USSR Review: Supplement

September 1968
USSR Review: Supplement

September 1988

This supplement of the USSR Review is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors, whose names are listed in the table of contents.
Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
USSR-Angola: Moscow's Role in the Cuban Troop Augmentation

Havana's decision in November 1987 to augment the Cuban troop presence in Angola was almost certainly made with Moscow's full knowledge and support. By forcing South Africa to reconsider its commitment to a military solution to the conflict and strengthening the Cuban position at the US-sponsored negotiations on Angola, the augmentation has furthered Moscow's goal of ending the conflict while preserving the security of the MPLA regime in Luanda.
USSR-Angola: Moscow's Role in the Cuban Troop Augmentation

Beyond possibly jointly deciding with Havana to increase the Cuban troop presence in Angola, Moscow's role in the augmentation has included helping transport Cuban troops and providing them with military equipment and logistic support in Angola (see figure). The Cuban augmentation serves Soviet interests by strengthening Havana's position at the US-sponsored negotiations on Angola and by shifting the regional military balance in Angola's favor. While Moscow and Havana appear to generally agree on the advantages of pursuing a negotiated solution backed by military force, differences could emerge between them over the timing of a Cuban troop withdrawal in conjunction with the implementation of UN Resolution 435 on Namibian independence (see inset).

The decision to augment the Cuban troop presence in Angola was, in our view, almost certainly made with Moscow's full knowledge and could even have been a joint Soviet-Cuban decision. Indeed, Cuba's President Castro and Angolan President Dos Santos met in Moscow in November 1987 and presumably hammered out the general lines of the augmentation.

Since then, the Soviets have commented favorably on the upgrade in the Cuban presence, have helped transport additional Cuban troops to Angola, and have provided additional military equipment to Angola, some of which is being used by Cuban forces.

A Stronger Cuban Presence

Previous Intelligence Community assessments have postulated that a dramatic military shift in the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola's (UNITA's)—or South Africa's—favor would prompt the Soviets to urge the Cubans to assume a more direct role in the fighting and to request additional Cuban reinforcements. It is evident that, faced with the failure of the Angolan offensive in the fall of 1987 and the prospect of escalating losses from a South African-UNITA counteroffensive, the Soviets and Cubans have indeed judged this to be the only viable military option. An alternative option—the direct engagement of Soviet combat forces—does not appear to have been seriously considered. Comments by Soviet officials indicate that Moscow does not believe Angola is sufficiently important to warrant the direct engagement of Soviet combat forces.

The Cuban buildup—to date roughly 12,000 to 13,000 additional troops—began in November 1987 and brings the total Cuban troop presence in Angola...
to more than 50,000. Since then, the Soviets have publicly praised the qualitative and quantitative change in the Cuban role in Angola:

- Soviet President Gromyko described the augmentation as "a notable action" in conversations with Mali's President Taisore in February 1986, according to Soviet press.

- An authoritative article in a Soviet military journal recently stressed that "the Angolans are not alone in the struggle... Cuban internationalist servicemen are at their side" and emphasized approvingly that the Cubans "take direct part in clashes with South African troops." Cuban reluctance to play a direct combat role in the offensive of 1987 was reportedly a major source of contention among the Soviets, the Cubans, and the Angolans.

Throughout the augmentation, Moscow has provided military equipment to Angola and has also provided an active logistical role there:

- The Soviets have delivered additional SA-3 surface-to-air missile (SAM) equipment, 12 MIG-23 fighter aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles for deployment to the southwest.

- Soviet military advisers continue to play a substantial role in Angola, and Cuban operations there depend on the Soviets for air-supreme links.

- So far in 1988, the Soviets have sent Cuba 70 tanks, additional armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and SA-13 mobile SAM launchers—possibly to replace some of the Cuban equipment sent to Angola earlier in the year.
Castro's speech at Moscow's 27th Party Congress in early 1986 revealed his concern that, under Gorbachev, the Soviets would pay less attention to their socialist allies in the Third World. Since then, Gorbachev's increased focus on US-Soviet relations, public support of negotiated settlements to regional conflicts, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan probably have exacerbated Cuban doubts about the Soviet commitment to the Third World in general. Castro almost certainly hopes that the augmentation will serve to demonstrate to Moscow the importance of continued Soviet-Cuban cooperation in the Third World. Perhaps more important, given public Soviet support for a negotiated settlement in Angola, Castro may be skeptical of Soviet willingness to protect Cuban interests in Angola and view the augmentation as a way to ensure a Cuban role in the talks and prevent a settlement that would force a Cuban troop withdrawal under terms not acceptable to Castro.

Benefits for Moscow

Even if the decision to augment Cuban forces was not Moscow's idea, the move serves Soviet interests:

- The Cubans have successfully shifted the regional military balance, causing the South Africans to reassess their commitment to supporting a military solution to the conflict between UNITA and the Angolan Government and helping to bring Pretoria into the current US-mediated negotiating process.
- The augmentation strengthens Havana's role in negotiations over a Cuban troop withdrawal, and this participation strengthens the Soviet position as well. The Soviets may have been concerned that Luanda would make concessions to South Africa that could jeopardize long-term Soviet interests in Angola. The Soviets probably expect that the Cubans will stiffen Angolan resolve to insist on provisions for an international peacekeeping force or other multilateral enforcement arrangement to ensure South African compliance with an accord.

Factors Influencing the Decision To Augment

Luanda had been demanding increased Cuban support to stabilize the deteriorating situation in southeastern Angola, and we believe the initial phase of the augmentation was primarily designed to meet this need. Domestic considerations, however, may have motivated Castro as well. Reports of widespread Cuban public dissatisfaction over Cuba's involvement in Angola—now in its 13th year—continue to surface, and Castro may believe that, by increasing Cuba's military leverage in Angola, he can enhance the prospects for a favorable negotiated settlement that would allow Cuban troops to be withdrawn "honorably" from the conflict.

Moreover, tensions in the Soviet-Cuban relationship—which appeared especially pronounced in the fall of 1987—may have played a role in Castro's decision to commit additional Cuban manpower and equipment. Growing Soviet irritation with Cuba's poor economic performance and mounting Cuban uncertainty over the effect Soviet reforms might have on the level of Moscow's economic aid to Havana may have led Castro to believe that the augmentation would remind Gorbachev of Cuba's value to the USSR and improve the prospects for increases in Soviet economic aid.
The military focus on the southwest—traditionally an area used by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to infiltrate Namibia—and Cuba's efforts to involve SWAPO in coordinated military actions probably have enabled Pretoria to carry out more operations in Namibia and improved SWAPO's military and political positions. The Soviets—and the Cubans—may be hoping this will bolster SWAPO's credibility with the Angolan Government. They may also see increased SWAPO activity in Namibia as another way to press Pretoria for more concessions at the bargaining table without sending Cuban troops into Namibia.

**Outlook**

Moscow has given some indication that it wants to avoid the political and economic costs of an all-out engagement between Cuba and South Africa.

This suggests that Moscow would oppose a Cuban invasion of Namibia, in the unlikely event Cuba proposed such a move. If South Africa were to mount an offensive against Cuban forces inside Angolan territory, however, the Soviets, we believe, would almost certainly provide the equipment and logistic support needed to hold off the South Africans. Meanwhile, the Soviets and Cubans would cite such an offensive as further proof that South Africa is the regional aggressor in an attempt to increase Pretoria's international isolation and possibly to stall the ongoing negotiations.

We believe that the Soviets are interested in a negotiated settlement as long as it provides for the removal of South African forces from Angola and leaves Moscow's client securely in power in Luanda. The Soviets may, however, believe that such a settlement is unlikely in the near term; they continue to express doubts about Pretoria's sincerity and evidently believe South Africa will refuse to implement UN Resolution 435 as part of a solution.

If Pretoria were to offer to start implementation of UN Resolution 435 at the same time the Cubans begin a phased troop withdrawal—a substantial concession—in our judgment, both Moscow and Havana would accept. Soviet-Cuban differences could emerge

**Steep Measures: Moscow's Leverage Over Cuba**

In the event that differences emerge between Moscow and Havana over the terms of a negotiated settlement, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would provoke a major rift with Cuba to gain a quick solution in Angola. Only in the fall of 1987, Moscow apparently smoothed—at least for the time being—a growing breach with Havana over the far more serious issue of economic reform in Cuba, suggesting that Gorbachev finds a non-confrontational approach with Castro more effective.

If the Soviets are more determined to achieve a negotiated settlement than we judge, however, Moscow could resort to more drastic measures to gain Cuban compliance. The Soviets could threaten not to replace Cuban military equipment deployed to Angola since November 1987—an arsenal that includes over one-sixth of Cuba's tank assets as well as hundreds of other armored vehicles and artillery pieces. Moscow has previously used the threat of reducing shipments of military spare parts to Cuba to force Havana to make policy changes or reforms.

To increase the pressure, the Soviets could also reduce economic aid or critical inputs into the Cuban economy, such as oil shipments, as they did in the late 1960s during a serious policy rift over the role of armed struggle in revolution. Castro would be unlikely to comply if the Soviets made general reductions in economic aid levels—even though Cuba's continued economic decline and hard currency shortage will limit its access to Western assistance. He probably would rely on Cuba's extensive internal security apparatus to contain any resulting domestic discontent. Major reductions in Soviet oil shipments, however, would severely undermine the industrial and transportation sectors of the economy and, we believe, would compel Castro to acquiesce to Soviet demands as he did in 1968.
over the timing of a Cuban troop withdrawal. Because UN Resolution 435 provides for an international peacekeeping force to remain in Namibia for only one year while South African forces withdraw from Namibia, Pretoria could insist that Havana cut the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to one year or, at the least, redeploy all Cubans north of the 13th parallel by then. Castro might resist such an arrangement to avoid the appearance of a military and political setback for Havana's Third World policy.

The Soviets, however, would probably press Cuba to be more flexible on a withdrawal timetable as long as they believed the settlement as a whole would preserve Angolan security (see inset). They probably would seek a face-saving way to address Cuban concerns without derailing the talks. If they sense that a tougher line should be taken with the Cubans, the Soviets might threaten not to replace the military equipment—including some of Havana's most sophisticated weapons systems—that Cuba has shipped to Angola as part of the augmentation. Nonetheless, Moscow probably would not cut off logistic support to Cuban troops already in the field, as this might also seriously endanger the Angolan regime.
Angola: A Beleaguered President Neto

President Jose Neto of Angola appears to be deteriorating as the country's formidable economic and social problems go unresolved and antigovernment sentiments remain active in much of the country. He is being forced to rely increasingly on Cuba and the USSR. Although Neto has not abandoned efforts to improve relations with the West, those members of his cabinet who advocate a balanced foreign policy appear to be losing influence to militant pro-Soviet elements.

Only the insurgents Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola and foreign exchange earnings from the Cabinda oil operations—amounting to $400 million to $800 million a year—prevent a total collapse of government authority. Plans are under way to increase oil production in Cabinda and off Angola's northern coast, but otherwise the economy is a shambles.

The economic situation appears as bad as it was before the revolt last May. There are critical food shortages in some rural areas and cases of starvation have been reported at some Luanda hospitals. Only a few markets or shops are operating in Luanda.

These problems are compounded by labor dissention at the docks and a shortage of trucks. As early as January, at least 20 ships were apparently waiting to unload at Luanda port; the backlog is costing the Angolan Government an estimated $3 million a month in demurrage costs.

Neto has made considerable progress toward controlling dissent within his own party—another 200 political dissidents have been detained in last December—a serious public document raises the threat of another popular rising. Many Angolans resent the recent government attacks on the Catholic Church.
Angola: A Beleaguered Neto...

From Page 1

Church and the arbitrary actions of the secret police.

The Communist Presence

Growing pressure on the regime has forced Neto to look increasingly to the Soviets and the Cubans for support. There are now about 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. By the beginning of 1976, 4,000 to 5,000 Cuban military advisers were serving in Angola, and 1

This number will probably drop to 10,000 before the end of this year. The Cuban presence is augmented by about 1,000 Soviets and several thousand advisers from other Communist countries.

Cuban advisers are said virtually to run the entire government ministries. They also hold important posts in the banks and at the top levels of the internal security forces and the judiciary. Apparently, no Cubans have been assigned to the Foreign Ministry, which probably indicates Neto's desire to maintain some control in foreign affairs.

The Soviets serve mainly as military instructors and technicians. They run the naval base and are involved in the construction of a new ship repair facility in Mocamedes. Almost every East European state is represented in Angola, Bulgaria and East Germany have the largest contingents of advisers. There are also some North Koreans there.

The growing foreign presence in the country has become a major source of friction with the Angolan public. Stories are widespread in Luanda of looting, rape, and cruelty by Cuban police and security forces. Cubans usually roam in groups and avoid entering some of the urban areas where black nationalism is strongest.

The Soviets are even less popular than the Cubans. Angolans consider them arrogant and insensitive and strongly criticize them for enjoying a much higher standard of living than the Angolans' expense. Neto doubles indicates that his growing dependence on Cuban and Soviet advisers will aggravate such tensions, but there is little he can do about it.

Relations with the West

Neto has not allowed his campaign to attract Western technical expertise and economic assistance. He may hope that by encouraging greater Western investment in Angola it will enhance the political legitimacy of his regime and increase his flexibility in dealing with the USSR.

Neto is not impressed with the quality of Soviet products sent to his country, and he probably doubts his Communist benefactors can meet all of Angola's needs. He also distrusts the Soviets and may suspect them of plotting to depose him now that his overall position appears to be weakening.

In announcing the appointment of his first ambassador to Portugal last month, Neto noted the economic benefits, including "the supply of technologies, machines, and industrial and agricultural products," that he hoped would result from improved relations with the West. The Angolans have also approached the Portuguese and the Yugoslavs for military assistance.

Neto has made significant progress in his efforts to gain international recognition. Sixteen African and nonaligned states are represented in Luanda, including the UK, Italy, and Brazil. Diplomatic relations have been established with Canada, Belgium, and the European Community. Neto says he is prepared to establish relations with the US as long as there are no preconditions.

The Yugoslav, Romanian, Nigerian, and Cuban Ambassadors in Luanda have urged the US to recognize the Neto regime on the grounds that Angola will become totally dependent on the USSR if it is denied access to a broader array of foreign assistance. The Portuguese Government made the same argument last year when it embarked on a major effort to improve relations with Angolans, but now it is having second thoughts.

A Unified Leadership

Neto's apparent hope of opening the door further to the West may not be realized any time soon. He appears to be under increasing pressure from militant pro-Nieto forces in the party to abandon the "Western option" and to disband several problack cabinet members who have been advocating better ties with the West, including Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge and Justice Minister Agostinho Neto.

Despite earlier reports that a major cabinet shakeup was likely early this year, Neto so far has announced only minor reshuffles to several lesser ministries. With the inclusion of more blacks and leftist military officers in the party leadership last December, the pressure is mounting on Neto to set Angola firmly on a Marxist-Leninist course in both foreign and domestic affairs.

A major street in Luanda
### Access to this document

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE**

Thursday 23 March 1978  NIDC 78/068C

---

**Warning Notice**

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

---

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 23 March 1978.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

USSR-AFRICA: Meeting in Moscow

Page 1

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
USSR-AFRICA: Meeting in Moscow

The Soviets are holding high-level meetings in Moscow with key African leaders and senior Soviet advisers in Africa. The Angolan chief of state will want to discuss the possibility of increased Soviet and Cuban military assistance in order to deal with continuing insurrections in his country. The Soviets will certainly want to hold a general discussion of ways and means to keep the pot boiling in Rhodesia. At this point, the USSR needs to prevent the continued progress of the internal settlement in Rhodesia and to improve the chaotic guerrilla operation there.

Top African and Soviet officials based in Africa began arriving in Moscow last weekend. Their travel plans were made suddenly.

-- Angolan President Neto apparently flew to Moscow over the weekend and is not expected to return to Luanda until next month.

-- General Buchariev, the senior Soviet military adviser to the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, was scheduled to leave Lusaka for Moscow in mid-March and may already be there.

Neto has his own particular problems to discuss with the Soviets. Serious economic difficulties plague the regime. Political dissidence is still a problem, and major economic and social problems remain unresolved.

Neto’s major concern is the increased pressure he is facing from Jonas Savimbi’s insurgent forces—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—which now operate in over half the country and pose a growing political
and military threat to the regime. The level of fighting has increased in recent months, and Angolan and Cuban troops are sustaining numerous casualties in all parts of the country.

Neto will presumably want to discuss additional Soviet and Cuban military assistance, including additional Cuban combat forces. Neto may also convey a request from the South-West Africa People's Organization for additional Soviet and Cuban assistance because of the possible impasse in negotiations on Namibia.

Chairman Mengistu—after his victory in the Ogaden—is now focusing on Eritrea. Ethiopian military planners are already moving ahead with efforts to break the power of the insurgent forces in that province, and additional Cuban combat personnel continue to arrive in Ethiopia. The USSR's interest in consolidating its influence in Addis Ababa strongly suggests that it will continue to support Mengistu's plans to break the power of the insurgents before entering any negotiations with them. An expansion of Soviet involvement in the Eritrean fighting is likely.

Moscow would probably prefer to try to settle the Eritrean problem peacefully before embarking on an all-out military campaign. Mengistu, on the other hand, appears determined to defer any talks with the Eritreans until he regains military dominance in the province. The Soviets will eventually go along with Mengistu if they have to, and are already portraying the Eritreans as surrogates for Western interests in order to justify Soviet support for an anti-insurgency campaign.

The Soviets will have to grapple with ways and means to keep the pot boiling in Rhodesia. The Soviets want to prevent progress toward an internal settlement in Rhodesia and to improve the chaotic guerrilla operations based in Zambia and Mozambique. The swearing-in of the three black leaders in the transitional government in Salisbury on Tuesday adds some urgency to Soviet efforts.

The Soviets, however, face a number of problems in trying to formulate a coherent strategy toward the Rhodesian insurgency. The most important at this point are political constraints. The frontline presidents, particularly Zambian
President Kaunda, are hesitant to permit an expanded Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa. Kaunda is under domestic pressure to abandon his preoccupation with the Rhodesian problem, and he himself fears Rhodesian military retaliation.

The Soviets, in turn, may distrust Mozambican President Machel and the insurgent faction based in Mozambique because of their willingness to accept aid from China.

The reluctance of the frontline presidents, who are meeting this weekend in Dar es Salaam, to encourage the Soviets is preventing a greater Soviet commitment to the insurgents. Until the frontline presidents and the rival insurgent factions in the Patriotic Front decide on military strategy and tactics, the Soviets will be in a weak position to push events along.

If the Soviets push too hard, the Africans will become suspicious. If the Soviets are hesitant, they may miss an opportunity. For the near term, Moscow will surely watch closely for new opportunities and be responsive to any African feelers for additional military assistance.
NO FOREIGN DESSEM
(CONFIDENTIAL)

MSGAD 15 (MIR) ZZA *03/03/76* 064117 E
HZCIC 121461302 EIC971LGY030

RR BUEAIE
DE BUEJCS 09765 1211243
HK-DCCC 121461441 C
R 3012432 APR 76
FM JCS
INFO RUEAIF/C I A
RUEHWHO/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
RUEHQA/CSAF WASH DC
RUEHAA/CNO WASH DC
RUEHNO/CSA WASH DC
R 3012432 APR 76
FM (b)(3):10 USC 424
TO BUEJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUSJAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERM
RUDGEBA
RUFRAA
RUDCEA
RUFRAA
RUSJAAA/USEVCOM (b)(3):10 USC 424
VAIHINGEN GERM
RUHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHSA (b)(3):10 USC 424

DT

E21:

C D H P T D H T 2 LNH RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
E22:

327 APR 76
THIS IS IR (b)(3):10 USC 424
1. ANGOLA/CUBA
2. CUBAN PROFILE IN ANGOLA (?)
3. NA
4. 3-10 APRIL 76
5. (b)(3):10 20 APR 76
6. NA
7. (b)(3):10 USC 424
8. NA
9. 30 APR 76
10. NA
11. (b)(3):10 USC 424
12. (b)(3):10 USC 424
13. (b)(3):10 USC 424
14. (b)(3):10 USC 424
15. TO INFORM (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c) SITUATION OF CUBANS
IN ANGOLA HAS ARRIVED (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

A. IN ORDER TO REDUCE THEIR VISIBILITY IN LUANDA, 27,000 CUBAN
TROPS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO CABINDA.
B. CUBAN SHIPS HAVE BEEN IN THE VICINITY OF CABINDA (b)(1), 1.4 (c)
SPECULATE THAT CUBAN TROPS HAVE BEEN FERRIED OUT TO THE SHIPS
AT NIGHT FOR RETURN TO CUBA.

REMARKS 7000 CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA MOVED TO CABINDA 17/04/76 (b)(1), (b)(3):10 USC 424, 1.4 (c)

3412-196-2
MSG90 15 (MIIR) ZZA 03/05/76 04117
CUBAN PRESENCE APPEARS CREDIBLE. THE SPECULATION THAT CUBANS ARE BEING SNEAKED OUT OF THE COUNTRY IS SO TENACIOUS THAT IT WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE WORTH REPORTING EXCEPT IT IS SO COUNTER TO THE CUSTOMARY STORIES OF INFLUX OF CUBANS THAT IT IS UNUSUAL. (b)(1), (14) (c).

AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ELICIT SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT.

(b)(1)(b)(3): 10 USC 424, 14 (c)

SUB-DEC 1962
DT
#9785
NNNY
NND8

(b)(3): 10 USC 424

CASTRO DELIBERATELY LINKED A DETAILED RECITATION OF THE THREAT THE US POSES TO "PROGRESSIVE FORCES" AROUND THE WORLD WITH THE MOST COMPLETE EXPLANATION HE HAS YET GIVEN THE CUBAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA. NONETHELESS, HE AVOIDED GIVING ANY SPECIFIC FIGURES FOR THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, OTHER THAN TO CHARACTERIZE THE LOSSES AS "VERY LOW." HE DID NOT MENTION THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS SENT TO ANGOLA.

HIS WARNINGS THAT CONTINUED RAIDS BY EXILES COULD JEOPARDIZE THE HIJACKING AGREEMENT WITH THE US WERE PROBABLY INTENDED TO ELICIT...
Both a vigorous US condemnation of the recent incident involving Cuban fishing boats and US action to prevent future attacks.

Castro continued Havana's diatribe against Peking by delivering the sharpest personal attack on the Chinese leadership since 1966. He criticized those who divided the revolutionary movement because of "simple decadence and old age, as in the case of the haughty and insane clique that rules the destiny of China."
Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activity in Southern Africa Through 1988

National Intelligence Estimate Memorandum to Holders
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NORFON — Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT — Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROP — Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON — Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL… — This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to...

DERIVATIVE CL BY REVIEW ON DERIVED FROM

A microfiche copy of this document is available from OIR/DLB or AIM request
printed copies from CPAS/IMC...
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

NIE 11/70-85

SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THROUGH 1988

Information available as of 28 January 1987 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum to Holders, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 8 February 1987.
CONTENTS

SCOPE NOTE .......................................................... 1

KEY JUDGMENTS ..................................................... 3

DISCUSSION .......................................................... 9
  The Regional Dimension ......................................... 9
  Consistent Objectives and Commitment ....................... 9
  Important Problems Remain .................................... 9
  Motives and Key Variables .................................... 10
  Angola ............................................................. 10
    More Likely Scenario: Steady Pressure, Limited Risk ...... 10
    Less Likely Scenario: Major South African Escalation .... 11
    Long-term Strategy ............................................ 11
  Mozambique ....................................................... 11
    More Likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting .................. 11
    Less Likely Alternative Scenario: Rapid Deterioration .... 12
    Second Alternative Scenario: Gradual Deterioration ...... 12
  Namibia/SWAPO ................................................... 12
  South Africa: Long-Range Approach .......................... 12
  Zimbabwe ......................................................... 13
  Other Frontline States ......................................... 13
  Implications for the United States .......................... 13

SECRET

1 6 4 9

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum to Holders updates our assessment of Soviet and Cuban policies in southern Africa in light of the events of the past two years and looks ahead two years. We have expanded somewhat our consideration of the Cuban role in the region and of Soviet Blue long-range objectives and policies toward South Africa.

The main focus of the 1985 Estimate was the challenges confronting the Soviet and Cuban position in southern Africa at that time. The Estimate captured those challenges, which included the Nkomati and Lusaka accords, Angolan and Mozambican economic problems, UNITA military success, and the US-brokered negotiations and predicted Moscow's responses quite well. For example, the Community expected the Soviets to point up the futility of negotiating with South Africa while waiting for Nkomati and Lusaka to collapse due to their "internal contradictions" and relying on their allies' military dependence to guarantee continued Soviet influence. The Soviets successfully followed this approach as the last two years have shown. Also, the Estimate noted that the CSSR would use its leverage to discourage the US-sponsored negotiations, again a response that the Soviets played out in subsequent months. Key questions of interest to policymakers—notably how the Soviets would respond to Lusaka, Nkomati, and the Namibia negotiations and how they would seek to expand their influence elsewhere—were answered in the Estimate.

Critical analysis of the 1985 Estimate indicates that:

—The range of alternative scenarios in the Angolan case was, in retrospect, too narrow. The Estimate considered the implications of further UNITA military gains and of Angolan agreement to a Namibia settlement and some level of Cuban troop withdrawal. However, it did not look at the possibility of a determined Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA offensive combined with a UNITA underestimation of its opponents' capabilities, a situation that materialized later in 1985.

—The implications of failure of US-brokered regional negotiations was not explored in sufficient detail, perhaps since this was treading too close to US policy interests at the time.
— We may have overestimated Cuban interest in at least partial withdrawal from Angola in 1984. It is equally likely, however, that there was indeed such interest at the time, and that Castro's more recent affirmations of his intent to keep forces in Angola for a virtually open-ended period reflect a direct and personal reversal of policy on his part.

— Then as now, gaps in intelligence coverage, especially on the military situation in Mozambique and Angola, made it difficult to raise the confidence level of our analysis of many aspects of Soviet and Cuban policy in the region.
KEY JUDGMENTS

Change in the Regional Outlook

Short-term Soviet and Cuban objectives in southern Africa have remained consistent over the past two years. These objectives, which they will continue to actively pursue over the next 18 months, include:

— Supporting their clients, Angola and Mozambique, against internal and external threats, albeit with a considerably greater commitment to Angola than to Mozambique.

— Preserving Soviet military access in Angola and Mozambique.

— Increasing Soviet Bloc influence in other states at the expense of the West.

— Extracting maximum propaganda value from Western association with South Africa.

— Undermining any Western initiatives that would threaten Soviet Bloc influence in the region.

— Improving their position to take advantage of developments in South Africa and to promote a pro-Soviet regime there using the ANC as their preferred instrument.

Since the 1985 Estimate, events in southern Africa have alleviated some of the challenges that confronted Soviet and Cuban pursuit of these objectives. A US-sponsored accord reducing Cuban presence and Soviet influence in the region, especially Angola, failed to materialize; the West did not offset their influence in Angola and Mozambique by providing significant economic aid; and South Africa did not impose its political and military domination over the region in the aftermath of the Nkomati and Lusaka accords.

Moscow and Havana face many factors that still work to thwart Soviet and Cuban achievement of their goals in the region—South African military predominance, ANC and SWAPO operational weakness, Soviet and Cuban inability to help their clients in Angola and Mozambique overcome insurgencies or build their economies, suspicion on the part of many states of Soviet motives, and the wider diplomatic and economic connections of the United States and the West. However, we believe that, on balance, Moscow and Havana are more confident now than in
1985 that trends in the region are not running against them. While economic constraints may affect somewhat the resources they devote to the region, their commitment to pursuit of their goals in southern Africa will remain consistent. As the security situation in the region worsens, Soviet and Cuban opportunities to expand their influence will grow.

Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets are pursuing long-term objectives in Angola and South Africa. Soviet objectives and policies in southern Africa reflect a mix of ideological, state interest, and opportunistic motivations. Critical variables that will affect the course of Soviet policy in the region include the security situation of the Luanda and Maputo regimes; South African willingness to intervene militarily in Angola, Mozambique, and other Frontline States; the success of Western policies in bringing about change in South Africa and the South African internal situation; and Soviet domestic economic constraints and political considerations.

Angola

While Angola has been the major priority of the USSR in southern Africa since the late 1970s, its importance in Soviet eyes probably increased even more over the past year due to US intervention on behalf of UNITA. Angola offers the USSR an opportunity to respond to this challenge under favorable military and political conditions:

— Our most likely scenario sees the Soviets continuing to build Angolan military strength while encouraging Luanda to keep steady pressure on UNITA through graduated offensive operations. In the event of limited Angolan-South African engagement, the Soviets probably would encourage Cuban units to help the Angolans, but probably would not substantially increase the role of their own advisers.

— In the event of a South African escalation of the conflict that threatened major Angolan formations, we believe that Moscow’s preferred option would be to have Cuban troops assume the burden of helping Angolan forces. A request to which Castro would probably accede. The Soviets might also expand the role of some advisers to include combat functions and increase the quality and quantity of military deliveries, but we believe that they are highly unlikely to use their own combat formations in Angola.

— Moscow’s and Havana’s long-term strategy in Angola appears to rely on the extension of Angolan air defense capabilities and increased military proficiency to restrict South African ability to resupply UNITA and damage Angolan forces, thereby enabling
the Angolans gradually to bottle up the insurgents. Meanwhile, the Soviets seem to believe that the insurgency will, for a variety of reasons including the diminishing of external support to UNITA, become less viable over time. Fidel Castro in 1986 stated his commitment to keep Cuban forces in Angola on a virtually open-ended basis.

Mozambique

Though Mozambique has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and remains a consistent supporter of the Soviets on international issues, Moscow has not made the kind of commitment to the FRELIMO regime that it has to the Angolans. While Maputo's military plight remains serious, Zimbabwean military intervention slowed insurgent momentum and relieved the ruling FRELIMO party and the Soviets of having to deal immediately with a near-term RENAMO threat to the survival of the regime. The insurgents will continue to retain substantial momentum, but we do not see RENAMO posing an immediate military challenge to FRELIMO's political survival.

More Likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting. The Kremlin will continue its military and economic backing of Maputo, though arms deliveries are down and Moscow may well keep the scale of its aid at relatively low levels over the next few years in view of Mozambique's dismal economic situation, inability to pay, and inability to absorb new military equipment. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to encourage and assist African efforts to help Mozambique fend off the insurgents. This option reduces Soviet Blue costs and exposure and opens possibilities for better relations with Frontline States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The Soviets will seek to extract political and propagan-da advantage by playing up their support for multinational—primarily African—military action against RENAMO. At the same time, they will probably seek to discourage Mozambican participation in any multinational military arrangements that would threaten to reduce Maputo's dependence on Soviet advisory support.

Less Likely Alternate Scenarios: Rapid Deterioration. We see two other less likely scenarios worthy of comment. It is unlikely that RENAMO will pose, over the span of this Estimate, a direct threat to the survival of the FRELIMO government. However, if FRELIMO resistance were to disintegrate quickly and the rebels be in a position to take Maputo, the Soviets in our judgment would be unlikely to escalate
their involvement and shoulder the high costs of preventing the
takeover themselves. They would probably generate an international
 clamor for a political solution. The Cubans would likely follow the
Soviet lead in this instance.

Second Alternative Scenario: Gradual Deterioration. In the
somewhat more likely event that Maputo's security situation continually
worsens over the next two years, we believe that Moscow and Havana
would respond first by encouraging Maputo's Frontline neighbors to
increase their support. Second, they would increase their own military
support—albeit at a gradual pace consistent with Mozambique's ability
to absorb the aid—to help Maputo protect key cities and roads. An
increased Cuban troop presence might well be a part of this expanded
support. Any significant augmentation of the Cuban military presence
would greatly increase risks of large-scale conflict with South Africa.

Namibia/SWAPO

Namibia is a low Soviet priority now that the prospect of a US-brokered
deal has faded. Moreover, the Soviets appear to be concerned
about SWAPO's ideological reliability, cohesion, and military potential.
The Soviets and Cubans will continue to provide SWAPO with arms,
training, advisory, and propaganda support, but probably will not
increase their aid to the organization—whose military effectiveness is
minimal—unless the Angolan situation stabilizes.

South Africa and the ANC

While the Soviets acknowledge that their current ability to influence
events in South Africa is limited, they anticipate that the eventual
breakdown of white rule and the emergence of a revolutionary situation
there will open the way for a pro-Soviet government using the ANC as
their principal instrument. We expect the USSR to continue its current
actions of supplying arms to the ANC, championing its cause in the inten
tional arena, funneling support to the South African Communist
Party to ensure its influence within the ANC, backing Western and
Third World antiapartheid campaigns, and promoting the ANC as the
leader of the antiapartheid movement inside South Africa. The Cubans
have made longstanding opposition to apartheid a more central issue in
their foreign policy, and will probably continue to encourage the ANC
to step up military activity inside the Republic of South Africa. They
may also increase the financial backing and number of advisers and
trainers they provide to the ANC.
Other States

Moscow most likely will try and build on the past year’s improvement in bilateral ties to Zimbabwe by closing an arms deal and, along with the Cubans, supporting President Mugabe in his role as Chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. The Kremlin is proceeding cautiously, however, that Mugabe may be wary of being “used” by Mugabe—wariness matched by Zimbabwean suspicions of the Soviets. The Soviets will also probe the interest of Frontline States Zambie and Botswana with offers of arms for defense against South Africa, seeking to use new arms deals as they have in Tanzania, to revive flagging political relationships.

Implications for the United States

Moscow and Havana continue to demonstrate their long-term commitment to their Angolan ally even in the face of US aid to UNITA and are probably willing to escalate that support as necessary to contain the UNITA threat. While they are probably less willing to increase their commitment in Mozambique, open Western support for RENAMO would probably lead the USSR and Cuba to consider upping the ante there as well. Nonetheless, they appear far from being able to help their clients overcome the insurrgencies in the foreseeable future.

The Soviets will almost certainly remain a minor economic player in southern Africa. The political benefits the West obtains from its economic predominance will probably vary directly with the overall levels of aid it is able to give to states in the region—sharp declines could open new opportunities for the USSR in now pro-Western countries.

While the USSR will pursue targets of opportunity in southern Africa through arms offers, economic constraints will probably lead them to be less generous than in the past on credits and repayment terms. This will almost certainly limit the attractiveness of their offers and may generate resentment on the part of those who received favorable terms in the past.

The Kremlin most likely will be willing to discuss southern Africa with the United States in bilateral exchanges to obtain information and intelligence on US plans and proposals and may also put forward regional initiatives of its own. The Soviets will strongly oppose US diplomatic initiatives or any regional process that excluded them or promised to reduce their influence, especially any Western attempts to promote a settlement in South Africa that did not leave the ANC in a strong position.
We believe that any confidence that the Soviets and Cubans may have that the white regime in South Africa will, over the medium term, turn inward due to its internal problems and play a less active role in the region would be misplaced and reflect a misreading of Pretoria's capabilities to pursue its regional policies and its determination to support UNITA. Also, while some Soviet observers acknowledge UNITA's intrinsic strength as a viable political force, we believe that Soviet and Cuban policies nonetheless continue to underestimate the viability of both the UNITA and RENAMO insurgencies.

Any Soviet and Cuban failure to appreciate the potential of UNITA and RENAMO to remain viable over the long term would present them with some policy dilemmas in the next few years. Their apparent strategy of gradually building the military capability of their clients while avoiding substantial costs and risks may not prove sufficient to prevent substantial insurgent gains.

Moscow and Havana will continue to have several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in the region:

— The Frontline States may be open to expanded arms relationships with the USSR, especially if South African military pressure intensifies.

— International and African audiences will be increasingly receptive to Soviet propaganda accusing the West of supporting apartheid and portraying Moscow as the natural ally of oppressed South African blacks.

— The external prestige of the ANC will probably continue to increase even as its internal capabilities will remain limited, enhancing the Soviet image as a longtime backer of the ANC.

— Any improvement in the military situation of Soviet clients Angola and Mozambique will offer opportunities for Moscow to upgrade support to SWAPO and the ANC.

— A sharp decline in Western economic aid could strengthen hardline pro-Soviets in Frontline States at the expense of more moderate leaders.
DISCUSSION

The Regional Dimension

1. Since the previous Estimate was published in 1985, the following events and trends have unfolded in southern Africa:

   — The United States has initiated a program of military support for UNITA, directly challenging a Soviet ally. At the same time, the US-sponsored regional negotiations collapsed.

   — The African National Congress has attracted increased support in the world state while remaining operationally weak inside South Africa. Meanwhile, the importance of apartheid on the African, Western, and international agendas has intensified.

   — Angola and Mozambique have not obtained the levels of economic aid they were seeking from the West.

   — Frontline States, fearful of South African intervention, have sought arms from both East and West.

   — For a variety of reasons, Soviet arms deliveries to one of their allies, Mozambique, have dropped off over the past two years, while those to Angola have continued at high levels (see table 1).

   — Insurgencies against Soviet client regimes in both Mozambique and Angola have not abated despite Soviet and Cuban military assistance.

Consistent Objectives and Commitment

2. Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets are pursuing long-term objectives in Angola and South Africa. Soviet objectives and policies in southern Africa reflect a mix of ideological, state interest, and opportunistic motivations. The significance of the region in Soviet eyes may have risen somewhat over the past two years as US involvement on behalf of UNITA magnified its standing as an arena of East-West competition.

3. The Soviets and Cubans continue to work together closely in southern Africa in pursuit of the objectives specified in the 1985 Estimate: supporting the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and Mozambique against internal and external threats, preserving Soviet military access in these countries, increasing Soviet Bloc influence in other states at the expense of the West, extracting maximum propaganda value from real and alleged Western association with South Africa, and undermining any Western diplomatic initiatives that would threaten their influence in the region. Over the long term, Moscow and Havana are seeking to promote a pro-Soviet government in Pretoria using the ANC as their preferred instrument.

4. In the previous Estimate, we judged that Moscow and Havana faced significant challenges to their position in the region. Since then, some of the above developments have reduced Soviet concern that the West would offset their influence in Angola and Mozambique and gain a predominant diplomatic position in the region. Moreover, South Africa has proved unable to impose its political dominance on Angola and Mozambique at Soviet and Cuban expense, as appeared possible after Pretoria signed non-aggression pacts with Luanda and Maputo in 1984.

Important Problems Remain

5. Many factors still work to thwart Soviet and Cuban achievement of their goals. South Africa remains the area’s strongest military power, and its internal difficulties may make it more rather than less inclined to strike or foment dissent in neighboring states. The military capabilities of both the ANC and SWAPO are minimal, and Namibia has receded on the international agenda. Although the military situation in Angola has improved somewhat, it has not stabilized. Maputo’s military prospects remain grim. Moscow and Havana have not been able to come up with an approach capable of defeating the insurgents in either Angola or Mozambique. Both of these Soviet allies have serious economic problems, which Moscow has been unable or unwilling to resolve. Also, in spite of their willingness to accept Soviet Bloc military aid
in dealing with South Africa. Frontline States such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia harbor suspicions of Moscow's political motives. Finally, the United States
continues to play an active role in the area and is the only
superpower that has contacts with all of the
significant regional players, pro-Western and pro-
Soviet alike.

6. We believe that, on balance, Moscow and Havan
are more confident now than they were in early
1989 that trends in southern Africa are not running
against them. We expect the USSR and Cuba to
continue, and, with heightened regional tensions, in-
tensify their efforts—including propaganda, active
measures, technical and political education, labor
union activity, and party-to-party contacts— to ex-
tend their influence and presence in southern Africa
and to try to undermine that of the West. Economic
constraints in both countries and regional develop-
ments will affect the resources each is willing to
devote to the region. We believe, however, that the
commitment of both Moscow and Havana to their
objectives in southern Africa will remain commis-
sional for the foreseeable future.

Motives and Key Variables

7. Moscow's policy in southern Africa reflects most
of the motivations that underlie Soviet involvement
in the Third World. South Africa is the most important
country because of its central economic relationship
with capitalist countries and because of its anti-
Communist policies backed by regionally dominant
military capabilities. In Angola, we see the ideological
imperative of defending self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist
states against "imperialist neo-colonialism."—Soviet
jargon for US foreign policy, including the "Reagan
Doctrine"—combined with the Soviet state interest in
supporting an ally in an area that is of strategic
importance to its economic potential, mineral
wealth, location along important sea routes, and ties to
the West. In Mozambique, the key motives of Soviet
policy appear to be fundamentally conservative, as
Moscow tries to preserve a previously gained position
while avoiding significant new commitments and ex-
posure. Elsewhere, we see the US exploiting new
opportunities, seeking entry in Zimbabwe and im-
proved relations with Tanzania on the basis of these
countries' fear of South Africa.

8. Critical variables affecting the interplay of Soviet
motivations and the Kremlin's policy choices in south-
ern Africa include:

— The security of the client regimes in Maputo and
  Luanda
— The extent of South African willingness to inter-
  vene militarily in Angola and Mozambique and
  to strike at the ANC in other Frontline States.
— The success of Western policies aimed at bring-
  ing about change in South Africa.
— Soviet domestic economic constraints and politi-
  cal considerations.

Angola

9. While Angola has been the major priority of the
USS in southern Africa since the late 1970s, its
importance in Soviet eyes probably increased even
more over the past year due to Moscow's perception of
US intervention on behalf of UNITA. Angola offers
the USSR an opportunity to respond to this challenge
under favorable military and political conditions. It
should be noted that in one estimation over 30 percent
of Luanda's oil revenue (which were assessed at $1.9
billion in 1985) has gone to the USSR and Cubans as
hard currency payment for their military support.
These payments almost certainly declined in 1986 due
to falling oil prices.

More Likely Scenarios: Steady Pressure, Limited Risk

10. Since FAPLA's 1985 military offensive, which
improved the government's position, the Soviets have
continued to build Angola's military strength, espe-
cially in the area of air defense. We believe that the
Soviet labor and may indeed have recommended the
current Angolan military strategy of keeping steady
pressure on UNITA through graduated, medium-scale
offensive operations, an approach that enables Moscow
to control the risks of confrontation with South Africa,
keep costs at a reasonable level, preserve Angolan
military dependence on the USSR, and deny UNITA
successes that might attract increased outside support.
For his part, Castro has personally underscored his
commitment in Angola by reiterating that he will not
withdraw Cuban military personnel, which now num-
ner about 30,000, until the conditions he specified last
summer—guaranteed independence for Nambia and
the end of apartheid in South Africa—are fulfilled.\footnote{See NI
Brief 86-0002, Soviet Influence and the Sub-Saharan
African: Politics in Command, Soviet Intelligence
Cisco Monthly, 1986, for a detailed discussion of these
activities.}
11. In our judgment, the Soviets are strongly disinclined to confront South African forces directly, and most likely prefer that the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) avoid major engagements with the South African Defense Force (SADF) as well. In the event of a limited FAPLA-SADF engagement, Soviet advisers in Angola would probably not go beyond their present support and advisory functions—the Soviets probably accept the fact that South Africa will deal FAPLA some local setbacks. However, they might encourage Cunza to commit its combat formations, which generally occupy defensive positions, to engage in offensive operations.

Less Likely Scenario: Major South African Escalation

12. A major South African attack that threatened the viability of a large FAPLA formation could lead Moscow to consider allowing Soviet pilots and, perhaps, other advisers limited participation in combat operations, though we believe that Moscow's preferred option would again be to encourage the Cubans to assume the burden of rescuing FAPLA. Castro probably would acquiesce to this in such a crisis situation. We continue to believe that the Soviets are highly unlikely to use their own combat formations in Angola.

Long-Term Strategy

13. Over the long run, the USSR is probably counting on the extension of Angola's air defense network and increased FAPLA proficiency to restrict SADF freedom of movement over Angola and limit its ability to resupply UNITA and to damage Angolan forces on the ground. This in turn would enable the Angolans to contain UNITA in a shrinking pocket in the southeast with reduced risk of South African retaliation. Meanwhile, Moscow will look to the following factors to reduce the viability of the insurgency over the next several years:

- South Africa's need to concentrate on mounting internal troubles, which could reduce the attention and resources it can devote to backing UNITA.

- The eventual passing of the scound of Jonas Savimbi, which will remove a major element of UNITA cohesion and strength.


The Soviets, in our judgment, may be overestimating the effects of these factors on UNITA viability. Internal troubles may, as we have noted, lead Pretoria to play a more active military role in the region, while UNITA is likely to survive after the departure of Savimbi. We expect the Soviets and their allies to continue their diplomatic, propaganda, and active measures activities aimed at discrediting UNITA as a tool of Pretoria and the West in an effort to promote the third of these factors.

Mozambique

14. While Mozambique has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and remains a consistent supporter of the Soviets on international issues, Moscow has not made the kind of commitment to the FRELIMO regime that it has to the Angolans. This is due to Soviet perceptions that FRELIMO is less committed to close ties to Moscow and to Marxism-Leninism than is the MPLA. Maputo's economic and political dealings with West and South Africa, and its overall economic and military weakness,

15. While Maputo's military plight remains serious, Zimbabwean military intervention slowed insurgent momentum and relieved the ruling FRELIMO party and the Soviets of having to deal immediately with a near-term RENAMO threat to the survival of the regime. The insurgents will continue to retain substantial momentum, but we do not see RENAMO posing an immediate military challenge to FRELIMO's political survival. Moscow's primary near-term objective in Mozambique is to help the regime defend itself without incurring significant new costs or commitments and to encourage the new Caissano government to reorient Mozambique's pursuit of socialism at home and close ties to the USSR.

More Likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting

16. The Kremlin will continue its military and economic backing of Maputo, though arms deliveries are down and Moscow may well keep the scale of its aid at relatively low levels over the next few years in view of Mozambique's dismal economic situation, inability to pay, and inability to absorb new military equipment (see table 1). The Soviets will almost certainly continue to encourage and assist African efforts...
to help Mozambique fend off the insurgents. This option reduces Soviet Bloc costs and exposure and opens possibilities for better relations with Frontline States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The Soviets will seek to extract political and propaganda advantages by playing up their support for multinational—primarily African—military action against RENAMO. At the same time, they will probably seek to discontinue Mozambican participation in any multinational military arrangements that would threaten to reduce Maputo's dependence on Soviet advisory support.

Less Likely Alternative Scenario:
Rapid Deterioration

17. We see two other less likely scenarios worthy of comment. It is unlikely that RENAMO will pose, over the span of this Estimate, a direct threat to the survival of the FRELIMO government. However, if FRELIMO resistance were to disintegrate quickly and the rebels be in a position to take Maputo, the Soviets, in our judgment, would be unlikely to sanction their involvement and shoulder the high costs of preventing the takeover themselves. They would most likely generate an international clamor for a political solution. The Cuban probably would follow the Soviet lead in this instance.

Second Alternative Scenario:
Gradual Deterioration

18. In the somewhat more likely event that Maputo's security situation continually worsens over the next two years, we believe that Moscow and Havana would respond first by encouraging Maputo's Frontline neighbors to increase their military support. Second, they would increase their own military support—albeit at a gradual pace consistent with Mozambique's ability to absorb the aid—to help Maputo protect key cities and roads. An increased Cuban troop presence might well be a part of this expanded support. Any significant augmentation of the Cuban military presence would greatly increase risks of large-scale conflict with South Africa.

Namibia/SWAPO

19. Namibia is a low Soviet priority now that the prospect of a US-brokered deal has faded. The Soviets appear to be concerned about SWAPO's ideological reliability, cohesion, and military potential, and the USSR would probably prefer that SWAPO maintain a relatively low profile so as not to complicate the situation in Angola. The Soviet Bloc will continue to supply arms, training, advisory, and propaganda support to SWAPO but will probably not increase assistance to the organization—whose military effectiveness is now minimal—until the Angolan situation stabilizes. Cuba has been pressuring other nonaligned states to provide material aid to SWAPO, and Castro, whose commitment to the movement has not flagged over the years, is likely in a position to sustain SWAPO at current levels.

South Africa: Long-Range Approach

20. The USSR's long-term goal in South Africa is the promotion of a pro-Soviet regime using the ANC as its principal instrument. Over the next decade or more, Moscow is looking to the breakdown of the present order in South Africa and the emergence of a revolutionary situation that the ANC, by virtue of its national appeal and access to arms and financial support, will be in a good position to exploit. Over the next few years, the Soviets will most likely continue their current mix of actions—supplying arms for the ANC, funneling support to the South African Communist Party to ensure its influence within the ANC, vocally backing Third World and Western antigovernment campaigns, championing the ANC in international organizations, and catalyzing the West for allegedly propping up apartheid—intended to promote the ANC as the leader of South African opposition, score propaganda points against the West, and portray the USSR as Black Africa's true ally.

21. Soviet officials have acknowledged that their current ability to influence events in South Africa is limited. While Moscow has considerable influence in the ANC as a result of East Bloc supply of about 50 percent of its arms and the prominent leadership role played by South African Communist Party (SACP) members, there are ANC leadership elements that are opposed to direct Soviet influence, and the ANC itself does not have direct control of the antiapartheid exiled factions inside the Republic of South Africa. Soviet writings suggest concern that the ANC be vulnerable to a split between pro-Soviet hardliners and nationalist elements willing to consider negotiating with the white government. As a result, Moscow will keep a close eye on the ANC through the KGB and SACP and could use the leverage that it does have to try to prevent ANC moves in a moderate direction.
22. The Cubans have reportedly encouraged the ANC to step up military activity inside South Africa, perhaps in the belief that this might help Angola by deflecting South African attention from UNITA. On the political side, in 1986 Castro increased the tempo of his longstanding opposition to apartheid and he may incrementally increase training and other assistance to the ANC.

Zimbabwe

23. Soviet-Zimbabwean relations have improved over the past 18 months, as President Mugabe traveled to Moscow for the first time on a high-profile state visit. For their part, the Soviets appear to have given up the option of supporting anti-Mugabe elements and are concentrating on their longtime objective of improving ties to Harare by exploiting Mugabe’s fear of South Africa, his alignment with Mozambique, and his socialist inclinations. The Soviets and Cubans gave Zimbabwe extensive financial help for the 1986 Non-Aligned Movement Conference and supported most of the NAM positions advocated by Mugabe in his role as chairman. Havana is setting up medical and educational exchange programs with Harare.

24. Moscow and Harare are currently involved in protracted negotiations for an air defense package that would help Zimbabwe defend against South African attack. Moscow sees Harare as fairly well off financially and is also probably wary of being "used" by Mugabe—wariness matched by Zimbabwean suspicions of the Soviets. Thus, the Soviets will probably not pay a high price in credits or other concessions to improve relations with Harare. However, they and the Cubans will continue to offer political support and probes for opportunities to expand their presence and influence in Harare, including offering to support Zimbabwean intervention in Mozambique. Mugabe, meanwhile, will pick and choose among these offers but is unlikely to allow major gains in Soviet or Cuban presence and influence unless South African military and economic pressure increases dramatically.

Implications for the United States

25. The once warm Soviet ties to Tanzania have deteriorated as a result of Tanzanian unhappiness with Soviet military and economic support. Moscow relies on Dar es Salaam’s lack of alternative military suppliers to ensure continued influence there, and in late 1986 Tanzania’s perceived need for arms to defend against South Africa led it to conclude a new arms deal with the USSR. Moscow also has provided logistic support for the Tanzanian military contingent in Mozambique. The Cubans have a limited intelligence and security cooperation agreement with Tanzania.

But we see little prospect of significant Cuban gains there. Generally, Western-oriented Zambia and Botswana have expressed similar frustration with their Soviet-supplied arms and neither has yet returned to the USSR for more military support. While the top priority of all of these states is obtaining economic help, the Soviets will look for opportunities to play on their military aid needs and will also seek openings to revitalize their new moribund position in Lesotho. Increased influence in any of these countries could improve Soviet ability to support future ANC activity, but would also expose these states to South African retaliation. The Soviets stand little chance of gaining even an opening for influence in Malawi in the near term.

Other Frontline States

26. The Soviets and Cubans continue to demonstrate their long-term commitment to their Angolan ally even in the face of US assistance to UNITA and are probably willing to escalate their military backing as necessary to prevent UNITA from posing a direct threat to the MPLA regime. While they are probably less willing to increase their commitment to Mozambique, open Western support for RENAMO might lead the USSR to consider upping the ante. In spite of their extensive military aid and apparent long-term strategy of strengthening Angolan and Mozambican military capabilities, the efficacy of Soviet and Cuban efforts to help their African allies and the insurmountable remains in doubt.

27. The Soviets continue to be a major player in the economic sphere. The USSR has not provided even its closest African allies with the economic aid needed by their ailing economies, and all of the black-ruled states of southern Africa, including Angola and Mozambique, look to the West for economic assistance. The political benefits that the West gains from its predominant economic role in the region are likely to vary directly with the overall levels of aid that the West is able to give and a sharp decline in economic aid could open new opportunities for the USSR in presently pro-Western countries.

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
28. While the USSR will pursue targets of opportunity in southern Africa through arms offers, economic constraints will probably contribute to greater Soviet reluctance to be generous on credits and repayment terms. This will almost certainly limit the attractiveness of their offers and may generate resentment on the part of those who received favorable terms in the past.

29. The USSR most likely will be willing to discuss southern African issues with the United States in bilateral exchanges in order to obtain information and intelligence on US plans and proposals. Moscow may also put forward proposals for a regional conference to polish its credentials on regional issues and avoid ceding the diplomatic initiative to the United States. As they did during the US-sponsored Namibia negotiations, however, the Soviets will push their clients not to accept any US diplomatic initiative or other regional process that promises to exclude the USSR or reduce Soviet and Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa. Any Western attempts to promote a power-sharing arrangement in South Africa that did not leave the ANC as the dominant political body would be especially likely to become a target of Soviet propaganda, active measures, and diplomacy.

30. We believe that any confidence that the Soviets and Cubans may have that the white regime in South Africa will, over the medium term, turn inward due to its internal problems and play a less active role in the region would be misplaced and reflect a misreading of Pretoria's capabilities to pursue its regional policies and its determination to support UNITA. Also, while some Soviet observers acknowledge UNITA's intrinsic strength as a viable political force, we believe that Soviet and Cuban policies nonetheless continue to underestimate the viability of both the UNITA and RENAMO insurgencies.

31. Any Soviet and Cuban failure to appreciate the potential of UNITA and RENAMO to remain viable over the long term would present them with some policy dilemmas in the next few years. Their apparent strategy of gradually building the military capability of their clients while avoiding substantial costs and risks may not prove sufficient to prevent substantial insurgent gains.

32. Moscow and Havana will continue to have several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in the region:

- The Frontline States may be open to expanded arms relationships with the USSR, especially if South African military pressure intensifies.

- International and African audiences will be increasingly receptive to Soviet propaganda accusing the West of supporting apartheid and portraying Moscow as the natural ally of oppressed South African blacks.

- The external prestige of the ANC will probably continue to increase even as its internal capabilities will remain limited, enhancing the Soviet image as a longtime backer of the ANC.

- Any improvement in the military situation of Soviet clients Angola and Mozambique will offer opportunities for Moscow to upgrade support to SWAPO and the ANC.

- A sharp decline in Western economic aid could strengthen hardline pro-Soviets in Frontline States at the expense of more moderate leaders.
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This indicates the countries where the Soviet military supports were carried out.

### Table 2

#### Southern Africa: Communist Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This indicates the countries where the Soviet military supports were carried out.

### Table 3

#### Southern Africa: Communist Economic Technicians, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This indicates the countries where the Soviet military supports were carried out.

---

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This indicates the countries where the Soviet military supports were carried out.

---

* Numbers are preliminary. Minimum estimates of the number of personnel for a period of one month or more.

---

* This table is secret.
DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive information and use of the recipient only.

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-89/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is blank.
SUBJECT: Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola During February 1976

Key Points

The amount of support provided the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) by the Soviet Union and Cuba in February rose slightly above the record January level.

-- February support totaled $400 million, bringing the total aid for the year beginning 1 March 1975 to over $400 million.

-- The largest portion of the February deliveries were foodstuff rather than military equipment. Although overall tonnage of goods delivered in February rose, the amount of military goods received probably declined. Some of the foodstuff delivered was given to the local population.

-- Communist shipping activity became more routine as the war wound down. The Soviet military airlift was limited and flights from Cuba were put on a regular every other day schedule beginning in mid month. Sealift operations between Cuba and Angola were increasingly integrated into the Cuban Merchant Fleet's worldwide schedules.

* This memorandum supplements and brings up to date two earlier Interagency Intelligence Memorandums entitled, "Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola from March through December 1975," published on 24 January 1976 and "Soviet and Cuban Aid to the MPLA in Angola During January 1976," published on 10 February 1976.
-- Arms deliveries included the first confirmed shipments of MIG-21 aircraft.

-- We believe an additional 1,500 Cubans were sent to Andola in February, raising the total number of Cuban military personnel to 13,500. This number may represent a peak, however, with new arrivals after mid month about matching departures.
The Details

1. Soviet and Cuban aid to Angola in February was maintained at a high level.

Sealift Deliveries

2.

3. Soviet ships carried military and military related cargo. sailed from the Black Sea and the Baltic port of Tallin.
arrivals sailed non-stop to Angola.

4. The most significant new equipment noted was MIG-21 aircraft

5. Cuban-owned or controlled ships stopping in Angola in February carried mostly foodstuff ships were reported to have provided food at pierside to the local population.

6. Besides hauling larger quantities of non-military goods in February, Cuban ships changed their voyage pattern. Rather than shuttling back and forth to Cuba, most ships resumed regular commercial operations after leaving the Angolan region. Simultaneously
more ships were assigned Angolan voyages as they became available in Cuba.

These changes suggest a somewhat more routine approach to current sealift operations.

7. We estimate that Cuban ships arriving in the Angolan region in February carried an estimated 1,500 troops in addition to cargo.

Airlift Operations

8. Soviet airlift activity to the Angolan area declined sharply in February.
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE-TIME GROUP

CONF: INFO: FILE

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF CI WHB 76-216.4

CUBA-ANGOLA: FIDEL CASTRO, IN A SPEECH ON JULY 26, REITERATED HIS STANDARD PLEDGE THAT "CUBAN MILITARY UNITS AND THE NECESSARY WEAPONS" WOULD REMAIN IN ANGOLA UNTIL LUANDA'S ARMED FORCES ARE ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED, AND TRAINED. Y

CASTRO ADDED THAT HE IS WITHDRAWING MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT NOW NEEDED BUT GAVE NO HINT AS TO THE NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED OR THE PACE OF THE WITHDRAWAL. HE PROMISED VISITING ANGOLAN PRESIDENT AGOSTINHO NETO THAT CUBAN TROOPS WOULD RETURN IF ANGOLA WERE AGAIN IN NEED AND STRESSED CUBA'S INTENTION TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN MANY FIELDS. Y

FOR HIS PART, NETO EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR CUBAN SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN TROOPS ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED, BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR CUBAN TECHNICIANS. Y

JUDGING FROM THE NATURE OF THE ANGOLAN DELEGATION, CONSIDERABLE PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE CUBAN ROLE IN ANGOLA PROBABLY TOOK PLACE.

NETO'S PARTY INCLUDED SENIOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, UNIONS,

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCED

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2013/09/25

E2 IMPEDEL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONF: INFO: FILE

AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS.
EUROPEAN BRIEF OCPAS EUR 83-236 FOR 7 DECEMBER 1983.

FROM: DDI/O/CPAS.

CONTENTS

1. (b)(1)
2. (b)(3)
3. ETHIOPIA-CUBA-ANGOLA: TROOP WITHDRAWAL
4. 
5. 
6. 

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
3. ETHIOPIA-CUBA-ANGOLA: TROOP WITHDRAWAL

///THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS FROM ETHIOPIA CARRIES SOME RISKS FOR THE MENGISTU REGIME, BUT THEY ARE OUTWEIGHTED BY POTENTIAL BENEFITS.

CUBAN TROOPS HAVE LEFT ETHIOPIA DURING THE PAST MONTH AS PART OF A 9,000 TO 4,000 REDUCTION. OTHER SOURCES INDICATE THAT 2,000 TO 3,000 TROOPS ARE DESTINED FOR ANGOLA.

ABOUT 2,000 TO 3,000 CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS ARE TO REMAIN IN ETHIOPIA AND WILL BE STATIONED NEAR THE CAPITAL--TROOPS ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OGADEN, WHERE THEY HAVE ACTED AS A STRATEGIC RESERVE.

COMMENT: ///A TROOP WITHDRAWAL MAY HAVE BEGUN, BUT THE DEPARTURE OF SPECIFIC CUBAN UNITS IS NOT YET CONFIRMED. CUBAN TROOPS IN THE OGADEN HAVE NOT ENGAGED IN COMBAT SINCE 1978 AND ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN IN THE CAPITAL--TROOPS ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OGADEN, WHERE THEY HAVE ACTED AS A STRATEGIC RESERVE.

///THE SOMALI MILITARY NO LONGER IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO ETHIOPIAN CONTROL OF THE OGADEN, AND THERE IS LITTLE NEED TO RETAIN A CUBAN PRESENCE IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, ADDIS ABEBA AS WELL AS HAVANA AND MOSCOW ARE LIKELY TO WELCOME THE REDUCTION OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF MAINTAINING CUBAN TROOPS THERE.

///MENGISTU'S REPORTED DECISION TO RETAIN SOME CUBAN TROOPS NEAR THE CAPITAL IS PROBABLY INTENDED TO PREVENT OPPONENTS FROM CONCLUDING THAT REDUCTION WILL WEAKEN THE REGIME'S DEFENSES. THEIR RETENTION, HOWEVER, ENCOURAGES CONTINUED SOVIET-CUBAN SUPPORT. MENGISTU CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY OF SOVIET MILITARY AID IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE INSURGENCIES.
Angola: Prospects for MPLA-UNITA Reconciliation

An Intelligence Assessment
Angola: Prospects for MPLA-UNITA Reconciliation

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [Redacted] for [Redacted], Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, ALA.

(REVERSE BLANK)
Angola:
Prospects for MPLA-UNITA
Reconciliation

Key Judgments
Information available as of 26 January 1985 was used in this report.

In the last two years, UNITA's military successes have forced the Marxist
MPLA regime in Luanda to consider whether to end the fighting through
negotiations. Although the MPLA has maintained a rigid public stance
opposing them, considerable ferment continues within the party supporting national reconciliation. Many in the
regime apparently view reconciliation as a device that at once would end
the civil war, lessen Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba,
and open the country to greater Western aid.

The internal pressure for negotiations has long existed, however, and does
not yet appear to have reached a critical mass sufficient to overcome
opposition. We are unsure of the magnitude of the opposition to talks, but
it appears to come from mulatto-led hardliners who persist in the belief
that UNITA can eventually be defeated in the field despite the failure of a
much ballyhooed regime offensive in 1984. Moreover, the mulattoes and a
sufficient number of their black supporters in the party, military, and
government appear to believe that a compromise with UNITA, especially
one that enhances the stature of UNITA's charismatic leader Jonas
Savimbi, could rapidly lead to an UNITA takeover and their own physical
demise.

In weighing the question of reconciliation, the regime is aware of the keen
interest in the subject among its allies and adversaries. The Soviets and Cubans have finally come to grips with the scale
and long-term nature of the UNITA problem, but they do not appear to
have budged from their staunch opposition to talks. On the other hand, the
MPLA has been repeatedly advised to negotiate by various African
leaders, by countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, and by South
Africa. We believe that Pretoria is an especially strong booster of
reconciliation because it assumes Savimbi would quickly dominate the
regime once he gained entry.

For its part, UNITA claims that it remains willing to negotiate with the
MPLA, but just what Savimbi would accept in a compromise is unclear.
His demands probably have grown following his rapid expansion into
northern and eastern Angola over the last two years.
The prospects that the MPLA leadership would initiate reconciliation talks any time soon with UNITA are, we believe, slim. The overwhelming problem for the MPLA of Savimbi’s popularity, which stands in sharp contrast to its own popular disfavor, appears insurmountable. Were he removed from office, however, the prospects that Luanda would consent to talks would increase. If talks do occur, we believe they might come under several circumstances:

- The regime may see negotiations—aimed primarily at a cease-fire—as a needed tactical pause that would allow Luanda to regroup its forces and, perhaps, assassinate Savimbi.
- President dos Santos has occasionally been said to favor talks, may become convincing enough to sell the MPLA leadership on negotiations as a tactical maneuver or as a way to reduce Angolan dependence on the USSR and Cuba.
- There is the outside chance that a coup of disgruntled officers, perhaps acting in the wake of embarrassing military setbacks, might overcome the almost inevitable opposition of the Soviets and Cubans to a coup and replace the current leadership and then sue for peace.

Even if talks should occur, the prospects that they will lead to peace are poor. Savimbi’s demands in any power-sharing scheme—say, for example, the interior portfolio—are likely to be more than the MPLA will be able to stomach. A somewhat more likely form of settlement would be a federation that granted UNITA control of much of the southern half of the country.

Yet, even if a federation were put in place, we believe it would only be a short time before the civil war resumed, with both parties seeking total power.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Setting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA's Views on Negotiations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA’s Stance on Negotiations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those Favoring Talks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Negotiations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Moves</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Advice and Pressure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Negotiation Boosters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet and Cuban Opposition</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Talks Might Occur</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Reasons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Move by dos Santos</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup d'état</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Scenarios</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the United States</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Angola: Prospects for MPLA-UNITA Reconciliation

Introduction

The question of reconciliation with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has long been a contentious issue in Angola's ruling Marxist party, the Popular Movement for the National Liberation of Angola (MPLA). To some in the regime, negotiations with the insurgents hold the potential for an end to a civil war that has plagued the country since independence in 1975.

With peace, they hope, Luanda could reduce its dependence on the Soviet Bloc and Cuba and obtain greater aid from the West. To hardliners in the party, talks with UNITA would at a minimum only enhance the insurgents' status and possibly lead to the party's rapid loss of power and the personal demise of its leaders.

The reconciliation issue, although not yet placed on the bargaining table, also appears to be emerging as critical to the prospects for ongoing regional negotiations. Some Western observers argue, for example, that, without a reconciliation agreement, the MPLA could not agree to a substantial Cuban troop withdrawal. Others believe that South Africa will not agree to withdraw from Namibia until UNITA's equities have been protected in a reconciliation agreement.

This paper reviews briefly the military setting that would condition any talks between the MPLA and UNITA, the ambiguities in their respective stances toward negotiations—emphasizing the evidence for division on the issue in the MPLA—and the external pressure on both sides to talk. It assesses the chances that negotiations will occur and, if they do, the possibility for their success, the two most likely settlement scenarios, and the implications for the United States.

Military Setting

For about six years after the end of the Angolan civil war in 1976, UNITA was confined largely to the southeastern corner of Angola, which it used as a base to stage a low-level insurgency in the central highlands, the home of Savimbi's Ovimbundu tribal group. In late 1982, however, Savimbi, most likely with heavy logistic support from South Africa, began expanding his area of control and now dominates almost the entire southeastern quadrant of Angola.

His area of influence—territory where insurgents have self-sustaining underground organizations—now extends northward to another third of the country. UNITA guerrillas have also demonstrated the ability to stage hit-and-run operations in much of the rest of Angola.

Savimbi's guerrillas also have increased the number of raids on economic targets and acts of sabotage in large population centers. In August 1983, for example, UNITA captured Cangamba, the first Angolan-and-Cuban-manned fortified garrison to fall to the insurgents. UNITA subsequently has laid siege to an increasing number of well-defended outposts, conducted sabotage operations in or near Angola's largest cities, ended any hope of resuming large-scale coffee production, shut down most diamond production, and now for some time has threatened publicly to disrupt the country's vital oil industry in Cabinda.

The MPLA and its Cuban and Soviet backers responded to UNITA's expansion—which, until 1984, had been accompanied by repeated South African incursions into southern Angola—with a significant military buildup. Luanda has acquired advanced early warning radar systems, sophisticated antiaircraft missiles and artillery, 18 MI-23s, about 60 more MI-21s, at least 24 MI-25 attack helicopters, at least eight SU-22 ground attack aircraft, and a wide variety of Soviet equipment.

The number of Cuban military personnel in Angola has increased to a total of approximately 35,000. MI-25s are flown by Cuban pilots and Angolan copilots. Cubans also fly MI-23s and some of the MI-21s.
The Soviets maintain Angolan aircraft and naval vessels and also fly a fleet of AN-12 transport aircraft that provides logistic support to Cuban and Angolan forces.

From August through October 1984, the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) conducted an ambitious offensive against Savimbi, designed, we believe, to cut off his supply line to the north and deal a punishing blow to his home base in the southeast. One major thrust was a sweep from the Angolan concentration near Munhango on the Benguela railway toward the southeast; if successful, the move would have cut UNITA's area of control in half. A second push, from the embattled town of Cuito Cuanavale, was supposed to recapture Mavinga and then move on UNITA headquarters in Jumbo.

The combat phase of the offensive apparently began in mid-September. We believe Angolan forces were able to make brief penetrations into UNITA-controlled territory but found further progress blocked. Government forces abandoned the overall offensive in mid-October and pulled back to their garrisons. Government sweeps through other parts of the country also wound down in October.

During and after the regime's offensive, the insurgents conducted several offensives of their own. They have staged further dramatic sabotage operations, including twice cutting off power and water to Luanda. By the end of the year, both sides appeared to be preparing for still more intensified conflict in 1985.

UNITA's Views on Negotiations

UNITA has long maintained publicly that it is willing to negotiate with the MPLA, but only on equal terms. Since breaking out of its base in the southeast, its demands appear to have increased, although precisely what they are is not clear. In mid-November, an UNITA official reiterated UNITA's willingness to talk with the MPLA, as did Savimbi in a speech later in the month. Savimbi, however, added that, following "such a significant evolution on the battlefield," UNITA now preferred the Angola problem to be solved "in the context of peace for the whole of southern Africa.

We doubt that Savimbi and his senior advisers have fully sorted out the position they might take in negotiations, but we suspect they will no longer be satisfied to settle for the role of simply a regionally and ethnically based political force. Savimbi appears to take seriously his claim to represent a broad-based opposition movement to the MPLA and, in our view, will insist on being a key actor in any regional settlement.

MPLA's Stance on Negotiations

The MPLA has opposed negotiations with UNITA unambiguously in almost all of its public statements. When the Angolan Ambassador to Portugal, a member of a moderate faction in the MPLA, publicly suggested in 1982 that talks might be desirable, he was soon recalled and the government repudiated his statement. Before and since then, President dos Santos and others have stated adamantly and often that they would not negotiate with the "South African puppet.

The regime's public front, however, masks an ongoing muted debate over the wisdom of talking to the
of the faction's attitude was the view expressed by some of its members that the "Europeans"—a derisive reference to both whites and mulattoes in the regime—should go "home" (meaning Portugal) and let the Africans settle their problems.

The Catete faction's influence declined precipitously in the early 1980s—we are unsure it continues to exist—but many of its ideas still appear to have appeal at senior levels of the MPLA. According to press accounts, President dos Santos has deprived some, although by no means all, of the faction's key leaders of their party and government posts and, in some cases, sent them into internal exile or diplomatic posts abroad. Dos Santos, however, has also diminished the powers of the hardline multiracial faction on the left, according to press sources and Western diplomatic reports, and has subsequently built up his own core of followers, including former members of the Catete faction. Some of the members of his group—and some reporting suggests dos Santos himself—continue to be interested in a rapprochement with UNITA.

These Exclusion Talks, a group within the party that has most ardently championed negotiations, has been the "Catete faction"—a loose collection of black nationalist "moderates," most of whom were born in the town of Catete near Luanda. In the early 1980s, the faction was openly hostile to Moscow, Havana, and the hardline mulattoes who held key party, government, and military positions. A major element in the informal Catete platform was a negotiated settlement with UNITA, the group also favored strong ties with the West. Typical
Earlier Talks

MPLA-UNITA relations are largely a saga of bitterness, mutual recrimination, and struggle. Each side has accused the other of selling out its rival to the Portuguese during the anticolonial struggle [we suspect both charges may be accurate], and there are rumors that the MPLA executed UNITA's negotiators in 1975 when the struggle escalated into civil war.

After the MPLA's victory, the new regime found that while one of its rivals—the Front for the National Liberation of Angola—began to fade into oblivion in the north, UNITA would not go away. The government attempted as early as April 1976 to negotiate with the insurgents and offered to incorporate UNITA officials into the government—with the exception of Savimbi and two other top leaders. By early 1978, Neto was said to be interested in reconciliation, even with Savimbi.

Here has been growing sentiment for talks with UNITA, but buckers of negotiations cannot decide how to deal.
Opposition to Negotiations
Despite some sentiment within the MPLA for reconciliation efforts, those in the party who oppose talks under any condition short of total surrender by UNITA still appear to have the upper hand. The opposition is led by at least three important militants:

- **Lucio Lara**, a Politburo member and the party’s chief ideologue, has long been identified as a leader of a faction determined to fight on against UNITA and to continue full support for the insurgent activities of the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). Lara emphasized the need for total victory over UNITA in late 1982, and he still strongly opposes reconciliation.

- **Henrique Carvalho** “Onambwe” Santos, alternate Politburo member and Minister of Industry, also is staunchly opposed to negotiations, according to several former de facto bosses of the secret police, he has hated and feared by many in the regime. Given his extensive association with Soviet bloc security services in the past, we suspect—although there is no evidence to confirm it—that he does their bidding, either for pay, or by inclination, or both.

- **Paulo Jorge**, who lost his job as Foreign Minister in late 1984 but still retains his seat on the Central Committee, also has strongly opposed talking with UNITA. In May 1984 he said that UNITA was a military problem, not a political issue. Although the MPLA Central Committee occasionally discussed the possibility of reconciliation, he dogmatically asserted that the leadership was largely united on its decision not to talk with UNITA and the outcome was always the same.
Although there are occasional rumors of a plan in Lisbon or other European capitals, there is no
credible evidence available to us that indicates talks
are under way. We have therefore decided to

..
unsolicited. In our view, most foreign observers recognize, however, that the subject is sensitive in Luanda and that, if it is broached, it must be discussed with considerable discretion. The advice, in addition to pressure, has come from various quarters.

South Africa
Pretoria has been the most forceful advocate of reconciliation. Of all outside powers, it has been Savimbi’s chief backer since the late 1970s. Yet we believe most key officials in the South African Government are determined that Savimbi eventually will take power in Luanda. Savimbi’s triumph would at the same time eliminate one of the regimes most hostile to Pretoria in the region and serve as part of a ring of “moderate” buffer states surrounding Namibia. To the South Africans, Angolan national reconciliation offers a possible shortcut for Savimbi’s taking power, a goal they believe he would eventually gain in any event by fighting to the bitter end.

Africa observers at least two reconciliation scenarios acceptable for achieving its objectives. One option would be for Savimbi to join a coalition government. Such a position would allow him eventually to outmaneuver his MPLA adversaries either through a coup or peaceful negotiation. The chief risk in this course of action would be that Savimbi might be assassinated in a hostile, Mbande-dominated Luanda. We doubt, however, that many in Pretoria believe that this is a realistic option.

A second alternative possibly acceptable to Pretoria would be a de facto partition of Angola—something UNITA still publicly rules out—in which UNITA would dominate the lower half of the country and serve as a buffer between a Marxist northern Angola and an independent Namibia. In such a scenario, Pretoria might calculate that Savimbi would be in a good position to press for total victory over the north once he established a secure base in the southern half of the country.

South Africa has pressed for UNITA-MPLA reconciliation in a variety of forums.

Other Negotiation Boosters
José Teixeira de Melo Santos also has received advice from his Frontline colleagues and other African leaders to negotiate his party’s differences with UNITA. The most ardent promoters of reconciliation appear to be the Zambians, who had ties with UNITA before Angolan independence and whose border with Angola is controlled by the insurgents. Since the abortive MPLA-UNITA talks in 1981-82, countries in both Eastern and Western Europe appear to support reconciliation as well.
Soviet and Cuban Opposition
Moscow is still apparently adamant that there be no compromise with Savimbi. In early 1984 a Soviet foreign affairs official told a US diplomat that UNITA's strength was illusory and would vanish if South African aid were cut off. He asserted that a coalition government with the insurgents would be out of the question so long as Savimbi controlled UNITA; were someone else in control, there was a possibility for some power sharing. In June, another Soviet official expressed Moscow's determination to see the struggle through without compromise with UNITA; this is the line customarily taken by Soviet propagandists.

The Soviet position softened somewhat—at least briefly—in the wake of Luanda's failed offensive in late 1984. A Soviet ambassador in southern Africa, after returning from a trip to Moscow and Luanda in October, told his superiors that he believed the insurgents with greater staying power and popularity. He said that the MPLA would be unable to defeat the insurgents militarily, and that Moscow believed there was no alternative to a negotiated settlement.

More recently, however, Moscow has reverted to its familiar hard line of opposing reconciliation under any circumstances other than UNITA's surrender. A Soviet diplomat said this point forcefully to a US official in late December, and we have no reason to doubt his sincerity or that it reflects his government's policy.

There have also been signs that Cuba might be looking on negotiations more favorably.

Prospects
The prospects for the MPLA leadership initiating reconciliation talks with UNITA are, we believe, slim. The overwhelming problem for the MPLA of Savimbi's potential popularity with the masses appears insurmountable so long as he heads UNITA. The basic assumption of many of the MPLA's top leaders appears to remain that, if Savimbi comes to Luanda alive and not as a prisoner, he will succeed in taking over the government. Consequently, reconciliation is tantamount to suicide.

In our view, most MPLA hardline leaders also believe they can avoid talks through a military victory. Hawks such as "Iko" Carreira are still seemingly enthralled by the military hardware FAPLA continues to acquire and, we believe, assume that it will eventually prove decisive against UNITA. Because their confidence evidently has not been shaken by the failure of FAPLA's offensive in 1984, it is difficult to determine when they will come to grips with what, in our view, is the reality of UNITA's slow but unrelenting expansion.

The hardliners, moreover, appear to have solid external backing. There is no convincing evidence that either Moscow or Havana is willing to endorse talks with UNITA at this time. Like the regime's top leadership, the Soviets and Cubans seem to believe that the MPLA could not compete with Savimbi in a nonviolent political contest. They also appear willing to allow Luanda to continue the fight.

Finally, the regime's actions so far convince us that those within
MPLA who are said to be willing to deal with UNITA—even under Savimbi—lack sufficient clout to force the government into talks.

**How Talks Might Occur**

Although the prospects for negotiations in the next year or so do not appear bright, they cannot be ruled out. If they were to occur, we believe they might be conducted under several possible scenarios.

**Tactical Reasons.** If the MPLA feels more hard pressed militarily—for example, large units begin to defect in the field or major towns fall and remain in UNITA’s hands—Luanda might stall for time by seeking talks leading to a cease-fire. This option might be especially attractive if it seemed likely to expose Savimbi to an assassination attempt. It would offer, however, the disadvantage of giving tacit recognition to Pretoria’s “nunette” and allow them to regroup as well.

**A Move by dos Santos.** Over the past few years dos Santos has indicated his intense desire to lessen Angolan dependence on the Soviets and Cubans, and a deal with Savimbi would be a giant step in this direction. Although he has, in our judgement, gradually enhanced his influence within the party—and thus increased his ability to make important decisions—we doubt he has the power alone to force through a controversial decision to seek reconciliation. Even so, one tactic he might try would be to sell the idea of negotiations to the Central Committee as an ostensibly tactical maneuver—and then proceed to negotiate seriously. Alternatively, he might eventually amass enough support in the party to force approval for talks on their own merits.

**Coup d’etat.** This is perhaps the most unlikely scenario, but it cannot be ruled out. Discontent among the Young Captains and other groups within FAPLA might lead to a forceful move against the widely unpopular ruling clique, particularly in the wake of a series of setbacks in the field or intensified terrorist activities affecting the major cities. Cubans troops already have saved the regime from a coup attempt in 1977, however, and they might do so again if the coup were led by moderates.

**Settlement Scenarios**

Were serious talks to occur, we doubt they would prove fruitful. UNITA probably would be willing to make concessions if it were granted a recognized role in the government, but it is likely to insist on a major role unacceptable to the MPLA. The MPLA, which has seen its dream of running a one-party state emerge in the mid-1970s and then recede in the 1980s in the face of UNITA’s expansion, still finds the prospect of power sharing repugnant. Moreover, the historical enmity between the leaders of the two parties, which dates from preindependence rivalries, suggests that even discourse through well-intentioned intermediaries would be rancorous and probably unproductive. The chances of a coalition government being created or—if it were—lasting more than a few months or involving real power sharing thus appear to be remote.

A more likely outcome to negotiations is partition or federation.
Implications for the United States

In our view, reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA could potentially unlock doors that so far bar the regional settlement. Washington seeks in southern Africa. Without the UNITA insurgency and the threat of further South African incursions, Angola's need for Cuban troops recedes. Moreover, a government of national unity would undoubtedly attempt to reduce its political and economic dependence on the Soviet Bloc and Cuba and turn more to the West for technical assistance and aid. In addition, were the MPLA regime leavened by an UNITA presence or were UNITA to have uncontested control of southern Angola, South Africa most likely would feel more secure about turning Namibia over to a SWAPO regime, which Pretoria probably would view as potentially less radical if surrounded by non-Marxist neighbors.

In the absence of an MPLA-UNITA rapprochement, the prospects for a regional settlement diminish. Although South Africa has not made reconciliation in Angola an explicit condition in negotiations for Namibian independence, most senior South African officials, in our view, believe that Luanda will not agree to an acceptable formula for Cuban troop withdrawal. Moreover, we believe that some of these officials will not support a regional settlement that does not fully protect UNITA's equities—a position that may rule out any proposal acceptable to an MPLA regime under siege from UNITA.
National Intelligence Bulletin
December 31, 1975

CONTENTS

ANGOLA: Tempo of fighting likely to increase ........................................... 1

LATIN AMERICA - ANGOLA: Reaction to Cuba's involvement ....................... 20
ANGOLA

With the Organization of African Unity’s emergency summit on Angola now less than two weeks off, the tempo of fighting in Angola is likely to pick up as each of the two rival regimes attempts to impress African leaders with its strength.

In northern Angola yesterday, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola withdrew from Camabatela after forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola had bombarded the town with rockets for several days.

In eastern Angola, heavy fighting is still taking place around Teixeira de Sousa, which the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola claimed it had captured last week with National Front forces.

Clashes between National Union and National Front troops under the command of Daniel Chipenda have spread to Lubito, Benguela, and Sa da Bandeira. The Popular Movement has become aware of the clashes, and it is now publicizing them in an effort to discredit the National Union - National Front alliance.

The Popular Movement is trying to create an impression of African nations banding together against the much publicized South African intervention on behalf of the National Front and National Union. A Movement military spokesman currently on a swing through Latin America seeking diplomatic support announced in Georgetown, Guyana, yesterday that Nigeria, Congo, and Guinea-Bissau are ready to send troops to Angola to support the Popular Movement.

It seems unlikely that either Nigeria or Congo plans any such involvement. Some troops from Guinea-Bissau, another former Portuguese territory, may already be fighting alongside the Popular Movement. Relations between the ruling party in Bissau and the Popular Movement have long been close.
LATIN AMERICA - ANGOLA

Latin American reaction to Cuban involvement in Angola has been mixed and for the most part relatively muted. Leftist governments are giving mild support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Some moderate countries like Colombia and Venezuela, which have recently normalized relations with Cuba, have found the Cuban actions somewhat embarrassing. Right-wing governments have responded with predictable denunciations of Cuba, and Brazil's early recognition of the Popular Movement placed Foreign Minister Silveira in a politically awkward position.

The Colombian press has criticized Cuba's intervention in Angola, but government leaders who worked to remove the divisive Cuba issue from Inter-American politics are loath to see it reintroduced. They see the Soviet role in Angola as the real issue, with the Cubans, as clients, acting only as the Soviets bid them.

The Venezuelan government is reported to be following the Angola situation closely. Some officials in Caracas are said to feel that US prestige requires a firm stand to prevent the fall of Angola into the Soviet camp. Some Venezuelan military officers are concerned that if the Cubans are able to act with impunity in Angola, Havana will be encouraged to resume revolutionary activity in Latin America.

Leaders of Chile and Uruguay see the Cuba-Angola connection as clear proof of their repeated claims of Cuba's continuing subversive policies. Their distrust of the Soviets and of detente, already strong, has been strengthened.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has been under strong attack by the country's prestigious, conservative press for the quick recognition of the Popular Movement regime in Angola. The ministry has been forced to deny that President Geisel was displeased over the handling of Angolan policy.

The departure of the Brazilian special representative from Luanda—officially for reasons of health—has fueled speculation that Geisel is reconsidering Brazil's position on Angola. The press continues to intimate that Foreign Minister Silveira is in trouble with the President over Angola, and there are signs that influential military conservatives are displeased with Silveira.

The Peruvians have so far stuck with the nonaligned declaration, which was silent on Soviet and Cuban activity in Angola but criticized South African
aggression. Guyana seems inclined to recognize the Popular Movement but may wait to follow the lead of the Organization of African Unity.

In Jamaica, Prime Minister Manley recently received a Popular Movement delegation. He is considering their request for technical help in livestock development and health.
Memorandum Views Prospects

Soviet-Cuban Supported Forces Expected to Win Soon in Angola

The Daily today offers a condensation of a CIA memorandum, "Prospects for Angola," dated January 26. Within a matter of weeks, the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement is likely to prevail on the battlefield of Angola. Some guerrilla activity will persist, perhaps for some time, but the Movement's primary goal will be to consolidate its military and administrative grip on Angola's major urban and economic centers, leaving the rural population to fend for itself as the Portuguese did before.

As time passes, the Movement is likely to abandon its re-compradorist program and attempt at least a token reconciliation, which is not likely to include a political role for either Holden Roberto or Jonas Savimbi.

Reconciliation is a practical approach for the Movement, from both a political and an economic standpoint. A stabilized Angola, based organization that derives support from workers, intellectuals, civil servants, and professionals, it professes to be multi-racial and multi-tribal, but it relies heavily on Communists and the urban Kombo. Its links to the Bakhanga and the Ovimbundo, who provide the bases of support for the National Front and the National Union, respectively, are virtually non-existent.

Economically, Angola's prospects are heavily dependent upon the inter-relationship of the country's major tribal areas. Angola's one-thousand coffee plantations in the Bakhanga north have been cultivated by Ovimbundo from the south. The major port capable of handling coffee shipments is Lobito, which is in Ovimbundo territory.

Zairian President Mobutu is unlikely to underwrite guerrilla operations by either the Front or the Union, largely out of a fear that such operations would draw immediate retaliation in kind from the Movement against Zaire's copper-producing Shaba (formerly Katanga) region. Some 4,000 Anti-Mapinda supporters of the late Moisés Tembe, have been fighting with the Movement. The Portuguese kept the Katangans intact after Tembe's secession collapsed in 1960, just to temper Mobutu's support for insurgents in Angola.

Zaire also has pressing economic problems. Resolving the economy rests in considerable part on regaining access to the Benguela railroad and the port of Lobito, the most efficient center of moving Zaire's exports and imports.

With all this in mind, Mobutu is reportedly already putting new pressure through Zairian President Mobutu (see Substantive, Page 19).
Substantial Cuban Role Likely in Angola After Movement Victory

From Page 1

and Mozambican President Machel to the Movement. His chances of early success are not great. Nevertheless, if Mobutu restrains himself, the Movement probably will allow him access to the Bemba area-to gain economic and political benefit.

Mobutu might increase his support for either Angola or Cabinda insurgents if he thought the Movement might annex Zairean territory separating Angola proper from Cabinda. We do not foresee the Movement making such a move, however, although Movement leader Agostinho Neto may make the threat in order to keep Mobutu in line.

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda will also be forced by a need to get the Bemba railroad reopened to seek accommodation with the Movement: Kaunda is on better ground than Mobutu. Despite a personal friendship for Neto, Kaunda publicly attacked either the man or his organization.

Kaunda has publicly criticized the Soviet and Cuban role in Angola, but his remarks have been moderate, emphasizing the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola and an African solution to the Angolan problem. Moreover, Zambia's direct support for the National Union was modest.

South Africa decided in mid-month to withdraw its forces from northern and central Angola. At that time, South Africa did decide to set up defenses along the Angola-Namibia border to prevent the Angolan army and Namibian people from moving against the northern territories. The result of this was that the Movement chose to land on the south African border and to move into Angola.

However, it is clear that the Movement will have to face a strong defense on the south African border and to move into Angola.

Popular Movement-Cuba Force Is Advancing in Northern Angola

Popular Movement and Cuban forces have assumed their advance against the National Front's remaining positions in northern Angola. Last week they occupied Dumba.

Dumba is a town in the north of Angola. It is located on the border with Namibia. The Popular Movement is advancing on this town with the support of Cuban forces.

The Popular Movement is expected to use this area as a base from which to launch further attacks on the National Front's positions in the north of Angola. The Popular Movement and Cuban forces are said to be well-prepared for this advance.
SECRET


FROM: DD/0/OPCAS.

ITEMS

1. SOUTH AFRICA: MOVING REINFORCEMENTS TO NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICA'S RECENT DEPLOYMENTS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO NORTHERN NAMIBIA AND ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES TO THE AREA SUGGEST THAT PRETORIA IS PREPARING ITS DEFENSES IN CASE THE CEASE-FIRE AGREED TO IN GENEVA BREAKS DOWN.

SOUTH AFRICA HAS DEPLOYED IV ATTRADE FIGHTERS AND IS IMPARE GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT TO GROOTVONNEIN, WHERE ONLY SEVERAL RECONNAISSANCE OR BOMBER AIRCRAFT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SEEN. PRETORIA HAS UPGRADED ITS GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSES BY DEPLOYING ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS TO NORTHERN NAMIBIAN BASES AND BY CONCENTRATING ITS LIMITED SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE ASSETS AROUND THE MAIN FORWARD AIRBASE AT ONDANGWA. SOUTH AFRICA HAS ALSO REINFORCED COUNTERINSURGENCY BATTALIONS IN THE AREA WITH CONVENTIONAL UNITS AND ADDITIONAL ARMOR AND NOW HAS 8,500 TO 10,000
SECRET

SOUTH AFRICA ANNOUNCED MONDAY THAT, IN COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED IN GENEVA LAST WEEK, IT WOULD BEGIN PULLING FORCES OUT OF ANGOLA ON 10 AUGUST AND COMPLETE THE WITHDRAWAL BY 1 SEPTEMBER.

COMMENT: THE DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT TO GROOTFONTEIN STILL DOES NOT GIVE PRETORIA REGIONAL AIR SUPERIORITY, AND DESPITE REINFORCEMENTS SOUTH AFRICA REMAINS OUTGUNNED IN SOUTHWEST ANGOLA BY CUBAN, ANGOLAN, AND SWAPO GROUND FORCES THAT NUMBER ABOUT 20,000 TROOPS AND 500 TANKS. ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE PROBABLY CAPABLE OF HALTING A CUBAN-ANGOLAN ATTACK INTO NAMIBIA, PRETORIA'S MILITARY PLANNERS ARE LIKELY TO REINFORCE THE AREA FURTHER, BOTH AS A PRUDENT DETERRENT AND AS A POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE THREAT THAT MIGHT INCREASE ITS NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

SECRET
SECRET

TO: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA BRIEF OCPAS LAB 88-005 FOR WEDNESDAY, 7 JANUARY 1988

FROM: ODI/O/CPAS

ITEMS

1. CUBA-ANGOLA: CUBA STRENGTHENING ANGOLAN DEFENSES

   CUBA HAS MOVED MAJOR PARTS OF A TANK BRIGADE FROM ITS 50TH DIVISION TO ANGOLA, PROBABLY IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUED MILITARY PRESSURE FROM UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES.

   ALL MAJOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS OF THE CUBAN 50TH MOTORIZED INFANTRY DIVISION ARE OUT OF THEIR GARRISON IN SABANA, CUBA. THE LOW LEVEL OF ACTIVITY OBSERVED RECENTLY AT SABANA SUGGESTS THE UNIT MAY HAVE BEEN ABSENT SINCE MID-DECEMBER.

   FORCES FROM A CUBAN TANK BRIGADE RECENTLY SENT TO THE ANGOLAN PORT OF LOBITO--PROBABLY PART OF THE 50TH DIVISION--HAVE DEPARTED, PROBABLY FOR BASES INLAND. MEANWHILE, PART OF THE CUBAN REGIMENT AT MENONQUE HAS LEFT ITS GARRISON BUT HAS NOT BEEN RELOCATED. CUBAN AND SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS HAVE ARRIVED AT THE PORT OF LUANDA AND ARE UNLOADING MILITARY CARGO AMID HEAVY SECURITY.

SECRET
COMMENT: THE MOVEMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT TO ANGOLA ALMOST CERTAINLY IS INTENDED TO SHORE UP LUANDA'S BATTERED SOUTHERN DEFENSES AND STEM FURTHER GOVERNMENT LOSSES TO UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. THE DEPLOYMENT SEEMS LIMITED TO PARTS OF THE 50TH DIVISION'S TANK BRIGADE—PROBABLY SOME 2,000 MEN. BUT OTHER PARTS OF THE DIVISION, WHICH TOTALS 7,000 TO 8,000 MEN, COULD BE EN ROUTE TO ANGOLA OR ENGAGED IN TRAINING EXERCISES IN CUBA.

THE NEW FORCES WILL PROBABLY BE SENT TO HUAMBO—THE HEADQUARTERS OF CUBAN FORCES IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA—AND THEN TO BASES CLOSER TO THE FIGHTING. THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING UNLOADED IN LUANDA IS UNDOUBTEDLY PART OF A SOVIET AND CUBAN EFFORT TO RESUPPLY GOVERNMENT FORCES BUT MAY ALSO BE RELATED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 50TH DIVISION ARMORED UNITS.

THE AUGMENTATION PROBABLY IS INTENDED AS A SHOW OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR LUANDA, RATHER THAN AS AN EFFORT TO INTENSIFY THE CONFLICT. NEVERTHELESS, IF UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES CONTINUE TO ROLL BACK ANGOLAN POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH, CUBAN UNITS MAY BE PREPARED TO INTERVENT IN THE FIGHTING TO PREVENT MAJOR BASES LIKE CUITO CUNAVALA FROM FALLING. THE CUBAN FORCE THAT LEFT MENONGUE MAY HAVE REDEPLOYED TO CUITO CUNAVALA TO BUTTRESS GOVERNMENT FORCES THERE.

2.

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25

FROM: DD/0/CPAS.

CONTENTS

1. CUBA-ANGOLA: UNUSUAL CUBAN TROOP MOVEMENTS

2.

3.

4.

5.

1. CUBA-ANGOLA: UNUSUAL CUBAN TROOP MOVEMENTS

HAVANA REPORTEDLY IS SENDING TROOPS AND A NEW MILITARY COMMANDER TO ANGOLA, APPARENTLY AS PART OF A NORMAL ROTATION, ALTHOUGH A REINFORCEMENT CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTS CLAIM FRESH COMBAT TROOPS, INCLUDING THE CUBAN ARMY'S 50TH DIVISION, HAVE ARRIVED IN ANGOLA AND ARE HEADED TOWARD GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST.

ROUTINE TRAINING

SECRET

3762
ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING AROUND THE 50TH DIVISION'S GARRISON IN CUBA AND THAT CUBAN ELEMENTS BASED IN ANGOLA AT MENONGUE AND MUAMBO—THOSE MOST LIKELY TO BE USED TO SUPPORT ANY NEW ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT COMBAT OPERATIONS—ALSO REMAIN IN GARRISON.

OTHER PRESS ACCOUNTS ALLEGED GENERAL OCHOA HAS ASSUMED COMMAND OF CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA.

COMMENT: THE RECENT TRANSPORT ACTIVITY IS UNUSUAL FOR THE END OF A TYPICAL ROTATION PERIOD; WHETHER THIS REPRESENTS AN INCREASE IN THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE CONFIRMED UNTIL NEW UNITS CAN BE LOCATED IN ANGOLA. HAVANA MAY HOPE TO USE THE REPORTS OF NEW DEPLOYMENTS TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON PRETORIA TO EXPEDITE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA. PUBLICITY FROM THE REPORTS MAY ALSO BE DESIGNED TO REASSURE LUANDA, WHICH MAY NOW BE QUESTIONING THE VALUE OF CUBAN FORCES AFTER THEY FAILED TO TAKE PART IN THE RECENT FIGHTING.

IF OCHOA, AN EXPERT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY, HAS REASSUMED COMMAND OF CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA, HAVANA MAY INTEND TO DEEPEN ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. ALTERNATIVELY, OCHOA MAY BE IN ANGOLA ON A FACTFINDING MISSION FOR PRESIDENT CASTRO, WHO IS SENSITIVE TO DEVELOPMENTS THAT MIGHT AFFECT THE US-ANGOLAN NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL.
Troops Attack By Helicopter In Angola

Cuban and Popular Movement troops transported by helicopters carried out assaults against positions of the National Union in central Angola on Monday and Tuesday.

The helicopters, tentatively identified as French-made Alouette, reportedly were supported by helicopter gun ships.

This is the first reported use of helicopters in such raids since the Angolan fighting began last year. The new development points to an acceleration of the Popular Movement's drive to take towns held by the National Union.

In the attack on Monday, about 100 troops were transported by six helicopters that apparently flew from Quissala; each of the helicopters made two flights. The troops—mostly Cubans—were landed along the road between Catando and Serre Lusaka. More troops were ferried into the area the following day.

The airborne operation has apparently fooled National Union leader Jonas Savimbi.

Some 200 National Union troops at M浇ake were cut off and have probably been captured.
UN Discussing South African Role in Angola

South African involvement in Angola is dominating the debate in the UN Security Council this week on Namibia.

Several African and other third-world delegates have broadened their standard attacks against Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia to include South African use of Namibia as a military base for intervention in Angola. South Africa has responded by attacking Cuban and Soviet intervention and defending its own involvement as necessary to protect the Cunene River project in Angola that supplies water to northern Namibia.

Pretoria has asked the Security Council to take responsibility for security of the project.

The principal Namibian liberation movement, meanwhile, is trying to produce a resolution that will attract major support. Last June, the UK and France joined the US in voicing a resolution that could have led to sanctions against Pretoria.

Pretoria will, of course, defy any Security Council demand that South African troops be withdrawn from Namibia. The South African intervention in the Angolan civil war was prompted in part by fears that a Popular Movement regime in Angola would provide direct support for Namibian insurgents. The insurgents are now based in Zambia.

The South Africans are disengaging from the Angolan fighting, but are strengthening their force along the Angola-Namibia border.
Namibia-Angola: Security Zone

The recent security zone created by South African authorities earlier this month in northern Namibia has been extended to cover the entire length of the Namibia-Angola border.

The 1-kilometer-wide (0.6-mile) zone, from which all villagers will be removed, is in effect a no-man's land designed to facilitate counterinsurgency operations by the South African military. South African spokesmen are justifying the extension of the zone by citing an increase in guerrilla operations by the South-West Africa People's Organization, the Namibian nationalist organization.

The South Africans say there have been more than 60 separate terrorist acts by these insurgents since last July and that at least 29 persons, including eight South African soldiers, have been killed. The South Africans also believe that the guerrillas are being trained in southern Angola by Cuban troops. SWAPO guerrillas have been active in southern Angola, but we are uncertain about their relations with the Cubans stationed in Angola.

There has been some increase recently in terrorist activities in northern Namibia, but the extension of the security zone seems conveniently timed to influence the current debate in the South African parliament over new stringent security measures proposed by the Vorster government.

The proposed measures have sparked some public opposition, and the government may hope the new security zone will dramatize the external threat to South Africa and ease passage of the controversial new measures.
South Africans Still in Angola

Pretoria's Stance on Understanding with Luanda

Photography Shows MIG-21s in Angola

The presence of MIG-21 fighters in Angola has been confirmed. South African troops are stationed just inland from Angola. The Popular Movement has seized MIG-21s from the USSR.

Vorster and his South African troops are stationed just inside Angola around Kapama and, Cuito Cuanavale, and at four refugee camps along the border. The Angolan-Namibian border, however, remains disputed.

Vorster last week had a wide-ranging discussion with the Popular Movement, but he mentioned that the Popular Movement does not consider the setting aside of apartheid a reasonable basis for dialogue.

The Prime Minister emphasized that his government must consider the Popular Movement's demand for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola.

The Popular Movement can complete the construction of the Ruvuma-Cuoio hydroelectric and irrigation projects, which will take another two years, and make arrangements for the further development of the Angolan side of the border. The South African government has been supporting the Popular Movement.

Vorster believes that the next target will be Rhodesia rather than Namibia. He stressed the importance of the maintenance of the Popular Movement's relationship with other countries, and said he expects a surge in guerrilla activity there. Vorster is also concerned about the possibility of a stepped-up insurgency.

Vorster said that he has gone so far as to ask for the release of a statement expressing the government's wish to negotiate with the Popular Movement. However, Vorster said he would not go so far as to imply that the Popular Movement would have to accept the border arrangements as they stand.

Vorster said that if he is prepared to go to war, it is to war, not to a negotiated settlement with Rhodesian national leader, Nkomo. Vorster said this is not a question of whether or not war is going to be fought, but of how it is going to be fought. Vorster has said that the South African government has made arrangements for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

The South African government has made arrangements for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. Vorster has said that if the Popular Movement does not accept this, it will be fought, not negotiated.
Interagency Memorandum

USSR-Cuba-Angola

- A large portion of the February deliveries were locomotives.
- We believe an additional 1,500 Cubans were sent to Angola in February, raising the total number of Cuban military personnel there to about 13,500. Since late February, the number has probably remained at this level, as further arrivals have been offset by an equal number of losses, including some wounded, returning to Cuba.

- Although overall tonnage of goods delivered in February rose above the January level, we believe that the amount of military goods shipped declined. A few deliveries, however, included the first confirmed shipment of MIG-21 aircraft.
National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

Thursday
8 September 1983
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Military Developments

South Africa has moved antiaircraft weapons and radar from Operet in northern Namibia. The South Africans recently repaved the airfield runway at Ngpla in southern Angola to handle larger aircraft and have expanded munitions and fuel storage facilities there. Although Pretoria has withdrawn some of its infantry that has been temporarily stationed in northern Namibia for training, it is continuing to repair and rearm armored vehicles there.

Comment: During the past two months, South Africa has consolidated its hold on the salient in southern Angola and may be preparing for extended operations before the dry season ends in early November. The equipment taken from Operet probably has been sent to Ngpla. Antiaircraft weapons and radar at the improved airfield there would strengthen South Africa's ability to resupply and provide air cover for its forces operating in southern Angola.
ANGOLA: Increased Fighting

Fighting between UNITA insurgents and Cuban and Angolan Government forces appears to have intensified during the past few weeks.

A major battle occurred on 24 December, when UNITA forces clashed with a Cuban-reinforced Angolan brigade that was trying to retake the insurgent-held town of Mavinga. Each side claims to have killed around 300 of the other's troops.

Comment: The insurgents have been on the offensive since November and appear to have marginally increased the territory they control. They evidently hope to force the regime to enter into negotiations on a role for UNITA in the government. Angolan officials have reiterated, however, that they are not willing to negotiate.
Angola: Near-Term Prospects

Special National Intelligence Estimate

Approved for Release: 2013/09/25
SNIE 71-84

ANGOLA:
NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS

Information available as of 19 January 1984 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
- The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
CONTENTS

SCOPE NOTE .............................................................................................................................. v
KEY JUDGMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................. 5
The Security Situation .................................................................................................................. 5
The Internal Situation ................................................................................................................... 8
The MPLA ..................................................................................................................................... 8
The Oil Question .......................................................................................................................... 10
UNITA ........................................................................................................................................... 11
The External Actors ...................................................................................................................... 12
The Soviet Union .......................................................................................................................... 12
Cuba ............................................................................................................................................... 13
South Africa .................................................................................................................................. 15
The Frontline States ...................................................................................................................... 14
Outlook ......................................................................................................................................... 14
SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses the probable course of events in Angola over the next year, focusing on the security situation, the political state of play in Luanda, Angola's economic prospects, and the UNITA insurgents' political and military capabilities. Although the Estimate deals primarily with specifically Angolan issues, it gives considerable attention to the prospective actions of those external actors—the Soviet Union and Cuba, the Frontline States, and South Africa—that heavily influence developments within Angola. In addition to estimating the outlook over the next year according to current trends, the Estimate also examines the likelihood and implications of greater Soviet and Cuban or South African involvement.
KEY JUDGMENTS

The Angolan Government will continue to lose ground to the UNITA insurgents over the next year, particularly in the rural areas, although we do not expect dramatic net changes in the overall military situation. UNITA—which has 35,000 men under arms and conducts sustained guerrilla activities in 12 of Angola's 16 provinces—will continue to make advances, particularly in the northeast where the economically important diamond mines and coffee plantations are located, but UNITA will remain unable to defeat the Angolan and Cuban forces that hold the major cities and key garrisons. (Luanda has a 35,000-man Army and 65,000-man People's Militia, and Havana's military contingent numbers about 30,000, of which an estimated 20,000 are combat troops.)

Spreading insurgent activity will cause Soviet and Cuban backers to increase their already high level of support to the besieged regime. Cuban forces may be further augmented, and they are likely to become more actively involved in the fighting. The Soviets, who have warned the South Africans they will give Luanda all the support necessary to protect Angola's territorial integrity, will increase their commitment to the MPLA regime by sending more arms, supporting a more active Cuban role, and even increasing their advisory presence as conditions dictate. We believe that the Soviets have not yet decided how far they will go to preserve the MPLA regime. While we think Moscow will stop short of sending its own ground combat troops to Angola during the next year, there is a growing possibility it will send pilots, air defense crews, and additional advisers. The chances of intervention would increase if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable to stabilize the military situation.

Despite the probable increase in Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan conflict, we do not expect the insurgents to suffer major reverses. The additional Communist assistance, however, will probably slow the UNITA offensive and will improve the MPLA's capability to hold on to major urban centers.

Moscow's growing military commitment to Angola reflects Luanda's importance to broader Soviet objectives: namely, undermining Western influence throughout the Third World, competing with the Chinese, promoting pro-Soviet change, and obtaining greater air and naval access in the region. Angola serves Soviet objectives in southern Africa by affording the USSR entry to the SWAPO and ANC insurgent
groups, which supports Moscow's long-term objective of undermining the white minority regime in South Africa.

In our view, Moscow could maintain its current level of support, and even increase it significantly, without feeling pressured to reexamine its position in Angola. Havana, in addition to being ideologically committed to the MPLA regime, will follow Soviet preferences as long as the costs of its involvement in Angola do not rise precipitously, such as by a sharp rise in casualties.

Angola faces an acute financial crisis as burgeoning investment costs in the petroleum and diamond sectors and a heavy debt service obligation for foreign military supplies and technicians consume almost all of the country's hard currency earnings. Overall, GDP probably will drop at least another 5 to 10 percent over the next year as a result of Luanda's inability to increase imports of essential goods and the steady drop in economic activities as UNITA sabotage teams move farther north. Luanda's efforts to obtain financial relief, particularly from Western sources, are not likely to be very successful. The continuing economic decline—Angola probably will prompt Luanda to ask Moscow for further concessions in their bilateral economic relationship—such as delaying repayments for military assistance—which the Soviets are likely to grant.

The political balance within the MPLA will remain delicate over the next year. Ideological factionalism and related racial tensions between mulattoes and blacks are major sources of friction within the regime that will continue to impede significant decision-making. The military successes of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA over the past year, however, appear to have narrowed differences between principal MPLA factions—the mulatto-led, pro-Soviet, more ideological hardliners and the more moderate, pragmatic black nationalists—on the necessity for an increased military effort against Savimbi's insurgents.

Although President dos Santos has reduced somewhat the power of the hardliners in the MPLA over the past two years—while undercutting the black nationalists even more—we still believe that no major decision can be made without the hardliners' agreement. Moreover, we believe that dos Santos cannot overly antagonize the hardliners even on lesser matters without running the risk of a move against him by this faction, particularly since we believe that the hardliners retain strong influence in the military and intelligence services.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, prefers the term "Luso faction" to "hardliners" and accepts the use of the term "hardliners" in the context of this paper only as indicating that this group in the Angolan government has consistently advocated close ties with the Soviet Union and its Communist allies, that many within it appear committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that the group as a whole opposes any form of political accommodation with UNITA. State/INR believes that, regardless of these labels, there are few in the government who would take exception to Angola's "hardline" position against South Africa and UNITA.
UNITA's strategy is to force the MPLA into a negotiated settlement. UNITA's leaders apparently recognize that they cannot militarily defeat the MPLA regime as long as the Cubans and Soviets remain in Angola. However, by crippling the Angolan economy and raising the cost of the conflict to unacceptable levels, the UNITA leadership believes it ultimately can force the MPLA to a negotiated settlement.

The South Africans, for their part, probably are satisfied with the results over the past year of their policy toward Angola. At a minimum, Pretoria probably calculates that the inability of Luanda to part with Cuban troops has eased pressure on South Africa to agree to a Namibian settlement. Furthermore, South Africa also probably believes that time is on the side of the UNITA insurgents, despite increased Soviet and Cuban assistance. Consequently, we expect South Africa to continue its current policy directions, to talk about negotiating with Luanda while keeping up the military pressure on the MPLA regime, with the long-term intention of driving its Soviet and Cuban backers out of Angola.

Some South African policymakers, including senior military officers, wish to pursue an international settlement on Namibia that provides for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Some individuals may believe that UNITA can win a military victory over the MPLA. Pretoria would prefer a solution that included a Cuban removal, an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation, and the establishment of a non-SWAPO-dominated government in Namibia, but most of the leadership realizes that it is unlikely to attain all these goals.
DISCUSSION

The Security Situation

1. UNITA's Military Capabilities. The insurgent National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) significantly expanded its areas of operations during the past year, and now conducts guerrilla activities in 12 of Angola's 16 provinces. UNITA also has established control over Angola's border with Zambia and more than half of the Namibian border, where its personnel act as customs agents and issue UNITA visas and travel documents. (See appended map.)

2. UNITA's forces have grown substantially since 1981 when it claimed to have 20,000 to 25,000 men under arms. UNITA's assertions that it now has some 85,000 active members probably are true. Slightly less than half of this force, approximately 15,000 men, is organized in conventional battalion-size units while the remaining 20,000 conduct hit-and-run, guerrilla-style operations. UNITA's troops are well trained, well organized, and well disciplined, and morale is high. Ovimbundus still predominate, but Western reporters who have traveled with the insurgents say that UNITA has been able to recruit a noticeable number of adherents from other tribal groups.

3. Although not self-sufficient, UNITA appears to be capturing substantial quantities of supplies—perhaps as much as half of its weapons—from Angolan Government forces. The insurgents' arsenal may now include more small-caliber artillery pieces and antiaircraft weapons. UNITA reportedly operates a large fleet of trucks and maintains a large-scale communications network throughout its area of operations.

4. In addition to its territorial expansion and numerical growth, UNITA in recent years has demonstrated a growing capability to deploy battalion-size units in large-scale assaults on isolated government outposts. The largest single instance of such an attack occurred at the town of Cangamba in early August 1983, when an estimated 3,000-man UNITA force overran a 1,500-man Angolan garrison after a two-week siege. But another battle like Cangamba, where UNITA took heavy casualties, would be costly to the insurgents.

5. Nevertheless, UNITA still suffers from several significant limitations that are likely to keep the insurgents from rapidly escalating the scale or tempo of activity. Although the insurgents have shot down some helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, UNITA still is vulnerable to airstrikes by ground attack fighters and helicopter gunships. UNITA also has been unable to acquire sophisticated antitank weapons, which its forces would need if they are to attack more heavily defended garrisons or convoys. As UNITA attempts to expand its operations into northern Angola, it will strain logistic resources and possibly encounter opposition from tribes not normally associated with the Ovimbundu-dominated insurgents. While these latter obstacles are not insurmountable, UNITA's advances into the northern areas are likely to be deliberate and measured.

6. Insurgent Strategy and Tactics. During the past year, UNITA effectively has disrupted Angola's three major rail lines and seriously hindered civilian and military traffic on the country's most vital highways and roads. Using hit-and-run as well as sabotage techniques, the guerrillas also have seriously damaged facilities supplying water and electricity to several of the country's largest cities and towns. UNITA initiates the vast majority of engagements with government forces, selecting favorable terrain and force ratios.

7. Although UNITA has surrounded some large provincial capitals, it has not yet launched concerted attacks against any of them. Nevertheless, Luanda is concerned about the security of Angola's more vulnerable cities and has committed additional air and ground forces for their defense. Although the threat posed by UNITA to the major cities lies down government forces, the insurgents' immediate objectives probably are to attack those economic targets not yet seriously affected by the war—coffees, diamonds, and petroleum. UNITA's near-term target probably will be the diamond mines in the northeast, followed by attempts to reach coffee plantations in the southwest, and finally oil facilities in the enclave of Cabinda.

8. UNITA's strategy is to bring the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to the negotiating table by means of combined military and
economic pressure. Its leaders apparently do not believe they can inflict an outright military defeat on Cuban-Angolan forces because UNITA is not yet capable of challenging MPLA control over major urban areas. However, by gradually eroding the Angolan economy and raising the cost of the conflict to unacceptable levels, the UNITA leadership believes ultimately can force the MPLA to a negotiated settlement.

9. Government Forces. The response to the insurgent threat by the Angolan Armed Forces—called the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA)—has been largely ineffective in recent years, particularly since UNITA began its northern push. The 35,000-man FAPLA is basically an infantry force, with most of its relatively sophisticated equipment, including armor, operated by Cubans. The poor health and low educational levels of most of its recruits significantly hamper FAPLA's development as a militarily capable force, a situation unlikely to change soon in view of the inefficiency and weak infrastructure of the Angolan Government.

10. Angolan troops are spread widely through the large country to meet the diverse threats of UNITA, South Africa, and latent ethnic nationalism in the north and Cabinda. Unlike the Cuban forces, which occupy relatively large garrisons, Angolan forces generally are deployed in smaller units within villages and towns, at critical economic installations, and along strategic lines of communication.

11. Government efforts to deny UNITA a popular base of support by grouping the populace of some areas in protected villages and establishing regional military councils apparently have had little effect. Similarly, the government has reconstituted Popular Vigilante Brigades to free the estimated 65,000-man People's Militia from some local security functions, but neither force appears to have improved the government's efforts significantly.

12. FAPLA also appears to be increasing its use of foreign insurgent forces based in Angola. Reportedly operating alongside FAPLA are personnel of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)—and perhaps of the African National Congress (ANC). Likewise, opponents of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, organized in the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC), reportedly are fighting in eastern Angola, albeit to little effect.

13. Despite significant foreign military assistance, the Angolan Army—which only recently started receiving concentrated training in counterinsurgency techniques—has little chance of mounting an effective campaign against the insurgents. The government offensive launched last October—augmented by recently delivered Soviet equipment, backed by Cuban-piloted helicopter gunships, and possibly involving Cuban ground units—appears to have hampered UNITA advances in the Manganese area. The insurgents have continued to advance in the northeast. A far greater direct Cuban combat participation in counterinsurgency operations is required if the government is to make much headway.

14. Cuban Presence. The Cuban military presence currently numbers about 30,000 personnel, of which an estimated 20,000 are combat troops. A large number of these Cubans are located in brigade-sized groups in the southern part of Angola; others serve as advisers and instructors, occupy positions on military staffs, man FAPLA's logistic system, and operate naval, air, air defense, and armored equipment. Although we believe the Cubans are involved in planning combat operations, the extent of their involvement is unknown. About 2,000 of these Cuban troops, including paratroopers, air defense personnel, and tank drivers, probably were sent to Angola within the past six months as security conditions deteriorated. Moreover, some of the several thousand Cuban military personnel reportedly withdrawing from Ethiopia may be redeployed to Angola, but so far we have no evidence of their arrival. We believe both the Cuban combat role and the levels of Cuban assistance could increase in the coming year without posing significant internal political or economic problems for Fidel Castro.

15. Soviet Presence. Soviet arms deliveries over the past several months have reached the highest level since the mid-1970s. There were seven Soviet seaborne military deliveries to Angola in November 1983 (as compared with the normal monthly level of two), and at least eight Soviet military transport aircraft have flown to Luanda since August with unknown types and quantities of equipment on board. Included in recent deliveries have been air defense equipment, MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships, MI-8 Hip helicopters, additional AN-26 Curl transports and MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, and—introduced in January—MIG-23 Flogger fighters and numerous light-armed vehicles. Furthermore, the Soviets recently increased from two to 12 the number of aircraft in their AN-12 Cub medium transport detachment (the largest such detachment outside the USSR).
16. Much of the sophisticated equipment—with the exception of the Mi-24 gunsips—will be of little direct use to counterinsurgency operations and were designed primarily to meet the South African threat. Still, the CSSR’s delivery of helicopters and its transport detachment evidences a willingness to support increased combat operations against UNITA. The Soviet military presence is chiefly advisory and numbers an estimated 600 to 1,200 personnel. Soviets also serve on military staffs and as instructors and may assist in operating some Angolan air defense equipment.

17. The South African Military Presence. South African Defense Force (SADF) troops have been deployed inside southern Angola since the conclusion of Operation Protea in September 1981 and now operate in a salient stretching about 160 kilometers (100 miles) north of the border and over 320 km (200 miles) wide. In the intervening two years, the South Africans have hardened their defenses and improved the airstrips at their forward bases at Na’iva and Xangano.

18. In early December 1983, South African forces (and possibly some units from the territorial forces of Namibia) perhaps totaling as many as 2,500, began widespread air and ground operations, some of which involved penetration of Angolan territory as far as 240 km (150 miles) north of the Namibian border. This operation was unprecedented in its heavy use of field artillery and air strikes against Angola’s forward positions, as well as seven operations against SWAPO.

In early January they engaged a large integrated Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO force in the Cavelo area, and claimed to have killed 324 men and destroyed 11 tanks while admitting to a loss of seven soldiers.

19. Pretoria’s tactical goals appear to include not only the preemptive of SWAPO’s annual offensive—the announced objective of the South African offensive—but also the neutralization of some Angolan air defenses in the south. South African ground and air units have launched attacks on Malunda, Cuaesi, Kassinga, and Cabanes—all locations equipped with advanced Soviet-supplied radars, antiaircraft artillery, and missile systems. The South Africans also conducted a small bombing raid against the SWAPO base near Lubango, an implicit challenge to Soviet efforts to improve air defenses there over the past year.

20. If South Africa were to withdraw its forces from southern Angola, as it offered in December to do temporarily if Angola, Cuba, or SWAPO does not exploit the situation, it still would retain enough units in a state of readiness at its Namibian staging bases to be able to react if it deemed this necessary. Pretoria also may anticipate UNITA’s occupying large areas of its salient, so that the insurgents can serve as a tripwire in the event the Angolans or SWAPO attempt to reenter in force.

21. Military Outlook. Military activity probably will continue at high levels with neither insurgent nor government forces likely to achieve victory in the near term. UNITA will continue to exert strong military pressure on Angola’s thinly stretched Army through attacks on poorly defended sites and economic targets. UNITA, however, will remain unable to challenge Angolan and Cuban forces holding major cities and key garrisons and, lacking adequate air defense capability, will also be unable to occupy strategic fixed positions without making its own concentrated forces vulnerable to attack by FAPLA airpower. The insurgents probably will make new territorial advances but will find it difficult to make major gains, particularly in the central region where westward expansion would bring them up against major Angolan and Cuban garrisons. Scattered attacks on diamond, coffee, and possibly petroleum facilities can be anticipated during the next 12 months, and these will increase significantly the cost of the conflict to the MPLA. Increasing frustration with the conflict and concern over the suffering of the populace on the part of FAPLA members will cause individual desertions and defections to UNITA forces to continue. Further, the worsening situation could lead to some FAPLA unit revolts.

22. Since we believe that Moscow will remain strongly, though possibly not irrevocably, committed to maintaining the MPLA regime in power, a continued heavy Soviet arms flow to Luanda is expected. We also believe that the Cubans, perhaps augmented by new arrivals, will become more directly involved in Angolan operations—although not on a sufficient scale to roll back the insurgent forces.

23. We believe that the Soviets have not yet decided how far they will go to preserve the MPLA regime. While we think Moscow will stop short of sending its own ground combat troops to Angola during the next year, there is a growing possibility it will send pilots, air defense crews, and additional advisers. The chances of intervention would increase if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable to stabilize the military situation.
24. Increased military aid from Moscow will strengthen the government’s defensive positions, but will not immediately improve MPLA’s counterinsurgency capabilities. Angola’s armed forces already possess more sophisticated arms than can be effectively absorbed or operated, and more equipment would not rectify the Army’s overriding problems of poor leadership, performance, and morale. If coupled with greater Soviet assistance, however, a more active Cuban combat role could help check major UNITA moves and contribute to the achievement of a new military equilibrium.

The Internal Situation

The MPLA

25. The Political State-of-Play in Luanda. The political balance within Angola’s ruling, Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola remains delicate. Ideological and ethnic factionalism continues to be a major source of friction within the MPLA regime that has significantly impeded decision-making. UNITA’s military successes over the past year, however, appear to have narrowed differences between the two principal party factions—the mutato-led, pro-Soviet, more ideological hardliners and the more moderate, pragmatic black nationalists—on the necessity for an increased military effort, buttressed by expanded Soviet and Cuban assistance, against Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA insurgents.

26. President José Eduardo dos Santos, a black who had been a compromise choice after Angola’s first President died in 1979, has been attempting to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the major party factions by understating the competing factions. He has succeeded in removing some pro-Soviet mutato hardliners from the government and replacing them with moderate blacks and pragmatists more sympathetic to his policy preferences. Similarly, the President has taken steps to weaken the black nationalists by removing their most strident leaders from positions of power within the government and party. The MPLA Central Committee’s decision in December 1982 to grant dos Santos “special powers” to deal with the “national emergency” seems to be part of his design to increase his influence at the expense of the factions.

27. Dos Santos has assembled an “inner circle” of confidants who are not closely aligned with either major faction. This group probably includes Minister of Interior Manuel “Kilo” Rodrigues, Deputy Foreign Minister Vasuncio da Moura, Minister of Defense Pedro Maria “Pedrak” Tomé, and Minister of State Security Juliano Mateus Paulo “Dino Mattru.” Other members may include from time to time Vice Minister of Defense Antonio dos Santos “Ndalu” and Political Bureau member Roberto de Almeida, an influential moderate black.

28. But dos Santos cannot make major policy decisions without the approval of a larger and more diverse “ruling group” of perhaps 10 or 12 key party leaders drawn from the party’s Central Committee and Political Bureau as well as from the cabinet. This larger collection of key personalities is, we believe, Angola’s true policymaking body. It includes members of dos Santos’s inner circle, other moderates and pragmatists—such as Minister of Planning Lopo do Nascimento, a black—as well as some of dos Santos’s ideological and ethnic opponents. Reporting from various sources suggests that hardline leader Lucio Lara, also party secretary, and former Defense Minister Iko Carreira, both mutatos, are currently the most important hardline members of the decisionmaking group. Carreira, however, is a known opportunist and his position is subject to change.

29. The Soviet- and Cuban-backed, mutato-led hardliners are more cohesive and better disciplined and organized than their black nationalist rivals. Because of their favored status under Portuguese colonial rule, mutatos as a group are better educated and more politically experienced and sophisticated, the key hardline leaders are seasoned political manipulators and infighters. Moreover, Moscow and Havana can be expected to use on behalf of the hardline faction the leverage they have as the military underwriters of the regime. During dos Santos’s visit to the Soviet Union last May, for example, he was told that Lucio Lara should not be harassed.

30. The party’s other major faction is a loose collection of black nationalists, some of whom are often referred to as the Catejo Group. We have not been able to identify the current leaders of the Catejo Group and, in view of recent trends in Luanda, the radical black nationalists may have to lay low temporarily and regroup. Some of the faction’s former adherents, such as Political Bureau member Ernesto Domingos Kima, apparently have been co-opted by the President. Others, like Vice Minister of Defense João Luís Neto, dos Santos has sent abroad for “training,” or assigned to provincial posts in the interior. One potential bright spot for the black nationalists has been the dramatic rise to a position of major influence over the past 18 months of Minister of Planning Lopo...
do Nascimento, a prominent black who is believed not to be a member of the Catete Group.

31. Despite the tensions that probably have resulted from the nationalists' losses of government and party positions, we believe dos Santos's policy preferences generally accord with those of the nationalists and he probably recognizes that they are potentially supported by the majority of the numerically superior blacks within the MPLA, as well as by the urban and rural blacks and the black rank and file in the armed forces and in the People's Militia. So far, however, black leaders have been unable to mobilize this latent support.

32. Although dos Santos has somewhat reduced the hardliners' power over the past two years, we believe that, still, no major decision can be made without their agreement. We believe that dos Santos's inner circle is currently in the ascendency; but the President probably cannot overly antagonize the hardliners even on lesser matters without running the risk of a move against him by this faction, particularly since we believe they retain important influence in the military and intelligence services. Although direct evidence of the relationship between Moscow and hardline leader Lucio Laine is not available, we believe that Soviet and Cuban desires probably are filtered into the ruling group through the hardliners led by Laine—as well as through Moscow's and Havana's direct dealings with dos Santos.

33. The MPLA's Agenda. The hardliners, who realize that a departure of Cuban troops would mean the end of mulatto influence in the Angolan Government, categorically reject a Cuban withdrawal as the price for a Namibian settlement and favor a military solution to the UNITA insurgency. We believe that the mulatto-led hardliners oppose reconciling with Savimbi because they are afraid that, if Savimbi were brought into the government, he would enter into an alliance with the black nationalists in the MPLA or, with his charisma and political skills, gain a dominant position in his own right—moves which in either case would spell the end of mulatto influence in Luanda.

34. The black nationalists, until recently at least, were prepared to consider a substantial reduction in the Cuban presence as the price for a Namibian settlement. The nationalists have been willing to force SWAPO to be more flexible in negotiations over Namibia and have favored using the threat of a reduction in Angolan support to accomplish this. Some members of the black nationalist faction also have expressed a willingness to seek a political accommodation with Savimbi. We believe, however, that the military momentum UNITA has generated in recent months, probably has triggered concern among the black nationalists, who may now believe that a withdrawal of Cuban forces at this juncture would give Savimbi's forces a decisive advantage on the battlefield. For this reason and because the nationalists probably do not want Luanda to appear to be knuckling under to external pressure, we believe they would favor a very gradual drawdown of Cuban troops but only if they thought that Savimbi could be contained militarily and dealt with politically.

35. The MPLA as a whole is probably dissatisfied with Soviet Bloc economic aid. Soviet hardliners and the black nationalists agree on the desirability of gaining US diplomatic recognition for Angola; both recognize that greater Western economic and technical assistance and investment are needed if Angola is to reverse its steep economic decline. The hardliners insist, however, that, despite the worsening economic situation, the withdrawal of Cuban troops—is too heavy a price to pay for such assistance. Both factions favor supporting anti-South African and anti-Mobutu insurgents, but the black nationalists apparently believe that Angola's national interests have been too readily sacrificed in the past and now favor a more moderate foreign policy.

36. Economic Pressures. Growing security and financial problems in recent years have deepened the economic decline that began with the abrupt departure of the Portuguese in 1975 and the onset of civil war. Agriculture has reverted largely to a subsistence level, as the fighting has cut off major producing areas in southern Angola from key urban centers. World prices for petroleum, the country's major export, have dropped in recent years, depressing foreign exchange earnings. As a result, imported spare parts and other inputs are in short supply, cutting industrial output to around 20 percent of capacity and forcing many plants to shut down altogether.

37. These pressures also are presenting the government with an acute financial crisis. The problem recently has come to a head as burgeoning investment costs in the petroleum and diamond sectors and a heavy debt service obligation for foreign military supplies and technicians consume almost all of the country's hard currency earnings. Even though Moscow reportedly has agreed to a three-year moratorium on repayment of about $750 million in loans for
military hardware supplied between 1978 and 1982, Luanda has not been able to meet its remaining obligations to the Soviet Union and its allies or to Western creditors. Luanda is bartering oil for vital food imports, and reportedly wants to pay part of the debt owed to Cuba for military and economic assistance in oil rather than hard currency.

38. Overall GDP probably will drop at least another 5 to 10 percent over the next year as a result of Luanda's inability to increase imports of goods—restoring depleted stocks of industrial raw materials, intermediate goods, fertilizers, machinery, and spare parts probably would require at least a 40-percent increase in imports—and the steady drop in economic activity as UNITA's sabotage teams move farther north. Food production is likely to continue declining, as farmers flock to the cities or resort to subsistence agriculture. This will make the dos Santos regime even more dependent on food imports and further strain an already overtaxed transportation system.

39. The rising demand for imports comes at a time when a big chunk of Luanda's export receipts is being used to pay off various service costs. Although new oil production will boost oil sales this year to around $1.5 billion, Luanda reportedly agreed to turn over about one-fourth of this amount to the USSR and Eastern Europe to pay for Communist military and economic assistance. Most of the remaining oil revenues already have been mortgaged to cover petroleum investment costs for a gas injection project in Cabinda. Luanda also probably will have to make some gesture to stem the burgeoning backlog on short-term debt to keep open the credit lines that finance most of its nonmilitary imports. Finally, we will be watching for further indications of accelerated capital flight as members of the Angola elite become more anxious about their own future.

40. Luanda's efforts to obtain financial relief, particularly from Western sources, are not likely to be very successful. Private creditors have become increasingly reluctant to extend loans because of the uncertain situation, lags in repayment of trade credits, and the failure of Angolan officials to provide accurate financial data. A more recent cause of concern has been the large, unexplained Angolan cash withdrawals from several Western banks. Western donors—including France, Brazil, Portugal, Italy, and Spain—have indicated that they will limit their support to government-guaranteed trade credits, a few investment loans, and some food aid.

41. In the absence of any substantial aid, we expect Luanda to ask Moscow for greater concessions in their bilateral military and economic relationships. The USSR is likely to modify the moratorium on repayments for military equipment to include some deliveries in 1983 and 1984. Moscow, however, will press Luanda to continue cash payments for Soviet and Cuban personnel in Angola and for spare parts and repairs. Moscow, moreover, will insist on repayment of Angola's overdue commercial debt, although the Soviets also will be sensitive to indications that Luanda is running into problems paying for food and other essential goods and services needed to keep the government in power.

The Oil Question

42. A critical element in Luanda's staying power is the uninterrupted flow of oil exports. Oil revenues currently account for over 85 percent of Luanda's foreign exchange, a share that is certain to rise as output from newly developed oilfields off the coast of Cabinda comes on stream. Angola's expected sales of about $1.6 billion in 1984 and the prospect of more in future years will ensure Luanda's ability to pay over the long term for Cuban troops and Soviet hardware. The importance of the oil industry operated and financed by US and other Western companies makes it an inviting target for some type of military action by UNITA. We doubt that UNITA can carry out a coordinated attack against Angola's various production facilities without South African or other highly skilled foreign assistance, but a small number of trained commandos probably could destroy a number of offshore production platforms. Also vulnerable to sabotage is the system of pipelines that carry crude from the platforms to an onshore facility where water, sand, and other impurities are separated out before the oil is pumped out to a loading buoy. Hitting the pipelines would shut down production for about a week. Repairing damaged production platforms would take considerably longer, and the facilities would be very costly to rebuild.

43. Sabotage of the petroleum facilities could prompt a decision by the Western companies to pull out temporarily. Such a move, however, almost certainly would result in Soviet pressure to take over the fields. While the Soviets can repair damage to pipelines or the loading buoy, we do not believe they have the technical expertise and operating equipment to rebuild or replace offshore production platforms.
UNITA

41. **Organization and Leadership.** Jonas Malheiro Savimbi remains UNITA's unchallenged leader as party president and commander in chief of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALIA), UNITA's military wing. In addition to its estimated forces of 35,000, UNITA may have another 30,000 unarmed and untrained supporters or adherents, a number that probably includes the families of the fighters as well as other civilians living within UNITA-controlled areas.

42. A 17-member Politburo is the top party organ. The leading officials after Savimbi are party Secretary General Miguel N'Zau Puna, a long-time Savimbi associate and the military chief of staff, Domingos Chinhiquila. Puna is a Cubalban, and the UNITA leadership includes a few other non-Ovimbundu as well.

43. UNITA in effect governs southeastern Angola and has established rudimentary, but well-run, health and educational services and agricultural enterprises, as well as a police force. UNITA's priorities at present, however, are on its military effort.

44. UNITA is shared by leaders in Lusaka, and MPLA-Cuban, or Soviet-backed assassination attempts are a real possibility, especially during Savimbi's travels abroad.

45. **Political Objectives.** UNITA's stated goal is to end the MPLA's monopoly on political power in Luanda and, through sustained military pressure, to ensure that no government that does not include UNITA can rule effectively. Eventually, in UNITA's view, the MPLA will be forced to negotiate an end to the conflict and share power with the insurgents.

UNITA, however, probably is uncertain about the final form of a negotiated settlement. Savimbi foresees a coalition central government with power shared among tribal and regional groups. Savimbi also has said that, with the ethnic orientation of Angolan politics, the formation of a single party would not be possible at present.

46. UNITA currently rejects the concept of a federal system that would limit UNITA to the territory it now controls in southern and southeastern Angola, in effect creating a buffer state between South Africa and a truncated Angola. We also believe UNITA would reject any MPLA proposal to grant UNITA a role in any government that excluded Savimbi.

UNITA's attitude, however, may be hardening in view of the MPLA's continued refusal to negotiate and UNITA's own sustained military successes. We believe, for example, that UNITA at one time might have been willing to accept a share in the government proportional to its ethnic representation in the country but now probably wants more.

47. **The South African Connection.** We believe South African assistance to UNITA probably fueled UNITA's recent advances. Although we lack detailed evidence, we believe that South Africa's direct support to the guerrillas has been substantial and has increased in recent years. In addition, Pretoria's periodic military incursions into southern Angola and its creation of a "buffer zone" there indirectly have benefited UNITA by tying down substantial numbers of Cuban and Angolan forces in defensive positions near the South African-controlled zone.

48. UNITA appears to lack other figures with Savimbi's broad personal appeal, international recognition, and exceptional leadership abilities. His removal through death or incapacitation would be a severe setback. We do not believe UNITA would wither away, however, but it would be considerably weakened and disorganized at least in the short term. Ultimately, it could emerge as a more intransigent movement seeking an all-out military victory rather than a negotiated solution. UNITA might also become more heavily influenced by South Africa without a leader of Savimbi's stature to maintain a degree of independence. This view of Savimbi's importance to UNITA appears to lack other figures with Savimbi's broad personal appeal, international recognition, and exceptional leadership abilities. His removal through death or incapacitation would be a severe setback. We do not believe UNITA would wither away, however, but it would be considerably weakened and disorganized at least in the short term. Ultimately, it could emerge as a more intransigent movement seeking an all-out military victory rather than a negotiated solution. UNITA might also become more heavily influenced by South Africa without a leader of Savimbi's stature to maintain a degree of independence. This view of Savimbi's importance to
although he has not been candid about the extent of its assistance.

53. South African material assistance has been critically important to UNITA because of its magnitude, regularity, and reliability. We believe that UNITA’s military advances over the past year were materially aided by increases in South African support. If South African aid to UNITA were to cease or be reduced sharply, the insurgent force would be required to scale back the level of its military operations. However, UNITA would remain a viable insurgency, controlling at least the southeastern portion of Angola, as well as continuing to operate in central and eastern Angola, since UNITA continues to capture a substantial amount—perhaps as much as half—of its arms and ammunition from the Angolan Army. Moreover, UNITA can afford a small amount of foreign exchange through diamond and ivory smuggling which it uses to purchase supplies on the international arms market.

54. Although Savimbi works closely with Pretoria, we believe that both Savimbi and South Africa recognize that theirs is a marriage of convenience only. Savimbi is not now Pretoria’s puppet, but his independence from South Africa is clearly limited by UNITA’s dependence on South African support.

55. Other Foreign Contacts. UNITA has received aid in the past from a variety of diverse sources, but such assistance has fallen off in recent years as more governments have recognized Luanda. France provided arms, supplies, and training, but apparently cut off its aid after the Socialists came to power in 1981. Morocco provided training and small arms, helped funnel assistance from other donors to UNITA, and facilitated contacts between UNITA and Arab countries, but reportedly followed France’s lead in cutting off assistance. Saudi Arabia provided considerable financial aid, but has not done so since the late 1970s. China provided training to UNITA leaders in the 1960s and furnished substantial quantities of small arms and other supplies in the late 1970s, but Beijing has established diplomatic relations with Luanda and probably no longer assists UNITA.

56. Western-oriented black African nations evidently have cut back support that had included facilitating shipments of foreign supplies to UNITA-controlled areas, furnishing UNITA with travel documents, and allowing UNITA open representation in their capitals. There is some evidence that Zaire still permits UNITA to operate on its territory, or at least turns a blind eye to a small UNITA presence.

57. There have been recent signs that some countries may be moving to establish unofficial or informal contacts with UNITA. Zambia is said to be initiating contacts with UNITA representatives in Europe, and Congo is reported to be extending feelers. The Congolese have also been urging the MPLA to reach an accommodation with UNITA. Although Savimbi is unlikely to receive any immediate public support or material assistance from these renewed contacts, the insurgents will be encouraged by the new signs of acceptability. UNITA representatives abroad report a greater openness on the part of certain European and African nations toward UNITA.

The External Actors

The Soviet Union

58. Moscow’s growing military commitment to Angola reflects Luanda’s importance to broader Soviet objectives—namely, undermining Western influence throughout the Third World, competing with the Chinese, promoting pro-Soviet change, and obtaining greater air and naval access in the region. Angola serves Soviet objectives in southern Africa by allowing the USSR entrance to SWAPO and the ANC, which supports Moscow’s long-term objective of undermining the white minority regime in South Africa. Angola also provides the Soviets with the capability to monitor and exploit any unrest in neighboring Zaire.

59. The USSR traditionally has displayed its commitment to the MPLA through the provision of military assistance. Since 1975, when Soviet arms, logistic support, and Cuban troops helped bring the MPLA to power, Moscow has signed military accords worth some $2 billion, of which $1.3 billion has been delivered; this support has been essential to the regime’s efforts to consolidate its power. As the security threat has increased during the past two years, from both UNITA and the South Africans, the USSR has provided more and better military equipment. Soviet advisors may also be assuming a more active role, possibly including some command and control functions.

60. Soviet calculations about Angola may be further affected by Moscow’s perceptions that it faces a renewed US challenge to its influence around the globe. In an authoritative statement on 5 January, TASS charged that recent South African incursions were “directly linked to the stepped-up aggressiveness
...of US imperialism and to acts of lawlessness perpetrated by it against Grenada, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. A related consideration for Moscow is the "prestige factor." Angola remains a symbol of the USSR's superpower status, of Soviet willingness and capability to project power to distant areas. A failure to support Angola—which in 1976 signed a Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty—would damage Moscow's credibility among other Third World clients and belie Moscow's claims of a growing pro-Soviet tilt in "the world correlation of forces."

61. We believe these various considerations will lead Moscow to escalate its military commitment to the MPLA regime as conditions in Angola dictate. Soviet officials already have told the South Africans they will give Luanda all the support necessary to protect Angola's territorial integrity. Future steps could include the provision of more military hardware, new augmentations of Cuban troops, a more offensive-minded Cuban troop posture against the UNITA forces, and/or increased Soviet advisory support and involvement in planning and directing Angolan military operations. We believe that the Soviets have not yet decided how far they will go to preserve the MPLA regime. While we think Moscow will stop short of sending its own ground combat troops to Angola during the next year, there is a growing possibility it will send pilots, air defense crews, and additional advisers. The chances of intervention would increase if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable to stabilize the military situation.

Cuba

62. Havana's involvement in Luanda has won respect and prestige for Fidel Castro in the Third World, enhanced his image as a major revolutionary figure, and enabled him to play a far greater international role than Cuba's size and importance would normally allow. Moreover, the financially strapped Cubans earn hard currency by charging Angola for the services of Cuban troops and civilian personnel. Angola is also an important outlet for Cuban's surplus labor, and a return to Cuba of the approximately 86,000 military and civilian personnel now stationed in Angola would aggravate Havana's already serious unemployment problem. Perhaps the most important factor, however, is Castro's need to provide a return to Moscow for the $4.6 billion in economic assistance it renders to Cuba annually. By serving Soviet policy goals in Angola, Havana helps justify the USSR's massive assistance program for Cuba.

63. Havana, in addition to being ideologically committed to the MPLA regime, will follow Soviet preferences as long as the costs of its involvement in Angola do not rise precipitously. Nonetheless, the Soviets probably could veto a Cuban pullout from Angola—mobilized by a dramatic rise in Cuban casualties—unless Castro was convinced that failure to do so would seriously threaten his own regime. At this point, even Moscow would reassess its position—that is, whether a continued Cuban presence in Angola is worth risking instability in a far more important client, Cuba. Given current trends, however, Havana's troops could remain in Angola for years. Without a total collapse of the MPLA, the Cubans probably see little prospect for a change in their current role. They could even increase the Cuban military presence substantially if Moscow and Luanda provided the right incentives.

South Africa

64. Pretoria's military involvement in Angola dates from the 1973-76 Angolan civil war, when its preferred contender for power, UNITA, and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), were forced back into the bush by Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA forces. Pretoria's worst fears were realized when Angola became a safe haven for SWAPO and ANC guerrillas, formed close links to the USSR and Cuba, and declared its intentions to become a Communist state. South Africa, now sees an opportunity to reverse this development and appears determined to help secure Jonas Saviimbi a share of political power. This objective, which Pretoria apparently sees as obtainable in the long term, may be one of South Africa's prerequisites to a settlement in Namibia.

65. Some South African policymakers, including senior military officers, wish to pursue an international settlement on Namibia that provides for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Some individuals may believe that UNITA can win a military victory over the MPLA. Pretoria would prefer a solution which included a Cuban removal, an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation, and the establishment of a non-SWAPO-dominated government in Namibia, but most of the leadership realizes that it is unlikely to attain all these goals.

66. While Pretoria realizes that it could not control an Angola led by Jonas Saviimbi, it probably is convinced that a government in which he participated would be useful in attaining other strategic objectives: namely, the neutralization of SWAPO as a military
force, the end of the ANC’s military presence in Angola, and the reduction or end of the largest Soviet
and Cuban presence in southern Africa. Helping Savimbi take power also would serve as a serious
warning to other states in the region that South Africa was prepared to commit major military assets in order
to impose acceptable political and economic arrangements throughout southern Africa.

67. South Africa has been stressing military action
as the leading instrument of its Angolan policy. But it
has not totally abandoned its diplomatic track, having
gauged in abortive bilateral talks with Angolan leader-
s at Cape Verde in late December 1982 and Febru-
ary 1983, and offering recently to withdraw its forces
temporarily from Angola if Luanda, SWAPO, or Cuba
does not seek the situation. At this juncture, howev-
er, these initiatives appear to be a sideshow. Pretoria is
sufficiently confident of UNITA’s military capabil-
ties, buttressed by South Africa, to believe the MPLA
will be forced sooner rather than later to negotiate.

The Frontline States

68. Angola’s four Frontline States (FLS)—Tanzania,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana—have become virtual bystanders in the Namibian-
Angolan equation. The Contact Group initiative and
the deteriorating economic and security situation in the
region have tended to shunt aside the FLS. FLS
ineffectiveness in dealing with the complexities of the
Angolan situation also reflects weaknesses of the
individual member states—particularly the preoccup-
ation with the grave economic difficulties each faces—and serious differences among them over
the appropriate course of action for Luanda.

69. As a group, the Frontline States continue to
support the MPLA position that the Cuban troop
withdrawal question should not be linked to Namibian independ-
ence. Nonetheless, Mozambique and Zamb-
ia have advised the MPLA leadership to be more
flexible on the Cuban issue, and have even suggested
talking directly to South Africa about a possible
desescalation of the fighting. Only President Nyerere of
Tanzania, the FLS chairman, remains adamantly op-
posed to contacts between any Frontline State and
Pretoria. The States also are divided in their positions
regarding UNITA. Although the group remains for-
maidly united in its support of the MPLA at the
legitimate government of Angola, Zambia and, to a
lesser extent, Botswana believe that, in view of the
obvious inability of the MPLA and its Communist
allies to defeat Savimbi’s forces on the battlefield, an
eventual political accommodation will be necessary.

70. Finally, even the one proposal introduced by an
African state to find a way out of the Angolan
tangle—the suggestion by former Nigerian head of
state Shagari that the Cuban troops be replaced by an
African peacekeeping force—did not emerge from the
Frontline group. The Nigerian proposal was a non-
starter, but the continuing inability of the FLS either
to produce new initiatives or to exert much influence
on any of the major actors suggests that the States will
continue to play a minor role, particularly so relative
to the central importance of their role in the Zimbab-
wean independence negotiations.

Outlook

71. On balance, we do not expect the situation in
Angola to change very much over the next year,
although security and economic conditions will con-
tinue to deteriorate. UNITA will continue to make
advances, particularly in the northeast, but probably
will remain unable to challenge Angolan and Cuban
forces holding major cities and key garrisons. Spread-
ing insurgent activity, however, will deepen the
MPLA’s sense of peril and cause its Soviet and Cuban
backers to continue their high level of military assis-
tance to the beleaguered regime. Consequently, despite the
ebb and flow of the insurgency and of Communist
involvement, we believe the overall military situation
will continue over the next year.

72. We think it likely that the Cuban forces will
be increased and that the Cubans will become more
actively involved in counterinsurgency operations, preferring to at least challenge UNITA in
selected parts of the country rather than adopt a nationwide “en-
clave” strategy. We do not expect the Cubans to
become sufficiently involved in the fighting to inflict
major reverses on the insurgents, anticipating rather
that they will do only enough to help prevent the
MPLA regime from losing significant new ground to
Savimbi’s insurgents.

73. Because we expect the overall military situation
to persist over the next year, we do not anticipate that
Moscow will face crucial decisions on its commitment
to the MPLA regime. The Soviet Union can maintain
its current level of support, and even increase it
significantly, without feeling pressured to reexamine
its position in Angola. Moscow will increase its military
commitment as security conditions dictate, including
sending more arms, extending more credit, encourag-
ing Cuba to send more troops and adopt a more active
combat role, and increasing its advisory role.
74. As long as President dos Santos moves cautiously, he probably can survive. Divisions within the MPLA will not prevent him from continuing negotiations with the United States and with South Africa. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that dos Santos can move decisively away from current policy directions in the near term because of serious divisions within the ruling party, the unstable security situation, and the pressures being exerted on him by the USSR.

Moreover, continued military pressure from the insurgents probably will cause black moderates in the MPLA to be almost as wary of negotiations as the mulattoes.

75. Despite the probability that the standoff between dos Santos and his party opponents will persist over the near term, the power equation in Luanda could change dramatically and with little warning. The continued deterioration in security and economic conditions in Angola could prompt disgruntled pro-Soviet hardliners to engineer a palace coup. Dos Santos’s apprehensions about such an eventuality may have contributed to the hardening of his position on UNITA and on a Cuban withdrawal. As long as dos Santos moves cautiously, he probably will remain in power. His chances of being deposed increase significantly if he moves in policy directions that threaten the influence in Luanda of mulatto-led, Soviet-backed hardliners. The possibility that the black nationalists, perhaps in league with disaffected elements of the Angolan Army, would take over the government seems remote, partly because we believe that the hardliners have increased their influence in the government’s security forces as Soviet and Cuban military assistance has increased over the past year.

76. UNITA has little alternative but to keep on fighting. Savimbi undoubtedly knows that, as long as the hardliners maintain their strong position in the MPLA, the only negotiations over power sharing in Angola that could occur would be over his dead body.

77. The South Africans, for their part, probably are satisfied with the results over the past year of their policy toward Angola. At a minimum, Pretoria probably calculates that the inability of Luanda to part with Cuban troops has used pressure on South Africa to agree to a Namibian settlement. Furthermore, South Africa also believes that time is on the side of the UNITA insurgents, despite increased Soviet and Cuban assistance. A recent South African military intelligence estimate concluded that UNITA is now the dominant armed force in Angola and that more Soviet and Cuban involvement would only turn Angola into the Soviets’ “Vietnam in Africa.” Consequently, we expect South Africa to continue its current policy direction, to talk about negotiating with Luanda while keeping up the military pressure on the MPLA regime with the long-term intention of driving their Communist backers out of Angola.

78. The possibility exists, of course, that the violence might escalate in Angola to the point of large-scale, open warfare between South Africa and Angolan-Cuban forces, an eventuality that could greatly deepen Soviet involvement in Angola. From this perspective, the year opened ominously with reports of Soviet threats warning Pretoria and UNITA to back down and the first significant engagement since September 1981 between South African forces and Cuban- and Soviet-assisted Angolan soldiers. Nevertheless, we believe that both Pretoria and Moscow want to avoid such a conflict, and that their struggle for influence in Luanda will continue much as it has since the Angolan conflict began in 1975-76.
DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive information and use of the recipient only.

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-59/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.