it.

- Increased deliveries of advanced equipment, including MIG-23 Floggers to Angola (January 1984), SU-17 Fitters to Angola, (September 1984), SA-2 SAMs to Angola (November 1984), SA-9 SAMs to Ethiopia (June 1984), MI-24 Hind attack helicopters to Angola (July 1983 and September 1984) and Mozambique (November 1983), MIG-21 Fishbeds to Mozambique (April 1983), and MI-14 Haze helicopters to Ethiopia (December 1983). The exact numbers of Soviets required to assemble this equipment are not available. However, special intelligence indicates that some Soviet equipment assembly teams range between five and eight personnel for MI-8 and MI-14 helicopters and MIG-21s.

- The construction of as many as five signals intercept facilities in Madagascar and two in Mozambique in 1983. Each site is normally manned by 12 men, at least some of whom are Soviets. (TS)

Although the overall Soviet military presence in Africa has increased since 1975--primarily because of the infusion of advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--the Soviets have
suffered setbacks and a decline of prestige in several Sub-Saharan African nations within the last two years. The Soviet military advisory presence has either been reduced, or probably will be reduced, in Tanzania and Zambia. Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Nigeria are now looking to the West for economic aid which the Soviets have not been inclined to provide. The Soviets may have decided that the prospects for increasing their presence in these countries or for receiving payment for services rendered and equipment delivered are poor, and are therefore limiting their aid. (S)

Most African countries receiving Soviet arms, including the USSR's three largest African clients—Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique—have expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of weapons delivered, the difficulty in obtaining spare parts, and the quality of instruction for their use. Angola and Mozambique also have reached some form of ceasefire or security accord with South Africa that requires South Africa to stop supporting insurgent activities in these countries. Should these arrangements prove effective and lead to some sort of political solution, they might lessen the need for Soviet support and equipment. (S)

Despite continuing efforts, the Soviets have been unable to regain basing rights for TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft in Conakry, Guinea, which they lost in 1977. They have also been unsuccessful in efforts to gain airfield access for reconnaissance aircraft in any country other than Angola or Ethiopia. (S)

Future Prospects
Multibillion-dollar investments have been made by the Soviets in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. We believe that the Soviets would take strong measures to prevent a change in leadership or political leaning in these countries if the result would be a loss of access or outright expulsion. It is conceivable that the Soviets would either organize or support a coup among Soviet-trained loyalists within the armed forces, such as occurred in Afghanistan, to ensure a leadership sympathetic to the Soviet Union in Angola or Ethiopia. However, such a Soviet move is less likely in Mozambique because the investment is smaller there. (S)

2For specific information on problems the Soviets are encountering in African countries, see the individual country discussions in the second part of this memorandum. (U)
Basing Rights. The Soviets continue to have important military and political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Angola, Ethiopia, and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique will continue to be the focal points of their interest, the Soviets will seek increased naval and aircraft access rights in countries where they have some military relationship. They probably are willing to invest additional arms and personnel in any country where there is a good possibility of gaining regular access or basing rights for aircraft or ships or where significant political payoffs could be gained. (S)

Moscow's first priority will most likely be the Indian Ocean nations, especially Seychelles, where they currently possess restricted access rights, or Madagascar. Increased access allowing regular naval visits or deployment of IL-38 May or TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft would greatly enhance Soviet intelligence capabilities against US, French, and South African operations in the central and southwestern Indian Ocean. Both Seychelles and Madagascar are well situated for intelligence collection efforts against the US base on Diego Garcia. (S)

We believe that the Soviets will continue to focus on gaining increased access rights in Seychelles. The Soviets have traditionally supported President Rene and have provided both military and economic support to the government. They have also deployed naval units to the region during periods of tension. Greater access in the future would likely develop, primarily through the promise of protection from outside political and military threats, such as the attempted coup in Seychelles by South African mercenaries in 1981. In addition, the Soviets will probably use increased military aid to expand their presence in Seychelles. To date, they have furnished radars, multiple rocket launchers, armored cars, and small arms. (S)

The Soviets have coveted the port of Diego Suarez in Madagascar and its adjacent airfield since the late 1970s. However, in spite of arms sales to Madagascar totaling nearly $40 million since 1980, they have been unable to secure basing rights for ships or reconnaissance aircraft. A November 1984 assistance agreement of $10 million, to include armored cars and multiple rocket launchers, may be intended to increase the pressure on President Ratsiraka to open up Diego Suarez. Ratsiraka, who has had good success at playing off Soviet and Western interests in the past, will probably be able to resist Soviet overtures in the near future. (S)
In western Africa, the Soviets have demonstrated that they would like to either regain landing rights for TU-95 Bear aircraft in Guinea or gain such access in another country. By doing so they would be closer to the mid-Atlantic shipping routes than they are now from their current base in Angola. A west African base would also give the Soviets a permanent forward support facility for aircraft en route to Angola. Soviet chances of gaining basing rights in a west African country are not as good as they are in the Indian Ocean because Western influence and interests, especially French, are still strong in the region. However, Guinea is the most likely candidate because Bears used the Conakry airfield in the 1970s, Soviet transport aircraft continue to stop en route to Angola, and Soviet naval vessels continue to visit Conakry. It is possible that the Soviets will attempt to regain some form of increased access rights there through political pressure, lucrative arms deals, or economic incentives within the next several years. (S

Arms Deliveries. If arms deliveries to Africa follow current trends, the volume will increase and deliveries of advanced equipment such as MIG-23 Floggers and MI-24 Hinds, especially to Angola and Ethiopia, will continue. Even after the Mozambican-South African accord of March 1984, the Soviet Union delivered MIG-21 Fishbeds and continued to deploy AN-12 Cubs to Mozambique. However, should Mozambique's need for arms decrease in the future due to the ceasefire with South Africa, the Soviet Union's leverage there, influenced by arms sales, would also decrease. Because the transfer of arms is the most effective form of aid the Soviets possess, they will continue to use it as much as possible in the future. (S

The Military Advisory Presence. The Soviet advisory presence will also increase as additional technical and maintenance personnel arrive with the advanced equipment and as instructors arrive to train African personnel on the equipment. These advisers will ensure a Soviet presence at many levels in African military establishments and will enhance Soviet influence in African political and strategic decision-making processes. (C

3Because Soviet equipment is less expensive and payment plans are more flexible than those of Western countries, many African countries will continue to buy Soviet military equipment despite some dissatisfactions with it. (S
The Soviet Presence by Country

Angola
Soviet military personnel have been present in Angola since 1975, when the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power. Massive Soviet support—and Cuban combat troops—arrived quickly as Western-backed guerrillas and South African troops attempted to overthrow the MPLA in 1975 and 1976. Since then, the Soviet presence has expanded and penetrated every aspect of the Angolan military, largely through the presence of military advisers. We estimate that as of December 1984, Soviet military advisers in Angola currently number, at least, 1,500. This is based on a September 1984 estimate of 1,200, with additional personnel included to support helicopter, aircraft, electronics, missile, and ground force equipment deliveries made within the last year which were not accounted for in the September estimate. As in Ethiopia and Mozambique, Soviet advisers are organized into a Military Advisory Group (MAG). In spite of intensive Soviet training and infusions of Soviet equipment, we believe the Angolan Army is still only a marginally capable fighting force and could not survive against any military threat—internal or external—without Soviet backing and a Cuban military presence. (S

The MAG headquarters, identified through the analysis of photography, is located two kilometers southwest of Luanda Airfield. This double fence-secured facility consists of administration, electronics, storage, and housing areas and a volleyball court (figure 2). The capacity of the housing is probably not more than 125 personnel. The MAG headquarters may have been located at this facility as early as October 1978, when a Tall Rods radio direction finding set, sometimes associated with a Soviet presence, was installed. In May 1979 a Park Drive set was installed. The Park Drive is a mobile military command and control satellite communications system used exclusively by the Soviets. (The other Third World countries where the Soviets have deployed Park Drives are Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam.) (S

Soviet military advisory personnel in Angola are assigned training and advisory positions at military schools, military area headquarters, and brigade headquarters. In 1981 Soviet advisers were captured and killed by South Africans at an Angolan

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brassheadquarters that was within 50 kilometers of the Namibian border. Open-press photography has shown Soviets instructing Angolan enlisted personnel in vehicle maintenance and in tactics at military installations, indicating Soviet involvement extends even to lower levels within the Angolan Army. (S__)

The Soviet Union has provided arms to the MPLA since 1974. Intelligence Community estimates indicate that deliveries in the last two years have increased markedly—from an estimated $189 million in 1982 to over $843 million in the first half of 1983. Deliveries in the second half of 1983 and in 1984 have apparently continued at the same level. There was also a corresponding qualitative increase in weapons complexity and capability. Arms shipments in 1983 included Angola's first SA-6 and SA-8 SAMS, MI-24 Hind attack helicopters, and MIG-23 Flogger fighter aircraft. Deliveries in 1984 have included additional Hinds, the first SU-17 Fitter fighters delivered to Sub-Saharan Africa, and Angola's first SA-2 SAMs. (S__)}
Much of the newer and more sophisticated equipment requires assembly on arrival. Soviet and Cuban military technicians are probably responsible for this assembly. In addition, Soviet personnel probably maintain the more complex equipment at Angola's 20 radar sites, 11 SAM sites, and four SAM support facilities, as well as complex equipment for several squadrons of jet fighters and helicopters. This equipment is scattered throughout the country, and Soviet maintenance personnel must travel widely to service it. The majority of these maintenance personnel probably are stationed in Luanda and Lubango, where Angola's most advanced aircraft are located. A Soviet housing area has been identified at Luanda, but not at Lubango.

At Luanda Airfield, where aircraft delivered to Angola are assembled, a barracks building probably used to house Soviet technicians, maintenance personnel, and pilots has been identified (figure 3). The barracks, distinct from others at the airfield by virtue of an air conditioning unit, a radio antenna, security fences, volleyball court, well-kept appearance, and the continued presence of aircraft ground support equipment, probably can accommodate 40 to 60 personnel. It has been occupied at least since April 1979 when the antenna and air conditioning unit were first noted on the roof.
Since 1977, when landing rights for the TU-95 Bears in Conakry, Guinea, were lost, these reconnaissance aircraft have periodically deployed to Luanda Airfield. An IL-62 Classic carrying maintenance and other support personnel normally deploys with the Bears. Some ground support equipment, notably an avionics cooling unit used in Angola only by Bears, is permanently stored at the airfield (figure 4). (S

In addition to the Bear and Classic deployments, at least two Soviet AN-12 Cub transport aircraft have been permanently stationed in Luanda since May 1977. These aircraft provide logistic support for Cuban and Angolan combat units. In October 1983 the Angolan internal situation deteriorated due to increased guerrilla and South African military activity. As a result the Soviets increased the number of Cubs to 12 (figure 5), the largest permanent out-of-country Soviet aircraft deployment outside the Warsaw Pact, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. An AN-12 squadron in the Soviet Union numbers around 400 men. For overseas deployment, allowing that only limited aircraft maintenance would normally be performed overseas, the number of personnel would be much lower, probably around 200. This number includes air and ground crews, and unit intelligence, command, and support personnel. (S

Soviet naval visits to Angola began in 1976. Naval visits and seaborne military equipment deliveries have occurred at three ports: Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe (formerly called Mocamedes). Luanda Naval Base is the primary naval installation used by the Soviet West African Flotilla. A Soviet naval shore station in Luanda has been noted in special intelligence since 1979. It uses a separate communications channel from the Soviet MAG, indicating that it does not support Angolan activity. We believe that there may be a permanent Soviet naval personnel presence of as many as 70 men ashore at Luanda. This figure is based on a November 1984 estimate of seven Soviet naval vessels in the flotilla—about one-third the size of the 22-ship Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron. Therefore, the Soviet presence ashore at Luanda would probably be no more than a third of the size of the 220-man unit at Dehalak Island, Ethiopia—about 70 men. (TS

At least one Soviet naval vessel, usually a minesweeper, is permanently stationed at Luanda, and a repair ship is often moored there as well. Major combatants which are not part of the West African Flotilla also regularly visit Luanda. These have included Victor I- and Victor II-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, a Kara-class guided missile cruiser, and a Kiev-class aircraft carrier. There was a continuous Soviet naval combatant presence (including Alligator-class tank landing ships) at Luanda in 1983, while there were only five short periods in 1982 when Soviet combatants were not present. (S
Little is known about the degree of Soviet involvement at major electronics facilities in Angola. There are currently three active Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets in the country, and all three are near the Cuban-Angolan defensive line north of the Namibian border. These three facilities were constructed in 1984; the Menongue site was established in January, the Matala site in March, and the Huambo site in June. Soviet personnel operate or assist in operating identical sets in Madagascar and Mozambique. It is quite likely, therefore, that some Soviet involvement exists at Full House sites in Angola as well. (TS)

Ethiopia
Soviet military personnel have been in Ethiopia since 1977, when Moscow sided with Ethiopia against Somalia in the conflict over the Ogaden. Soviet-provided military equipment used by Cuban combat brigades and Ethiopian units forced the Somali Army out of the Ogaden in 1977 and 1978. By siding with Ethiopia, the USSR lost its air, naval, and signals collection facilities in Berbera, Somalia. These facilities were subsequently reestablished in South Yemen and Ethiopia, although on a smaller scale. (S)

We estimate that in September 1984, 1,700 Soviet military personnel, organized into a MAG, were in Ethiopia. As no major influxes of arms occurred between September and December 1984, this number is probably still accurate. According to special intelligence, Soviet advisers have been integrated into all elements of the Ethiopian Army from army down through brigade level. Since 1977 the Soviet MAG has trained and equipped the Ethiopian Army, building a force capable of defeating any of its neighbors in a conventional war, but not yet capable of putting down the insurgencies in Ethiopia's northern provinces of Tigre and Eritrea. The depth of Soviet involvement in operational planning is evidenced by the visits of Soviet Ground Forces Commander in Chief General V. I. Petrov, who has reviewed and advised on recent operations against insurgents in Tigre and Eritrea in 1982, 1983, and 1984. (S)

Since March 1979, the MAG headquarters has been at Liddetta Airfield in Addis Ababa, on the old Imperial Golf Course grounds. It had previously been at a location two kilometers to the south as early as December 1977. The headquarters is fence-secured and consists of administrative, housing, electronics, and

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5NIE 11-10/2-84 (S), 19 September 1984, The USSR and the Third World. (S)
recreational (including volleyball) areas (figure 6). The housing area has four monitor-roofed barracks with unique door overhangs, each housing 50 to 70 men. These barracks, which were built in 1980 and 1981, are found only at Soviet and Cuban facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. A Park Drive set has been associated with the WAG headquarters since December 1977 (figure 7); and, for a period in 1979, a second set was present. (Its current location is not known.)

Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of Soviet arms in Sub-Saharan Africa. Deliveries for the period 1980-82 totalled $1.8 billion, more than triple the value of deliveries to Angola during the same period. Deliveries of Soviet equipment continued at a steady rate through 1983 and 1984. In 1983, however, the Ethiopians purchased a substantial amount of equipment from other nations, particularly jet trainers from Czechoslovakia, possibly an indication of dissatisfaction with Soviet equipment. (S

Most arms are shipped through the port of Aseb. A Soviet unit of up to 350 personnel may be stationed in Aseb. They are housed in a wall-secured camp that has five of the unique monitor-roofed barracks. There is also a volleyball court within the camp. (S

After delivery to Aseb, most equipment is moved to the Addis Ababa area or to the Ogaden. Most aircraft and helicopters, which require assembly, are transported to Haifar Meda Airfield near Addis Ababa. The presence of five of the monitor-roofed barracks at the airfield, plus reporting from a generally reliable source, indicates both a Soviet and Cuban presence. Additional Soviet and Cuban personnel are probably at Dire Dawa assembling MIG-23 Floggers which were delivered there in early 1984. (S

Soviet personnel reportedly assist in the maintenance of the equipment at the nine radar sites, eight SAM sites and three SAM support facilities, and several jet fighter and helicopter squadron bases in Ethiopia. Because these assets are deployed

6Technicians assembling equipment at the port, such as M14 Haze helicopters, as well as personnel maintaining electronics and SAM sites at Aseb, may be housed in these barracks. In addition, there is a large rest and recreation facility just north of Aseb that appears too sophisticated to be Ethiopian or Cuban. This facility, completed in April 1983, may be Soviet-associated. (S
throughout the country, Soviet technicians must travel widely. However, most personnel are probably stationed at the Soviet housing areas identified in Addis Ababa, Aseb, Asmara, and Harar Meda. (S)

A pair of Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance aircraft, supported by two AN-12 Cub transpots, have deployed to Yohannes IV Airfield at Asmara, Ethiopia, several times a year since February 1980. Additional AN-12 deployments have been observed at Asmara at least since January 1978. These Cub aircraft probably have been carrying arms and personnel in support of Ethiopian operations in the region. In addition to the May and Cub deployments to Asmara, Cubss were occasionally deployed to Harar Meda Airfield to provide logistic support for the Ethiopians in 1978 and 1979. By late 1979 the Ethiopian Air Force had received its own Cubss and those of the Soviets were withdrawn from Ethiopia. (S)

The AN-12s that deploy with the May aircraft carry support equipment. Most of the major ground support equipment, however, such as the cooling units used for the May's avionics and electronics, is kept in a secured vehicle park at a barracks (with a volleyball court) on the edge of the airfield (figure 8). This support equipment—which arrived at the same time as the May aircraft—and the barracks probably are reserved for Soviet use. The barracks buildings have a capacity of 150 to 200 personnel. Sixty persons probably support the Cub and May (which has a crew of 12) activity; the others are probably Soviet personnel associated with Ethiopian Air Force units at the airfield and MAG personnel assigned to army units in the area. (S)

In May 1984, Eritrean rebels infiltrated Yohannes IV Airfield and destroyed one May and damaged the second. It is possible that future May deployments will use a more secure Ethiopian airfield, such as Harar Meda or Dire Dawa. (S)

Soviet naval assets have been stationed at Dehalak Island since April 1978, shortly after they were expelled from bases in Berbera, Somalia. The total Soviet military presence on Dehalak is estimated by DIA to be about 220 men. The base itself consists of a floating drydock, two piers, 25 buildings, an electric power plant, and material and POL storage areas. (S)

Support ships of the 22-vessel Indian Ocean Squadron are permanently stationed at Dehalak, and a Soviet naval infantry company, the only one permanently stationed on foreign soil, guards the facility. Other Soviet combatants using Dehalak have included Echo-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines,
Kara-class guided missile cruisers, and Alligator-class tank landing ships. In addition, Ethiopian and North Yemeni naval craft are occasionally repaired at Dehalak. No seaborne equipment deliveries occur at Dehalak; they are made to Aseb and Mitsuwa. (S)

There are two known active Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets in Ethiopia— one in the north at Agordat, the other in the south at Gode. The Agordat site was established in May 1983; the site at Gode in March 1984.

Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. According to DIA, Soviet military personnel have been there since 1976. We estimate that as of November 1984, about 800 Soviet military advisory personnel are in the MAG in Mozambique. The primary responsibilities of these advisers are to train Mozambican armed forces personnel and to fulfill planning and operational duties down to the brigade level. Although the

*NIE 11-6-84 (S) November 1984, Soviet Global Military Reach. (S)*
The location of the Soviet MAG and its headquarters have not been identified on photography, a source of undetermined reliability reports that Soviet personnel are living in the Matola suburb of Maputo. (S)

Unlike events in Angola and Ethiopia, there was no massive influx of arms and the attendant advisers and technicians to Mozambique early in the relationship. The Soviet presence has expanded gradually and to a lesser degree than in Angola and Ethiopia. Despite Soviet training and substantial shipments of Soviet equipment in the last eight years, Mozambique's armed forces are still judged to be incapable of either controlling internal guerrilla groups such as RENAMO or defending the country's borders. (S)

As in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Soviet technicians attached to the MAG in Mozambique probably assist with the assembly and maintenance of equipment. Before 1982, the arms delivered to Mozambique were largely obsolete equipment, such as MIG-17 Fresco fighters and T-34 tanks. Since then, however, Mozambique has been receiving T-54 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, and Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. Nevertheless, Mozambique is far behind both Angola and Ethiopia in the amount and value of arms delivered from the USSR. Mozambique received about $295 million worth of equipment during the period 1976 through 1982--Angola received about $775 million worth and Ethiopia received $2.3 billion worth during this same period. (S)

Equipment is shipped to three ports: Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. The fighter aircraft are being assembled at Nacala Airfield and the Hind helicopters at Maputo Airfield. Unlike facilities in Angola or Ethiopia, no Soviet barracks have been observed on photography at any of these facilities. (S)

Soviet military transport aircraft have temporarily deployed to Maputo Airfield at least since 1977. Since May 1983, two AN-12 Cubs have been permanently deployed to Maputo to provide counterinsurgency support by carrying personnel and equipment to and from combat areas (figure 9). About 30 Soviet personnel are needed to maintain and fly these aircraft. (S)

Soviet naval vessels have visited Maputo, Beira, and Nacala regularly since 1977. A December 1983 visit included a Kiev-class carrier, and earlier visits have included a Sverdlov-class cruiser and a Kashin-class guided missile destroyer. In contrast to Dehalak and Luanda, however, there is no continuous Soviet naval presence. It is unlikely, therefore, that there are any Soviet naval personnel permanently stationed in Mozambique to support these visits. (S)
Two Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets are operational in Mozambique—one at Beira and the second at the Villa Pery Army Barracks. Both are directed against guerrilla activity and, according to special intelligence, both have Soviet personnel involved in their operation. There are six radar sites, four SAM sites, and one missile support facility as well as three fighter, one transport, and several helicopter squadrons in Mozambique. Most of this equipment is located in and around Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Soviet MAG personnel, with Cuban assistance, probably maintain most of this equipment. (TS)

**Benin**

We estimate that there are 20 Soviet military advisers in Benin. Soviet naval vessels regularly visit the port of Cotonou, and Moscow has begun building a naval base for the Beninese Navy as part of a 1978 agreement. It has not been determined whether the Soviets will have access rights to the base when it is completed. Soviet military advisers and technicians probably train Beninese military personnel and maintain equipment they have provided over the years. (S)

**Burundi**

According to our latest information, 20 Soviet military advisers are in Burundi. They are involved in training Burundian military personnel and in maintaining ground force and air defense equipment supplied by Moscow in the last eight years. (S)

**Congo**

There are an estimated 200 Soviet military advisers in Congo. They maintain one squadron of MIG-21 Fishbeds, one of MIG-17 Fresco fighters, and one of MI-8 Hip helicopters, as well as radar and electronics equipment. (S)

A general coolness has developed in Soviet-Congolese relations in the last several years, due in part to disappointment with the quality of military equipment delivered as well as a perceived lack of meaningful economic aid from the Soviets. Because of these shortcomings, Congo has turned to the West and the People's Republic of China for economic assistance, while continuing to purchase some military hardware from Moscow. (S)

**Guinea**

Until the mid-1970s, the Sub-Saharan country where Soviet influence was greatest was Guinea. In 1977, however, Guinean President Sekou Toure revoked Soviet reconnaissance aircraft landing rights and reduced Soviet naval access at the port of Conakry. Soviet naval vessels still visit Conakry, and transport aircraft en route to Angola refuel at Conakry Airfield. (S)
About 50 Soviet military advisers remain in Guinea. They maintain the single Guinean fighter squadron, which is equipped with several types of MIGs. Analysis of photography indicates that the advisers may also assist in the transshipment of arms through Conakry to Mali. (S

Guinea Bissau
There are 50 Soviet advisers in Guinea Bissau. The Soviets historically have been the major arms supplier to this country. However, Bissauan officials have recently stated that they are dissatisfied with the level and quality of Soviet military assistance, and the government has begun receiving military assistance from France and the United States. (S

Madagascar
The Soviet military presence in Madagascar is currently limited by the Malagasy government to 150 men. The Soviets' main functions are to maintain Malagasy MIG-21 Fishbed jets and air warning radars and to man and maintain as many as five signals intercept sets around the island. As many as 30 additional Soviet military personnel maintain and fly two VTA AN-12 Cubs, which have been stationed at Antananarivo since 1978. These two aircraft perform military support and commercial transport functions for the Malagasy government. (S

Relations between the Soviet Union and Madagascar run hot and cold. Military attache reporting indicates that in early 1984 the Soviet military presence may have been reduced to 100 personnel. In addition, a Malagasy military delegation to the Soviet Union in May 1984 cut short a visit after being snubbed by the Soviet government. The snubbing may have been a result of Soviet frustration at its inability to gain naval visitation or aircraft basing rights in Madagascar, or the failure of Madagascar to keep up payments on equipment purchased from the Soviets. However, in November 1984 Madagascar agreed to purchase $10 million worth of armored cars and multiple rocket launchers, an indication that relations may be warming. (S

As many as five Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets operated, reportedly with Soviet personnel, between December 1983 and late 1984. US Embassy protests to President Ratsiraka about the Full House sets may have been responsible for their being removed by December 1984. However, it is possible that sets have been reassembled at new locations, or are being stored for future use. (S

Mali
We estimate that there are currently 150 Soviet military advisory personnel in Mali. They are engaged in training Malian military
personnel, providing technical assistance, and maintaining SA-3 missile units and Mali's single MIG fighter squadron, equipped primarily with MIG-17 Frescos. (S)

The Soviets are carrying out a program to upgrade six Malian airfields, and although the Soviets do not have access rights to these airfields, the improvements made thus far on the two completed airfields far exceed Malian needs. Airfields in Mali were used by the Soviets during the 1975 Angolan airlift. (S)

Although the Soviets continue to provide military assistance, there has recently been some tension in relations. Despite Soviet invitations, Malian President Traore has delayed scheduling an official visit to Moscow. The Malian Army is reportedly unhappy with the quality of Soviet equipment and technical training and, possibly because of this, has not made payments on equipment delivered. The Soviets have refused to authorize delivery of further arms and equipment until payment is resumed. (S)

Nigeria
We believe there are only five Soviet military advisers in Nigeria. They reportedly maintain the Nigerian Air Force's two

Sao Tome and Principe
One hundred Soviet military advisers are estimated to be in Sao Tome and Principe. They carry out training for Sao Tome's military forces and maintain that country's Soviet-supplied military equipment. (S)

Seychelles
There are estimated to be 18 Soviet military advisory personnel in Seychelles. They maintain and operate two coastal surveillance radars and assist in training Seychelles military personnel. (S)

The Soviets have been staunch supporters of President Rene since he came to power in a coup in 1977. They have sent some military equipment—$6 million worth in 1983—and have provided naval support during times of crisis. Recent examples of this support occurred in March 1983, when Rene suspected a mercenary-backed effort to overthrow him was under way, and in September of the same year, when Rene made a trip to Paris. In both cases, Soviet landing ships with naval infantry aboard visited the islands to guarantee Rene's position of power. (S)
Since 1983, the Soviets have had stopover rights in Seychelles for VTA aircraft en route to Mozambique and Madagascar. They may also be helping Seychelles refurbish fuel storage tanks on St. Anne Island. Although the Soviets probably will not have immediate access to the tanks, they may be allowed to use them at some point in the future. (S)

Tanzania
A source whose reporting has generally been substantiated indicated that Tanzania intended to reduce the Soviet military advisory presence from 92 to 64 by the beginning of 1985. The Soviets are primarily engaged in systems maintenance on equipment they have provided in the last 10 years. Even though their advisory team has been reduced this year, the Soviets sold a substantial amount of hardware to Tanzania in 1984 and even granted a loan to the Tanzanian People's Defense Force for the purchase of additional equipment. The Tanzanians would reportedly like to further reduce the Soviet presence in their country, down to as few as 55; however, it is likely that they will allow some Soviets to stay, due to their inability to keep the more sophisticated equipment operational without Soviet help. (S)

Zambia
We believe there are not more than 50 Soviet advisory personnel in Zambia. The majority of this contingent probably trains the Zambians to operate the MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, MI-8 Hip helicopters, SA-3 SAMs, and various types of air warning radar delivered since the late 1970s. The Soviets also play a major role in maintaining this equipment. (S)

Zambia's position as a landlocked country limits its usefulness as a base for reconnaissance aircraft, and its economic problems make it a poor target for additional arms sales. Therefore, the Soviets' military presence in Zambia, which began when Moscow provided aid to African nationalists fighting against the white minority regime in Rhodesia, may decrease in the future. (S)
SUBJECT: Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military Presence (U)

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SECRET

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3. USSR - SOUTHERN AFRICA: US, SOUTH AFRICA CRITICIZED

THE LATEST US INITIATIVES ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ARE UNSATISFACTORY. BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO MEET ANGOLA'S DEMANDS FOR A STOP TO SOUTH AFRICAN AID TO UNITA AND FOR INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF ANGOLAN SECURITY. PRAVDA YESTERDAY CONDEMNED PRETORIA'S DECISION TO ESTABLISH A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA AS A MOVE TO CIRCUMVENT UN RESOLUTIONS ON NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, AND IT CLAIMED THAT PRETORIA WOULD NOT HAVE ACTED WITHOUT US SUPPORT.

COMMENTS: MOSCOW IS ALMOST CERTAINLY WARNING THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT NOT TO ACCEPT ANY SETTLEMENT THAT DOES NOT PROVIDE CONCRETE GUARANTEES OF ITS SURVIVAL. REPORTS ON SOVIET COMMENTS AT THE UN SUGGESTS MOSCOW WILL NOT INITIATE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST PRETORIA BUT PROBABLY WOULD SUPPORT AN AFRICAN-LED MOVE. THE SOVIETS WILL NONETHELESS EXPLOIT A PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITY FOR TO LAMBAST SOUTH AFRICA'S DULICITY ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND "COLLUSION" BETWEEN THE US AND SOUTH AFRICA.
Western Europe–Canada–International Organizations

STAFF NOTES

Secret
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CI SNNWE 76-068
No. 0113-76
April 6, 1976
WESTERN EUROPE – CANADA – INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regions. specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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April 6, 1976
UN Debates South African Intervention in Angola

The Security Council debate on Angola last week was not so much a victory for the Soviets as confirmation of African resentment over Western support for South Africa. The debate also reflected the overriding priority the African states assign to full independence for the remaining African territories.

South African intervention in Angola was the major target of African condemnation. Despite the misgivings of many African states over Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola, the African speakers at the Council debate limited their attacks to South Africa's military presence and virtually ignored the role of the Communist states. The resolution finally adopted refers only to South African "aggression" in Angola and demands compensation from Pretoria for damages done during its intervention.

Western European Council members attempted to broaden the debate to include all foreign military intervention. The Africans rejected a general discussion and concentrated their fire on Pretoria's intervention in Angola and its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, both—the Africans asserted—aided by Western economic and military support. Even the Chinese—one of the strongest proponents of decolonization—were publicly rebuked by the Africans for "side-tracking" the debate from South African to Soviet and Cuban intervention.

The final resolution did not enjoy balanced support; the USSR was the only permanent Security

April 6, 1976
Council member to vote for it. Far from contributing to UN attempts to achieve independence for Namibia or guarantee majority rule in Rhodesia, the resolution is likely to have the opposite effect. South Africa has already publicly stated that it will not comply with the resolution's demands.

April 6, 1976
Intelligence Checklist

January 26, 1976
The Intelligence Checklist is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

January 26, 1976

USSR/CUBA/ANGOLA: At Annex we present the key points and supporting tables from an interagency memorandum, Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola from March through December 1975, dated January 24, 1976. As a supplement, we are including a copy of the memorandum itself.
Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA/ZAIRE: Both National Union leader Savimbi and Zairian President Mobutu are seeking political accommodation with Popular Movement President Neto.

There are no indications that Neto would be receptive to an approach from Savimbi. Neto seems committed to a military solution and determined to exclude the Union and the Front from any political role in Angola.

Savimbi asked for Kenya's mediation just after meeting with Mobutu, the Front's principal backer. Mobutu reportedly told Savimbi that Zaire had done all it could to help the Front-Union coalition, and that he had to turn to Zaire's own pressing internal problems.

The Front's military collapse in northern Angola has prompted Mobutu to seek his own channel to Neto. Zaire's copper industry relies heavily on Angola's rail and port facilities, which have been denied it because of the fighting. Mobuto cannot expect access to those facilities without paying a high financial and political price to Neto.

--continued
Intelligence Checklist

On the military side, the Popular Movement claimed over the weekend that its forces in central Angola captured the port of Novo Redondo, 100 miles north of the National Union's key rail and port complex at Lobito. Fighting also continued around the eastern city of Teixeira de Sousa, but neither the Movement nor the Union scored any significant gains.

USSR/ANGOLA: Soviet army officers in civilian dress are "working closely" with Popular Movement military leaders in Luanda. The officers reportedly do not advise units in the field, however.

Soviet advisers in Luanda are giving instruction in flying and maintaining helicopters and in small-scale naval gunnery. Soviet personnel also handle the unloading and disposition of sea and air deliveries of Soviet arms and equipment delivered to Luanda.

Meanwhile, the Popular Movement's "foreign minister" on Friday ended a visit to the USSR. He reportedly expressed satisfaction with Moscow's "total support."

The Movement official did not meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Soviet handling of the visit suggests that Moscow viewed it primarily as a party-to-party occasion rather than a government-level affair.
National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
10 September 1981
Special Analysis

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA: Challenge and Opportunity

The South African raid into Angola has provided Moscow and Havana with an opportunity to portray the US as South Africa's only significant backer. At the same time, the Soviets and Cubans need to demonstrate further tangible support for their ally. Moscow also may see Angola as an excellent theater to demonstrate firmness in its global rivalry with the US. The Soviets probably remain unwilling to engage the South Africans directly, but their activities could bring a South African response that might lead to a broader conflict.

Soviet and Cuban Options

At a minimum, Moscow and Havana will provide additional training to the Angolans and SWAPO, and Moscow will promptly replace the equipment captured or destroyed by the South Africans. Moscow could also speed up delivery of weaponry already contracted for but not yet delivered.
The Angolans almost certainly see an urgent need to improve their air defenses in southern Angola, and Moscow could be considering a major expansion of the air defenses along the Mocamedes-Menongue rail line. This would involve direct Soviet or Cuban participation, possibly including Soviet pilots.

As many as 19,000 Cuban military personnel already are in Angola. Moscow might support a major southward movement of some of these troops into the border region, but this would risk greater casualties—a politically sensitive issue for President Castro at home. The Cubans were bloodied by South African ground forces in 1975, and they have been reluctant to undertake operations against UNITA.

Most of the Cuban forces already in Angola, however, are not fully occupied. Havana, moreover, fears some US action against Cuba itself and probably would be reluctant to reduce its defense—particularly air defense—forces at home. The Soviets are not likely to introduce ground troops into Angola.

Moscow and Havana probably will be reluctant to confront South African forces by moving into areas along the Namibian border. The Soviets have made no public commitment to defend Angola, and Cuba has said its forces would go into action only if South African forces approach the areas they defend. Both realize that the limited forces they could move into the border area over the short term would be vulnerable to South African attack.

The two Communist countries are more likely to help build up Angolan defenses just to the north and ascertain the South African reaction. It would take several months to create a credible defense capability in the border

---continued

10 September 1981
region. The closer an air defense system comes to the Namibian border—thereby threatening South Africa's ability to attack SWAPO camps—the greater the risk of a preemptive South African attack.

Pretoria's Reaction

For the moment, the South Africans probably see no need for new large operations, although cross-border raids are likely to continue. The recent ground action probably disrupted SWAPO plans for the coming rainy season, and the destruction of radar facilities in Angola near the border ensures South Africa's air superiority and serves as a warning to the Angolans and their backers. Pretoria currently does not anticipate significant increases in Soviet or Cuban personnel near the Namibian border.

If the South Africans should conclude that expanded air defenses threaten their freedom of action in the area, they will move to preserve it. This might prompt Moscow and Havana to reassess their policy of avoiding direct military confrontations with the South Africans.
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, October 9, 1976. Classification abbreviations precede each paragraph. The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

USSR-ANGOLA: Friendship Treaty Signed

Page 4
USSA-ANGOLA: Friendship Treaty Signed

Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev and Angolan President Neto signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in Moscow yesterday.

The USSR has concluded such treaties with only a few third-world countries—India, Egypt, Iraq, and Somalia. The text of the new treaty has not yet been published, but a Tass summary indicates that it generally follows the format and substance of the other treaties with third-world states, outlining a commitment to cooperate in a wide variety of fields.

Neto's talks in Moscow have apparently focused on strengthening party ties and on the needs of Angola's economy. The Angolans seem anxious to see Moscow play a greater role in their country's postwar development, but the situation in Angola limits the amount of useful assistance the Soviets can provide.

Angola needs access to the West if it is to benefit fully from its oil, agricultural, and mineral resources. Neto has in fact been making efforts to expand ties with the West—most recently exchanging ambassadors with Sweden and resuming diplomatic relations with Portugal.

The treaty apparently provides for strengthening military cooperation—implying continued Soviet military aid. It is possible that under this clause the Soviets will try to gain access to military facilities in Angola.

In signing the treaty, Moscow certainly has an eye to the rest of southern Africa, especially the insurgent movements in Namibia and Rhodesia.

TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Angolan Forces Advance; Soviets Stay in Background

Soviet army officers in civilian dress working with Popular Movement military leaders in Luanda. The officers do not wear uniforms in this photo. 

ANGOLA/USA: Soviet army officers in civilian dress reportedly are working with Popular Movement military leaders in Luanda, but are not showing units in the field. (Page 1)

Soviet intelligence officers work with East German and Cuban officers as a Popular Movement Intelligence training school outside Luanda. Other Soviet advisers are giving instructions on flying and maintaining helicopters.

Angolan naval personnel are being trained in aery to man Portuguese patrol boats which the Soviets are reconditioning. Soviets personnel also unload and distribute sea and air deliveries of Soviet arms and equipment.

Popular Movement "foreign minister" Jose Eduardo dos Santos cut short a visit to the USSR on Friday, but he expressed satisfaction with "positive and "essential" support for the Angolan people and praised Cuban and government ties.

Soviet handling of the visit suggests that Moscow viewed it as primarily a party-to-party occasion rather than a governmental affair. Dos Santos met with Boris Ponomarev, a Politburo candidate-member and the party secretary responsible for relations with non-ruling communist parties, and with a deputy director of the Central Committee's international department. Dos Santos delivered messages from Popular Movement leader Agostinho Neto for General Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin during meetings with Deputy Premier Arhipov and Deputy Foreign Minister Ilchen.

Dos Santos' failure to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko could reflect Soviet reluctance to accommodate government support for the Popular Movement during Secretary Akhmedov's presence in Moscow or simply Gromyko's heavy schedule during the Secretary's visit.

Speculation that Dos Santos left Moscow two days early because of disagreement with Soviet efforts to promote a political solution in Angola has not been substantiated. The Soviets say that his Friday departure was necessitated by health-preserving problems.

National

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has asked Kenya to mediate between the National Union and Popular Movement with the aim of establishing a coalition govern-

ment.

Savimbi approached Kenya's foreign minister last week when both were in Zambia. President Kenyatta tried twice last year to bring Angolan rival groups together. Several Kenya foreign ministry officials are said to believe Kenyatta

(See Angola... Page 4)
Angola...

From Page 1

should transmit Savimbi's request to the OAU chairman, Ugandan President Idi Amin, and let him try to arrange talks between Savimbi and the Popular Movement.

There are no indications that Neto would be receptive to talks with Savimbi. Neto asserts firmly committed to a military solution in Angola and determined to exclude both Savimbi and National Front leader Holden Roberto from any future political role.

Savimbi asked for Kofi's mediation one day after meeting in Kinshasa with Zairian President Mobutu, the National Front's principal backer.

The Popular Movement is claiming new battlefield gains in central Angola.

According to press reports, Cuban-led Popular Movement forces have taken the port of Naco Redondo, some 100 miles north of the National Union's key oil fields and port complex at Lobito.

Popular Movement forces are moving toward Alto Hama, an important road junction some 50 miles from Huambo (Nova Lohwe), the capital of the nominal National Union - National Front government.

Fighting also continued over the weekend around the eastern city of Tete and Zaire, but neither the National Union nor the Popular Movement scored significant gains. In southern Angola, the Popular Movement still has not made a determined bid to take the National Front's remaining strongpoints at Sango, Antonio de Zaire and Sao Salvador.
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, October 2, 1976. Classification abbreviations precede each paragraph. The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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ANGOLA: Military Operations

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ANGOLA: Military Operations

The Neto government is carrying out military operations against National Union insurgents in southern Angola near the Namibian border. Government forces are being supported by Cubans and apparently also by some guerrillas of the South West Africa People's Organization.

The operations have sparked serious unrest among the population on the Angolan side of the border between Calque and Pereira de Eca. The South African government confirmed earlier this week that construction has been suspended at two key points—Calque and Ruacana—of the joint Angolan–South African Cunene hydroelectric project. Work at Calque was halted at the request of the Angolan government.

The Angolans have disputed news stories in the South African media indicating that the operations have resulted in widespread killing of innocent persons. According to the stories, refugees reaching Namibia this week claimed that 500 persons had been killed since the operations began last weekend.

The Angolan–Namibian border area is likely to become the scene of increasing military activity in the months ahead. The Neto regime is anxious to extend its authority to the border and, with Cuban help, has established a number of garrisons in the area.

SWAPO would like to step up its incursions into Namibia from Angola, especially now that South Africa's control over the territory is attracting international attention. Until recently, SWAPO conducted its limited guerrilla operations mainly from Zambia.
The South Africans, who have been concerned over the border area for some time, apparently believe the present operations in Angola are designed to provide support for future SWAPO incursions into Namibia.

South African forces have apparently been carrying on limited operations of their own in southern Angola with the assistance of anti-Neto Angolans. Neto's forces captured a South African soldier and three Angolans in southeastern Angola in late August.
Popular Movement in Angola Takes Towns North of Luanda

The military position of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola north of Luanda has improved following the receipt of substantial new military assistance from the USSR and Cuba.

The Popular Movement captured both Castra and the neighboring coastal town of Sara de Dande from the National Front last weekend.

The loss of the two towns is a serious setback for the National Front, which has been pushed back to the Lufira River, more than 60 miles from Luanda.

National Front President Holden Roberto nor the commander of the Zambian troops assisting the Front is optimistic that the defensive line can be held if the Popular Movement pushes on toward Ambiri, a Front stronghold in the north.

We do not have fife information on operations of the National Union column approaching Luanda from the south.

The National Front and National Union have finally announced the composition of the coalition government they proclaimed on November 11. According to press reports from Kinshasa, the two groups have set up a 12-man government with two prime ministers of equal rank, each of whom will hold office alternately for one month at a time.

The prime ministerial posts will be filled by Johny Eduardo Chibaka of the National Front and Jose Ndula of the National Union. They had been the ranking representatives of each respective group in the transitional Angolan government that collapsed last summer.

The actual leaders of the two groups, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, have not taken official positions. They are both unwilling to let themselves be identified with a fragile regime that so far has won no international recognition.
Angolan Group May Receive Soviet MiGs

MIG crates reportedly were included in Soviet equipment delivered to an air base in Congo last weekend;

The MiGs now being assembled by Soviet technicians in Congo will be delivered to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, perhaps in the next few days.

The planes will give the Popular Movement a big psychological edge. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola has been expecting the Popular Movement to obtain MiGs and has been soliciting anti-aircraft guns and air support from Zairian President Mobutu.

Because the Popular Movement has no trained pilots, it is likely that the MiGs would be flown by Cubans. The number of Cuban military personnel working with the Popular Movement in Angola and Congo may have increased to between 1,000 and 2,000 since late September. The Cubans have been participating in the fighting and have been providing the Popular Movement a wide range of combat support.
Angola's National Union Is Said To Capture Key Railroad Town

Forces of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola have captured the railroad town of Talemba de Sousa. The "national union" now apparently controls the entire length of the railway line from Talemba de Sousa to Benguela and Lobito, which were captured earlier this month in joint operations with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

NATIONAL UNION President Jose Savimbi hopes to have the railroad reopened to Zambia and Zaire to facilitate the movement of troops. Press reports from Luanda indicate that Soviet "troops" have arrived at Moxico on Thursday. According to the East Europeans, the Soviets will pilot MiG-21s, operate tanks, and act as advisors for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

We cannot confirm the arrival of Soviet soldiers in such numbers. It is reasonable, however, to expect some Soviet military advisers and civilian technicians to turn up in view of the substantial amounts of material Moscovita is providing the Popular Movement.

It seems more likely that Cabinda rather than Soviets will place any MiGs that may appear in Angola. The Soviets have been using Cabinda to support the Popular Movement in the field to avoid—or at least limit—their own involvement.
The Daily Summary

South Africa/Anhola: As South assistance to the Popular movement has increased and become more overt, South Africa has expanded considerably its support for the movements and liberation groups in Angola, the National Front and National Union.

South Africa Increases Support for Political Groups in Angola

South African support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola has expanded considerably. In the past few weeks, though we do not know how many South Africans are involved in the fighting.

For many months after the Portuguese coup in April 1974, South Africa maintained a relatively detached view of developments in Angola. Prime Minister Vorster maintained direct contact with Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, although Vorster does not appear to have given him firm commitments of assistance.

Vorster reassessed its position last summer as the situation in Angola shifted toward civil war, and Soviet assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola increased and became more open. At that time, the Popular Movement ousted the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union from Luanda and began to gain a military advantage in areas farther south in Angola.

In September

Top Secret

The South African government is upset by the fighting in Angola where National Front and National Union troops would be trained and equipped with South African arms for an eventual effort to retake the port of Lobito.

South Africa advisers were to conduct the training and accompany the Angolan forces during operations. Reports indicated it would supply financial and material assistance to the National Front for use elsewhere in Angola.

South Africa has since provided the National Front with heavy equipment, artillery, and armored cars. It also sent small units of South African forces overseas.

(See South Africa, Page 4)
South African Support...

From Page 1

Pretoria allotted several artillery pieces and gun crews directly to National Front headquarters at Ambela in northern Angola. The gun crews have been in action with the National Front north of Luanda.

The impact of this assistance has been substantial. The recent successes of the National Front and National Union in recapturing several outposts and pushing the Popular Movement back toward Luanda could not have been achieved without South African assistance. The South Africans are skeptical that the Front's campaign north of Luanda—bogged down for several weeks—will be as effective.

Near Future

Pretoria's commitment is not suspended. Prime Minister Vorster has carefully reviewed each step of the growing involvement before giving his approval and at one point seriously considered withdrawing before Angola became independent on November 11. Pretoria finally decided to stay for the near future, apparently because of the success of the National Front-National Union push into central Angola.

Vorster may also have been encouraged by the general absence of criticism of South African involvement. Pretoria has not experienced widespread condemnation from either black Africa or the international community, and Vorster's efforts at detente with black Africa do not appear to have suffered.

Nonetheless, Vorster also realizes that withdrawal of the advisers now would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the National Front-National Union campaign.

National Union forces do not have the expertise to fight on without outside advisers, instructors, and technicians.

Vorster is concerned over the growing Soviet and Cuban support of the Popular Movement, particularly the appearance of close to 3,000 Cubans in Angola and Cabinda. In a recent talk with US officials in Pretoria, he was clearly worried that this may tip the balance again in favor of the Popular Movement. If this happens, he will pull out South African personnel on short notice, though he might be willing to continue support of the Angolan groups.

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Discussion of Short-Term Prospects in Angola

Prospects for a political solution are currently remote, since at present there exists no basis for agreement among the three movements for participation in a government of national unity.

The military advantage in Angola already appears to be shifting once again in favor of the FNLA, largely owing to substantially increased foreign military assistance. Angola’s strong ethnic and regional divisions, reflected in the three liberation movements and militarized by the fighting among them, will make it exceedingly difficult for any one movement to gain effective political and military control over the entire country.

Nevertheless, it may soon be possible for the FNLA to challenge the MPLA and UNITA in their ethnic strongholds in the north and south, and to extend its military presence throughout much of the territory. Even so, the FNLA would continue to be threatened by serious political and military opposition, and its Luanda-based regime would be both politically and economically unstable, possibly for years to come.

Ideally, some kind of political solution could be found in which all three of the movements...
Prospects in Angola...

Angola's liberation groups could participate in a government of national unity. The major obstacle to a government of national unity is the MPLA, which has arrogated to itself the role of Angola's government. It has been encouraged to maintain an uncompromising stand toward its rivals by the massive military and political support it is receiving from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The future of the FNLA and UNITA depends on their ability to force the MPLA, either militarily or politically, into accepting them into a government of national unity. While this seems to be UNITA's preferred option, it is less certain that the FNLA would even now be prepared to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA.

The ability of FNLA and UNITA to force a military settlement depends on their obtaining continued military assistance on a par with that provided the MPLA by Moscow and Havana. Without this support FNLA-UNITA strength is likely to erode gradually, leaving them dependent on foreign political pressure to convince the MPLA to agree to a coalition government.

Equally important is the ability of the two movements, which have both suffered serious organizational weaknesses in the past, to survive the likely intensification of MPLA military pressure. Moreover, the support of Moscow and Havana that still exists between the FNLA and UNITA, their continued political and military cooperation cannot be taken as certain.

The MPLA's political dominance is by no means assured. The MPLA's African supporters have mounted a campaign to reverse the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) policy of neutrality toward Angola and gain OAU endorsement of the MPLA.

The longer the fighting continues without a political solution in sight, the greater will be the pressure within the OAU to grant recognition to the MPLA in order to avoid protracted and acrimonious debate over the Angola problem, which has already placed severe strains on African unity.

Initially, Portugal's refusal to recognize either of the self-proclaimed "governments" in Angola influenced many non-African countries to remain neutral. Leftist pressures in Lisbon and "radical" African pressure on the OAU to recognize the MPLA continue, however.

If Lisbon and the OAU, or even significant numbers of OAU members, recognize the MPLA regime, there will be little reason for other countries not to follow suit. If Lisbon refuses to extend recognition, its position eventually will become irrelevant—if it has not already—and more countries will look to the OAU for guidance on recognition.
USSR/ANGOLA: The Soviets are giving extensive military support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Their high visibility of their role has drawn criticism from African leaders. The People's Forces of the Popular Movement, meanwhile, are rushing to meet advancing troops of the joint National Front-National Union forces some 150 miles south of Luanda. (Page 5)
Highly Visible Soviet Role in Angola Upsets Other African Nations

The Soviet Union moved quickly last week to recognize the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as the sole legitimate governing authority in the former Portuguese territory and to establish diplomatic relations with it. The Soviets derived one benefit from recognition—a key fig leaf for the shift of military equipment to the Movement; it was the most extensive shift ever conducted by the Soviet Union south of the Sahara. It also brought sharp anti-Soviet responses from a number of sub-Saharan nations.

High Visibility

The high visibility of the Soviet role in Angola is a break with the past. Three years ago Moscow seemed to be losing interest in the Popular Movement, weakened by factional strife and no longer able to appease the all-powerful leader of the Angolan liberation struggle, the Movement did not seem likely to force an end to Portuguese rule. Its prospects changed with the fall of the Cartago regime in April 1974, and the Soviets moved quickly to strengthen the military capabilities of the Popular Movement. In addition to training movements, the Soviets provided an array of military hardware.

By independence the Movement was well stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine guns and grenade launchers, as well as heavier items like 30-mm. mortars, 81-mm. recoilless rifles, and 120-mm. rocket launchers. The Movement also obtained armored cars, trucks, armed personnel carriers, and anti-tank weapons. It was, and is, far and away the best equipped of the contending groups in Angola.

Soviets pressure on Uganda to recognize the Movement until OAU chairman Idi Amin’s features and was one reason for last week’s “temporary” rupture in relations between Moscow and the Angolans.

Rejection outside of sub-Saharan Africa is far less than expected. The Soviets clearly will be disappointed if theajaran is brought before the UN. But Moscow almost certainly expected a sharp reaction to its activities, and the decision to pull out the stop for the Popular Movement probably was based on the calculation that the gains were worth the price.

Soviet Objectives

Angola is a rich prize compared to the other former Portuguese African territories; it has major resources of oil and other minerals. The Soviets have no compelling need for these resources, but they might want to hinder Western access to them.

Strategically, Angola could be of some interest to the Soviets if they are contemplating expansion of their naval activities in the South Atlantic.

Politically, an Angolan military presence could provide a platform from which the Soviets might expand into adjacent areas, particularly southern Africa.

None of the Soviet objectives will be reached overnight, and Moscow may not necessarily expect a quick return on its investment. It has made the Popular Movement.

The specter of China looms large in Soviet thinking, and China supports another Angolan faction.

Moscow would like to put the lie to assertions from Peking that Soviet imperialism does not support the aspirations of the third world. The message to be conveyed is that Moscow pays off.

A related message may be intended for the US—that the USSR has the will, and the capability, to compete with the US for influence in peripheral areas of the globe.

The heavy domestic coverage the Soviet press has given Angola raises a possibility that internal political reasons contributed to Moscow’s support of the Popular Movement.

Angola may be seen as providing an opportunity for the Kremlin to demonstrate adherence to and support for revolutionary movements, something that is more important, if not necessarily well, Angola can be cited as tangible evidence that despite some setbacks, events are moving in ways favorable to the Soviet Union.

New Battle Brewing in Angola

Forces of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, comprising by Cuban aid, are busily preparing to meet advancing troops of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola about 150 miles southwest of Luanda. The Popular Movement has also established a heavy defense center around the Camerun treasure, which supplies the capital’s electric power. It is near Dundo, a town 100 miles south of Luanda, that fell earlier this week.

The northward advance of the National Front-National Union force has given every appearance of being unstoppable. It is being led by South Africans and Portuguese professional soldiers who understand the tactics and logistics of such an advance.

Moreover, the Popular Movement has proven to give ground faster than expected. The fighting has now reached a point where the Popular Movement has fallen back as far as it can and is expected to end and it may be preparing to make a stand. South African officials have indicated that if the Angolans continue to be so heavily moving so far north, they might order their troops out, a factor that could tip the balance of military power back in the Popular Movement's favor.
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola from March through December 1975

Top Secret

NIO IIM 76-004C
24 January 1976

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January 24, 1976

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola from March through December 1975

Key Points

The intelligence community estimates that:

-- The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba shipped about 20,000 tons of military equipment to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from March through December 1975.

-- Soviet and East European sea shipments totaled some 12,500 tons, and a Soviet airlift added another 2,000 tons.

-- Cuban merchant ships delivered about 5,500 tons of military equipment.

-- Cuba also sent to Angola in this period some 7,500 Cuban military personnel, and the USSR sent about 400 military advisers.

-- Valued in equivalent US prices, this Soviet and Cuban support from March through December 1975 would be on the order of $200 million. With the evidence available to us, we can calculate an estimate of $179

1/This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the National Security Agency.

2/A Soviet-Cuban airlift has continued to move Cuban troops into Angola since the end of 1975, and as of 22 January 1976 a total of about 11,000 Cuban military personnel had been sent to Angola. On that date, this troop airlift came to an end, at least temporarily, although additional Cuban troops may still be moving into Angola by ship.
million. Since this figure has been deliberately based on conservative judgments, however, and taking into account some evidence which cannot yet be quantified, we believe that this may understate the total by some $20 million.1/

- Military equipment delivered to Angola accounts for $144 million of the $179 million.2/

- The cost (wages, maintenance, etc.) of Soviet and Cuban personnel in Angola accounts for $22 million.

- The cost of transporting Soviet and Cuban equipment and personnel to Angola accounts for $13 million.

1/ Since 1 January 1976, the Soviet and Cuban sealift/airlift in support of the MPLA has continued. Between 1 and 22 January, the cut-off date of this report, there have been two voyages by Soviet ships carrying military equipment to the Angolan region; two additional Soviet arms carriers are probably en route. There have also been four voyages by Cuban-owned or controlled ships carrying Cuban troops and/or military equipment, and six additional ships with similar cargo mixes are probably en route to the Angolan region. In addition, three Cubana Bristol Britannia aircraft flights have been made to West Africa with Cuban troops and 14 Soviet-piloted long range IL-62 flights have ferried Cuban troops to the Angolan region. There were no Soviet flights originating in the USSR to the Angola region between 1 and 20 January, but several flights to Angola left the USSR on 21-22 January. We cannot estimate the monetary value of these additional deliveries until further information becomes available.

2/ Some reports indicate that the MPLA may have MIG-type jets. We have no confirmation of this. If the Soviets have sent MIGs to Angola, however, they would probably be either MIG-17s or MIG-21s. The US equivalent price for a single MIG-17 is $750,000, and the US equivalent price for a single MIG-21 is $1.7 million. In addition, we believe that the MPLA possesses surface-to-air missiles, but we are unable to determine how many. Thus, we have not included them in our estimates on the value of the military equipment sent to Angola. Assuming that the Soviet missiles are roughly comparable to the US Redeye missile, each Soviet surface-to-air missile sent to Angola would raise the total by about $14,300 in equivalent US prices.
-- With this Soviet and Cuban assistance -- both materiel and trained manpower -- the MPLA side has become by far the best equipped and militarily the strongest of the contending factions in Angola. The equipment provided to the MPLA has included:

- T-34 medium tanks and PT-76 light tanks.
- BRDM armored cars and armored personnel carriers.
- 122-mm long-range rockets and truck mounted rocket launchers.
- Antiaircraft guns.
- Sagger antitank missiles.
- Recoilless rifles.
NOTE: The figures contained in this memorandum present the US intelligence community's best estimate of the amounts and value of communist military assistance to Angola from March through December 1975. The estimate is based on information collected and collated from a variety of intelligence sources, and some reports are more reliable and complete than others. In a number of cases, the data are incomplete and imprecise. The accuracy of our estimates will improve as additional information becomes available.

1. Moscow has backed the MPLA since it was founded in 1956 with the aid of the small, clandestine Angolan Communist Party. During the early years of the MPLA's existence, the Soviets gave it a steady though moderate supply of military and financial aid, much of it channeled through Congo, Zambia and Tanzania. In the early 1970s the level of Moscow's aid diminished, as the MPLA's prospects for control of Angola appeared to deteriorate, in large part because it was weakened by internal factional strife.

2. In the months following the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal in April 1974, the USSR reassessed its policy toward Angola and decided to expand its support to the MPLA. In March 1975 Soviet aid increased markedly. Cuba, which had been providing very small scale support to the MPLA since the early 1960s, apparently sent a contingent of military advisers last spring and markedly expanded its aid beginning in September 1975.

Equipment Deliveries

3. Most of the military equipment and supplies sent to the MPLA during the period under review were by sea on Soviet, East European, and Cuban ships. The USSR has also employed aircraft to deliver high priority weapons, ammunition, and other items, and the Cubans have used both merchant ships and aircraft to move equipment and troops into Angola.
4. Overall, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Cuba shipped at least 20,000 tons of military equipment and supplies between March 1975 and year's end. Included in the Soviet deliveries have been T-34 medium and PT-76 light tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), BRDM armored cars, 122-mm truck-mounted rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, antiaircraft guns, and probably SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.* Most of the Cuban deliveries have been small arms and ammunition, but Cuba has also provided some trucks, APCs, and T-34 tanks.

5. Soviet and East European Sea Shipments: From March through December 1975, 26 Soviet, 6 East German, and 3 Yugoslav ships offloaded a total of some 12,500 tons of arms and military equipment, mostly in Pointe Noire, Congo and Luanda, Angola (see Annexes 2 and 3). The Soviet ships, accounting for perhaps 12,000 tons of the total, operated both out of the Black Sea—the USSR's traditional staging point for military deliveries—and the Baltic. A small amount of communist arms for the MPLA, was delivered to Dar es Salaam by at least one Soviet ship. A small amount of military supplies, transshipped from other African ports, was probably carried on East German and Yugoslav ships.

6. Soviet Airlift: The Soviets began to deliver arms by air in March 1975. Intermittent flights were reported for the next six months with most planes landing in Congo. The major Soviet airlift for the Angolan fighting began on October 29, 1975 and by the end of December Soviet military transports had made 44 flights (35 by AN-22 heavy transports and 9 by AN-12 medium transports) to Angola. The flights delivered an estimated 2,000 tons of military equipment, including ammunition, tanks, and other heavy equipment. In addition, small arms were carried on at least 12 shuttle flights by Soviet aircraft between Congo and Angola.

7. There have been numerous reports that the Soviets have supplied MIG-type aircraft to the MPLA.

* We do not have information on the number of Soviet surface-to-air missiles in Angola, and therefore have not included them in the tonnages or dollar values used in this memorandum. But assuming that they are roughly comparable to the US Redeye missile, each Soviet missile in Angola would add about $14,300 in equivalent US prices.
have indicated that 8 or 12 MIG aircraft have been provided and that some of these were being assembled at Luanda airport in late December or early January.

Cuban pilots and ground support personnel are in Angola. Nevertheless, we have as yet no conclusive information on the presence of MIGs in Angola (the only jet aircraft known to be in the MPLA inventory are a few older jets left by the Portuguese). Thus, we have not included any MIG aircraft in our estimates either of the tonnage or value of goods delivered to the MPLA.

8. In addition, the MPLA has employed helicopters in Angola. Some helicopters were left in Angola when the Portuguese departed, but there is a possibility that the Soviets may have sent others. Because of the inconclusive nature of the evidence, we have not included helicopters in either Table 1 or 2. If the Soviets have sent helicopters, the most likely would be the MI-8, and a single Soviet MI-8 helicopter would cost about $1.35 million in US equivalent costs.

9. Cuban Deliveries by Sea: Cuban merchant ships made a total of 11 or 12 voyages between Cuba and West African ports between early September and the end of the year. They delivered an estimated 5,500 tons of military equipment and some 4,000 armed forces personnel to Angola by sea (see Annex 4). Some of the ships are believed to have carried only personnel, others mostly military equipment, and the remainder a mix of the two. Most of the ships offloaded at the ports of Pointe Noire, Congo and/or Porto Amboim and Luanda, Angola. At least two, however, may have discharged some of their cargoes in Conakry for subsequent movement to Angola by Soviet aircraft, and at least two other Cuban ships may have been involved in a shuttle operation from Conakry to Pointe Noire and Luanda. A few of the Cuban ships may also have transferred part of their cargo to Cuban fishing ships in West African waters for delivery to smaller ports in Angola and Congo.
10. Ships involved in the Cuban sealift operation at any one
time account for about 10 percent of Cuba’s merchant fleet and
are drawn primarily from Cuba’s trade with Western Europe. Most
of the ships are believed to have loaded in Mariel, Cuba’s tightly
controlled military port 40 miles west of Havana.

11. Cuban Airlift: From late September through the end
of 1975, Cuba employed four or five civil aircraft -- three Britan-
nias and one and possibly two IL-18s -- on about 45 flights to
transport 3,500 Cuban military personnel and very small amounts
of arms and ammunition to West African airports for ultimate
deployment in Angola. Until mid-December, a total of 37 flights
operated via Barbados, a regional refueling point. Thereafter --
precluded from using Barbados by US pressure on the island --
subsequent flights to Africa have operated via the Azores, Guyana,
Gander, and the Cape Verde Islands.*

Estimated Cost of Communist Military Aid

12. The monetary value assigned to Soviet, East European
and Cuban assistance to the MPLA from March through December 1975
depends on whether Soviet trade prices are used or US prices
for comparable goods and services are used. The latter are,
on the average, significantly higher, but they give a more
accurate representation of how much an equivalent amount of aid
would cost in American terms. (Communist costs tend to be lower,
because wage and price structures are vastly different from those

* Since the beginning of 1976 -- beyond the time-frame covered by
this memorandum -- the Cuban airlift potential has been augmented
by the introduction of Soviet-piloted long-range IL-62s. As of
22 January, 14 IL-62 flights had flown from Havana to Angola
with a refueling stop in Conakry. If the planes carried troops
and personal baggage, each aircraft could transport as many as
200 men. The use of the IL-62s significantly improves Cuba's
ability to support its forces in Angola. In addition, five
Cubana Bristol Britannia aircraft flights and one IL-13 flight
have been made to West Africa with Cuban troops in the same period.
We believe that as of 22 January a total of about 11,000 Cuban
troops had been sent to Angola. On that date, this troop air-
lift came to an end, at least temporarily, although additional
Cuban troops may still be moving into Angola by ship.
in the US.) The intelligence community's best estimates of the cost of communist aid to the MPLA are presented in both ways in the table below, and cover equipment, manpower and transportation costs. The first figure in each case is the estimate based on US costs. The second figure, which appears in parentheses, is the estimate based on Soviet foreign trade prices for equipment and Soviet or Cuban cost for services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviet and East European Aid</th>
<th>Cuban Aid</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>$100 (52)</td>
<td>$44 (2.3)</td>
<td>$144 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>20 (4)</td>
<td>22 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>7 (3)</td>
<td>13 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$108 (56)</td>
<td>$71 (30)</td>
<td>$179 (86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. **Equipment Costs**: Table 2 lists in more detail the Soviet and East European equipment delivered to the MPLA, and shows both sets of prices.

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We have more confidence in the reliability of our estimates on the large items of equipment than on the list of small arms and other infantry weapons. Much of the larger equipment has been sighted in combat by trained military observers.
14. Though much of the small arms and other infantry weapons were seen in combat situations, the amount received is hard to quantify. Large quantities of small arms were noted while being unloaded from ships or aircraft and in some cases were identified by crate sizes and markings. Shipments were made by a wide range of sources from assets with professional backgrounds through observers who have little or no familiarity with military equipment.

The weight of the equipment shown in Table 2 is almost 12,500 tons and the cargoes received from the Soviets from March through December were some 15 percent higher, or about 14,500 tons, including small amounts of POL.

16. Our estimates of military deliveries from Cuba—which for the most part have remained in the hands of Cuban troops but are still a form of aid to the MPLA—are based on far less precise evidence. We can calculate with fair accuracy the total tonnage of Cuban deliveries, but have little evidence on the type of arms involved. Lacking a better method of estimating the value of Cuban deliveries, we have assumed that the mix of Cuban arms is similar to that of Soviet equipment deliveries. We then calculated the average prices per ton of Soviet arms shipments (in both Soviet and US prices), and applied those prices to the tonnage total of Cuban shipments. The US equivalent cost of Cuban arms deliveries is thus estimated to be $44 million, and the value in Soviet trade prices to be $23 million.

17. Manpower Costs: In 1975, the Soviet military advisors supporting the MPLA in Angola and Congo cost the USSR an estimated $1.7 million in US prices (rounded to $2 million in Table 1).
Table 2

Estimated Amounts and Types of Soviet Equipment Delivered to KPLA
March through December 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pieces of Equipment</th>
<th>Estimated Soviet Trade Prices 1/</th>
<th>Equivalent US Prices 2/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$51,719</td>
<td>$100,073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Major Equipment**

T-34 tanks
45
4,500
27,000

PT-76 light tanks
43
3,223
13,459

Armored personnel-carrying
BTR 40, BTR 50, BTR 60
91
8,162
17,199

Various light armored vehicles
206
5,768
7,210

ZPU 4 AA machine guns
26
260
820

30 mm and 37 mm AA guns
9
225
1,980

10-ton trucks
80
480
1,000

7-ton trucks
2
16
40

GAZ-63 trucks
50
150
400

Converted landing craft
3
732
750

122 mm truck mounted rocket
15
525
3254

launchers

122 mm howitzers
8
104
300

85 mm field guns
4
12
200

76 mm divisional guns
6
105
1024

Tank transporters
2
42
75

Communications vans
6
210
600

**Small Arms and Other Infantry Weapons**

122 mm rockets
15,000
4,515
4,515

120 mm mortars
40
42
228

82 mm B-10 recoilless rifles
700
2,660
3,500

82 mm mortars
530
473
1,167

RPG-2 grenade launchers
1,000
40
230

RPG-7 grenade launchers
375
690
154

SA-7 SAM

82 anti-tank missiles (including launchers with control systems)
10 launchers
90
440

100 missiles
800
450

12.7 mm heavy machine guns
100
200
400

7.62 mm light machine guns
2,070
2,070
1,460

7.62 mm carbines SKS
5,000
500
250

7.62 mm submachine guns
1,800
180
270

7.62 mm pistols
1,000
100
100

AK-47 rifles
13,900
1,390
2,154

Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines
20,000
200
520

Hand grenades
196,000
800
588

Electric generators
20
100
400

Ammunition
4,000 tons
11,200
10,000

Tactical communication (man pack and vehicle mounted)
812
893
1,484

1/ Based on estimated Soviet trade prices to LDC customers.
2/ Based on prices of comparable US equipment currently in use.
3/ Most are unidentified, but the majority are probably scout-type vehicles.
4/ No comparable US equipment.
The equivalent costs in Soviet prices for this period are slightly higher than in US prices.* Based on the limited information available, the following tabulation gives our best estimate of the number of Soviet advisors supporting the MPLA since January 1975 and associated costs:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>No. of Personnel</th>
<th>Million US $ Cost To USSR</th>
<th>US Equivalent Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan-June</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Dec</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* We estimate that the total cost of employing one Soviet military technician for one year in Angola to be about $13,500. This estimate is based on information from available Soviet military aid agreements with LDCs. The cost figure considers both foreign exchange expenditures, including salary, round trip fare from Moscow with luggage, insurance, leave, and transfer allowance of 30 percent of salary if employed for over a year, and local currency outlays such as quarters and medical care. Our estimate of $12,000 for employing one US military technician in a nation like Angola for one year is based on average US pay and allowances, and does not include transport and other support costs that could increase the figure by at least 25 percent. It should be noted that the average rank of US military technicians serving in LDCs is well below that of Soviet technicians, which tends to offset the higher US pay scale and makes US costs comparable.
18. In addition, several hundred MPLA officers received military training in the USSR and Cuba during the March-December period. The cost of this training is estimated at more than one million dollars in US equivalent costs.

19. The number of Cuban military personnel sent to Angola rose from about 300 in the fall of 1975 to around 7,500 by the end of 1975. The total cost of supporting such a contingent -- which may be shared or picked up entirely by the USSR -- is estimated at $4 million in Cuban prices, based on an average monthly salary for Cuban military personnel of $75 per man plus $225 a month per man for field support. Equivalent US costs would be $20 million (see the following table).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>No. of Personnel</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>US Force Operating in West Africa*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Sept-Dec 1975: 4.2 (rounded to 4.0) 20.4 (rounded to 20.0)

* A cost of about $17,600 per man per year was derived on the basis of the annual recurring cost of a US infantry brigade base with four infantry battalions and one armored battalion. The figures represent personnel operation, maintenance and recurring procurement costs.

20. Transportation Costs: Total transportation costs incurred by the USSR and Cuba from March through December 1975 in the air and sea movement of men and material are estimated at
$13 million in US equivalent prices and $5 million in Soviet and Cuban prices. The estimate of Cuban and Soviet transport expenses are based primarily on direct operating cost of the aircraft and ships involved. The US equivalent costs are those which would be incurred by agencies of the US Government moving similar types and quantities of goods over comparable distances.

21. **Soviet Funding of Cuban Assistance.** Soviet and Cuban efforts in Angola appear to be closely integrated. In addition to sending troops and associated equipment to Angola, the Cubans are also supplying personnel to operate most of the more sophisticated Soviet equipment. Not only does this provide the needed manpower to man the Soviet weapons, but it also has allowed the Soviets to maintain a lower profile in their support to the MPLA.

22. A persuasive case can be made that the Soviets are picking up most of the Cuban costs. The stock of arms which the Cubans had prior to their increased involvement in Angola was not in excess of what they appeared to need internally, and the 5,500 tons of military equipment which the Cubans delivered to Angola from March through December 1975 would have depleted their stocks. We believe that this is the reason the Soviets increased their military shipments to Cuba in 1975 to 15,000 tons, compared to a 1967-1974 yearly average of about 11,000 tons. Much, if not all, of the 4,000 ton increase probably represents reimbursement to the Cubans for the materiel they have shipped to Angola.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Ship</th>
<th>Port of Departure</th>
<th>Date of Departure</th>
<th>Port of Arrival</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Cargo Offloaded*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Franz Bogush</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>30 March</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>11/17 Apr</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,028 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapitan Voolens</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>+/- Apr</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>7/17 May</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,145 GRT</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapitan Georgi</td>
<td>Nikolaev</td>
<td>29 Apr</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baglary</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,262 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyarnu</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>+/- May</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>11/15 June</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,236 GRT</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iosif Dubrovskiy</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>+/- May</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>12/20 June</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,555 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Libknecht</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>24 May</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,280 GRT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I Soviet</td>
<td>Porto Amboim</td>
<td>Mid Aug</td>
<td>289</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I Soviet</td>
<td>Porto Amboim</td>
<td>Mid Aug</td>
<td>154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transbalt</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>1 Aug</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>19/31 Aug</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,206 GRT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>U/I Soviet</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>7/14 Sept</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Ship</td>
<td>Port of Departure</td>
<td>Date of Departure</td>
<td>Port of Arrival</td>
<td>Date of Arrival</td>
<td>Cargo Offloaded</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I Soviet</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>7/14 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I Soviet</td>
<td>Porto Amboim</td>
<td>16 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Rusakov</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>-/- Sept</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>30 Sept</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,551 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akademik</td>
<td>Nikolaev</td>
<td>9 Sept</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>2/3 Oct</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millionschikov</td>
<td>Batave</td>
<td>19/23 Sept</td>
<td>Noire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,100 GRT</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>27/30 Sept</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapitan Kadetskiy</td>
<td>Nikolaev</td>
<td>6 Sept</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>2/12 Oct</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,278 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leninskaya Gvardiya</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>1 Oct</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>18/22 Oct</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,555 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,555 GRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrey Andreyev</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>-/- Oct</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>30 Oct/ 4 Nov</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,555 GRT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I Soviet</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>1 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,555 GRT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klim Voroshilov</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>6/8 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>13/21 Nov</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,173 GRT</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>22 Nov/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Dec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Ship</td>
<td>Port of Departure</td>
<td>Date of Departure</td>
<td>Port of Arrival</td>
<td>Date of Arrival</td>
<td>Cargo Offloaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurg Kurako</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>5 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>21/24 Nov</td>
<td>1710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olga Varentsova</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>12 Nov</td>
<td>Pointe</td>
<td>28 Nov/9 Dec</td>
<td>765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapitan Leoncji</td>
<td>Nikolaev</td>
<td>16 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>30 Nov/2 Dec</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapitan Kushnarenko</td>
<td>Nikolaev</td>
<td>30 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>14/20 Dec</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leninskaya Gvardiya</td>
<td>Tallin</td>
<td>2 Dec</td>
<td>Pointe</td>
<td>23 Dec</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petr Yemtssov</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>12 Dec</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>27 Dec/3 Jan</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated tons.
### Cuban Ships Suspected of Involvement In The Delivery of Military Equipment
#### And/or Personnel to the Angolan Region
##### September-December 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>GT</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Port of Origin/Date</th>
<th>Port of Destination/Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Mariel Early Sept</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 24-26 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana/Mariel Mid-Sept (Estimate)</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 5 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral Islands 8,932</td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalian2</td>
<td>Mariel 18-19 Sep</td>
<td>Porto Amboim 5-6 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Ferlioco 7,552</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana 17-24 Sept</td>
<td>Porto Amboim 7-9 Oct Pointe Noire 11-19 Oct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1/ Data not confirmed
2/ \[\text{Somalian}\]
### Annex 3

**Suspected East German and Yugoslav Arms Carriers to Angola 1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Port of Departure</th>
<th>Port of Arrival</th>
<th>Cargo Offloaded</th>
<th>Estimated*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lausitz (East German)</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5,528 GRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-/-</td>
<td>-/- April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postojna (Yugoslav)</td>
<td>Ploce</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8,388 GRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23-27 Mar</td>
<td>22-30 April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lobito</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 June</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadro (Yugoslav)</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,775 GRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-/- May</td>
<td>-/ May</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/I (East German)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15 June-12 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24 May</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elbe (East German)</td>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>Luanda and Cabinda</td>
<td>15 June-12 July</td>
<td>2,815 GRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mila Gojalic (Yugoslav)</td>
<td>Rijeka</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wittenberg (East German)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>5,711 GRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-/ July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Marx Stadt (East German)</td>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>Pointe Noire</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>30 Sept/6 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wittenberg (East German)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>5,711 GRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated tons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>GRT</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Port of Origin/Date</th>
<th>Port of Destination/Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Plata</td>
<td>7,340</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana/Mariel 22-26 Sept</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 12-13 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceano Pacifico</td>
<td>6,650</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana 4-5 Nov</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 27-29 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Large Trawler)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam Heroico</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Mariel 4-6 Nov</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 1-3 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uvero</td>
<td>9,470</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana 5 Dec</td>
<td>Luanda 25-27 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lussia</td>
<td>9,391</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Mariel 20 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda 9-16 Dec</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 4

(Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>GT</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Port of Origin/Date</th>
<th>Port of Destination/Date</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IX Aniversario</td>
<td>7,725</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana 21 Nov</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 11-16 Dec</td>
<td>This ship is believed to have carried primarily personnel. It can be fitted out to carry as many as 700 persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mariel 24 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Jigue</td>
<td>9,408</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Huelitas 21 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda 12-26 Dec</td>
<td>First identified using special addressing procedures on 20 Nov, this ship may have carried primarily military equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mariel 24 Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carro Felado</td>
<td>9,290</td>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>Havana 22 Nov</td>
<td>Pointe Noire 17 Dec</td>
<td>First identified using special addressing procedures on 7 Dec, this ship is believed to have carried primarily military equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mariel 24 Nov</td>
<td>Luanda 19 Dec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ It is possible that only one Cuban ship was involved in these entries and that it made two port calls at Pointe Noire on a single voyage.

2/ The Coral Islands operates under the Somalian flag but is owned by the Cuban controlled Interislands Shipping Company headquartered in Hong Kong.
Contents

Angola-Cuba-South Africa: Military Balance on Border .......... 10
Disposition of Forces, 4 October 1988

Angola

South African Forces
20,000 troops
100 tanks

Cuban Forces
18,000 troops
500 tanks

Angolan Forces
4,000-5,000 troops
100 tanks

UNITA held

3020

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Special Analysis

ANGOLA-CUBA-SOUTH AFRICA: Military Balance on Border

The status of South African and Cuban-Angolan forces along the Angolan-Namibian border has changed little over the past few months, but the prospects for military confrontation in the area will increase sharply if the US-mediated regional negotiations fail. The formidable strategic advantage Havana established with its unprecedented deployment of troops to the border area early this year has been offset as Pretoria has substantially reinforced its positions in northern Namibia.

The major buildup of Cuban forces in Angola earlier this year fundamentally changed the military balance in the Angolan-Namibian border region. Cuba's moves put South Africa on the defensive, and when South African vulnerability was made evident by Cuban air attacks in the Caluequeh area this summer, Pretoria withdrew its forces from Angola. Although caught off guard, South Africa has taken advantage of the regional negotiations and military showdown to double its 10,000-troop contingent in northern Namibia. South Africa's forces in Namibia are not strong enough to initiate large-scale hostilities, but the reinforcements have addressed the most glaring deficiencies and have considerably raised the costs of a potential Cuban attack.

Strengths of Major Protagonists

The Cubans south of Angola's 16th parallel are concentrated in an area from Cahama to Xangongo to just north of Ruacana Falls. The force comprises some 18,000 combat troops and 500 tanks. It is organized into five tank brigades divided into 16 tactical groups—each with 600 to 800 troops—and into joint infantry battalions combined with Angolan and South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) forces. Each tactical group operates as an independent maneuver unit and is organized around a tank battalion and a mechanized infantry company, with its own antiaircraft, air defense, artillery, and support elements.

Airfields at Cahama and Xangongo provide air support for Cuban ground units and appear designed to support operations by Cuban MIG-23s. If it needs to reinforce its contingent in the southwest, Cuba has available three tactical groups from the southeast and additional air support from its three MIG-23 and one MIG-21 squadron deployed at major Angolan airfields.

continued
The Angolan Army also has participated in the Cuban push into the southwest. Luanda has approximately four brigades—totaling 4,000 to 5,000 troops—and about 100 tanks near the border but had no sizable military presence there before the Cuban redeployment. Increased UNITA operations throughout the country have kept Luanda from sending many additional units to the area.

Pretoria has an estimated 20,000 troops in northern Namibia, organized into three task forces that integrate armored South African Defense Force units with lightly armed black South-West Africa Territory Forces. Although South Africa's approximately 125 tanks are outgunned five to one, the terrain in the border area is more suited to Pretoria's about 1,000 wheeled fighting vehicles. Mobility will be increasingly important when the rainy season that begins in November complicates large-scale mechanized operations.

South Africa has not added much to its air forces in the region. The number of fighter and ground attack aircraft increased briefly in August—probably to cover the withdrawal from Angola.

Pretoria can bring Mirage combat aircraft from South Africa to Namibia within 24 hours, but strong air defenses around Cuban deployments and Havana's more advanced fighter aircraft will force Pretoria to be cautious in the use of largely irreplaceable air assets.

Prospects for a Confrontation

Havana's military moves almost certainly caused South Africa to begin serious regional negotiations, and, if the talks break down, Havana might again apply military pressure to restart them or to extract concessions from Pretoria. Substantial South African reinforcements along the border, however, have reduced Havana's strategic advantage and sharply increased the cost of any Cuban offensive into Namibia.

Although a major Cuban ground operation does not appear likely, Havana retains a strong comparative advantage in the air; if hostilities resume, Cuba would probably undertake limited strikes against specific targets, such as South African airfields in northern Namibia.
Area Briefs

June 13, 1978

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
ME A BRIEF AP-MEAB 78-091 FOR JUNE 13, 1978

//THERE IS NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIET AGGRESSIVENESS IN AFRICA WILL BE TEMPERED BY THE CURRENT LEVEL OF WESTERN OPPOSITION OR BY THEIR OWN AWARENESS

DATE: 
ORIG: 
UNIT: 
EXT: 
RELEASING OFFICER 
CLASSIFICATION 
COORDINATING OFFICERS 
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER 
E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 

FORM 11-73 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 
Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
THAT THE EXPANSION OF INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT HAS BEEN ON THE HORN. THERE ARE POLITICAL COSTS. BUT MOSCOW'S MAJOR CONCERN--HOW THE US WOULD REACT--IS EASED BY ITS AWARENESS OF THE GENERAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE WEST OVER HOW TO COUNTER THE SOVIETS IN AFRICA. AND WHEN MOSCOW EXAMINES HOW THE US MIGHT RETALIATE IN OTHER AREAS, IT PRESUMABLY CALCULATES THAT SUCH MAJOR ISSUES AS SALT WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED AND THAT PENALTIES IN OTHER AREAS WOULD BE BEARABLE.///

IMPACT ON SOVIET RELATIONS IN AFRICA.

///NEVERTHELESS, MOSCOW PRESUMABLY REALIZES THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN UNCONTROLABLE FACTORS IN THE AREA--WHICH CANNOT BE ASSESSED OR EVEN ANTICIPATED--THAT COULD INVOLVE POLITICAL COSTS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE FEAR AMONG MODERATE AFRICANS THAT THERE IS A SOVIET GRAND DESIGN FOR THE CONTINENT COULD FOSTER AFRICAN REGIONAL
UNITY--SUCH AS IN WEST AFRICA--AS WELL AS THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE. GUINEA PRESIDENT SEKOU TOURE'S RECENT EFFORTS TO LIMIT HIS DEALINGS WITH THE USSR AND TO MEND FENCES WITH HIS PRO-WESTERN NEIGHBORS IVORY COAST AND SENEGAL IS IN PART A REACTION TO INCREASING SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. THE WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE IVORY COAST, SENEGAL, AND LIBERIA TO SERVE AS MAJOR STAGING POINTS FOR THE WESTERN Airlift to Zaïre's Shaba Province last month was also a reaction to Soviet and Cuban military actions on the continent.///

THE KATANGAN INVASION OF SHABA NOT ONLY ENHANCES THE MODERATE AFRICAN PERCEPTION OF SOVIET PERFIDY BUT THREATENS TO COMPLICATE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. THE FRENCH REACTED STRONGLY TO THE INVASION AT THE NATO SUMMIT, WHICH COULD LEAD TO A STRENGTHENING OF TIES WITH THE US AND A WEAKENING OF TIES WITH THE USSR. PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE IS BEHIND PRESIDENT GISCARD'S EXPAN-
SION OF MILITARY INITIATIVES AND MORE ACTIVE POLITICAL ROLE IN AFRICA. GISCARD ENCOURAGED THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GUINEA, THE IVORY COAST, AND SENEGAL. RESOURCE-RICH AFRICA IS A NATURAL PARTNER FOR THE FRENCH, AND SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD IN THE LONG TERM WORK TO MOSCOW’S DISADVANTAGE.///

///A MORE PERVERSIVE SOVIET PRESENCE COULD PROVOKE AFRICAN POPULAR RESENTMENT, AND THERE ALREADY ARE INDICATIONS IN ANGOLA THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BEGINNING TO BE PERCEIVED AS NEO-COLONIALISTS, INTERESTED ONLY IN EXPLOITING THE COUNTRY’S RESOURCES. THE POPULAR PERCEPTION IN SUCH MODERATE COUNTRIES AS LIBERIA, UPPER VOLTA, GABON, AND CHAD IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO UNDERMINE STABILITY AND SEIZE VALUABLE RAW MATERIALS ON THE CONTINENT. SOVIETS AND ETHIOPIANS ARE NOW SPARRING OVER MOSCOW’S ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA, AND THE RECENT OUSTER OF THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR AND A SOUTH YEMENI OFFICIAL FROM ADDIS
ABABA WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A SIGNAL DIRECTED TO THE KREMLIN. MENGISTU PROBABLY RESENTS, MOREOVER, RECENT SOVIET HECTORING ON THE NEED FOR ADDIS TO ESTABLISH A "VANGUARD" MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY. HE HAS BEEN CONSPICUOUSLY SILENT ON THE SHABA INVASION, AND THE ETHIOPIAN MEDIA HAVE NOT REPLAYED SOVIET AND CUBAN DENIALS OF INVOLVEMENT.//Y

THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO ENCOUNTERING OPPOSITION FROM THE NONALIGNED STATES AND ARE PRESUMABLY ANTICIPATING OPPOSITION AT THE SUMMER SESSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. AFRICAN OPINION SYMPATHIZED WITH MOSCOW'S BEHAVIOR IN THE OGADEN, BUT MOST AFRICAN STATES REGARD THE ERITREAN PROBLEM AS AN INTERNAL ETHIOPIAN MATTER. SUCH IMPORTANT MODERATE STATES AS KENYA ARE ALREADY UNEASY ABOUT THE SOVIET AND CUBAN BUILDUP IN AFRICA, AND-- AS HAPPENED WITH THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA-- MOSCOW'S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ERITREA COULD LEAD TO A SPLIT IN OAU RANKS.//Y

THE SOVIETS ARE FACING DIFFICULTIES IN THE RHODESIAN
SITUATION BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S RESISTANCE TO INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL CUBANS INTO ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE LEADER NKOMO'S UNWILLINGNESS TO CLOSE THE DOOR TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN, AND MOZAMBIQUE PRESIDENT MACHEL'S INABILITY TO CONVINCE ZAPU AND ZANU TO COORDINATE THEIR MILITARY ACTIONS. THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO CONFRONT POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ANGOLA OVER THE LONGER RUN BECAUSE OF THE SORRY STATE OF THE ANGOLAN ECONOMY, THE INCREASE IN POPULAR DISCONTENT, AND THE CABINET SPLIT BETWEEN A PRO-SOVET FACTION AND THOSE ADVOCATING A MORE NONALIGNED FOREIGN POLICY AND A LESS RADICAL DOMESTIC PROGRAM. JONAS SAVIMBI'S UNITA POSES A GROWING POLITICAL AND MILITARY THREAT TO THE NETO REGIME THAT MAY EVENTUALLY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL CUBAN TROOPS. //U IMPACT ON SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. //U SOVIET ASSERTIVENESS IN THE OGADEN ON BEHALF OF ETHIOPIA DID NOT DAMAGE MOSCOW'S INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BECAUSE THE USSR'S ARAB FRIENDS—EVEN THOSE WHO
BACKED SOMALIA--GAVE THEIR NEED FOR SOVIET SUPPORT AGAINST ISRAEL A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY THAN THEIR SYMPATHY FOR SOMALIA. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A PROTRACTED WAR IN ERITREA, HOWEVER, HAS ALREADY DRAWN AN ADVERSE REACTION FROM MANY ARAB QUARTERS INCLUDING SUCH SOVIET CLIENTS AS IRAQ AND SYRIA AS WELL AS--TO A LESSER EXTENT--LIBYA AND ALGERIA. ONLY SOUTH YEMEN--AMONG SOVIET CLIENTS--HAS ACTIVELY SUPPORTED ETHIOPIAN EFFORTS IN ERITREA. MANY ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY IRAQ AND SYRIA, HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT SUPPORTERS OF THE ERITREANS AND OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO CRUSH THE GUERRILLAS MILITARILY. DAMASCUS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BACKED THE ERITREANS SINCE 1963, PROVIDING SMALL QUANTITIES OF MILITARY AID, A FEW ADVISERS TO TRAIN GUERRILLAS IN SUDAN, AND DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT.//4

//BOTH IRAQ AND SYRIA HAVE REBUFFED SOVIET PRESSURES TO STOP THEIR MILITARY DELIVERIES TO THE ERITREANS.

MOSCOW'S NEED FOR IRAQI FACILITIES FOR ITS AILIFT TO
ADDIS ABABA, AS WELL AS SOVIET INTEREST IN IRAQI OIL, LIMITS THE PRESSURE IT CAN APPLY AGAINST IRAQ. SYRIA, BOWING TO SOVIET PRESSURE, STOPPED AIDING SOMALIA, BUT DAMASCUS HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO FOLLOW SOVIET STRUCTURES AND CEASE AIDING THE ERITREANS. THE SYRIANS MAY EVEN BE ENTERTAINING THE IDEA OF A TACIT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE IRAQIS BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER IDENTITY OF INTERESTS IN THE WAKE OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES ON THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN AFGHANISTAN.///

///IRAQ, WHICH HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTER OF THE ERITREANS, HAS APPROACHED THE SOVIETS SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS TO VOICE CONCERN ABOUT THE EXPECTED ETHIOPIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE REBELS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, IRAQI LEADER SADDAM HUSSEIN RECENTLY TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD THAT IRAQ OPPOSES ANY MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE ERITREANS AND WARNED THE AMBASSADOR THAT IRAQ IS PREPARED TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IF THE SITUATION ON THE HORN WORSENS. THE RECENT

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Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
EXECUTION OF AT LEAST 14 IRAQI COMMUNISTS WAS PRESUMABLY INTENDED IN PART AS A SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS OF BAGHDAD'S UNHAPPINESS ABOUT THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.//Y

//ALTHOUGH THE LIBYANS AND ALGERIANS HAVE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET ROLE IN THEIR SUPPORT OF MENGISTU, THEY ARE CONCERNED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN DISPUTE, PARTICULARLY THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT SOVIET OR CUBAN INTERVENTION. GADHAFI IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE ERITREANS

THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO NOT SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING ALL PALESTINIAN FACTIONS TO BREAK WITH THE ERITREANS.//Y

//SUDAN IS PARTICULARLY NERVOUS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN ERITREA, VIEWING THE SITUATION AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO SUDAN ITSELF. SUDAN IS A MAJOR SANCTUARY FOR THE INSURGENTS, AND THE NUMAYRI GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT INCREASED
FIGHTING WITH THE REBELS WILL SPILL INTO THE SUDAN. HE
HA- ATTEMPTED A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ADDIS ABABA TO LESSEN
THE CHANCES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHTING AND PERMITTED
THE RETURN OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO KHARTOUM AFTER A
YEAR'S ABSENCE. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, OF
ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES TO THE
REBELS./Y
MOSCOW CUBAN CONNECTION/Y
/// OVER THE LONGER RUN, THE SOVIETS WILL FACE MORE COM-
PLEX MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA IF MORE
CUBANS ARE NEEDED TO STABILIZE THE SITUATIONS IN ETHIO-
PIA, ANGOLA, AND ALONG RHODESIA'S BORDERS WITH ZAMBIA
AND MOZAMBIQUE. THE POLITICAL COSTS FOR THE SOVIETS
WOULD THEN BEGIN TO RISE. THE INCREASING "CUBANIZATION"
OF THE CONTINENT COULD HAVE AN INCREASING NEGATIVE EF-
FECT NOT ONLY UPON THOSE FORCES ALREADY OPPOSED TO SO-
VIET POLICY--CONSERVATIVE AND EVEN SOME RADICAL ARABS,
IRAN, AND THE WEST--BUT ALSO UPON MODERATE AFRICANS.
CASTRO HIMSELF MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO PLACE LIMITS ON CUBA'S PRESENCE AND INVOLVEMENT.///

///THE SOVIETS CANNOT YET TELL HOW FAR THEY AND THE CUBANS WILL HAVE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ETHIOPIA'S WAR WITH THE ERITREANS. ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT COULD DRAG THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS INTO A MORASS, SINCE THE ERITREAN REBELLION IS STRONGLY BASED ON POPULAR HOSTILITY TO ETHIOPIA. MOSCOW AND HAVANA, THEREFORE, MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE CALLED UPON TO SHOULDER A MAJOR BURDEN IN ERITREA WITHOUT PROSPECT OF AN EARLY END TO THE FIGHTING THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN GOING ON FOR MANY YEARS. THIS INVOLVEMENT WOULD TEND TO FURTHER ANTAGONIZE A WIDE CIRCLE OF ARABS AND AFRICANS AND WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY THAN THE DEFENSE AGAINST SOMALI AGGRESSION.///

THE ECONOMIC FACTOR ///

///THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA ARE MANAGEABLE. SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS INCREASED SHARPLY SINCE 1975, BUT ITS SHARE OF MOS-
COW'S TOTAL FOREIGN AID TO THE THIRD WORLD HAS REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT AT 13 TO 15 PERCENT. IN ECONOMIC TERMS, THE COST IS MINIMAL BECAUSE THE GREAT BULK OF AID EXTENSIONS ARE CREDITS (NOT GRANTS) AND ARE REIMBURSABLE.

SOVIET TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE--BOTH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY--IS PAID FOR ON A CURRENT ACCOUNT BASIS BY THE HOST COUNTRY AND GENERALLY AT A PROFIT TO MOSCOW.//

//SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS REPAYABLE OVER 10 TO 12 YEARS AT LOW INTEREST, AND IN THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA, LIBYA IS REPORTEDLY PICKING UP A LARGE PART OF THE COST IN HARD CURRENCY. WEAPONS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT WORTH NEARLY $1 BILLION HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO SOVIET CLIENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1975, AND--JUDGING FROM THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT STILL TO BE SHIPPED UNDER EARLIER CONTRACTS--THE LEVEL OF DELIVERIES IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN HIGH. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW THE LARGEST SUPPLIER OF ARMS TO THE AREA.
National Intelligence Daily

Tuesday
5 January 1982
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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Cross-Border Operations

South African military forces appear to be preparing for a small incursion into southern Angola.

Since last September South African forces have maintained a continuous presence in southern Angola in order to preserve gains achieved by previous incursions. Pretoria is determined to prevent guerrilla forces of the South-West Africa People's Organization from reestablishing forward positions in southern Angola. It also is attempting to deny Angolan forces access to bases in the border area from which the Angolans had supported SWAPO.
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)

18 December 1978
Angola

President Neto in a speech yesterday to his ruling party rejected what he claimed are the US conditions for establishing relations with Angola. Neto alleged that Washington's desire to establish relations with Luanda is conditioned on the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola and on his government's reaching a settlement with the insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. He said the US conditions are unacceptable because they would leave Angola vulnerable to military attacks from South Africa.
Weekly Review
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorates of Sciences and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
THE SOVIETS AND PORTUGUESE AFRICA

The Soviets are paying more attention to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa as these nations have gained or are approaching independence.

Moscow is the major source of weapons and training in Guinea-Bissau and has provided economic aid as well. Since mid-February 1975, when Moscow first assigned an ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, the Soviet mission there has grown to at least 14 permanent officers and employees. An additional 30 Soviets have been on temporary duty at various times over the past five months.

The Soviets probably hope to use their ties to Guinea-Bissau as an entree to the Cape Verde Islands, which become independent on July 5. The rulers of Guinea-Bissau, who in all likelihood will be the dominant force on the islands, have stated they do not intend to allow any foreign bases in Guinea-Bissau or the Cape Verdes. With a precipitous drop in Portuguese aid, however, they may look to Moscow, and the Soviets could angle for military-related facilities in return.

The Soviets are also doing well in Mozambique. The two countries will establish diplomatic relations and sign a trade agreement when that colony gains independence on June 25. Other reports say the Soviets, who gave extensive support to the insurgents, will train the new Mozambique navy. Mozambique's location along the Indian Ocean has evidently led the Soviets to sound out the new rulers regarding port facilities. They apparently were turned down, but Moscow will probably continue to press for some access to Mozambique's ports.

Events in Angola are going less well, although the Soviet-backed Popular Movement has recently made gains against its major rival, the National Front. Front leaders now claim the Soviets have delivered "heavy arms," including armored cars, to the Movement.

A strategic motive is clearly behind the Soviet policy. Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verdes could be used to strengthen naval capabilities in the South Atlantic, and Mozambique could provide a fallback position to Somalia in the western Indian Ocean. Soviet policy is also motivated by political considerations. Moscow hopes to combat China's influence in the Third World and show that its interest in detente has not weakened its will to be actively involved in these areas.
Weekly Review
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA: AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The country's first days of independence have been marked by more fighting between forces of the two rival "regimes" that are vying for recognition as the legitimate government. With the continuing efforts of the Africans' regional organization to arrange a truce apparently getting nowhere, the outlook is still for a protracted military struggle in which the foreign support going to the two sides may be decisive.

On the Scene

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola remains under heavy pressure in areas of eastern and central Angola from the more moderate National Front for the Liberation of Angola and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. This week, a National Union force followed up recent successes in the central sector by capturing the key railhead of Teixeira de Sousa. The victory gave the National Union apparent control of virtually all of that part of the Benguela railroad that lies in Angola, but perhaps not for long. The Popular Movement, striking back, has sent a large force toward Lusio. In any event, the railroad, which normally carries vital copper exports from Zaire and Zambia, remains inoperative because of damage to several sections of track.

On November 18, the National Union announced that its forces, which are operating with elements of the National Front, had taken Malanje, one of the Popular Movement's few remaining strongholds in central Angola. Its fall leaves a wide gap between the Movement's forces in Luanda and important units operating from Henrique de Carvalho.

Forces of the National Front that have been moving toward Luanda from the south apparently reached Dondo this week, putting them close to the hydroelectric plant that supplies power to Luanda. North of the capital, the Front may be about to abandon its effort—stalled for nearly a month—to break through the Popular Movement's defenses around Quifangando. Instead, the Front may try to move on the capital from the east.

In Cabinda, where the Popular Movement is strongly entrenched, its forces apparently succeeded late last week in beating off an invasion attempt from Zaire by a Cabindan separatist...
group that is supported by Zairian President Mobutu. There have been no recent reports of further fighting in Cabinda.

On the political level, the Luanda-based Popular Movement regime headed by Agostinho Neto late last week installed an 18-man cabinet in which Neto's lieutenant, Lopo de Nascimento, holds the post of prime minister. He was the Movement's principal representative in the four-party transitional government that collapsed last summer. Both the political and military wings of the Popular Movement are represented in the cabinet. The rival National Front - National Union "government," meanwhile, has had trouble getting off the ground. Both parties apparently have agreed, after protracted negotiations, that each will provide a president and prime minister on a rotating basis. A leadership slate has still not been announced, but it now appears that neither National Front leader Holden Roberto nor the National Union's Jonas Savimbi will take top positions. Each is hesitant to become too closely linked with the joint government, which they both regard as a marriage of convenience to provide a focus for anti-Soviet foreign support.

Foreign Reaction

Partly because of the existence of the competing regimes, most nations—including the bulk of the 46-member states of the Organization of African Unity—are withholding recognition from either Angola claimant. Some 25 governments, including the USSR, Cuba, ten other Communist countries, and ten African states, have recognized Neto's government, however, while no state has formally accepted the National Front - National Union regime. This week, Neto's people unsuccessfully sought admission to the current meeting in London of the International Coffee Council.

The Organization of African Unity is still trying to resolve the Angolan situation through a government of national unity, but its efforts have been impaired by the failure of the ten African states—all radical regimes—that have recognized Neto to abide by the OAU's request to remain neutral. Other OAU members want to avoid any further division over the Angola issue. At present, OAU Chairman Amin's proposal for sending an African peacekeeping force to Angola and calls by Somalia for a summit meeting and by Ethiopia for a foreign ministers' conference show little sign of getting off the ground.

The Soviet Role

Moscow provided fresh evidence during the past week of the importance it attaches to a victory by the Popular Movement, the group the USSR has supported for years. With the Movement's forces continuing to retreat in most sectors and the threat to its hold on Luanda apparently growing, the USSR mounted another substantial airlift of military supplies and equipment—its second within about two weeks.

At present, there is no firm evidence that Moscow is planning additional supply flights to Angola soon. The Soviets will be watching the military situation closely, however, and may well provide further support to the Popular Movement if its fortunes continue to decline.
The USSR has had to pay a price in black Africa for its strong military and diplomatic support of Neto's regime, although Soviet leaders presumably had made a prior determination that the prospect of gaining significant influence in southern Africa was worth the price. A number of African states have been particularly upset by the Kremlin's flouting of the OAU's call for neutrality in the Angolan dispute.

Soviet pressure on Uganda's Amin—the OAU chairman—to recognize Neto's government contributed to the recent temporary rupture in relations between Moscow and Kampala. Nigeria, long an important target country for the Soviets in Africa, has denied overflight rights for Soviet aircraft flying to Luanda and publicly criticized the Soviet Union's "flagrant interference" in Angola's affairs. Tanzanian President Nyerere, long a staunch supporter himself of the Popular Movement, reportedly ordered the impoundment of more than 1,700 tons of Soviet military equipment stockpiled in his country for the Movement. Zaire is trying to make an issue in the UN Security Council of the Soviets' support for their Angolan protege.

Cuban Involvement

Concurrent with the Soviet supply airlifts, Havana, probably with a nudge from Moscow, has stepped up its airlift of troops to support the Popular Movement's military operations. Cubans have advised and trained Neto's forces for years, both in Cuba and in Africa. The number of Castro's people involved in the situation has risen sharply in recent months, particularly since the end of September when the airlift apparently began.

The Cubans have almost certainly become more directly involved in the Angolan fighting since the tide of battle turned against the Popular Movement last month. They probably played an important role, for example, in the Movement's successful defense, so far, of its position in Cabora. If Moscow has provided Neto with fighter aircraft, they most likely would be flown by Cuban pilots.

Peking Finesse

The Chinese, who have long viewed the Angolan strife in the broader context of Sino-Soviet rivalry, have taken ill-concealed delight in the African backlash to Moscow's heavy-handed involvement with the Popular Movement. Peking's media have been saturated with replays of anti-Soviet articles and statements from numerous African capitals, and Chinese propagandists have authored a number of articles clearly aimed at fanning African emotions.

Anticipation of precisely such a propaganda windfall led Peking, in the immediate pre-independence period, to lower the visibility of its own involvement in Angola.

Future Chinese support for the National Front - National Union coalition will almost certainly be of the type that can be funneled through African intermediaries in a way that will leave Peking with a plausible case for denying any direct role.
The Communist military presence in sub-Saharan Africa has increased dramatically this year, mostly reflecting a jump of 40 percent in the number of Cubans in Angola.

Communist Presence in Black Africa

The number of Communist military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa has grown by almost 30 percent since the beginning of the year. A substantial rise in the number of Cubans accounted for almost all of the increase. The Cuban presence will probably grow further, adding to the number of Communist military personnel in the region by the end of the year.

There are now an estimated 19,000 to 21,000 Communist troops, military advisers, and technicians in sub-Saharan Africa, compared with less than 16,000 at the beginning of the year. In addition, at least 27,000 Communist personnel are serving in economic-related positions in these countries. Arrivals and departures are frequent, and these numbers fluctuate widely, but the increasing trend is clear.

The Cubans

Cubans are the most numerous among the military personnel, numbering 15,000 to 17,000; of these, 13,000 to 15,000 are in Angola. The 40 percent increase in the Cuban presence in Africa since January is due mainly to reinforcements sent to Angola. Including civilians, there may be up to 20,000 Cubans in that country.

The largest number of Cubans arrived in Angola in May and June, when some 3,000 to 4,000—nearly all soldiers—were brought in by air and sea, following a coup attempt by dissident Angolan elements. Since then, additional Cubans have been flown in regularly, mostly for rotation. Small numbers of Cuban advisers and technicians also have gone to Angola to train the local armed forces in the use of aircraft and the growing Angolan inventory of predominantly Soviet-supplied ground weapons.

The increased Cuban military presence in Angola largely reflects Moscow's and Havana's desire to improve Angolan internal security and border defenses—problems that have made President Neto's position increasingly precarious.

The Cubans also expanded their presence in several other sub-Saharan countries. The first 50 Cubans in Ethiopia—advisers and medical personnel—arrived in April. They have not yet participated in the Ogaden conflict or against the Eritrean separatists, and would do so only if Moscow concurred.

There are an estimated 700 Cuban advisers in Congo; some are involved in cross-border operations against separatists in the Angolan exclave of Cabinda. The total number of Cubans in Congo, including civilians, may be over 1,100.

The Soviets' military presence in black Africa has grown far more slowly this year than Cuba's—probably no more than a 10 percent increase since January. The number of Soviet advisers is about 3,500—some 1,500 of whom are in Somalia and have been for some time.

Substantial new Soviet military aid to Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania accounted for almost all the increase. Ethiopia registered the largest increase, receiving 60 technicians to train ground forces and to service the large number of weapons being sent by Moscow. Soviet personnel also are providing important logistic support to Ethiopian troops.
Moscow has sent additional personnel to Mozambique to train that country's ground forces on armor and antiaircraft weapons, and to train Rhodesian nationalists on small arms and guerrilla tactics.

More than 300 advisers from Eastern Europe—primarily East Germans—are also now in sub-Saharan Africa. Most are in Tanzania and Zambia, where they are training air force and ground personnel. About 15 Yugoslav Army specialists have been sent to Ethiopia to train the militia. The Chinese and North Korean presence has remained nearly unchanged, totaling about 500 persons.

Future Trends
Continued increases in Communist military personnel during the rest of 1977 are expected. The flow of Cubans to Angola probably will account for most of the gains, although the rate of increase may decline. Additional Cuban advisers probably are slated for duty in Ethiopia and to train Rhodesian guerrillas in Zambia and Mozambique.

Larger purchases of East European military equipment will require additional technicians from those countries as well. Recent negotiations in Peking with representatives of several African states and insurgent groups may signal an increase in Chinese arrivals later this year, although the increase, if any, is likely to be small.
Weekly Review
The Castro government is becoming increasingly uneasy over the difficulties it faces in Angola, but it remains committed to the active support of President Neto's regime.

Cuba: Concern Over Angola

The Cuban government is clearly worried by the mounting problems it faces in Angola. What appeared last year as a relatively easy triumph for Cuban "internationalism" is now becoming a foreign policy quagmire.

From the Cuban viewpoint, the difficulties in Angola are many and serious:

- Economic and social conditions are deteriorating.
- Political instability has heightened, and Cuban troops reportedly had to play a key role in putting down an uprising on May 27.
- Resentment is growing among Angolans against the Cubans.
- The defeat of the Katangans who invaded Zaire from Angola has kindled fears of Zairian military retaliation.

Cuba's involvement in Angola is extensive. In addition to combat troops, Cuba has provided President Neto's regime with a large number of military advisers who are tasked with organizing and training the armed forces, militia, national police force, and secret police forces.

Civilian advisers are partially filling the vacuum created by the departure of the managerial, supervisory, and technical personnel of the colonial era. These include agricultural and livestock technicians, medical personnel, merchant marine specialists, educators, and construction personnel.

To help Neto's Popular Movement broaden its political base, the Cubans are also providing experts in forming mass
organizations and a political machine. Some Angolans have apparently been sent to Cuba for training.

As the extensive Cuban presence has become increasingly evident, the image of Cubans as the new colonialists has spread. The Angolans frequently criticize the Cubans for being arrogant, for ignoring African sensibilities, and for their tendency to take command instead of remaining in the background as advisers.

Angolans also resent the Cubans and Soviets for monopolizing the few remaining luxuries in the country. The failure of the foreigners to bring about any economic progress or to eliminate the insurgen-
cies has added to their unpopularity.

The Cuban Response

So far, the Cubans have responded to the mounting problems in Angola by increasing the number of Cuban personnel in the country. In mid-April and early May, the Castro government began activat-
ing reservists for service in Africa.

No fewer than 4,000 reservists were called up during this period. All apparently were asked to "volunteer" for one year of service in Angola.

In the south, where insurgency is more widespread, Cuban forces may score some minor successes against the guerrillas led by Jonas Savimbi. Over the long term, however, the Cuban and Angolan forces will probably be unable to neutralize Savimbi's guerrillas without a much larger military force.

The rapid reinforcement indicates that the limit of Havana's support has not yet been reached. Angola still faces the likelihood of a worsening situation, and may press Cuba for additional military and technical support.

Cuban President Fidel Castro would seem to have few options other than to respond positively; he probably would be willing to send additional combat troops. In the meantime, Cuba probably will press some East European nations and the USSR for additional material aid as well as some African nations for greater moral support.

The Economic Burden

The economic burden of Angola is not yet an important constraint on Cuban policymakers. The personnel now stationed in Angola represent only a small fraction of Cuba's labor force and a loss in national earnings of about $40 million to $45 million annually—only 0.5 percent of gross national product. The diversion of merchant vessels for logistic support in-
volved at most 10 percent of the Cuban fleet and a financial loss of $15 million annually if these vessels were available for charter.

The USSR bears almost all other costs of the Cuban involvement, at least indirectly. It has replaced—probably on a grant basis—most of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola. Much of the equipment delivered by the Soviets is in fact newer and more sophisticated than that which the Cubans earlier sent to Angola.

The Soviets have also provided planes and pilots to help move Cuban troops and supplies and have leased two long-range IL-62 transport aircraft to Cuba.

This has enabled Cuba to continue uninterrupted its regular civil air service.

The Cuban government is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over the exaggerated domestic perceptions of the cost of involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of their government's overall commitment in Angola, but they are aware that the highly visible call-up of forces has coincided with a sharp economic downturn.

Although Cuban leaders maintain—correctly—that the island's economic downturn is due to low world sugar prices, they have apparently failed to convince the public. President Castro, who pays close attention to mass atti-
dutes, has never told the full story of the intervention in Angola.

If it is faced with continued demands for a significant expansion of its forces in Angola, the Cuban leadership may be forced to reassess its policy.
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July 15, 1977

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA

Guerillas of Jonas Savimbi's southern-based National Union for the Total Independence of Angola have carried out some successful operations in recent weeks and are planning new attacks against government and Cuban forces. Cooperation reportedly is increasing between the National Union and other governments, particularly the Mobutu regime in neighboring Zaire.

National Union guerillas reportedly have managed to halt almost all local traffic along the vital Benguela Railroad in central Angola by destroying bridges and removing large sections of track; service to Zaire and Zambia has never resumed since the Angolan civil war. The group—which currently controls between one-third and one-half of Angola's territory—hopes to consolidate its position in the southeastern part of the country by capturing several towns later this month. It also plans to try to expand westward and is contemplating incursions into a coffee-growing area well to the north of the railroad.

The National Union's forces include some 10,000 to 12,000 "first line" guerillas and 8,000 trainees, ranged against an Angolan army numbering about 34,000 and at least 13,000 Cubans. The group's supporters consist mainly of the large Ovimbundu ethnic group and some other central and southern Angolan tribes.

As it tries to move northward outside its base area, the National Union is likely to encounter increasing difficulty. Its prospects for eventually gaining a share of power on the national level will depend on the amount of foreign support it receives, on the durability of the Cuban commitment to President Neto's government, and on whether Neto makes any headway in coping with Angola's severe economic problems and with dissension in his regime.

At present, foreign assistance to the National Union is limited. South Africa probably continues to furnish some items of equipment.
and perhaps some funding. President Kaunda of Zambia has long been sympathetic toward the National Union, and Savimbi is seeking to expand ties with the Zambians and other moderate African governments.

Zairian President Mobutu recently promised to send medicine and communications equipment to the National Union. Mobutu reportedly said that during his recent tour of Western Europe he was approached by several heads of state who expressed interest in resuming arms and other aid to Savimbi's forces.

In exchange for the Zairian assistance, the National Union reportedly has dispatched some 1,300 guerrillas along the Zairian border north of Luau (formerly Teixeira de Sousa)—well outside the National Union's traditional area of operations. Their mission includes harassing anti-Mobutu Katangan forces on the Angolan side of the border as well as attacking important Angolan and Cuban installations in the area.
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Cuba-Angola: Growing Civilian Assistance Program

Nearly three dozen new cooperation agreements covering Cuban economic and technical assistance to Angola for 1979 indicate there will be a substantial boost in the Cuban civilian presence, although second thoughts on the part of Angolan leaders may keep the increase from reaching the levels originally planned.
Cuba-Angola: Growing Civilian Assistance Program

We expect that the Cuban civilian presence in Angola will increase this year despite a claim to the contrary made by the Cuban Ambassador in Luanda. The increase, however, may not reach the levels originally planned.

Angola's former Second Deputy Premier Rocha came to Havana last November and signed 35 cooperation agreements covering Cuban economic and technical assistance to Angola for 1979. These agreements call for Cuba to boost its nonmilitary technical personnel from the present level of some 7,000 to 10,700. The civilians will be in addition to the estimated 19,000-20,000 Cuban military personnel presently stationed in Angola.

On returning to Luanda, however, Rocha was removed from his government post, allegedly for having agreed to such a dramatic rise in the Cuban presence. There are indications that President Neto is planning a trip to Cuba soon, possibly in an attempt to disentangle Luanda from the agreements. His visit will probably result in a compromise rather than in a total rejection of the agreements.

The Cuban assistance includes construction workers, teachers, medical personnel, political and economic advisers, and other specialists of various kinds. Cubans now are stationed throughout the country's 17 provinces and are assigned to every government ministry.

Cuban construction activity in Angola this year is expected to emphasize the repairing of war damage to roads and bridges. Levi Farah, chairman of the State Committee on Construction and supervisor of Cuban construction activities in Angola, has said that in 1979 the Cubans will do two-and-a-half times more construction work than last year.

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Medical aid will also probably increase this year. Cuban health workers (doctors, nurses and technicians) are running the Angolan public health system and staffing most hospitals. They concentrate on disease prevention and vaccination programs, but also treat war casualties. Some of these medical personnel are recently graduated doctors who are serving their two-year obligatory rural service in Angola rather than at home. In a November interview, Dr. Narey Ramos, head of Cuban health personnel in Angola, said that there were more than 800 Cuban medical persons in Angola at that time. This is more than double the number serving in Angola in 1977.

Education will be another area of increased Cuban involvement. In December, the Second Che Guevara Internationalist Teaching Brigade was preparing to leave Cuba. The first brigade, which arrived in Angola last spring, had nearly 800 members. The second group will also serve in Angola for two years. Although many of these "teachers" have just graduated from high school, they are well educated by Angolan standards.

Havana also sponsors an extensive school program for Angolan students in Cuba. As of mid-1978, about 1,000 Angolans were studying on Cuba's Isle of Youth, and the total is expected to reach 2,500 sometime this year. Mozambican, Ethiopian and Tanzanian students also are enrolled in these work-study programs, which can last for several years.

Cuban President Fidel Castro has several reasons for increasing his technical assistance program in Angola. For one, Cuba's reputation has been put on the line by its close identification with the Neto government. Cuban military and civilian advisers have been stationed in Angola for several years, and are intimately involved in the day-to-day running of the country. Moreover, Cuba receives some economic benefit from its technical assistance program. For example, it brokers Angolan coffee on the world market as payment for the teachers of the Guevara brigade, and earns additional hard currency from its sale of Angolan fish. Service in Angola also provides productive employment and on-the-job training experiences for Havana's young, highly motivated technicians.

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Castro seems to regard Angola as the perfect recipient for his foreign policy initiatives and would like to see it evolve into an example of what Cuba can accomplish when carrying out its "internationalist duty." He knows, however, that this will take many years and considerable effort to accomplish.
Intelligence Checklist

April 7, 1976
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The *Intelligence Checklist* is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

April 7, 1976

CUBA/ANGOLA: The small number of Cuban troops returning home from Angola is being offset by military, security, economic, and administrative advisers outbound for Luanda.

The Cuban experts and technicians due to go to Angola will take their families.

The Cuban military and civilian presence in Angola would be lengthy because of the need for Cuban military units to help keep order and to speed up the training of Angolan units in the use of Soviet weapons. The Cubans also will aid in overcoming the physical destruction caused by the war.

Havana views its support to the Angolan government as a long-term program that will permit a gradual reduction in combat troops while at the same time keeping a large Cuban advisory presence for at least the rest of the year.
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Cuba: Havana's Interests in Angola

Angola remains an important element in Havana's foreign relationships, and the Cubans expect to maintain a large military presence there for many years.
Cuba: Havana's Interests in Angola

The Castro regime may be focusing less on the liberation of southern Africa and more on Latin America and international forums in coming months, but Angola remains an important element in Havana's foreign relationships. The Cubans expect to maintain a large presence in Angola for many years, much of it military. Some reductions in the military presence may be achieved in time, but this will depend, first, on Cuban perceptions of the military threat to the Angolan Government and, second, on what concessions the Cubans may be able to get.

Background

Since September 1975, when the first large contingent of Cuban military advisers was sent to Angola to assemble weapons flowing in from the USSR and to train the Angolans to use them, the Castro regime has made a substantial investment in both personnel and in political capital to attain and consolidate power by Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The size of the investment, however, was disproportionate to Angola's importance to Cuba. Had the Cuban leadership known in September 1975 that 20,000 to 30,000 Cuban troops would be drawn into Africa the following spring, it might not have sent the original contingent.

That group was made up largely of the 1976 graduating class of the Cuban Military Academy. In late October 1975, when the MPLA forces in the field began to disintegrate and the newly arrived Cuban cadets found themselves literally thrown into the firing line, the Castro regime had to decide quickly whether to reinforce this elite group or leave it to its fate. Thus, a primarily domestic concern--the threat of losing the Military Academy's senior class and the negative impact that loss would have on the Cuban population only two months before the Cuban Communist Party's first congress--played probably a more significant role in Fidel Castro's decision to reinforce than did any purely bilateral or other

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international factor. In effect, Cuba stumbled into a full-scale war, although its vital interests had not been threatened.

Once Havana committed itself to open-ended military intervention, however, events in Angola did affect Cuba's vital interests. The easy military victories that followed the South African withdrawal, the international acclaim that accrued to Cuba because of its decisive military role, and Havana's growing conviction that the tide had turned against the proponents of white supremacy, led the Castro regime to try to take advantage of the political momentum by turning Angola into a springboard for paramilitary operations across its borders. The Cubans even used Angola to support another Angola-type operation in Ethiopia, where again boldness was crowned with success. Angola became a key element in Cuban foreign policy, and Havana established a sizable permanent presence there.

Later, the situation changed dramatically. The Cubans found themselves tied up in a counterinsurgency effort that cost them a small but steady flow of casualties on three fronts; they saw their guerrilla allies of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) staggered by South Africa's lightning air raids and counter-guerrilla strikes; they saw their meddling in Zaire rebound against them; they were drawn into an internal MPLA power struggle and had to help suppress a coup attempt against Neto; they trained thousands of guerrillas of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) over a three-year period but had little to show for it; they developed serious problems in some areas of their relationship with the Angolans; finally, they had the initiative in Rhodesia stolen from them. The Angolan honeymoon ended.

The Current Picture

The Cubans now see themselves committed to a seemingly interminable large-scale military presence in Angola because Luanda's military establishment is incapable of quelling the insurgency—now limited primarily to Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—or providing adequate defense against external attack and is likely to remain so for many

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years to come. A large Cuban civilian presence is also necessary because Angola desperately needs technical, professional, and administrative assistance, and no other countries seem willing to help on the scale required. Moreover, Havana realizes that its initial success in Angola did not set all southern Africa afire, and the process of "liberation" in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa—if it is to be accomplished via the "armed struggle" route by the Africans themselves—is a long-term matter.

Nevertheless, there are benefits for Cuba through involvement in Angola. By backing up its rhetoric with deeds, it gains considerable prestige among world revolutionaries, establishes respect for Cuban capabilities among other governments, and promotes national pride at home. By serving as an agent of Soviet influence, it acquires leverage in its dealings with Moscow. Its Angolan commitment enhances Castro's world role far beyond that merited by Cuba's actual importance. In addition, the Cuban leadership views service in Angola as a way for Cuban youth to pay its dues, a kind of initiation through which the postrevolutionary generation—perceived as largely unappreciative of the sacrifices required of its predecessors—must pass before gaining entry into revolutionary society. There are some economic advantages as well in the form of an outlet for Cuba's surplus labor force and some hard currency earnings.

As long as security needs are met, the Castro regime is probably ambivalent about reducing its military presence in Angola. It has a growing manpower surplus at home and, therefore, returning troops would fill no great domestic vacuum. A reduced troop level would free combat personnel for duty elsewhere, but there presently is no appropriate hotspot. Had the Cubans been ready to carry out a reduction, it most likely would have occurred prior to the nonaligned movement's summit in Havana—unless Castro plans to announce a pullout schedule at the summit—as a means of overcoming the concerns of the movement's moderates regarding Cuban intentions abroad. It still may take place with that end in mind, but the impact in the postsummit period would probably be significantly diluted.

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The troops themselves give some impetus to a reduction—garrison life apparently has proved boring and some reports talk of clashes between Cuban and MPLA military personnel and of Cubans demonstrating publicly because they want to return home—but there seems to be little pressure on Cuba from any quarter to pull out even a token force. In fact, some young people in Cuba see service abroad as a chance for travel that ordinarily would not be open to them; they also know that the regime places a premium on "internationalism" and that those who volunteer for such duty receive special consideration for party membership, good jobs, promotion, and educational opportunities.

What If...?

Were a Namibian settlement achieved and Angola’s southern border secured, the Cubans might be willing to send a small number of military personnel home, but they are not in the habit of making gratuitous concessions. Unless such a reduction were a condition of the settlement itself or a condition of a companion agreement, Havana might well maintain full strength in Angola with the intention of using a reduction to gain concessions on other matters. The Cubans would be especially sensitive to appearances; they probably would be extremely reluctant to pull out troops if such a move could be interpreted as a response to US pressure. Moreover, if the Cubans believed that their presence was being negotiated unilaterally by Angola, they could well be moved to action against the Angolan leadership. Thus, talks aimed at reducing Cuban influence in Angola could have the opposite result.

Moscow’s decision in 1962 to remove strategic weapons from Cuba without consulting Havana enraged Castro and demonstrated graphically how sensitive he is to being ignored on negotiations that directly involve his government. In 1962 he was powerless to resist, but in 1979 he controls the most potent combat force in Angola. The internal struggle in South Yemen in June 1978 is a case in point; the Cubans reportedly helped the Prime Minister oust the President after the latter had moved to improve ties with North Yemen, Oman, and the United States. The President, who was captured and executed by those who carried out Yemeni coup, had only nine months before been

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embraced by Castro when he arrived in Cuba for an official visit. The South Yemen experience demonstrated that Castro is not above sacrificing individuals when he is compelled to decide among various options.

In Angola, Neto has been particularly useful to the Cubans; like any other chief of state, however, he is expendable. For example, relations between Castro and Algeria's President Ben Bella were particularly close in the early 1960s, but Castro had little trouble developing and maintaining a close relationship with Houari Boumediene who ousted Ben Bella and kept him under house arrest for more than a decade. In the Congo, a large Cuban bodyguard unit prevented the overthrow of President Massamba-Debat during an Army revolt in mid-1966, but years later Massamba-Debat's execution failed to make a ripple in Cuba's ties with President Yombe-Opongo. In its foreign relations the Castro regime wed itself to a political line, not to an individual.

Havana's Interests

The Cubans also might move against Neto if they become convinced that he is forsaking socialism for capitalism or that he is allowing an increase in US influence at the expense of Cuba and the USSR. Havana will react strongly to any attempt to turn the clock back in Angola or to any action that might suggest that the Cuban sacrifices made to create a new socialist state have been in vain.

On the other hand, Havana would welcome any improvement in Angola's relations with other countries that would help to secure Angola's borders, reduce or eliminate the domestic insurgency, and better Luanda's economic situation so long as that improvement did not threaten Cuban influence or interfere--at least in the short term and midterm--with Cuba's support of African guerrillas trained and garrisoned in Angolan territory. The sooner Angola becomes economically healthy, the sooner Cuba can broaden its exploitation of Angola's wealth; the faster a national reconciliation is effected, the faster the Cuban casualty lists will be reduced. But these are extremely complex and often interrelated problems, and Cuban suspicions would be quickly aroused unless proposed solutions made specific allowances for Cuban interests. They might agree not to station troops near

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the Angolan-Namibian border, but they would oppose any attempt to dismantle the air defense system they are extending across southern Angola.

The Cubans can indeed cooperate with their "enemies" to achieve common interests as they proved in the early months of 1976 when Cuban and South African commanders in the field reached a working arrangement for the protection and continued operation of the hydroelectric facility in southern Angola; the South Africans did not want to lose electricity in South West Africa, and the Cubans did not want to lose men in clashes with South African forces. Similarly, "anti-imperialist" Cuban troops are providing security for "imperialism's" oilfields in Cabinda so that Angola will not become a greater economic burden for its present benefactors.

Differences in Perceptions

Cooperation, however, depends on a convergence of interests, and on the larger issues—national reconciliation, true nonalignment, significant reduction in the Cuban troop level—the negative factors seem to outweigh the positive ones. Havana has no intention of permitting Angola to subscribe to "true nonalignment," because, to the Cubans, this means "alignment with the West." The Castro regime did not send five regiments of Cuban soldiers to Angola so that country could become truly nonaligned by Western standards. Unless they are forced out militarily, the Cubans are likely to be in Angola in significant numbers for the next decade or more, or until they are convinced that Luanda can guarantee internal order and provide external defense on its own. With the Soviets footing the bill and unemployment slowly rising at home, no incentive exists for Cuba to pull its troops out. Even the casualty rate does not amount to an incentive; the present Cuban policy is to limit combat with Angolan guerrillas and leave the bulk of the counter-insurgency program to the Angolan armed forces.

The Cuban assessment of the threat to Angola's security—Havana's rationale for its troop presence—is likely to illustrate that what appears to be virtual paranoia to Western observers is a perfectly legitimate concern by Cuban measurement. The Cuban leadership has remained almost static since 1959—the elite influencing policy
and making decisions now is the same group who for over 20 years has seen itself as the target of unrelenting hostility in the form of invasion, paramilitary action, bombings, sabotage, subversion, economic blockade, assassination attempts, diplomatic isolation, and various other types of harassment. The leaders make judgments based largely on their own experience, and their experience accentuates their caution and skepticism when dealing with the United States. They are likely to have an exaggerated impression of the security threat in Angola and thus will probably make an exaggerated estimate of the number of troops required, but their concern will be generally real, and they will use their perceptions as the basis for their actions and decisions.

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# National Intelligence Bulletin

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USSR-CHINA-ANGOLA

Soviet press coverage of the civil war in Angola remains extremely heavy. Pravda, Izvestia, and the Soviet news agency Tass are hammering away at alleged intervention by such outside forces as Chinese, South Africans, Zairians, Portuguese “fascists,” and “American mercenaries” on behalf of the Popular Movement’s rivals.

Moscow has reserved some of its strongest attacks for the Chinese. The Soviet press recently blasted Peking for its criticism of Moscow’s “expansion” and “Interference” in Angola. Reflecting Soviet sensitivity to these charges, the commentaries railed against Peking’s own military, financial, and training support for anti-Movement forces, as well as its collusion with “Portuguese fascists, South African racists, and international monopolies.”

Anti-Soviet vitriol has for some time been a standard feature of Chinese commentary on the Angolan conflict. Peking’s effort to embarrass Moscow for its involvement with the Popular Movement has gained momentum, however, since the Chinese lowered the visibility of their involvement by withdrawing Chinese advisers from Zairian training programs for the National Front late last month. Since then, People’s Daily has carried two articles lambasting Soviet meddling in Angola, and the traditional independence day editorial gave heavy play to the same theme.

The New China News Agency has also carried several lengthy reports focusing on the Soviet role in Angola. Its daily transmissions have been saturated with replays of anti-Soviet articles and statements from a number of African capitals. Chinese propagandists have had a field day rehearsing the generally negative African reaction to Moscow’s recognition of the Popular Movement in contravention of the Organization of African Unity’s call for neutrality in the Angolan dispute. Peking has prominently identified itself as a strong supporter of the organization’s policies. A recent People’s Daily editorial said the organization’s call for extension of recognition to all three Angolan liberation groups and for the rival factions to unite was both “explicit and correct.”

Pravda on November 17 carried one step further Moscow’s indignation over Chinese criticism, claiming that “in the course of recent contacts in Peking,” the Chinese had made an approach to the US suggesting “paralleled or joint efforts” against the Popular Movement. In addition to raising the specter of Chinese-US collusion in Angola, Pravda replayed a British press report that “American mercenaries...veterans of Vietnam” are serving with the Movement’s adversaries. The latter charge, while not new, had been absent from Soviet commentary for some time.
ANGOLA

We cannot confirm recent press reports that Soviet military advisers have been captured in the fighting in Angola, but the Soviets clearly are becoming more involved in the civil war in the former Portuguese colony.

In a news release from Lusaka, Zambia, on November 21, the National Union claimed it had captured some Soviets, Cubans, Mozambicans, a Congolese, and a Brazilian mercenary. The captured foreigners were said to have been supporting Popular Movement forces defending the key northern resupply city of Malanje. National Front and National Union forces were reported to have taken the city from the Popular Movement last week, despite the latter’s recent assertion that it retains control there.

Approximately 100 Soviet military advisers were believed to be assisting Popular Movement forces in the Luanda area at the time of independence on November 11. Their role probably included training Popular Movement troops in the use of modern weapons, giving advice on tactics and strategy against rival groups, and supervising the delivery, assembly, and maintenance of the large amount of Soviet weapons received just before independence.

Another group of Soviet technicians in Brazzaville and Point Noire, Congo, is probably servicing weapons bound for Popular Movement forces in Angola. This advisory group may now total 200.

Should the Popular Movement already have, or soon possess, MIG aircraft, the number of Soviet military personnel in Angola may rise to between 400 and 500. The Movement now has an inventory of Soviet equipment that includes unknown numbers of armored cars, armored personnel carriers, tanks, multiple rocket launchers, light field artillery, heavy mortars, and SA-7 defensive missiles. In addition, some 3,000 Cubans are assisting the Popular Movement.

Losses by the Popular Movement to its rivals during the past month underscore the necessity for urgent resupply of Soviet equipment. The active communist presence and involvement in Angola are likely to accelerate as Moscow and Havana seek to secure for the Popular Movement a controlling voice in the future of the former Portuguese territory.
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

MIDDLE EAST AFRICA

1 Angola

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA

Civil War Continues

Angola’s civil war continues to lurch along in its characteristic tug-of-war fashion. Despite an array of self-serving claims and counterclaims, it is apparent that neither of the two opposing forces has yet achieved the upper hand.

An advance along the coast from southern Angola by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola appears to have temporarily run out of steam around Novo Redondo, some 200 miles south of Luanda. Earlier claims by the National Union that it had advanced as far north as Porto Amboim were apparently unfounded.

The most notable military development during the past week was the capture of Luso by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Luso sits astride the Benguela railroad, and its capture effectively deters any early hopes on the part of the National Union to restore traffic along the line. A large Popular Movement force moving westward from Luso has been stalled approximately halfway between Luso and Silva Porto by a National Union counterattack.

North of Luanda, fighting between the Popular Movement and the Zairian-backed National Front has remained in a state of flux for several weeks, with inconclusive fighting around the Lifune River near the coast and some 60 miles southeast of Carmona.

Political Maneuvering

On the political scene, the Popular Movement continues to make slow but steady progress. During the past week the People’s Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey) became the twelfth African state to recognize the regime established by the Popular Movement on November 11.

Somalia, along with other backers of the Popular Movement—Guinea, Congo, and Mozambique—hopes to change the Organization of African Unity’s policy from neutrality to endorsement of the Popular Movement regime in Angola as the legitimate government. An OAU summit meeting was proposed by Somalia last month, and it now appears likely to receive approval of the two thirds of the organization’s 46 member states necessary for it to be convened.

Ugandan President Idi Amin, in his capacity as chairman of the OAU, is seeking to postpone the summit meeting. Amin announced on November 27 that Uganda will not play host to the summit.

Amin would prefer to avoid confrontation—and a possible OAU policy shift—by convening the ad hoc military advisory commission on Angola instead of a summit meeting. It seems unlikely, however, that Amin could accomplish anything at a meeting of the commission.

In any case, it appears that the OAU may be moving away from the effort to mediate and will
focus instead on the issue of outside intervention, particularly that of South Africa.

The growing publicity about South African military support for the National Front and the National Union is becoming a serious political liability for the two Angolan groups. Continued publicity of South African activities in Angola could well convince more African countries to recognize the Popular Movement. Many African states are concerned about Soviet involvement in Angola, but view it as an extension of long-standing Soviet support for the Popular Movement during the insurgency against Portugal. Their concern over the Soviet role is outweighed by their concern about the South Africans.

USSR Accuses US

The Soviet central press is giving heavy play to allegations of extensive US military intervention in Angola on behalf of the Popular Movement’s rivals. This may be Moscow’s way of responding to Secretary Kissinger’s recent public warnings that continued Soviet and Cuban support for the Popular Movement could have serious consequences for detente.

The Soviet media have concentrated on replaying charges made by various American and African journals. Pravda, however, broke stride earlier this week by running an article which asserted that US (and NATO) “servicemen,” along with weapons and other military equipment, were being “rushed” to Angola to reinforce the ranks of “foreign interventionists” fighting there.

In an apparent effort to further justify Soviet involvement in Angola, Kremlin propagandists are continuing to refer to US-Chinese collusion in the former Portuguese territory. Pravda, for example, has speculated that Angola might be high on the agenda in the talks this week between President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and Chinese leaders in Peking. The Communist Party daily had earlier charged that the Chinese had approached the US to suggest “parallel or joint efforts” against the Soviet-backed Popular Movement.

Soviet commentators are also going to great lengths to emphasize that detente with the West in no way precludes Soviet support for national liberation struggles elsewhere in the world. In an editorial on the limits of detente, Izvestia on December 2 said that “some people would like to have us believe that the process of easing tension in the world and support for the national liberation struggle are incompatible things. They have tried to assert this in the past but in vain.” The editorial closed by noting that “the detente process does not mean—and never has meant—the freezing of the socio-political status quo in the world.”
Weekly Review
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MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA

1 Angola: On and On

Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome.
ANGOLA: ON AND ON

None of the contending parties in the civil war scored any major military gains during the past week, although the forces opposing the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola made some progress in the west-central sector. Leaders of the two sides are intensifying their efforts to win political support among African states prior to the planned special summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity. The conference apparently will not convene before next month.

The Military Situation

Late last week, a strike force including elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the allied National Front for the Liberation of Angola pushed the Popular Movement out of the town of Cela. A National Union communique issued on December 15 had the force moving north toward Quibala, apparently along one of the main routes leading from the south to Luanda, seat of the Popular Movement’s government. The muscle of this and other combined National Union - National Front task groups is provided by unknown numbers of South African soldiers, white mercenaries, and black Angolans who fought for the Portuguese against the Popular Movement during the insurgency.

In the east, the National Union consolidated its hold on Luso, recaptured last week. Union leaders and their advisers plan to send one of their combined strike groups against Teixeira de Sousa, which like Luso has changed hands twice in the past month, and another toward Henrique de Carvalho, the Movement’s main operational base in eastern Angola. National Union president Jonas Savimbi reportedly has committed some 5,000 troops to the two operations and is confident of success.

North of Luanda, the military situation has remained essentially static since Popular Move-
With the OAU meetings in abeyance, Savimbi flew to Uganda this week for talks with OAU chairman Idi Amin. The National Union leader is to confer with conservative Senegalese President Senghor and reportedly intends on the same trip to visit Cameroon and Ivory Coast. In his talks with the West African leaders, all of whom oppose the Popular Movement’s drive for OAU recognition as the sole legitimate Angolan nationalist group, Savimbi presumably will be focusing on concernting tactics for building African support against the Soviets and Cubans. His principal African backers—President Mobutu of Zaire and President Kaunda of Zambia—are actually working toward the same goal.

Savimbi and his allies face an uphill struggle in their effort to neutralize the highly emotional South African issue, which mainly motivated Nigeria’s and Tanzania’s recognition of the Neto regime and is clearly causing other African governments to waver in their adherence to neutrality. The Popular Movement, of course, will continue to exploit the issue for all it is worth. This week the Movement stoked the fire by exhibiting, at a press conference in Luanda, four South African soldiers captured in the recent fighting at Cela. Neto’s lieutenant then took the four with him on a visit to Nigeria that began in Lagos on December 16; they are certain to attract wide publicity there and wherever else he may visit.

Savimbi, while in Kampala, made an attempt to disown Pretoria’s assistance by claiming that any South African forces in Angola are there on their own and by calling on African states to help drive them out. His argument is not likely to be persuasive in many African capitals.

**Soviet Press Admits Support**

The Soviet central press has, for the first time, indirectly admitted that both Moscow and Havana are providing military support to the Popular Movement in Angola.

Earlier this month Pravda, in reporting on a press conference held by President Nyerere in
Brussels, cited the Tanzanian President’s statement that he was “certain” the USSR was providing the MPLA with the “necessary arms” for its struggle against the “interventionists” from South Africa. In an accompanying commentary, Pravda stated inter alia that the Soviet Union, which stands “among the loyal friends” of the Angolan people and was one of the first to welcome the birth of an independent regime, “is providing help and support to Angola during these difficult days.”

Last weekend, moreover, the Soviet news agency Tass took the unusual step of publicizing MPLA leader Neto’s expression of gratitude for Moscow’s “all-round help” to the Angolan people. At the same time, Pravda provided the first hint seen thus far in the Soviet press that Cuba is furnishing substantial assistance to the MPLA. The Communist Party daily said that Cuba “always supported all national liberation movements in Africa, including the MPLA—the sole legitimate representative of the Angolan people.”

Moscow’s decision to make public, even in an unofficial way, its role in Angola coincides with recent MPLA gains in the military and diplomatic arena and suggests that the Soviets may want to get their fair share of the credit for these successes. The decision also dovetails with recent revelations in the US press of allegedly substantial US support for the MPLA’s rivals; hence, the Soviets may now feel less compelled to mask the dimensions of their own involvement.

**Sino-Soviet Rivalry**

Peking is still making an effort to capitalize on Moscow’s heavy-handed support for the Popular Movement. Publicly, the Chinese are maintaining a position of strict neutrality, and there is no evidence that any significant new amounts of Chinese military assistance are reaching the National Front or National Union.

As long as other countries maintain their current levels of assistance to the National Front and the National Union, China can be expected to maintain a low profile with its former clients, endorse the Organization of African Unity’s call for neutrality toward Angola, and score propaganda points at Moscow’s expense. Peking is clearly concerned, however, that it may not be able to sustain this approach.

Any significant reduction in support for the National Front and National Union by other countries, for example, would present the Chinese with difficult decisions. Mobutu would almost certainly want to divert to Angola large amounts of the Chinese assistance to his country to make up for the loss of other sources, and such increased Chinese involvement would soon become public knowledge.

The prospect of a reversal of the Organization of African Unity’s position on Angola or an agreement among its members to go their separate ways on the recognition issue would be equally unsettling to the Chinese. This would almost certainly lead to much wider African and Third World recognition for the Popular Movement and leave Peking on the wrong side of the fence.
SECRET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

19 July 1985

IMPACT OF CLARK AMENDMENT REPEAL

Summary

In our judgement, repeal of the Clark Amendment in a vote now scheduled for August could be a crossroads in the stalled US-brokered negotiations for a regional settlement in southern Africa. In response to preliminary House and Senate votes on repeal, Luanda suspended discussion with the United States and we believe it is unlikely to resume talks until it has assessed any changes in US policy towards UNITA. Moscow and Havana likely will use repeal of the Clark Amendment to strengthen the arguments of MPLA hardliners who oppose negotiations. We believe Savimbi will regard a repeal as a significant political victory that will reduce UNITA's diplomatic isolation and will help ensure that his interests are protected in future regional negotiations. Furthermore, it may encourage him to push aggressively for US military and financial assistance, including more sophisticated weaponry. South Africa will react favorably to repeal of the Clark Amendment, but we think Pretoria is likely to interpret it as reflecting domestic US politics, not a change in policy.
For now, the prospect of repeal has further complicated the already stalled settlement talks. Over the longer run, the impact of a repeal on resumption of negotiations depends in large measure on whether Angola views it—and any subsequent US actions—as a turning point in US policy. Indeed, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Luanda could interpret repeal as a signal to resume talks if only to forestall further US moves.

* * *

Status of Settlement

US efforts to negotiate a regional settlement in southern Africa appeared close to a breakthrough last year when Luanda—apparently with the grudging approval of the Soviet Union and Cuba—accepted linkage of a conditional Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence. In a letter to the UN Secretary General last November, Luanda proposed to send home the 20,000 Cuban troops stationed in southern Angola over a three-year period while retaining the 10,000 or so remaining Cuban troops as a residual force in the north. Luanda demanded, in return, that South Africa withdraw its forces from southern Angola, implement the UN plan for Namibia, cut off aid to UNITA, and cease attacks against Angola.

There has been little movement in the negotiations since Pretoria rejected the specifics of the Angolan proposal and demanded that all of the Cubans be withdrawn simultaneously with South African troops from Namibia. In March, the US proposed a "synthesis" of the two positions that was intended as a starting point to move the process off dead-center. Luanda promised to consider the US proposals but had not responded officially. Pretoria accused the US of retreating from its previous understanding on a total Cuban withdrawal and emphasized that South Africa would not be a party to an agreement that jeopardized UNITA's position. The South African raid in Cibinda Province in May prompted Luanda to announce in late May that it had suspended bilateral talks with South Africa, pending an explanation from Pretoria.

Reactions to the Repeal

While the key players—except for Angola—have yet to react officially to the Senate (10 June) and House (10 July) votes to repeal the Clark Amendment, past public statements and negotiating positions give us some insights into their likely views. In our judgment, formal repeal
will be seen as a positive statement of US support for UNITA and encourage suspicion that materiel or financial assistance is being or will be provided. The perception that the United States has taken sides probably will lead to repeated challenges to the US role as a neutral broker.

Angola: On 5 July, in a speech for the visiting Yugoslav president, the Angolan leader said that talks with both South Africa and the United States had been suspended. In extending the suspension to the United States, dos Santos cited the UNITA-hosted gathering in Angola of anticommmunist insurgents, some of which are US-backed, and the Senate vote to repeal the Clark Amendment. Luanda reacted immediately to the House vote by announcing on 12 July suspension of "contacts" with US envoys, although it did not close the door on a resumption of negotiations. Based on their track record in the negotiations, we believe Luanda probably found the Congressional action to be a convenient excuse for avoiding further talks that may have created expectations of additional Angolan concessions concerning a Cuban troop withdrawal--moves we believe Luanda is not prepared to make at this time, given the growing military threat from UNITA.

We believe it likely that Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners in the MPLA will portray repeal of the Clark Amendment as vindicating their long-held views that the principal US objective was to install a Savimbi-led regime in Luanda and that only Moscow and Havana are reliable allies. We believe that those in the MPLA leadership most closely tied to the negotiations, such as Minister of Interior Rodrigues, are likely to come under increasing criticism and their arguments supporting closer ties to the United States will come under sharp fire.

South Africa: Based on its support of UNITA, Pretoria will portray repeal of the Clark Amendment as Washington's recognition of South Africa's position that UNITA is a key actor that must be included formally in the negotiations process. Privately, however, Pretoria is likely to assess the repeal as reflecting US domestic politics and not a fundamental change in US policies.

UNITA: The Angolan insurgents, in our view, will see repeal as a significant political victory and a step tantamount to official recognition. Despite UNITA's growing military prowess, the insurgents have been unable to break their diplomatic isolation. Only South Africa openly supports UNITA; a few Black African, European, and Arab countries have provided behind the scenes encouragement and a small amount of materiel or financial support.* Savimbi probably is aware that this assistance is most likely a hedge in the event of an ultimate
UNITA victory, and could disappear suddenly if the donor's political interests alter or if UNITA's military fortunes are reversed.

In our judgement, the repeal will no doubt be a psychological boost for Savimbi. Based on his actions and speeches to date, we believe that Savimbi is concerned that he might be sold out as part of a settlement in which he was not a formal participant. Luanda's proposal to trade a Cuban withdrawal for Namibian independence was probably viewed by Savimbi as an Angolan attempt to cut his supply lines to the south and make him vulnerable to a protracted war of attrition. Savimbi has said repeatedly that peace in Angola will only be settled by an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation at which time Cuban troops will no longer be needed and can be withdrawn. Savimbi may see repeal of the Clark Amendment as a sign that Washington is starting to come around to his views.

UNITA undoubtedly would hope that repeal will lead ultimately to US materiel support. Although their battlefield performance suggests that Savimbi's insurgent army is well stocked by Pretoria, he has openly commented that the insurgents need certain sophisticated weapons--anti-tank and antiaircraft rockets, for example--that are not readily available from South Africa. At a minimum we believe that Savimbi will push for US assistance if only to pin down a US commitment to his cause.

USSR and Cuba: We believe repeal of the Clark Amendment will be used by Moscow to further its efforts to dissuade Luanda from participating in the regional negotiations. It also will add weight to Soviet arguments that the United States was all along covertly working hand-in-hand with South Africa to install a UNITA regime in Angola. Moscow probably also hopes the repeal will strengthen the political positions of the MPLA hardliners who promote pro-Soviet policies.

In addition, we believe Moscow probably will seize on the repeal in a vocal propaganda campaign to promote Black African unity against US policies throughout Africa. The Soviets may also argue that repeal implies a stepped-up US role in aiding UNITA and requires the continued Cuban troop presence in Angola, if not an even greater Cuban and Soviet involvement.

* These countries have included, France, Morocco, Senegal, and Zaire.
From Havana’s perspective, we believe that Castro will view the repeal as an ominous confirmation that the United States is adopting a tougher foreign policy in general towards Cuba and Cuban interests. His public statements lead us to believe Castro is convinced that improved relations with the Reagan administration are not possible, a conviction that may harden his position on several issues, including Angola. Following the South African raid on Cabinda, Castro publicly reaffirmed his commitment to the MPLA and asserted his willingness to even increase the Cuban contribution until a “just” Namibian settlement is reached.

We do not believe, however, that the repeal of the Clark Amendment itself will necessarily prompt an increase in Soviet or Cuban support for Angola. In the past, increased deliveries of Soviet weapons and additional Cuban troop arrivals have followed regime-threatening military setbacks, not diplomatic ups and downs. Even so, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Moscow or Havana could use the repeal as a convenient excuse to boost military support.

Black African States: Based on their reactions throughout the settlement talks, we believe most Black African states will roundly condemn the repeal as a statement of support for UNITA, inconsistent with the US role as mediator. They are also likely to charge the United States with collusion with Pretoria.

States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe that have been most critical of the linkage of a Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence and US dealings with South Africa probably will see the repeal as vindication of their positions. There could be some negative fallout from more moderate states, such as Zambia, that have supported US diplomatic efforts and leaders in these countries may be more hesitant to back future US initiatives in regional forums.

Outlook for the Negotiations

At a minimum, we believe that the MPLA will sustain its suspension of direct contacts with US officials over the near term and will want to assess the direction of US policy vis-a-vis Savimbi. Luanda, which has clearly been unwilling to see its Cuban protectors leave, probably would interpret any increase in UNITA’s strength as circumstantial evidence of US involvement and would be even more reluctant to return to the negotiating table. Over the longer run, the impact of a repeal on resumption of negotiations depends in large measure on whether Angola
views it—and any subsequent US actions—as a turning point in US policy. Indeed, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Luanda could interpret repeal as a signal to resume talks if only to forestall further US moves. If the Angolans were to resume talks, the atmosphere would probably be one of intense suspicion of US motives and with the moderates in the MPLA discredited, prospects for compromise would be limited in the near term, in our view.
Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit

An Intelligence Assessment
Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit

An Intelligence Assessment

Information as of 12 June 1979 has been used in preparing this report.

The author of this paper is Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries are welcomed.

This paper has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officers.

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit

Key Judgments

The Soviets would like to use the US-USSR summit meeting to restore the notion of the centrality of Soviet-American relations in world politics, to counter the diplomatic activity of China, and to demonstrate that important US interests could be affected as a result of changes in relations with the USSR. They have been dissatisfied with the state of Soviet-American relations and want the summit to impart a more positive tone and foster the impression of greater stability and, if possible, of restored forward momentum. This in turn is intended to head off the dangers that the USSR perceives in China’s rapprochement with the United States and to promote the process of detente in Europe. Moscow also wants to impress on its clients that its relationship with the United States is helpful to their interests, although Moscow cannot be perceived as sacrificing the interests of its clients to detente.

The Soviets can be expected to insist on resolving regional conflicts on their own terms. They will take a major share of credit for “stabilizing” the situations in Angola and Ethiopia, and will not see any merit in peaceful solutions in Africa that might help the United States and the West salvage their own interests. The Soviets will be particularly assertive in responding to the recent Egyptian-Israeli treaty, which Moscow will interpret as evidence of US exploitation of Soviet geopolitical weakness in the Middle East. President Brezhnev will be concerned with the possibility of an increased US military role in both Egypt and Israel, reminiscent of US monitoring in the Sinai following the disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975.

The Soviets are likely to be more defensive and even truculent in those areas where they perceive US manipulation of Soviet anxieties over China’s relations with the USSR and the United States. The Soviets have been worried about the possibility of improved Sino-US relations since the end of the Cultural Revolution 10 years ago ushered in a new phase of Chinese foreign policy. Moscow’s positive response to China’s recent bid for talks aimed at improved relations was designed in part to bolster the USSR’s tactical position before the summit.

The above information is Confidential
Soviet Foreign Policy
On the Eve of the Summit

As the summit approaches, President Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership can view their country's position in the world with considerable satisfaction. The current balance of military power has markedly reduced the likelihood of major reversals in central areas of Soviet interest in Europe and in the standoff with China. Soviet strength has also reduced the probability of unmanageable crises in the Middle East and Africa. There may be domestic crises in Eastern Europe, but the Soviets remain confident that they can be confronted without risk of military intervention by the West.

Part of the Soviet mood is a sense of momentum during Brezhnev's stewardship in the USSR's favor in the Third World. This is largely a matter of growth relative to the United States and the West as a whole, which finds Soviet international prestige on a more solid footing today than was the case in Khrushchev's day. In the Middle East, the fall of the Shah and the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has created a more congenial policy environment for them to exploit. They are likely to draw some encouragement about their prospects in Africa following successful interventions in Angola and Ethiopia. Successes in Africa have also enhanced the development of a strong, long-term relationship with Cuba, and the Soviets are probably anticipating opportunities for acquiring stable and relatively hospitable partners like Fidel Castro.

**Differences over Africa.**
The Soviets have already given notice that they are not impressed with the US argument that their actions in Africa have broken the unwritten rules of detente. The Soviets will take a major share of credit for “stabilizing” the situations in Angola and Ethiopia, and they will argue with their US counterparts that Africa should not be allowed to affect important questions of East-West relations. The Soviets realize that they are newcomers in Africa, and they are sensitive to any suggestion that they do not have at least as much right to be involved as other outside powers. They believe their own propaganda, moreover, and regard Western influence in Africa as a relic of the colonial past.
Clearly, the Soviets believe that the “wheel of history” is turning in their direction on the African continent.

Mindful of US accusations about Soviet activities in Africa, Brezhnev will probably respond by criticizing the United States for trying to weaken the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe and to isolate the black nationalist leadership in southern Africa. He might attempt to use the summit meetings to learn more about US efforts to deal with southern Africa, and he will be sensitive to the suspicion of Soviet clients that Moscow’s position in Africa could be mortgaged to detente and SALT II. The Soviet leadership believes that it holds one of the keys to solving the major confrontations on the continent and will insist that the US cooperate with the USSR on dealing with the Horn, Namibia, and even Zimbabwe. The Soviets will not see any merit in peaceful solutions in Africa that might help the United States and the West to salvage their own interests. Similarly, there will be no tacit Soviet acceptance of linkage, which was vigorously denied in last year’s Soviet Government statement arguing that “detente certainly does not supplant an artificial holding back of the objective processes of historical development.”

**Defensive over Asia and Middle East**
The Soviets are likely to be more defensive and even truculent in those areas where they perceive US exploitation of Soviet weakness, particularly with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviets have been worried about the possibility of improved Sino-US relations since the end of the Cultural Revolution 10 years ago ushered in a new phase of Chinese foreign policy. From the Soviet standpoint, Beijing is capable of any perfidy, and Moscow is also dismayed at the unpredictability of the “China card” players in the US administration. As a result, Brezhnev will attempt to probe US intentions and to warn against providing the
Chinese with modern technology and military equipment. He will undoubtedly attempt to impress upon the President the deep seriousness with which Moscow views Chinese intentions and may imply, if not flatly state, that detente will be jeopardized by US preferential provision to China of high technology in civilian and military fields. Given their particular concern about the potential for Sino-Japanese-American cooperation against the Soviet interests, the Soviet delegation will try to create a more favorable basis for their own relationship with the United States.

In the past, the Soviets have undoubtedly sought agreements with the United States that could be given an anti-Chinese appearance. While such devices would suit them admirably, they can have no expectation that the United States, particularly at this stage of its relations with China, would cooperate. They nevertheless expect that a generally successful summit, in and of itself, will manifest a degree of understanding between the superpowers that will offset some of the rise in Beijing's prestige. This will be a delicate matter, in which the Soviets will not want to appear overanxious.

The Soviets will be particularly assertive in responding to the recent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which Moscow will interpret as evidence of US exploitation of Soviet geopolitical weakness in the Middle East. Brezhnev can be expected to point to the treaty as an example of US irresponsibility in the wake of the 1977 joint statement on the Middle East. He will be particularly concerned with the possibility of an increased US military role in both Egypt and Israel, reminiscent of US monitoring in the Sinai following the disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975. During recent consultations with the French, Soviet officials were extremely tough on issues connected with the treaty, refusing to accept the treaty as an accomplished fact and criticizing their negative position on the deployment of the UN Emergency Force to monitor the withdrawal.

Several Soviet officials have already indicated that the USSR will try to block implementation of the treaty by vetoing the use of UN forces in the Sinai to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Soviet officials at the United Nations have begun a campaign to organize Security Council opposition to UN monitoring of the treaty's provisions, but the summit could nevertheless provide an opportunity for the Soviets to seek a compromise to avoid placing Moscow on the side of the radical Arabs in the area. Nevertheless, given Moscow's position in the Middle East as odd man out, the most important determinant of its veto will be the Arab consensus on this issue.

**Other Aspects of the Third World**

The Soviets will be particularly interested in reviewing trouble spots in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and they might expect to be credited for their restraint in these areas. In conversations with Chancellor Schmidt, for example, the Soviets have referred to their "reasonable" behavior during the Sino-Vietnamese war as opposed to the "hostile actions" of the Chinese. The Soviets could refer to additional evidence of "caution" in their behavior:

- Failure to recognize the Polisario or to give significant help to Algeria in its conflict with Morocco over the Western Sahara.
- Unwillingness to get involved in the confrontations between Libya and Chad, and Tanzania and Uganda.
- Respect for the Somali frontier on the Horn of Africa and restraint in dealing with Eritrea.

Local factors played the major part in impressing on the Soviets the need for restraint in these areas, and it would be wrong to conclude that the Soviets consider themselves restrained by detente in their behavior in the Third World.

The Soviets want to impress on their clients that a special US-USSR relationship is helpful to their interest, although Moscow cannot be perceived as sacrificing the interest of their clients to detente. The Soviets have cooperated in the past on Arab-Israeli and Lebanese cease-fires and have endorsed various renewals of UN peacekeeping missions; the limits on Soviet support for Libya and the hesitancy of Soviet support for Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement also augur well for the possibility of a continued Soviet effort to avoid flash point situations in the Middle East.
The Soviets will try to use any discussion of Asia to
counter the diplomatic activity of China and to
demonstrate that important US interests could be
affected as a result of changes in relations with the
USSR. The Soviets are likely to raise, for example,
their interest in freedom of seas in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, particularly because of Moscow's
geopolitical weakness in the area and its major
requirements in securing access to foreign fishing
grounds. The Soviets appear particularly interested in
resuming the Indian Ocean arms control talks, and
Brezhnev may raise the issue at the summit. The
Soviets believe that the United States enjoys distinct
advantages in being able to deploy land-based strike
aircraft and military transport and reconnaissance
flights to the region, and they regard US support
facilities in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region as
being superior to anything that Moscow has thus far
secured in Ethiopia or South Yemen.

Elsewhere in Asia, the Soviets are in a position to
refrain from certain types of activities that could have
a negative impact on the global relationships between
the superpowers. The Soviets are in no position, for
example, to influence overtly the actions of North
Korea's Kim Il-song, but their continued unwillingness
to supply Pyongyang with such sophisticated weaponry
as MiG-23 fighter aircraft indicates that Moscow still
favors the preservation of the status quo on the Korean
peninsula. The extent of future Soviet use of Vietnam-
ese air and naval bases and Moscow's willingness to
modernize Vietnamese forces with advanced weaponry
will determine Vietnam's future dependence on the
USSR, China's perception of a threat on its southern
border, and the level of Soviet-US differences over
Southeast Asia.

Europe on the Back Burner
Unlike the summit in 1972, when the Soviets were
pressing for West German ratification of the USSR-
West German treaty and for a clear US commitment
to convene a European security conference, the Soviets
will presumably not make Europe a major political
topic at the summit. Brezhnev will almost certainly try
to prod the United States on the subject of mutual
force reductions and on the "military detente" aspects
of CSCE. The Soviets will try to appear as benevolent
as possible on European matters, if only to undermine
the current view in NATO that the West must counter
the Soviet military presence in Europe. The Soviet
leadership appears to believe that Washington's push
for higher defense budgets and for modernization of
theater nuclear forces is responsible in part for that
view. The recent Soviet emphasis on security arms
control issues in dealing with European countries
testsifies to their concern with US steps to bolster
Western resolve.

Although the main purpose of the summit meeting, in
Soviet eyes, is to lift Soviet-US relations to a more
amicable and more stable plane, there is always the
possibility that various global issues could become
irritants in the bilateral talks. In addition to the
potential for discord in the Middle East over the
Egyptian-Israeli treaty, there are other areas where
Moscow and Washington are on opposite sides of the
fence:

- Another Egyptian-Libyan clash, more than the
border fighting in 1977, would find the United States
and USSR at odds in their support for the protagonists.

- Both the United States and the USSR have recently
increased their support for North and South Yemen,
respectively, and the Soviets are also hinting at a
revived insurgency by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman.

- Future events in Lebanon as well as the direction of
Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement could have an adverse
impact on the border situation between Syria and
Israel.

- The Soviet-Cuban military relationship, and particu-
larly the impact of this relationship on events in
southern Africa, continues to cause difficulties.

The Persian Gulf is another potential area of dispute,
with the Soviets reiterating their intention of protect-
ing their interests in any future Iranian crisis and
warning against "imperialist meddling" in a country
that borders on the USSR.
The Soviets will be particularly assertive in defending their interests in South and Southeast Asia, the region in which the Soviets judge that the United States has lost the most influence in recent years. The loss of the US position in Iran, the dissolution of the Central Treaty Organization, the advent of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, and the consolidation of Soviet ties with Vietnam must be considered key pluses in any Soviet net assessment of the area. The Soviets have once again adopted a tougher line on Pakistani and Iranian aid for the insurgency in Afghanistan, which indicates that they may have decided to justify greater aid for Kabul and are less concerned with the impact of such a decision on neighboring states.

The Soviets have also been laying the groundwork for a propaganda campaign aimed at embarrassing the United States at next month's UN Conference on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

The Future Relationship With the United States

The current Soviet leadership has a propensity for formalizing its relationships with other powers in international documents. In the past few months, the USSR has signed treaties with states that it supports—Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. It has also negotiated protocols on regular bilateral consultations with key Western states with which it is not unfriendly—France, West Germany, and Canada. The Soviets regard these protocols as useful in providing continuing access to other governments, in inhibiting the other partner should it contemplate anti-Soviet actions, and in signifying a shift in regional alignments.

The Soviets may not see advantages in achieving such a relationship with the United States at this juncture, but the Soviets would like to restore the notion of the centrality of Soviet-American relations in world politics. This would permit Moscow to tell its clients that it was dealing actively with the United States on Third World trouble spots. With respect to bilateral relations, the Soviets probably judge that consultations would help to keep Soviet-US relations in reasonably good repair. Moscow also would like to have additional channels for discussing such key issues as nonproliferation and crisis management. The Soviets would expect this arrangement to impress the Chinese in particular with the limits of their potential. It also would further the sense of detente in Europe, while simultaneously causing US allies to worry about US reliability.

The above information is Confidential.
3 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:                   CIA ER 81-10117 M

SUBJECT:  INR Request for Data on Warsaw Pact Military Assistance to Angola

1. Attached are the tables you requested for INR's Congressional briefing. The tables show military assistance to Angola, including: (a) agreement and delivery values; (b) types and numbers of specific weapons delivered; and (c) military personnel present in 1980. The detail of the request dictated that these data be classified SECRET/Also attached is the unclassified table on Communist military technicians in Africa in 1979 as you requested.

2. If you have any further questions, please call

Attachment:  As stated

Office of Economic Research

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
### Table 1

**Military Assistance from Warsaw Pact Countries**

#### Sales Agreements and Deliveries

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<td>336</td>
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<td><strong>Eastern Europe</strong></td>
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#### Major Equipment Deliveries

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<td>Aircraft:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter and Trainer Aircraft</td>
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<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
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<td>Helicopters</td>
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<td>Land Equipment:</td>
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<td>Medium and Light Tanks</td>
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<td>Other Armored Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery Pieces (100 mm or larger)</td>
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<td>Naval Ships:</td>
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<td>Motor Torpedo and Patrol Boats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Middle Range (155 mm) Artillery</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air Bttns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air Launchers (hand held)</td>
<td>NA</td>
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**Million US $**

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*NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS*
### Table 3

**Africa: Communist Military Technicians**

**Present, 1979**

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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1. Minimum estimates of the number of personnel present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
2. Including 30,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia.

This Table is Unclassified.
19 October 1979

MEMORANDUM

ANGOLA: ATITUDES TOWARD RECONCILIATION (U)

For the MPLA, negotiations with UNITA probably would be an inflammatory and divisive issue. Each side publicly has set preconditions unacceptable to the other. Savimbi demands the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola; the MPLA says neither Savimbi nor his senior military leaders could serve in a government of national unity.

Prior to his death last month, Neto was continuing a drive begun last year to consolidate his personal power, but he had made little progress toward resolving Angola's serious economic, political, and social problems. Public discontent was growing. Neto saw that the UNITA insurgency was having a serious effect on the MPLA's ability to rule the country. He apparently had concluded that the Government could not solve most of Angola's problems as long as the insurgency continued.

Shortly before his death, Neto reportedly had been in contact with Savimbi and was planning to meet with him to try and end the civil war.

We do not know if Neto had obtained approval of his Politburo for these initiatives with UNITA. Neto could not seek a negotiated settlement with UNITA because of factionalism.

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within the MPLA. Several senior MPLA officials have voiced opposition to talks with Savimbi. In December 1978, Defense Minister Iko Carreira, currently a leading figure in the new ruling group, said that there was no point in his government negotiating with UNITA because the MPLA will never share power with another group.

MPLA Secretary General Lucio Lara, a major power broker in the new government, said last fall that the government could negotiate with UNITA leaders but not Savimbi. Mulattoes among the senior MPLA leadership fear reconciliation with Savimbi, a charismatic black. Other MPLA officials may believe, like Neto, that negotiations offer the only solution to the military stalemate, but we have no indications that these individuals have sufficient political support to push for talks with UNITA at this time. The members of the ruling circle in any case are preoccupied currently with sorting out the political relationships among themselves and coping with the resurgence of racial tensions in Luanda. Eventually, however, the MPLA will have to consider a negotiated settlement with Savimbi.

Savimbi and Negotiations

Savimbi acknowledges the need for dialogue, but publicly has claimed he would "never" talk with Neto or other senior MPLA officials.

UNITA has no hope of defeating the MPLA military as long as the Cubans maintain their substantial military presence in Angola. The UNITA leadership undoubtably is concerned that Luanda's diplomatic efforts to improve relations with Angola's neighbors will tend to isolate UNITA militarily and politically. The establishment of US-Angolan relations would be a psychological blow. A Namibian settlement or a UN presence along the Angolan-Namibian frontier would not disable UNITA forces, but would cause additional problems.
MEMORANDUM

SOUTH AFRICAN AID TO UNITA

Although UNITA and Pretoria have sought to keep their relationship under tight wraps since the Angolan war, South Africa provides specialized equipment and logistic support to Savimbi. Pretoria apparently is not providing significant arms aid, although it probably gives small amounts to Savimbi from time to time, either directly from South African stocks or from foreign sources whom Pretoria assists in passing aid to UNITA.

Support to UNITA is handled by the military, whose substantial forces along the Angolan border in northern Namibia provide ideal security in helping Savimbi. A principal point of contact appears to be the important South African base at Rundu, a camp adjacent to the border; Pretoria used the Rundu camp during the Angolan civil war to support UNITA and its own forces in Angola.

Pretoria recognizes that UNITA is unlikely to achieve power in Angola without massive outside support, which neither South Africa nor other foreign powers are willing to provide. Pretoria attached greater importance to reaching an accommodation with the Angolan government.
South African Options

The future of the UNITA-South African relationship seems inextricably linked to a Namibian solution. Aid to UNITA will continue until Pretoria attains the kind of settlement it wants. At present, UNITA is important to Pretoria because Savimbi ties down Cuban and Angolan resources that might otherwise be used to support SWAPO's limited guerrilla incursions into Namibia. UNITA also serves as a useful vehicle for Pretoria to use to prod the new Angolan government toward an accommodation that would be advantageous for both countries. South African aid to UNITA may even increase if Pretoria determines Savimbi is faltering or his other sources of outside aid are drying up. Pretoria probably would see little benefit in making Savimbi significantly stronger as long as the new government in Luanda, at least in the short run, continues Neto's policies while the country's internal problems are being sorted out in the post-Neto period. If the South Africans perceive that the Angolans and the Frontline presidents have decided that SWAPO must be strengthened because Pretoria's negative response to Neto's DMZ proposal indicates that Pretoria is no longer willing to negotiate seriously about an international settlement for Namibia, military aid to Savimbi might be stepped up.

If South African Aid Ends . . .

An internationally sponsored settlement acceptable to Pretoria would probably bring a gradual end of support to UNITA, provided Pretoria's security concerns are satisfied during the transition process and after a new government is installed in Windhoek. Loss of South African aid, particularly if Savimbi is unable to make it up from other supporters, would force him to reassess his strategy. Guerrilla operations would doubtless be hampered, but unless the Angolans and Cubans develop an effective counterinsurgency capability, Savimbi is probably strong enough to continue to challenge Luanda's control of much of southern Angola. UNITA has developed a momentum of its own, and Savimbi has succeeded over the years largely through his own efforts. His charismatic leadership, the cohesiveness of his movement with its strong tribal base, and UNITA's apparent ability to fulfill its major arms requirements from within Angola favor UNITA's survival as an insurgent movement.

If the South African government chooses to go it alone in Namibia, Pretoria would probably use Savimbi as part of a broad effort to counter the outside pressure that would almost certainly be applied through Angola.
against a pariah Namibian regime. In such an event, Pretoria would probably try to tie UNITA more tightly to South Africa by upgrading Savimbi's military capabilities. It would not be difficult to send him more equipment from Namibia, possibly including effective air defense weapons that Savimbi has unsuccessfully been seeking from his other foreign supporters. Strengthening Savimbi would create even greater turmoil in Angola, and might encourage Savimbi to resist any attempt at national reconciliation with Luanda should the new regime try for a political solution as an alternative to relying on the Cubans.
MENORANDUM

ANGOLA: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC USES OF THE MOCAMBEDES-MENDEUGUE RAILROAD

Summary

The Mocamedes-Mendongue Railroad (Caminho de Ferro de Mocamedes-CFM) serves as a major supply line for Angolan and Cuban military forces stationed in southern Angola. Its use for non-military purposes appears to be severely limited at present. Prior to independence, however, the CFM was a key element in the operation of the Kassings iron ore enterprise, then a major foreign exchange earner. The present Angolan government clearly would like to revive the non-inactive Kassings facility.

Background: Angola's Railroads

The CFM is the southernmost of Angola's three main railroads. The other two run eastward from Luanda and Benguela. All three were built and initially operated by the Portuguese during the colonial period. The railroads carried exports from the interior to ports on the Atlantic coast. They also transported food from the agricultural hinterlands to the coastal populations.

All three railroads run in a generally east-west direction. A few spurs run from the main line to agricultural or mining centers. The most important railroad of the three—the Benguela line in central Angola—is the only one that connects to rail lines beyond Angola's borders.

This memorandum was written by the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It was requested by the National Security Council Staff. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Africa and the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome.

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The Portuguese apparently ran the railroads fairly effectively prior to independence. Locomotives, rolling stock, and track beds were said to have been well maintained. The railroads, along with the rest of the economy, were hurt by the massive exodus of trained Portuguese at the time of independence and the further disruptions resulting from the introduction of a new social and political system. Maintenance of locomotives, rolling stock and track beds almost certainly has suffered.

The continuing war with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgents has also had an adverse effect on the operation of the railroads, but the CFM apparently has suffered far less than the Benguela line. The insurgents have focused on the Benguela because of its international importance and its location in a region where the guerrillas are actively vying with government forces for control.

Reported incidents--mines, derailing, and attacks on trains--have taken almost one per day on the Benguela line but appear to be limited to only about two or three per month on the CFM. Nevertheless, the Angolans have admitted that the CFM has occasionally suffered interruptions and damage to equipment.

**Military Importance of the CFM**

Most military forces in southern Angola are stationed along the CFM; the main garrisons are in the towns served by the railroad. On several occasions APCs and other military equipment on railcars in the Mocamedes port area have been seen on railcars in Lubango. Other supplies required by these forces (fuel, ammunition, etc.) probably are delivered by rail but would not be clearly identifiable as military.

The garrisons are also supplied by road, but movement of large quantities would be difficult over Angola's generally poor roads. Moreover, any road traffic from the north must cross the main area of UNITA operations. Convoys would have to run a gauntlet most of the way.

Three Angolan brigades and elements of another infantry unit of nearly brigade size are stationed at the garrisons in Mocamedes, Lubango, Natala, and Menongue. In addition, remnants of another brigade, decimated by South African attacks the past few months, may have taken refuge in the main garrisons. The Angolans also maintain air defense sites along the rail line--there are SA-3 missile sites at Menongue, Lubango, and Natala--
and a series of antiaircraft gun emplacements and air warning radars at various locations. SWAPO guerrillas from Namibia also have bases and storage facilities near some of the Angolan garrisons.

There is a sizable Cuban presence in the garrisons along the CFM. The Cubans have been heavily involved in training and advising the Angolan army and in establishing and operating the country's air defense system. A squadron of Cuban-piloted MiG-21s is stationed at Lubango.

The Cubans, moreover, have several combat units in the area and probably have increased their presence there in recent months in response to South Africa's operations in the border region of southern Angola. Three Cuban infantry battalions were recently observed in fortified encampments at Jamba and Menongue.

Although most of the Angolan and Cuban military units along the railroad probably are based there because of the South African threat, Angolan military operations against UNITA have also been staged out of these garrisons. Menongue apparently is the main support base for operations against UNITA strongholds in southeastern Angola.

Economic Potential

The present contribution of the Angolan railroads, and the CFM in particular, to Angola's prostrate economy appears insignificant. The major export earners—oil and diamonds—do not rely on the railroads. Reports of food shortages in the coastal cities and the country's food import requirements indicate that little food is reaching the coast from agricultural areas in the interior.

The CFM was at one time an important part of the Angolan economy. In the late 1960s, the Portuguese made a major effort to exploit the iron ore deposits in the vicinity of Kassings. The railroad was improved, its capacity was expanded, and an ore-loading facility was constructed at the Hocamedes seaport. The CFM was re-equipped with US and West German diesel locomotives, in contrast to the other Angolan railroads that relied primarily on wood-burning steam locomotives.

As a result of these measures, iron ore production at Kassingas exceeded five million tons per year in the early 1970s, and iron ore exports were the fourth largest foreign exchange earner for the colony. Since independence, iron ore production has virtually ceased.
The Angolan government would like to revive this important economic activity, and an Austrian firm reportedly is rejuvenating the Kassinga mines. To reach pre-independence production levels at Kassinga, restoration of the CFM clearly would be essential.

We do not know how long it will take to revive the Kassinga mines, but if the Angolans are seriously interested in exploiting this venture we would expect them to seek additional purchases of rolling stock or other railroad equipment. In the interim, the military probably will continue to make the most use of the railroad.
SUBJECT: Angola: Military and Economic Uses of the Mocamedes-Menongue Railroad
Intelligence Checklist

February 4, 1976

23
The *Intelligence Checklist* is a special publication produced by the Director of Central Intelligence with particular attention to the interests and needs of certain committees of the Congress.
Intelligence Checklist

ANGOLA: The National Union, hard pressed by Cuban troops fighting for the Popular Movement, is organizing many of its troops into guerrilla units.

In eastern Angola, the National Union is reported grouping some 3,000 troops into guerrilla units, which are already active around the town of Lumege. These units will be used to screen conventional forces trying to advance toward Teixeira de Sousa.

Although the Popular Movement apparently has not made any major gains in recent days, two separate Cuban columns of about 1,000 men each, backed by armored cars, reportedly are moving on Teixeira da Silva. Their ultimate target is probably Huambo, the National Union's former political headquarters.

In northern Angola, Popular Movement forces are stockpiling supplies for a move on Tomboco, one of the National Front's few remaining garrisons. The Front is expecting more European mercenaries to arrive at Santo Antonio do Zaire.

---continued---
Intelligence Checklist
11 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Hopkins
NIO for Latin America

SUBJECT: Economic Costs to Cuba of Involvement in Angola

Attached is OER's response to Dr. Brzezinski's request on the economic costs of Cuba's involvement in Angola.

Attachment: As stated

Office of Economic Research

ERM 77-10489
Economic Costs to Cuba of Involvement in Angola

The economic burden of Angola is not yet an important constraint on Cuban policymakers. We estimate the total annual cost to Cuba of maintaining 19,800 troops in Angola at $60 million, 0.7% of 1977 GNP. Havana bears only the estimated $45 million in subsistence and salary costs, and even part of these apparently are covered by Luanda. In addition, the diversion of merchant vessels for logistic support involves at most 10% of the Cuban fleet and a financial loss of $15 million annually if these vessels were available for charter.

Cuba’s burden in Angola is only one quarter of the US economic burden of Viet Nam during the peak year, 1968. The Defense Department and the Senate Appropriations Committee estimate US costs during 1968 at $26.5 billion, 3% of 1968 GNP. The share of Cuba’s total labor force currently stationed in Angola, however, is virtually identical to the share of the total US labor force in Viet Nam during 1968 -- 0.67% and 0.65% respectively.

Virtually all materiel costs of the Cuban involvement are borne by the USSR. Moscow has replaced -- probably on a grant basis -- most of the military equipment which Havana has sent to Angola. Much of this replacement stock sent to Cuba is newer and in some cases more sophisticated. Moreover, most of the military equipment being used in Angola was sent there directly from the USSR. The Soviets have provided Soviet planes and pilots to facilitate Cuban logistics and have leased two long-range IL-62s to Cuba for twice weekly flights to Luanda. This has enabled Havana to continue its civil air service on Cubana’s current routes without interruption.

While the real economic cost is relatively small, Havana is reportedly becoming increasingly concerned over the Cuban populace’s exaggerated perception of the cost of the Cuban involvement in Angola. Few Cubans have detailed knowledge of Havana’s overall commitment in Angola, but they are aware that the highly visible callup of forces has coincided with a sharp economic decline. The Cuban leaders have consistently and correctly maintained in all of their public announcements that the island’s economic decline is due to low world sugar prices. Nevertheless, the populace apparently views the Angolan adventures as a major cause of Cuba’s economic difficulties. Castro prefers to rule through genuine popular support rather than repression and does pay close attention to mass attitudes. Out of respect for public opinion, he has never told the Cuban people the full story of the intervention in Angola.
Africa Review

6 April 1981
Nigeria: Stake in Angola and Namibia

Although the Nigerians feel no real affinity for Angola's Marxist-oriented regime and would like to see it dispense with Soviet and Cuban support, they support Luanda as a key player in the struggle for Namibian independence under black majority rule. Nigeria will defend a Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola so long as it sees that country as militarily threatened by South Africa and by Western-assisted insurgents.
This publication is produced by the Office of Political Analysis. Some issues contain articles drafted in other offices. Some articles are preliminary or speculative in nature, but the contents normally are coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the views of a single analyst; these items are clearly designated as uncoordinated views.
NIGERIA: STAKE IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA

Lagos's pro-Angolan policy is dictated by its commitment to the elimination of white supremacist regimes in southern Africa, the centerpiece of Nigerian foreign policy. Because the Angolan Government allows Namibian insurgents to operate from its territory, Nigeria supports Angola as a key player in black Africa's struggle to win independence for Namibia under black majority rule.

Given their Western ties and capitalist orientation, the Nigerians feel no real affinity for Angola's Marxist-oriented regime and would like to see it dispense with Soviet and Cuban support. But Lagos will defend a Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola so long as it sees that country as militarily threatened by South Africa and Western-assisted Angolan insurgents.

Muhammed's Legacy

President Shagari's freedom of action on Angola is constrained by the legacy of the late head of state (1975-76) General Muhammed, a fellow Muslim northerner who articulated Nigeria's Angolan policy and who is nationally revered as a martyred hero. Shagari, a low-key and unassuming figure, cannot afford to appear significantly less committed to Angola than was Muhammed, a far more forceful and outspoken leader. To do so would invite unflattering comparison with Muhammed and domestic criticism—especially in Shagari's own northern constituency.

Muhammed, who was elevated to power in a July 1975 coup, viewed Angola as a test case for a new activist foreign policy designed to assert Nigeria's claim to African leadership. The policy featured strong opposition to colonialism and racism in southern Africa—a domestically popular and unifying issue. The Nigerians felt compelled to side with the Soviet-backed Popular

6 April 1981
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Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the Angolan civil war when it became clear that South Africa had intervened in Angola on behalf of Jonas Savimbi's Western-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Nigeria formally recognized the MPLA in November 1975 as the sole legitimate government of Angola. Lagos then mounted an intense diplomatic campaign in Africa that culminated in the spring of 1976 in OAU membership for Angola and political legitimacy in African eyes for the MPLA regime.

1976 Dispute With the United States

In early 1976, Nigerian-US relations plunged to their lowest point ever over Angola, aggravating Lagos's underlying suspicions of US policy in Africa and dramatizing major differences in perceptions of the southern African scene. Nigeria's skepticism of US intentions in Africa was rooted in attitudes formed during its civil war (1967-70). While the United States embargoed arms sales to both sides, the Biafran secessionists benefited from US public sympathy and private US humanitarian relief efforts.

US policy toward Angola fortified Nigeria's belief that US policy in Africa was largely shaped by a concern with countering Soviet influence in the world and a desire to protect American investment in mineral-rich South Africa, with black Africa's goals of eliminating racism and minority rule taking a back seat. From this perspective, the Nigerians were baffled and angered by Washington's preoccupation with the Soviets and Cubans and its silence about South Africa (which Lagos believed had earlier supplied arms to Biafra).

US failure to condemn South African intervention in Angola and suspected US covert support for Savimbi's faction led Nigeria to launch a bitter official attack on the US in January 1976. A month later, following Muhammed's assassination in an abortive military coup, the United States was accused by the Nigerian press of

6 April 1981
complicity because Muhammed had dared to challenge the United States over Angola. Nigeria subsequently was racked by a wave of xenophobia and unrest that featured violent anti-American student demonstrations abetted by the regime.

Attitudes Toward the Soviets and Cubans

Nigerian unease over the Soviet and Cuban military presence in Africa has increased in recent years. At the 1978 OAU summit in Khartoum, Muhammed's successor, General Obasanjo, publicly called for the Soviets and Cubans to leave Angola and Ethiopia "as soon as their missions were completed." Nigeria also is concerned about the influence of the Soviets and their Libyan friends in neighboring Benin and Chad, which Lagos fears could become future bases for Libyan subversion against northern Nigeria.

But Lagos continues to reluctantly acquiesce in Soviet and Cuban support for Angola as a necessary evil to defend against the South African-assisted Angolan insurgents. The Nigerians still hold that the Soviets and Cubans were legitimately invited to Angola by a sovereign government to help counter a South African invasion.

In the Nigerian view, South Africa's involvement with Angolan insurgents and the need for a large Cuban and Soviet presence would end if only the West would pressure Pretoria into accepting independence for Namibia under genuine black majority rule. Nigeria, moreover, has consistently urged the United States to recognize the MPLA government and to provide it with an alternative source of aid to lessen Angola's dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. The recently announced US plan to seek a repeal of the Clark Amendment—which bars US aid to Angolan insurgents—has been publicly dubbed "atrocious" by Shagari and set off a round of increasingly strident criticism of Washington in the Nigerian press.

6 April 1981
The Soviets have always won a degree of favor with Nigeria for their arms aid to southern African liberation movements and their opposition to colonialism and racism in Africa. The Nigerians also remain grateful for the provision of Soviet heavy arms and fighter aircraft to the federal side during the Nigerian civil war, which helped ensure its victory.

Relations With the MPLA

Despite Nigeria's support for Angola as a bulwark against South Africa, its day-to-day relations with Luanda are limited and rather cool. Because of its own massive development needs, Nigeria is in no position to provide military or economic aid to Angola on a large enough scale to give Luanda an alternative to dependence on the Soviets and Cubans.

In 1975, Nigeria granted the MPLA government $20 million in economic aid. This sum was equal to Nigeria's total foreign aid since 1972 to all other African countries and African regional organizations. Lagos later sent some civilian technicians to Luanda, but it did not sign an economic protocol with Angola until 1980—a standard agreement covering trade, air services, fisheries, and cultural and educational exchanges. Trade between the two countries is insignificant. At one time there was a Nigerian police training team in Luanda, and Nigeria has periodically shipped meager amounts of small arms and ammunition to Angola in recent years for delivery to Namibian (and formerly to Zimbabwean) insurgents training there.

Relations With SWAPO

Nigeria supports the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), based in southern Angola, as the only "authentic representative" of the Namibian people. Lagos is unlikely to endorse any Namibian independence plan that excludes SWAPO from participation. The Nigerians insist on SWAPO participation even though they find SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma difficult to deal with and are appalled by SWAPO's lack of unity. Until the collapse this January of the UN transitional plan for Namibia, Lagos for years had put pressure on Nujoma to compromise in settlement talks held under the auspices of the five-nation Western "contact group."

6 April 1981
Africa Review

Supplement
30 March 1979
AFRICA REVIEW (U)
SUPPLEMENT
30 March 1979
CONTENTS

Nigeria-USSR: Faltering Economic Relations (U) . . . 1

Nigerian-Soviet relations, which have gradually cooled in recent years partly as a result of Nigerian displeasure over Soviet aid programs, will probably be further strained if Lagos goes through with a threat to turn over construction of the 1.3-million-ton Ajaokuta iron and steel plant to Western firms. (C)

Challenge to Soviet Policy in Africa (U) . . . . . . . 5

The Soviet Union's poor economic performance and deficiencies of the Soviet military assistance program could diminish Soviet prospects in several African countries. (C)
Challenge to Soviet Policy in Africa (U)

Developments in Africa over the last few months could test Soviet policy in a way that Moscow is traditionally least able to handle. In the past, Moscow has made gains in Nigeria, Angola, and Ethiopia by responding to their needs for military assistance and thus keeping in power a regime sympathetic in varying degrees to the Soviet Union and somewhat responsive to its influence. Security concerns in several countries where Soviet influence has increased are becoming less pressing, and some recipients of Soviet military largess are increasingly interested in economic development. Poor economic performance by the Soviets will aggravate problems caused by the deficiencies of the Soviet military assistance program and will particularly diminish Soviet prospects in areas where military assistance is accorded a lower priority. (C)

Nigeria

Nigeria, which challenged the Soviet Union at an Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference in Khartoum last July because of its military activities in Africa, has become particularly critical of Soviet economic assistance in Africa. The Nigerians believe that the Soviets concentrate on giving military assistance to countries whose survival is threatened but do not follow up with economic development assistance that is needed over the long haul. Those countries that would prefer to remain socialist, according to the Nigerians, thus turn to the West for what Moscow is unwilling to supply, which often leads to the eventual expulsion of the Soviets. The Nigerians have cited Guinea, Sudan, Egypt, and Somalia as examples of this trend and predict it will continue in Angola and Mozambique and even in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe when the enthusiasm of "military brotherhood" has waned. Nigeria itself could soon be added to the list. The Soviet-Nigerian relationship has deteriorated in part because of problems in their military assistance relationship, a phenomenon that accelerated because of Soviet deficiencies in aiding economic development. The

SC 00393/79

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Nigerians particularly complain about poor Soviet performance in construction of the Ajaokuta steel mill and an oil pipeline. (C)

**Angola**

Dependent on Soviet assistance to deal with the UNITA insurgency, Angola has not been publicly critical of Moscow's military or economic assistance. Clandestine reporting, however, indicates some Angolan dissatisfaction with the Soviets on both counts, and the Neto government is already exploring the possibility of diversifying its sources of economic assistance. Neto has made overtures to the United States, relations with France and Portugal have improved, and an association with the EC under the Lome Convention is being examined. (S NF NC OC)

Neto has also tried to come to grips with Angola's dependency on the Soviet Union by improving ties with Zaire and China. Angola's relations with Zaire have improved since the Shaba invasion, and both sides, looking for economic benefits, have agreed to reopen the Benguela Railroad. Neto clearly hopes that improved relations with Zairian President Mobutu would lead Kinshasa to curtail its assistance to UNITA in return for Angolan control over the Katangese. (C)

An Angolan representative met with Chinese Vice Premier Li during his trip to southern Africa in January. The Angolans reportedly sought public recognition of the Angolan Government by Beijing and will almost certainly insist on termination of Chinese aid to UNITA before relations are established. The Chinese apparently were not willing to go this far, but the door has been opened, and future contacts and eventual normalization of ties are likely. (TS U)

Moscow has apparently not opposed Neto's Western diplomacy and would welcome termination of Chinese aid to UNITA. The Soviets would be wary, however, of a Chinese presence in Luanda. The recent trip by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev to Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia--also visited by Chinese Vice-Premier Li in January--was probably an attempt to gauge the impact of the Chinese visit on Soviet interests. From the Soviet
perspective, closer ties between Angola and China would probably be an irritant in relations, but if Neto works out an agreement Moscow will have little choice except to acquiesce and work to ensure support for its position among pro-Soviet Angolans. (C)

**Ethiopia**

The Soviet-Ethiopian relationship is a marriage of convenience that has been plagued by mutual suspicions and differences over policy. During the past year, both sides have tried to minimize the tension in their relationship in order to concentrate on military objectives--expulsion of the Somalis from the Ogaden and suppression of the Eritrean insurgents. While insurgency remains a problem in both areas, Ethiopian leader Mengistu has probably weathered the worst and appears more confident of his ability to deal with remaining problems. The shift in emphasis from military affairs to economic development in Ethiopia will present new challenges to the Soviets. (C)

Even during the worst of military situations in the Ogaden, Mengistu and the Ethiopians were privately critical of the Soviet role in Ethiopian economic development. They have complained about the price the Soviets paid for Ethiopian coffee as well as allegedly inflated Soviet prices for civil aircraft. Mengistu wants Ethiopia to seek the best possible economic deal for itself--regardless of its ideological, political, and military relationship with the USSR. (S NF NC OC)

During his negotiations with the Soviets in November, Mengistu reportedly staked out a tough bargaining position on economic issues and refused at first to sign the friendship treaty. He reportedly resented what he believed to be Moscow's cavalier treatment of Ethiopia's economic needs, but eventually secured additional economic aid. The size of the economic commitment is uncertain, but the reports of disagreement ring true and suggest that this will continue to be a source of friction between the two and may increase as the Ethiopians place more emphasis on economic development. Barring a change in Soviet policy or Ethiopian priorities, these disagreements may ultimately jeopardize the Soviet position in Ethiopia. (S NF NC OC)

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30 March 1979

Top Secret
Aside from the agreement with Ethiopia, there have been no recent changes in Soviet policy suggesting that Moscow will be more responsive in the short run to the economic needs of its principal African clients. At least one Gosplan official told US officials that the demands for aid from Ethiopia and Angola alone cannot be met. (C)

Lower Level Soviets Recognize The Problem

One of Moscow's repeated deficiencies in Third World relationships has been that its aid has traditionally avoided hard currency expenditures and has emphasized high-visibility industrial projects in the state sector of recipient states. Aid has also been channeled primarily to countries undergoing a sociopolitical transformation of an "anti-imperialist" nature; in effect aid was directed at political, not economic, goals. This has offered short-term payoffs but fostered long-term setbacks. (C)

Some scholars at the USSR's African Institute are reportedly questioning this approach. They have told US officials that Soviet aid should give increased attention to agricultural and rural development. They acknowledge that the USSR is not at its best in these areas, but argue that aid should be used where it will do the most economic good. In addition, they want more attention given to the local traditions of developing societies rather than insisting that development pattern itself slavishly after the Soviet model. In agriculture, for example, they suggest that Soviet-style collectivization would serve as a general guideline for what the agricultural sector should be in a developed society, not a prescription for the precise form that agricultural reform should take in developing countries. (C)

In the Soviet system, the views of these young scholars may never reach the policymakers and the conservative Soviet bureaucracy does not usually promote independent thinkers who challenge established attitudes or policies. It is worth noting, however, that the director of the African Institute is the son of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and thus has access to the policy-making level of the Soviet bureaucracy. Additionally,
the agreement with Ethiopia reportedly includes substantial aid for agricultural development. Significant change in Soviet aid policy is not likely in the short run, but the fact that some discussion of the subject is going on indicates it cannot be ruled out. (S NF NC OC) (TOP SECRET UMBRA NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
Africa Review

11 August 1982
11 August 1982

Cuban Presence in Africa

The number of Cuban nondiplomatic personnel serving in Africa has remained fairly constant since January.
This publication is produced by the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Some issues contain articles drafted in other offices. Some articles are preliminary or speculative in nature, but the contents normally are coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the views of a single analyst; such items not coordinated with other offices are clearly designated.
Cuban Presence in Africa

Since last reported in the _Africa Review_ of 13 January 1982, the number of Cuban nondiplomatic personnel serving in Africa has remained fairly constant. This probably is a reflection of increased Cuban attention to the Middle East and Central America. Although Cuban military forces now appear to be increasing their role in combat in southern Angola, available information suggests no new augmentation of personnel, which number 20,000 to 25,000.

The issue of Cuba's military presence in Angola has become a key element of the negotiations related to a Namibian settlement. We foresee no significant change in the number of Cuban forces in Angola in the near term. Havana, which recently reiterated that a withdrawal of its forces will take place only when requested by Angola, remains reluctant to link any drawdown to a Namibian settlement.

Elsewhere, a Cuban economic delegation visited Ghana in June, and advisers are expected to arrive there before the end of the year. The Ghanaian press indicated areas of cooperation will include agriculture, education, and the sugar industry. In addition, Cubana Airlines announced the inauguration of a monthly flight to Maputo, Mozambique, in June. These flights will be an extra leg from the airline's stop in Luanda, and will allow Havana to rotate on a regular basis its 1,600 to 2,000 personnel stationed in Mozambique.

¹ This is a periodic summary of the Cuban nondiplomatic presence in Africa.
Africa Review

21 April 1982

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13 Briefs Angola: Paying for the Civil War

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Secret

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Africa Briefs

Angola: Paying for the Civil War

With oil revenues declining, the Angolan Government is having increasing difficulty coping with the financial burdens of the civil war. Officials in Luanda recently estimated that the cost of fighting the UNITA insurgents is running at more than $1.8 billion annually, much of which is payment for military assistance. Havana is paid in hard currency for its soldiers in Angola, as are Cuba, the USSR, and East Germany for arms and advisors.

Angola earns its hard currency primarily from Western purchases of its oil, one of the few productive sectors of the economy. Recent declines in oil sales, however, have led the government to reduce its estimate of total export earnings in 1982 from $2.2 billion to $1.4 billion. To continue paying for the war, Angola will increasingly have to forgo nonmilitary imports at a time when both the oil and nonoil sectors are severely depressed. If the regime at some point becomes unable even to pay for the military support it needs to survive, Moscow and Havana will have to decide whether to change the terms of their assistance.
National Intelligence Daily

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ANGOLA: Impact of Neto's Death

The death of President Neto in Moscow late Monday may lead to a major power struggle in Luanda. There apparently is no provision for an orderly succession. Angolan and Cuban military units in the country have been placed on alert to prevent a possible coup.

The factions that joined to rule Angola under Neto could divide in a struggle for power. One major faction consists of radical blacks who seem to favor doctrinaire Marxism and who probably have not supported Neto's policies of gradual rapprochement with the West and cooperation on a Namibian settlement. The other major faction is composed of moderate blacks and mulattoes—heirs to Neto's pragmatic Marxism—who have been increasingly on the defensive over the past year and probably will see their positions weakened, although they may not go down without a fight. The Army could take advantage of the situation to increase its influence.

If the contending groups can reach a compromise, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, who was named acting head of state when Neto left for Moscow last week, will retain control. Dos Santos is a black and a moderate who apparently supported Neto's policies. If there is no compromise, the Army will seize control and install armed forces chief of staff Joao Luis Neto, known as Xietu. Xietu—who is unrelated to the late president—is very popular with younger blacks in the party and the military and has long been considered a contender to succeed Neto. He is reportedly pro-Soviet.

Cuba and the USSR will no doubt do their best to ensure that a more amenable regime comes to power in Angola. It is difficult, however, to anticipate how involved either will become in the succession struggle or who they will support. Over the past two years Angolan-Soviet relations have been strained in large part because of Neto's personal suspicions of the Soviets.