This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel

1. (U) CRYSTAL SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ANGOLA (AD)/NAHIBIA (AD)
2. (U) IR IN DTG 003306JL197-4956
3. (U) TITLES SAOF OPERATIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS IN ANGOLA
4. (U) DATE OF INFOR 320813
5. (U) DETALES SEE FM LIVRE
6. (U) SOURCES DTG 003306JL197-4956

8. MUG SUMMARY IN THE MOST RECENT SERIES OF FOLLOWUP OPERATIONS, SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SAOF) GROUND UNITS FIRST MADE CONTACT WITH SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLAS ON 820722 NORTH OF KUPA, AND THE LAST ACTION WAS COMPLETED ON 320810 IN THE VICINITY OF DTG 003306JL197-4956, ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF CUVELAI. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GUERRILLAS KILLED IN THESE OPERATIONS WAS 253. THE SAOF GROUND UNITS INVOLVED BEGAN WITHDRAWING SOUTHWARD SOON AFTER 320810 AND MOST OF THEM CAN BE PRESUMED NOT TO HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR BASE AREAS.

9. (U) DETAILS

1. COMMEND THE SAOF GROUND FORCES NORMALLY DEPLOYED IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA (SIX MANEUVER COMPANIES) NORMALLY OPERATE IN GROUPS OF TWO TO FOUR COMPANIES EACH.

2. MUG IN THE MOST RECENT SERIES OF SAOF FOLLOWUP OPERATIONS, THE FIRST CONTACT OCCURRED ON 820722 JUST NORTH OF KUPA. EIGHT SWAPO GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED THAT DAY. TRACKING THE SWAPO RETREAT NORTHWARD, THE SAOF KILLED 18 GUERRILLAS ON 820723 AND 3 GUERRILLAS ON 820731 ABOUT 8 KILOMETERS NORTH OF CUVELAI.

3. MUG ON 820802, ABOUT 10 KILOMETERS NORTH OF CUVELAI, THE SAOF KILLED 106 SWAPO GUERRILLAS OF A UNIT SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS "ALPHA B4."

---
- 4. **443** on 820804, the SADF ambushed a truck convoy northwest of Cuvelai; destroyed most of the vehicles, but captured three 10-ton trucks loaded with 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machine guns.

- 5. **443** during 826815-826816, about 15 kilometers northwest of Cuvelai, the SADF encountered SWAPO elements later identified as "Bravo 54" and elements of the central and eastern regional MOSs. During 826804-826810, the SADF killed 118 guerrillas--most of them on the last two days.

- 6. The total SWAPO KIA in this series of operations, which ended on 826816, is thus 233. The SADF claims 16 of its own personnel KIA during the period, including the 15 (12 men of 1 parachute BN and 3 aircrew) who were on board the Puma HEL lost on 826803.

- 7. The SADF ground units began withdrawing southward from the vicinity of Cuvelai soon after 826810, and most of them can be assumed now to have returned to their base areas.

END OF MESSAGE
REEL NUMBER 008102 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0055
MSG NO 104 (M1IR) K01 23/10/80 08:49
LCIC 15:09:162 (M1)

CONFIDENTIAL

80 5239630
TOR: 2211152 OCT 80
NC 5239630

PP RUEAIIA
DE RUENSA #7153 2961031
ZNY 000000
P 2210292 OCT 80
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUK RUTADHA PRIORIT
RUEHDTA RUEADWO/DA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCJAAA/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUSNAAA/USCINCUR VAICHINGEN GER PRIORITY
RUDOVIA (b)(3):10 USC 403-3(0)
BT:
EZT:
EZT:
CITE 0433
(b)(3):10 USC 424, (b)(3):50 USC 403-3(0)
SUBJ: THIS IS IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 (U)
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ ANGOLA
(AO)/ NAMIBIA (WA)
2. (U) TITLE: SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES STRIKE
INTO ANGOLA.
3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 801022
4. (U) ORIGINATOR: SEE FM LINE
5. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. (U) SOURCE: SECURITY FORCE SPOKESMAN AND VARIOUS
NEWS MEDIA.
7. (U) SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES LAUNCHED
AN ATTACK INTO ANGOLA ON 801020 KILLING TWENTY-EIGHT
SWAPO AND MPLA SOLDIERS.
8A. (U) DETAILS:
1. (U) ACCORDING TO A SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECURITY FORCES,
BRIGADIER WILLIE MEYER, SECOND-IN-COMMAND OF THE SWA

CONFIDENTIAL
TERRITORY FORCE, TWENTY-EIGHT SWAPO AND MPLA MEMBERS WERE KILLED BY SWA TERRITORY FORCE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE ON AUGUST 20.

2. (U) THE ATTACK OCCURRED IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, NORTH OF CAOKOLAND IN THE NORTHWESTERN CORNER OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE OBJECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN OFFENSIVE WAS TO DESTROY A SWAPO BASE THERE.

3. (U) THE DEFENSE SPOKESMAN SAID IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW MANY OF THE 28 DEAD WERE MPLA SOLDIERS. THE MPLA SOLDIERS HAD BECOME ENEMIES IN THE FIGHTING.

4. (U) IN ADDITION, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT A LARGE QUANTITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION WAS DESTROYED IN THE RAID.

5. (U) BRIGADIER MEYER SAID THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN AND SOUTH WEST AFRICAN FORCES HAD RETURNED SAFELY TO BASE. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO MENTION OF ANY CASUALTIES FOR THESE FORCES.

88. [D](3):10 USC 424
THE CUMULATIVE CASUALTY FIGURES KILLED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GUERRILLA WAR IN SWA/NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA FOR YEAR-TO-DATE ARE: SWAPO - ONE THOUSAND AND SEVEN; SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES (TO INCLUDE SWA TERRITORY FORCES) - EIGHTY-TWO. ALTHOUGH THE NEWS MEDIA AND DEFENSE FORCE SPOKESMAN INDICATE THAT A TOTAL OF THIRTEEN HUNDRED SWAPO AND MPLA SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN KILLED, PLACES THE FIGURE OVER ONE THOUSAND.

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE ORIG: NO
12. (U) PREPARED BY: (D)(3):10 USC 424

13. (U) APPROVED BY: ASST.
14. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
15. (U) ENCL: N/A
16. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

DECL 21 OCT 90  

NNNC
CONFIDENTIAL

00 RUCAIIE
DE RUEKJCS #8977 3221048
MT 1584019

0 1810512 NOV 78
FN JCS
INFO RUEAMCC/CMD CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEANGA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEANA/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAOOW/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIFIC I A
RUEIAH/NSA WASH DC

0 181002 NOV 78 22K RUEKJCS RUEHC RUEHDT
FM
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC/1
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC/1
RUEHDT/SECSTATE WASH DC/1
INFO RUSHAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/1 IMMED
RUDOVIA/USE UCOM/1 VAIHINGEN GE/1 IMMED
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1810512 NOV 78

E1Z:
1. COUNTRY: RSA (SF)/ANGOLA (AO)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 0X310 USG 434
3. TITLE: EAST GERMANS IN ANGOLA
4. PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 781117
6. DATE OF REPORT: 781118
7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781117 0X310 USG 434
8. REFERENCES:
9. ASSESSMENT:
10. ORIGINATOR:
11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO GPQ: NO
12. PREPARING OFFICER: 0X310 USG 434
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:
14. SOURCE:
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO
16. SUMMARY: 1. IN A BRIEFING GIVEN TO ALL MILITARY ATTACHES
IN PRETORIA SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REPORTED

CONFIDENTIAL

0 1810512 NOV 78
THAT THERE ARE THREE BATTALIONS OF EAST GERMAN INFANTRY TROOPS IN ANGOLA. THESE TROOPS WERE DEPLOYED IN ANGOLA TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND COMBAT SUPPORT TO FAPLA AND SWAPO TROOPS AGAINST UNITA IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THAT COUNTRY. HERETOFORE THIS ROLE WAS PERFORMED BY THE CUBAN FORCES STATIONED IN ANGOLA. CUBAN LEADERSHIP FAILED, AMONG OTHER REASONS, BECAUSE THEY RECEIVED PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN THE FIELD WHICH RESULTED IN EXTREME DISLIKE FOR THE CUBANS BY FAPLA TROOPS. ON ONE RECENT OCCASION, CUBAN TROOPS FIRED ON FAPLA FORCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THEM INTO BATTLE. FAPLA TROOPS TURNED ON THE CUBANS AND 150 CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN THE INCIDENT. PRIOR TO THIS BUILD UP, EAST GERMAN SOLDIERS WERE USED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PURPOSES.

2. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 3000 EAST GERMAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WHICH INCLUDES SUPPORT PERSONNEL. ONE PARABATTALION IS LOCATED AT CATENGUE (1220S-1400E). THIS BATTALION HAS SUBUNITS DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL ANGOLA. ONE INFANTRY BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED AT ROCADAS (1640S-1500E) AND ONE AT ONGIVA (40 KM ACROSS ANGOLA'S SOUTHERN BORDER).

3. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE THE EAST GERMAN TROOPS HAVE NOT PARTICIPATED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS AS A UNIT BUT HAVE REMAINED IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS PROVIDING OFFICERS AND NCO'S TO FAPLA AND SWAPO FORCES FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

4. THE EAST GERMAN FORCES ARE KNOWN TO HAVE MORTARS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND SUSPECTED TO HAVE ANTI-TANK RECOILLESS RIFLES. THEY ARE EXTENSIVELY SUPPORTED BY M18 HELICOPTERS IN THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA FORCES. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF FIXED WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BEING USED BY THE EAST GERMAN FORCES. HELICOPTER LOSSES ARE DESCRIBED AS HEAVY AND ATtributed TO LACK OF PILOT EXPERIENCE AND NOT TO DIRECT COMBAT ACTION. DURING THE LATTER PART OF SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER 3 M18 HELICOPTERS CRASHED WHILE TAKING OFF OR LANDING. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF A REUSUPPLY BUILD UP FOR EAST GERMAN AND FAPLA FORCES MAINLY THROUGH LUNANDA.

5. SADF OFFICIALS SAID UNITA FORCES WERE HOLDING UP VERY WELL AGAINST FAPLA FORCES EVEN THOUGH FAPLA RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM THE EAST GERMANs. MOST OF THE OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA FORCES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA IN THE REGION OF THE CITY OF CUNENE (1500S-1540E).

COMMENTS: SADF OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED OF THE PRESENCE OF EAST GERMAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA. THEY CERTAINLY VIEW THIS AS AN EVENTUAL THREAT TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN NAMIBIA. WITH THE EAST GERMANs PROVIDING TRAINING AND SUPPORT TO SWAPO TROOPS SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT REACT TO THE BUILD UP THROUGH CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS. THIS INVOLVEMENT IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THIS IS A MAJOR INTRODUCTION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES INTO SOUTHERN AFRICA, AN EVENT AND ESCALATION MANY OBSERVERs SAID WOULD NEVER HAPPEN. SOUTH AFRICA SEES A CORRELATION BETWEEN THIS BUILD UP AND THE MAJOR COMMITMENT THE SOVIET UNION MADE IN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALI. SOUTH AFRICAN'S SPECULATE THAT THIS INVOLVEMENT WILL EVENTUALLY LEAK ACROSS THE BORDER INTO NAMIBIA.
UNCLASSIFIED NO. 77

REEL NUMBER 037357 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0234

SDS

4 DE 77 20:25

RE: EKJ'S CIA WASHC
INFO BUSNAA/MSC/NCEIR LININGEN GER
RUCABR AY
RUCBSAA
RUCBAA
RUCBAHA
RUCBAA

TO: EKJ'S CIA WASHC
INFO BUSNAA/MSC/NCEIR LININGEN GER

UNCLASSIFIED NO. 77

THIS IS IR
3. COUNTRY: BSA/SE/ANGOLA/AO/CUBA/CU

(b)(3)(10 USC 424)
4. TITLE: INCREASE INCUBANS IN ANGOLA
5. PROJECT NUMBER: NO
6. DATE OF INFORMATION: 771110
7. DATE OF REPORT: 771114
8. PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 771111
9. REFERENCES: INITIATIVE
10. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE & INFO 4
11. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3)(10 USC 424)
12. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO DEP: NO
13. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3)(10 USC 424
14. APPROVING OFFICER
15. SOURCE: THE STAR 771111
16. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DISC NO
17. SUMMARY: SOURCE NEWSPAPERS CORRESPONDENT IN LUANNA REPORTS
18. RELEASE FROM THE ANGOLAN NEWS AGENCY (ANGOF) TO THE EFFECT THAT
19. U.S.A IS SENDING A FURTHER 2600 CIVILIAN ADVISORS TO ANGOLA. THIS
20. INCREASE WAS DECIDED LAST WEEK DURING MINISTERIAL LEVEL TALKS
21. HELD IN LUANNA. IN TURN, THE CUBAN ARE PRESSING ANGOLA TO
22. SET UP A QUOTE TRADE UNION UNQUOTE MECHANISM SIMILAR TO THE
23. CUBAN COMMISSARIES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CORSS).
THESE ARE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS WHICH CARRY OUT SOCIAL AND SECURITY TASKS.
COMMENT: 1954 COMES TO ANGOLA.
COUNTRY: (U) South Africa (SF) USSR (UR) Angola (AO)  
TITLE: Military Equipment Captured During Operation Askari (U)  
DATE OF INFO: (U) 840326  
REPORT DATE: (U) 840327  
ORIGINATOR: (U)  
REQ REFERENCES: (U)  
SOURCE: (U)  

SUMMARY: Enclosed is a list of the types of items captured in southern Angola during December 1983 and January 1984 by units of the South African Defense Force (SADF) and South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF).

DETAILS:

1. Enclosed is a list of 279 types of items, mostly of Soviet bloc manufacture, captured by SADF/SWATF units in Operation ASKARI, during December 1983 and January 1984, in southern Angola.

2. The list does not include the quantities of each item captured. This information is not available at this time. The overall quantity of material, however, is comparable to, and probably exceeds, the tonnage captured during Operation PROTEA in 1981.

3. The list includes three items not previously captured by SADF: the SA-9 missile system, the Flap Wheel radar, and the B405/GAZ Model 66-75 mobile communications system.

4. The list also includes the PT-76 and T-55 tanks, 122-mm D30-2A field artillery gun, and the 57-mm ZIS-2 antiaircraft artillery gun.
CAPTURED EQUIPMENT: OPERATION ASKARI

## ARMoured Vehicles
1. BTR 152 Model V3 (Armoured Personnel Carrier)
2. PT-76
3. BTR 152 Model V2 (Armoured Personnel Carrier)
4. BRDM 2 (4x4 Reconnaissance Vehicle)
5. T-55

## Vehicles Cargo/Pers
1. Ural 375 D10 6x6
2. GAZ 66-51 4x4
3. GAZ 66-52 4x4
4. GAZ 66-55 4x4
5. Motorcycles (Various)

## Vehicles with Communications Equipment Other Than Armoured Vehicles
6. R405/GAZ Model 66-75 (GAZ 66 with van type body and R405 Radio Equipment)
7. RL18/GAZ Model 66-06 (GAZ 66 with van type body and RL18 Radio Equipment)
8. 2-Wheel trailer (Generator Unit for R405 Radio Truck)
9. UAZ 469 B with Radios

## Vehicles Other Than Cargo/Pers and Communications
10. ZIL 131 (6x6 Workshop Truck for light repairs)
11. Ural 375 Mid Fuel Tanker (5.5 m³ Capacity)
12. Zetor Agricultural Tractor (3595 cc Model 7011)
16. Ural 375 B10 RPK 1 16 x 6 Truck with Radar unit for 57 mm A/A Battery
17. UAZ 452 AP (4 x 4 UAZ Ambulance w/o stretchers)

TRAILERS AND OTHER TOWED ITEMS
18. PMR-3 Mechanical Mine-laying Unit
19. 124M Mobile Kitchen
20. Generator SFO-30 (4-Wheel 2 axle Generator for RPK 1 57 mm S60 Anti Aircraft Battery)
21. Generator CN 3-1
22. Tanker Al-555A (Fuel tanker 4 000, Litter)
23. Tanker TB - 50 MTB (IAFP) (Single axle water tanker)

ARTILLERY GUNS
24. 57 mm ZIS-2
25. 76 mm ZIS-3
26. 122 mm D30-2A 18 M

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS
27. 57 mm S60
28. 23 mm ZU-23
29. 14,5 mm ZPU-1

WEAPONS
30. RPG-7 40 mm
31. Sten Mk II
32. VZ 24
33. VZ 26
34. Airguns
35. Mosin Nagant (Model 1938 Carbine)
36. Mosin Nagant (Model 1944 Carbine)
37. Mosin Nagant (Model 1891/30)
38. Type 56 (SKS) China
39. M59/66 Yugoslavia
40. VZ 52
41. M1 US Carbine
42. Winchester Mod 94 30-30
43. PPSH 41
44. FPS 43 (Fixed Butt)
45. FPS 43 (Folding Butt)
46. RPD
47. RPK
48. DP
49. RP 46
50. Mauser Model 98 7.9 mm
51. AKM (East German)
52. AKM (USSR)
53. AK 47 (USSR)
54. AK 47 (USSR) (Folding Butt)
55. AK 47 M70 (Yugoslavia)
56. AK 47 (Bulgaria)
57. AK 47 (Folding Butt) (Bulgaria)
58. VZ 58P (Czechoslovakia)
59. VZ 58 V (Czechoslovakia)
60. PKM
61. SGMB
62. PKT
63. PKM Spare Barrels
64. AGS 17
65. OSHK 38/46 Vehicle Machine Gun
66. PKM Pintle mounted with Mag Holder
67. Spare Barrel for ZPU-1
68. KPV Vehicle Heavy Machine Gun
69. Spare Barrel 12.7 mm
70. Muzzle Loader
71. Martine Henry
72. 82 mm Mortar Pipe M37 "New" with Muzzle Safety Device
73. 82 mm Mortar Bi-Poda M37
74. 82 mm Mortar Base-Plates M37
75. 82 mm B10 Recoilless Rifle (with wheels)
76. 82 mm B10 Recoilless Rifle (w/o wheels)
77. 122 mm Grad-P Single tube Rocket Launcher (with sights)
78. 60 mm Mortar Pipe (2 USA
   (1 USSR)

PISTOLS
79. 9 mm Makarov (Each with 2 Magazines)
80. 7.62 mm Tokarev (with 2 Magazines)
81. 7.62 mm Tokarev (with 1 Magazine and holster)
82. 9 mm Star (with 1 Magazine)

WEAPON ACCESSORIES
81. Magazine ZU 23
84. Barrel ZU 23
85. Magazine 7,62 x 54R PKM Box
86. Magazine 14,5 mm ZPU-1 Box
87. Magazine RPD
88. Magazine Drum PPSh
89. Magazine PP43/PPSh Curved
90. Magazine VZ 26
91. Magazines G3 Alluminium
92. Magazine AK
93. Magazine 14,5 mm BRDM
94. AK 47/ZK M91 Oil Bottle (Crate)
95. B10 Gun Tote (Large)
96. B10 Gun Tote (Small)
97. Gun Totes (Unknown)
98. 23 mm SU 21 Tote.
99. 57 mm ZIS-2 Gun Tote
100. 76 mm ZIS-3 Gun Tote
101. 122 mm D10 Gun Tote (Incomplete)
102. Manometer
103. ŽIP-NZ Measuring Bar
104. Barrel 57 mm Ack-Ack T54/T55
105. Mixed GUN Spares (Crate)
106. U/S Weapon Parts (Crate)
107. 57 mm A/A (Anti-Aircraft) Cooling Pump
108. 57 mm A/A Distribution Box
109. 57 MM Cablos (On reels)
110. 57 mm Cablos (Loose)
111. 57 mm A/A Cleaning Kit
112. 57 mm A/A Loading Platform
113. 57 mm A/A Spares (Crate)
114. Gyro Binoculars
115. Clinometer
116. Vog-17m 30 mm Grenade Magazine (Empty)

AMMUNITION

117. 7,62 x 39 mm Ball
118. 7,62 x 39 mm Tracer
119. 7,62 x 51 Ball (Bulgaria)
120. 7,62 x 54 R Ball
121. 7,62 x 54 R FRM Box Magazines with 250 rounds belted
122. 7,62 x 54 R Armour Piercing Incendiary (API)
123. 7,62 x 54 R Tracer
124. 12,7 x 109 mm API
125. 12,7 mm x 109 Tracer
126. 14,5 mm Ball
127. 14,5 mm Ball (Belted)
128. 23 mm AFT (Armour Piercing Tracer)
129. 23 mm Frag HE (Fragmentation High Explosive)
130. 23 mm ZU 23 Belts (+ 50 Rounds each)
131. 23 mm ZU 23 Magazines (+ 50 Rounds each)
132. 57 mm Frag HE Art (Yugoslavia)
133. 57 mm AFT BC A/A (Armour Piercing Tracer Ballistic Corp, Anti Aircraft)
134. 57 mm Frag-T (Fused) A/A (Fragmentation Tracer)
135. 57 mm Frag-T (Unfused) A/A
136. 57 mm AFT BC
137. 57 mm AFT BC (Arrowhood)
138. 57 mm AFT BC (Yugoslavia)
139. 57 mm Frag
140. 76 mm APT BC
141. 76 mm Frag HE (Fused)
142. 76 mm Frag HE (Unfused)
143. 76 mm Heat (Fused) High Explosive Anti-tank
144. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Fused M-5)
145. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Fused M-6)
146. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Fused M2-36)
147. 82 mm Mortar Bombs (Unfused)
148. 82 mm Recoiless Rifle Frag HE
149. 82 mm Recoiless Rifle Heat
150. 100 mm Frag HE
151. 100 mm Heat (Fused)
152. 100 mmHVAPDS (Hyper Velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot)
153. 122 mm Frag HE
154. 122 mm Heat (Fused)
155. 122 mm Heat (Fused) Stand-Off
156. 122 mm Rocket Grad-P
157. SA-7
158. VOG-17M 30 mm
159. VOG-17 M 30 mm Grenade Magazines with 29 rounds Belted
160. Fuse M63 57 for 50mm Anti Aircraft Frag-T
161. Fuse RTM-1-Y for 57 mm Frag HE (Artillery)
162. Fuse M-5 for 82 mm Mortar Bombs
163. Fuse M-6 for 82 mm Mortar Bombs
164. Fuse MNN-Y for 122 mm Rocket Grad-P
165.  Fuses RGM-2 (for 122 mm Frag HE)
166.  PG-7 Rockets (In cases with boosters)
167.  PG-7 Rockets (Loose)
168.  PG-7 Rocket Boosters
169.  TM-57 Anti Tank mines
170.  MVE-57 Ignitors
171.  PGM 5-2M Anti Pers Mines (In cases with sticks)
172.  PGM 5-2M Anti Pers Mines (Loose)
173.  PGM 2 Anti Pers Mines
174.  FI Grenade Hand
175.  F Grenade Hand
176.  RGD-5 Grenade Hand
177.  RGD-5 Grenade Hand
178.  RG-42 Grenade Hand
179.  RG-42 Grenade Hand
180.  Grenade Hand Strikers UZB6 Delay
181.  Explosive Blocks TNT 75g (Packed)
182.  Explosive Blocks TNT 75g (Unpacked)
183.  Explosive Blocks TNT 200g (Unpacked)
184.  Explosive Blocks TNT 400g (Unpacked)
185.  Explosive Blocks TNT 600g (Unpacked)
186.  Explosive Blocks TNT 200g (Packed)
187.  Explosive Blocks TNT 400g (Packed)
188.  Charges Cratering Cylindrical TNT
189.  RKG-3M Anti Tank Handgrenades (Complete)
190.  RKG-3M Detonators
191.  RKG-1M Grenades
192.  RKG-3M Handles
193. PMD-6M Anti Personnel Mine (Box without explosives)
194. PMD-6M Anti Personnel Mine (with explosive)
195. PMD-6 Anti Personnel Mine (Box without explosive)
196. Trip Flare - white (with sticks)
197. Trip Flare - Green (with sticks)
198. Signal Flare Hand Green
199. Signal Flare Hand Red
200. Signal Flare Hand White
201. MD2 Detonator USSR
202. S4 Detonator USSR (Box)
203. Electrical Detonators Assorted (Crate)

OPTICS
204. PAB-2 Periscope Artillery Aiming Circle
205. ANB-1 Aximath Mount for PAB-2
206. MP-41 Sight for M37 Mortar
207. OPN5 Sight for 122 mm Grad-P
208. K-1 Collimator
209. NIM-44 Sight for Mortar
210. Orudy Panoramic Sight
211. ISO-2/K610 Sight for B10 Recoilless Rifle
212. OP4M-45 Telescope for D 30 122 mm Artillery
213. TVNG-2G Infra Red Periscope
214. TVN-2 Infra Red Periscope
215. TKN-15 Infra Red Periscope
216. RPM-1 AM Infra Red
217. Periscope (in plastic box)
218. PMO-7v Sight for RPM-7
219. 8x30 Binoculars
220. MVA-7x40 Binoculars
221. DS-1 Stereoscope Rangefinder
222. 3-D Rangefinder with tripod "Telemetro"
223. 37 mm TnP-1-37 Bore Scope
224. TnP-1-30-515 Bore Scope 30 mm
225. TnP-14-350 14.5 mm
226. 2 TS 27 23 mm Bore Scope with kit in carrier box
227. Theodolite (Incomplete with stand)

INSTRUMENTS, MECHANISMS, ETC
228. VPKHR Chemical Reconnaissance Instrument
229. 9 PS8 (MBGI-1) Trigger Mechanism for SA 7
230. Meteorological set
231. ZIP-N-2 Verx Box Parts Unknown (Sophisticated)

MISCELLANEOUS
232. Compressor unit type HCV 120A with 3 HP electric motor
233. Generator unit with Berliet engine and electric motor
234. Generator Unit 25 HP man occp
235. Rifle oil (20 litre drums)
236. Minefield markers (carto)
237. RDV-5000 (Rubber tank 5000 litre)
238. Tripod Collimator (Large)
239. Tripod Collimator (Small)
240. Jack Bottle Hydraulic
241. Pump Hand ZIU-1
242. Grease Gun
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>243.</td>
<td>Tools Assorted (Crate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244.</td>
<td>Spade (with handle large)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245.</td>
<td>Spade (without handle large)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246.</td>
<td>Shovel Infantry (with handle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247.</td>
<td>Shovel Infantry (without handle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248.</td>
<td>Spade Infantry (utility small)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249.</td>
<td>Hoe (with handle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250.</td>
<td>2 Man saw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251.</td>
<td>Pick Infantry (with handle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252.</td>
<td>Pick Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253.</td>
<td>Knife (Assorted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254.</td>
<td>Meat cleaver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255.</td>
<td>Panga (Short blade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256.</td>
<td>Panga (Long blade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257.</td>
<td>Bag Mortar carrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258.</td>
<td>Canteen water carrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259.</td>
<td>Tins mess with water bottle (Incomplete)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260.</td>
<td>Helmet soldier steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261.</td>
<td>Pan tin eating (Incomplete sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262.</td>
<td>Lamp Parrafin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263.</td>
<td>Flask water carrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264.</td>
<td>Filing Cabinet Cardex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CLOTHING (BUNDLES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>265.</td>
<td>Webbing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266.</td>
<td>Web Belts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267.</td>
<td>Rifle Belts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268.</td>
<td>Ground Sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269.</td>
<td>Boots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270.</td>
<td>Civilian Clothing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
271. Trousers Camouflage (Made in Cuba)
272. Shirts Camouflage (Cuba)
273. Jackets (Made in Cuba)
274. Trousers green
275. Pullovers green
276. Shirts various
277. Hats, caps, berets
This report provides types and amounts of Soviet manufactured military equipment in the inventory of the Angolan (AFP) armed forces in mid-February 1977.

(b)(3):10 USC 424
22. DETAILS:

1. ☐ ☐ Armed Vehicles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T34 tanks</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T54 tanks</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT76 amphibious light tank</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR40 armored car</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR50 tracked APC</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR60 wheeled APC</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM armored car w/ heavy machinegun</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ☐ ☐ Artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BM21 40-tube 122-mm truck mounted multiple rocket launchers</td>
<td>100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122-mm rocket rounds for the BM21's</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm antitank guns (recoilless rifles?)</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-mm mortars</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZS3 76-mm antitank guns</td>
<td>unk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified rocket launchers (3M?)</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified light antiaircraft guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counted on armored vehicles</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified heavy antiaircraft guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counted on armored vehicles</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. ☐ ☐ Aircraft:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified types</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comment:**

- **AX47 rifles:** 10,000
- **AXW rifles:** 10,000
- **Sks rifles:** 10,000
- **Tezarow pistols:** 2,000
- **Unidentified hand grenades:** 80,000
- **Unidentified antitank and antipersonnel mines:** 40,000
SECRET

INQUIRE=DOC8D
ITEM NO=00434085
CDS
C 63902RUEKJCS 1648 291807ZMSR 88-8380080
S
/
/
SECRET
/
FRP: 3
/
/
/
MILITARY
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
2. (C) [NATL 16508] COMPARED UNITA FORCES WITH THOSE OF THE MPLA, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS CUBAN TRAINED AND SOMETIMES LED. HE DESCRIBED THE FAPLA SOLDIERS AS BEING GOOD FIGHTERS AND WELL RESPECTED BY THE SADF SOLDIERS THEY HAVE FACED. UNITA ON THE OTHER HAND WERE MUCH LESS DEPENDABLE AND DEDICATED TO "MIXING IT UP" WITH THE ENEMY. [B(1),1.4 (C)]

[Labeled UNITA FORCES AS NOT GOOD SOLDIERS. SADF FORCES TRAINING THE UNITA SOLDIERS ON]
WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAVE FOUND THAT UNITA, IN GENERAL, DOES NOT USE THE WEAPONS EFFICIENTLY. IN PARTICULAR, THE SADF HAS TAUGHT UNITA THE USE OF THE AMERICAN STINGERS AND (CONFIRMING OTHER REPORTS WE HAVE SEEN) THERE HAVE BEEN FREQUENT INSTANCES WHERE THEY HAVE EITHER USED THEM INCORRECTLY OR HAVE FAILED TO FIRE THEM OUT OF FEAR WHEN UNDER AIR ATTACK.

3. (SECRET) IN SPITE OF GSA RHETORIC THAT THE SADF IS IN NAMIBIA PROTECTING THE OVAMBO PEOPLE FROM THE SWAPO TERRORIST, THE SADF IS THERE TO SUSTAIN UNITA. THE OVAMBO, IN FACT, SUPPORT THE SWAPO TERRORIST PROGRAM AND DO NOT LIKE THE SADF PRESENCE. THIS GREATLY COMPLICATES THE SADF MISSION. IN ONE ENGAGEMENT INSIDE ANGOLA, A GROUP OF 12 UNITA SOLDIERS, WAS ATTACKED BY A FORCE OF 30 FAPLA SOLDIERS WHOSE MISSION WAS TO CAPTURE A WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICER. THE FAPLA WERE YELLING IN THE NIGHT TO HIS UNITA COMRADES, TO TURN HIM OVER AND "JOIN THEIR SIDE." CALLED IN A HELICOPTER STRIKE THAT KILLED 16 OF THE ATTACKERS AND DROVE OFF THE REST, BUT HE WAS LEFT WITH A GROWING DOUBT WHETHER THE UNITA SOLDIERS, WHOSE FIGHTING THAT NIGHT WAS UNUSUALLY LACK-LUSTER, WOULD HAVE TURNED HIM OVER TO THE FAPLA.

4. (SECRET) CONVERSELY, THE SADF IS HAVING GOOD SUCCESS "TURNING" CAPTURED TERRORISTS (SWAPO) AND USING THEM AS TRACKERS AGAINST OTHER TERRORISTS AND THE ODD FAPLA COMMANDO RAID. THE SADF WILL HAND CUFF THE TERRORIST TO

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
A BED FOR 2 WEEKS, FEED HIM WELL, AND TALK HIM INTO JOINING THEIR SIDE. "VERY FEW" WHO DECIDE TO JOIN TRY TO GET AWAY OR GIVE LESS THAN THEIR BEST. A TYPICAL TACTIC IS TO SEND A GROUP OF 5 TO 6 OF THE "EX-TER" TRACKERS (AT A RUN) ON THE SPOOR (TRAIL) OF A TERRORIST ATTACKERS, FOLLOWED BY SEVERAL RATELS ARMORED CARS. WHEN THE SPOOR IS LOST THE TRACKERS FAN OUT IN A SEMI-CIRCLE UNTIL ONE OF THEM LOCATES THE SPOOR AND TAKES OFF AT A RUN. THE OTHERS FALL IN BEHIND AND CONTINUE THE CHASE. NO WORDS ARE SPOKEN BETWEEN THE TRACKERS AND THE PURSUIT CAN LAST FROM 6 TO 10 HOURS. THE RATELS FOLLOW ON LINE BEHIND THE FILE OF TRACKERS GUIDED BY A TRACKER SITTING ON THE HOOD OF THE LEAD VEHICLE. ASKED IF THE TRACKERS WERE BUSHMEN, SAID NO. THEY ARE ANGOLANS; NOT AS GOOD AS THE BUSHMEN, BUT SURPRISINGLY CAPABLE TRACKERS, WITH INCREDIBLE ENDURANCE.

5. (SECRET) THE "AFRIKANER MENTALITY" OF MANY SADF COMMANDERS
IS A PROBLEM. AFRIKAANS SPEAKING (MOST) SADF COMMANDERS REFUSE TO BELIEVE A BLACK ARMY CAN FIGHT. MANY TIMES SENT BACK INTEL. REPORTS OF HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF FAPLA FORCES DUG IN AT A GIVEN LOCATION ONLY TO HAVE COMMANDERS SEND VASTLY OUTNUMBERED SADF FORCES AGAINST THE ENEMY POSITIONS. HE RECOUNTED INCIDENTS OF RATELS BEING THROWN AGAINST, AND "CHEWED TO PIECES" BY SIZABLE GROUPS OF FAPLA TANKS BURIED IN CONCRETE BUNKERS AND PLATOON SIZE SADF FORCES SENT TO ATTACK 500 MAN SIZE FAPLA UNITS. "ITS MAD, BUT THEY (AFRIKANER COMMANDERS) WON'T ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AFRICAN CAN FIGHT WELL AGAINST A WHITE MAN."

COMMENTS: 1. (D) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424

//IPSP: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
//CONSOBJ: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
ADMIN
PROJ: (U) NONE
COLL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
INSTR: (U)
PREP: (U)
ACQ: (U)
DISSEM: (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET -- WARNING NOTICE -- INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED -- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS -- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS.
DECL: SADR
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
The subject of Soviet actions in Angola, (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Agreed that rather direct Soviet involvement under present circumstances is somewhat surprising. However, posed a Soviet policy choice of arms or worsened current relations with some African states and acquisition of a privileged position in a very strategic location. (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

Replied that he naturally would expect the Soviets to have opted for the latter choice, next referred to a recent article in the Economist speculating that there is low-level American aid reaching the PHLA/UNITA via Zaire. Reiterated the Economist conclusion which doubted that possible American aid would escalate Soviet support. "That would be too bad." (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

"For then Angola will belong to the Russians." He added that PHLA/UNITA forces could not accept decisive aid from apartheid South Africa because the liabilities were too great. PHLA and UNITA were already under severe pressure from reportedly accepting help from their racist neighbors to the South. He concluded that only the United States could help the PHLA/UNITA forces in a meaningful way.
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

1. (U) COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: ANGOLA ON ALERT?
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: NA
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 000242
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 00029
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 00029 (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: H-3
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: YES QPB: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. (U) APPROVING OFFICER: 
14. (U) SOURCE: ELIMA DAILY, KINSHASA LAKE
15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRECT: NO
16. (U) ON DATE OF REPORT, SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WARNED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF AN IMMINENT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTHERN
ANGOLA.

22. (G) THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC WARNING THAT A MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, WITH THE GOAL TO SABOTAGE PLANS FOR THE CREATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA WAS BEING PLANNED. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY IN LUANDA STATED THAT STRONG CONCENTRATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ARE massed along the CUNENE PROVINCE BORDER. THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIQUE, WILL TAKE PLACE USING AIR SUPPORT AND HELICOPTER-TRANSPORTED TROOPS, AND IN ADDITION TO SABOTAGING THE UNITED NATIONS DEMILITARIZATION PLAN, IS DESIGNED AS A SHOW OF SUPPORT TO UNITA. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO STATES THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE CONDUCTED AN INTERNATIONAL PRESS CAMPAIGN WHICH ANNOUNCES THAT UNITA FORCES, STATIONED IN NAMIBIA, ARE READY TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE AND OCCUPY BORDER POSITIONS WITHIN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE FORESEEN BETWEEN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA. IN CUNENE PROVINCE ALONE, THE COMMUNIQUE ADDS, MORE THAN FIFTY ACTS OF AGRÉSSION HAVE BEEN COMMITTED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 800000, ALONG THE KWANDO RIVER, SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE RECENTLY BOMBARD THE BORDER TOWN OF BIRICIO REPORTEDLY ON 800023 AND 8000221. SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAVE ALSO REPORTEDLY INFILTRATED INTO THE RUACHANA AREA WHERE THEY HAVE CLOSED THE SLUICES OF THE DAM ALONG THE KWANDO RIVER.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: AS WIDELY REPORTED, ANGOLA CONSIDERS THE SPORADIC ATTACKS ALONG ITS BORDERS AS BEING ATTEMPTS BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES TO SUPPORT UNITA IN DISRUPTING ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REALIZATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE ALONG THE ANGOLAN/NAMIBIAN BORDER - A PRIME FACTOR FOR DEMOCRACY IN NAMIBIA. TRUE, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ATTACKS ALONG THE ANGOLAN BUT AS IN THE CASE OF BIRICIO ON 8000213, THE ATTACK LASTED ONLY ONE HOUR AND CONSISTED OF BOMBARDMENT BY 140MM CANNONS. THE COMMUNIQUE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE CONSIDERED AS YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO RECALL THE ANGOLAN FORCES BUT AT THE SAME TIME REFLECTS POSSIBLY INCREASED SUPPORT TO UNITA BY SOUTH AFRICA.
SECRET

INQUIRE=DOC10D
ITEM NO=00341268
CDS
C 66006RUEKJCS 3364 022014ZMSP 88-0825103
S / / SECRET
FRP: , , 3, 4, , , ,
MILITARY

88 0825103 MSP
PAGE 001 NC 0825103
TOR: 022014Z NOV 88 RUEKJCS 3364

HEADER
PP RUEAI
DE RUEKJCS #3364 3072006
ZNY-45556
P 021703Z NOV 88
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC RUESAF/RUEJ
RUEHMH/RUEMC/RUEKJO
RUEHMH/RUEMC/RUEKJO
RUEKJCS/CIA WASHINGTON DC
BT

S C R E T — N O F O R N — U N I N T E L

SERIAL: (U) IIR(b)(2)

BODY
COUNTRY: (U) PORTUGAL (PO); GUINEA BISSAU (PU); CUBA (CU); ANGOLA (AO).
SUBJECT: IIR(O)(3):10 USC /GUINEA BISSAUAN CONTRIBUTION TO CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL A PIPEDREAM (U)
WARNING: NOTICE: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED—S C R E T — N O F O R N — U N I N T E L.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 881011.
REQ: (U)
SOURCE: (S/NF/WM)(b)(1),1.14(c)

SUMMARY: (S/NF/WM) GUINEA BISSAU'S (PU) PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO SEND PU MILITARY TROOPS TO ANGOLA TO OVERSEE AND ASSIST IN CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL (CTW) IS WISHFUL THINKING.
TEXT: (S/NF/WM) A. BACKGROUND: LISBON MEDIA REPORTED ON 11 OCT 88 THAT PU PRESIDENT BERNARDO "NINO" ((VIEIRA)) HAD DECLARED THAT PU WAS PREPARED TO SEND ITS MILITARY TO ANGOLA TO ASSIST IN THE CONTROL

RUEAI
OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS; IT JUST DEPENDED ON A REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA. ((VIEIRA)) WAS IN LISBON ON A STATE VISIT WITH PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT MARIO ((SOARES)) WHEN HE MADE THE REMARKS ON 10 OCT 88.

B. (S/NF/NN) (b)(1),1.4 (c) THE PU ARMY WAS A FAIRLY EFFECTIVE GUERRILLA FORCE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE ARMY DURING THE COLONIAL WARS. AFTER INDEPENDENCE, AND AFTER THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PU ARMY AS A FORMAL ARMY, IT IMMEDIATELY FELL APART AS AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING ELEMENT. THERE STILL IS NO REAL ORGANIZATION, NO DISCIPLINE, VIRTUALLY NO SALARIES FOR THE SOLDIERS, AND NO NOTION OF A GENUINE MISSION.

ITS SOLDIERS ARE OFTEN INTOXICATED AND ENGAGE IN OPEN ROBBERY OF PU CITIZENS, OFTEN DRIVEN BY HUNGER TO STEALING FOOD, CROPS, AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS. THE ARMY HAS BEEN USED MORE FOR KEEPING THE POPULACE IN LINE THAN FOR ANY OTHER FUNCTION AND WOULD NOT STAND A CHANCE IN A MILITARY CONFLICT WITH A PREPARED AND TRAINED ENEMY.

(b)(1),1.4 (c) LESS THAN A COMPANY OF WELL-TRAINED AND EQUIPPED COMMANDOS OR SPECIAL PURPOSE TROOPS COULD SEIZE THE CAPITAL CITY OF BISSA WITHOUT THE PU ARMY BEING MUCH OF AN OBSTACLE. THE NOTION THAT THE PU ARMY COULD PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY IN THE CTW PROCESS IN ANGOLA IS BEYOND REASON. THE PU ARMY COULD NOT POLICE ITSELF IN ANGOLA, MUCH LESS ASSIST IN POLICING THE CUBAN FORCES.

C. (S/NF/NN) (b)(1),1.4 (c)
SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLA-MOZAMBIQUE-CAPE VERDE/RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES (U)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE (U).
1. (U) COUNTRIES: ANGOLA (AO), MOZAMBIQUE (MZ), CAPE VERDE (CV).
2. (U) TITLE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES.
3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 810801-810924
4. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
5. (U) REFERENCES: 
   (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. (U) SOURCES: (b)(1), 1.4 (c)
7. (U) SUMMARY: OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, A NUMBER OF
FRAGMENTARY REPORTS RELATING TO EVENTS IN THE FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES OF ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND CAPE VERDE.

(b)(1),1.4(c)

8. A. [U] DETAILS:

1A1 MOZAMBIQUE: (b)(1),1.4(c) SOVIET SUBMARINES HAVE BEEN USING THE PORT OF NACALA ON A PERIODIC BASIS FOR THE PAST YEAR. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS IN NACALA AND THE LOCAL POPULACE ARE SAID TO BE POOR DUE TO SOVIET REFUSAL TO MIX WITH THE BLACK POPULATION. THE SOVIET'S HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING, AND THEIR ATTITUDES OF RACIAL SUPERIORITY, INDEED, (b)(1),1.4(c) ANTI-SOVET RIOTS HAVE OCCURRED IN NACALA SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST YEAR WHICH LOCAL FPLM UNITS HAVE BEEN HARD Pressed TO CONTROL.

[Redacted] IN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, (b)(1),1.4(c) THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NRM) NOW CONTROLS UP TO ONE THIRD OF THE COUNTRY, PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL AREAS. THE NRM IS SAID TO BE FLYING THE PORTUGUESE FLAG OVER LIBERATED AREAS AND TO BE RECEIVING SOUTH AFRICAN AND "OTHER" SUPPORT. WHILE THE "OTHER" SUPPORT WAS NOT SPECIFIED, (b)(1),1.4(c) THE NRM WAS BEING LED BY FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIALISTS. [Redacted] BELIEVE THAT THE NRM POSSES A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE FREIMO GOVERNMENT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

8. ANGOLA: (b)(1),1.4(c) CUBAN UNITS IN-COUNTRY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS IN ORDER TO INCREASE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS. CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA ARE SAID TO BE RELUCTANT TO VENTURE OUTSIDE THE CITIES AND SUFFER FROM POOR MORALE AND FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY VIS A VIS THE SOUTH AFRICANS. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE CUBANS IS ALSO SAID TO BE DWINDLING AS A RESULT OF THEIR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE MPLA'S ARBITRARY POLICIES IN CONTROLLED AREAS, AS WELL AS BY RACIAL ANTAGONISMS.

[Redacted] IN ADDITION, [Redacted] AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION, SWAPO HAS FORMULATED PLANS TO INFILTRATE LARGE NUMBERS OF GUERRILLAS INTO NAMIBIA. ONCE ACROSS THE BORDER, THESE GUERRILLAS ARE TO ORGANIZE INTO SMALL BANDS AND ATTACK SANDAF LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT FACILITIES. THIS, THE GUERRILLAS HOPE, WILL KEEP THE SOUTH AFRICANS OFF BALANCE AND RENDER ADDITIONAL INCURSIONS INTO ANGOLA MORE DIFFICULT.

C. [Redacted] DISCREDIT SPECULATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CAPE VERDE (GCV) MAY GRANT BASE ACCESS TO THE SOVIETS FOR THREE REASONS:

1. THE GCV PRESENTLY RECEIVES LARGE REMITTANCES FROM OVERSEAS LABORERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND PORTUGAL.

2. THE POPULATION AT LARGE IS PRO-U.S., DUE TO THE FACT THAT MOST FAMILIES HAVE RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES.

3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE REGULARLY USES THE AIRFIELD ON SAL ISLAND AND SECRETLY PAYS THE GCV "MILLIONS OF DOLLARS" FOR ITS USE.

(b)(1),1.4(c)
(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
10. (U) COLLECTION MANAGEMENT CODES: NONE
11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE
12. (U) PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424

13. (U) APPROVED BY:
14. (U) REQUEST FOR EVAL: YES REL TO: NONE
15. (U) ENCLOSURES: NONE

REW-1 OCT 1997

NNDD

NNHH
SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/SADF
VIKES ON A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT

SUBJ: 10/02/82

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.
1. (U) CITIZEN SOUTH AFRICA (EF)/NAMIBIA (EF)/ANGOLA (AD)
2. (U) IN NYT
3. (U) TITLES: SADF VIEWS ON A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 10/02/82
5. (U) UNCLASSIFIED

---

SUMMARY

- BEAMS FIRM IN HIS CONVICTIONS THAT THE SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO COME TO POWER IN NAMIBIA AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD DISTANCE "THE TERRORISTS" AS FAR FROM ITS OWN BORDERS AS POSSIBLE. HE DOES NOT SEEM OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT A DECLINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SHOULD AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION NOT BE FOUND IN NAMIBIA.

- (U) DETAIL:

1. (U) DISCUSSED NAMIBIA RECENTLY AT A PRIVATE SOCIAL GATHERING. HE WAS ADAMANT THAT SWAPO SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO GAIN POWER. ALL THE SOVIET MILITARY MATERIEL HE IN ANGOLA SHOULD BE SHIFTED SOUTH TO CONTINUE THE "COMMUNIST BONSLAUGHT" ON SOUTH AFRICA. HE SAID SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD DISTANCE "THE TERRORISTS" AS FAR FROM ITS OWN BORDERS AS POSSIBLE.

2. (U) HE SEEMED CONVINCED THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WOULD NEVER LEAVE. HE SAID THE POPULAR MOVEMENT...
FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (UNITA) GOVERNMENT WOULD COLLAPSE UNDER THE PRESSURES OF THE UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA) INSURGENCY. "EVEN AS THE CUBANS WITHDRAW," IN ADDITION, HE SAID CUBAN FAVORS EXPORTING AN UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS AT SOVIET AND ANGOLAN EXPENSE, AND EVEN IF THE CUBANS AGREED TO WITHDRAW, "HOW COULD SOUTH AFRICA BE SURE THAT REALLY COULD HAPPEN?"

- 3. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE SOLUTION IN NAMIBIA COULD HAVE TO BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE IDEA OF ANY FINAL MILITARY SOLUTION HE SAID WAS AS ABSURD AS THE ISRAELI NOTION THAT THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION COULD BE EXTERMINATED. BUT HE ALSO REFERRED TO AN "OPEN-ENDED" MILITARY STRUGGLE ACCOMPANYING THE POLITICAL SOLUTION. ASKED WHETHER HE HAS CONCERNED ABOUT A DECLINE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IF NO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED SETTLEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT FOR NAMIBIA, "HE SAID "CAN IT GET WORSE THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST?""
END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL 0020 JAN 77

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR

1. CUBA/USSR/ANGOLA
2. CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA (U)
3. YUGOSLAV NEWS SERVICE, TANJUG
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. 77034
7. 770101
8. 770112, (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. CIRC-WO
15. SUMMARY: (U) YUGOSLAV PRESS REPORTS ARTICLE BY
GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ PRINTED IN HAVANA STATING THAT
CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA WAS AN INDEPENDENT
DECISION ON PART OF CUBANS.
22. DETAILS: (U) TANJUG NEWS SERVICE CARRIED NEWS
ARTICLE, DATED LINGED HAVANA 77034, BY GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ
DISCLOSING THAT DECISION TO SEND CUBAN TROOPS TO ANGOLA
IN 1975 WAS REACHED INDEPENDENTLY OF USSR AND THAT USSR WAS
INFORMED ONLY AFTER DECISION WAS MADE.
23. (U) ARTICLE CONTINUED BY PROVIDING LOGISTICAL
INFORMATION. THE FIRST GROUP OF EIGHTY-TWO SOLDIERS
WITH ARMS WERE TRANSPORTED BY CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT, NOT
FURTHER IDENTIFIED, LANDING LEGALLY AT BARBADOS AND
GUINEA BISSAU, AND SECRETLY PROCEEDING TO LUANDA.
ARRIVING NIGHT OF 751108, IN COURSE OF SIX MONTHS, CIVILIAN CARRIERS MADE ONE HUNDRED ONE FLIGHTS AND FORTY-TWO SHIP CROSSINGS TRANSPORTING SOLDIERS, ARMS AND OIL.

24. (U) ARTHOR CLAIMS THAT FIRST CUBAN CONTACT WITH ANGOLIAN REVOLUTIONARIES WAS MADE CHE GUEVARA PERSONALLY IN 1965 WHEN HE SPENT EIGHT MONTHS IN CONGO PRIOR TO FALL OF CHOMBE.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 TO (b)(1),1.4 (C)
(c)

, DESCRIBE MARQUEZ AS MORE OF A NOVELIST THAN A JOURNALIST, THUS THE RATING OF SOURCE AND IX94-589/, CONSIDERING THE SOVIET'S INTEREST IN CUBA, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE CUBA WOULD MOUNT AN INDEPENDENT OPERATION. THIS REPORT, THEREFORE, IS PROVIDED FOR WHATEVER VALUE MAY BE GLEANED FROM IT.

8501
NNNN
NND0
INQUIRE=DOC2D
ITEM NO=004426338
CDS
C 44343RUEKJCS 2082 1215592MCR 863686-0192493
DINSW
/
/
CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY

86 0192493 MCR PAGE 001 NC 0192493 TOR: 1215592 MAR 86 RUEKJCS 2082

HEADER
RR RUEAIJA
DE RUEKJCS #2082 0711404
ZNY 000000
R 121404Z MAR 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAIJA/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/)
RUCIHUI
RUEALG/Safe
AIG 11881
R 121356Z MAR 86
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC (b)(3):10 USC 424
RUEOEAH/USOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PN/)
INFO RUEAIJA/CIA WASHDC
RUSMDA/USCENTCUR VATHINGEN GE)
RUEAIJA/
RUEHY
RUEHSA
RUEHNN
BT
CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL (b)(3):10 USC 424

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

BODY
PASS:
- -

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN
COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SP); URUGUAY (UY);
- ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: IRC SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTEREST
- IN ANGOLA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
- EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

DOI: (U) 860310
REQS: (U) [(b)(3):10 USC 424]
SOURCE: (U) [(b)(3):10 USC 424]

SUMMARY: (C/HI) SOUTH AFRICA IS PLANNING DECISIVE MILITARY

TEXT: (C/HI) [(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c]

THESE OPERATIONS WERE EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE APPROXIMATELY IN LATE 1987 WHEN IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE U.S. AND PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN UNDERTAKING DUE TO PROBABLE FRUSTRATION OVER THE LACK OF DECISIVE PROGRESS BY THE UNITAS FORCES. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THIS TYPE OF ISRAELI BLITZKRIEG CAMPAIGN WAS WELL WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY'S CAPABILITIES AND WOULD ELIMINATE THE PRINCIPLE MILITARY THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA'S EXISTENCE AND BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE ENTIRE REGION. [BILLACO] STATED THAT THE OPERATIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN CONJUNCTION WITH UNITAS. HE STATED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S ONLY FEAR FOR SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WAS THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE U.S. VETO IN THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA FROM ECONOMIC RETRIBUTION OR SANCTIONS FROM THE PRO-SOVIET/CUBAN BLOCK OF THAT ORGANIZATION. none-
theless, the operation would have to be carried out to guarantee south african survival as a sovereign and inde-
pendent nation.

COMMENTS: (C) [(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c]
APPR: (U)  
WARNING: (U) NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. 
DECL:  CABR  
END OF MESSAGE  
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

INQUIRE=DOC18d
ITEM NO=00234215
CDS
S
/ /
SECRET
FRP: , , 3, , , ,

HEADER
RR RUEAIA
DE RUEKJCS #0787 0741101
ZNY 666666
R 151101Z MAR 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEENAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEGIA/Q C J CL (J
RUEAIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUELGX/SAFE
R 151054Z MAR 91
FM 090115247
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUSNOR/USCINCIR VAIHINGEN
INFO RUGAID/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUPTAKE
RULHCNE
RUCBSAA
RUCJACC/USCINCIR MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RT
 CONTROLS
SECRET

SECRET — NOFORN
—
SERIAL: (U) IIR

BODY
—
COUNTRY: (U) CONGO (CF); CUBA (CU).
—
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: IIR CUBAN WITHDRAWL PROGRESSES (U)

SECRET
—
NOFORN

PAGE: 0001

91-3427687
MSR
PAGE 001
NC 3427687
TOR: 1510572 MAR 91
UPID
151054Z
224
63
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET NOFORN.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PSI: (U) 910207.

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: [Redacted]

SUMMARY: (S) THE CAMP WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS A MAIN CUBAN TROOP BASE CAMP JUST NORTHEAST OF POINTE NOIRE HAS BEEN EVACUATED. NO PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT REMAIN ON SITE.

TEXT: (S/NF) THE SITE WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS A MAIN BASE CAMP FOR CUBAN TROOPS IN THE CONGO HAS BEEN EVACUATED. ALL EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN MOVED OUT OF THE CAMP. ALL THAT REMAINS ARE SOME EMPTY CEMENT BUILDINGS. NO VISIBLE TROOP OR EQUIPMENT MOVEMENTS WERE OBSERVED.

COMMENTS: 1. (S/NF)
TEXT: 1. (C/NF) DURING A DISCUSSION WITH [REDACTED] ON 9 OCT 86, MANY DETAILS ABOUT LIFE IN ANGOLA THROUGH MARCH OF 1986 EMERGED. THE TOWN OF LUBANGO IS THE LOCATION OF AN AIRFIELD FROM WHICH MIG 21, 23 HINDS AND HIPS ARE FLOWN. [REDACTED] REVEALED INFORMATION RELATING TO THE DAILY LIFE OF THE LOCAL CIVILIAN POPULATION, AIRCREW TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION, TYPES OF TACTICS USED BY THE AIRCREWS, CREW MORALE, AND TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS.

2. (C/NF) [REDACTED] REVEALED THAT THE LOCAL CURRENCY IS NEARLY NONEXISTENT, AND A HIGHLY ORGANIZED SYSTEM OF BARTER HAS EVOLVED. THE PRINCIPAL MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE IS THE LOCAL BEER. IN EXCHANGE FOR BEER, IT IS POSSIBLE TO RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM POTATOES TO AIRPLANE TRAVEL. TYPICAL RATES OF EXCHANGE WERE ONE CASE OF BEER FOR TEN KILOGRAMS OR THREE CHICKENS. THREE CASES OF BEER CAN BE EXCHANGED FOR ONE PIG AND 15 CASES FOR ONE COW. ONE CASE OF BEER WAS VALUED AT USD 1000. IN THE CAPITAL OF LUANDA, LOCAL CURRENCY IS AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, THE BARTER SYSTEM IS IN EFFECT. MANY BUSINESSES, TO INCLUDE HOTELS, REQUEST PAY FOR SERVICES IN HARD CURRENCIES. A TYPICAL COST IS USD 100 FOR ONE NIGHT IN A HOTEL. WHEN [REDACTED] ARRIVED IN LUANDA, THERE WERE NO TAXIS AVAILABLE FOR HIRE, AND THERE WERE NO CONSUMER GOODS AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE IN THE STORES. THE LACK OF CONSUMER GOODS PREVAILS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. A COMMON PRACTICE OF FOREIGNERS LIVING AND WORKING IN ANGOLA IS TO SMUGGLE HARD CURRENCY INTO THE COUNTRY. EVERY SIX MONTHS, [REDACTED] RETURNED TO EUROPE AND BROUGHT BACK USD 1500 BUT WOULD DECLARE ONLY USD 500, HIDING USD 1000.

3. (C/NF) [REDACTED] DISCUSSED TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION. THE ONLY RELIABLE AND QUICK MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IS BY AIR.
HOWEVER, MANY PROBLEMS EXIST. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE BOEING AIRCRAFT WERE SO OVERLOADED THAT THE PILOTS HAD TO ABOPT THE TAKEOFF, RETURN TO THE TERMINAL WHERE THE CREW WOULD THROW OUT OF THE PLANE AS MUCH AS THEY FELT NECESSARY, AND RETATTEMPT THE TAKEOFF. (REDacted) STATED THAT ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS, THE BOEING TRANSPORT CRASHED IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF, THE PROBABLE CAUSE AN OVERGESS AICRAFT. THE CREW WOULD THROW OFF LUGGAGE FIRST AND CONSUMABLES LAST. IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR [REDACTED] TO RIDE ANYWHERE ON A MILITARY AIRCRAFT; THE COST WAS ONE CASE OF BEER. THIS WAS DONE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS FORBIDDEN FOR CIVILIANS, ESPECIALLY FOREIGNERS, TO RIDE ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

4. (REDacted) DISCUSSED GROUND TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS. DIVIDED TRAFFIC INTO TWO MAIN TYPES, MILITARY CONVOYS AND "GUN RUNNERS OR COWBOYS". THE TYPICAL MILITARY CONVOY FROM LUBANGO TO LUANDA REQUIRED 50 DAYS TO TRAVEL THE APPROXIMATE 300 KILOMETERS. HAZARDS INCLUDED ATTACKS BY REBELS (UNITA) AND LAND MINES. THE MINES WOULD USUALLY EXPLODE UNDER THE THIRD OR FOURTH TRUCK AND HALT THE CONVOY FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. THE PROBABLE REASON FOR THE SLOW SPEED IS THE MINE CLEARING ACTIVITIES REQUIRED ALONG THE ROUTE. THE COWBOYS ARE INDEPENDENT CIVILIAN TRUCKERS WHO ALWAYS TRAVEL AT NIGHT. NORMAL METHOD OF OPERATION INCLUDED THE CARRYING OF FLARES FOR ILLUMINATION AND ADDITIONAL MEN TO OPERATE MACHINE GUNS. AS THE TRUCKER TRAVELED FROM POINT TO POINT, AS HE REACHED THE CREST OF A HILL, HE WOULD FIRE A NIGHT ILLUMINATION FLARE. IN THEORY, THE REBELS WOULD THEN TAKE COVER. IN ADDITION, AS THE TRUCK TRAVELED ADMIN END OF MESSAGE
SERIAL: (U) IIR  
BODY  
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AQ); CUBA (CU); SOVIET UNION (UR)  
SUBJ: (U) IIR  
LIFE AROUND THE MILITARY AIR  

DOWN THE HILL THROUGH THE NEXT VALLEY, THE MACHINE GUNNERS WOULD FIRE ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. THIS TACTIC HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL, HOWEVER, THERE REMAINS A LOT OF RISK. SOURCE OBSERVED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, VEHICLES AND BODIES WHICH HAD BEEN SHOT AFTER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT PASSAGE. THE HIGH PAY CONTINUES TO ATTRACT VOLUNTEERS TO FACE THE DEADLY RISKS.

5. (C/NE) STATED THAT THE FIRST 15 MIG 21 PILOTS TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION ARRIVED IN LUBANGO DURING THE STAY THERE. THE ANGOLAN PILOTS WERE ALL METIS. TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION LASTED THREE YEARS, AND ALL BEGAN BY LEARNING RUSSIAN. (C/NE) STATED THAT THE PILOTS FELT ALL THEY LEARNED IN THE SOVIET UNION WAS HOW TO TAKE-OFF AND LAND.

8. (G/AF) [Redacted] stated that there are about 15 Mig 21s and an undetermined number of Mig 23s at Lubango. The Mig 23s arrived in early 1985. Also at the air base are Mi-24 Hind helicopters and Alouettes.
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

SUMMARY: (CONFIDENTIAL) THIS IIR FORWARDS INFORMATION CONCERNING EFFORTS AND INTEREST OF THE CHINESE IN LEARNING ABOUT U.S. ACTIONS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION.

TEXT: (CONFIDENTIAL) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)
AS LONG AS THE USSR IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN SUPPORTING BOTH CUBA AND ANGOLA, THE CHINESE WILL VIEW WITH INTEREST ANY DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN MONEY, EQUIPMENT OR TALENT.
SECRET 27792

REEL NUMBER 027552 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0365

MSGNO 26 (MIIR) -22-06-73 -26-5-
Z2ZC 21:22:542 (MI)

SECRET

78 1154237

TOR: 2111567 AUG 78

NO 1154237

RR RUEAIA
GE RUFNPS #7792 2331123
ZNY 699999
R 211121Z AUG 78
FM 2221113 0606894
TO RUEKCS/DIA WASHIC
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHIC
RUEAIA/CIA WASHIC
RUTAVC ASAOIT00 USC 424 330350
RUENAA
RUEHUB
RUFHOL
RUSMAAA/USCINCEUR VATHINGEN GE
RUDORRA
RUCBSAA
RUDONBA
RUFRAAA
RUDONBA
RUFTHAA
RUSHHA/CINCFAC

BT
E21:
SECRET 27792
NOFORN/ANTEL
E22:
SUBJECT: THIS IS IR

1. (U) COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO); CUBA (CU)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: CUBAN LOSSES DURING ABORTED MFLA OFFENSIVE IN CABINDA.
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 780619
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 780621
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: N/A

(b)(3):10 USC 424

8. (U) REFERENCES: INITIATIVE
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: N/A
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: N/A
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424

SECRET 27792
A recent MPLA offensive against FLEC rebels in Cabinda area has turned into a minor disaster, particularly for Cuban combat elements supporting the MPLA. The Cuban elements were apparently singled out as prime targets and reportedly sustained 33% some killed a month during the course of the adopted offensive. Included among other foreign elements supporting the MPLA during the same offensive were a number of East German military advisors. Their exact role is not clear.

SECRET 27792
RR RUEAIIIE
DE RUEKJCS 99434 32420425
ZNY 2019058Z 0C
R 200124Z NOV 79
FM JCS
INFO RUEMC/SECSTATE WASH DC
RUEKIB/C I A
RUEAMWB/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
RUEFQA/CSAF WASH DC
RUSEA/MAW/EH WASH DC
RUSEA/MAW/CIA WASH DC
R 201716Z NOV 79
FM 0939101600 444
TO RUEKJCS/BIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUSNAAM/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
RUEHEGA 0939101600 444
BT
EII
CONFIDENTIAL
EII
271 NOV 79 093910

1. UK
2. (U) CUBANS IN ANGOLA
3. NA
4. 18 NOV 79
5. 0939103000 BIA
6. 0939103000 BIA
7. 19 NOVEMBER 1979
8. 19 NOVEMBER 1979
9. 19 NOVEMBER 1979
10. 19 NOVEMBER 1979
11. 19 NOVEMBER 1979
12. 19 NOVEMBER 1979
13. OK
14. SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATED
5,000 CUBAN TROOPS UNDER COMMAND OF THE MPLA.
HE ALSO STATED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ADVISERS ARE
ACCOMPANYING FORCES SUPPORTING THE MPLA IN THE SOUTH OF ANGOLA.
SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WERE DEPLOYED ON A PERIMETER OF 50 MILES
RADIUS AROUND THE HYDRO ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT IN THE LIITORAL
BETWEEN SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ANGOLA.
HE TOLD OF EIGHT MIG-21S FLOWN INTO BRAZZAVILLE FOUR
DAYS AGO, WHICH IN HIS OPINION, WAS MAKING THE RUSSIAN
SAM SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIAL. THOUGHT THE SITUATION WOULD
YET BLOW UP.
93910
BT
99434
NNNN
NND0
---------------------

3298-404-1
SECRET NOFORN

REEL NUMBER 307392 SEQUENCE NUMBER 3010

MSGNO 10 (MIIR) 06/01/75 05:50 W2ZC 11:35:46

EIJ074GL9129
PP RUEAIE
DE RUEKJCS #8236 0051134
ZK5 959595
P 0511342 JAN 78
FM JCS
INFO RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHQ/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAOD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIF/C I A
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIM/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUE01H/NSA WASH DC
P 0510257 JAN 7A
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIA/CIA WASHDC

BT
EZI:
SECRET NOFORM
EZ2:
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. ISRAEL
2. (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. CUBAN OVERSEAS PRESENCE AND MILITARY CAPABILITY (U)
4. N/A
5. 780103
6. 780105
7. 780103 (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. B-2
10. (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. YES/NO
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. 
14. 
15. NO
16. TS/NOFORM (b)(1),1.4 (c)

A. PARA 12A(1)
(1) ALGERIA: ABOUT 100-200 CUBAN MILITARY INSTRUCTORS ARE PRESENTLY IN ALGERIA. SOME ARE TRAINING MEMBERS OF THE QUOTE POLISARIO UNQUOTE MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF QUOTE SPANISH SAHARA UNQUOTE.
(2) IRAQ: ABOUT 200 CUBAN INSTRUCTORS ARRIVED IN IRAQ IN THE SUMMER OF 1976. THEIR SPECIFIC ROLE IS NOT CLEAR; HOWEVER, THEY SEEM TO BE INSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL ARMY (MILITIA OF THE BATH

SECRET NOFORM
PARTY) AND PALESTINIANS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE.

(3) P.O.R.Y. ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE 300 CUBANS IN
P.O.R.Y. CUBA HAS SUPPORTED P.O.R.Y. THROUGH QUOTE THE CUBAN
REVOLUTION DEFENSE COMMITTEE UNQUOTE, BY ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL
MILITIA. THERE ARE ABOUT 200 CUBAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL IN-
STRUCTORS. ACCORDING TO CUBAN MILITARY MEN
PARTICIPATED IN GUERRILLA TRAINING AND SOME HAVE AIDED THE REBELS
IN GUERRILLA TRAINING AND SOME HAVE AIDED THE REBELS AT TAPAR.
IT SEEMS THAT IN THE P.O.R.Y. MILITIA TRAINING CAMP THE CUBANS
TRAINED PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS AND MEMBERS OF AFRICAN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (ERITREA LIBERATION FRONT). ANOTHER FIELD OF AC-
TION FOR THE CUBANS IS IN THE P.O.R.Y. AIR FORCE. INFORMATION
FROM 1974 STATES THAT CUBAN PILOTS TRAINED P.O.R.Y. PILOTS ON
MIG-21 AIRCRAFT. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CUBANS FORMED THE OPER-
ATIONAL UNITS OF THE P.O.R.Y. AIR FORCE. THE CUBAN PILOTS
THEN APPEARENTLY LEFT P.O.R.Y. IT IS LIKELY THAT DURING LAST
YEAR A FEW CUBAN RADAR AND S/A MISSILES ARRIVED IN P.O.R.Y.
SYSTEMS WERE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS.

(4) LIBYA: SINCE CASTRO'S VISIT (MARCH 1977), CUBAN MIL-
ITARY PERSONNEL HAVE BEGUN TO ARRIVE IN LIBYA. THESE PERSONNEL
ARE EMPLOYED IN TRAINING AND ADVISING, ESPECIALLY IN THE
ARMORED FORCES AND INTELLIGENCE, AND PERHAPS IN COMMAND/-
GUERRILLA TRAINING. WE ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN LIBYA AT APPROXIMATELY 200-300 MEN.

(5) ANGOLA: FROM THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER 1975 UNTIL FEB-
RUARY 1976 A LARGE SOVIET AERIAL (ABOUT 81 FLIGHTS, MOST OF
THEM AN-22 AIRCRAFT) WAS OBSERVED. THE AERIAL SUPPLIED MILITARY
AID TO THE MPLA MOVEMENT. IN THE BEGINNING OF 1976 THERE WERE
12,000 CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ANGOLA. THEY WERE ORGANIZED
IN TEN BATTALIONS AND FOUR TANK COMPANIES WHICH OPERATED IN SMALL
GROUPS OF FIVE-SIX TANKS. THE CUBANS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN
THE CIVIL WAR, AND BROUGHT ABOUT THE VICTORY OF THE MPLA MARXIST
MOVEMENT. THE CUBANS PROVIDED THE AIR SUPPORT
FOR THE LAND FORCES BY FLYING MIG-21'S. IN ADDITION, THE CUBANS
INSTRUCTED THE USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS SUCH AS A/T MISSILES,
RECOILLESS GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND MORTARS. THE CUBAN FORCES
PARTICIPATED IN ALL STAGES OF THE MPLA'S OVERTAKING OF ANGOLA'S
GOVERNMENT. THEY UNDERTOOK THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GUARDING RAIL-
ROADS, ROADS AND AIR FIELDS. THE CUBANS FUGHT IN INDEPENDENT
UNITS AS WELL AS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF MPLA UNITS. CUBAN FORCES IN
ANGOLA HAVE INCREASED AND THEIR NUMBER TODAY IS ESTIMATED AS
AT LEAST 15,000. THERE ARE ALSO ABOUT 4,000 CUBAN CIVILIAN
ADVISORS IN ANGOLA.

(6) ETHIOPIA: SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ETHIOPIA
AND SOMALIA THE NUMBER OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ETHIOPIA
HAS INCREASED. ESTIMATES THEIR NUMBER TO BE ABOUT
400-600 MEN. THE CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ETHIOPIA ARE
ADVISORS AND INSTRUCTORS. THEY DO NOT OPERATE AS INDEPENDENT
MILITARY UNITS. THE CUBANS' MAIN ACTIVITIES CENTER AROUND AID TO
THE MILITIA.

(7) MOZAMBIQUE: ABOUT 200-400 CUBANS ARE PRESENTLY IN MOZ-
AMBIQUE. THEY ARE EMPLOYED IN INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING GUERRILLA
FIGHTERS IN THE USE OF SOVIET ARMS AND PREPARING THEM FOR MIL-
ITARY ACTION AGAINST RHODESIA. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CUBANS IN
MOZAMBIQUE ARE FORMING A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE MILITARY ACTION IN RHODESIA.

8) GUINEA: THERE ARE ABOUT 200 CUBAN TECHNICIANS AND TEACHERS FOR PRE-MILITARY TRAINING IN GUINEA. REPORTS INDICATE THAT CUBAN ADMINISTRATORS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

9) TANZANIA: THERE IS NO RELIABLE INFORMATION ON A CUBAN PRESENCE IN TANZANIA. HAS REPORTED THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 50 CUBANS IN TANZANIA. THEY REPORTEDLY AIM IN THE TRAINING OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTERS WHO PLAN TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME IN RHODESIA.

10) CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE): THERE ARE ABOUT 150 CUBANS IN CONGO. THEIR OCCUPATION IS UNKNOWN.

11) SIERRA LEONE: CUBAN SECURITY PERSONNEL ASSIST THE TRAINING OF A LOCAL UNIT FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY.

12) ZAMBIA: THE PRESENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF CUBAN PERSONNEL IS LIKELY.

12A (1)(B): AS FAR AS IS KNOWN BY IT IS PROBABLE THAT CUBA VIEWS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD AS ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF HER MILITARY FORCES (DESPITE THE FACT HAS NO POSITIVE INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THIS SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE). IT SEEMS THAT, BEHIND THE VIEW, STANDS CUBA'S DESIRE TO SUPPORT RADICAL AND QUOTE ANTI-IMPERIALISTIC UNQUOTE ELEMENTS. AGAIN, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CUBAN MILITARY WHICH MIGHT PREPARE IT FOR OVERSEAS INVOLVEMENT OR ANY MILITARY DOCTRINAL CHANGE WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN FORMED FOR THESE SPECIFIC PURPOSES.

12A (1)(C): HAS NO INFORMATION ON THE EXISTENCE OF CUBAN MILITARY UNITS WHOSE MAIN PURPOSE IS INVOLVEMENT IN DISTANT PARTS OF THE WORLD.

12A (1)(D) AND (E): HAS NO INFORMATION ON CUBAN MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS NOR ON THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AMERICAN ELEMENTS IN THE CUBAN MILITARY.

12A (1)(F) AND (G): HAS NO INFORMATION ON THESE TOPICS.


12A (1)(I): HAS NO INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC.

12A (1)(J): HAS NO DETAILS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER THE CUBANS. DURING THE WAR IN ANGOLA STRONG COOPERATION BETWEEN SOVIETS AND CUBANS WAS OBSERVED. THE SOVIETS GAVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND SUPPLIED ARMS. ASSESSSES THAT THE SOVIETS KEEP A CLOSE WATCH OVER CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA.

12A (1)(K): IT SEEMS THAT UNTIL RECENTLY CUBA KEPT CLOSE RELATIONS WITH HAMATIYA'S POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL SIMILARITY OF THIS FRONT TO CUBAN IDEOLOGY. ACCORDING TO ARAFAT MET WITH CASTRO DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN APRIL 1977, THE TWO DECIDED ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR RELATIONS.

SECRET NOT FOR

SECRET NOT FOR

SECRET NOT FOR

SECRET NOT FOR
ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN TRAINING FIELDS IN IRAQ AND LEBANON. AT THE MOMENT [REDACTED] HAS NO WAY TO VERIFY THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CUBAN CONDUCT OF COURSES FOR THE FATAH ORGANIZATION.
2. (SECRET) WHEN COMPLIMENTED ON THE "SUCCESS" OF THE BUDGET FIGHT, THE NOTED, "...DON'T BE FooLED, WE DIDN'T GET NEAR THE FIGURES WE WANTED. WE'RE TRYING TO KEEP QUIET FOR THE NEWSPAPERS BUT NONE OF US ARE REALLY HAPPY WITH THE RESULT. RIGHT NOW IS JUST A DIFFICULT TIME PARTICULARLY WITH THE U.S. FACING GRAMM/RUDMAN RESTRICTIONS."

3. (SECRET) CLAIMED SPAIN WILL FULLY INTEGRATE INTO NATO "...WITHIN TWO YEARS. IT JUST MAKES A LOT OF SENSE FOR THE SPANISH. ONE THING FULL INTEGRATION WILL DO IS ALLOW THEM TO PRESSURE THE BRITISH TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF GIBRALTAR. FRANKLY, I THINK THE BRITISH WOULD BE HAPPY TO BAIL OUT. CERTAINLY, THE FALKLANDS MUST HAVE TAUGHT THEM SOME BITTER LESSONS ABOUT HANGING ONTO OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS IN THE FACE OF REALITIES."
4. [Name Redacted] was much more circumspect when it came to discussing his own possibilities for another tour. He noted, "...that's really not a question I can even speculate upon because the decision rests solely with the government. I did take some damaging hits below the waterline during the budget fight and it's impossible to be in a position like this and not make some political enemies. In fact, I was ready to retire as a colonel in 1974 and here I am 12 years later still being swept along by events. I guess we all feel the same, however, if the country needs my services it would be hard to say no but it's the government which will decide and I'm happy to leave it at that."

5. [Name Redacted] the U.S. political system drew these comments from the [Name Redacted]. "...the U.S. system is probably the admin..."

End of message
BODY

COUNTRY: (U) USSR (UR); ANGOLA (AO);
- TURKEY (TU); GREECE (GR); SPAIN (SP).

SUBJ: PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BY THE
BEST AROUND BUT I DOUBT THAT IT WOULD EVER WORK ANYWHERE
ELSE EXCEPT IN THE U.S.. THE WEAKEST THING IS THE
ANONYMITY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS. CONGRESS CAN DO ANYTHING
IT WANTS AND WHO CAN BE BLAMED? CONGRESS...WHO IS
CONGRESS? IF THE PRESIDENT DOES SOMETHING HE HAS TO
TAKE THE BLAME, BUT CONGRESS?...ITS TOO EASY FOR ACTIONS
TO BE FORCED WITHOUT ANY PERSONAL ACCOUNTING, LIKE THE
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS PUSHED ON THE PRESIDENT."

6. (C) ALSO DISCUSSED HIS VIEWS OF GREECE
AND TURKEY. "

THE TURKS ARE OK. THEY ARE YOUR FRIENDS AND WILL STAND BY THEIR
COMMITTMENT BUT THE GREEKS ARE SOMETHING ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT. ALSO, I THINK YOU (U.S.) ARE MISSING A BET
BY NOT CONSULTING WITH THE TURKS ON MIDDLE EAST EVENTS.
AFTER ALL THEY TOUCH THE SOVIET UNION, IRAN, IRAQ AND
SYRIA...MANY OF THE KEY PLAYERS IN THE MID EAST. YOU
REALLY SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR INSIGHTS ON THE
AREA."

7. (C) CONCLUDED BY POIKING PEOPLE SAYING, ". . . THEY ARE THE MOST LEGALISTIC IN THE
WORLD. THEY SPEND MONTHS FIGURING OUT WHERE THE LOOP
HOLES ARE IN THE LAWS. IN FACT, THEY SPEND MUCH MORE
TIME LOOKING FOR WAYS OUT OF WORK THAN IT WOULD TAKE TO
DO THE JOB. SOMETIMES IT GETS FRUSTRATING IN THIS
COUNTRY."

COMMENTS: (C) IS BRIGHT AND LOVES TO
PUT HIS IDEAS ON DISPLAY. NOT ONE TO SHRINK AWAY FROM
THE TOUGH QUESTIONS, HE NORMALLY SHOOTS STRAIGHT. THE
ONLY TAP DANCE CAME ON THE QUESTION ABOUT HIS "FUTURE
PLANS" AND MAYBE HE COULDN'T HAVE GIVEN ANY OTHER
ANSWER AT THIS TIME. HIS OPEN ADMISSION THAT HE MAY
HAVE GIVEN HURT IN THE BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIS
CIVILIAN MASTERS WAS REVEALING. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN
AFGHANISTAN AND ANGOLA SAYS MUCH ABOUT THE DEPTH OF THE
FEELING ABOUT THE SOVIET MACHINATIONS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA. FINALLY, LEFT LITTLE
DOUBT AS TO HIS ANTI-RED FEELINGS WHEN HE NOTED ABOUT
THE CHINESE WHO IS THE SENIOR ATTACHE
"...HE IS REALLY A VERY CHARMING MAN, IN FACT,
HE MAY BE THE ONLY COMMUNIST I'VE EVER LIKED!"

//IPS#: //COMSOC
ADMIN
PROJ: (U) NONE
CONFIDENTIAL

NO RELIABILITY/SECRET STATE WASH DC
RUEAFIE/C I A
RUE404/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
RUEFHQ/C/CSAF WASH DC
RUEMAA/CNO WASH DC
RUE40MD/CSA WASH DC
R 021902 APR 76
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEJCS/DA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUSMIAA/CINCER VAATlingen GER
EXC (b)(3):10 USC 424
BT EZ21
C O N F I D E N T I A L 133 APR 76.
EZ21
FROM (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 USC 403-1(i)
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2. (U) SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA
3. N/A
4. 1 APR 76
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. 2 APR 76
7. N/A
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. 2 APR 1976
10. N/A
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12.
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14.
15. (U) REPORT PRESENTS HIGHLIGHTS OF AN ADDRESS GIVEN BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL R.F.O. ROGERS, CHIEF, SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE
TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGION;
1. (U) GENERAL ROGERS DELETED THE BACKGROUND IN SOUTH AFRICA'S
ROLE IN ANGOLA. GENERAL ROGERS NOTED THAT CUBAN TROOPS HAD BEEN
BROUGHT INTO THAT COUNTRY IN AUGUST 75 AND LATER THE SOUTH
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS APPROACHED BY CERTAIN INTERESTED PARTIES,
INCLUDING VARIOUS AFRICAN STATES, FOR ASSISTANCE, AFTER DUE
CONSIDERATION. SOUTH AFRICA HAD AGREED TO GIVE THIS ASSISTANCE
"ON A LIMITED SCALE":
2. (U) MILITARY PERFORMANCE: GENERAL ROGERS SAID SOUTH AFRICA HAD
ACCOMPLISHED HER MILITARY PLAN IN ANGOLA IN A "BRILLIANT MANNER."
"MILITARILY, OUR BOYS IN ANGOLA ACQUIRED THEMSELVES OUTSTANDINGLY
AND PROVED MORE THAN A MATCH FOR ANYONE THEY MET, INCLUDING
THE CUBANS." GENERAL ROGERS SAID THERE WERE CASUALTIES, BUT
NOTHING LIKE NUMBERS QUOTED IN RUMORS. HE SAID THAT ONLY 28
MEN WERE KILLED IN ACTION AND 100 MEN WERE WOUNDED.
3. (U) CONCLUSION: THE GENERAL SAID THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY THREAT AGAINST THE REPUBLIC AND CONDITIONS
ALONG HER BORDER WERE QUITE, HOWEVER, HE SAID THEY WOULD BE
PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY, AND APPEALED TO THE PEOPLE TO
provide the equipment and personnel required.
Comments: (c) There are so many figures quoted as to South
Africa's losses in Angola, it is difficult to decide which to
rely upon. (b)(1)(b)(3):10 USC 424.1 (c)

The appeal to the people of South Africa to lend their
support was timely, as the SAG released on 1 April 76 the new
budget, of which 17.2 percent was for defense.

BT
#9776
NNNN
NNDD

Disseminates:
(b)(3)(b)(3):2 USC 424.1 (c)
SECRET NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR-900206.

_WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS._

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 900206.

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (G/NF) 900206.

SUMMARY: (G/NF) THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND SUCCESS OF THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA. SOVIET ADVISORS ARE ASSISTING ONLY IN TECHNICAL AREAS; CUBANS ARE FLYING SOME SORTIES.

TEXT: 1. (U) THE POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE
WHICH AGREES WITH THE SERIOUSNESS AND INTENSITY OF THE OFFENSIVE BUT WHICH GIVES THE SOVIETS CREDIT FOR THE BETTER PLANNING AND EXECUTION.  IN ANY CASE, UNITA PRESIDENT JONAS ((SAVINBI)) CUT SHORT A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO PORTUGAL IN ORDER TO GET BACK TO AFRICA. FAPLA TROOPS ARE DOING SOMETHING RIGHT.
1. (U) In the 29 February 1977 and 3 March 1977 issues of "Gente" magazine, two articles appeared on Cuba's involvement in Angola. The stories written by Robert Moss, apparently are the first in a series to be published in "Gente" concerning Castro's venture in Africa.
2. The 29 February article offers a chronology of the conflict between warring factions. It discusses South Africa's role as well as the movement and employment of communist troops and material into Angola. The second article covers subject matter similar to that of the first and provides some specific details on combat engagements.

COMMENT: The information provided by the articles is probably not new or unknown outside of Argentina. What is interesting, however, is that it was published in a very popular magazine that receives wide coverage. The stories paint Castro's Cuba in a very poor light and shows Cuba as a puppet of the Soviet Union's imperialistic machinations. The articles tell the story of Angola as seen by many Argentine military officers. [(b)(1),1.4(c)]

Also, it clearly demonstrates the type of exposure the Argentine public has regarding Cuba's intervention in Angola. Please advise if these articles are of value. If so, subsequent publications will be forwarded via IR.
primeros en venta!!
por calidad, jerarquía y precio

EN EL PRÓXIMO
POR MANOJO

[Image content is not legible due to the nature of the document]
mento y se escaparon, pero no
fueron sin antes intentar volar el
puente. Las cargas explosivas ya
habían sido puestas, pero el úl-
timo hombre encargado de con-
trolar el encendido del detonador
se había olvidado de recortar el
cable. Los sudafricanos dirigieron
sus trapos sobre el puente y se
acercaron a Catengué, donde las
tunas desde Benguela y Nova Lis-
boa se cruzaban. Ya era hora de
buscar provisiones y descubrir
donde se hallaba el enemigo.
Se envió una partida de solda-
dos a la ruta hacia Nova Lisboa
para que las unidades del MPLA
estaban avanzando hacia Catengué,
un teniente sudafricano llamado
Jan se dirigió con un Land Rover
hacia un convoy del MPLA, con-
ducido por oficiales... "Mercedes
Benz y Citroen llamados" de los
portugueses.
Se salvó por el hecho de que
e el MPLA lo confundiera con un
cubano... "¿Dónde están los compa-
neros?" alguien le preguntó. Jan
miró alrededor y se acercó a ellos,
con sus amurallados haciendo la señal
del MPLA. El coche del movimiento
del MPLA se alejó y entonces Jan
abierto luego sobre ellos con un
un Browning 50.
A continuación estableció un
puerto de emboscada en el cam-
ino y pudo detener no menos
de siete carros del enemigo, iban
cayendo como polillas dentro de
una fosa, sin ningún recorrido
generalizado.Tres hombres del MPLA
fueron capturados y fue obligado
caravos fosas para las primeras esti-
mas de la emboscada Jan fue
apodado "el cubano" durante el
curso de la campaña.
Mientras tanto, partidas de re-
cognoscimiento establecieron que
la fuerza del MPLA cubana estaba
localizada más alla de Benguela
cerca de Zulú. Los morte-
ros causaron pánico entre las tro-
nas rubias, que se negaron a en-
frontarlos y la columna desapareció
una demora de seis horas. Los in-
trigadores del FNLA devolvieron la
baza ametralladora y los morteros
tan rápidamente (25
vueltas en un minuto en vez de los
dos minutos normales) que sus
flechas comenzaron a prenderse
fuego. Hubo varios incendios. Fi-
nalmente la ruta fue despejada,
después de que un grupo de la
Armada encontraron un cañonero
rondonando en el sur de la presión
electrónica. Un grupo fue enviado a
intentar detener el MPLA de su re-
trada, pero el enemigo ya había
realizado una rápida evacuación.

**COLUMNNA ZULU VERSUS CUBANOS**

N

neasamente la suerte salvó el
puente para la columna
Zulu. Los ingenieros cubanos ha-

bun colocado un cable desde a
da travesa del puente, dirigiendo
2,000 metros del detonador. Todo
estaba dispuesto para la voladura,

y los sudafricanos se sorprendie-
ron de que el puente no hubiera
arrodado en el agua. Por un guate
fuente una de sus partidas de re-
conocimiento que rondaba par

dese terreno había cortado el
alambre.

En el campo de batalla de Ca-

tengué los sudafricanos recoge-
ron otra clave que los indica a

presenta cubana, un mapa mar-

cado en español. Tomaron presos

da siete hombres, que les informa-

ron de la existencia de un gran
campana fuera de Benguela,

con 350 cubanos Oroso nombres

de la batalla fueron un Mercedes

Benz, un Alfa Romeo que habían

sido utilizadas por el MPLA. Los

scouts informaron que un total de

dos soldados del MPLA habían sido
debidamente en Catengué.\n
Luego de la batalla de Caten-
gue, los cubanos y el MPLA se di-

rigieron hacia el norte, abando-
nando trincheras y aun grandes
cantidad de municiones. A unos

15 km de Benguela la columna

Zulú se topó con un gran cam-

pamento de entrenamiento capaz de

contener a 100 soldados, rodeado

por trincheras y fosas profundos.

Simplemente había sido abando-
nado. Los sudafricanos se llevaron

150 tanques de diesel de que

habían sido abandonados. Justo

al sur de Benguela la columna

en otro campana que resultó haber sido la principal base
cubana, y que había intentado

prender fuego en su destruc-

ción. El fuego no se expandió,

pudieron escalar grandes contro-

lados de cubanos, carteles políticos
y otras propuestas declaradas.

bosquimanos se regocijaron am-

tante cantidad de productos naturales.

Las fuerzas zulúes estaban

rutas para el asalto sobre

Benguela. Al anochecer en su re-

imiento 150 sudafricanos blancos

con sus panaderos. Los bosquimi-

os y el batallón del FNLA, refor-

zado a 450 metros y 800 militor-

es portugueses. El combate comenzó

34 de noviembre una semana

ante la batalla fue independencia

la base aérea en el sudeste de la
ciudad. La ciudad fue tomada sin resistencia.

Pero ahora había ocurrido algo
que los sudafricanos habían le-

mido tanto: el MPLA y las fuerzas
cubanas, cruzaron sus fuerzas

e la ciudad. Simultáneamente,

abrieron fuego proyectiles de 12.7

mm del otro lado de Benguela.

Un grupo también fue de los cuban

de los nativos con pequeñas ar

mas sobre las aldeas de la ciu-

dad. La columna fue que dete-

nente por 26 horas en el aero-

puerto.
La sorprendente victoria militar de la pequeña columna sudaficana en Angola ofrecía la posibilidad de algo más: un triunfo militar sobre los comunistas. Pero la oportunidad fue rechazada.

Aún, para un líder y político avezado como Jonas Savimbi, la relación con los sudfricanos no fue fácil al principio. El había estado luchando contra los portugueses durante años, solamente para terminar con el país de su infancia, de apariencia eran foco de odio y resentimiento de los negros nacidos en Angola. Pero pronto se rompió el hielo.

Savimbi y sus hombres comenzaron a llamarlo Comandante Sudáfricano Kasas (que significa 'comandante'), debido a que provenía de una familia alemana, y Kasas lo apodó a Savimbi como 'el Doctor'.

El mayor arnés con un equipo de 18 instructores de la policía, infantería que pronto fueron designados en los campamentos de UNITA como 'hermanos'. Eran aquellos que entrenaron a las tropas de UNITA y ayudaron a establecer una solapa posición en la guerra central. El equipo sudáfricano llegó en el momento en que las fuerzas presenciales habían tomado el control de las ciudades mas importantes en Angola, excepto Nova Lisboa, Sinua Portó, Daromana y Serpa Pinto. Los comunistas retenían los puertos clave y estaban penetrando en las áreas tribales de Omundonde desde tiempo atrás controladas por UNITA.

El comandante Kasas estaba a cargo de reclutas de UNITA, que tenían entre 14 y 20 años. Realizó un curso de entrenamiento de dos semanas, trabajando noche y día.

**BARRERA EN NOVA LISBOA**

La mason crucial de los asesores sudáfricanos para con Savimbi era detener el avance de los comunistas sobre Nova Lisboa, en una de las tres rutas principales desde Luanda al norte y dos de Benguela y Lobito al este. Una columna de UNITA bajo el comando de Savimbi partió el 4 de octubre para detener un avance comunita desde el oeste y el 5 de octubre, se unió con los cubanos y el MPLA, tres días después.

Luego de la batalla las fuerzas de UNITA estaban en una posición definitiva en el oeste de Nova Lisboa y el comandante Kasas pidió refuerzos inmediatos. Realizó una escalada de carros blindados, transportados por vía naval desde la base de Lisboa. La idea era atacar desde el norte, contra la fuerza de UNITA, que aún estaba en el norte, estableciéndose en el área de Ombika.

El comandante Kasas reunio cuatro carros blindados y los batallones de UNITA en una columna conocida como FOXBAT; fue entonces que 6 de noviembre las fuerzas de UNITA desfilaron una de sus milicias como sonidos de guerra. El avance del MPLA era dirigido por una oficial cubano (con varios estrellas rojas en su chaqueta), conduciendo un Citroën negro. Un soldado sudáfricano disparó con un rife 105 mm a su coche, produciendo la muerte instantánea del oficial. La columna FOXBAT tambien tenía una línea aproximadamente de 30 km que se extendía hasta el oeste, pero la columna UNITA y debían estar listos para retirarse el 11 de noviembre.

Mientras tanto el 14 de octubre, otra columna sudáfricana se dirigió al límite de África del Sudoeste hacia Angola. El nombre en clave era 'ZULU', que aparentemente contundió a los cubanos. Había mayor cantidad de negros sudáfricanos que blancos en columnas, pero no había ninguno.

**Oficial al mando**

El oficial al mando era un coronel africano de la provincia del Caza, residiendo en la Academia Militar de Saldanha, y que había ofrecido como voluntario para servir en Angola. Sus compañeros lo apodaban 'Ronel', debido a la extraordinaria velocidad de avance de sus columnas.

El 9 de octubre a las 9:30 fue informado que tenía que desembarcar para dirigirse a los cuarteles de operaciones de Rundu, sobre el límite angolano. En Rundu descubrió que su fuerza consistía en básicamente una batalla de refugios principalmente rechazado de la franja privada, incluyendo bosques masivos. A estos lucho con otras fuerzas portuguesas y en una batalla larga para el FNLA de 1,000 hombres divididos en tres compañías con el mando del coronel. Varias semanas después, los hombres del FNLA...
LA BATALLA SUDAFRICANA

A pesar de que la guerra en Angola fue una de las más largas y costosas de la historia del mundo, fue también una de las menos conocidas. En este contexto, la batalla sudaficana es un hito importante en la historia de la lucha por la independencia de Angola. En 1975, tras la independencia de Portugal, Angola se convirtió en un foco de conflictos internacionales. Los grupos rebeldes como UNITA y FNLA lucharon contra el gobierno angolano, pero el control fue tomado por el MPLA en 1979.

LAS SIGLAS Y SU SIGNIFICADO

UNITA: Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola. Esta fracción —a través de una alianza con Savimbi— logró mantenerse aliada al FNLA, aunque mantuvo una posición independiente. En 1979, la UNITA se alió al MPLA. Lucharon contra el MPLA, proclamando la «República Popular de Angola». Este grupo recibió apoyo de las fuerzas cubanas y del MPLA. RECIBIERON ARMAS SOVIÉTICAS Y 15 MIL SOLDADOS CUBANOS. 

FNLA: Frente Nacional para la Liberación de Angola. Aliado con la UNITA, ambos grupos recibieron asesores y refuerzos sudáficanos. RECIBIERON ARMAS SOVIÉTICAS Y 15 MIL SOLDADOS CUBANOS.

Esta es la historia de una invasión, de una intervención en un país africano. Sucedio en Angola.

La guerra secreta de Fidel Castro

Quincientos soldados cubanos, además de armas, tanques y aviones soviéticos, sirvieron para instalar en Angola un régimen comunista. El periodista inglés Robert Moss contó en la primera nota cómo se obtenía el dinero de hombres y pertrechos a la ex colonia portuguesa. La documentación se agrega ahora el relato del contraataque sud Africano y los grupos anticomunistas de la Unita y el FNLA. Conviene no olvidar que el continente nos separa de este artículo, donde se comienza la aventura cubana. Para reflexionar.

Por ROBERT MOSS.
El respeto por usted llega hasta lo minúsculo.

Posiblemente, ésta sea la pieza más pequeña, menos costosa y más insignificante de cualquier vehículo.

Pero cuando una empresa fundamenta su filosofía en el respeto que siente por sus usuarios, su tranquilidad, su bienestar... ésta es una pieza vital.

Digna de ser producida, probada y controlada al mismo nivel de exigencia con que se verifica la perfección de un rulemán, o la resistencia de una biela.

Por eso usted va a encontrar el respeto de Chrysler hacia usted, reflejado en cada parte y cada detalle de su Dodge.

En un motor arrollable.
En una suspensión que soporta cómodamente todo lo que el camino y usted exijan.

En un tornillo que, simplemente, no se afloja ni se rompe.

Por eso usted va a disfrutar miles de kilómetros sin problemas, con mantenimiento mínimo y consumo justo.

Así hacemos los Dodge.

Con respeto hacia usted.

Y que usted nos retribuye, tal como lo demostramos el éxito de Dodge, la sostenida demanda y el consecuente alto valor de reventa de los Dodge usados.

Respeto por sus derechos a elegir, exigir y disfrutar de un vehículo sano, simple y seguro.

Desde el motor, hasta el último tornillo.

Dodge. Con todo el respeto de Chrysler.
Algunos digestivos le ofrecen una sola razón para tomarlos sólo Alikal le da 2 buenas razones

1. Una tableta analgésica que calma el dolor de cabeza que acompaña casi siempre al malestar estomacal despaja y ensancha

2. Una sal efervescente, digestiva y refrescante que alivia el malestar estomacal proporcionando una estimulante sensación de frescura

...y rápido alivio al malestar!
La columna avanza

Los días más tarde la columna avanzaba, ahora dirigida por un Land Rover con un niño en el techo, tomó en su poder a la ciudad de Joao de Aliﬁa. Estaba decidida a establecer el control de las tierras de Mocamedes, y la columna salió a rastras de Sa da Bandeira, la capital de Huila, que sólo contenía un considerable número de pobladores blancos. La preocupación principal de "Rommel" era que ahora las fuerzas del MPLA pudiesen allanar a los civiles en peligro al huir dentro de la ciudad, pero las defensas se concentraron en las aldeas, tal como en el Montecristo Rei (llamado así por la gran estatua de Cristo que estaba ubicada en su cima). Las fuerzas zulúes se aproximaron al aeropuerto en primer lugar, y ya que la columna era básicamente abastecida por aire. Luego enviaron tropas al Monte Cristo Rei por la noche del 24 de octubre. Se encontraron que las fuerzas del MPLA ya se habían retirado de su armamento bélico. Esto nuevamente era típico de la campaña, ya que a medida que Zulú se alejaba hacia el Norte, ésta se introducía en un campo donde su poder sería mayor.

Junto con tropas de carros blindados y medios de transporte, los sudaneses elegirían como su próximo blanco el mayor puesto del sur, Mocamedes. En su camino, las tropas se toparon con soldados que lanzaron algunos proyectiles con forma de cabeza de 122 mm, un arma de Almendro, manipulado, liviana y capaz de ser lanzada desde cualquier vehículo.

Fue durante estas escaramuzas en las afueras de Mocamedes que la columna también se enfrentó con proyectiles RPG-7, utilizados como medio de lucha sicológica. Estos proyectiles tenían un alcance de alrededor de 600 metros, y un mecanismo de auto-destrucción, lo que suponía una seria amenaza para los soldados del MPLA.

Para sorpresa de los sudaneses, las fuerzas enemigas simplemente tomaron su armamento y, con la altura, explotarían en el aire con un gran estallido, produciendo una gran nube negra impronta de la columna y el/MPLA. Se decía que los sudaneses estaban en una situación similar a la de Pereira de Écia por sus constantes fracasos, y que el/MPLA no se dejó volar tanto. La situación de Pereira de Écia nos da un panorama de lo que los sudaneses podían hacer en el futuro:

La batalla fuerte de Mocamedes hubiera producido resultados para la columna Zulú si el enemigo hubiera protestado con morteros más potentes. Pero la columna logró atravesar su ruta, capturando una nueva arma (un cañón de 82 mm) construido por los rusos, y de ese modo logrando la batalla de Mocamedes el 27 de octubre.

Pero esa guerra fue alentada desde el exterior y envenenó a todos, grandes y chicos.
Desde la infancia
ACROCEL es parte de nuestra vida

Y ahora es una imperiosa necesidad. Por sus ventajas (practicidad, rendimiento económico) y por todas las otras ventajas del PROCESO 411

un tratamiento exclusivo de la tela para guardapolvos con Acrocel, que:
* Repela permanentemente todo tipo de manchas
* Facilita el lavado: exalta la blancura
* Aumenta la duración de las prendas y como siempre,
* Evita el planchado

Guardapolvos en tela con

ACROCEL de SUDAMTEX
LA CONEXIÓN DE LAS BARBADOS

Fue durante la guerra en las islas con un grupo de soldados negros e instructores blancos que habían regresado con honra en la foto.

Por supuesto, el cuento ya no tiene su propio futuro como el gobierno de una isla que deseara entender, pero aún así, el esfuerzo que se hizo por entender el mundo que se indicó ante la realidad de la realidad, más allá de las fronteras del tiempo, y en un futuro más cerca.

Cuba ha sido un frente que ha sido declarado en varias ocasiones, con buenos y malos momentos, pero siempre ha sido un lugar de esperanza, de libertad, de justicia. En los momentos difíciles, siempre ha tenido un lugar para las nuevas generaciones, para aquellos que buscan un futuro mejor.

Aunque ubicada en el este de América, Cuba ha sido el escenario de muchos enfrentamientos, a la vez que ha sido el refugio de muchas esperanzas. La revolución cubana, con sus pros y contras, ha sido un elemento de cambio que ha marcado a muchos, tanto en su país como en el mundo en general.

Aunque las opciones que se presenten puedan ser difíciles, y aunque las decisiones que se tomen puedan ser duras, siempre habrá un futuro que está por venir, y en ese futuro, habrá un espacio para todos.
EL PRIMER MOVIMIENTO DE LOS CUBANOS

Fuentes del espionaje occidental creen que Castro ya había tomado la decisión de iniciar un ataque contra el puerto de Luanda, que se encontraba en manos de las fuerzas de la UNITA. El ataque se produjo el 25 de septiembre, en el marco de un plan que incluía la utilización de fuerzas cubanas y soviéticas.

Una amotinada, un viento en férreo. Un muchacho anegado y un conductor cubano. Algo diferente de espantar. Una invasión directa en un país lejano.

PILOTOS PARA LOS CAZAS SOVIETICOS

Los pelesches de guerra eran desplegados, armados y treintenados en Ponte. El 29 de septiembre el barco 'Mujieres del Viento' zarparon y a bordo llevaban 20 vehículos blindados, 30 cañones pesados y 120 soldados cubanos. El 2 de octubre otro barco cubano desembarcó 350 hombres, quienes fueron transportados en avión al frente norte.
Una instructora cubana destrina con tropa de angoleños. Pies, sombreros, máscaras, significan alguna cooperación. Salvo los instructores, los demás cubanos enviados a África negaban que su misión tenía finalidad de combatir.

Estos irregulares pertenecen a las tropas del MPLA y la foto fue tomada en la región de Bieza del Dande, cuando estas tropas apoyadas por los cubanos fueron ocupando el territorio angoleño que cubrieron la UNITA y el FNLA.

**LANZACOHETES PARA EL MPLA**

Se cuida a la explicación: Rosa Coudinho no hizo ningún intento por perturbar el envío de armas del bloque soviético a MPLA desde que fue designado Alto Comandante en 1974. Su inmediato sucesor, el general de la Fuerza Aérea, Silva Cardoso, fue menos parcial. En abril de 1972, el comandante general Cardoso, dijo que no creía en las armas lanzacohetes y que no se había recibido ninguna solicitud de armas de ese tipo. Sin embargo, en octubre de 1972, declaró que era posible que se hubieran recibido armas lanzacohetes, pero que no se habían utilizado.

Recientemente, el general Silva Cardoso, quien fue abiertamente crítico de las tácticas de guerra, afirmó en una conferencia de prensa que no se había recibido ninguna solicitud de armas lanzacohetes. Sin embargo, en otra conferencia, Cardoso admitió que hubo un envío de armas lanzacohetes a MPLA en octubre de 1972. Sin embargo, no se ha proporcionado ninguna evidencia oficial de que estas armas hayan sido utilizadas.

En resumen, el general Silva Cardoso ha sido crítico de las tácticas de guerra, pero sus declaraciones sobre el envío de armas lanzacohetes a MPLA han sido contradictorias. No se ha proporcionado ninguna evidencia oficial de que estas armas hayan sido utilizadas.
E n el morning del 7 de octubre y 1974, la compañía de bata-
tos de los 40 regimientos, la 7en-
as Sáenz, se dirigía hacia el este-
te en la región central de Angola. Ven-
taban hacia un viaje de entrenamiento.
La situación de Angola había cambiado drástica-
mente desde la independencia por motivos
nacionales. El gobierno en el exilio había sos-
peñado de una columna del presosven-
co MPLA, dirigido por José Eduardo
G omé, en el sur de Angola.
La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.
La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.
La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

En la mañana del 7 de octubre e
1974, la compañía de bat-
tos de los 40 regimientos, la
7ena Sáenz, se dirigía hacia el este-
te en la región central de Angola. Ven-
taban hacia un viaje de entrenamiento.
La situación de Angola había cambiado drástica-
mente desde la independencia por motivos
nacionales. El gobierno en el exilio había sos-
peñado de una columna del presosven-
co MPLA, dirigido por José Eduardo
G omé, en el sur de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.

La columna de la UNita (Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola) había pasado su base en S. Paulo, donde los dos
miles de combatientes también
regresaron al mando del presidente Moosabu, de la
organización, uno de los líderes del MPLA, hacia No-
va Lisboa, la segunda ciudad de Angola.
INSTRUCTORES CUBANOS

Primero llegaron unos pocos instructores. En el lejano para africano comenzaron a entrenar a las legiones del movimiento beligerante denominado MPLA, un grupo que luego unirieron, luego de complicadas indecisiones políticas. Fueron abastecidos con armamentos soviéticos. Luego arribaron más cubanos. Unos 15 mil, según el extenso artículo que redactó e investigó el periodista inglés.
PASO EN ANGOLA.
CONVIENE QUE USTED SE ENTERE. TIENE QUE VER TAMBIÉN CON ARGENTINA.
ES LA HISTORIA DE UNA INVASIÓN.

LA GUERRA SECRETA DE FIDEL CASTRO
POR ROBERT MOSS

Angola fue una colonia portuguesa en África. Angola es rica en oro y diamantes. Cuando comienza el proceso de su independencia, Fidel Castro decide iniciar una aventura africana con el apoyo decisivo de la Unión Soviética. Esto se traduce en hombres y armas. Más de 15,000 soldados cubanos instauraron en Angola un régimen comunista, con armas sofisticadas, tanques soviéticos, aviones MiG 21 y raciones de comidas que venían de Alemania Oriental. Esta serie de notas cuenta en detalle esa invasión y abre los ojos sobre las tácticas y estrategias del mundo comunista hacia África. Conviene, cuando se lea este artículo, no olvidar que sólo nos separa de ese continente un océano.

MOSS: LA INFORMACIÓN MENOS CONOCIDA

Hace pocos meses visitó la Argentina, concedió entrevistas, habló de política. Es periodista y su nombre está ligado a una temática intrincada. Es que no siempre los temas de la política internacional son lo suficientemente claros. O se los conoce parcialmente. La claridad es, precisamente, una de las virtudes de Moss, algo que habitualmente demuestra como editor de "Foreign Report", un semanario confidencial londinense. Su libro "El colapso de la democracia" está a punto de aparecer en Buenos Aires.
GANÉ!

JUGANDO AL PRODE

TRAIGAME CENITAS CON SALSA GOLF, POLO A LOS SIETE PERFUMES, FRUTILLAS VENDÔME Y VINO FRANCES.

GASTANDOLA EN RESTAURANTES

¿Qué número va a salir la Grande?

PAGANDO CONSULTAS A ADIVINAS
GANÉ!

JUGANDO AL PRODE

TRAIGAME CENITOLLA CON SALSA GOLF, POLLO A LOS SIETE PÉRFUMES, FRUTILES Y VINO FRANCÉS

GASTANDOLA EN RESTAURANTES

¿QUE NÚMERO VA A SALIR LA GRANDE?

PAGANDO CONSULTAS A ADIVINAS
Two articles appearing on Cuba's involvement in Angola. First in a series to be published in "Gente" concerning Castro's venture in Africa.
FIDEL CASTRO'S SECRET WAR

By Robert Moss

This is the history of an invasion, an incident in Angola, which we must be aware of and which also has something to do with Argentina.

Angola used to be a Portuguese colony in Africa. Angola is rich in gold and diamonds. When it began to fight for its independence, Fidel Castro decided to launch an African adventure with the decisive support of the Soviet Union. The war was in the form of men and arms. In Angola, more than 13,000 Cuban soldiers established a communist regime, with sophisticated weapons, Soviet tanks, MiG-21 aircraft, and rations coming from East Germany. This series of reports recounts this invasion in detail and is an eye-opener on the tactics and strategies employed by the communist camp in dealing with Africa. When reading this article, you must not forget that only an ocean separates us from that continent.

Moss--The Least-Known Facts

A few months ago, he visited Argentina, gave interviews, and talked about politics. He is a newsman and his name is linked to a rather intricate theme. The topics of international policy are not always sufficiently clear—or they are known only partly. Clarity is precisely one of the virtues of Moss, something which he habitually demonstrates as editor of "Foreign Report," a London confidential weekly. His book "The Collapse of Democracy" is about to come out in Buenos Aires.

In the morning of 7 October 1975, a company of cookies from the anti-Soviet movement UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], headed by Jonas Savimbi, happened to be moving west in the central region of Angola. It belonged to one of the three guerrilla movements which had agreed to share the government in Angola as soon as it became independent from Portugal—something which had indeed occurred a month earlier. Its mission was to intercept a column of the pro-Soviet MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] which was advancing on Nova Lisboa, Angola's second-largest city.

The UNITA column had left its base at Silva Porto with two old Panhard weapons carriers (a gift from President Mobutu of Zaire) but one of them had broken down on the way. The rest of the unit's armament was not at all impressive: three jeeps with AT missile launchers, two 106-mm recoilless guns, and four Browning cal.50 machineguns. That was virtually the entire arsenal of UNITA.

The column included 14 South African infantry instructors who were acting as advisors, commanded by a major. They were professionals who had volunteered to help UNITA in what until then had been a constant series of defeats at the hands of superior forces armed by the Soviets. They were wearing UNITA uniforms.

About 4.5 miles from the town of Norton de Matos, the small column came to a bridge. The scouts reported that the area was free of enemy.
but immediately an observation aircraft appeared overhead and a soldier
going to fire away at it. That unleashed a hurricane of fire. From the
hills on the other side of the river, the hidden forces of the NPLA hit
the company with recoilless guns, light artillery and mortars, while
five Soviet-made T-34 tanks with Cuban crews began to advance.

The South African major's jeep was hit by an AT projectile from one
of the tanks but was not damaged. The young UNITA soldiers—who had
gotten only two weeks of training for guerrilla warfare—scattered with-
out knowing what to do. But the only armored car of UNITA, commanded by
a South African 2nd lieutenant, advanced and managed to hit one of the
enemy tanks with a 90-mm shell. The tank burst into flames. The same
thing happened to another one that was hit by a 106-mm shell. After that,
the other three tanks withdrew.

While the MPLA mortars maintained heavy fire, the South Africans
fired six AT missiles blindly at the enemy's hidden positions. Later on,
a UNITA patrol claimed to have counted 116 dead MPLA soldiers. The South
Africans suffered no losses.

This skirmish in an obscure corner of Central Angola (so far not re-
ported) was the first armed clash between the Cubans and the South Afri-
cans, the prelude to a war in which one of the most blatant expansionist
attempts of the Soviets and their satellites turned out successful, not
due to victory in battle but due to the political mistakes made—in my
judgment—by the United States in this case.

The communist invasion of Angola is one of the most decisive and
one of the most somber events of the period which began in 1965. It is
the story of how more than 15,000 soldiers from the sugar republic in the
Caribbean were brought 6,000 miles across the Atlantic to serve as the
colonial troops of the Soviet Empire. And it is the tale of how a pro-
communist government in Lisbon and a number of Third World governments
facilitated the path of invasion.

It also the story of how the South Africans—supposedly isolated
from the international community—were persuaded, by the moderate black
leaders of some African countries, to send troops to Angola in order to
tepel communist intervention.

At the end of a veritable lightning offensive, the South Africans
were about to assure total military victory for the anticommunist move-
ments in Angola. Why that victory did not materialize is an even more
complex story.

In an era of televised battles, of events following each other in
rapid succession, with instant replay, the war in Angola was notably se-
cret and the truth of what happened there is only now beginning to come
to light gradually. The Cubans published their version in a very ex-
tensive article published by the Colombian novelist Gabriel Garcia
Marquez in the Mexican magazine "Progreso." Although very rich in detail,
his narration is full of distortions and inaccuracies.
For example, Geraldo Marques declared that the decision to send Cuban soldiers to Angola was made on 3 November 1975. But the Cuban troops had been on the battlefield several months earlier. In his article, he gives the impression that the Cubans "wrote" to triumph south during the first months of 1976 but he does not mention the fact that it took them more than 2 months to occupy the territory which the South Africans had abandoned after making the political decision to withdraw.

"A Rough Tiger With Its Wild Cubs"

This was a war of camouflage. Both the Cubans and the South Africans were in Angola wearing civilian clothes or other uniforms. The Cuban volunteers (like the three prisoners who were taken to South Africa to be hospitalized) had come to Angola, convinced that they were going to work on engineering projects or that they were going to take courses in the USSR. The first South African instructors of CNITA were ordered to talk only English and to pass themselves off as Englishmen.

I am not going to try to describe the secret war in Angola down to the very last detail but this story (supported by authoritative sources in various noncommunist countries) will present many, many details which so far are unknown. First of all, the communist invasion of Angola as such and how it took place; then, the course of the war, including the battle for Luanda, the capital.

The Soviets were profoundly involved in Angola from the start of the sixties. In 1956, the rigidly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party helped establish the MPLA in which Dr. Agostinho Neto rose as the dominant figure; he is a mulatto who had participated in the formation of communist underground organization while he was a student in Oporto. Around 1960, the MPLA established its first contacts with the Cubans who at that time helped in setting up a training camp for the African guerrilla fighters in Dolisie, Congo-Brazzaville. A group of MPLA cadres also received training in Cuba during that same period of time.

In 1964, the Portuguese communist leader Alvaro Cunhal organized a meeting between Agostinho Neto and Soviet leaders in Moscow. That was the start of an ambitious Soviet aid project. Weapons and rations began to arrive from the socialist countries in Dar-es-Salaam from where they were trucked to Angola via Zambia. Soon, Soviet merchant vessels became a familiar sight in the waters of Tanzania; they were loaded with small arms. AK-47 rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, and mortars. The Soviets also began to send a money subsidy which varied between $150,000 and $300,000 per year.

Most important perhaps was the fact that the Soviets began to receive a regular contingent of MPLA members to be trained at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (as political cadres), in the military camp at Sinforopol, in the Ukraine (as NCOs and EM), and in the Frunze Military Academy (for officers). One of the Frunze graduates was Leo Carreira who, as minister of defense, was to play a decisive part in the secret conversations which led to the Cuban invasion of Angola.
Soviet aid to the MPLA declined between 1972 and 1974, apparently as a consequence of the poor results obtained in the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese. However, there was a notable revival of interest in the activities of the MPLA shortly after the coup which took place in Lisbon on 25 April 1974; it opened the doors wide for the decolonization of Portuguese Africa. Since the Portuguese Communists had an interest to do with that coup, the Soviets had precise information almost 2 months in advance.

But for the Soviets the key strategic objective was not Portugal; instead, it was its African possessions, especially Angola, which is rich in petroleum, diamonds, and other minerals and which is in a decisive geopolitical location. Sources in UNITA say that the Soviets had already signed a secret accord with Nito in 1969 in which they guaranteed continuing support in exchange for the promise that, if the MPLA were to be victorious, it would permit the establishment of Soviet naval bases in Angola.

The Portuguese announced their decolonizing plans in August 1974. During the second half of that year, the Soviets sent arms to the MPLA via Dar-es-Salaam, worth 56 million. They also opened another route for the shipment of supplies via Congo-Brazzaville. The arms were taken by boat to the Congolese port of Pointe Noire and then to the north of Cabinda by truck; they also arrived by plane at the Nova Nova base in the outskirts of Brazzaville from where they were taken to Angola in small boats from which they were unloaded along the desolate sections of the coast in the Northwest, or in light aircraft.

At that moment, the Portuguese high commissioner in Angola was Admiral Rosa Coutinho, the "Red Admiral," notorious for his hostility with the MPLA. According to sources in the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), Rosa Coutinho's hostility toward the movement and its leader, Holden Roberto, sprang from the way in which he was humiliated when, as a young colonial official, he was assigned to Santo Antonio de Zaire; he was taken prisoner at that time by the FNLA and was kept in a jail in Kinshasa for half a year. Holden Roberto is the brother-in-law of President Mobutu of Zaire (the former in Congo).

Rocket Launchers for the MPLA

Regardless of what the explanation may be, Rosa Coutinho did nothing to disturb the shipment of arms from the Soviet Bloc to the MPLA after he was appointed high commissioner in 1974. His successor, Air Force General Silva Cardoso was less partial. In April 1975, he stopped a Yugoslav vessel and prevented it from unloading arms in Luanda although the flow of weapons continued through the use of fishing boats and Soviet-made landing craft.

To General Silva Cardoso (who was abruptly transferred in July 1975 under the pretexts of "physical and psychological exhaustion") fell the task of governing during the period which brought the disintegration of the political formula that had been agreed upon for
the future of Angola at the Alvor Conference in Portugal; the agreement was signed by the three guerrilla movements in January 1973. The three sides agreed to share a provisional government which would prepare for the elections to be held on 30 October and which would declare independence on 11 November. Each side pledged to contribute 8,000 men to establish a national armed force.

But the MPLA and its supporters on the outside had not the slightest intention of sharing power and even less so of permitting a general election in which the UNITA—with a strong base among the Ovimbundu, the numerically strongest ethnic group in Angola—would certainly have won a majority. Between April and August 1973, arms from the Soviet Bloc penetrated through the ports of Luanda, Dar-es-Salaam, and Pointe Noire. Big shipments from the USSR also arrived by air in Brazzaville.

The MPLA was equipped for conventional warfare with rocket launchers, T-54 and T-34 tanks, and field artillery. By contrast, the UNITA and the FNLA only had small arms.

Although arms shipments were important, they would not have done too much good if the members of the MPLA did not know how to use them. In December 1974, a large contingent of MPLA officers went to the USSR for military training. Early in 1975, an extremely important decision was made: Cuban instructors were to be dispatched to Angola.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of Cuba in charge of foreign relations, publicly admitted (in a speech delivered in December 1975) that there were 230 Cuban military instructors with the MPLA in April of that year. Some had been transferred around that time to Ft. Massangano. On 25 July, another 30 Cubans arrived by air in Brazzaville to help assemble the weapons stored at Pointe Noire.

The Portuguese leftists officers, who had visited Havana in July, had pledged (according to Garcia Marquez) to guarantee the formal Portuguese blessing for Cuban aid to the MPLA. In August, the MPLA defense minister, Iko Carreira, visited Moscow and asked for the dispatch of Soviet troops to assist the MPLA. The Soviets decidedly rejected the request, undoubtedly afraid of United States intervention; but they did suggest to Carreira that he present the same request to the Cubans. Shortly thereafter, Carreira met with three high-ranking Cuban advisors in Luanda; after that it was their job to convince Castro.

In spite of Cuban commitments in other parts of Africa, in the Middle East, and in the Caribbean, some reputable Western sources think that Castro was not too enthusiastic right away about the idea of this new ideological venture. His greatest fear was the possible reaction by the United States, perhaps in the form of direct action or through a blockade against Cuba. The Island's poor economic situation and the rather slim military budget ($300 million per year) could have been other reasons for his rather cool attitude. The Soviets however made it quite clear that they "would pay the bills" and it is also said that
they secretly promised their direct participation if the Americans should intervene.

Simultaneously, a series of African governments—Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Mozambique, Congo-Brazzaville, and Algeria—put pressure on Castro to dispatch troops.

First Cuban Move

Western espionage sources believe that Castro had already decided fully to intervene in Angola even before Oscar Oruana, one of the Cuban advisors who had been in Luanda, met with him in Havana to warn him about possible South African intervention. South Africa had continued to maintain secret relations with UNITA and FNLA and one could not rule out the possibility of its active participation in support of those two organizations.

At any rate, the course of events during the following weeks demonstrates the fact that the Cuban troops went into action in Angola long before 5 November (the date given by Garcia Marquez). The Cuban troops engaged in combat in Angola two months before the South Africans did.

On 16 August, 200 additional Cuban instructors arrived in Luanda, where the MPLA completely dominated the situation. According to UNITA sources, some of the Cubans were transferred to Lobito and Benguela, in the South, where they set up a training camp and a supply base. During the heavy fighting against the MPLA over control of Lobito—a traditional stronghold of UNITA, during that same month—it is said that there were "white-skinned, Spanish-speaking men" fighting side by side with the guerrillas of the MPLA. In September, the FNLA found the corpses of two Cubans in the remnants of an armored vehicle on the northern front.

Toward the end of September, the Cubans began to arrive at a faster rate. The same is true of the shipment of weapons; Congo-Brazzaville was the principal transit station. President Marien Ngouabi returned the favor which had been offered him when he visited Cuba a short time ago. Castro promised his expensive military aid, including six Soviet-made patrol boats (Zaire only has two), MiG fighters, and military training for his troops.

Pilots for Soviet Fighter Planes

The war material was unloaded, stored, and transshipped at Pointe-Noire. On 23 September, the Cuban vessel "Vietnam Heroico" brought 20 armored vehicles, 30 heavy trucks, and 120 Cuban soldiers to that port. On 5 October, 350 men debarked from another Cuban vessel and were airlifted to the Northern Front.

Afterward, the vessel "La Playa de La Habana" brought 500 men on 12 October while another 270 Cubans, including pilots, had arrived in
Brazzaville by air. On 14 October, a delegation from the Cuban Communist Party arrived in Brazzaville and assured the MPLA leaders that their country would provide the pilots necessary to fly the Mig-17 and 21 planes sent by the USSR.

On 16 October, Soviet aircraft brought 800 Cuban soldiers to Brazzaville. This Soviet flight and the following ones employed the transit permit which had been given for the air spaces of Algeria and Guinea-Conakry. Between 18 and 19 October, 500 Cuban soldiers, who had arrived in the vessel "La Playa de La Habana," were airlifted to Angola in Soviet aircraft. On 20 October, another 750 Cubans arrived at Novo Redondo, south of Luanda, using coastal vessels. On the 26th of that month, 160 Cuban soldiers arrived at Maya-Maya and immediately continued on to Angola.

As Castro's men continued to arrive, the quantity and quality of Soviet war materiel unloaded at Pointe Noire increased spectacularly. Mig-21 fighters, without their armament (which was installed in Congo-Brazzaville), tanks, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, and small arms. Many of these arms were moved to arsenals located in the interior of Angola, in Porto Amboim and Quilama, ready for use by the Cubans the moment they arrived.

Toward 11 November, Angola's Independence Day, there were around 4,000 Cuban soldiers in that country. About 2,500 were in Luanda and on the Quifangondo Front where their presence made it possible for the MPLA to beat back the advance of the FNLA toward the capital. It therefore makes no sense to say that Cuba's decision to send major combat units was made early in November, after South African intervention.

During the 2 months following independence, the strength of the Cuban forces in Angola was increased to a total of 15,000 men. Some belonged to special infantry units of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (the equivalent of the special forces of the Soviet KGB [State Security Committee], experts in internal repression); but the majority were "volunteers" drawn from the ranks of the reserves who were offered big pay to make the trip. None of them were told that they were going to war.

Sergente Ezequiel Musteller, a peasant from the Cuban Province of Oriente, 23 years old, captured by the South Africans in the area of Carianga on 10 December, said that he had gone to Angola, convinced that he was to participate in an aid mission to build schools.

Carlos Haru Meya and Roberto Morales Bellma, captured on 12 December, said that they believed that they were going to be taken to the USSR for a political education course.

The Barbados Connection

How did the Cuban troop transports get to Angola? The resupply airport preferred by the Ilyushin and Britannia aircraft, which took off from Jose Marti Airport between October and December 1975, was Seawell, on Barbados. Security was rather perfunctory, the airport
was far from the capital, Bridgetown, and few people seemed to notice
the nightly flights during the first few weeks. Barbados is one of the
few places in the Caribbean where customs are very liberal and where
officials have the habit of closing their eyes to all kinds of abnormal
activities.

It is not known for certain whether the government in Bridgetown
gave the green light. But Errol Barrow, a that time prime minister,
said in an interview with the London daily "the Sunday Telegraph" that
there must have been about 50 flights which stopped over there before
pressure caused them to protest with the Cubans on 17 December. Other
observers say that, at the height of the airlift, there were between
ten and 15 flights per week and up to five in a single night. It is im-
possible to think that Barrow's Government was unaware of the movements
of these mysterious aircraft.

Barrow told "The Sunday Telegraph" that he was not familiar with
the real nature of the Cuban flights and insisted that the Cubans at no
time even tried to ask him for permission to use his country as a stop-
over in their air operation.

What seems to be beyond discussion is the fact that each aircraft
carried around 100 men, wearing civilian clothes but carrying arms in
their suitcases. The cargo spaces of the aircraft were filled with
small arms, light artillery, and mortars.

When the Barbados connection was cut, the Cubans asked prime minis-
ter Eric Williams of Trinidad for assistance. But he refused, maintaining
that he was not prepared to support foreign intervention in Angola. The
Cubans however found other friendly countries.

The Portuguese played a decisive role in helping the Cubans at the
end of 1975. The Britannia 31 aircraft of the Cuban Airline Company
were refueled at the air base on the island of Santa Maria de las
Azores. As on Barbados, the aircraft landed at night, with their lights
shut off, and without declaring their cargo. The passengers did not
get off.

But Portuguese military intelligence officers established that the
flight originating in Havana on 20 December brought 94 passengers to
Guinea-Bissau. During the following four flights, 250 passengers were
recorded.

The tremendous logistic effort which was mounted to bring the Cu-
bans and their weapons to Angola went almost undetected at that moment
and Western intelligence services were quite slop in discovering the
facts and circumstances. The Cubans however had some trouble: several
coastal vessels, which they used to move men and arms from the Congo
to the northern part of Angola, were victims of Sabotage. Two of them
were blown up by Portuguese agents connected with the French [intelli-
gence] services and at least three others were wiped out by South Afri-
can commandos.

- 8 -
What was life like on the front for a young Cuban, around 22 or 23, who began his military service at 16 and who had a job in a textile mill or who was a peasant in his home country? We can get some information on that through the diary of a soldier assigned to a place near Quibala, the scene of the biggest battles in December 1975.

He left Havana in a "big plane" on 4 December (one day after Castro, according to his apologists, had ordered the intervention) and the trip took 28 hours. "They did not allow us to bring documents or any other identifying items along," he noted in his diary, "but everybody knows that there are Cubans in Angola."

One of the things which impressed him most of all was "an enormous quantity of arms and ammunition stored for the invading force. I was fascinated to see all those weapons around which did not belong to anybody. The amount of money wasted in the war is incredible." In contrast to many of his buddies, it seems that he was a Catholic because he was disguised when, in a small church abandoned by the Portuguese, he found "a stack of English-language magazines with photos of nude women."

One or two weeks after his arrival, he complained about the poor combat efficiency of his allies in the MPLA. On 21 November he wrote that "this morning, two armored vehicles and one truck were attacked by surprise and destroyed while we were on patrol. Those Angolans are very careless."

Just two days later he complained that the Angolans did not want to dig foxholes during the night in spite of the fact that enemy guns were in position very close by. On the following day, the Cuban forces suffered heavy losses: "38 dead, hundreds taken prisoner, eight armored vehicles destroyed, and many wounded."

As the campaign progressed, rations, hygiene, and rumors on the ferocity and savagery of the enemy became the main sources of concern. "Over the past several days, we have not had enough to eat but, thank God, there is much cattle about here." Since UNITA controlled the richest land during the campaign, the members of the MPLA and their Cuban allies very often went hungry even though the Cubans received sufficient rations by air, which was a factor of irritation to their African "comrades."

Like any front line soldier, the Cuban was soon preoccupied with hygiene. On 1 December he wrote that, while resting, he had killed "52 lice; I counted them because they were real beasts and, boy, did they bite!" At that point he had managed to find a young black woman who made coffee for him.

This was a war where there were very few conveniences and comforts for the men, except the occasional discovery of some Angolan wine left behind by the Portuguese settlers after their departure from Angola. The Cubans, both officers and men, had only one luxury: they received a weekly ration of cigars and cigarettes from their homeland.
The Cubans took some heavy blows. In the battle for Bridge No. 14, in the area north of Santa Comba, on 9 December, they lost 90 men. In a battle near Quibala, on 14 December, another 50 were killed in action. Badly wounded Cuban soldiers were moved to the CDP—apparently in order not to demoralize the Cuban people. The soldiers told stories about refrigerator vessels which carried the corpses of dead Cubans.

The wartime performance of the Cubans in Angola did little to help create a myth of Vietcong-style invincibility, at least among those who really know how to fight. Neither propaganda about "revolutionary solidarity," nor Castro's efforts to demonstrate the existence of affinity between the Cuban and Angolan peoples ("African blood runs through our veins") were sufficient to eliminate friction between the expeditionary force and the people whom it was supposed to be helping. Cuban prisoners were very explicit in their opinions on their African allies.

It was quite common to hear them complain that the men of the MPLA were poorly trained from the military viewpoint and that they were nothing but "a bunch of cowards." On the other hand, MPLA prisoners said that the Cubans were "racists" who insisted on getting privileges denied the African troops. Besides, they would kill any black soldier who tried to withdraw even though his officers had already fled. Such tensions persist. Early in January of this year, there were reports to the effect that ten Cubans were killed by MPLA men in a barracks in the south of Angola. Castro's African safari did not end in Angola. He said so very clearly in his 26 July 1975 speech when he remarked: "The Cuban military units and the necessary weapons will remain in Angola.... This will continue as long as necessary.... And the Cuban soldiers will again fight side by side with the Angolan people." In Rhodesia? In Southwest Africa? in South Africa, the main target of communist aggression on the African Continent?

A tremendous effort is being made at this moment—through newspapers, books, and motion pictures—to depict the Cuban troops in Angola as heroic conquerors, inspired by love of their cause, before whom the enemy's lines open up like the waters of the Red Sea.

The truth was somewhat different. The Cubans outnumbered the South African forces by 10:1. Thanks to Soviet generosity, the pro-Moscow forces outnumbered their enemies at the same ratio in terms of armament and they also had Mig aircraft. All in all, the Cubans "won" only in the sense that the South Africans were politically forced to withdraw while the anticomunist guerrillas continue to fight.

But this was a victory at any rate. It teaches us that, in the great worldwide conflict, in which Angola was just one battle, victory or defeat will depend exclusively on political determination.
Cuban instructors. First, just a few instructors came in the distant African country, they began to train the leaders of the political movement called FPLR. They were supplied with arms. Then more Cubans came. About 15,000. According to the article written by the English newspaper on the basis of his investigation.
Evidence:
A projectile of Soviet origin on Ampelan soil.

New weapons, quite luxurious, recently arrived from the communist countries.
A Cuban female instructor parading with Angolan troops. Earrings, finger rings, and bracelets indicate some coquettishness on her part. Except for the instructors, the other Cubans dispatched to Africa did not know that their ultimate mission would be to fight.
These irregulars belong to the MPLA troops and the photo was taken in the region of Barra do Dande, when these troops were supported by Cubans who were occupying the Angolan territory given up by UNITA and FNLA.
Washed along its coastline by the Atlantic, Angola is an old target of countries in the communist area. Those countries mounted a powerful operation to turn it into another satellite. The forces involved were disproportionately strong.

Legend: 1—Cuban troops airlifted via Azores, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola; 2—Cuban troops airlifted via Algeria or Conakry to Brazzaville and then by land to Angola; 3—Cuban troops airlifted via Barbados to Luanda and Brazzaville; 4—troops, arms, and vehicles shipped from Cuba to Congo-Brazzaville and then airlifted to Angola; 5—Soviet supplies brought in by ship to Congo-Brazzaville and then Angola; 6—Soviet arms by boat to Dar-es-Salaam and then by air to Angola.
A submachinegun and guts; an Angolan boy and a Cuban driver—something difficult to explain; direct invasion of a distant country.
A document in itself: a Soviet T-54 tank smack in the middle of a street in Luanda, the capital of Angola. Undisguised support.
FIDEL CASTRO’S SECRET WAR

This is the history of an invasion, of intervention in an African country. It happened in Angola: 15,000 Cuban soldiers, plus weapons, tanks, and Soviet aircraft were used to establish a communist regime in Angola. In the first installment, the English newspaper Robert Moss reported on the arrival of men and supplies in the former Portuguese Colony. To this documentary report we now add the story of the South African counteraffensive and the actions of the anticommunist groups of Angola’s UNITA and FNLA. In reading this article, we must not forget that there is only an ocean separating us from the continent where this Cuban adventure took place. Food for thought.

By Robert Moss.

Abbreviations and Their Meaning

UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. This fraction fought side by side with the FNLA through an alliance. We can consider them to be the anticommunist front. They fought against the procommunist MPLA.

FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola, allied with UNITA. Both groups received South African advisors and reinforcements.

MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, procommunist. Received Soviet weapons and 15,000 Cuban soldiers.

The communist invasion of Angola was a challenge to the Western world. Will anybody accept it? Or could the Cuban troops and the Soviet forces, by any chance, set up a Marxist movement only with a minority in order to impose dictatorship by force of arms?

This prospect is far from pleasing to the majority of the countries in "New Africa." The moderate or pro-Western leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Mobutu of Zaire, or Senghor of Senegal, in no way whatsoever wanted to see a new Soviet pawn established in Angola.

Zambia and Zaire—both of whom depend on the Benguela Railroad—were afraid that the communists would then exert economic pressure in order to force them to change their policies. Angola became a base for subversion against neighboring states.

Angola's mineral wealth (especially in diamonds, iron mineral, and petroleum at Cabinda) and its strategic position turned it into a center of vital interest for the Western governments. But interest in Angola is much more profound. It is a place where the Russians managed to test United States capabilities after Vietnam. Before the end of the conflict, the majority of Western governments—United States, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Israel—had aided the anti-Soviet forces in Angola. But that was not enough. South Africa had to shoulder the heaviest burden.
by dispatching instructors, advisors, and an armed column in a desperate attempt to diminish the disparity with respect to the black nationalists who were supported by Russia.

The South African Battle

Nobody expressed appreciation for South Africa's struggle against the Cuban troops and the major forces in Africa. South Africa however did earn the appreciation of the United Nations Security Council months after it had withdrawn its troops. South African Defense Minister Botha, in a speech to Parliament, pointed out that his country was a part of Africa, in contrast to Cuba, and therefore had some right to show its interest in events taking place beyond its borders. Then he added: "We are an African State and if we want to maintain our self-respect, we cannot shirk our responsibility as an African State, situated in this strategic location, on the world's most important sealane."

But the key fact concerning South Africa's intervention in Angola turned up in a manner which neither Botha, nor any other official in Pretoria, the capital of South Africa, had been prepared to deal with. The South Africans entered Angola with the blessings of many Western governments and many governments of New Africa and upon the urgent invitation of the black nationalist movements in Angola.

UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi flew to Pretoria at a critical moment during the war to ask Mr. Vorster to keep the troops there. The South Africans also participated in this war after they had been encouraged by Henry Kissinger who offered them American guarantees which in the end did not materialize.

Among the black leaders, Kenneth Kaunda was the boldest and the most blunt in his statements. In 1976, he warned that there was no reason to believe that the Russians would behave in Angola any different from the way they behaved in Czechoslovakia. He said: "So long as we continue to condemn the South African presence in Angola—if by that we think that we are placing things in their proper context—we will in effect be only fooling ourselves."

"How were the South Africans drawn into a black civil war? The story begins in March 1975, when an old South African Intelligence Service officer met with Jonas Savimbi in a European capital. During a meeting in Lusaka, Savimbi asked for money and small arms so that his movement could contribute to the united black army which was in action, thus helping to establish a military balance which would force the pro-Soviet FNLA to carry out the elections.

Like other Western governments, the South Africans were worried over the disputes existing between UNITA and its rivals in the FNLA, the third black faction in Angola; this is why they insisted that Savimbi establish a formal alliance with its leader, Holden Roberto. Savimbi displayed a certain reluctance toward this proposal, complaining of plunder and "anti-white" attitudes among the FNLA leaders. The South Africans rejected his request and suspended contact with Savimbi for several months.
Holden Roberto had also contacted the South Africans through Portuguese intermediaries. Their first meeting with Roberto took place in Kinshasa. On the basis of Roberto Holden's desire to build an alliance with Savimbi, the South Africans agreed to let the FNLA have a shipment of second-hand rifles, shotguns, and mortars which they did receive in August.

A third meeting was held toward the end of August on the territory occupied by UNITA within Angola; it was attended by a former general of the South African Army who agreed to provide instructors. Two training camps were set up, one for UNITA in Calombo, south of Silva Porto, and another one for the FNLA, in Mapupa, in the southern part of Angola.

A platoon of South African soldiers have already been dispatched to Angola, to the hydroelectric complex of Calqueque on the Cunene River on 9 August; but that was merely a defensive move to protect the dam and the hydroelectric complex, which supplied energy to the towns in the south of Angola, against plunder. The South Africans declared that their intervention here had the tacit approval of the Portuguese.

South Africa's entry on the battlefield and the armed offensive, called "Operation Zulu," now began.

The army had received instructions to assist the forces of Savimbi and Roberto for the purpose of controlling the areas in the south and center of Angola, where they had ethnic support, and above all to help UNITA to hold on to its capital, Nova Lisboa, which was threatened by the Cuban forces and the MPLA. The hope was that, if the anti-Soviet forces were to find themselves in a solid position on 11 December, that is to say, Independence Day, the MPLA and its followers would find themselves forced to deal with them and to abandon their plan of conquest.

The surprising victory of the small South African column in Angola offered a possibility for something more: a military victory over the communists. But the opportunity was missed.

Relations with the South Africans were not easy in the beginning, even for a seasoned leader and politician such as Jonas Savimbi. He had been fighting against the Portuguese for many years but now he had to deal with a country whose policy of apartheid was the target of hatred and resentment on the part of black nationalists. Then he found a friend and confidant in the young and blond major who arrived at Silva Porto on 21 September 1975.

The South African was not a recent arrival in Angola; he had served as military advisor with the South African Embassy in Luanda between 1970 and 1973 and he spoke fluent Portuguese. He was an intellectual soldier who had written a doctoral thesis on counterinsurgency at the Defense College in Pretoria.

The ice was soon broken and Savimbi and his men began to talk to the South African Major Kass (which means cheese) because he came from a German family; Kass called Savimbi "doctor" or simply "Doc."
The Major arrived with a team of 18 infantry instructors who soon were called "brothers" at the UNITA camps. They had to train the UNITA troops and help them establish a strong position in Central Africa. The South African team arrived at the moment when the pro-Soviet forces had seized control in Angola's most important cities, with the exception of Nova Lisboa, Silva Porto, Carmona, and Serpa Pinto. The communists held the key ports and were penetrating into the tribal areas of the Ovimbundu which had always been controlled by the UNITA.

Major Kaas (sic) was in charge of the UNITA recruits who were between the ages of 14 and 20. He gave a 2-week training course, working night and day.

Barrier in Nova Lisboa

The crucial mission of the South African advisors assigned to Savimbi was to stop the advance of the communists on Nova Lisboa along one of the three main routes: from Luanda to the north and from Benguela and Lobito to the west. One UNITA column, under the command of Savimbi, left on 4 October to stop a communist advance from the west and clashed with the Cubans and the MPLA 3 days later.

During the battle, the UNITA forces established defensive positions west of Nova Lisboa and Major Kaas asked for immediate reinforcement by radio. He received a squadron of 22 armored cars which were transported to Silva Porto. The idea of attacking north of the Cuanza River with this new force was tempting but orders were to stay in position. One afternoon in October, Major Chindondo, the UNITA personnel chief, arrived excitedly at the camp, alerting everybody to the fact that the enemy was advancing toward Nova Lisboa from the north, establishing himself in the area of Quibala.

Major Kaas assembled his armored cars and the UNITA battalion in a column called FOXBAT; it was then, on 7 November, that the UNITA destroyed one of their biggest outfits (sic). The MPLA advance was led by a Cuban officer (with two red stars on his blouse), driving a black Citroen. A South African soldier fired a 105-mm rifle at the vehicle, instantly killing the officer. The FOXBAT column held a line of approximately 30 km which was to hold out until Independence Day. The policy was for the South Africans not to move any further into UNITA territory and to be prepared to withdraw on 11 November.

On 14 October, however, another South African column moved to the border between Southwest Africa and Angola. The code name given to that operation was OPERATION ZULU which apparently confused the Cubans. There were more South African blacks than whites in the column but there were no Zulus.

The officer in command was a South African colonel from Cape Province, a graduate of the Saltend Bay Military Academy, who had volunteered to serve in Angola. His comrades called him "Rommel" because of the extraordinary speed with which his columns advanced.
At 0930 on 9 October he was informed that he was to leave Pretoria and move to the operations base at Runtu on the border with Angola. At Runtu he found that his force consisted of two battalions: one battalion recruited mainly from the Caprivi strip, including Bushmen who had already fought under former Portuguese officers; and one black battalion from the FNLA, numbering 1,000 men, divided into three companies under the command of Major Businha.

The FNLA men were followers of Daniel Chipenda, a guerrilla leader whose headquarters was in Serpa Pinto. Chipenda had broken away from the MPLA the year before so that his new allies did not yet have full confidence in him. His men had been trained by South African instructors in Mapupa. Two of the FNLA companies had gotten one month of training and the other one had only had 4 days of training; it ran into so much trouble that it had to turn back.

"Rommel" only had six South African officers and a few other men to help him command his forces. From the very beginning, he had trouble with the language. Half of the bushmen spoke Portuguese and the other half, recruited in the southwestern part of Africa, spoke Afrikaans.

"Rommel" had gotten orders to seize the important centers along the coast prior to 11 November, Independence Day, where ethnic support for the UNITA and the FNLA was strongest. He had to explain to the civilians in the towns that this was a FNLA/UNITA column; some Portuguese inhabitants mistakenly believed that they had come to restore the old regime.

When the column crossed the border at Cuangar on 14 October, it included only civilian vehicles—trucks, private cars, and a few Land Rovers. The first target was the city of Pereira d'Eca which had changed hands many times. The column did not encounter much resistance from the MPLA troops who were along the road (and they did not have many problems either with the UNITA forces which had not yet been notified of OPERATION ZULU). The defenders simply went into hiding when they arrived at the city.

That became the "style" for most of the campaign. The MPLA soldiers used to wear civilian clothing under their uniforms so that, after they had been driven out of their position, they could throw their rifles away, take off their uniforms, and mingle with the civilian population.

The column occupied Pereira d'Eca so fast that the MPLA troops, who were in the outskirts of the city, did not have time to learn of the capture of Pereira d'Eca by their adversaries. Major Businha was celebrating the victory in a local bar when two MPLA soldiers appeared. He turned to them and looked them over; then he saluted them with two fingers pointing up (the MPLA salute). When they responded with the same sign, the major whipped out his weapon and killed both of them. The situation in Pereira d'Eca gives us an idea of what the South Africans were going to encounter in most of the big towns which had been
destroyed by a black civil war. Many buildings had been sacked and the shops and stores had been cleaned out. The local UNITA forces were brought in to restore basic services.

Rommel Advances

Two days later, the reinforced column, now commanded from a Land Rover with a rifle [sic] mounted on the roof, took over the City of Joao de Almeida. It was better defended because the MPLA had used it as a major war material base. Large quantities of rations were captured, along with war material and propaganda material. Now the road was free for the attack on Sa da Bandeira, the capital of Huila, which still contained a considerable number of whites. "Rommel's" main concern now was that the MPLA forces would endanger the civilians in the city but the defenses were concentrated in the outskirts, such as at Monte Cristo Rei (so called because of the huge stature of Christ located on its summit).

The Zulu forces were approaching the airport, primarily, since the column was basically supplied by air. Then they sent troops to Monte Cristo Rei by sea during the night of 24 October. They found that the MPLA forces had withdrawn with their war material. This again was typical of the campaign; as the Zulu troops moved north, the other side entered an area in which it was stronger.

With the troops in the armored cars and half a platoon with 81-mm mortars, the South Africans chose Mocamedes, the major port in the South, as their first target. On the way, the troops clashed with soldiers who fired several 122-mm tube-shaped [sic] projectiles; this is an easily handled, light weapon capable of being fired from almost any vehicle.

It was during these skirmishes in the outskirts of Mocamedes that the column also ran into RPG-7 projectiles used as a means of psychological warfare. These projectiles had a range of about 600 meters and a self-destruct mechanism. Fired from high altitude, they would explode in the air with a tremendous bang, producing a big black cloud, completely harmless, because there were no fragments in the shell, but certainly demoralizing to the black soldiers who simply refused to believe that those projectiles were not dangerous.

The battle outside Mocamedes would have turned out rather badly for the Zulu column if the enemy had fired more powerful mortars. But the column managed to continue on, capturing a new weapon (82-mm rifles) made by the Russians; it also occupied the Bay of Mocamedes on 27 October.

While the local UNITA forces established control in Mocamedes, the column returned to Sa da Bandeira in order to regroups for the main attack in the North. Information had been received to the effect that the MPLA was moving south from its positions in Benguela and Lobito, one of the objectives for the South African operation since it was the country's second-largest port and its biggest railroad center.

The rainy season began at that time, rivers flooded and the lowlands to the north were turned into swamps. From then on, the campaign
centered around bridges and river crossings. Control of all of the all-weather roads became the key for victory or defeat.

On the road from Sa da Bandeira to Benguela, the Zulu column ran into a series of well-equipped positions of the MPLA forces. The influence of the Cubans, who proved to be well trained in setting up and maintaining static positions, could be seen very clearly at every military post along the way.

The first clash on the way to Benguela took place in Caporolo toward the end of October. Here the Cubans and the MPLA forces had set up their weapons on a hill overlooking a bridge. "Rommel" sent his bushmen to the west, along the river, so that they might cross it and take the enemy by surprise from the rear. The bushmen were too far away, missing the lowest section of the river where they could simply ford. In the meantime, one of the panhardis discovered the enemy position on the main road further ahead.

To the surprise of the South Africans, the enemy forces simply took their arms and escaped but they did not pull out before trying to blow the bridge. The explosive charges had been put in place but the last man responsible for pushing the button had obviously forgotten to connect the cable to the detonator. The South Africans crossed the bridge with their troops and approached Catengue, where the roads from Benguela and Nova Lisboa cross. The time had come to look for provisions and to discover where the enemy was.

A party of soldiers was sent out on the road to Nova Lisboa, where the MPLA units were advanced toward Catengue. A South African lieutenant, called Jan, drove a Land Rover toward a MPLA convoy, led by officers in Mercedes Benz and Citroen vehicles "taken" from the Portuguese.

He managed to get away because the MPLA mistook him for a Cuban. "Where are our comrades?" somebody asked him. Jan mumbled something and approached them, raising his fingers to give the MPLA salute. The MPLA vehicle approached and then Jan open fire on them with his Brown- ing 50 [cal.] rifle [sic; MG].

He then set up an ambush on the road and was able to knock off no less than seven enemy [armored] cars. He picked them off as if in a shooting gallery.

Three MPLA men were captured and were forced to dig graves for the coming victims of the ambush. For the rest of the campaign, Jan was dubbed "the Cuban."

In the meantime, reconnaissance patrols had discovered that the Cuban MPLA force was located further beyond Benguela with 15-20 mortars. The mortars caused panic among the Zulu troops who refused to face them and the column was delayed for 6 hours. The FNLA gunners drove the MPLA roadblock back, firing their mortars so rapidly (25 rounds per minute, instead of the customary 2 minutes) that their tubes began to catch fire.
There were several fires. The road was finally cleared when the scouts of the Zulu force found a bulldozer as they swept around the enemy position to the south. One squad was sent out to try to block the MPLA's retreat but the enemy had evacuated very quickly.

Zulu Column Against Cubans

Once again, fate saved the bridge for the Zulu column. The Cuban engineers had run a cable from the rear of the bridge to the detonator for 2,000 meters. Everything was ready to blow the bridge and the South Africans were surprised that it was not blown up. By a stroke of luck, one of their reconnaissance patrols had cut the wire while moving through the area.

On the Catenga battlefield, the South Africans found another piece of evidence pointing to the Cuban presence: a map marked in Spanish. They captured seven men who told them of the existence of a big camp outside Benguela [sic], with 350 Cubans. Other battle trophies included a Mercedes Benz and an Alfa Romeo which had been used by the MPLA. The scouts reported that a total of 52 MPLA soldiers had been killed in Catenga.

After the battle of Catenga, the Cubans and the MPLA moved north, abandoning their trenches and even large quantities of ammunition. About 10 km from Benguela, the Zulu column ran into a big training camp capable of accommodating 100 men, surrounded by deep trenches and ditches. It had simply been abandoned. The South Africans took 150 cans of diesel oil which had been abandoned. Just south of Benguela, the column ran into another camp which turned out to have been the main Cuban base and which was set up for burning so that it would be destroyed. The fire did not spread and they were able to rescue large quantities of cigars, canned meat, and other gourmet foods. The bushmen were delighted with this tremendous quantity of by no means negligible products.

The Zulu forces were ready for the assault on Benguela. Their regiment included 150 white South Africans with their Panhards, along with the bushmen and the FNLA battalion, which had shrunk to 450 black and 80 white Portuguese. The attack began on 4 November, one week prior to Independence Day; the air base southwest of the city was taken without resistance.

But now something happened with the South Africans had very much been afraid of; the MPLA and the Cuban forces pushed into the city. They simultaneously opened fire with 122-mm projectiles from the other side of Benguela; they likewise fired on the native huts with small arms from the city's outskirts. The column had to stop at the airport for 26 hours.

For the first time since his almost uninterrupted advance, "Rommel" faced a dilemma: his mortars had a maximum range of 5 km while the enemy's batteries were at least 7-km away and the Soviet projectiles had a range of 14 km (that is, the 122-mm projectiles). He could not
risk opening fire on the city, nor could he advance with his armored
cars and permit the enemy to approach further. In the meantime, the
enemy's projectiles scared his soldiers. From his CP at the airport,
"Rommel" found a solution: he sent his mortars to the east of the city's
outskirts, speculating that he could move them for a certain distance
before the Cuban troops would arrive. He was successful because, when
the South African mortars opened fire, they were still several meters
from their targets [sic]. The enemy commander however had concluded
that the South Africans were merely marauding or snooping around and
so the Cubans advanced immediately. The mortar companies inside Ben-
guela offered little resistance and the Zulu column once again took
the Angolan city with little effort.

The Benguela battle however had taught one lesson: the tremendous
effort made by the soldiers could not always make up for the disadvan-
tages of being under fire, especially in a war where black troops on
both sides displayed a pronounced preference for fighting as far as
possible from the enemy lines. "Rommel" sent an urgent radio message,
asking Rantu to send artillery with which he could match the long-
range equipment of the MPLA.

The Zulu Force entered Lobito on 7 November. The majority of the
population supported the UNITA and the Cubans and the MPLA withdrew
without fighting. After Lobito had been taken by the pro-Soviet forces,
UNITA had been able to maintain close contact by phone with its units
inside the city. Nothing had been done to cut off these obvious means
of communication.

The only battle inside the city was between the allied forces since
the UNITA troops in the area demanded their territory. They found Portu-
guese soldiers and bushmen in a police station and they simply kicked
them out of the camp. The bushmen were furious and the commissioner in
charge of the local UNITA forces, Dr. Valentino, had to calm the situa-
tion with friendly statements delivered in a diplomatic tone of voice.
There were unpleasant incidents in the local barracks which had been
occupied by the FNLA. One of the UNITA military commanders, Major Lu-
mumba, entered the place and kicked the FNLA out, threatening it with
his rifles. The Zulu force remained in Lobito until Independence Day.
"Rommel" established his HQ at the airfield, near the swamps, where the
mosquitos and lice prevented him and his men from catching any sleep.
He was hoping that he would be recalled to Luanda on 11 November in accordance
with original instructions. But the orders were changed. An even
bloodier struggle was ahead.

In our next issue: "The Battle for Luanda."
cod the truth community to stop entire genocide. For
them back at least until their cooperation is for
12,000; however, the South African forces pushed
who were photographed on another soil. They ended
after. There are some of the Cuban soldiers
 waren. They flew from America to
other continent. They came from an-
Here is the documented. They came from an-

LN 127-77
They chat and talk about their experiences. They are Cuban soldiers in Angola with their black allies of the MPLA, the procommunist Angolan fraction.
Guarding the landings. The war established a satellite of Havana and Moscow. On the other side of the ocean, South America.
The photo shows the leader of UNITA, an anticomunist force, haranguing his troops. Jonas Savimbi needed the help of South African advisors.
Angola undoubtedly is involved in a civil war. But that war was encouraged from abroad and involved everybody, both big and little.
In any of the three Angolan groups, one could see youngsters parading at
the head. Communism is behind those of the MPLA.
Evidence: A MPLA soldier on the turret of a Soviet tank. This picture was taken near Luanda.
There was no lack of summary executions everytime the opposing bands took a city. Violence was encouraged.
CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY: (U) The annual FAPLA offensive against UNITA in Angola is bigger and better this year. There are four different offensives. The prospect for success is slim since the rainy season begins soon. This year's actions are possibly timed to coincide with the non-aligned nations conference which began 2 September in Luanda.

TEXT: 1. (b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC 424, 1, 4 (c)

2. (U) THERE ARE FOUR SEPARATE OPERATIONS UNDERWAY.

3. (U) HUAMBO (b)(3): 10 USC 424 TWO FAPLA BRIGADES ARE ENGAG-
ED IN AN AREA PACIFICATION ROLE. THE MISSION IS TO ROOT OUT UNITA AND PLACE A FAPLA INTELLIGENCE NETWORK IN BEING.
THE TWO FAPLA BRIGADES ARE THE SO-CALLED "VIGALANTE" BRIGADES.
4. (U) CUNENE (b)(3):10 USC 424 EVALE AREA) ONE FAPLA BRIGADE AND AROUND 1,200 LOCAL SWAPO SOLDIERS ARE INVOLVED IN AN AREA PACIFICATION OPERATION IN THIS AREA. THE MISSION IS THE SAME AS IN HUAMBO.
5. CAZOMBO (b)(3):10 USC 424 TWO FAPLA BRIGADES ARE INVOLVED IN A CONVENTIONAL STYLE ATTACK FROM LUACANA TO CAPTURE CAZOMBO. TWO ADDITIONAL FAPLA BRIGADES ARE MOVING INTO THIS AREA TO ASSIST. THE ATTACKING FORCE IS SUPPORTED BY MI-21, 23, AND MI-25 AIRCRAFT. THEY ALSO HAVE ATTACHED ARMOR CONSISTING OF 2 EA T-62'S AND 4 EA T-55'S MANNED BY CUBANS. NUMEROUS SOVIET ADVISORS ARE PRESENT.
ON 28 AUGUST A SOVIET ADVISORY COMMITTEE VISITED THE TWO FORWARD BRIGADES. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE LOGISTICAL BUILD-UP PRIOR TO THIS OPERATION. HOWEVER, (b)(3):10 BELIEVES PETROL FOR THE AIRCRAFT AND THE TANKS IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONDUCT THE COMPLETE OPERATION. THE TWO FORWARD BRIGADES ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED 50KM NORTH OF CAZOMBO. THE RAINY SEASON IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN SEVERAL WEEKS WHICH SHOULD GRIND THE OFFENSIVE TO A HALT.
6. CUITO CUANAVALE (b)(3):10 USC 424 5 EA FAPLA BRIGADES ARE INVOLVED IN A TWO-PRONGED ATTACK FROM HAVINGA (b)(3):10
WITH 2 EA BRIGADES IN THE NORTH AND 3 EA BRIGADES IN THE SOUTH TO CAPTURE CUITO CUANAVALE. THIS OPERATION IS SUPPORTED BY MI-21, 23, SU-22, AND MI-25 AIRCRAFT PLUS A COMPANY OF TANKS. THERE ARE SOVIET ARTILLERY ADVISORS AT BRIGADE LEVEL. THE AIR FORCE IS ATTACKING TARGETS PRIOR TO THE ARMY'S ADVANCE.
7. (b)(1):14 (C) THINKS THAT FAPLA MAY TRY AN AIR STRIKE ON JAMBA, UNITA'S HEADQUARTERS DURING THIS PERIOD WHILE THE NON ALIGNED NATIONS ARE MEETING. (b)(1):14 (C)
8. (b)(1):14 (C) THERE ARE SEVERAL NEW ASPECTS TO THIS YEAR'S OFFENSIVES:
- A. AN INCREASE IN SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.
- B. USE OF T-62 TANKS.
- C. CUBAN CREWS FOR TANKS.
- D. USE OF MI-23 AND SU-22 AIRCRAFT.
- E. BIGGER AND BETTER LOGISTICS BUILDUP.

COMMENT: 1. (b)(1):14 (C) ALL FOUR OPERATIONS WERE LAUNCHED TOO LATE TO AVOID THE AVENT OF RAINY SEASON. THEY SEEM TO DO IT EVERY YEAR. (b)(1):14 (C)

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANNUAL FAPLA OFFENSIVE (U)
(b)(3):10 USC 424
4. (b)(1)
OC RUEALLA
DE RLEHSA #5703 2441E44
ZNY
O 011528Z SEP 81
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO REX/JCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC:
RUEALLA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHEC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHIN
RUEJAE
RUEJPI
RUEJMO
RUEAJQ
RUEBAR
RUEOAJ
RUEGDI
RHFRAX
RUEOAF
RUEHOT
RUCJAAA/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUSNAAA/USCINCURED VAIHINGEN GER IMMEDIATE
RUDOVIA
RUEHRO
BT
EZ1:

SUBJ: 1R (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/URSR/CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO. 6 (1)
(b)(3):10 USC 424/(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(l)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. CJ TRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SFI/NAMIBIA
WA/ANGOLA (101)/URSR (UB)
2. NO IR NO. (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN NAMIBIA
4. DATE OF INFO: 810910
5. ORIG: SEE FOLIAGE
6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. SUMMARY: IN THE FIGHTING NEAR NGIVA (b)(3):10 USC 424), SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) UNITS CAPTURED ONE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISOR AND KILLED FOUR OTHERS. NINE ADDITIONAL PROBABLE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE OBSERVED ESCAPING. THESE 14 SOVIETS WERE IN ADDITION TO AN UNCONFIRMED NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISORS WHO WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE ESCAPED FROM XANGONGO (b)(3):10 (b)(3):19 BEFORE THE INITIAL SADF GROUND ATTACK ON 810825. BASED ON DOCUMENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE FOUND THERE. (b)(1).1.4(c)


10. ONE REASON FOR THE RELATIVELY LIGHT SADF CASUALTIES IS THAT MANY SWAPO/FAPLA T-34 TANKS WERE DUG IN SO DEEPLY THAT THEIR GUNS WERE UNABLE TO TRAVERSE, AND MANY 12.7-MM AND 14.5-MM AA GUNS WERE DUG IN SO THAT THEY COULD NOT BE DEPRESSED FOR ANTIPEOPLE USE.

9A. DETAILS: NONE
9B. ORG CMTS: N/A
10. PROJ: N/A
11. COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
12. SPEC INST: NONE
13. PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. APPROVED BY: N/A
15. REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: N/A
16. ENCL: N/A
17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

(b)(3):10 USC 424
SOUTH AFRICA/NAIMIBIA/ANGOLA/OPERATION DAISY (11)

THIS IS AN INF0 REPORT, NOT A FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (5F)/NAIMIBIA (1A)/ANGOLA (AQ)
2. (U) I.K. NO: [Redacted]
3. (U) TITLE: OPERATION DAISY
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: [Redacted]
5. (U) URG1: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) LEG REFS: [Redacted]
8. SUMMARY: DURING 1-22 NOV 81, BETWEEN 2,100 AND 2,500 SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) TROOPS, SUPPORTED BY A VARIETY OF ATTACK AND TRANSPORT PLANES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE (SAAF), DESTROYED A SENIOR HEADQUARTERS COMPLEX OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLA FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA.

9. 1. (U) DETAILS:
   - 1. DURING 1-22 NOV 81, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADEF) CARRIED OUT OPERATION DAISY IN SOUTHEASTERN ANGOLA. THE OBJECTIVE OF DAISY WAS TO DESTROY A SENIOR FIELD HQ OF THE SWAPO GUERRILLA FORCES, WHICH HAD BEEN LOCATED EAST OF VANGE BETWEEN THE KEGUMBE AND CAUNDO RIVERS. THIS WAS THE SWAPO HQ THAT HAD CONTROLLED THE THREE FRONT HQS (NORTHEASTERN, NORTHERN, AND NORTHEASTERN FRONTS) THAT HAD BEEN DISRUPTED BY THE SADF IN OPERATION PROTEA IN AUGUST AND IN EARLIER CROSS-BORDER RAIDS DURING 1981. DURING OCTOBER, THIS HQ WAS TRYING TO REGROUP SWAPO FORCES AND TO REESTABLISH A DEGREE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA THAT WOULD PERMIT A RESUMPTION OF EFFECTIVE SWAPO RAIDS INTO NAMIBIA.

   - 2. DAISY WAS PLANNED IN ORDER TO PREVENT SWAPO FROM REESTABLISHING ITSELF IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, AND SINCE THE OBJECTIVE AREA WAS CLEARLY SEPARATED FROM ANGOLAN TOWNS AND GOVERNMENT MILITARY (FAPLA) INSTALLATIONS, DAISY WAS SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SADF TO CONDUCT A PURELY ANTI-SWAPO OPERATION. IT WAS ALSO CONSIDERED MILITARILY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WILL AND ABILITY TO STRIKE SWAPO BASES AT A DISTANCE OF MORE THAN 200 KM INSIDE ANGOLA.

   - 3. DIRECTIVES ISSUED TO THE ATTACKING FORCES STRESSED THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING SADF CASUALTIES AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. DIRECTIVES ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN PROPERTY, AND THE ANGOLAN INFRASTRUCTURE, AND CONTACT WITH FAPLA FORCES THAT DID NOT TRY TO INTERFERE.
THE ATTACKING SAW FORCES INCLUDED ONE BATTALION-SIZE MECHANIZED INFANTRY GROUP, ONE BN-SIZE MOTORIZED INF GROUP, AND AIRBORNE FORCES APPROXIMATELY OF BN SIZE WHICH WERE ORGANIZED INTO RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS, BLOCKING FORCES, AND A RESERVE. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THIS FORCE WAS BETWEEN 2,000 AND 2,500. IT WAS COMMANDED BY BRIG R. "ITUP" (YADENHURST), THE 1st COMMANDER, SECTOR 10, WITH HQ AT OSMARATI. SARF SUPPORT INCLUDED BUCANEERS, MIRAGE F-17'S, IMPALA MK-2'S, C-47'S, C-130'S, BLOUETTE 111'S, AND DUMAS.

THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE SAS GUERILLA FORCES IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA WAS ESTIMATED AT 1,000. THE HQ COMPLEX WAS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF A 3K-SQKM DEFENSIVE AREA. THE 1,000 GUERILLAS WERE DEPLOYED IN THREE MAIN GROUPS—TWO TO THE EAST, SOUTH, AND WEST OF THE HQ. THE GROUPS ON THE EAST AND SOUTH WERE REGULAR GUERILLA TROOPS. MANAGEMENT OF THE HQ WAS A GROUP OF SAS "CRIMINAL" DETAINED WHO WERE ALSO EXPECTED TO HELP DEFEND THE HQ IF NECESSARY.

ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 NOV, AIRBORNE RECON TEAMS
WERE DROPPED A FEW KILOMETERS NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF THE OBJ AREA. THEY REPORTED ON 2 NOV THAT THE SAAPO HU AND DEFENSIVE TROOPS WERE STILL IN PLACE, AND THE MECH AND MTZ INF UNITS CROSSED THE BORDER IN TWO COLUMNs. THEY CROSSED NORTHWEST OF UMHAKAI—THE MTZ COLUMN ON THE LEFT, ADVANCED GENERALLY NORTHWEST TO AND UNGOE (UNLOCATED BUT PROBABLY ABOUT 140 KM NORTHEAST OF THE BURGER), THE MECH COLUMN; ON THE RIGHT, ADVANCED NORTHEAST AND TO BYPASS IONGE TO THE EAST BEFORE TURNING NORTHWEST TO AND THE UBJ.

ON 3 NOV, THE MTZ GP ATTACKED A SMALL SAAPO SECURITY OUTPOST AT IONGE AND CLEARED THE POSITION FOR USE BY BRIGADIER GENERAL HORSST AS A FORWARD TACTICAL HU. A SMALL SAA INF FORCE WAS LEFT THERE FOR LOCAL SECURITY. THE AIRBORNE RESERVE FORCE WAS PLACED ON ALERT AT THE IONGE AIRSTRIP.
8. Between 0400 and 0500 on 4 Nov, airborne units were dropped by C-130 aircraft north and northwest of the OAH area to act as blocking forces. At 0915, SADF aircraft attacked the OAH area, flying from east to west. They reported ineffective 23-mm and SA-7 anti-aircraft fire. At 0500, the mechanised column attacked from the east and the MTZ GP from the south.

9. The mechanised column was surprised by SADF resistance encountered about 10 to 15 km east of the OAH area. This was the only resistance, however; the OAH area itself had been abandoned by the time the SADF units arrived. Most of the guerrillas escaped safely, successfully avoiding the blocking forces.

10. During 5-9 Nov, the SADF units remained in the OAH area to replenish their supplies and to destroy the abandoned SADF and defensive positions. Communications equipment, weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical equipment and supplies, the abandoned weapons included AK-47 and other rifles, various machineguns, 82-mm mortars, RPG-7 launchers, and various mines.

11. On 6 Nov, an SAAF Mirage F-1 shot down a Mig-21 that seemed to be trying to interfere with SADF operations in support of Daisly.

12. During 10-22 Nov, the SADF units searched a wide area for signs of a SADF presence. The parachute units searched for the area east of the OAH area, the MTZ units searched to the south, and the mechanised units to the east. Mechanised units penetrated as far north as 240 km from the Namibia border east of Cassinga. Daisly officially ended on 22 Nov, and all SADF forces had returned to their bases in Namibia by 24 Nov.

13. During the entire Operation, only 71 SADF guerrillas reported killed, the SADF units lost three killed, at least three guerrillas including two wounded, were captured. It is possible that other SADF casualties resulted from the SAAF attack on 4 Nov and were removed from the OAH area by the guerrillas who
ESCAPED. APPARENTLY MOST OF THE KNOWN S-APD DEAD WERE KILLED AT IUNDE ON 3 NOV AND EAST OF THE OBJ AREA ON 4 NOV. TWO OF THE SAA DEAD WERE KILLED IN THE SNIPESHoot EAST OF THE OBJ ON 4 NOV. THE THIRD WAS KILLED LATER THE SAME DAY BY AN ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE LEFT IN AN ABANDONED BUNKER IN THE OBJ AREA.

END OF MESSAGE
RR RUEALBE
DE WUE-SIA D7456C3345150
ZNY
A 1418512 0C: 47 FEL
FM
TO RUECJEU/AW-WGTEUN 0G/
INFU LEPALALU 03-AOC
RUEH/SEC/TAO-AMOC
RUEHTU
RUCIAL
RUCIPA
RUEALBE/2
RUEFHL
RUEH/2
RUCIAE/SEC/2 - SCOLL AFY FL
RUEALBE/SEC/2 - 21-MUN GEN
RUEALBE/1-AMOC - VILLAMUN GEN
BT

SECTION 03 OF 03

END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORM JUL 78

REEL NUMBER 007536 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0005

MSGNO 5 (MIIR) 31/07/78 08:46
GCIC 10:08:47Z (MI)

CONFIDENTIAL

78 1059220

TOR: 310731Z JUL 78 NC 1059220

PP RUEAIIE
DE RUCK JCS 8515 2120729
INY-04000
P 310729Z JUL 78
FM JCS
INFO RUEAMCC/CINC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHOA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEBAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAOWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAFI/CIA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEIHAH/WSA WASH DC
P 310605Z JUL 78
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUCK JCS/DIA WASH DC
INFO RUSHAA/SCINCEFUR WAIHINGEN GER
RUDOVA/USECOM (b)(3):10 USC 424-10

BY
EZ1:
EZ2: CONFIDENTIAL NOFORM JUL 78

(b)(3):10 USC 424

1. COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
2. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: SOUTH AFRICAN ANGOLAN RAID (U)
4. PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 780722
6. DATE OF REPORT: 780728
7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION:
8. REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B INFO 2
10. ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. REQUEST EVALUATION: NO OPQ: NO
12. PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 US
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NOOPEN CAVEAT (b)(3):10 USC 424
(b)(3):10 USC
16. SUMMARY: (confidential) (b)(1)(4)(c)

(b)(1), 1 THE SAOF USED AN AIR DROPPED CANISTER BOMB UNIT AS AN
ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON DURING THE RAID ON CASINGA. THE ANTI-
PERSONNEL WEAPON WAS DESCRIBED AS THE TYPE THAT AFTER IMPACT

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORM JUL 78

47
BOUNCES BACK INTO THE AIR AND EXPLODES AT 1 TO 2 METERS, DESCRIBED THE WEAPON AS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AND THAT THIS WEAPON ACCOUNTED FOR A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE ANGOLAN CASUALTIES. COMMENT: 464 THIS IS THE FIRST EVIDENCE THAT THIS TYPE OF WEAPON WAS USED IN THE PASSINGA RAID. (§1.14.4 (c)
CONFIDENTIAL AUG 76.

REEL NUMBER C0059 SEQUENCE NUMBER 0023

MSGNO 25 [Miir] 23/08/76 00:10
MY230 C15:57:292 EIC 992

FR RUEAI
DE RUEUCS #8524 23:15:56
ZNY-EEE 15:57:362 G
R 2C15542 AUG 76

FR JCS
INFO RUENCS/SECSSTATE WASH DC
JUEALIF C I-A
JUEADLAIWHITE HOUSE WASH DC
JUEFHDA/CFAS WASH DC
JUEAAA/CDIO WASH DC
JUEADO/CFSA WASH DC
R 2C11452 AUG 76

FR (b)(3):10 USC 424

TO RUENCS/DIA WASH DC
INFO RUSMIA/CINCEUR WASHINGTON GCMR
6T
E21: CONFIDENTIAL AUG 76.
E22: THIS IS IN (b)(3):10 USC 424

1. ANGOLA/REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2. (U) MORE CUBAN'S TO ANGOLA
3. (U)/A
4. 18 AUG 76
5. (b)(3):10 USC 424 18 AUG 76
6. B-2
7. NEWS MEDIA
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. (U)/A
10. 26 AUGUST 1976
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12. 
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14.
15. (U) IN THE 18 AUG EDITION OF THE RANU DAILY MAIL, IT WAS
ANNOUNCED THAT CUBA WAS TO SEND 4,000 TROOPS TO "HELP CRUSH
UNITA." THIS IS REPORTS THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THIS
ARTICLE.
1. (U) ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, CUBA HAS AGREED TO SEND 4,000
MORE TROOPS TO ANGOLA SOON AS PART OF A NEW CAMPAIGN TO CRUSH
THE GROWING GUERRILLA RESISTANCE OF THE 25,000 UNITA TROOPS
NOW FIGHTING IN THE BUSH. THE DECISION WAS APPARENTLY MADE
DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT CASTRO AND NETO DURING NETO'S
RECENT STATE VISIT TO CUBA. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT THIS ACTION
WAS TAKEN "TO COUNTER THE SUCCESSFUL GUERRILLA ACTION BEING HAGED
BY UNITA AGAINST THE CUBAN FORCES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, IN WHICH
UNITA HAS SUCCEEDED IN PINNING DOWN THE CUBAN FORCES WHO ARE THE
BACKBONE OF THE MPLA GOVERNMENT." THE ARTICLE STATED THAT THE
CUBANS WHO WERE TRAINED FOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE WERE RELUCTANT
TO MOVE OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WHERE UNITA EXERCISES SOME CONTROL.
2. (U) THE ARTICLE STATED THAT A NUMBER OF CUBAN SOLDIERS HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL AUG 76.

3. (U) THE ARTICLE STATED THAT, UNITA SPOKESMAN SEEM EXTREMELY CONFIDENT THAT THEIR STRATEGY OF A LONG, DRAWN-OUT, HARASSING GUERILLA CAMPAIGN WILL "EVENTUALLY FORCE THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS OUT OF ANGOLA JUST AS THE US WAS FORCED OUT OF VIETNAM." CONTINUING, IT STATED, "UNITA HAS COMPLETED THEIR REORGANIZATION AFTER LOSING THE CONVENTIONAL WAR AGAINST THE SUPERIOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF THE CUBANS EARLIER THIS YEAR; AND, DR. SAVIMBI IS LEADING THE BATTLE FROM INSIDE ANGOLA. ALMOST ALL HIS FORMER SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS HAVE RETURNED TO HIM AND NEW RECRUITS ARE GAINED DAILY."

4. (U) THE ARTICLE CLAIMED THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO CUT OFF ALL LINES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TOWNS AND VILLAGES. "THEY ARE DETERMINED THAT THE LIVELAND RAILWAY WILL BE PUT PERMANENTLY OUT OF ACTION," IT SAID. THE LIVELAND RADIO ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE HAS VERIFIED UNITA CLAIMS AND INDICATED THAT SUPPORTERS WERE ACTIVELY UNDERMINING THE MPLA GOVERNMENT IN AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL. THE RADIO ALSO HAS REPORTEDLY CLAIMED THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT CHARGED THAT "SABOTEURS HAD STOLEN THOUSANDS OF TRUCKS, DESTROYED 'COUNTLESS' BRIDGES AND DISRUPTED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN A CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO RUIN THE ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY."

COMMENT: (U) IT IS RUMORED IN SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY CIRCLES THAT THE MORALE OF THE CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA IS INDEED LOW AND THAT THE CUBAN TROOPS WERE INDEED RELUCTANT TO CARRY THE WAR TO THE ENEMY--IN THIS CASE UNITA IN THE SOUTHEAST OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT SAVIMBI IS WAGING A WAR OF SORTS PROBABLY WITH A GREAT DEAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT. ANY SUCCESSES HE HAS ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, ARE NOT PRECISELY KNOWN. SAVIMBI CONTINUES TO BE HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN ANGOLA FOR THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS AND VIETNAM FOR THE US IS NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE OR PARTICULARLY VALID; HOWEVER, THERE IS A THREAD OF COMPARATIVE VALIDITY. _SPECULATES THAT THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COUNTER ANY THREAT SUCH AS THAT IMPOSED BY SAVIMBI WITHOUT MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AT AN INCREASINGLY GREATER RESOURCE INVESTMENT WHICH NEITHER CAN DIRECTLY AFFORD. HENCE, THE SPECULATION THAT 4,000 MORE CUBANS ARE ENROUTE TO ANGOLA IS PROBABLY CORRECT.

THIS REPORT IS A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO 630-31 DEC 1982.
1. (U) The article stated, "MPLA and CUBAN forces are massing in southern ANGOLA in a determined bid to stamp out all resistance." According to reports reaching WINDHOEK, SNA, it is the "biggest military operation in ANGOLA since the end of the ANGOLAN civil war.

2. (G) According to the article, the buildup "is aimed primarily at stamping out UNITA resistance to the MPLA Government. UNITA is still believed to have the upper hand in certain parts of southern ANGOLA." The article continued, "despite mass troop movements, reports of fighting appear to be unfounded." First news of the operation came from the border town of CUANGAR on Tuesday, 24 August.

3. (G) The article further stated that on 25 August, the combined
CUBAN and MPLA forces moved into CALAIS in force, accompanied by helicopters, tanks, and armoured cars. Sources in RUNDU, which is just across the river from CALAIS, said that though troops were massing across the river there was no shooting. All appeared to be calm, with CUBAN soldiers seen handing out cigarettes to the villagers. Earlier reports said the sound of shots and explosions could be heard from across the ANGOLAN border. On 27 August sources said there was no shooting, and only large aircraft, apparently landing troops and supplies, could be seen landing across the border.

4. (U) The article further announced the flight of about 700 refugees across the border into the KAVANGO homeland in northeastern SWA on 26 August. The refugees, mostly black, have been put up in the existing refugee camp where they were being cared for by the KAVANGO Government. The article further stated, "there were now about 2,000 people in the refugee camp, counting last night's arrivals as well as refugees still left over in the camp after crossing the KAVANGO River several months ago."

COMMENTS: (U) For sometime now reports have indicated that the UNITA forces are causing many headaches for the MPLA and CUBAN forces in southern ANGOLA. This concentration of troops into this area is apparently an all out attempt to improve their position in southern ANGOLA. The influx of the 700 refugees into SWA could present a problem to authorities and further strains on the economy in order to provide needed care.
SECRET

INQUIRE=DOC17D
ITEM NO=00236739
CDS
C 38399 [06133423401338ZMSR 90-2273353 C I MIDB
S FRP: , ,3, , , , ,

AGT 09133923401338MSR 90-2273353 MSR PAGE 001 NC 2273353
TOR: 061338Z DEC 90 NC 2273353

HEADER
RR RUEAIA
DE RUFHILI #0499/01 3401335
ZNY 340099
R 061334Z DEC 90
FM [031001111124]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC/ [0313111124]
INFO RU [03135011011011]
RUFTA
RUFDAAN
RUFGAID
RUCUAA
RULWIOC
RUSHNOR/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFGAID/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHFMRE
RHFPPAA
RHDLCE
RUQYSDG
RUDOOPA
RUEAIA
RUEADWY/DA WASHDC/ [031351111011]
RHFPPAA
RUEHSP
RUEHLO
RUEHTO
RUEHMY
RUEHSA
RUEHZ
BT

SECRET

BODY
SERIAL: (U) IIR [03101010424]
COUNTRY: (U) [03101013424] SOUTH AFRICA (SA); ANGOLA

SECRET
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: IIB UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICA (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET.

-----------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

-----------------------------------------------

DOI: (U) 901100.

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (C) /CA/109302G/1

SUMMARY: (C/A) SOUTH AFRICA REPORTEDLY MAY BE PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPLY AND MILITARY ADVISORY SUPPORT TO UNITA FORCES IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. UNITA MAY BE ESTABLISHING A HEADQUARTERS IN LUNDA PROVINCE.

TEXT: (C/A) ACCORDING TO AS YET UNCONFIRMED REPORTING, SOUTH AFRICA IS PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES (E.G., FUEL AND FOOD) TO THE UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA). THESE SUPPLIES ARE REPORTEDLY SHIPPED BY SEA FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO A ZAIREAN PORT AND THEN TRANSPORTED TO UNITA FORCES IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. SOUTH AFRICA IS ALSO REPORTEDLY PROVIDING SOME MILITARY ADVISORS TO UNITA FORCES IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. THERE HAS BEEN INFORMATION THAT UNITA IS ESTABLISHING A MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN THE LUNDA PROVINCE OF NORTHERN ANGOLA.

COMMENTS: (C/A) HAVE SUGGESTED UNITA COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA, IN THE PAST, CONCERNING UNITA'S AGENDA IN THE PEACE TALKS WITH THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA). SOURCE'S INFORMATION, PRESENTED IN THIS REPORT, PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INDICATION OF ACTIVE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLAN AFFAIRS. IF TRUE, IT WOULD INDICATE COLLABORATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAIRE IN ASSISTING UNITA AS WELL AS SUGGEST UNITA INTEREST IN BROADENING THE BASES FOR ITS SUPPORT. THE ESTABLISHMENT
UNCLASSIFIED

84 3185631 MUR TOR: 240716Z JAN 84 NC 3185631

RR RUERIA
DE RUEKJCS #0866 0240713
ZNY EEEEE
R 240713Z JAN 84
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
R UENAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAOHG/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAI/ CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMC/CNO CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIA/DIORSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGXSAFE
R 2406427 JAN 84
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUERKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/
INFO RU(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i)
RUEHGN
RUEHSB
RUFDA
RUEHLD
RHOLCNE
RUFHFR
RUEHOT
RHFRAAB
RUSNNOAU/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER/)
RUSNNOAU/USEUCOM/VAIHINGEN GER/
BT
EZ1:
UNCLAS EFT 0
EZ2:
UNCLAS EFTQ
SERIAL: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
PASS:
COUNTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF): NAMIBIA (WA)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 FOUR GUERRILLAS KILLED IN THE
- OPERATIONAL AREA
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTEL
DOI: 840121
RECS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
SOURCE: THE CITIZEN
SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TRACKED DOWN AND KILLED
FOUR BLACK-NATIONALIST TERRORISTS WHO HAD FLED INVADING SA
TROOPS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE ((MEIRING))
COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORIAL FORCE SAID
MSGNO 9 MIIR1 ISG 24/01/84 03:13
ON 840121. THE TERRORISTS WERE KILLED IN A SKIRMISH THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE MANGETTI BLOCK ON 840121.

COMMENTS: THE SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER WHICH IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE. INFORMATION IS POSSIBLY TRUE.

PROJ: N/A
COLL: NONE
INSTR: NONE
PREP: (b)(3):10 USC 424
APPR: 
EVAL: NONE REL TO: NONE
ENCL: NONE
DISSEM: N/A

NNDD

NNNN
SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: SADF ADMITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLAN FIGHTING

--------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

--------

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN.

DOI: (U) 871112.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: [REDACTED]
BT
CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR
BODY

COUNTRY: (U) SOUTH AFRICA (SF); ANGOLA (AO).

SUBJ: SADF ADMITS INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLAN FIGHTING
TAKING FAPLA'S BASE AT CUITO CUANAVALE.

//IPSP: (U)
//COMSOBJ: (U)
ADMIN
PROJ: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) NONE
PREP: (U)
ACQ: (U)
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
NOFORN--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
DECL: CMR
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN
The purpose of this report is to outline information related to South African military operations in Angola. A total of 7 South Africans have been captured after they inserted themselves into South African Commando's. The only units which were reconnaissance were the only units which were captured. In one case, National Servicemen have been captured in this manner. The significance of this report relates to South African military short-comings, some of which are reported to be in training and operations.
to a US Navy "SEAL". They have trained for operations from South African Navy (SAN) submarines. The Army probably will have to form at least one brigade with all-PP (no National Servicemen).

C. The main operating forces in Angola were motorised units of about 2,000 men each. It was such a unit which captured TEIXEIRA DE SOUZA. Another occupied NOVO REDONDO and caused some concern during the withdrawal lest it be cut off. When the enemy sensed that South Africa was withdrawing, they made a strong effort to capture the major South African supply dump at CELA and then swing west to cut off NOVO REDONDO. Defensive measures to block this attack disrupted the withdrawal schedule.

d. Four aircraft were lost in Angolas two Puma helicopters and two light spitter planes. One of the helicopters was destroyed on the ground by enemy fire, but the other was shot down by friendly anti-aircraft fire in the CELA area. In this incident, who died included Brigadier POTGIETER, who commanded the Military Academy last year. One officer survived. The fact that the helicopter was not marked was the main cause of the error, notwithstanding unsatisfactory recognition skill.

COMMENTS:}

ADDITIONAL COVERAGE:

Ref para 1.d. above, the comment relative to the shooting down by friendly ground fire of a SAF helicopter in which BRIG POTGIETER was riding and subsequently killed adds validity to rumors emanating from SCA [SCARLET SCARLET] to this effect. Pretoria IN [INFORMATION] reported this incident as a "light aircraft" crash and, CHAOPH YA [CHAOPH YA] assumed that aircraft involved was HC-1. It is now apparent the aircraft involved was a PUMA helicopter. This is more in line with the capabilities of PUMA HC, the pilot of this helicopter who was also killed, and who was well known...
CONFIDENTIAL

83 0672413 MCR 80 TOR: 0809322 MAR 83 NC 0672413

AR RUEAILA
DE RUEHSAM#2090 0670925
ZNY ECECECE
R 080923Z MAR 83
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO 473:422/ THE WHITE HOUSE
RUEAILA/CIA WASHINGTON DC/
473/: /SECSTATE WASHDC
RUFHOL
RUEHTN
RUEHDR
RUEHCR
RUEHSG
RUFODE
473/:4
RUEHOS
RUEHLG
RUEHLS
RHEOCH
473/:4
RUEHR
RUEHOT
RUFHFR
RHFRAAE
473/:5
RUSNNOA/USCINCINER VAIHINGEN GER/
47:9-:0926-5123(0)1109:10
47: ---/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL/42:330(0)2034
BT
EZ1:
EZ2:
SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA/ETHIOPIA/
CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) CTRY: ANGOLA (AOI)/SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/ETHIOPIA (ET)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 830202
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REF: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8300811414
8. The Cuban presence in Angola may have increased significantly during January 1983. As many as 10,000 additional Cuban military could have entered Angola, primarily from Ethiopia.

9.A. Details: (b)(1),1.4(c) Previous report of increased Cuban presence (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4(c) from a previous baseline of 25,000 Cuban military, as many as 10,000 additional Cuban military may have entered Angola (b)(1),1.4(c) acknowledged that that could be true but evidence was scanty. (b)(1),1.4(c) At present, he could not verify a number above 25,000. (b)(1)

The possibility existed that some 5-10,000 Cubans could have come in on flights from Ethiopia (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4(c).

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
12. (U) SPEC INSTS: NONE
13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. (U) APP BY: N/A
15. (U) REQ Eval: NO REL TO: NONE
16. (U) ENCL: N/A
17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A
DECL: ODA

NNDD

830081415
An article headlined "5,000 SA men stay in Angola" appeared in the February 4, 1976 edition of the JOHANNESBURG Star. This LR reports substance of this article.

1. In an interview with Mr. Bernard MOSTERT of the Washington Post, Mr. P.W. Botha, SA Defence Minister, was quoted as saying that, "since 5,000 to 5,000 troops were patrolling the whole area for which we are responsible, and would stay there until a new ANGOLA regime assumed full sovereignty that it would not provide bases for terrorists striking across the border into SOUTHEAST AFRICA." The area referred to extends from "the ATLANTIC OCEAN to the EMBASSY border and up to 50 km into ANGOLA at some points." Mr. Botha is further quoted as saying, "We are prepared to withdraw from ANGOLA when we are satisfied that ANGOLA won't be used to overrun the OMAHA with undesirable elements (SWAPO) and refugees." Mr. Botha insisted that, "SWAPO is not a big problem. It is only a danger in this sense: it is inspired by intervention of a foreign force and areas from communist sources and training in communist countries."

**Rec'd DS 17 FEB 76**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
<th><strong>3366-175-2</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DD: 1396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This report contains unclassified information. Please note that it should not be used or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(b)(3):10 USC 424

2. Mr. Botha further stated that, "the lack of Western support for South Africa's continued military involvement in Angola has produced broad feelings of disappointment - not only with Washington - with responsible institutions of the free world - that they don't stand up against Russian militarism." "Your executive branch said openly it was supporting FNLA and UNITA. Only after the Senate made its fateful decision to stop financing arms for anti-FNLA forces then things went wrong," he said.

3. According to this article, Mr. Botha "was cagey" about how wrong things went. He said, "At first, South African troops had so much success we were in further than we wanted. Some units stretched several hundred km into Angola."

4. The article stated the Russian backed FNLA and their Cuban allies countered with what Botha said were "superior weapons", notably the 122 mm rocket launcher. Botha said, "we were not routed as some of your papers said, but the South Africans pulled back along the border."

5. The following question was put to Mr. Botha: "With the growing prospect of black majority rule inance, South Africa will become the last white bastion in Africa. Can it survive in its present form?" He replied: "We are not fighting the continent. We are fighting the intervention."

Content: Botha is more open with the foreign press than his own country's press. Very little of the information which was attributed to him directly has ever been published previously in South Africa. This interview is sure to stir the ire of South African news men, the public and parliament.
PP: RUEAIA
DE: RUESHA #1824 0717324
IN: 0000
P: 181309Z MAR 81
FM: (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO: RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
INFO: RUEAIA/CIA WASHD C PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEOFM//
RUEHTN
RUEHLD
RUEHDD
RUCJAAA/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUSNAA/USCINCER VAHINGEN GER PRIORITY
RUDOWIA//
BT
E21:
CONFIDENTIAL
U
E22:
U
SUBJECT: THIS IS IIR
U
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (RF)/ ANGOLA
(AO)/ NAMIBIA (WA)
2. (U) TITLE: SA ATTACKS SWAPO BASE IN ANGOLA
3. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 810318
4. (U) ORIGINATOR: SEE FM LINE
5. (U) REFERENCES: (b)(3):10 USC 424
6. (U) SOURCE: VARIOUS NEWS MEDIA
7. (U) SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE HAS ATTACKED
ANOTHER SWAPO BASE IN ANGOLA ON 810317.
8A. (U) DETAILS:
1. (U) ACCORDING TO THE NEWS MEDIA, GENERAL CONSTAND

2. (U) GEN VILJOEN SAID THAT AFTER REPEATED WARNINGS TO ANGOLA BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE ATTACKED THE BASE. HE SAID THESE OPERATIONS, LIKE THIS ONE, ARE ALWAYS CONDUCTED AGAINST CONFIRMED "TERRORIST BASES". HE ADDED THAT THIS ATTACK FOLLOWS MURDERS AND DEEDS OF "TERROR" PERPETRATED AGAINST INNOCENT INHABITANTS OF SWA/NAMIBIA.

3. (U) VILJOEN SAID ALL DEFENSE FORCE ELEMENTS RETURNED SAFELY TO SWA/NAMIBIA.

8B. (U) ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:
1. ☐ ☐ NO OTHER INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED IN TERMS OF SWAPO OR POSSIBLE ANGOLAN CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE ARE WITHHOLDING THEIR CASUALTY REPORTING TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. ☐ ☐ INDICATED THAT THE LAST ACCOUNT OF ANY SA CASUALTIES OCCURRED ON 810205 AND 810208 WHEN TWO SA SOLDIERS WERE KILLED BY SWAPO.

2. ☐ ☐ FOUR CANBERRA BOMBERS RETURNED TO WATERKLOOF AIR BASE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (17 MAR 81). WHILE THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY TIED TO THE RAID, THE CANBERRA'S ARE ONLY FLOWN INFREQUENTLY AND IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THEY COULD OF PROVIDED AIR SUPPORT TO THE LATEST SADF RAID INTO ANGOLA.

9. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
11. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE DIRC: NO
12. (U) PREPARED BY: (d)(3):10 USC 424
13. (U) APPROVED BY:
14. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
15. (U) ENCL: N/A
16. (U) DIST BY ORIGINATOR: N/A
DECL 17 MAR 87
NNDD
NNNN
SECRET

INQURE=DOC6D
ITEM NO=00055885
CDS
S 15921RUEKJCS 8585 0914552MSO 87-5073726

FRP: , , , 5, , ,
MILITARY

HEADER
OO RUEAIJA
DE RUEKJCS #8585 1601454
ZNY 55555
O 091454Z JUN 87
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIJA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CNC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEJIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CNC WASHINGTON DC
RUCLAKA / (03) 50 0408 10-10
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/ (03) 50 0408 10-10
RUCLHUN / (03) 50 0408 10-10
RUEITAIQ

RUEALGX/SAFE
O 091454Z JUN 87
FM (03) 10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RHDLNE / (03) 50 0408 10-10 / IMMEDIATE
RUEHNA / (03) 50 0408 10-10 / IMMEDIATE
RUSNOA/USCINCERVAIHINGEN GERM / (03) 50 0408 10-10 / IMMEDIATE
RUFAGDAC/USCUCOM/VAIHINGEN GERM IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR / (03) 10 USC 424
RUEHSG
RUEHLG
RUFHLI

BT

CONTROLS
SECRET

SERIAL: (U) IIR

BODY

SECRET
SUMMARY: ( ơn) THE SADF IS SPOILING FOR A FIGHT WITH FAPLA IN ANGOLA.

TEXT: 1. ( ơn) [(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

2. ( ơn) [(b)(1),1.4 (c) (THE SADF) WERE WATCHING THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA VERY CAREFULLY. THEY WANTED FAPLA TO LAUNCH THEIR OFFENSIVE TOWARD JAMBA IN THE SOUTHEAST. (FAPLA) ARE ALMOST READY. (THE SADF) CAN HARDLY WAIT FOR THEM TO MOVE A LITTLE MORE SOUTHEAST WHERE WE CAN SMACK THEM GOOD. (THE SADF) ARE REALLY READY TO SET THEM BACK A BIT.

COMMENT: 1. ( ơn) WE TAKE THIS AS SERIOUS AND NOT THE BRAVADO OF AN INDIVIDUAL. (DUI49)

//IPSP:  (b)(3):10 USC 424
//COMSOBJ:  
ADMIN
PROJ:  (U) NONE
INSTR:  (U) [(b)(3):10 USC 424
PREP:  (U)
APPR:  (U)
WARNING:  (U) NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
DECL: OADR
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY: (C) DURING THE MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT IN ANGOLA, THE REQUIREMENT FOR TROOPS ASSIGNED TO THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION (JMC) HAS INCREASED AND NEW MEASURES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO MEET THIS NEED. THE ANGOLAN (FAPLA) COMPONENT HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO SEND JMC TROOPS INTO AREAS UNDER SADF CONTROL AND ALSO TO RISK CLASHES BETWEEN JMC TROOPS AND GUERRILLAS ANYWHERE WITHIN THE AREA OF DISENGAGEMENT.

TEXT: 1. (C) DURING THE CURRENT SADF-FAPLA DISENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, THE JMC DETERMINED THAT IT NEEDED MORE THAN THE SIX COMPANIES OF INFANTRY ORIGINALLY ALLOTTED TO IT.
MSG NO 23 (MIIR) ISG 05/06/84 22:09

This force was too small for effective monitoring of South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas in the area of disengagement.

2. (C) To meet this need, the SADF has undertaken to assign additional South African Army (SAA) troops to the JMC. To continue implementing the agreed principle of troop parity, FAPLA has undertaken to match SAA strength on joint monitoring teams by attaching FAPLA units as required for particular JMC missions. These additional FAPLA troops would be returned to their parent organizations following the mission.

3. (C) In addition, (D)(1),1.4 (C)

The FAPLA component has proven to be reluctant to send joint monitoring teams to investigate alleged violations in the area that remained under SADF control—south of the current latitude of the JMC HQ. When such occasions arise, the FAPLA tendency has been to demur on the basis that problems south of the line should be handled by the SADF independently.

4. (C) The also claim that their FAPLA counterparts have been reluctant to risk direct confrontations between joint monitoring teams and SWAPO guerrilla units—either north or south of the line. The effect of this FAPLA approach to JMC operations, for about the past two months, has been that joint monitoring teams are used mainly to investigate allegations north of the line that involve results of past SWAPO activity.

COMMENTS: (C) (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (C)

PROJ: (U) N/A
COLL: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U)(b)(3):10 USC 424
PREP: (U)
APP': (U)
REL: (U) NO REL TO: NONE
EVAL: (U) NONE
DISSEM: (U) N/A
DECL: OADR

     NNNN

8400341156
SECRET

RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEHSA #7566 1731419
ZNY 66666
R 211331Z JUN 84
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHIN (b)(3):10 USC 424
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUSNNA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GERT/
RUDOVIA
BT
E21:
E22:
SECRET
SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
PASS: (U)
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)
SUBJ: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTEL
DOI: (U) 840612
REGS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424
SOURCE: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: SIX CUBAN REGIMENTS ARE POSTED ALONG THE
MOCAMEDES-MENONQUE RAILROAD. THEY ARE ORIENTED TO PREVENT
UNITA FROM CONTROLLING THE RAILROAD. ADDITIONAL CUBAN
FORCES ARE DEPLOYED WITH RADAR SITES AND AS ADVISORS TO
ACCOMPANY FORWARD DEPLOYED BRIGADES. THE FURTHEREST
SOUTH THAT CUBANS ARE KNOWN TO BE DEPLOYED ARE VIREI,
CAHAMA, AND MULONDO.

TEXT: THE SIX CUBAN REGIMENTS ARE LOCATED AT MOCAMEDES,
CHIBEMBA, DONGO, MENONQUE, KITUMI, AND
MATALA. THE CAHAMA RADAR SITE IS BELIEVED TO BE AN EARLY
WARNING SITE, AND THE MULONDO
RADAR SITE IS BELIEVED TO BE FIRE CONTROL
AN ADDITIONAL CUBAN BATTALION IS LOCATED AT VIREI

COMMENTS: (C) (b)(1),1.4 (c)

PROJ: (U) N/NA
This is an Intel report. Not finally evaluated Intel.

1. (U) C)ays South Africa (SN) Angola (A) Namibia (WA)
2. (U) IR No: 103/10350/25-250
3. (U) Title: (A)opping views on the relation between Cuban and Angolan and Namibian Settlement
4. (U) Date of Initial: 820620-820620
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FH LINE
6. (U) ORIG: SEE FH LINE
7. (U) Sources: 03/01, 03/23, 03/30, 04/01

8. (U) SUMMARY: According to a very senior Spokesman, the Cuban troop presence in Angola is the "main concern" of the South African Defense Force (SADF) with regard to a settlement in Namibia. If the Cubans do not withdraw from Angola, he said, the Angolan "civil war problem could not be solved, and there could be no lasting peace in Southern Africa" regardless of who comes to power in Windhoek.

9. (U) DETAILS:

   - 1. (U) In 820520, a very senior officer of the SADF stated that the Cuban troop presence in Angola is the South Africa's "main concern" with regard to the Namibian settlement. He said: "The situation in Angola: the Civil War problem must be solved if there is to be a lasting peace in Southern Africa."

   - 2. (U) He indicated that he had always agreed with the idea that the Angolan problem and the Namibian settlement should be worked out concurrently, but now he was beginning to feel that perhaps the Angolan problem ought to be solved first.
- 3. He said he believes the popular movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in Luanda feels that it must keep the Cuban troops in Angola to help control the UNIDIV for the total independence of Angola (UNITA) in their current "civil war." If an MPLA-UNITA settlement could be arranged, no one in Angola would feel the need for Cuban troops, and conversely as long as the Cubans are on hand to help, the MPLA will continue to try to retain exclusive power and not be inclined to come to terms with UNITA politically.

- 4. He apparently also believes that the Cuban troops—and the Soviet bloc support and influence they represent in Angola—constitute a threat to stability in Namibia and ultimately in South Africa. He said that if the Cubans stayed in Angola and the MPLA-UNITA war continued, it would make no difference who came to power in Windhoek as a result of a Namibia settlement. If South Africa were ousting Cuba in Namibia and the Angolan problem had not been solved, South Africa could be able to continue fighting, and the SADF would be called upon to continue its assistance in the defense of Namibia.
ELECTION AND TO ACCEPT A HOLE IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LUNDA--BUT ONLY AFTER THE CUBANS ARE GONE. WE CHARACTERIZED THE CUBAN PRESENCE AS "A CANCER" THAT WOULD SPREAD INTO AND THROUGH HAMIBIA. AS LONG AS THE CUBANS REMAINED IN ANGOLA AND BY IMPLICATION THE NPLA IN LUNDA'S VIABILITY IN HAMIBIA AND IN OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WOULD BE THREATENED.

END OF MESSAGE...
CONFIDENTIAL

THESSALIE
DE BUEKJCS 00960 GSS2202
ZHYV C3CE 221041562 C
R 292202 FEB 76
FM JCS
INFO RUEALIFE I.A.
RUCAGWW/WHITE MCUSE WASH DC
RUEFHOA/CSAP WASH DC
RUEWHA/CNO WASH DC
RUEWNO/CSAP WASH DC
R 291510 FEB 76
FM 09150.10 USC 424

TO BUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUSHAAA/DESIGNER WAININGEN GER
RUDGQA
RUDQCA
RHPRAB
RUDONBB
RUDONBA
RUDHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUSHAAA/USEC/CMC/09/00/00 USC 4-10
RUDGWA
RUDGVAA
RUDGVAA

BT
EZI: 180 FEB 76

E2Z:
THIS IS IN

1. BOTAUCA
2. 40,000 CUBANS IN ANGOLA AND A RUSSIAN SUPPLY BASE (U)
3. NA
4. 83 FEB 76
5. (0910.10 USC 424)
6. 8-2
7. LOCAL PRESS, "DIARIO DE NOTICIAS" (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. (0910.10 USC 4-10)
9. NA
10. (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. (b)(3):10 USC 424

15. (U) "DIARIO DE NOTICIAS", LISBON DAILY NEWSPAPER, REPORTS
THE CUBANS ARRIVING IN ANGOLA. THIS INFORMATION SUPPOSEDLY CAME FROM SOUTHERN AFRICAN AND WESTERN SECRET SERVICES. THE SAME SOURCES SAID THAT EVENTUALLY THE CUBANS MAY MAKE UP A COLONY OF 40,000 PEOPLE.

16. (U) ACCORDING TO PROF. MICHAEL LOW, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA, "THIS HAPPENING OFFERS THE POSSIBILITIES OF GROWING STABILITY IN ANGOLA.

LOW ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE SITUATION "NOW CONSTITUTES A VERY INTERESTING EVOLUTION OF TRIANGULAR OBLIGATIONS FOR THE U.S.S.R., CUBA AND ANGOLA.

I BELIEVE THAT THE USSR HAS LIMITED POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN THIS BRILLIANTLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED STRATEGIC OUP." BEHIND THAT, HE ADDED THAT, "THE SOVIET UNION HOPES THAT THE MPLA WILL GIVE IT A BASE THAT WILL ACT AS A SUPPLY BASE IN

3365 - 468-2
MSGRD 49 (H/IR) 221 23/02/76 04:15
LUANDA - IN SOME RESPECTS A MILITARY BASE (CMT, TC SAY THE LEAST)
FROM WHICH IT WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT A NEW STRATEGY COM-
CERNING THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC.
ON THE OTHER HAND THE MPLA WILL HAVE THE POSSIBILITIES OF MAINTAINING A WELL TRAINED NATIONAL ARMY AND WILL BENEFIT FROM CONSTANT SUPPORT IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS OF THE UNITA TROOPS."
COMMENTS: THAT PRESENT NUMBER OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA IS 20,000 (TWENTY THOUSAND) PLUS ABOUT 1,500 WOMEN. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS THAT THE CUBANS CONTROL ALL VITAL POINTS WITHIN LLAODA AND MPLA TERRITORY. BELIEVES THE MPLA BLACKS WILL BEGIN ATTACKING CUBANS UNLESS THEY LEAVE ANGOLA. STATES THAT AT LEAST 60% 80,000 CUBAN MILITARY WOULD BE NECESSARY TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL ANGOLA.

(d)(3):10 USC 424
SUBJ: IN (D)(3):10 USC 424 / REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/ NAMIBIA/RECENT ANTI-SWAP OPERATIONS (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF), ANGOLA (AO), NAMIBIA (NA)
2. (U) IN NC: [Redacted]
3. (U) TITLE: RECENT ANTI-SWAP OPERATIONS
4. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 110715
5. (U) UNIC: SEE FC LINC
6. (U) REFS: (D)(3):10 USC 424

---

SECRET

81 6767422
PAGE 001 CF005 NC 6767422
TOP: 1616ADZ JUL 81

JP RUEAJIA
DE RUEJSA #1700/01 1971356
ZNY 000000
P 161322 JUL 81
FM (D)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
INF RUEAJIA/CIA WASH/DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WAS/DC PRIORITY
RUEJF/ (D)(3):50 USC 403-1(I)
RUEJLD/
RUEJNA/
RUEJMT/
RUCJAAA/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUDNAAA/USCINCUE/VAHINGEN GDR PRIORITY
RUDSNAV/USEUCOM GDR PRIORITY
RUDX/VAHINGEN GDR PRIORITY
B1
SECRET SECTION 01 02 of Two

CITE 0184
3a. (U) SUMMARY: IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS, THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN COMBAT ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA AND SOUTHERN ANGOLA RELATIVE TO PREVIOUS MONTHS. THIS WAS CAUSED BY A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING CERTAIN SHIFTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN TACTICS.

3b. (U) DETAILS:
1. DURING 910701-910715, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES (SAOF) OPERATING IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA AND SOUTHERN ANGOLA KILLED 126 AND CAPTURED 26 GUERRILLAS OF THE SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO). SIX OF THOSE CAPTURED WERE WOUNDED. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THREE SAOF GEN KILLED.

2. THE NUMBER OF SWAPO-INITIATED INCIDENTS IN NAMIBIA HAS FALLEN DRAMATICALLY FROM A PEAK OF 117 AND 100 IN APRIL AND MAY RESPECTIVELY TO 85 IN JUNE AND 2 IN JULY (AS OF 910715).

3. DURING 810709-810715, THE SAOF CAPTURED ABOUT 100 TONS OF SWAPO BASES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA INCLUDING SOVIET SA-7 MISSILE LAUNCHERS, 122-MM ARTY RCKET- LAUNCHERS, AND MORTARS. MATERIEL CAPTURED FROM ONE SWAPO BASE INCLUDED TWO SOVIET R-10 RECOILLESS GUNS IN TACT AND THE US 7.5-IN antitank MINE.


5. THESE RECENT SAOF SUCCESSES RELATIVE TO PREVIOUS MONTHS WERE THE RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING CERTAIN SHIFTS IN SAOF TACTICS AND TACTICAL OBJECTIVES.

6. DURING 910400 AND 910500, SAOF INTEL...
DETECTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE CULMINATION OF A PROCESS OF SNAPO "INTEGRATION" WITH ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (FAPLA), WHICH HAD BEEN PROCEEDING FOR UP TO 12 MONTHS. FAPLA WAS SHARING SUPPLIES, MOTOR TRANSPORT, SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, AND MILITARY INTEL WITH SNAPO. AND SNAPO BASES HAD BEEN RELOCATED MUCH CLOSER TO FAPLA BASES APPARENTLY TO FACILITATE THIS SHARING AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAPLA AIR DEFENSES. THE EFFECT WAS TO INCREASE SNAPO'S OVERALL CAPABILITIES AND TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SAOF TO MAINTAIN ITS POLICY OF AVOIDING CONTACT WITH FAPLA. IN RESPONSE, THE SAOF BEGAN A PROGRAM OF MORE AGGRESSIVE COMBAT PATROLS INTO ANGOLA IN LATE JUNE/AIRED PRIMARILY AT DISRUPTING SNAPO COMMUNICATIONS AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE SAOF ALSO TRIED TO ENSURE THAT FAPLA RECEIVED ADEQUATE WARNING OF THESE PATROLS TO ENABLE THEM TO STAY OUT OF THE WAY.

b. IMPLEMENT THE EFFECT OF THESE SAOF OPERATIONS IN LATE JUNE AND EARLY JULY WAS TO BEGIN A REVERSAL OF THE SNAPO/FAPLA "INTEGRATION" PROCESS, TO CREATE SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES IN SNAPO BASES, AND GENERALLY TO SOW CONFUSION AMONG SNAPO UNITS. THE LOGISTICAL DIRECTIONS...
Ruptures coupled with the current drought in the region caused SARU to move south in larger numbers (and perhaps with less caution) aiming to infiltrate villages in search of food. The SARU then began to intercept the larger southbound SARU groups (30 to 40 men each) north of the border, before they broke up into their normal size (5 to 10) infiltration teams.

C. Subsequently in July, the SARU changed its pursuit tactics against fleeing northbound SARU units. Previously, the objective of SARU patrols was to overtake fleeing SARU units and attack them as far south as possible. The new tactic was to follow the northbound SARU units to their bases and to attack the bases. Results of this change included the capture of material and senior officers as described in paras 3 and 4 above.

(b)(1), 14(c)
(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

10. (U) PROJECT NO: NONE
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
12. (U) SPECIAL INSTR: NONE DIREC: NO
13. (U) PREPARED BY: 
14. (U) APPROVED BY: (b)(3): 10 USC 424
15. (U) REG EVAL: YES REL TO: NONE
16. (U) ENCL: N/A
17. (U) DISTS BY ORIG: N/A

END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL

RR RUEAIYA
DE RUEHSA 4839 2041407
ZNY 473-08-10 USC 424
R 2314037 JUL 81
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//
473-08-10 USC 403-403-10
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHTN (b)(3):50 USC 403-403-10
RUEHRC
RUEOFAR
RUCJAAA/USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDT (b)(3):50 USC 403-403-10
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER
RUVDIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):50 USC 403-403-10
BT
EZ1:
CONFIDENTIAL (b)(3):10 USC 424
EZ2:
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: IR REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA ANGOLA/POSSIBLE ANC-SWAPCO OPERATIONS (U)

(b)(3):10 USC 424,(b)(3):50 USC 403-10

This is an info report, not finally evaluated intel

1. (U) CTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SW) /NAMIBIA
   (WA)/ANGOLA (AO)

2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424

3. (U) TITLE: POSSIBLE ANC-SWAPCO COOPERATION

4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 810722

5. (U) REQ REF: (b)(3):10 USC 424

6. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE

7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. (C) SUMMARY: SAF OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA HAVE UNCOVERED EVIDENCE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN

CONFIDENTIAL (b)(3):10 USC 424
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) AND THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC). APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT ANC GUERRILLAS IN ANGOLA ARE USING SWAPO BASES AND FACILITIES, RECEIVING INSTRUCTION FROM CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL, CONDUCTING SOME TRAINING JOINTLY WITH SWAPO, AND RECEIVING SOME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM THE POPULAR ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FAPLA). 

APPARENTLY HAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANC GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN USED IN SWAPO OPERATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND DOES NOT SEEM OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL.

3.A. IU DETAILS: NONE
3.B. ORIG CMN: (9)(10)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

10. IU PROJECT N°: NONE
11. IU COL MGMT CODE: N/A
12. IU SPECIAL INST: NONE DIRC: NO
13. IU PREPARED BY: (9)(3):10 USC 424
14. IU APPROVED BY: 
15. IU REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
16. IU ENCL: N/A
17. IU DIST BY ORIG: N/A

SIGNED ON: 19 JUL 1981
NNNN

NOTICE
SUMMARY:  (C) THREE SENIOR SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) OFFICERS PRESENTED A BRIEFING TO THE FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE. THE OFFENSIVE HAS MADE VERY LITTLE FORWARD PROGRESS AND HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN FOR THE LAST TEN DAYS BECAUSE OF LACK OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

TEXT:  1.  (C) THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA IS AS FOLLOWS:


BEEN 6 KIA AND 4 WIA. DURING THE SAME PERIOD FAPLA MATERIEL LOSSES HAVE AMOUNTED TO 10 TANKS, 8 BTR-60'S, 2 BM-21'S, 65 LOGISTICAL VEHICLES, AND 1 SA-13 DESTROYED.

C. THE OFFENSIVE ON BOTH FRONTS HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN FOR THE PAST 10 DAYS BECAUSE OF SEVERE SUPPLY SHORTAGES--SOME UNITS ARE REPORTEDLY COMPLETELY OUT OF RATIONS AND MOST OTHER EXPENDABLE MATERIAL. THE PROBLEM APPEARS TO CENTER AROUND POOR TIMING OF THE OFFENSIVE--BEGUN TOO LATE IN THE DRY SEASON TO ACHIEVE ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES BEFORE THE RAINS BEGIN--AND INCREDIBLY BAD LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FORCES. REPORTEDLY, ONLY 5 REGULAR UNITA BATTALIONS ARE OPPOSING FAPLA FORCES.

2. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CURRENT FAPLA OFFENSIVE AND OPERATION 2D CONGRESS (THE 1985 OFFENSIVE) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

--STRONG POINTS:
A. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS YEAR'S OFFENSIVE, FAPLA STOCKPILED SUPPLIES TO THE EAST OF THE CUIFO RIVER AND THIS EFFORT PAID OFF INITIALLY BY PERMITTING MUCH BETTER RESUPPLY OF THE FORWARD BRIGADES.

B. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN TRAINING OF FAPLA FORCES, PARTICULARLY SPECIAL ACTION TROOPS SUCH AS COUNTER INSURGENCY AND COMMANDO FORCES WHO HAVE BEEN AUGMENTING FORWARD FAPLA BRIGADES.
C. UPGRADED MOBILE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND MORE EFFECTIVE ADMIN

END OF MESSAGE
SERIAL: (U) IIR
BODY
PASS: (U)
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO);
SUBJ: UPDATE ON THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA (U)
INTEGRATION OF THESE ELEMENTS INTO THE OVERALL TACTICAL
SCHEME OF MANEUVER. AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS WITH THE BRIGADES
ARE THE SA-7, -8, -9, -13, -14, AND -16'S AS WELL AS HAND-HELD
ANTI-AIR MISSILES.

D. UPGRADED AND MORE EFFECTIVE BRIDGING EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN
USED BY FAPLA THIS YEAR. OF SPECIAL NOTE IS THE USE OF
ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCH BRIDGES (AVLBS) TO SPAN SEVERAL OF
THE LARGELY DRY RIVERS WITH EMBANKMENTS TOO STEEP FOR
VEHICLES TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT BRIDGING.

E. OVERALL, THERE APPEARED TO BE MUCH BETTER PLANNING FOR
THIS YEAR'S OFFENSIVE.

F. THERE ARE SOME 4 TO 7 SOVIET AND THE SAME NUMBER OF
CUBAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS WITH EACH FAPLA BRIGADE;
PRIMARILY WITH AIR DEFENSE, ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERING
ELEMENTS. CUBAN PILOTS ARE FLYING MIG'S AND HELOS IN
SUPPORT OF THE FORWARD FAPLA BRIGADES AND SOVIET PILOTS
ARE FLYING RESUPPLY AND TROOP TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELOS
IN FAPLA REAR AREAS.

--WEAK POINTS:
A. FAPLA HAS BOTH 121MM HOWITZERS AND BM-21'S SUPPORTING
THE OFFENSIVE BUT, BECAUSE OF VERY POOR TARGETING, IT HAS
BEEN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE.

B. ALTHOUGH LOGISTICAL PLANNING HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY
IMPROVED FOR THIS OFFENSIVE; THE TIMING OF RESUPPLY IS
STILL EXTREMELY POOR AND THIS HAS RESULTED IN LACK OF FOOD
AND AMMUNITION TO THE LEADING BRIGADES. THE RESULT IS A
BOGGED DOWN OFFENSIVE.

C. FAPLA HAS NOT CONDUCTED ANY OPERATIONS IN UNITA'S REAR
AREAS, THEREBY PERMITTING UNITA COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION
IN RESUPPLY, TROOP MOVEMENT, ETC.

D. FAPLA DOES NOT HAVE ANY EFFECTIVE AIR-GROUND LIAISON
RESULTING IN SEVERAL FRIENDLY TROOP STRIKES BY THEIR OWN
AIRCRAFT AND VERY INEFFECTIVE CLOSE COMBAT SUPPORT FOR
THEIR TROOPS.
E. EFFECTIVE UNITA ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AND FEAR OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIRFORCE INTERVENTION HAS FORCED FAPLA AIR FORCES TO BE MORE DEFENSIVE AND CAUTIOUS. FAPLA MAKES ONLY HIGH-ALTITUDE ATTACKS WHICH ARE LARGELY INEFFECTIVE AND HELICOPTER OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN REAR AREAS, HAVE VIRTUALLY STOPPED.

3. (T) SADF ASSESSMENT IS THAT FAPLA FORCES IN THE 3RD MILITARY REGION WILL NOT TAKE THEIR ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES. IN THE 6TH MILITARY REGION, THE LEADING BRIGADES MAY BE SUCCESSFUL IN CROSSING THE LOMBA RIVER BUT THIS WILL BE THE EXTENT OF THEIR FORWARD MOVEMENT. THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED IN TAKING—OR EVEN SERIOUSLY THREATENING—THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF MAVINGA.

4. (T) FAPLA AIRCRAFT AND HELO INVENTORY IS AS FOLLOWS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIG-21</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-23</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-76</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN-12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN-26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-17</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-25/35</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZELLO5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALOUTTE III</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMENTS: 1. (T)
SERIAL: (U) IIR
BODY
PASS: (U)
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO);
SUBJ: UPDATE ON THE ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA (U)
PREPARED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND FORWARD DEPLOYED
FORCES TO INTERVENE IN SUPPORT OF UNITA IF UNITA RUNS INTO
TROUBLE CONTAINING THE OFFENSIVE.

//IPSP:
//COMSOBJ
ADMIN
PROJ: (U) NONE
INSTR: (U) NONE
PREP: (U)
APPR: (U)
DECL: OADR
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
MSGNO 23 (MIII) ISG *06/09/85* *01:04*
ZCZC 06:03:21Z (MII)

CONFIDENTIAL

R RUEAIJA
DE RUEKJCS #2509 2481509
ZNY CCCEC
R 0615097 SEP 85
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSDA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAAA/CCO WASHINGTON DC
RUEHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIJA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUECS/SECSHA SECSHA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMS CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEAMSC/CMS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC/200305/
RUCLHUA
RUECGS/Safe
R 0614587 SEP 85
FM [D](3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC/200310 USC 424
INFO RUECH/200310 USC 424
RHOLCEA/200310 USC 424
RUSNMAA/USCINCEUR VAISHINGEN GER/
BT
EZ1:
CONFIDENTIAL

EZ2:
SERIAL: (U) IID [D](3):10 USC 424
COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO)
SUBJ: IID [D](3):10 USC 424 [FAPLA'S EFFORTS TO ENGAGE UNITA - (U)]
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
DOI: (U) 060904
REOS: (U) [D](3):10 USC 424
SOURCE: (U) [D](3):10 USC 424

SUMMARY: (U) "CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS" IN ANGOLA.

TEXT: 1. [D](3):10 USC 424 THREE AREAS WHERE FAPLA FORCES WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED WITH UNITA 2. [D](3):10 USC 424 IN THE AREA SOUTH OF LUBANGO [D](3):10 USC 424 FAPLA HAS DEPLOYED 6 BATTALION IN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL UNITA'S ACTIVITIES. 3. [D](3):10 USC 424 FOUR BRIGADES, SUPPORTED BY CUBAN ARMOR ARE ATTEM-
PTING TO ENGAGE UNITA FORCES BETWEEN LUACANO AND CAZOMBO. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME CUBAN ARMOR WAS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF A FAPLA OFFENSIVE.

4. 5 BRIGADES WERE MOVING IN A TWO PRONGED ATTACK FROM CUITE CUANAVALE TO MAVINGA. MAVINGA HAD SUSTAINED AIR ATTACKS BY MIG-21S OR POSSIBLY SU-22. FEELS THAT IF MIG-21S WERE USED THAT THEY WERE PROBABLY FLOWN BY ANGOLANS. HOWEVER, IF SU-22S WERE-employed, FEELS THE PILOTS WERE MOST LIKELY CUBANS.

5. ACROSS THE FACILITIES AT MENONGUE AIRFIELD WERE UNDERGOING CONSIDERABLE EXPANSION. FEELS THAT IT IS MOST PROBABLE THAT SV-22 AIRCRAFT WILL BE BASED AT MENONGUE WITH THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF STRIKING AT UNITA HEADQUARTERS AT JAMBA. ALTHOUGH FACILITIES AT JAMBA ARE QUITE DISPERSED AND DO NOT MAKE AN EASY TARGET, FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE MORE OF A PROPAGANDA TARGET THAN ONE HAVING REAL MILITARY VALUE.

6. SOVIET ADVISORS WERE OPERATING DOWN TO BRIGADE LEVEL AND THAT ALL OPERATIONS WERE PLANNED BY SOVIET ADVISORS. PUT NO CREDIBILITY IN REPORTS OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS OPERATING IN EASTERN ANGOLA. FELT THAT IF THERE WERE SOVIET COMBAT FORCES IN ANGOLA THEY WOULD BE PROTECTING LUANDA IN LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE.

7. WITH REGARD TO LUANDA MAJOR BUILDINGS IN LUANDA WERE BEING EQUIPPED WITH POWER GENERATORS DUE TO UNITA'S CAPABILITY TO INTERRUPT POWER SUPPLIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

END OF MESSAGE

NNDD

8500833339
SUBJ: IR (b)(3):10 USC 424 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/USSR/CURRENT SAADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 5 (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ISF/NAMIBIA (WA)/ANGOLA (IAO)/USSR (UR)

2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 5
4. DATE OF INFO: 810829
5. ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. SOURCE: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8. SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) FORCES ENCOUNTERED RELATIVELY HEAVY RESISTANCE BY REGROUPED ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT (FAPLA) UNITS AT NGIVA (b)(3):10 USC 424 BEFORE THE POSITION WAS FINALLY SECURED LATE ON 810827. SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) NORTHWESTERN FRONT HQ WERE KILLED OR CAPTURED IN THE FIGHTING. APPARENTLY ONE OF THOSE KILLED WAS THE FRONT'S CHIEF OF INTEL. MOST OF THE SADF FORCES ARE NOW AT MUPA (b)(3):10 USC 424 WHICH WAS TO BE THE NORTHERNMOST PENETRATION BY GROUND UNITS IN THE ORIGINAL BATTLE PLAN. WITHDRAWAL TO NAMIBIA WILL BEGIN TODAY (810829) AND IS EXPECTED TO REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS AND MORE FIGHTING. SADF GROUND UNITS INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION CONSIST OF TWO TASK FORCES, EACH WITH THREE BATTALIONS, A TOTAL OF BETWEEN 4,000 AND 5,000 TROOPS. SADF HQ STATES THAT 10 SADF MEN HAD BEEN KIA BY NIGHTFALL ON 810829 AND ESTIMATES SWAPO KIA TO HAVE BEEN QUOTE IN THE HUNDREDS UNQUOTE. NO ESTIMATE OF FAPLA CASUALTIES IS AVAILABLE AS YET. (b)(1)(4)(c) HAS LOST ONE ALLOUTTE HELO TO AAA FIRE, WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS GENERALLY HEAVY. NO CUBAN PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED. THE SWAPO CONVENTIONAL BRIGADE HAD BEEN MOVED TO CAHAMA (b)(3):10 USC 424 ASSE OF CHIBEMBA (b)(3):10 USC 424

9A. DETAILS: NONE
9B. (b)(1)(4)(c)

10. PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
11. COLL MGMT CODE: NONE
12. SPECIAL INSTS: NONE DIRC: NO
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. 
15. REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
16. ENCL: NONE
17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

SECRET 20 AUG 87
ANN
NNDD
SUBJ: 14/1943/103/424/07/2/0 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA/UKRAINE/OPERATION DROTEA RESULTS (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/NAMIBIA (NF)/ANGOLA (AO)/UKRAINE (UK)

2. (U) IR NUMBER: 14/1943/103/424/07/2/0
SUMMARY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY (SAA) HAS EVIDENCE OF 21 SOVIETS PRESENT IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN LATE AUGUST AND BELIEVES IT HAS PROVED THE INVOLVEMENT OF AT LEAST SOME OF THEM IN LOW LEVEL MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO). DURING 810824-810904, THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADEF) CAPTURED ABOUT 2,400 TONS OF MILITARY MATERIAL IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AND DESTROYED ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT IN PLACE THERE. CAPTURED ARMORED VEHICLES DISPLAYED AT OSHAKATI NAMIBIA INCLUDED NINE T-34 TANKS AND FOUR PT-76 TANKS. THE SADEF SUSTAINED TEN MEN KILLED IN ACTION DURING THIS OPERATION, NAMED OPERATION PROTEA; AND ESTIMATES THAT SWAPO AND THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT FORCES LOST ABOUT 1,000 KIA.

DETAILS:

1. IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR SOVIETS KILLED AND ONE CAPTURED ON 810827, THE SADEF HAS PRESENTED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF 17 OTHER SOVIETS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AT THE TIME. THEY INCLUDED AT LEAST 12 OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS ADVISORS TO FAPLA AND THE SAA CHIEF AND HIS STAFF BELIEVE THEY HAVE PROVED THAT MANY OF THESE SOVIET ADVISORS WERE WORKING WITH SWAPO ALSO AND WERE INVOLVED IN SWAPO MILITARY OPERATIONS AT COMPANY LEVEL OR BELOW. THE SAA EVIDENCE OF THIS INCLUDES A PHOTO OF SOVIETS WORKING WITH SWAPO/FAPLA OPERATIONS MAP AND WHAT PURPORTS TO BE THE MAP ITSELF.

2. DURING OPERATION PROTEA IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, 810824-810904, THE SADEF CAPTURED ABOUT 400 TONS OF AMMUNITION, 487 TONS OF WEAPONS, 1,194 TONS OF SOFTSKIN VEHICLES, 20 TONS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, AND OVER 374 TONS
OF ARMORED VEHICLES, CAPTURED WEAPONRY INCLUDED 2 BM-21
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS, 26 ZIS-3 76MM FIELD GUNS, 16
ZU-23 TWIN AAA GUNS, 20 4-55 TRIPLE 20-MM AAA GUNS, AND
110 SA-7 GRAIL SAM'S. ARMORED VEHICLES INCLUDED 9 T-34/85-
MM MEDIUM TANKS, 4 PT-76 LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS TANKS, AND 4
BRDM-2 AMPHIBIOUS SCOUT CARS. ALL OF THIS MATERIEL WAS
DISPLAYED AT THE SADF SECTOR 10 HQ AT OSHAKATI ON 010914.

3. (SS) THE SAA ESTIMATES THAT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME
TONNAGES OF AMMUNITION AND OTHER MATERIEL WERE DESTROYED
IN PLACE DURING THE OPERATION. ROUGHLY HALF OF THE MATERIEL
WAS FOUND AT XANGONGO (1834S/01501E) AND THE OTHER HALF
AT NGIVA (17035S/01547E). A CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE
VALUE OF THE CAPTURED MATERIEL DISPLAYED AT OSHAKATI IS
N$99.27 MILLION. THIS ESTIMATE IS REGARDED AS CONSERVATIVE
BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS THE AGE OF CERTAIN ITEMS, INCLUDING
FOR EXAMPLE A VALUE OF N$50,000 FOR THE MEDIUM TANK.

4. (SS) THE SADF SUSTAINED 10 MEN KIA DURING THE OPERATION,
AND THE SAA ESTIMATES THAT ABOUT 1,000 MEN OF SWAPO AND
FAPLA WERE KIA. ACCURATE BODY COUNTS WERE NOT RECORDED;
BUT THE SAA ESTIMATES THAT SWAPO AND FAPLA EACH LOST ABOUT
500 KIA.

END OF MESSAGE
04/38/ SECTION MESSAGE

OO RUEAIIA
DE RUEHSA #5989/02 1257152
ZNY CAAA
D 141638Z SEP 81
FM [REDACTED]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA #WASHINGTON DC/
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA #ASMOC PRIORITY
RUEMC/SECAFE #ASMOC PRIORITY
RUEMTN [REDACTED]
RUCIEA
RUCIBA
RUEMOA
RUEBRA
RUEQAJ
RUCODF
RHEFRA
RUEOFAR
RUEHOTA
RUCJAA/USCINCRED H4COIL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUSNAA/USCINCEUR VAININGEN GER PRIORITY
RUOVDIA/USEUCOM #VAININGEN GER PRIORITY
BY

9d. [REDACTED]

10. (U) PROJECT NUB W/A
11. (U) CULL PHOT CODES [REDACTED]
12. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: N/A
13. (U) PREPARED BY: [Redacted]
14. (U) APPROVED BY: [Redacted]
15. (U) REQUIRE EVALUATION: YES
   REL TO: NONE
16. (U) ENCL: N/A
17. (U) DISTRIBUTION: N/A
   DEL 10 SEP 81

END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL


TEXT: 1. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA. FAPLA HAS LOST THE FOLLOWING...
MSGNO  18 (MIIR)  ISG  *03/10/85*  *00:18*

AIRCRAFT SINCE 1 AUG 85:
- 7 EACH MI-25
- 2 EACH MI-17
- 3 EACH MI-8
- 3 EACH MIG-21
- 2 EACH MIG-23

THEY CREDIT THE LOSS TO SEVERAL FACTORS, I.E. GROUND FIRE, 
SA-7, MORTAR FIRE WHILE MIG-25'S WERE ON THE GROUND, AND 
SIMPLY RUNNING OUT OF GAS. THEY CLAIM CUBANS AND RUSSIANS 
ARE FLYING THE MORE SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT. WITH THE CUBAN'S 
in THE MIG-21'S AND MI-25S WITH RUSSIANS IN THE MIG- 
23S.

2. (++) THE OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF CAZOMBO. 
FAPLA HAS EMPLOYED FOUR INFANTRY BRIGADES, 14TH, 
21ST, 67TH, AND 63RD. THEY CAPTURED CAZOMBO ON 19 SEP-
TEMBER. THE UNITS ARE STILL IN THE AREA WITH THE 63RD 
MOVING TOWARD LUCUSSE IN THE WEST. FAPLA EMPLOYED 6 EA 
tANKS, 2 EA BEING T-62'S. THERE WERE THREE SOVIET ADVISORS 
PER BRIGADE WITH CUBAN CREWS IN THE TANKS. THE RAINY SEA-
SON HAS ALREADY BEGUN IN THIS AREA. FAPLA MAY TRY TO HOLD 
CAZOMBO THROUGH THE RAINY SEASON. IF THEY TRY, (d)(1).1.4(c) 
SEES IT AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNITA TO PICK THEM OFF 
AND STRANGLE THEIR LOGISTICS.

3. (++) THE OPERATION ON THE VICINITY OF MAVINGA. THERE 
 ARE ALSO 4 FAPLA BRIGADES INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION. 
THIS IS THE MAIN ATTACK. THE BRIGADES ARE 8TH, 13TH, 7TH, 
AND 25TH. THE 8TH AND 13TH WENT ON ONE AXIS FROM QUITO 
CANAVALE AND THE 7TH AND 25TH ON ANOTHER. THE DECISIVE 
BATTLE TOOK PLACE ON THE LOMBA RIVER. UNITA PUT UP A 
DETERMINED RESISTANCE AND HAS STOPPED THE ADVANCE JUST 
NORTH OF MAVINGA. THE 82ND BRIGADE HAS BEEN ORDERED INTO 
THE AREA FROM THE NORTH AS WELL AS 2 EA SHAPO BATTALIONS 
GOING TO MENONGUE. (b)(1).1.4(c) BELIEVES THEY WILL TRY FOR 
MAVINGA BEFORE THE RAINS COME IN MID-OCTOBER. IF THEY 
CAN TAKE MAVINGA, THEY MAY TRY FOR JAMBA. (b)(1).1.4(c)DOUBTS 
THEIR SUCCESS. THIS AS WELL AS THE OTHER OPERATION ARE 
EXPERIENCING LOGISTICS PROBLEMS. (b)(1).1.4(c) SAYS THEY HAVE 
INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE TO BURN THEIR VEHICLES RATHER THAN 
ALLOW THEM TO FALL INTO UNITA HANDS. THERE ARE THREE 
SOVIET ADVISORS PER BRIGADE SUPPORTED BY AIR. AN AN-30 
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WAS ALLEGEDLY USED TO RECON 
UNITA POSITION AS WELL AS DEEPER RECON TOWARDS JAMBA.

4. (++) THE FAPLA BRIGADE IS ABOUT EQUAL TO A U.S. BATTAL-
ION. THE STRENGTH OF THESE BRIGADES IS FROM 800 TO 1200 
MEN.

5. (++) ADMITTED THEY HAD MEDICS IN OTHER LOCA-
TIONS SUPPORTING UNITA. THEY REFUSED TO COMMENT ON ANY AIR 
SUPPORT PROVIDED OR TROOPS DEPLOYED.

COMMENTS:  1  (d)(1).1.4(c) 10 USC 424.1.4(c)

END OF MESSAGE  CONFIDENTIAL

*****<SECTION 2>*****

SERIAL:  (U) IIR  (b)(3):10 USC 424
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

1. (U) CTRY: ANGOLA (AO)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: SOVIET BLOC PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 821203
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. (U) SOURCE:

8. (U) SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO (b)(1), 1.4 (c)

8201941326
THERE ARE MORE THAN 26,000 MILITARY AND 8,500 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FROM SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES STATIONED IN ANGOLA.

9A. (U) DETAILS:
1. (b)(1), (1.4)(c) ESTIMATES ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL NOW STATIONED IN ANGOLA:
   - USSR: 750 MILITARY AND 250 CIVILIAN
   - EAST GERMANY: 1,000 MILITARY AND 1,800 CIVILIANS
   - CUBA: 25,000 MILITARY AND 6,500 CIVILIANS
   - OTHER: ABOUT 1,000 TOTAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
2. (b)(1), (1.4)(c) APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT EAST GERMAN MILITARY PERSONNEL (IN ADDITION TO THE CUBANS) ARE NOW FLYING MIG-21 AIRCRAFT ON OPERATIONAL MISSIONS.

9B. (U) ORIG CMTS: (b)(1), (1.4)(c) ESTIMATES AND OPINIONS ARE PROBABLY GENUINE, POSSIBLY ACCURATE, AND COULD INFLUENCE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES.

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
12. (U) SPEC INST: NONE DIRC: NO
13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. (U) APP BY:
15. (U) REG EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
16. (U) ENCL: N/A
17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: NONE

8201941327
SECRET

NO FOREIGN DETAIL

100.
COUNTRY NATIONAL ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

1. THE USA AND CUBA, AS WELL AS OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS EAST GERMANY, PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION TO ANGOLA THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES IN LUXEMBOURG, FRANCE AND BELGIUM. THE PROJECTS WHICH HAVE RESULTED FROM THIS ASSISTANCE INCLUDE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD THROUGH THE COUNTRY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FACTORY FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF MOTOR VEHICLES.


3. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 6000 CUBAN CIVILIANS IN ANGOLA. THESE INCLUDE ADVISORS, EXPERTS, TEACHERS, FARMERS AND COMPANY MANAGERS.

4. SEVERAL CUBAN FARMING FAMILIES HAVE BEEN SETTLED IN THE GABELO-DUBALA REGION, WHILE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF NATIONALIZED ENTERPRISES, ESPECIALLY IN THE SUGAR AND COFFEE INDUSTRIES, ARE MANAGED AND CONTROLLED BY CUBANS. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED THAT CUBAN SETTLERS IN THE COUNTRY BE GRANTED ANGOLAN CITIZENSHIP, AND HAS UNDERTAKEN TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN CIVILIANS IN ANGOLA TO 10,000.

CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THESE CUBAN CIVILIANS PROBABLY PRECLUDES THE WITHDRAWAL OF ANY CUBAN TROOPS MIGE THE UNSETTLED PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY.

5. THE MPLA ARMED FORCES OF APPROXIMATELY 55,000 MEN NOW INCLUDE ABOUT 13,500 CUBANS, AND ABOUT 1,000 SOVIET, EAST GERMANY, BULGARIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIAN PERSONNEL. SOVIET, CUBAN AND EAST GERMANY PERSONNEL ARE ALSO ASSISTING IN THE DIRECTIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, AND ESPECIALLY EAST GERMANS FILL MOST OF THE SENIOR POSITIONS IN THIS ORGANIZATION.
5. (SECRET) THE USSR ASSISTS ANGOLA IN SEVERAL RESPECTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PERSONNEL. OF THE ESTIMATED 450 SOVIET PERSONNEL AT PRESENT IN ANGOLA, MORE THAN HALF ARE INVOLVED WITH MILITARY AFFAIRS. THEY CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATE INTERNAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE, WHICH THEY DOMINATE. THE USSR ALSO PROVIDES FLIGHT TRAINING AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FOR THE AIR FORCE. SOVIET PILOTS ARE KNOWN TO FLY THE HEAVIER TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE AIR DEFENSE OF LuANDA IS MANNED BY THE SOVIETS, AND CERTAIN SENIOR POSITIONS IN NAVAL VESSELS ARE FILLED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL.
PP RUEA11E
DE RUEJCS 187057
M 0945101
TO RUEKES/JCS
INFO RUSAAA/USCINCEUR VAININGEN GEH

FURTHER SECTION 2 OF 2 0313 JULY 78

B. ARMAMENTS. THE BULK OF THE ARMAMENTS IN ANGOLA IS FROM THE USSR. SINCE JULY 1977 THEY HAVE PROVIDED ANGOLA WITH ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WORTH BETWEEN AN ESTIMATED R50 AND R100 MILLION. THIS INCLUDES ARTILLERY PIECES, SMALLARMS AND WEAPONS AND VEHICLES. SINCE MAY 1977 APPROXIMATELY 1,200 SOVIET MILITARY CONVY SELLS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO ANGOLA. SINCE SEPTEMBER 1977 THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO DONATED A ZHU 2 PATROL CRAFT, A SHERSHEN TORPEDO BOAT AND A POLYMCH U-BOAT TO THE ANGOLAN NAVY.

C. TRAINING. SOVIET INSTRUCTORS PROVIDE TRAINING TO AIR FORCE PILOTS, TO THE DIRECITRATES OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, AND TO THE ANGOLAN POLICE CORPS. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT RECRUITS FOR THE NAVY ARE ALSO BEING TRAINED BY THE SOVIETS.

D. MERCHANT NAVY. THE SOVIET UNION HAS SINCE MARCH 1978 DONATED THE FOLLOWING MERCHANT VESSELS TO ANGOLA:
1. VLADIMIR ILICH, 5,500 TONS
2. KARL MARX, 8,000 TONS
3. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, PROBABLY 8,000 TONS
4. SIX FISHERV VESSELS.

E. TROOPS. THE APPROXIMATELY 13,500 CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA ARE DEPLOYED IN ALL MILITARY FRONTS AND ARE ACTIVELY TAKING PART.
IN OPERATIONS, (RECENT U.S. FIGURES GENERALLY HOLD THE
CUBAN STRENGTH TO BE 19,000 TO 20,000). THEY ARE FURTHERMORE
EMPLOYED AS GENERAL PERSONNEL IN THE AIR FORCE AND SUSPECTED TO
BE PILOTS OF VIG AIRCRAFTS AND HELICOPTERS. CUBAN ALSO HOLD
SENIOR POSITIONS ON BRITISH SHIPS, AND VIRTUALLY ALL TRAINING
OF CUBAN PERSONNEL IS CONDUCTED BY CUBANS. THEY ARE INVOLVED
IN THE TRAINING OF AFRICAN PILOTS, NAVAL PERSONNEL AND THE
POLICE AND SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. SINCE JUNE 1975
CUBAN FORCES HAVE SUFFERED AN ESTIMATED 2,000 CASUALTIES,
AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THEY ARE CURRENTLY BEING
EMPLOYED AS RESERVES IN OPERATIONS AGAINST UNITA.
THEY ARE ALSO DEPLOYED MOSTLY IN THE LARGER CENTERS, WHERE
THE LEADER OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES BEING CONDUCTED AGAINST
THEM ARE SLIGHT.

7. (CONFIDENTIAL) THERE ARE AT PRESENT AN ESTIMATED 250 TO
300 EAST GERMANS 1. ANGOLA, MOST OF WHOM ARE SPECIALIZED
PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE MANAGEMENT, TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY. SOME
PERFORM TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS IN THE AIR FORCE, AND THEY ALSO
PROVIDE ADVANCED TRAINING TO THE ARMY. FOR THIS PURPOSE MILITARY
TRAINING CENETRE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE DOK, WHERE
REPORTEDLY PERSONNEL REMOVED BY SOVIET ADVISORS, WILL BE
TRAINED.

END OF MESSAGE
RR RUEAIUA
DE RUEKJCS @1776 3431602
ZNY EEEEEE
R 091602Z DEC 83
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIAA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 091515Z DEC 83
FM [(b)(3):10 USC 424]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHCR [(b)(3):10 USC 40-10]
RUEHNO/[(b)(3):10 USC 424]
RUSNOA/USCINCGER VAHINGEN GER/[(b)(3):10 USC 40-10]
RUSNOA/USEUCOM VAHINGEN GER/
BT
EZ1:
UNCLASS EFT 0
EZ2:
UNCLASS EFT 0
SERIAL: [(b)(3):10 USC 424]
COUNTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF); SOVIET UNION (UR); ANGOLA (AO);
      MOZAMBIQUE (MZ); NAMIBIA (WZ)
SUBJ: II0 [(b)(3):10 USC 424] REDS BUILDING MASSIVE ARSENAL ON
      SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS - GEN MULLER
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT; NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTEL
DOI: 831208
REQS: [(b)(3):10 USC 424]
SOURCE: THE CITIZEN
SUMMARY: THE KREMLIN IS PUMPING EVER-INCREASING QUANTITIES
OF AERIAL HARDWARE RANGING FROM SUPersonic JET FIGHTERS TO
ADVANCED RADAR AND MISSILE SYSTEMS INTO SOUTH AFRICA'S
NEIGHBORING BLACK STATES, SAYS THE CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRI-
CAN AIR FORCE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL MIKE ((MULLER)).

8307400187

COMMENTS: THE SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE; INFORMATION IS POSSIBLY TRUE. THIS IS THE ENTIRE ARTICLE.
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

COUNTRY: (U) ANGOLA (AO), CUBA (CU)
SUBJ: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 MORE ANGOLAN LOSSES (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.
DOI: (U) 840918410
REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (U) OPEN: "O DIA," PORTUGAL, MORNING DAILY LISBON NEWSPAPER. RIGHTIST ORIENTATION.
PRIVATELY OWNED.

SUMMARY: (U) SOURCE REPORTS THAT UNITA HAS DOWNED A MIG-21 AND AN MI-8, IN ADDITION TO INFlicting CASUALTIES ON THE ANGOLAN ARMY. THE 18 SEP 84 REPORT IN THE "O DIA," BASED ON UNITA SOURCES, IS PARAPHRASED AND TRANSLATED BELOW.

TEXT: (U) THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASED TRANSLATION OF AN 18 SEP 84 NEWSPAPER REPORT ABOUT ANGOLAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT/CUBAN/UNITA TROOP CASUALTIES.
- UNITA FORCES DOWNED A MIG-21 AIRCRAFT (REGISTRATION NUMBER 64C) TWO KILOMETERS TO THE EAST OF KUENBA AND SHOT AN MI-8 HELICOPTER, WHICH CRASHED 51 KILOMETERS TO THE EAST OF THE CITY OF LUSO. THE CUBAN PILOT OF THE MIG-21 WAS BURNED TO DEATH, AS WAS THE HELICOPTER CREW.
- THE UNITA REPORT WAS GIVEN TO THIS NEWSPAPER YESTERDAY, AND IT ALSO CLAIMS THE FOLLOWING ARMY CASUALTIES:
  A. DEAD - 97 FAPLA, 11 CUBANS
  B. CAPTURED - 17 FAPLA
  C. SURRENDERED - 17 FAPLA
  D. WEAPONS CAPTURED - 103
  E. LIBERATED PEOPLE - 741
  F. UNITA DEAD - 08
  G. UNITA WOUNDED - 17
- THE DOCUMENT AFFIRMS THAT ON THE 13TH OF SEPTEMBER, ACTION AT KIENGUE (122 KILOMETERS FROM THE ZAIRE BORDER AND 90 KILOMETERS NORTH OF MARIMBA) ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE CUANGO RIVER) RESULTED IN SEVEN CUBANS KILLED AND THE CAPTURE OF MANY

<<< SECTION 2 >>>

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
 SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

8400612953
IT APPEARS THAT THIS REPORT RefERS TO AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN ADDITION TO THOSE REPORTED IN ANGOLAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES.
REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET AMUR AND ALLIGATOR CLASS VESSELS IN LUBANDA WERE FLYING THE ANGOLAN FLAG AND NOT AS A COURTESY FLAG. FURTHER, THAT THE LST AND AN LCT WERE OBSERVED CONDUCTING CROSS-BEACH OPERATIONS WITH TASKS. (D)(1.4) ALSO SIGHTED WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE A SUBMARINE BUT COULD NOT CONFIRM.
(U) Under banner headlines, the Friday, 29 November edition of the Johannesburg Star reported: "SA Troops Well Inside Angola." This DK reports substance of article.

(U) 1. The Star article reported that South African troops were in ANGOLA serving as advisers and providing logistical support to the anti-NKLA forces. The article also stated that SA troops had clashed with NKLA troops in southern ANGOLA in recent weeks, but that it was not always clear whether they were forces of the NKLA or Smash. The SA troops are said to be based at CAIQUKE (11165,-14400) about 30 km inside ANGOLA and were prepared to penetrate more than 300 km into ANGOLA in consonance with the "hot pursuit" policy of the SAH.

(U) 2. According to the article, there was a company of about 150 SA troops with armored cars in CAIQUKE. Details on the number of advisers were lacking. The article claimed the presence of SA troops in ANGOLA had the approval of JONAS SAVIMBI, the UNTIA leader, which controls most of the territory south of BENGUELA.
Railway stretching from the Port of LOBITO (12225S-13305E) to the ZAMBIA copperbelt region.

(U) 1. The article quoting "authoritative sources in PRETORIA" and referring frequently to "the Minister" stated with reference to the SAVIMBI blessing that "In this case we are in good company because we find ourselves in the company of the big free nations of the world," referring to FRANCE, UK, US and "perhaps" BELGIUM.

(U) 4. The article stated that "RUSSIA is in this bad position. She has long lines of communication in this instance. The West with many friends in SOUTHERN AFRICA can establish itself in a very strong position and make it impossible for RUSSIA to infiltrate SOUTHERN AFRICA." Further, it added "SOUTH AFRICA would like to see more active AMERICAN participation." Referring again to "the Minister", the article continued, "the Minister said SOUTH AFRICA would be prepared to join other nations if they are prepared to drive RUSSIA out of SOUTHERN AFRICA, but added, SOUTH AFRICA would not fight to the last SOUTH AFRICAN on behalf of the free world." "If we have to fight we will fight on our borders to the last man," he said.

(U) 5. Quoting an article in the LONDON TIMES, the Star article continued, "The LONDON Times said today, the feeling is that the West is not pulling its weight in confronting the Communist threat in ANGOLA. More active participation by the West would allow SOUTH AFRICA to increase its own involvement on the side of FNLA and UNITA."

COMMENT: Although his name was missing and his title was only alluded to, it is quite obvious the "Minister" and this source was the Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. BOTHA. It appears to RO that this being the case, Mr. BOTHA is giving the public up for the eventual announcement that SOUTH AFRICA is perhaps involved deeply in the ANGOLA situation. Military mail from the "border operational areas" is now being censored; and, defense related announcements are becoming more frequent and from a higher level. These events follow closely recent meetings with the press - particularly the English press - called by Mr. BOTHA in which he vented his displeasure about press speculation and leaks which he considered endangered the security of the country.
CONFIDENTIAL

MSGNO  5 (MIR) ZZA 30/12/75 07153
VZC1 101561532 EIC183LGY886

PP RUEAIIE
DE RUEKJCS #9325 3691043
ZNY 101571001 C
P 2910432 DEC 75
FM JCS
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
RUEAIIF/C I A
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
RUEFHQ/CSA/F WASH DC
RUECNA/CNO WASH CC
RUEADWW/CSA WASH CC
P 2910102 DEC 75
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC
INFO RUEBARA
RUSNA/USCINCERL VIENNA GERMANY
RUDONBAA
RUCBSAAN
ZEN
RUEH
BT

E21:

CONFIDENTIAL DEC 75
E21

(b)(3):10 USC 424

THIS IS IR
(b)(3):10 USC 424
1. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA/UGS
2. RUSSIAN AIRPLANE FLYING MISSIONS IN ANGOLA
3. N/A
4. 29 DEC 75
5. 29 DEC 75
6. 29 DEC 75
7. (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. 29 DEC 75
10. ONE SECTION
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. (b)(3):10 USC 424
15. UNIDENTIFIED TYPE OF SOVIET JET A/C REPORTEDLY FLYING SUPPORT MISSIONS IN ANGOLA, INFO SKETCHY, HOWEVER
(b)(1)(1.4) INDICATED RUSSIAN MADE JETS INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. (b)(1)(1.4) NOT SURE PLANES ARE BEING LAUNCHED FROM ANGOLA, FEELS THEY MAY BE FLYING IN FROM NORTHERN NEIGHBORS. (b)(1)(1.4)

1981
BT
#9325
NNNN
NDDD

DISSEMINATED
(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):10 USC 424

3323 55 1
PP RUEAIIE
DE RUEKJCS #9845 3461306
INTELL-P
P 1213062 DEC 78
FM JCS
INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEANAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWDC/CSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIF/C I A
RUEOM/Wolf WASH DC
F 1213063 DEC 78
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC
INFO RUSEAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER
RUDOVIA/USEUCOM (b)(3):10 USC 424 VAIHINGEN GER
RUFHOL (b)(3):10 USC 424
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
RUEHD (b)(3):10 USC 424
BT
E21:
CONFIDENTIAL

E22:
This is in (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. (U) COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA(SF)/ANGOLA(AO)/GERMAN
   DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (CD)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):15 USC 370
3. (U) TITLE: EAST GERMANS IN ANGOLA
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: NONE
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 781212
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 781212
7. (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781212 (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. (U) REFERENCE: INITIATIVE AND IN (b)(3):10 USC 424
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: (b)(3):10 USC 424
11. (U) REQUEST EVAL: NO, OPIQ: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. (U) SOURCE: S.A. NEWSPAPER RAND DAILY MAIL DTG 781212
15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE, DIRC: NO
16. (U) SUMMARY: THIS REPORT FORWARDS A VERBATIM COPY OF A
NEWSPAPER ARTICLE IN THE RAND DAILY MAIL ON 2 DEC 73
CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF 2,000 EAST GERMAN PARATROOPS
AND MILITARY INSTRUCTORS IN ANGOLA.

(1) HEADLINE: "2,000 EAST GERMANS JOIN WAR ON UNITA"
BY CHRIS MARAIS.

"NEARLY 2,000 EAST GERMAN PARATROOPS AND MILITARY
INSTRUCTORS HAVE FLOWN INTO ANGOLA DURING THE PAST
SIX WEEKS AND ARE NOW ACTIVELY DEPLOYED AGAINST UNITA
GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGIONS, ACCORDING
TO MILITARY OBSERVERS."

"THE EAST GERMANS, EQUIPPED WITH PERSONAL WEAPONS, HAVE
JOINED THE RULING MPLA FORCES AND THEIR CUBAN ALLIES
IN MOUNTING A MASSIVE ONSLAUGHT AGAINST DR. JONAS SAVIMBI'S
UNITA GROUPS."

"MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORT, TOO, THAT A NUMBER OF EAST GERMAN
INSTRUCTORS ARE TRAINING MPLA AND SWAPO RECRUITS AT BASE
CAMPS."

"THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE EAST GERMAN MILITARY
PRESENCE HAS BEEN TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH ELECTION
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA."

"AS YET, NONE OF THE EAST GERMAN FORCES HAS SET FOOT
ON SWA SOIL, THE OBSERVERS SAID."

"ASKED HOW THE OPERATION AGAINST UNITA WAS FARING THE
REPORTS SAID THAT DR SAVIMBI'S FORCES IN THE SOUTH OF
ANGOLA WERE TOO WELL-ORGANISED TO HAVE SUFFERED ANY
MAJOR SETBACKS."

COMMENT: --(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

DECE 12 DEC 73
NNDD

NNNN

003510USC424:2
This report provides additional insights into how the Malawi Army officer corps views the position of MALAWI in the political spectrum and into the officers' thinking with regard to the circumstances under which MALAWI's political orientation might be forced to change.

2. (c) said the struggle for control of ANO-LA had been the subject of intense conversation among many of the officers (d) during the previous week. He said the major concern expressed by the officers was that the West (with which MALAWI was clearly identified in their minds) was on the verge of

Not Markdownable

Confidential

DD Form 1396

"Swing" ANGOLA. Moreover, he added that he was personally convinced that if "we" allowed Communist interests to prevail in ANGOLA, as they were now prevailing in MOZAMBIQUE, the West would be forced to lose all of its influence in the southern third of Africa, and if the West lost its influence in southern Africa, PALAZUL would soon find itself hopelessly isolated and inevitably forced to an accommodation with the radical forces that lay between it and the Indian Ocean coast.

3. (c) Specifically (b)(1), (b)(4) (c) believed it was essential for the U.S. to do more in support of the moderate UNITA-PFNL coalition and to prevent the Soviet-supported MPLA from dominating the future government of ANGOLA. He seemed to be very well informed on current and current on the various news media reports of Communist and other foreign activities in and around ANGOLA. He said it seemed as though the future of ANGOLA was likely to be determined by the fact that the USSR was willing to do whatever was necessary to ensure an MPLA victory while the U.S. was apparently not willing to do enough to prevent an MPLA victory.

4. (c) (b)(1), (b)(4) (c) knew that such national policy decisions were not as simple for a democracy like the U.S. as some of the younger officers thought. But their views, he said, should nevertheless be of interest to the U.S. Government. He said the younger officers saw the power and wealth of the U.S. as practically unlimited; they believed that the ability of the U.S. to influence world events was limited only by the will of the American people; and they would be very disillusioned if the U.S. were to allow Soviet interests to "take over" in ANGOLA. This possible disillusionment was significant, he said, because these younger officers represented an important segment of the next generation of leaders in PALAZUL.

5. (c) (b)(1), (b)(4) (c) realized that ANGOLA itself was not of vital interest to the U.S.—nor should it be to the USSR. Then why, he asked, was the Soviet Union trying so hard to gain the position of prime influence there? Was it not because of SOUTHERN AFRICA and the Cape sea routes? He said he believed that the Soviet strategy here is to eventually dominate the Cape and that the Soviets see ANGOLA and MOZAMBIQUE as means to that end. He suggested that the U.S. also should regard the Cape as a vital interest and be willing to counter this Soviet strategy.
RR RUEAI\A
DE RUTADO #4441 1571145
ZNY 
R 0611397 JUN 81
FM(b)(3):10 USC 424
TO RUEKCS/01A WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAI\A/CIA WASHOC
RUEKCS/RFCOEF WASHOC
RUEAA/2ND WASHOC
RUECN/CN WASHOC
RUEBARA (b)(3):50 USC 493-10
RUSNAAAI/ISEUCON (b)(3):50 VAIHINGEN GE
RULCNE (b)(3):50 USC 493-10
RUCJAAA/SCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL
RUECMRA (b)(3):50 USC 493-10
RUCBAAA/INCLANT NORVA
RUCBAAA (b)(3):50 USC 493-10
RUSNAAI
RUSNAAAI/SCINCUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUECMRA (b)(3):50 USC 403-10
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
(b)(3):10 USC 424

SUBJECT: (b)(3):10 USC 424 CAYO VERDE/CUBAN OVERSEAS PRESENCE
(0)
(b)(3):10 USC 424 (b)(3):50 USC 493-10

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL

5194313 -
9A. => DETAILS: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF

THE CUBANS NORMALLY RUN THREE FLIGHTS PER WEEK THROUGH SAL ISLAND'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BETWEEN HAVANA AND LUANDA. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE FREQUENCY HAS BEEN INCREASED TO FIVE FLIGHTS PER WEEK. THE TWO ADDITIONAL ONES NOT RPT NOT BEING OFFICIALLY RECORDED BY THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES. MODESTY, THE TWO ADDITIONAL QUOTE GHOST UNQUOTE FLIGHTS ARE MANNED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CABIN ATTENDANTS WHO ARE CUBANS. THE AIRCRAFT IN USE ARE REPORTEDLY IL-62'S WITH COMMERCIAL PASSENGER CONFIGURATION.

9B. => (b)(1)(b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)
THIS IS IR REPORTS SOVIETS TRAINING IN USSR OF TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE.

SUMMARY:

1. USSR (UR) - ANGOLA/MOZAMBIQUE

2. (D)(3):10 USC 424

SOVIET TRAINING OF TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (U)

DELETED

UNKNOWN

720510

(b)(3):10 USC 424

END SUMMARY.

DELETED

RELATED FOLLOWING STORY. (D)(1).14 (C)

ACCEPTED THE RANK OF PRAPORSHCHIK IN ARMY. WITH UNDERSTANDING.

HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO USE PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS. INSTEAD HE

HE WAS SENT TO 'BASE SOMWHERE IN CRIMEA,' WHERE HE WORKED WITH

TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. TROOPS WERE FLOWN DIRECTLY

TO BASE WHERE THEY REMAINED, WITHOUT PASSES, FOR THE DURATION

(UNSPECIFIED) OF THEIR TRAINING.

ORIGINATORS COMMENTS: (D)(1).14 (C)
SUMMARY: A NUMBER OF SOVIET GENERAL OFFICERS ARE PLAYING A KEY ROLE IN ANGOLA.

DETAILS: CLAIMED THAT SOVIET GENERAL COL. TSCHACHENKO MITSCH HAS BEEN ASSIGNED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REORGANIZING THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES. THE GENERAL HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING AND CONTROLLING OF OPERATIONS IN THE REGIONS BORDERING ANGOLA. ALSO SPECULATED THAT IN THE EASTERN REGION OF ANGOLA ON THE BORDERS WITH WEST AFRICA AND ZAMBIA, THE FOLLOWING SOVIET GENERALS ARE PRESENT: PARANOY, KUPTCHEVRKO, REMEN AND ZVICHARENKO. IN LUBANGO PROVINCE, ANGOLA, GENERALS VODANZ DONKESZIAN, VARGAOR AND ZAPUTRIANEVI ARE ALSO ALLEGEDLY WORKING WITH THE ANGOLANS AND FILLING IMPORTANT COMMAND POSITIONS, IN THE ULGE SECTOR GENERAL TCHATSENKO AND IN CABINDA GENERAL POR- TOLOV.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (C)
4. The exact intent or extent of the statements about Southern Africa are not known. Cuban military advisors are working with SWAPO forces for eventual control of Namibia and with guerrilla groups training to fight in Rhodesia. For the near term, however, the Cuban association with these groups will be limited to military advisors.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3)-10 USC 424
(XGDS P-RECEIPT)-UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

CUBA: CIVILIAN ADVISORS TO ANGOLA, (U)

1. Cuban and Angolan officials have signed 35 collaboration agreements for 10,000 Cuban civilian advisers to work in Angola in 1979. Of the projected number, 6,400 will be working under the basic economic-technical agreements and the remainder will assist cooperatives and commercial enterprises and provide political advice. The previous estimate was 9,000, but based on recent information from Angola's President Neto, 7,200 Cuban...
CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE NOW SERVING IN ANGOLA.

HAVANA APPEARS TO HAVE EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM TO STEADILY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN THE THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA. THE MOVEMENT OF CUBANS WILL BE FACILITATED WITH THE EXPANSION OF CUBAN CIVIL AIRLINES ROUTES. HAVANA APPARENTLY IS WILLING TO BEAR THE STRAIN OF THE DOMESTIC LABOR MARKET FOR THE BENEFITS IT DERIVES FROM RENDERING SUCH AID. THIS LATEST EFFORT, WHICH IS STRONGLY BACKED BY THE CUBAN HIERARCHY, WILL PROVIDE TRAINING TO CUBAN GRADUATES OF SECONDARY AND TECHNICAL SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES.

PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
(MCCA 17; DEC 78)

END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJ: IR (b)(3): 10 USC 424 | PORTUGAL (PO): SOUTH AFRICA (SF): ANGOLA (AO): RUMORS OF INCREASED MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

EZI:

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

1. (U) CRITYS: PORTUGAL (PO): SOUTH AFRICA (SF): ANGOLA (AO)

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

EZZ:

1. (U) IR NO: (b)(3): 10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: Rumors of Increased Military Presence in Angola (U)
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 8/1/83
5. (U) ORG: (b)(3):10USC 424
6. (U) REQ REFS: 
7. (U) SOURCE: (b)(3):10USC 424

---------------------------------

8. (CONFIDENTIAL) SUMMARY: South Africa is concerned over rumors of increased military strength in Angola. They have reports of the arrival of five Soviet Mig-27 aircraft during the last half of October. There are also reports of a new surface to air missile system being installed in Angola which the South Africans originally described as a SAM-10: due to the sketchy nature of the reports, this system is now listed as unidentified. Increases in foreign military personnel also concern the South Africans. They indicate that one "Latino" (their term) has been taken and may be a Nicaraguan; they have been concerned for some time with reports of a Nicaraguan unit deployed in Angola. They are also concerned with a reported East German military force.

9A. (U) DETAILS: None

9B. (CONFIDENTIAL) ORIG CMTS: The information provided is based greatly on rumor with little actual confirmation.

(b)(3),1.A (c)

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
11. (U) (b)(3):10USC 424
12. (U) SPEC INST: CIRC NO: None
13. (U) PREP BY: (b)(3):10USC 424
14. (U) APP BY: 
15. (U) REQ EVAL: Yes; Rel to None
16. (U) ENCL: N/A
17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A
RECL 04 Nov 07

CONFIDENTIAL INFOR
SECRET

R 2427592 MAY 77 26X
FM DIA WASH DC
TO
SUBJ: CIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U) DIN IN 144-34 (AS OF 27453 EOT 24 MAY 77) CUBA-RELATED CONVOYS TO AFRICA.

1. THIS IN AN UNPRECEDEDENTED MOVE - APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO COUNTER AN UPLIFT IN INSURGENT ACTIVITY AND RESULTANT PRESSURE ON CUBAN TROOPS - THE THIRD CUBAN CONVOY OF CUBAN MERCHANT SHIPS HAS DEPARTED CUBAN WATERS FOR AFRICA.

2. 

3. THESE THREE CONVOYS OF SHIPS DEPARTED CUBA ABOUT THE TIME CUBAN CASUALTIES REPORTEDLY INCREASED IN THE THREE FRONT INSURGENT WAR IN ANGOLA AND CAPIVADA. CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO APPARENTLY FEELS THAT THE NEED FOR CUBAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JOSEPH SOKOLO IS CLEAR. USE OF SHIPS TO TRANSPORT PERSONNEL WAS IMPLEMENTED IN LATE 1975 AND 1976 DURING THE CONVENTIONAL PHASE OF THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA. WHAT REMAINS UNEXPLAINED IS THE REASON FOR THE USE OF SHIPS NOW, SINCE THREE-TIME WEEKLY CUBAN CIVIL AIR AND SOVIET-CHARTERED FLIGHTS BETWEEN HAVANA AND LUBA IT IS A LESS THAN 24 HOURS PER FLIGHT, IF THE SHIPS CARRY ONLY MATERIALS, THIS WOULD BE A SHIP FROM RECENT PRACTICE, SINCE THE BULK OF MILITARY SUPPLOES IN RECENT MONTHS HAS REPORTEDLY COME DIRECTLY FROM THE US.

PREPARED BY (D)(3):10 USC 424

(924-24 536 899)
TO RUEJCS/DIA WASHOC
INFO RUECSA
FROM MINEX
SUBJECT: LIFE IN LUANDA
DATE: 26 SEP 79

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 790924
3. TITLE: LIFE IN LUANDA
4. PROJECT NUMBER: AE
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 790924
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790924
7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: ANGOLA
8. REFERENCES: INITIATIVE
9. ASSESSMENT: 
10. ORIGINATOR: 
11. REQUEST EVAL: YES (PO) none
12. PREPARING OFFICE: 
13. APPROVING AUTH: 
14. SOURCE: 
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: UNSources CAVET used to protect

CONFIDENTIAL
A BUSINESSMAN WHO RETURNED RECENTLY FROM ANGOLA PROVIDED HIS VIEWS OF LIFE IN LUANDA.

21. (C) DETAILS: FOLLOWING ARE ITEMS ADDRESSED:

A. HIS VISIT WAS AS "OFFICIAL" AS HE COULD ARRANGE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED ON ALL CALLS TO GOA OFFICES BY THE PORTUGUESE EMBASSY'S COMMERCIAL OFFICER--WHO HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN TO ANY OF THE OFFICES, IN SPITE OF HAVING BEEN IN COUNTRY FOR A YEAR. THEY HAD MEETINGS WITH THE MINISTERS OF PLANNING AND OF INDUSTRY AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK. NO CUBANS OR OTHER NON-CUBANS WERE IN EVIDENCE.

B. PRESENT IN LUANDA WHEN NEWS OF PRESIDENT AUGUSTINO NETO'S DEATH ARRIVED, THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE ALTERATION TO THE LOCAL AMBIENCE APPARENT TO SOURCED. THOUGH A RUMOR BEGAN GOING AROUND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD KILLED NETO AT ALL LEVELS OF CONTACTS, WHITES AND MULATTOES EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THEIR FUTURE. ONE MULATTO ANGOLAN OFFICIAL (NFI) ASKED FOR A JOB. ALMOST ALL OF THE CONTACTS EXPRESSED STRONG DISLIKE FOR THE CUBANS BUT SPOKE IN PRAISE OF THE YUGOSLAVS.

C. MANY INDIVIDUALS HAD RECEIVED TRAINING IN YUGOSLAVIA PRIOR TO ANGOLA'S INDEPENDENCE.

D. THE YPLA HAS THREE SEPARATE ARMED ORGANIZATIONS: FAPLA, THE ARMY, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTROLLED BY THE GOA OR, IN OTHER WORDS, BY THE WHITES AND MULATTOES; THE 20,000-STONG PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES, CONTROLLED BY THE BLACkS AND THE POLICE. IF A CONFRONTATION DEVELOPS--BLACKS VS MULATTOES AND WHITES--CONTACTS SAID THEY BELIEVE MANY FAPLA UNITS WILL SUPPORT THE BLACKS AND OTHERS WILL GO OVER TO UNITA. UNITA IS YET AN OPP OFFICER--"COMMANDANTE ZOLA"--WHO HAS A BLACK AMERICAN WIFE. ZOLA WANTED TO TALK POLITICS, BUT WAS TOLD HE WOULD HAVE NONE OF IT. UNITAS ALSO HAD SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO CLAIMED TO BE UNITA PERSONNEL AND WHO WERE QUITE OPEN ABOUT THEIR CONNECTIONS.

E. MANY APPARENTLY NON-OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT WERE VISIBLE. ONE ANGOLAN TOLD THE STORY THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN LEFT IN PLACE "IN ORDER TO GIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS THE IMPRESSION OF ANGOLAN STRENGTH." SEVERAL NIGERIA BROKE THE SOUND BARRIER OVER LUANDA AT NIGHT ON OCCASION, "FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS."

F. SPOKE WITH A SALESMAN WHO HAD RECENTLY SOLD SIX ARMORED MERCEDES 600 LIMOUSINES (ALLEGEDLY) AT A COST OF US DOLLS 325,000 EACH TO THE NETO GOVERNMENT. OTHER SIMILAR CARS HAD BEEN PURCHASED EARLIER. GOA MINISTERS DRIVE AT HIGH SPEEDS THROUGH LUANDA WITH SIRENS BLARING AND COLORED LIGHTS FLASHING. AT ONE POINT THE DRIVER STOPPED HIS CAR AND TOLD HIS "CREW" TO STAND AT ATTENTION, AS DID THE DRIVER. THIS OCCURRED DURING THE PLAY OF THE ANGOLAN NATIONAL ANTHEM.

THE SOURCE WAS INFORMED THAT TROOPS IN THE STREET INSURED
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT. THE DRIVER ADDED THAT AN EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT AND TWO OF HIS STAFF MEMBERS WERE KILLED BY ANGOLAN POLICE OR TROOPS WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY PROPER RESPECT TO THE ANGOLAN NATIONAL ANTHEM.

IMPRESSIONS OF LIFE IN LUANDA WERE AS FOLLOWS: HIS HOTEL — ONE RESERVED FOR HIGH LEVEL VISITORS — WAS VERY DIRTY, BED LINENS AND TOWELS WERE UNUSABLE (HE BORROWED SOME FROM A RELATIVE). HOTEL PASSENGER ELEVATORS WERE NOT WORKING AND GUESTS HAD TO RIDE (WITH CONSIDERABLE TREPIDATION) THE FREIGHT ELEVATOR, WITH UNDESCRIBABLE PEOPLE AND COMMODITIES. THERE WERE LINES HUNDREDS OF METERS LONG OUTSIDE THE ONLY FOUR RESTAURANTS IN THE CITY OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. ONLY FISH AND RICE WERE SERVED. MANY HUNGRY-LOOKING RAGGED PEOPLE ARE ON THE STREETS. IN CONTRAST, A PORTUGUESE BUSINESSMAN, WHO HAS A HOUSE IN THE DIPLOMATIC AREA OF LUANDA, HAS TWO BOATS, FOUR CARS, HORSES AND A KITCHEN STOCKED WITH LOBSTER, STEAKS, CHAMPAGNE, ETC.

PROBABLY REPORTED ACCURATELY WHAT HE SAW AND HEARS. HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO ANGOLA BEFORE AND ISN'T TOO KEEN ON GOING BACK. HE IS AN ASTUTE AND REASONABLY PASSIONATE OBSERVER WHO HAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN IMPROVING HIS BUSINESS CONNECTION IN ANGOLA. HOWEVER, HE FEELS ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS OPERATIONS WILL HAVE TO AVOID THE RESOLUTION OF THE NETO SUCCESSION PROBLEM.

THIS REPORT WAS COORDINATED WITH "O. (C.) DOWGRADIN & OECLAS DATA: DEC 26 DEC 1980".
CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS IN

1. (U) COUNTRY: PORTUGAL (PO)
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA
4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 771023
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 771027
7. (U) DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 771023
8. (U) REFERENCES: INITIATIVE
9. (U) ASSESSMENT: (b)(3):10 USC 424
10. (U) ORIGINATOR:
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: NO
12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY
14. (U) SOURCE:
15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NONE; DIRC: NO
16. (b)(1), (c)
17. SUMMARY: REPORT CONTAINS COMMENTS
18. (U) DETAILS: A.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. THE ANGOLANS WERE EXTREMELY HAPPY TO RECEIVE THE ADDITIONAL AIRFRAMES SINCE THE QUBANS AND RUSSIANS PROHIBITED THEM FROM GETTING CLOSE TO THE EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE IN COUNTRY. 

THERE IS TOTAL DIS\_QUST WITH THE QUBAN/RUSSIAN ADVISORS. ALSO THE CONSENSUS OF OPINION HOLDS THAT PRESIDENT NETO IS A VIRTUAL PRISONER.
UNCLASSIFIED

SERIAL: 1180838
COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AG), SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
SUBJ: III(680010/168/44) RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED -
INTL
DOI: 640109
REF: III(680010/168/44) 640109-1
SOURCE: THE CITIZEN

SUMMARY: A STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE GEN MAGNUS
(MALAN) SAID SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN
FROM BATTLE AREAS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AFTER A MONTH OF CON-
DUCTING WHAT DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAVE TERMED A SUCCESSFUL
OPERATION AGAINST SWAPO BASES. ON 840107 INFORMATION
WAS RELEASED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAD KILLED A

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED EFTO
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 01557 JAN 84
FM (E04010284-1)
TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC

USCINCUR VAHNEG GBR (E0193-50?)
USECOM DOD VAHNEG GBR

UNCLASS EFTO SECTION O1 OF 02

UNCLASS EFTO

SERIAL: IIR
COUNTRY: ANGOLA (AO)
SUBJ: IIR (E081015-120) RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS
- IN ANGOLA, II

WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALY EVALUATED
- INTEL
DOJ: 840105
RCS: (E00X) 096052-25X

SOURCE: THE CITIZEN

SUMMARY: A STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE GEN MUGABE
1 (MENALI) SAID SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WERE BEING WITHDRAWN
FROM BATTLE AREAS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AFTER A MONTH OF CONDUCTING
WHAT DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAVE TERMINED A SUCCESSFUL
OPERATION AGAINST SWAPO BASES. ON 840107 INFORMATION
WAS RELEASED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAD KILLED A
COMBINED FORCE OF 324 SWAPO, CUBAN AND ANGOLAN TROOPS
AND DESTROYED 11 SOVIET TANKS, IN FIGHTING AT CUADEI.
1 (E00X) 096052-25X

SEVEN SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS DIED IN THE
LATEST ENCOUNTER, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 21 SINCE THE OPERA-
TION BEGAN ON 6 DEC 83.

TEXT: 1. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS, LTGEN IAN
1 (GLEESON) SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE
(SADF) HAD SUCCEEDED IN DISPERSING THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA
PEOPLES ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) BUILD-UP, DISRUPTING THEIR
PREPARATIONS FOR INFILTRATION IN NAMIBIA AND TURNED BACK
THE SPEARHEAD OF THEIR ADVANCE.

2. THE RELEASE STATED THAT A COMBINED FORCE OF 324 SWAPO,
CUBAN AND ANGOLAN TROOPS HAD BEEN KILLED, AN 11 TANKS
DESTROYED AFTER AN ATTACK ON AN SADF CONVOY ON 840105
NEAR CUADEI. THE DEFENSE FORCE CLAIMED A NUMBER OF
PRISONERS - INCLUDING ANGOLAN - HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT WOULD
NOT DISCLOSE THE EXACT NUMBER. SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD
FACED HEAVY ARTILLERY AND TANKS. ELEVEN TANKS HAD BEEN
PUT OUT OF ACTION BY SOUTH AFRICAN INFANTRY USING ANTI-
TANK WEAPONS, AND 50 MM CANNONS ON INFANTRY FIGHTING
VEHICLES. IN ADDITION THE SADF HAS DESTROYED A "SIZABLE"
AMOUNT OF MILITARY HARDWARE INCLUDING "SOPHISTICATED

ACTION INFO

C5A WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
C5AM WASHINGTON DC
C5A WASHINGTON DC
CC WASHINGTON DC
DIHSA FT GEORGE # HEADE MO
CC WASHINGTON DC
SAFE

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=84010/00892 TOR=84010/0515Z TAD=84010/0546Z CSDN=M1AB14
PAGE 1 OF 1
091455Z JAN 84
SECT O1 OF O2

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO
UNCLASSIFIED EFTO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 091455Z JAN 84
FM (O) 091455Z USAF-434
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC

USCINFCUR VAHIMGEN GBR (O) (IC-50)
USEUCOM (O) VAHIMGEN GBR /

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 02 OF 02

UNCLAS EFTO

SERIAL: I116
COUNTRY: ANGOLA (O) SOUTH AFRICA (SF)
SUBJ: I116 RESULTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS ON ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES BY SWAPO OR "FORCES OF ANY OTHER ORDER" WHILE THE SCALING-DOWN OPERATION IS IN PROGRESS.

COMMENTS: SOURCE IS A DAILY JOHANNESBURG NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE. INFORMATION IS PROBABLY TRUE.

PROJ: N/A
COL: NONE
INSTR: (O) 091455Z SECSTATE-04
PREP:
APPR:
EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
ENCL: NONE
DISSEM: N/A BT

ACTION
INFO N01(*) 36(*) SECRE(* sf SECRE(*) (INFOR**)

ASD-PABI (O) 091455Z USAF-434

-CSA WASHINGTON DC
-CNO WASHINGTON DC
-CSAF WASHINGTON DC
-CIA WASHINGTON DC
-CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
-DENSA FT GEORGE G WDIE MD
-CWASHINGTON DC
-SAFE

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=84010/00901 TOR=84010/0517Z TAD=84010/0546Z CDSN=MIAB16

UNCLASSIFIED EFTO PAGE 1 OF 1

091455Z JAN 84
SECT 02 DF 02
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/CUBA (CU)/ANGOLA (AO)
   - NAMIBIA (WA)
2. (U) IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. (U) TITLE: SAFD OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820106
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) REF REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424

8305012059
8. SUMMARY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF) HAS CONFIRMED THE LOSS OF ONE OF ITS PUMA HELICOPTERS WITH CREW IN FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA DURING 4-5 JAN 82. THE THREE CONFIRMED KIA INCLUDED THE SON OF MAJ GEN DENNIS J. (EARP), SAAF, CHIEF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, HQ, SADF. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME TO INDICATE WHETHER CUBAN TROOPS MIGHT HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LOSS OF THE SADEF HEL AND CREW. THE CUBAN PRISIONER TAKEN BY THE SADEF IN ANGOLA ON 5 JAN 82 WAS EVACUATED INTO NAMIBIA ON 6 JAN 82 AND IS BEING INTERROGATED IN NAMIBIA AT THIS TIME.

9.A. DETAILS: NONE

10. PROJ NO: N/A
11. COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
12. SPEC INST: NONE
13. PREPARED BY: (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. APPROVED BY: 
15. REQ EVAL: NO
16. ENCL: N/A
17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

DECL: 8 JAN 82
NNNN
NNDN
NNDD
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. CTRY: SOUTH AFRICA (SF)/CUBA (CU)/ANGOLA (AO)/NAMIBIA (HA)
2. IR NO: (b)(3):10 USC 424
3. TITLE: SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA NO 3
4. DATE OF INFO: 820107
5. ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. REQ REFS: (b)(3):10 USC 424
7. SOURCE: PRETORIA NEWS
8. SUMMARY: THE CUBAN SOLDIERS INVOLVED IN THE RECENT FIGHTING AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE (SADF)

8305020736
UNITS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA MAY HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF A CUBAN LOGISTICAL UNIT BASED AT LUBANGO. THE ONE CUBAN PRISONER AND ONE KIA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS MEMBERS OF A LOGISTICAL COMPANY BASED THERE. THE PRISONER WAS IDENTIFIED AS PRIVATE FRANCISCO PAULO (HERNANDEZ), AGE 31. PVT HERNANDEZ IS MARRIED, HAS FOUR CHILDREN, AND HAD BEEN STATIONED IN ANGOLA FOR FIVE MONTHS. THE KIA WAS IDENTIFIED AS SERGEANT RAYMUNDO (DAVILA).

9.A. DETAILS: NONE
9.B. ORIG CMTS: SOURCE IS A DAILY NEWSPAPER THAT IS SOMETIMES RELIABLE; INFO IS POSSIBLY TRUE. THIS REPORT ADDS DETAIL TO IR'S MORE DETAIL WILL BE AVAILABLE LATER.
10. PROJ NO: N/A
11. COLL MGMT CODES: N/A
12. SPEC INST: NONE
13. PREPARED BY: N/A
14. APPROVED BY: N/A
15. REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE
16. ENCL: N/A
17. DIST BY ORIG: N/A

NNDD