Forces. When they mobilized, violated the agreements of World War II, occupied Europe, engaged in provocative acts, we acted with great restraint.

We had absolute military superiority in strategic terms. We had a nuclear monopoly, and we did not use it. We have acted with restraint.

And I do not suggest now that we should not act always with a modicum of restraint and good judgment, but that does not mean we must unilaterally concessions and that does not mean that we must subordinate the security of the free world to the objective of getting an agreement regardless of what that agreement contains.

Who has precipitated the confrontation in this world? It has been the Soviets, not us. Anyone who says the United States has done it, that we are equally guilty, is not looking at the facts.

We gave the Philippines their independence. We gave Okinawa back to Japan. We relinquished territory we occupied.

Have the Soviets ever done that? No. The Soviets have been engaged in a campaign of political and territorial aggression since World War II.

My God, can we not recognize that? Who is it that started this confrontation? Not the United States. But when confronted with an adversary with that mentality we had better be tough, but we must be prepared to negotiate from a position that protects the vital interests of the United States. We do not want some milque-toast in charge of the Arms Control Agency. At least I do not think the American people do. I think some of my colleagues do.

That is what is at issue here.

[Exhibit 11]

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

(By Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger)

DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS AND OTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE STABILITY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, the District of Columbia, To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to submit, in accordance with Public Law 97-252, the Department of Defense evaluation of possible initiatives for improving the containment and control of nuclear weapons, particularly during crises.

I share with the Congress the conviction that we must make every effort to ensure against nuclear war, the Department of Defense, the United States and the Soviet Union are equally persuaded that we can and should improve existing mechanisms to control crisis which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misinterpretation. Of course we should be aware that measures toward these ends, no matter how attractive at first glance, in certain cases, could entail unacceptable risks to our security and that of our allies. The Department of Defense has therefore carefully assessed the potential advantages and disadvantages of each possible new initiative intended to lower the danger of an accident or miscalculation which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

That evaluation has led me to propose to the President several important measures.

The addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the communications link between the United States and the USSR.

The establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link between the U.S. and USSR.

The agreement between the U.S. and Soviet government in order to establish data links with their embassies in the countries of the other.

Agreement among the world's nations to consult in the event of a nuclear incident involving a terrestrial communications link, or Hotline, between Washington and Moscow.

The Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Accident Measures Agreement), signed in 1971, requires each side to maintain and improve organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; to notify the other side in advance of a significant military launch, particularly in the event of an accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident involving the deployment of a nuclear weapon which could create a radiation risk of nuclear war; and in the event of any unexplained nuclear incident to act in such a way as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other party.

The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the US-USSR Direct Communications Link, signed in 1971, provided for the upgrading of the Hotline and the installation of two satellite communications circuits.

The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (Incident at Sea Agreement), signed in 1972, enjoinsthe two sides to observe the law of the sea and the spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; to refrain from provocative acts at sea that could increase the risk of war, and to provide advance notice to mariners of the hazards of the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or aircraft in flight.

The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in 1973, requires that the two sides refrain from actions which could escalate relations between them, lower the military confrontations and/or lead to nuclear war between them or between one of them and another country.

It also recognizes that each party must refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, its allies, or other countries and to consult with the other in the event of heightened risk of nuclear war.

C. Current initiatives

On 18 November 1981, President Reagan delivered the first in a series of major speeches, a program for preserving peace. He stated that the cornerstones of his program are to engage the Soviet Union "... in a dialogue about meaningful restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East from West." He also took the occasion to propose the general framework of his major arms control initiatives and to express his commitment to re-
ducing the risk of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or mis-interpretation.

President Reagan returned to this theme in his Berlin speech of 11 June 1983, and at the United Nations in June 1983, where he announced that we would approach the Soviet Union with proposals for reciprocal measures in such areas as advanced notification of major strategic and tactical maneuvers, a limit on test launches of nuclear weapons, and a ban on the testing of cruise missiles. In addition, the President's START and INF negotiators in Geneva to discuss those proposals with the Soviet counterparts. The President's proposals reflect his belief that we must take every step possible to ensure that nuclear war cannot break out as a result of an accident, miscommunication or misunderstanding.

The measures not only include, but go beyond, the suggestions he made in Berlin and at the U.N. Thus the President proposed additional not only of ICBM launches but also of all launches of U.S. and Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles and of intermediate-range, land-based ballistic missiles. The President's proposals for advance notice of major strategic exercises to cover all major military exercises which might cause concern. Further, to illustrate the value of this measure, the U.S. voluntarily notified the Soviet Union in advance of its plans to begin the major military exercise. He added that the "third party" danger.

Most of the U.S. efforts in this area have concentrated on the interaction of Soviet and U.S. forces and systems, and possible risks of nuclear war through accident, miscommunication or misunderstanding from this interaction. However, we have also paid attention to the risks that might arise from the use of packs by a third country or subnational group. Six nations are known to have detonated nuclear explosive devices, and a number of additional states now have the capability to develop and produce nuclear weapons. A détente in the "nuclear" could occur quickly, once a nation with the necessary technology came to regard nuclear weapons as a desirable means to respond to perceived threats, to acquire international prestige, to preserve national honor, or to compensate for loss of confidence in outside security assurances or nuclear guarantees. Countering the possibility that a nuclear group might acquire a nuclear weapon by fabricating a crude device or by stealing one from an existing stockpile.

A. The "third party" danger

Most of the U.S. efforts in this area have concentrated on the interaction of Soviet and U.S. forces and systems, and possible risks of nuclear war through accident, miscommunication or misunderstanding from this interaction. However, we have also paid attention to the risks that might arise from the use of nuclear forces by a third country or subnational group. Six nations are known to have detonated nuclear explosive devices, and a number of additional states now have the capability to develop and produce nuclear weapons. A détente in the "nuclear" could occur quickly, once a nation with the necessary technology came to regard nuclear weapons as a desirable means to respond to perceived threats, to acquire international prestige, to preserve national honor, or to compensate for loss of confidence in outside security assurances or nuclear guarantees. Countering the possibility that a nuclear group might acquire a nuclear weapon by fabricating a crude device or by stealing one from an existing stockpile.

1. Intergovernmental Ballistic Missile Launches

A number of previous U.S.-Soviet agreements have provided for advance notification of some ICBM launches. The 1971 "Accident Measures" Agreement requires each side to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches which will extend beyond its national territory. In the direction of the other party. Both sides have understood the Agreement to apply to land- rather than submarine-based ballistic missiles. A protocol to the Agreement requires immediate notification of an "unsuccessful" or malfunctioning launch of an unarmed missile when the trajectory of the missile extends beyond national territory in a direction that could be misinterpreted by the other side.

The 1973 Incidents at Sea agreement requires both sides to issue Notices to Airmen and Mariners (NOTAM's) for missile launches which will impact in international waters. The NOTAM's mention only the projected launch point or area, the type of vehicle, or
he purpose of the launch. Moreover, relatively few Soviet launches are covered by the agreement, whereas virtually all U.S. CBM and SLBM launches are directed to the open oceans.

The SALT II Treaty would have obligated each party to notify the other well in advance of any multiple ICBM launches and of single ICBM launches which would extend beyond its national territory. Unlike the IOTAMs required under the Incidents at Sea Agreement, the SALT notifications ought would have included detailed information (e.g., launch locations, test range) and would have been provided directly to the other side. The U.S. SBM would be provided notifications in July 1979, consistent with the desire that the two countries act in accord with appropriate provisions of the SALT II treaty even though it was not ratified. The Soviets also have provided notifications, albeit not as detailed as the U.S. CBM.

None of the previous agreements provides for coverage of all ICBM launches. In particular, they do not cover all launches which impact within the territory of the launching nation. Because any launch can create some uncertainty and ambiguity, the U.S. has proposed in the START negotiations that the sides provide notifications of all ICBM launches, whether they occur singly or in multiples, whether their flights remain within national boundaries or extend beyond them. This proposal would add the additional layer of equalizing the current obligations on each side for advance notification and of discouraging the use of missile launches for geopolitical purposes such as a "show-of-force."

2. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Launches

The United States and the USSR do not now notify each other directly or specifically on SLBM launches. They only issue standard NOTAMs which announce air space and ocean "closure areas" if they expect an SLBM to be launched. These notams are not specific. They do not, however, specify the reason for the closures. The President has, therefore, proposed that the two sides provide specific advance notification of all SLBM launches. Any SLBM launch within national territory, or even those launches, committed with the ICBM notification proposal, could mean that for the first time, advance notice would be required for all launches of strategic ballistic missiles in the arsenals of either side.

3. LRINF Ballistic Missile Launches

Finally, the United States has proposed that both sides provide advance notification:
- All launches of land-based longer-range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) ballistic missiles. These include the Soviet Union's SS-20, SS-4, and SS-8-5 missiles, and the U.S. PERSHING II. We continue to seek elimination of all land-based American and new Soviet LRINF missiles. While we are negotiating to ban, however, we believe at notification is needed. A successful LRINF ballistic missile launches would have some negative benefits. The Soviet LRINF missiles are already deployed in large numbers. Our PERSHING system is in an advanced stage of development. Unless prior notification is given, any of these missiles could lead to miscalculations concerning military or political intent.

4. Advance notification of major military exercises

Each year the United States and the SSR conduct military exercises intended to provide training, to assess operational readiness, or to develop, perfect or refine plans, procedures, and relationships related to nuclear forces. Such exercises within a nation's major nuclear forces, could be misinterpreted and evoke an unintended response from the other side. The President has proposed that each side provide advance notice of major military exercises involving nuclear forces which are of such a scope as to raise the concerns of the other side.

The United States currently provides advance notice of major exercises via embassy notifications and new sever examples. For example, last year we gave advance notice of Global Shield, our largest and most significant exercise for strategic nuclear forces. The USSR provides no advance notification, except in conformance with the voluntary procedures of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which call for advance notice of exercises involving 25,000 or more troops.

C. Expanded data exchanges

The first proposal of the President's proposal calls for a broad range of data exchanges of basic data about each side's nuclear forces. The U.S. START and INF delegations are now pursuing such an agreement.

The data exchange envisaged would go far beyond that contained in the SALT II agreements. SALT II provided for reciprocal information only on the numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles--ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The President has proposed a much wider and more detailed exchange of data on both strategic and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which would provide expanded information on the make-up of each side's forces.

The exchange of detailed information about each side's forces might help verification and could facilitate future arms control negotiations. It would also enhance the understanding each side has of the capabilities and limitations of the other. Such exchanges would be essential for the implementation of any START or INF Agreement.

III. POSSIBLE NEW MEASURES TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION

One of the most effective ways to further the effort already under way is for President Reagan to ensure against unintended nuclear crisis conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would be to improve the ability of the two to communicate about crises and military incidents. In examining new initiatives for using the way of enhancing nuclear weapons use, the Department of Defense has therefore focused on improving the speed, reliability, accuracy, and completeness of direct communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, we have studied whether improved communications with other countries could lower the risk of war.

A. Hotline improvements

A primary measure to enhance communications is to improve the Direct Communications Link (DCL) or "Hotline" between the U.S. and Soviet heads of government. The Hotline is, and should remain, for use only in severe emergencies. It would degrade security, and reduce its impact in major crises, if it were used for purposes that could be handled effectively through routine or lower-level bilateral channels.

In keeping with the Hotline mission, the precise number of times that the two heads of state have used it has not been disclosed. It is known that it has been used sparingly during its twenty-year existence, but it has proved invaluable in major crises. U.S. Presidents have cited its use during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to prevent possible Soviet misunderstanding of U.S. fleet movements in the Mediterranean and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

The United States and the Soviet Union have significantly upgraded the DCL since its creation. The system originally consisted of two terminal points with teletype equipment linked by one, full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit (route Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow and for back-up, one full-time duplex radio-telegraph circuit (route Washington-Tanger-Mediterranean). In 1971, the two governments agreed to establish twelve communication circuits for the DCL, with multiple terminals in each country. When those became operational in 1976, the DCL achieved almost 100 percent technical reliability. The original radio circuit was terminated, while the wire telegraph circuit remains as a back-up.

1. Facsimile Transmission Capability

The Department of Defense has now proposed for consideration by the President the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the system. This improvement would increase the DCL's ability to quickly exchange information by enabling the two sides to transmit more, and more complex, data more reliably and efficiently. The system is currently limited by the slowness of the transmission process could be used to send more messages or for increased deliberation and consultation on each side. In addition, a facsimile transmission capability would minimize or entirely eliminate the need for key-boarding and therefore the possibility of operator error.

More important, facsimile equipment would endow the Hotline with a capability which it does not now possess: the ability to exchange graphic information. The precise, detailed, and easily interpreted information offered by maps, charts, and drawings could be essential in resolving an ongoing military crisis. Because graphic information can require no translation, the total time saved through this method could actually be much greater than that implied simply by the increase in the transmission rate. Translation is the slowest step in the direct communication process. A highly proficient Russian intelligence analyst can produce a full translation at the rate of only 1,000 words per hour, and do a cursory review at the rate of 6,000 words per hour.

2. Voice and Video Capability

The Department of Defense has also considered the possibility of adding a voice or video capability to the DCL. We have concluded, however, that this step would carry many more disadvantages than advantages. The United States and the Soviet Union explicitly agreed not to include video capability when they renewed the original Hotline agreement and its subsequent improvement. On both occasions, they concluded that printed communication would be much more precise, and more reliable. The conclusions of this report reinforce that conclusion.

Because voice communication is more difficult than written material to translate, it is far more subject to misunderstanding. In addition, a direct conversation could encourage instant response, thereby denying the head of state the necessary opportunity to consult with advisors and prepare a thoughtful and measured response. For
reasons, emergency voice communica-
tion between the two leaders could reduce,
or heightened, their ability to re-
stra a crisis. The same considerations
y, in heightened fashion, to the installa-
tion of video conferencing capability.
B. Possible new communications
mechanisms
bilateral Joint Military Communications
Link
The measure which we are now consider-
would create a Joint Military Communi-
ations Link (JMCL), paralleling the DCL,
seen the United States and the Soviet
ion. A JMCL would provide a direct facil-
ity transmission capability between the
national crisis control centers (in the
States, the National Military Com-
d Center in the Pentagon). It would
ple, but not supplant, existing diplo-
atic channels. Acquiring a JMCL in the
national military command centers would enable us to build
and strengthen the existing rapid com-
nications system, and reduce require-
ments for additional personnel, training.
Also, it would allow rapid exchange of
tly technical information that could be
mental to understanding and therefore re-
nerg a nuclear or other military crisis. No-
ng communications link between
United States and the USSR has a simi-
capability.
JMCL could be used to implement
ments on the sharing of military infor-
mation that is time urgent. It could, for ex-
ple, be the mechanism for the consulta-
tion on terrorist nuclear activity that we dis-
s later in this report. It could also be the
agned vehicle for the ballistic missile
ich and missile warning notifications
posed by the President.
JMCL would also have a crisis control
ction. It could be used in the event of
military incident that required urgent
mmunication between the United States
the USSR, but did not warrant direct
act between the two heads of govern-
ment.
JMCL could also be used for cooper-
—rather, the advancement of confronta-
tions—between the two countries, but not
ergency situations—for example, if a military
lf of the one side were lost or disabled, a
CIC would facilitate assistance by the
er. Similarly, it could ensure proper han-
g of any military objects with nuclear com-
ons which threatened to impact on
id. We believe that exercises of a JMCL
regular use for implementing informa-
sharing agreements would go far
ward ensuring that the system would
rk well in any crisis.
The information-sharing function of a
CIC would provide both sides with a series
opportunities to prepare for emergen-
ties situations—increasing their fac-
liarity with the system and to identify
procedural changes which would
ighten its usefulness in a military crisis.
A U.S.-Soviet exercise of a JMCL
uld also offer an important facility for re-
sing and building each side’s confidence in
system.
2. Multilateral Military Communications
Link
While the bilateral JMCL concept could
ance communication and reduce the risk
arising from objects with nuclear com-
interpretation, we believe that a multilateral
CL would not be desirable. It would be ex-
emly difficult to determine which states
to include in a multilateral network. The ad-
ition of too many states would threaten to
make a MCL so unwieldy that it would
er function effectively.
3. Embassy-Capital High Rate Data
Communication Link
Another promising method of improving
communications between the United
Soviet Union could be for each to
bility, its Embassy in the other country. We believe
that such a system could provide an important
ment to the DCL and to a
JMCL.
Each government would control
tribute to the other side’s ability to
in the necessary equipment freely and
interference.
4. Crisis Control Center
We have already considered the sug-
gestions for a U.S.-Soviet or multinational
ational crisis control center, but have concluded
that it would not be desirable to establish
such an institution at this time. Over time,
we believe, a crisis control center might allow us to pur-
chase of a crisis control center, by indicating ways in which
we could reduce the risks involved in it to an
acceptable level. We doubt, however, that a
ational crisis control center located in a
neutral country would be feasible. We
that the use of a JMCL would be
more likely to point the way to a bilateral
ment linking separate crisis control
structures in Washington and Moscow.
A crisis control center in a neutral
united States and the USSR would be far removed from the
ational capitals where crisis decisions would
have to be made. This separation would
several serious drawbacks. It is most
likely that a center would be completely
passed in national crisis decisionmaking. If not,
a center would create a cumbersome
on and international
sses, retarding action just
speed and ease of decisionmaking.
ly the need for greater
s in which to communicate,
which would be an important feature of a
JMCL, would be difficult to achieve in an in-
military environment. A U.S.-Soviet crisis control
The institutional barriers to a clear
and legitimate channel for automatic con-
sideration of any crisis—including those in
which Soviet participation would serve
tially rather than reduce, tensions.
A multilateral crisis control center would
suffer from even more problems. The
members in a center, the less likely they
would all share a common interest in
quelling the outbreak of or escalation of
conflict. Even if the worst is the case, that
decisionmaking process in a multinational
center would easily become bogged
down, and inhibit timely, concerted actions to
avert a serious crisis. Indeed, there would
be a general risk that the facility would evolve
from a confidential tool for crisis manage-
ment into a forum for waging propaganda
warfare over sensitive crises.
Finally, the expansion of the number of
reciprocates would increase the danger that a member
would misuse the facility to spread disinfo-
formation or misuse gathered information.
With unrestricted membership, it would be
impossible by definition to keep the
intelligence data. Any shared information
would immediately be in the public domain.
5. Information Sharing Facility
A U.S.-Soviet institution for sharing infor-
mation on nuclear activities by third coun-
tries or terrorists would present many of
the problems associated with a crisis control
center and add new ones. Since such a body
would concentrate on information
exchange, the risks would increase that the
Soviets could transform it into a new source
of sensitive intelligence data or attempt to
exploit it for disinformation purposes.
Those risks would be considerably
or effort was made to endow the institution
with a general data bank or if it was made
a multilateral rather than bilateral forum.
Although an information-sharing institu-
tion is not new, it is not easy to implement. We are
considering a multinational agreement or
ning for consultations during particular
alarms.
ations party to the agreement would
when it released, appropriate, consult
with each other on nuclear explosions or ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist
groups. By limiting the consultation to an
aspect of the nuclear proliferation problem
that is of particular concern to virtually all
states, the agreement would minimize the
risk that a nation would use it for disinformation
puses.
IV. ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO REDUCE
AMBIGUITY AND MISINTERPRETATION
In addition to the enhanced communica-
tion mechanisms discussed in the previous
section, the Department of Defense has con-
sidered a number of other measures which
might reduce ambiguity surrounding mili-
tary incidents, and thus lessen the possibil-
ity of misinterpretation. These fall into
three general categories: improved arms
control verification procedures; improved
warning of nuclear attack; and reduced
nerability of command, control, and
munication systems.
A. Enhanced verification procedures for
nuclear arms control agreements
Effective verification is essential to effective
arms control. The first requirement for
effective verification is possession of satis-
factory monitoring. The most effective end,
the United States maintains an exten-
sive intelligence capability for monitoring
treaty-limited activities and invests heavily
in new technologies which may improve
our ability to space monitor activity related to treaty
compliance.
Effective verification depends on satisfying
a series of non-technical conditions as well. Our verification efforts cannot rely
only on information obtained from moni-
ting of the other side to evade detection, and
our own ability to counter cheating. We
must assess the incentive of the other side
to cheat. We must also assess the political
disposition of the other side to cheat, and the
ations, recognizing that charges of treaty viola-
tion are not easily made or easily accept-
ed, especially when evidence based upon
the most sensitive intelligence sources and
methods is involved. Enforcement of compli-
ance under these circumstances is even
more difficult.
The verification provisions of US-USSR
arms control treaties vary widely. Some
agreements, such as the Biological Weapons
Conventions, do not include effective verifica-
tions measures, but instead simply provide
consultations about compliance. Other
agreements, like the SALT I Interim Agree-
ment and the ABM Treaty, explicitly refer
to national technical means of verification
(NTM), and provide supplements to NTM
through counting rules and collateral measures such as dismantlement and destruction procedures. The SALT II verification provisions appeared to go further by including telemetry encryption under measures that could be monitored and checked measures. In fact, however, some SALT II provisions were ambiguous and provided an inadequate basis for judging compliance.

The information needed by the West for effective verification of arms control agreements generally requires disclosure of what the Soviet Union considers to be state secrets—even though it may involve information normally made public in the West. Consequently, except for such collateral measures and distress procedures, the Soviet Union typically prefers cavedted or ambiguous wording which makes it difficult to challenge its compliance with verification rules.

The Soviet Union's callous disregard of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention by producing deadly toxins and of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by using and encouraging the use of deadly toxins against combatants and innocent civilians in Southeast Asia provides the measure of understanding why, in the future, the U.S. must insist that arms control agreements with the USSR contain effective verification provisions.

We have examined several technical and practical measures which could enhance verification capabilities and thereby contribute to mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. These include the use of combined consultative commissions, international verification on bodies, data exchanges and other measures beyond National Technical Means of verification. All, however, require further analysis in the context of specific treaty requirements.

B. Measures to Lengthen Warning Time of Potential Attack

Many of the initiatives discussed earlier in this report—the President's proposals for ballistic missile launch notifications, the joint military communications link the high rate data link between each side's capital, and in the other country, the agreement to consult during times involving terrorist nuclear activity—would strengthen U.S. and Soviet awareness of—and thereby ability to divert—any near-term danger of a nuclear accident or attack. We have also examined possible technical measures which might enhance U.S. and Soviet warning capabilities, whether the threat comes from the other party, from a third country, or from a terrorist or subnational group. After careful study, however, we have concluded that none of the possible bilateral U.S.-Soviet measures available for increasing warning time would have enough utility to warrant its continued consideration.

C. Measures to Reduce Vulnerability of Command, Control, and Communications (C3) on Both Sides

Finally, we have examined possible bilateral U.S.-Soviet and unilateral approaches to reduce the vulnerability of our command, control, and communications (C3) systems—the systems necessary to communicate with direct and strategic forces.

The strategic C3 system is vital to ensure that strategic forces can respond to attack, and is therefore an essential element of deterrence. The system also guarantees that the ultimate control over nuclear weapons resides at the highest national decision-making level. The C3 system provides the essential intermediary between our nuclear attack warning system and the decision-makers who would determine a response to a nuclear attack. Thus, it must be capable of performing its functions both during and after attack.

Shortly after President Reagan took office in 1981, he directed that a thorough review be conducted of the strategic C3 system and its ability to function under and survive attack. When the President announced his Strategic Modernization Program, he gave the highest priority to correcting strategic deficiencies. Major initiatives for achieving these C3 corrections are now under way. President Reagan's decision was based on the need to strengthen U.S. C3 capability and survivability, as well as a sustained Soviet C3 improvement program. That Soviet effort has not only strengthened the Soviet strategic C3 system but also increased its ability to target and destroy U.S. strategic forces and associated C3.

The modernization program for strategic C3 systems calls for balanced improvements in essential command, control, communications, and computer systems. The President also directed the development of a survivability and endurance of the alert warning and attack assessment sensors, increasing mobility and endurance of command decision-making, and extending use of information from U.S. forces following conventional nuclear attack.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield some time, he may need to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, before the Senator from Texas leaves the Chamber, could I propose a question?

Mr. TOWER. I would be delighted.

Fire away.

Mr. TSONGAS. The Senator made a very strong statement to the effect that Congress cannot and should not prevent the President on national security issues. I thought he made a very compelling argument in that regard.

If the Senator could correct my memory, sometime ago the President announced that he was going to put the MX in Minuteman silos and I distinctly recall turning on the television and watching someone who resembled the Senator from Texas blasting the President for that decision and was going to lead the fight against it. Did I misremember that?

Mr. TOWER. No, the Senator certainly did not. I was strongly critical of the decision to abandon the MPS system. But once that decision was made by the President I moved to try to accommodate that decision and to help look for other means of basing the MX system, and it is my intention to review very carefully whatever recommendations the President makes subsequent to that commission's report and do my best to support it. I think the high probability is that I will support it.

Mr. TSONGAS. The Senator from Texas found it in the national interest to indicate strong vehement opposition to the original Presidential decision, did he not?

Mr. TOWER. The point is I criticized his judgment of the MPS basing mode. I did nothing in Congress to try to block it or to knock it around. Therein lies the difference.

Now do not misunderstand me. I think we should be critical. I think we should be careful. But I do not think we should narrowly circumscribe the President's freedom of action in the foreign policy arena.

Let me be the first to say that sometimes I pass judgment on foreign policy issues here. As a matter of fact, I offered an amendment one time in the Senate to proscribe any aid to Indonesia. That was when Sukarno was the dictator of Indonesia. I was counseled against it by others who were wiser than I was, but I was young then, as is the Senator from Massachusetts now, and I thought it was a good idea. I think it was not a month after I had successfully gotten through the Senate a resolution proscribing any assistance to Indonesia that Sukarno was overthrown and was replaced by the Subarto government.

I made a mistake. Senator. I have made several mistakes in the 22 years I have been here. I hope I will not repeat them.

Mr. TSONGAS. It is my understanding, after the Senator's statement on the MX basing mode, that the committee decided, led by the Senator, on zero production as an alternative was forthcoming.

Mr. TOWER. That is right. In that instance, we did not impose our decision on the administration on a permanent basing mode for the MX. We withheld the funds until such time as the administration made a recommendation on such permanent basing, recognizing that the initiative should come from the administration.

Mr. TSONGAS. The Senator from Texas second-guessed his President and made sure the President's decision would not be carried out. The moral of the story is very clear. It is all right when the Senator does it; it is not all right when someone else does it, and age is not the issue.

Mr. TOWER. It is not that clear. Senator. What I am saying is that we zeroed the funds in the Senate committee. It had the desired effect, that is to get the administration to make a decision on permanent basing of the MX.

Mr. TSONGAS. They made a decision.

Mr. TOWER. Well, Senator. You raise the question. When the decision was made, once the decision was made—

Mr. TSONGAS. But, Senator—

Mr. TOWER. I ask the Senator not to ask a question of me and cut me off.