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RUEIAQ/HPCFTGEORGE/M/EDM:
RHLBAAA/USCINCUS QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
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RUEOGWA/CORUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM
RUEA1IA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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SERIAL: (U) IIR

/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *******/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJ: IIR WHY THE "TANDA" PHENOMENON DOES NOT EXIST IN THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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SUMMARY: (G) THE GUATEMALAN ARMY DOES NOT HAVE THE PHENOMENON OF "TANDAS", THOSE POWERFUL HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES AMONG MILITARY OFFICER YEAR GROUPS WHICH IN SOME OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES CAN GREATLY INFLUENCE SUCH THINGS AS SENIOR LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND COMMAND ASSIGNMENTS. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE GUATEMALAN OFFICER CORPS CAUSED BY TWO EARLY 1980 COUPS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF VERTICAL COLUMNS OF LOYALTIES AMONG "OPERATORS", "INTEL" TYPES AND SMALLER SUBGROUPS OF OFFICERS, THE MELTING OF YEAR GROUPS IN MILITARY COURSES, AND SPLIT YEAR GROUPS ALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE LACK OF "TANDA" DOMINATION.

TEXT: 1. (G) THE GUATEMALAN ARMY'S MILITARY ACADEMY HAS BEEN GRADUATING CLASSES OF MILITARY OFFICERS FOR SOME 115 YEARS, AND AS SUCH, THE ACADEMY IS CONSIDERED THE BEDROCK OF GUATEMALAN ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONALISM AND VALUES. YET, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT A STRONG MILITARY ACADEMY TRADITION ALSO EXISTS IN NEIGHBORING HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR, THE GUATEMALAN OFFICER CORPS, UNLIKE THOSE OF HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR, DOES NOT EXPERIENCE THE POWERFUL INTERNAL INFLUENCES OF THE "TANDAS". THE PHENOMENON OF THE TANDA HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE VERY STRONG IDENTIFICATION AND LOYALTY AMONG MEMBERS OF ONE'S ACADEMY CLASS -- A HORIZONTAL LOYALTY. THIS TANDA PHENOMENON AT TIMES IS THEN AMPLIFIED BY THE AD HOC BANDING TOGETHER OF VARIOUS TANDAS OR YEAR GROUPS OF ACADEMY GRADUATES IN ORDER TO ENFORCE THEIR PREFERENCES, E.G. FOR TOP LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR TOP ASSIGNMENTS, ON THE REST OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICER CORPS. ALLIANCES BETWEEN CERTAIN TANDAS THEMSELVES AND ALLIANCES BETWEEN THESE TANDAS AND ARMY CHIEFS OR MINISTERS OF DEFENSE HAVE OFTEN RESULTED IN UNDERSTANDINGS OR AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE OVERPOWERED THE INTERESTS OF OTHER TANDAS. THIS REPORT ANALYZES WHY THIS PHENOMENON IS NOT NOW PRESENT IN THE GUATEMALAN ARMY, AN ARMY WHICH IS SIMILAR IN MANY OTHER WAYS TO ITS CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS.

2. (G) THE GUATEMALAN ARMY ONCE POSSESSED THIS "TANDA" CHARACTERISTIC UP THROUGH THE 1970'S, ALBEIT NOT QUITE TO THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AS THAT OF ITS NEIGHBORING ARMIES OF EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. THEN DURING THE EARLY 1980'S, A COMBINATION OF FACTORS CONVERGED TO DILUTE GUATEMALAN TANDAS OF MUCH OF THEIR HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES IN FAVOR OF LOYALTIES MORE VERTICAL IN NATURE THROUGHOUT THE INSTITUTION.

3. (G) THE COUP AGAINST LUCAS -- THE MILITARY COUP AGAINST PRESIDENT (AND GENERAL)
FERNANDO LUCAS GARCIA IN MARCH OF 1982 WAS AN ESPECIALLY GUT-WRENCHING EXPERIENCE FOR THE OFFICER CORPS. THE COUP SUCCEEDED IN OUSTING LUCAS GARCIA IN FAVOR OF GENERAL JOSE EFRAIN RIOS MONT, BUT IT ALSO SERVED TO SPLIT APART WHAT UNTIL THEN HAD BEEN A HOMOGENEOUS OFFICER CORPS. MILITARY ACADEMY CLASSMATES AND FRIENDS FOR UP TO 20 YEARS SUDDENLY FOUND THEMSELVES ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF THIS BARRACKS COUP, WITH THOSE WHO HAD MAINTAINED LOYALTY TO LUCAS.Subsequently being relegated to positions of lesser importance, positions away from the capital, or were sent abroad as attaches or students. Then in Aug 1983, RIOS MONT SUFFERED THE SAME FATE AS HIS PREDECESSOR, WITH MANY OFFICERS WHO HAD RESISTED THE PREVIOUS COUP AGAINST LUCAS NOW LEADING THE MOVE AGAINST GEN RIOS AND AGAINST THOSE SAME CLASSMATES WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE OUSTER OF LUCAS.


5. LET THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR -- CONICALIDENTAL WITH THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LUCAS REGIME, OR MORE LIKELY AS A RESULT OF IT, THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE RISE IN THE COMBAT POWER OF THE THREE INSURGENT GROUPS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE AS MANY AS 8,000 FULLTIME ARMED GUERRILLAS, SOME 40,000 IRREGULAR INSURGENTS, AND A POPULAR SUPPORT BASE INSIDE GUATEMALA OF 150,000 CITIZENS. SOME OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY’S RESPONSES TO THIS INCREASED THREAT HAD THE UNWITTING EFFECT OF ALSO REDUCING HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES OF THE ACADEMY CLASSES. THREE SUCH ACTIONS WORTHY OF DISCUSSION BELOW ARE:
- THE RISE OF VERTICAL COLUMNS OF OFFICER SPECIALISTS;
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL OFFICER SUBGROUPS;
- THE DELAY IN THE PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS;
- THE GREATER USE OF RESERVE OFFICERS.

7. (G) THE "COFRADIA" --
UNDER DIRECTORS OF INTELLIGENCE SUCH AS THE THEN COL.
MANUEL ANTONIO CALLEJAS Y CALLEJAS. BACK IN THE EARLY
1980's, THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE MADE DRAMATIC GAINS
IN ITS CAPABILITIES, SO MUCH SO THAT TODAY IT MUST BE
GIVEN MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR ENGINEERING THE MILITARY
DECLINE OF THE GUERRILLAS FROM 1982 TO THE PRESENT. BUT
WHILE DOING SO, THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (D-2) BECAME
AN ELITE "CLUB" WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS, RETAINING THE
VERY BEST OF OFFICERS FOR CONSECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE
ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN THE D-2, OR AT A MINIMUM, ALWAYS
BRINGING BACK INTO THE D-2 THOSE OFFICERS WHO HAD
DEPARTED IN ORDER TO BECOME COMMANDERS, SECOND
COMMANDERS, OR G-2'S IN BATTALIONS, MILITARY ZONES, AND
BRIGADES. TODAY, OFFICERS WITH THIS TYPE OF D-2 - G-2
BACKGROUND WHO ARE IN GOOD STANDING WITHIN ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CIRCLES ARE CONSIDERED MEMBERS OF THE
"COFRADIA".

8. (G) THE MERE MENTION OF THE WORD "COFRADIA" INSIDE
THE INSTITUTION CONJURES UP THE IDEA OF THE "INTELLIGENCE
CLUB", THE TERM "COFRADIA" BEING THE NAME GIVEN TO THE
POWERFUL ORGANIZATIONS OF VILLAGE-CHURCH ELDERS THAT
EXIST TODAY IN THE INDIAN HIGHLANDS OF GUATEMALA.
PRESENTLY, THIS VERTICAL COLUMN OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS,
FROM CAPTAINS TO GENERALS, REPRESENTS THE STRONGEST
INTERNAL NETWORK OF LOYALTIES WITHIN THE INSTITUTION.
WELL KNOWN MEMBERS OF THIS UNOFFICIAL COFRADIA INCLUDE
ARMY CHIEF, BG EDGAR ((GODOY)), AND BG JORGE
((PERUSSINA)), AS WELL AS COLONELS LUIS ((ORTEGA))
MENALDO, JULIO ((BALCONI)), MARCO ((GONZALES)) TARACENA,
JUST TO NAME A VERY FEW.

9. (G) THE OPERATORS --
AS TALENT WAS NEEDED AND RECRUITED FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK,
OTHER CAPABLE OFFICERS WERE BEING HAND PICKED AT ALL
LEVELS TO SERVE IN KEY OPERATIONS AND TROOP COMMAND
ASSIGNMENTS, ESPECIALLY POSITIONS RELATED TO PLANNING AND
CONDUCTING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS. ALTHOUGH
NOT AS TIGHT KNIT A GROUP AS THE COFRADIA, THE
"OPERATORS" ALL THE SAME DEVELOPED THEIR OWN VERTICAL
LEADER-SUBORDINATE NETWORK OF RECOGNITION, RELATIONSHIPS
AND LOYALTIES, AND ARE TODAY CONSIDERED A SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT VERTICAL COLUMN OF OFFICER LOYALTIES, A VERTICAL
COLUMN THAT ALSO EXISTS FROM GENERALS DOWN TO CAPTAINS.
THE "OPERATORS" INCLUDE SUCH STANDOUTS AS: GENERAL LUIS
((MENDOZA)), THE MAD; BG JOSE ((GARCIA)) SAMAYOA, DEPUTY
ARMY CHIEF; BG MARIO ((ENRIQUEZ)); AND INFLUENTIAL
COLONELS JOSE ((QUILO)), CARLOS ((PINEDA)), CARLOS
10. THE BALANCE --

The "COFRADIA" and the "OPERATORS" continue to maintain more or less an even balance over the application of influence within the institution. This is due to the balance among top army leaders, and the existence of additional subgroupings of these same officers which are based on other particular affinities. Regarding the leaders, when Gen Gramajo (an operator) was the MOD, he was counterbalanced by the army chief, Gen Callejas, who was known as the "Bishop" of the COFRADIA. Today, Gen Mendoza, an operator, holds the MOD position, but he is clearly balanced off by army chief, Gen Godoy, and the chief of the president's staff, Col Ortega, both of the COFRADIA.

11. ADDITIONAL SUB-GROUP LOYALTIES --

Regarding additional subgroupings within the army, there is a clique of officers (captain to general) who had served in the elite airborne units with airborne commanders such as Gramajo, then Mendoza, and more recently, Perussina -- called the "ParaCaidistas". Another sub-group of officers today are the "Kaibiles" (Guatemalan Rangers), who have become a more recent elite of the Guatemalan Army. These two subgroups actually include a mixture of both intelligence and operations oriented officers. A third subgrouping are air force pilots. Subgroups like these within the institution tend to develop vertical loyalties in themselves as well as serve to bring about some melding of "COFRADIA" and operations officers out of the mutual respect gained inside a sub-group.

12. DELAY IN MILITARY EDUCATION --

At the height of the conflict with the insurgent groups, the army suspended the conduct of its management type officer courses in order to keep more officers in the field. Therefore, for a number of years, there were no opportunities to attend the combined arms advanced course or the command and general staff course. When these courses were finally opened again, officers were sent to these courses on a "best qualified" basis as a result of written exams. The officers with the highest scores were given courses outside Guatemala, with those next in line to attend courses at the army's center for military studies (CEM). The officer corps is still recovering from those course delays as is exemplified in the current command and staff course, which has a mix of officers to include some lieutenant colonels about to make full colonel down to mid-level majors. This melding of ranks and year groups at the CEM's courses has also served to
INTERFERE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF HORIZONTAL YEAR GROUP LOYALTIES.

13. THE RESERVE OFFICER --
THE WAR ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT THE USE OF MANY MORE "RESERVE"
OFFICERS; GRADUATES OF ONE OF THE SEVEN ARMY RUN MILITARY
HIGH SCHOOLS WHO ARE COMMISSIONED AS RESERVE SECOND
LIEUTENANTS AND WHO ARE ALLOWED TO COME ON ACTIVE DUTY
AND SERVE A FULL 30 YEAR CAREER, BUT ARE LIMITED TO A TOP
RANK OF LTC. THE INFLUX OF RESERVE OFFICERS HAS DILUTED
WHAT WAS PREVIOUSLY A SMALLER POOL OF ACADEMY OFFICERS,
SO THAT IN THE TACTICAL UNITS, ACADEMY GRADUATES SEE
PROPORTIONATELY LESS OF THEIR CLASSMATES ON A REGULAR
BASIS, THUS IMPEDING THE STRENGTHENING OF THEIR OLD
ACADEMY TIES.

14. THE SPLIT YEAR GROUPS --
ONE OTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY THAT
MERITS MENTION BECAUSE IT MITIGATES AGAINST STRONG
HORIZONTAL ACADEMY CLASS LOYALTIES IS THE ARMY'S USE OF
SPLIT YEAR GROUPS -- TWO ACADEMY CLASSES A YEAR, ONE
GRADUATING IN JUNE, THE OTHER IN DECEMBER. THIS POLICY,
WHICH RESULTS IN SMALLER ACADEMY CLASSES, OCCURS WITH
REGULARITY AT PRESENT, BUT WAS ALSO MUCH IN PRACTICE FOR
YEAR GROUPS THAT MAKE UP THE GENERALS AND COLONELS OF
TODAY. ACTUALLY, ACADEMY CLASSES NO. 71, 72, 73, AND 74
GROUPS THAT WERE NOT SPLIT, OUT OF THE 14 CLASSES FROM
WHICH ALL THE CURRENT GENERALS AND COLONELS BELONG.

15. ANY TANDAS IN SIGHT?
THE CLOSEST THING TO A TANDA IN RECENT HISTORY IN
GUATEMALA WOULD HAVE BEEN CLASS NO. 60, WHICH GRADUATED
IN JUNE 1961. OF ITS APPROXIMATELY 20 SURVIVING MEMBERS
ON RETIREMENT DAY 30 YEARS LATER (30 JUN 1991), SIX HAD
MADE IT TO GENERAL -- AN UNUSUALLY HIGH PERCENTAGE. BUT
EVEN WITH SIX GENERALS, AND ONE OF THEM SERVING AS THE
MOD, CLASS NO. 60 DID NOT SWING NOTICEABLE INFLUENCE
WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS; THE VERTICAL COLUMNS OF
LOYALTIES THAT WERE ALREADY IN PLACE CLEARLY DOMINATED
ANY HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES BY CLASS NO. 60. SOME
"GUATEMATOLIGISTS" MAY LOOK UPON ACADEMY CLASS NUMBER 73
(GRADUATED IN 1969) AS A POSSIBLE TANDA IN THE MAKING
BECAUSE OF THE HIGH NUMBER OF VERY EXCELLENT OFFICERS
AMONG ITS REMAINING 17 ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS. HOWEVER, A
CLOSE STUDY OF THESE RISING STARS WILL SHOW THAT MANY OF
THEM ARE ALREADY WELL INTEGRATED INTO ONE OF THOSE TWO
POWERFUL VERTICAL COLUMNS -- THE INTELLIGENCE "COFRADIA"
OR THE OPERATORS.

COMMENTS: }

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