1. Reference is made to memorandum from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Secretary of Defense, dated 13 June 1961, subject as above, in which he requested answers to questions posed by Mr. Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

2. The three studies were prepared on a priority basis. They are responsive to Mr. Acheson’s questions on the above request which states, in part: “These questions do not reflect any policy decisions, but are posed to create an analytical framework which would be helpful in review of the Berlin problem.” Consideration was given to the views developed jointly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Mr. Dean Acheson and General Norstad during the discussions held on 14 June 1961.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate concern is to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall. United States preparations for a Berlin crisis - in the US, in Europe, and world-wide - should be taken in both nuclear and nonnuclear military areas concurrently. In this connection the requirement for modernizing, strengthening, and improving the US and Allied military posture world-wide has been recognized; however, the basic consideration remains the need for re-establishing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our Allies must have confidence and the USSR
must be made to believe that the United States has the will and determination to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO, Berlin or the US position world-wide, as necessary, rather than submit to Soviet abrogation of US and Allied rights or position. Berlin is the immediate concern, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the questions posed by Mr. Dean Acheson are contained herein.

4. The conclusions to the three appended studies, which are based on the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be employed by either side, are summarized as follows:

a. Military Measures World-Wide
   (1) The early execution by the United States of the measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only if the necessary political decisions required to implement them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions is the acceptance of the risk of general war.

   (2) The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). United States action alone is feasible only to the extent that the Allies will permit the use of their national territories and that the action contemplated does not involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination and leadership which could be expected not only to influence the Soviet decision making process, but also to
restore the confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain their full cooperation and support.

(3) Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state of readiness of US forces world-wide, but particularly in Europe), it is doubtful that US Allies, in the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of general war.

(4) The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the Soviets might react by taking military counter-actions to pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin. For this reason, the United States must be prepared for general war.

b. Types and Amount of Offensive Nonnuclear Force for Certain Contingencies

(1) When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no substantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces. However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measurement (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin. This size force is based on the assumption that political limitations
restrict military operations to the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only.

(2) When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation, the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-Neisse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required to achieve this objective.

(3) To allow the Communists time and opportunity to change their decision to block access. If the action begins with Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven divisional force with adequate air support would provide, during the first five days, time and opportunity for the Communists to change their decision to block access. In the event that the Soviets entered the operation at any time, the situation described in paragraph 4b(2) would pertain. The Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the operation could avoid destruction.

c. Adequacy of Capabilities.

(1) After a mobilization period of four months, the United States or the US and its European Allies, has
the capability of deploying sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if opposed by GDR and Russian forces.

(2) Due to the inability to determine the quality of European Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence that all European Allies and the United States will commence full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

(3) Because of the need for air bases, staging areas and assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required, and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient forces in Europe in a four-month period to restore access against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

(4) Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war for any extended period with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases, mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15
months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the
United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied
forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet
forces.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the desirability of
providing viable alternatives to general war in the event the
measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A fail to deter the
Soviets from denying Allied access to Berlin and limited ground
force action is unsuccessful. In this connection, considera-
tion must be given to other measures that will forcibly demon-
strate on a rising scale US determination to achieve its objec-
tive of restoring access to Berlin. Possible measures could
include consideration of actions such as the use of
nuclear weapons on purely military targets in a manner which
will forcibly drive home to the Soviets the seriousness with
which the United States views the situation.

6. It is recommended that you note the enclosed studies and
forward them to the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs as requested by him, for use by Mr.
Acheson in his continuing review of the Berlin problem.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/l. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. Question: How much of the Soviet nuclear strike force would be destroyed?

Answer:

a. JCS SIOP-62 plans for the attack of about 1,000 installations which bear a relationship to nuclear delivery capability. The Alert Force is scheduled to attack about 75 percent of these installations and assuming timely tactical warning or US pre-emption so that all US alert forces survive through initial launch, may be expected to destroy about 42 percent of the total, including all 76 airfields which constitute the home bases and primary staging bases of the entire Soviet long-range nuclear strike capability and the known ICBM and IRBM sites. Programmed for attack by the Alert Force are all airfields with nuclear storage facilities, all primary staging bases, and all nuclear storage facilities. Not attacked by the Alert Force are 235 (out of a total of 750) airfields. These 235 airfields do not have military aircraft currently assigned and/or are inactive or do not have support facilities. The Full Force is scheduled to attack all of the approximately 1,000 installations and may expect to destroy about 88 percent of them, assuming no before-launch losses. Additional installations would be destroyed or damaged but at a level of assurance lesser than 70 percent. The level of assurance for destruction of all known installations representing a direct threat to the CONUS would be high - about 95 percent. Vulnerability of SIOP forces to destruction before launch is discussed in paragraph 3 f, below. In general, and assuming timely tactical warning of enemy missile attack, destruction before launch would be expected to be low for

* In each instance of the use of the term "destroyed," the term is applied to those targets with an assurance of 70 percent or greater of receiving severe damage, considering all factors of attrition and reliability except pre-launch destruction of SIOP forces.

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the Alert Force. If the Soviets should initiate the attack, destruction before launch would be relatively high for the follow-on force, unless there has been strategic warning sufficient for force generation followed by tactical warning.

b. The above information on destruction of Soviet nuclear strike force is expressed in terms of destruction of the bases from which the forces would be launched. The forces themselves may or may not be on the bases at the time of attack. If on base, they would be destroyed. The number on base at time of attack would be a function of such factors as the readiness measures taken prior to attack, whether the US or USSR struck first, and the strategic and tactical warning available to the Soviets.

c. Annex A hereto shows a detailed breakdown of the types of installations considered, the number placed at risk by the Alert Force attacks, and the number expected to be destroyed by the Alert Force and the Full Force, with at least 70% assurance. The data in Annex A, as in the preceding paragraphs, do not reflect those forces assigned to unified and specified commands which are not committed to or reflected in SIOP.

2. Question: What would be the probable resulting damage in the US, European and Soviet Civil Societies?

Answer:

a. USSR and Red China:

(1) There are 103 government control centers in the USSR and China which appear on the SIOP Target List. Eighty-three percent of these could be expected to be destroyed by the Alert Force and all by the Full Force, with 70 percent or greater assurance in each case. Additional destruction and damage would be achieved by the Alert Force but at a level of confidence less than 70%. Twenty-three additional government control centers may be destroyed by the Full Force as bonus incident to attack of other targets.
(2) In the USSR, 199 cities would be struck by the Alert Force and 295 by the Full Force. By a 1959 census, there are 293 cities in the USSR of 50,000 or greater population. Assuming that at least one weapon arrives at each programmed Desired Ground Zero (DGZ), the Alert Force can be expected to inflict casualties (including fallout effects for the first seventy-two hours with a 60% shielding factor) to 56% of the urban population and 37% of the total population. The Full Force can be expected to inflict casualties to 72% of the urban population and 54% of the total population. These figures would vary, dependent on the number of weapons actually arriving at an enemy DGZ. The expected destruction of industrial floor space in the cities attacked would be 66% for the Alert Force and 74% for the Full Force.

(3) In China, 49 cities would be struck by the Alert Force and 41% of the urban population and 10% of the total population would be expected casualties. Seventy-eight cities would be struck by the Full Force, and 53% of the urban population and 16% of the total population would be expected casualties. These figures also include the fallout effects mentioned above. The expected destruction of industrial floor space in the cities attacked would be 55% for the Alert Force and 64% for the Full Force.

b. Europe.

(1) In the Satellite countries of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania, only military installations are scheduled to be attacked. Basically, these consist of 165 airfields. Incident to these attacks, the Alert Force would cause an expected 1,378,000 casualties and the Full Force 4,004,000. These figures equate to about 1% and 4% respectively of the European satellite populations, again including the fallout considerations mentioned earlier.
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(2) The probable resulting damage in the Allied European countries would be dependent to varying degree, upon the Soviet strategic concept, which side exercised the initiative, whether attacks came by surprise or were preceded by useful warning, and the Soviet estimate of whether or not the damage which they could inflict primarily on the US alone would bring about a cessation of hostilities and permit them to take over Western Europe intact. If the Soviets decided to pursue this course of action, the attacks on Western Europe probably would be relatively light and restricted, to the extent feasible, to military targets which could attack USSR. If a course of action were followed which resulted in attacks against the full spectrum of Western European military, urban-industrial and political strengths to the extent permitted by availability of force, the damage level would probably be of the same general nature as that suffered by the US. Annex B hereto provides more detailed figures on damage to civil societies in the USSR, China, and the European Satellites.

c. United States

(1) While a number of studies have been conducted through recent years which indicate estimates of damage to the US civil society expected to result from a general nuclear war, there is no specific study conducted recently and generally accepted which can be drawn upon for the information you desire. A useful source would be the last annual NESC study conducted in 1955.

The results of that study are not available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this purpose. However, there is sufficient pattern in past studies to permit a synthesis of results of those studies. General consensus has been that while a nuclear exchange would leave the US in a seriously damaged condition, with many millions of
casualties and little immediate war supporting capability, the US would continue to exist as an organized and viable nation, and ultimately would prevail, whereas the USSR would not.

3. Question: What are the major uncertainties, e.g., regarding the size and disposition of the Soviet missile force, which underlie these judgments?

Answer: The major uncertainties lie in the areas of the size, location, posture and operational effectiveness of Soviet missile effort. Also important are the uncertainties concerning Soviet early warning capability, which relates to reaction times of all Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, and their operational capability to achieve simultaneity of attack on US forces, which affects greatly the destruction before launch of our own delivery vehicles. These areas of uncertainty are discussed below in greater detail.

a. No confirmed deployed locations of ICBMs have as yet been identified, other than the test ranges. There is evidence, with varying interpretations as to reliability, of some additional possible operational ICBM site-complexes. The most suspect locations for operational ICBM site-complexes are in northwestern USSR. All ICBM and HBM operational sites are currently considered to be soft, but future hardening is considered probable. The primary element of uncertainty lies in the range of divergent views in current estimates of the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher. The full range of uncertainty as to the Soviet missile capability is reflected in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-61.

b. It is assumed that the Soviets will strive to achieve simultaneity of arrival of ICBMs in the initial salvo against Western targets. Concerning the current reliability of the
Soviet ICBM, it is estimated that some 40-65 percent of the total number of ICBMs on launcher would get off within 15-30 minutes of scheduled times and arrive in the vicinity of assigned targets (i.e., three times the nominal Circular Error Probable (CEP) for the missile). If the Soviets launch first, initial missile and manned aircraft penetrations of the early warning and missile detection nets are expected to be well coordinated. However, full simultaneity of missile impact will not be achieved, but the Soviets will endeavor to coordinate closely, timewise, attacks on CONUS and Europe.

c. The Soviet active early warning capability is extensive, elaborate, and heavily overlapping, but limited to medium and high altitude coverage about the periphery and sensitive interior areas. The only known gap is in the southwestern-southeastern section bordering on Tibet. This will doubtless be closed in the near future. The low altitude capability is limited. The development of high frequency ionospheric back-scatter radars for detection of long-range missile launchings has been within Soviet capabilities for the last five years. The Soviets also have a high capability for long-range passive detection.

d. The Soviet air defense system is undergoing a major transition which is significantly improving its capabilities against medium and high altitude air attack. The principal aspects of this transition are: the rapid installation of surface-to-air missile sites and the widespread deployment of an air defense control system with semi-automatic features. Other significant recent developments include the advent of better radars, the introduction of limited numbers of improved interceptors, the estimated introduction of nuclear weapons into surface-to-air missiles, and the probable incorporation of more advanced electronic gear and armament.
into interceptors. The Soviets now have an extensive, high-priority research program to develop a static anti-ballistic missile system. Considering their progress to date, their technical capabilities and the advantages to them of early deployment, limited deployment of such a system is expected to begin in 1963-1966. Notwithstanding the above, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in coping with large-scale air attack employing varied and sophisticated tactics, through at least 1963.

e. US air defense capability is currently limited to detection and active attack of air breathing vehicles, and an initial capability for detection of ICBMs. Later in the period under consideration, the second EM243 site will enhance the probability of tactical warning of enemy mass ICBM attack. The capability for post launch detection of submarine-launched missiles, and for active kill of ICBM and submarine-launched missiles is not envisioned within the time period under consideration.

f. Planning for the strikes in JCS SIOP-52 reflects consideration of and compensation for all factors which might degrade assurance of success, with the partial exception of destruction before launch. The consideration accorded destruction before launch is reflected in the planned launch of strikes on specific targets from bases which differ in location and type, and in utilizing a mix of delivery systems. While this consideration applies to planning, the fact remains that the strike effects and results described herein are based upon an assumption of no destruction before launch, which would likely be inaccurate in varying degree in any case. In the circumstances postulated - i.e., a Berlin crisis with an associated state of tension - the ability of our forces to enhance deterrence to enemy intensification of the crisis, or to engage, survive and
prevail if such deterrence fails, can be significantly improved by a number of political and military actions referred to in a separate memorandum being forwarded to you on that subject from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These actions would considerably reduce the extent of destruction of a large portion of our offensive forces prior to launch. Moreover, the same actions would place us in an enhanced posture for execution of a possible national decision to pre-empt in the event other actions to retain our rights regarding Berlin were defeated. Extensive two-sided wargames of SIOP-62, now being conducted, may be expected to contribute more precise data on base and vehicle survivability than is now available.

4. Question: How crucial to the outcome would be the question of whether the US or USSR struck first?

Answer: In answering this question, "crucial to the outcome" is interpreted to mean critical to prevailing in general war.

a. If the US exercised pre-emptive initiative in general war, the weight of attack launched against the Sino-Soviet Bloc would be such that although the US would be greatly damaged by the USSR retaliatory effort, the US clearly would prevail.

b. Currently effective Basic National Security Policy has, as a basic objective, prevailing in event of general war. The policy also precludes preventive war. However, current planning recognizes that in response to knowledge that a Soviet attack against the US is imminent or to honor a security treaty commitment, the US forces may be required to take the initiative if so directed by the President. By implication, a provision of the policy is that the US shall prevail in event of either initiation or retaliation. Our general war plans, which are based on this policy, are drawn up to permit the US to prevail, even though placed in a retaliatory role.
c. The degree to which we would be successful in prevailing if placed in a retaliatory role, principally would be dependent on the enemy capability relative to the capabilities of US and allied forces, including their survivability and timeliness of response. Timeliness of response in turn would be dependent on receipt of warning of attack, timeliness of decision to react, and capability of the friendly forces to respond to the decision to strike. Current intelligence estimates accord the enemy a high capability in the way of both offensive and defensive forces. US active defensive capabilities are limited to application against air-breathing vehicles and pre-launch action against the submarine missile threat through ASW operations. While some assurance of ICBM warning is available, we have no post-launch active defenses against ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, ASWs and submarine-launched missiles, and there are differing evaluations of the degree to which our ASW operations can reduce the sizeable Soviet submarine force. The survivability of our forces is a complex function of many critical factors. Survivability is greatly enhanced by increased mobility and by placing a large number of forces in an alert status. Alert forces are those which, on fixed bases, can react within 15 minutes of warning time, and those on mobile bases within 2 hours. Additional measures available to increase survivability include additional dispersal of forces, hardening, and pre-launch of forces under positive control.

d. In summary, the US clearly would prevail if we initiate general nuclear war. If we are placed in the position of striking in retaliation, the degree to which we are successful in prevailing is dependent upon the timeliness of our response. Our plans and the associated measures for their
execution provide for an effective response. Success in the implementation of those plans is dependent on receipt of adequate warning and on timeliness of decision to execute those plans.

5. Question: If present plans were altered so as to concentrate on destruction of the Soviet nuclear striking force by bringing a greater part of our force to bear on exclusively military targets, what would be the answers to the first three questions listed above?

Answer:

a. Effect on Soviet Nuclear Striking Force. There are currently included in the target list attacked by SIOP-62 forces all known elements of the Soviet nuclear striking force and related facilities. The level of assurance for attack of all targets representing the nuclear threat to the CONUS (i.e., those 148 installations so listed in Annex A hereto) is high - about 95% - considering all factors except destruction before launch, which for the Alert Force would be low. Directing a greater part of our force against exclusively military targets would not result in a significant increase in destruction of the Soviet nuclear striking force. Increasing the level of attack against air bases and missile launch sites would not affect the survival of those aircraft and missiles launched prior to arrival of US weapons. The number so launched, of course, would depend on whether the US initiated the attack or retaliated. Raising the level of US attack against known fixed military installations would not reduce the threat posed by missiles the location of which is not known. Thus, the alteration of present plans to more heavily weight the attack of military targets would not reduce Soviet capabilities to a significant degree.
b. Effect on US, European and Soviet Civil Societies.

Inasmuch as increasing the level of effort against military targets would result in little change in effect on the Soviet nuclear striking force, there would be correspondingly little change in effect of Soviet strikes on the US and Western European civil societies. Diversion of US forces from other targets to military targets would reduce by relatively small percentage the effect on the Soviet civil society. If the diversion were highly pronounced, it could result in failure to damage the war-supporting economies of the USSR and China to the extent necessary to render them incapable of further support of the war effort. This latter condition was found by Study No. 2009 to be a shortcoming of attacking only military targets.

c. Major Uncertainties. As indicated in a above, diverting more US forces to attack of military targets would result in relatively insignificant increase in destruction of the Soviet nuclear striking force. Consequently, there would be correspondingly little change in the effect of the major uncertainties (identified in paragraph 4 above) on judgment as to effects of general nuclear war on the Soviet nuclear striking force and on US, European and Soviet civil societies.
**ANNEX A**

**DAMAGE TO SINO-SOVIE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY BY THE ALERT FORCE AND FULL FORCE**

The number of installations on the target list of the Single Integrated Operational Plan 1962 (SIOP-62) is indicated below. Included is an indication of the number of installations planned to be attacked and expected to be destroyed by either the Alert Force or the Full Force. The number indicated destroyed represents those installations which would be destroyed at a level of assurance of 70 percent or more, considering all factors of attrition and reliability of weapons except destruction before launch. The actual number destroyed or significantly damaged would be greater, but at a lesser level of confidence than 70 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Attacked by Alert</th>
<th>Destroyed by Alert</th>
<th>Destroyed by Full</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Threat to United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields w/nuclear storage and primary staging bases</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear storage</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile sites and storage, ICBM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Threat to Forward Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields w/o nuclear storage (nuclears could be deployed)</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile sites, MREBM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile storage, MREBM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite Air Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields w/o nuclear storage</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-Surface Missile storage</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Annex A*
Residual Air and Surface Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Attacked by Alert</th>
<th>Destroyed by Alert</th>
<th>Pull</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residual and reserve airfields (A/C and wpns could be deployed)</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base, Surface</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Depots</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Repair Facilities</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Strategic Nuclear Threat Installations</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX B

DAMAGE TO SINO-SOVET BLOCK CIVIL SOCIETIES

Destruction of floor space and personnel casualties represent useful indices of effect on civil societies of nuclear general war. Indicated below are assessments of damage, expressed in those terms, expected to result from attacks planned for SIOP-62 forces. These estimates are based upon arrival of at least one weapon at each DOZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed* by</th>
<th>Alert Force</th>
<th>Full Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Industrial floor space USSR</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total floor space USSR</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban casualties** USSR</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Rural casualties USSR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total casualties USSR</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Industrial floor space China</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total floor space China</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban casualties China</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Rural casualties China</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total casualties China</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualties in European Satellites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban casualties</th>
<th>Total casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>421,000</td>
<td>496,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>258,000</td>
<td>308,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>197,000</td>
<td>282,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>214,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>497,000</td>
<td>2,636,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Urban/Industrial Complexes at Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>199</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>295</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government Control Centers in USSR and China

| No. attacked by Alert Force | 118 |
| No. destroyed by Alert Force | 85  |
| No. destroyed by Full Force  | 121 |

* Destroyed means damage to building or facilities which precludes production without essentially complete reconstruction of the installation. Connotes collapse or severe damage to all principal structures. A greater number of installations will receive lesser but significant damage which would require materials and effort to repair before production could be restored.

** Casualties include fallout effects during the first 72 hours with a 60 percent shielding.
APPENDIX A

MILITARY MEASURES WORLDWIDE

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine preparations of mounting seriousness which could be taken by the United States in the CONUS, in Europe, and worldwide to provide a basis for the threat and use of military force to restore access to Berlin by application of:
   a. Substantial nonnuclear force in successive stages.
   b. General nuclear war.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. Assumptions for this study include those set forth in paragraph 2 of the basic paper plus the following:
   a. The purpose of the preparatory steps envisaged in this study are twofold:
      (1) To influence Soviet decisions before they are taken this summer or fall
      (2) Provided the preparations envisaged in this study fail to have the desired deterrent effect, to create no later than October 1961 the best capability for application of substantial nonnuclear force to restore ground access against GDR forces alone, or against total Soviet Bloc capabilities which can be brought to bear in East Germany for periods of 5 to 15 days before resort is made to the use of nuclear weapons.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 6 June 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the "Checklist of Military and Non-Military measures in the Berlin Crisis", forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960, 24

Appendix A
TOP SECRET

provides a wide range of actions responsive to the problem of 1
deterring the Soviet Bloc from attempts to blockade access to 2
Berlin. In addition, in their memorandum for the Secretary of 3
Defense dated 13 April 1961, as well as in their memorandum 4
for the Secretary of Defense dated 28 April 1961, the Joint 5
Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist" together 6
with the premise on which it is based, i.e., accepting the 7
risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial 8
framework for the development of plans for US and Free World 9
response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free 10
World access thereto.

4. For additional facts see Annex A.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Annex B.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. The early execution by the United States of the 17
measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the 18
time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961), 19
would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process 20
regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only 21
if the necessary political decisions required to implement 22
them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions 23
is the acceptance of the risk of general war.

b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A 25
in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete 26
Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the 27
greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United 28
Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 29
United States action alone is feasible only to the extent 30
that the Allies will permit the use of their national 31
territories and that the action contemplated does not 32
TOP SECRET

involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are
designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination
and leadership which could be expected not only to influence
the Soviet decision making process, but also to restore the
certainty of our Allies in the United States and to obtain
their full cooperation and support.

c. Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably
be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures
envisioned in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state
of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in
Europe), it is doubtful in the extreme that US Allies, in
the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident,
would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited
nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of
general war.

d. The execution of the measures envisioned in Annex C to
Appendix A, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect
on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the
Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to
pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin.
For this reason the United States must be prepared for
general war.
The fundamental difference in the concept envisaged in this study and the concept envisaged in the "Checklist of Military and Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis" is as follows:

a. In this study selected measures would be implemented progressively over the next few months with a view to enhancing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and improving US and Allied non-nuclear capabilities in Europe by 31 October 1961 in order to deter the Soviet Bloc from attempting a blockade of West Berlin and at the same time to prepare for the eventuality of general war.

b. The Concept of the "Checklist" envisages progressive application of measures after a Berlin incident has occurred while the measures listed in Annex C to Appendix A are designed to deter a Berlin crisis by adequate preparation beforehand.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A

DISCUSSION

1. In accordance with the assumptions in this study, it is envisaged that a number of actions, particularly military measures, could be implemented immediately as a deterrent to possible Soviet Bloc attempts to develop a Berlin crisis in the near future. The concept of initiating some measures of the type envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A to gain a deterrent effect prior to an anticipated Berlin incident was recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 13 April 1961, subject, "The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans".

2. Although no immediate action was taken by the US Coordinating Group to implement the above recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some of the measures recommended for early implementation have, in effect, been executed. For example, the existence of the Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, France) military planning staff (LIVEOAK) has become known as a result of some recent newspaper articles.

3. As the Berlin situation has developed without a major incident since Premier Khrushchev's threats in November 1958, it has become increasingly clear that the Soviets remain as intransigent even with regard to their objectives of making permanent and irrevocable the division of Germany and the complete incorporation of West Berlin into their East German satellite. This Soviet position was most recently reaffirmed at the recent meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

4. Accordingly, this study focuses primarily on those military reinforcement measures and preparations which could be
recommended to the President for implementation in order both

to restore the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and to

achieve as early as possible a military posture which would

permit the United States and its Allies or the United States

unilaterally, to apply substantial non-nuclear force against any

Soviet Bloc attempt to blockade ground access to Berlin; and

concurrently to prepare for the ultimate risk of general war

which such actions involve.

5. The sequence of military actions which are envisaged is

set forth in Annex C together with corresponding political

actions and pertinent remarks with regard to implementation.

6. An inspection of the sequence of events in Annex C

readily indicates that the actions envisaged amount to a

"crash" program within the time limits assumed within this

study (i.e., 31 October 1961). However, this aspect does not

invalidate the over-all deterrent effect which may be expected

from implementation of these measures.

7. While the execution of the measures envisaged in

Annex C to Appendix A, whether on a US unilateral basis or

Allied basis, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect

on the Soviets, conceivably it could have an adverse and

opposite effect on the Soviet Bloc, i.e., instead of deterring

them from a blockade of West Berlin, it could cause them to

take military counteractions to preempt US and/or Allied

efforts to protect West Berlin.

8. For example, if the United States and its Allies

mobilize and deploy additional nonnuclear ground forces to

Europe, as a minimum it may be expected that the Soviet Bloc

will respond in kind. In addition, it may be expected that the

Soviet Bloc will accuse the United States and the West of

deliberately preparing for aggressive war in Central Europe

for the purpose of destroying the German Democrat Republic (GDR)
and reunifying Germany by force. In addition they are certain to raise the specter of a resurgent and militant West Germany seeking to aggress against the Communist states under the pretext of liberating East Germany and Berlin. Moreover, all of these moves are certain to cause serious repercussions in other parts of the world. For example, the fixation of United States and Allied attention on and the provision of additional resources to Western Europe could motivate the CHICOMs to attempt to achieve their objectives of liberating Taiwan and overrunning Southeast Asia by overt military force.

9. It is also obvious from an examination of Annex C that full Allied, including NATO, cooperation is not only desirable but essential if the full deterrent effectiveness of the measures envisaged is to be realized. In the absence of an overt Soviet-inspired Berlin incident, it is most improbable that the United States could count on full Allied cooperation in implementing a series of measures such as those envisaged in Annex C. Forceful US leadership, however, and US unilateral preparations to resort to force, if necessary, could have a catalytic effect on our allies in stimulating them to take appropriate corresponding actions.

10. That is not to say that United States Allies, including the FRG, would not fight for West Berlin. It is to say, however, that the people and governments of Western Europe may remain loath to engage in such deterrent preparatory actions without a clear demonstration of US leadership.
1. **Purpose.**

The purpose of this list of actions is to demonstrate a United States resolve to employ military force, to include the use of nuclear weapons if necessary, to prevent the Soviets from taking action to deny allied rights in Berlin.

2. **Time Phasing.**

The actions to be taken are keyed to Khrushchev's pronouncements to sign a separate treaty with the GDR by the end of 1951, and are phased into three time groupings: D-5 MOS to D-4 MOS; D-4 MOS to D-2 MOS; D-2 MOS to D-DAY (31 Dec 1961). Although this assumed time frame would not complete preparations by 31 October 1961, it would constitute as much progress as could be realistically expected in a 4-month period assuming an approximate 1 July 1961 starting date.

3. **Implementation.**

Although measures are listed in a generally ascending order of severity within the assumed time frame, the implementation of any measure listed is dependent upon the circumstances which may develop rapidly over the next few weeks. Accordingly, the measures could be executed in any order required.

4. **Political Measures.**

Opposite each military-measure is listed corresponding political actions required for implementation. The political measures column is not intended to cover all corresponding appropriate political actions but only the most obvious ones required for military action. Of primary importance is the requirement for allied, particularly tripartite, agreement and cooperation for the full effectiveness of many measures.
1. Restore Credibility of Deterrent

Restore credibility of the deterrent by:

a. Enhancing posture of nuclear capable forward forces by moving additional nuclear weapons forward in proximity to forces. (e.g., USCINCLEB's land-battle missile warheads now dispersed in CONUS.)

b. Instituting development program to produce a land-based MGM for NATO.

c. Providing nuclear assistance to France.

d. None.

2. Corresponding Political Measures

a. Executive action to modify U.S. Policy is necessary.

b. DOD action required to initiate MIRV development program.

c. Executive action to release nuclear information to France required.

d. None.

e. Will require Presidential approval of increased nuclear weapon dispersal authority, and temporary augmentation of weapon storage capacity. Using available logistical transport and storage facilities, forward dispersal could be sustained indefinitely. Soviets could increase their nuclear dispersals to European satellites, but net advantage would retain option for timely withdrawal of weapon augmentation if necessary.

f. Executive action to modify U.S. Policy is necessary.

A. TIME PERIOD: D-5 to D+1 MONTHS
(assume D-Day is 31 Dec. 1961)

REMARKS

a. None

b. Can be sustained indefinitely. Counter to existing USSR program. Revocable at will.

c. Can be sustained indefinitely. Communist response in kind doubtful (i.e. China). Action irrevocable; information given cannot be withdrawn.

d. None.
MILITARY MEASURES

2. Increase Readiness

Increase state of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in Europe. This should include discontinuance of inactivation and/or retirement of operational forces such as B-47 wings and amphibious ships.

CORRESPONDING
POLITICAL MEASURES

Urge our allies to do the same. For example, urge the UK to improve the state of readiness of British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and BDE/Germany to include movement of combat service support units and strategic reserves from UK to continent.

REMARKS

Among appropriate measures would be the following:

a. Step-up and practice alert and combat procedures.

b. Deploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to BAOR area.

c. Implementation by unified and specified commanders on a periodic basis of selected alert measures contained in their respective alert plans.

d. Intensified training of force, US or tripartite, selected to execute Berlin probe and ground access operation. Consider deployment of this force to the Rhineland area with replacement of this force with units from CONUS.

e. Increase readiness to execute demolition and mining plans in Central Europe.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY MEASURES</th>
<th>CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Reinforcement of US Forces</td>
<td>Requires Congressional authorization for increase in size of Armed Services and provision of new weapons and equipment. In addition, this measure will necessitate an increase in the monthly draft call.</td>
<td>To bring current US forces in Europe to wartime strengths would require deployment of personnel from CONUS units. Replacement of such personnel within CONUS units would be necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mobilization</td>
<td>a. Presidential declaration of a limited national emergency followed by supporting Congressional resolution of a full national emergency.</td>
<td>a. Appropriate mobilization will be required to enhance credible general war posture. Navy and Marine organized reserves, AF reserves and RG are generally considered ready for immediate integration into the active forces; most reserve Army units would require more time. More importantly, in the absence of a Presidential declaration of emergency, reserve and RG units could not be mobilized for a sufficient period to accomplish the objective. Forces would be generated in accordance with current mobilization plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Alternative to declaration of national emergency is to seek new enabling measures from Congress.</td>
<td>b. None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Request NATO partners, particularly UK, France and FRG to take comparable action. Of particular importance is return of the French fleet to NATO control and return of French Army divisions to Europe.</td>
<td>c. None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate appropriate mobilization.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Further Reinforcement of US Forces
Deploy additional forces to Europe and other critical areas as required.

6. Reinforcement of FBA
Step-up capability of FBA army and air forces with nuclear capable weapons, and provide them with sufficient logistical assistance to insure their combat effectiveness.

Bilateral and SAC consultation should, if possible, precede movement to Europe of additional forces. Formulation of Presidential declaration of National Emergency.

Arrange for additional bilateral negotiations for the purpose of obtaining rapid agreement on these matters.

The provision of nuclear capable weapons to the FBA is a particularly sensitive point with Premier Khrushchev and the East Germans.

CORRESPONDING

POLITICAL MEASURES

d. Extend draft law and increase draft calls.

d. None.

REMARKS

Without a Presidential declaration of a National Emergency the following units could be deployed to Europe within a thirty day period. Augmentation by Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) may be required.

(1) 3 STRAC Divisions.
(2) Air Force forces as required up to a maximum of 42 squadrons.
(3) Fleet Marine Forces augmentation to Mediterranean (1 Division Team).
(4) 2d Fleet to Eastern Atlantic; augment 6th Fleet by one ASW Group and one CVN.
### MILITARY MEASURES

7. Air Actions

Air Force and Naval Air actions which can be taken to demonstrate US resolve and deter-
mination:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Conduct air operations through corridors to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet with fighter escort when appropriate.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Establish continuous air surveillance and an ASW barrier patrol along the Greenland-Iceland-UK line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Augment SAC airborne alert as deemed necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Increase ELINT and photographic sorties around Sino-Soviet periphery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Resume U-2 flights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Increase reconnaissance flights in Berlin air corridors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Fly-over of Soviet Siberia and Arctic stations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. On selective basis, destroy Soviet Bloc aircraft which attempt to interfere with our operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Executive approval required to concede adherence to self-imposed restrictions upon use of corridor airspace.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Will require some augmentation of US forces in the Atlantic, and UK support in providing coverage for UK forces portion of the line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. None.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. - h. Executive approval required depending upon action to be taken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REMARKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Could provoke Soviet interception and possible attrition of aircraft. Equal possibility transit would be unchallenged.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Enhance warning of hostile air, or submarine penetrations of this line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Enhance deterrence and provide strategic indication of US resolve.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| d. - h. Risk of attrition and possible capture of US personnel. Risk of Soviet propaganda gain in US and world opinion. Soviets could respond in kind over Arctic and Europe. On balance, US will derive net advantage, with public opinion risks offset by increased respect for US deter-
mination and improved US intelligence. Effort can be sustained for pro-
tected period or terminated at our option. |
### MILITARY MEASURES

8. Demonstration of Intent

Conduct exercises, preferably tripartite but US alone if necessary, in the vicinity of Berlin so that the USSR will be readily identifiable as an action related to restoration of ground access.

7. World-Wide Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Intervention in Laos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implement US or SEATO plans if necessary to regain control of LAOS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. World-Wide Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Deployment to South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should the situation deteriorate in spite of measures now being undertaken, deploy organized forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Demonstration of Intent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seek full UK/French/FEG cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. World-Wide Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Intervention in Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential decision required to restore control of Laos to Royal Laois Government; to eliminate communist supported and augmented Pathet Lao/Be Minh Le units as a cohesive force and main obstacle to RLG control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REMARKS

Will demonstrate Allied cohesion and resolve with respect to the use of force.

- **a. Sustainability** - continued employment of US forces. Expansion - may entail additional operations against North Vietnam, CHICOM intervention, support for Burma, Thailand, E. Pakistan. Response in kind - in addition to Soviet moves against countries above, may induce similar Soviet sponsored action against S. Korea, Taiwan. Reversibility: Once committed and faced with Soviet responses indicated above, there would be no acceptable alternative to sustained action until military victory achieved, or until the opposition agreed to negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to the US.

- **b. Deployment to South Vietnam** |
| Should the situation deteriorate in spite of measures now being undertaken, deploy organized forces. |

Obtain Diem's request. None
### MILITARY MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Corresponding Political Measures</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fusion Nuclear Tests.</td>
<td>Initiate if Geneva talks have not produced acceptable results. Proclaim intentions justified on basis of refusal by Soviets to come to reasonable terms at the table.</td>
<td>Demonstrate to Soviet Bloc and world public opinion that US refuses to risk military disadvantage accruing from continued Soviet procrastination and intransigence in Geneva. Test for improvement of our nuclear capabilities relative to those of the USSR. Soviets could start tests as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HATO Air Readiness. Advance the state of readiness of HATO air defense and reinforce ADIZ measures.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Would indicate allied support of US position. Would enhance the air defense posture in Europe. Soviets could interfere with air operations in the air access corridors to Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Meeting of Military Commanders. SACSUM and SACLANI hold special meetings with subordinate commanders.</td>
<td>Notify Allies and explain reasons. Restrict tourist travel.</td>
<td>To highlight the continuance of extraordinary activities of key military commanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Commencement of Withdrawal of Personnel. Begin withdrawal of non-essential personnel, including dependents from Europe and other forward areas.</td>
<td>Notify Allies of planned policy.</td>
<td>Domestic public opinion will have to be conditioned to this step. Exact timing of commencement of evacuation of dependents will be determined in coordination with USCINCUS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rotation Policy Suspended. Suspend normal military rotation policy to and from Europe; stop dependent travel to Europe and other forward areas.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will increase force readiness by retaining experienced personnel in the area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. TIME PERIOD: D-4 to D-2 Months**

(Assume D-Day is 31 December 1971)

REVIEW ALL THE FOREGOING FOR CONTINUATION, REITERATION, OR, IF NOT ALREADY EXECUTED, FOR IMPLEMENTATION.
C. THE PERIOD: D-2 Months to D-Day  
(Assume D-Day is 31 December 1961)

REVIEW ALL THE FOREGOING FOR CONTINUATION, REITERATION, OR, IF NOT ALREADY EXECUTED, FOR IMPLEMENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY MEASURES</th>
<th>CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Allied Reinforcement</strong>&lt;br&gt;Request reinforcement and movement into position of British, French, and German military forces.</td>
<td>Allied support and agreement required.</td>
<td>To increase NATO defense capabilities and demonstrate Allied willingness to use force to maintain access to Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Squadron Dispersal</strong>&lt;br&gt;Execute USAFE/NATO squadron dispersal plan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Autobahn Traffic</strong>&lt;br&gt;Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from Berlin in tripartite convoys escorted by armed UN's equipped with two-way communications equipment.</td>
<td>Allied agreement required.</td>
<td>Convoy procedure can be maintained indefinitely, and discontinued with reduction in tensions. Soviet response in kind would not effect US operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Remarks</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To increase NATO defense capabilities and demonstrate Allied willingness to use force to maintain access to Berlin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convoy procedure can be maintained indefinitely, and discontinued with reduction in tensions. Soviet response in kind would not effect US operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex C to Appendix A
5. Naval Patrolling
Request active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to submarine activities.

6. Submarine Exercise
Conduct submarine exercises with US & UK submarines and Turkish forces in Black Sea and along Turkish coast within terms of Montreux Convention.

7. ASW Surveillance
Execute ASW surveillance with visible patrolling at the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Turkish Straits.

8. Naval Countermeasures
Execute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR shipping as follows:
   a. Protracted delay of ship's servicing (bunkering, provisioning, etc.)
   b. Regulate the movement of Bloc ships in Allied ports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY MEASURES</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. Naval Patrolling</td>
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<td>Request active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with particular attention to submarine activities.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRESPONDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL MEASURES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian agreement required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To inform Soviets that their military posture and deployments are under surveillance. Would improve ASW activities of US forces in Mediterranean. Can be sustained for moderate duration and discontinued on US-Italian decision, or unilateral Italian decision, upon reduction of tensions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To alert Soviets to US and UK naval strength in area in war fighting condition. In position to close Bosporus if appropriate. Forces can be maintained in area indefinitely only if adequate back-up available. Redeployment can be effected by decision and on short notice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advise Allies.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignore Soviet protests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will give evidence of increasing US firmness of purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY MEASURES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Increase charges to Bloc shipping for bunkering, lightering, piloting and repairs in Allied ports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Refuse to charter shipping to Bloc countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Intensify surveillance of Soviet fishing fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Be prepared to close rapidly the naval exits from the Baltic and Black Seas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Restrictions on Bloc Air
Prohibit Soviet Bloc air operations, including civil, over and into US and Allied territory.

10. Dispersal of COMUS Forces
Execute dispersal plan for COMUS based forces.

11. Navigational Precautions
Encode LOMAL and COMUX navigational aids.

Notify all user nations.

Denies international use of navigational aids.
10. Airborne Alert
Direct SAC to execute airborne alert.

11. Offensive Operations
Conduct military operations in accordance with current plans as required.

**MILITARY MEASURES**

**CORRESPONDING POLITICAL MEASURES**

None.

**REMARKS**

Put general US strike force in optimum position for strike.

US and Allied plans are in being and under constant review and refinement. Several plans include precut messages of implementation requiring only decision to undertake the military action.
APPENDIX B

TYPES AND AMOUNT OF OFFENSIVE NONNUCLEAR FORCE FOR CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the type and amount of offensive nonnuclear force which would have to be applied in Europe in order to:
   a. Restore access to Berlin if the Soviets opposed it with German Democratic Republic (GDR) forces alone.
   b. Permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces at successively higher levels as readily available USSR and GDR forces were encountered.
   c. Allow the communists time and opportunity to change their decision to block access by avoiding destruction of the force without use of US nuclear weapons for a period of (1) five days, (2) 15 days, during which negotiations could be undertaken, looking to restoration of access.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. a. Assumptions for this consideration include those set forth in paragraph 2 of the basic paper.
   b. That the preparatory measures as outlined in Appendix A have been taken.
   c. That the operations envisaged for these situations are confined to the area of East Germany.
   d. That any aggressive action conducted in Western Europe would invoke the NATO alliance and that the problem then becomes one of NATO at war with the Soviet Bloc and, therefore, outside the scope of this paper.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. See Annex A to Appendix A
DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Annex hereto.

CONCLUSIONS

5. Under the assumption that the USSR does not employ nuclear weapons, the estimated forces required are:

a. When opposed by GDR forces alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the hypothesis of opposition from GDR forces alone is invalid, and that there is no substantive difference between GDR and Soviet military forces. However, using present active GDR forces as a unit of measurement (6 divisions and about 225 tactical aircraft), it is considered that a balanced force of seven divisions supported by four tactical air wings could reopen access to Berlin.

This size force is based on the assumption that political limitations restrict military operations to the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and the air forces to defensive operations only.

b. When opposed by readily available USSR and GDR forces in the area of East Germany only. Under such a situation the hostilities could not be limited to the Helmstedt-Berlin corridor alone. Operations would have to be conducted to meet and defeat Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany with the objective of establishing a defense line on the Oder-Naissse River line. Forces on the order of 50 allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required to achieve this objective.
c. To allow the communists time and opportunity to change their decision to block access. If the action begins with Allied forces opposed by GDR forces only, a balanced seven divisional force with adequate air support would provide, during the first five days, time and opportunity for the communists to change their decision to block access. In the event that the Soviets entered the operation at any time the situation described in paragraph 4 b (2) would pertain. The Allied force of seven divisions already committed to the operation could avoid destruction.
ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

DISCUSSION

1. Proceeding on the hypothesis that preparatory measures have been taken, the US and Allied forces in Europe can be considered to be on a war-time basis and in a high state of readiness. As the United States Allied action to use military force to reopen ground access to Berlin threatens to overcome the German Democratic Republic (GDR) forces, the Soviets must decide either to permit the GDR forces to be defeated or to come to the aid of the GDR.

2. Assuming the Soviets come to the aid of the GDR, the operations could not be limited to a corridor along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis, but rather would be a major war in East Germany. The forces which the Soviets have readily available for employment in West Europe would require an Allied attack to defeat the Bloc forces in East Germany and to hold this area by occupying positions along the Oder-Neisse River line. Actually, in this operation, the objective of Berlin becomes secondary and the primary issue becomes the unification of Germany. To defeat the Bloc forces in this course of action would require on the order of 50 divisions together with the air forces and freedom of air action commensurate with the magnitude of the ground operations. The following assumptions prevail:

a. That an initial force of seven divisions have attacked along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis against GDR forces only and that at some point in the operation the Soviets entered the conflict in order to prevent the defeat of the GDR forces.

b. The attack of the Soviets is limited to the Allied forces operating in East Germany and that bases and forces in Western Europe are not attacked.
4. The sequence of actions and reactions are outlined below:

a. The decision to enter nuclear war if necessary will have been made at the start of the action to reopen ground access.

b. Allied preparations.

c. Soviets sign a peace treaty with GDR and declare that GDR will control access into Berlin.

d. GDR representatives refuse entry at the Helmstedt check point, by physical force in the form of armed border police.

e. A small military probe has been tried and is forcibly locked by what appears to be only GDR forces.

f. The United States commits a seven division force against the GDR forces. The GDR forces initially fight a delaying action, but subsequently as the US force advances, attempts to strike the rear and flanks of the US force. The US force has prepared against this and, therefore, its progress toward Berlin continues.

g. At this point it must be realized that the Soviets are furnishing at least logistic and technical assistance to the GDR. Some manned aircraft may be furnished, either from Soviet Air Force or from satellites.

h. Increased advance of the US Forces indicates to the Soviets that additional forces are necessary to reinforce the GDR. At this point Soviets may:

(1) Launch an assault on Western Europe with the divisions located with the GDR.

(2) Commit the Soviet divisions within GDR in support of GDR forces' effort to halt and destroy the US Force advancing toward Berlin.

(3) Commit only a small portion of the Soviet divisions in the GDR, to strengthen defenses just enough to counterbalance the strength of the US Force.
(4) Conduct nonnuclear air operations against US installations in Western Europe. This can be combined with any of the above courses of action, or can be conducted initially as the sole course of action.

(5) Initiate submarine action against allied shipping and mining in allied waters.

5. The decision to initiate general nuclear war might be made under any of the following situations:

a. When the Soviets cross the West German border with combat forces.

b. When the Soviets conduct air bombardment (even though nonnuclear) of US bases, airfields, and installations in West Germany.

c. When the Soviets enter the conflict in support of the GDR forces blocking access to Berlin.

d. If West Berlin is seized by East Germans or by Soviets in any action, including para-military, masked as a civil disturbance.

e. If the US force proceeding along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis is in danger of annihilation because of heavy Soviet air-ground attack.
APPENDIX C

ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the adequacy of our capability to prosecute by 31 October 1961, the course of action described in Question #2, assuming the preparations referred to in Question #1 have been made. If the 31 October 1961 capability is judged inadequate for effective execution, how long would it take to create the required capability? This adequacy to be considered from the viewpoint of full Allied cooperations, including West German participation, and also as a unilateral US action.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Annex A to Appendix A.

DISCUSSION

3. For discussion, see the Annex hereto.

CONCLUSIONS

4. After a mobilization period of four months the US, or the US and its European allies, has the capability of deploying sufficient ground and air forces to Europe to restore access to Berlin if opposed only by GDR. This same size force could avoid destruction for a period of five days or 15 days if opposed by GDR and Russian forces.

5. Due to the inability to determine the quality of European Allied forces and due to the inability to predict with confidence that all European Allies and the United States will commence full mobilization four months prior to an anticipated incident in Berlin, it is considered that there would not be sufficient forces in Europe by 31 October 1961 to restore access to Berlin against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.
6. Because of the need for air bases, staging areas, and assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to consider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain is also required. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient forces in Europe in a four month period to restore access against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.

7. Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage in nonnuclear war with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961. If some cases mobilization of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained (one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in comparable numbers with Soviet forces.
1. Summary of Requirements. A summary of the forces required is included in Appendix B. Since Berlin is located in the central area and since the primary involvement of US forces will take place in the central area, a detailed study of requirements and adequacy of capabilities will be limited to this area. However, it must be most strongly emphasized that since the actions outlined in these studies could lead to general war it is most important that the north area and south area be reinforced. If this is not accomplished the central area can be outflanked and the entire NATO position in central Europe be placed in jeopardy. Summary of the requirements for Central Europe are:

a. To restore access if opposed only by the GDR. Seven Allied divisions and four tactical air wings would be required.

b. To permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces as successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance were encountered. Forces on the order of magnitude of 50 Allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required.

c. Navy. Since it is assumed that the actions contained in this study are taken prior to commencement of hostilities, it follows as a corollary that Army and Air Force units sealifted to Europe would be moved administratively under peacetime conditions. Under actual conditions, this assumption might not prove to be valid in view of Soviet capability to initiate submarine warfare at any time of their choice. Preparations must be made to insure the
safety of seaborne movements against Soviet interference.
Navy mobilization should be concurrent with the other
Services to bring ships to wartime complements and to pro-
vide the planned ASW augmentation in ships and aircraft
from Ready Reserve.
2. Summary of Capabilities
a. Present forces in Europe are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army Forces</th>
<th>Air Force Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>15 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4 divisions (reduced strength)</td>
<td>15 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4 divisions</td>
<td>10 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>12 divisions (reduced strength)</td>
<td>10 wings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forces of UK, France and FRG have a capability for
limited defensive operations and little or no offensive
capability.

b. The current JSCP indicates that during the first
four months of full mobilization after declaration of a
national emergency by the President the US has the capability
of moving 10 Divisions to Europe, including the three STRAC
Divisions and one Marine Div/Wing Team which can be moved
at any time but which normally would be moved during the
first 30 days after mobilization.

c. The US Air Force would move 23 squadrons to Europe
during the first 30 days after mobilization. This includes
the CASP which can be moved at anytime. During this same
period of time Allied contributions to the air force in
Central Europe would amount to an estimated additional 6
wings.

d. It is estimated that by month our principal Allies
in Western Europe could make the following additional forces
available:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army Forces</th>
<th>Air Force Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>4 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2 divisions</td>
<td>2 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOP SECRET

a. Based on the above figures, the total US and Allied 
forces available by May are estimated to be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army Forces</th>
<th>Air Force Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>13 divisions</td>
<td>22 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10 divisions</td>
<td>19 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>12 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRO</td>
<td>20 divisions</td>
<td>10 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>49 divisions</td>
<td>63 wings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. The Navy indicates that the 10 MSTS transports now 
in operation in the Atlantic can move a total of 140,000 
troops during a four month period. Since it is assumed that 
this is an administrative move, not forcibly opposed by 
the Russians, the movement of additional men and cargo is 
only contingent on the charter, requisition, and reactivation 
of additional bottoms to carry the required personnel and 
tonnage. The lift capability can be increased to more 
than meet the total contemplated lift requirements. Air-
lift would be available to handle priority movements and 
advance echelons.

3. Soviet Capabilities. The Russians presently have 20 
Divisions in East Germany. It is estimated that they have the 
capability of reinforcing their forces in East Germany at the 
rate of four Divisions per day for the first ten days and 
three Divisions per day for the remainder of the first month 
after D-Day for a total of about 120 Divisions. Additionally 
these Divisions would be supported by 1000 tactical aircraft 
positioned in East Germany and backed by another 2500 tactical 
type aircraft located in Western USSR alone.

4. In view of the foregoing, the following points are 
considered appropriate:

a. It is impossible for the US to carry out this operation 
without necessary Allied cooperation. In addition to pro-
viding a united front to the Soviets with the attendant
psychological advantages it is necessary to have the use of
ports, airbases, staging areas, and assembly areas. As a
minimum we must obtain approval by the Federal Republic of
Germany and at least tacit agreement by the French and
British. It is very apparent that it is to our advantage
to obtain the cooperation and participation of as many of
our NATO Allies as possible in this operation.

d. Another factor which would seriously affect the
current capability of the Allied forces, particularly the
US Forces, is that capability and concept are based on the
use of tactical nuclear weapons rather than matching the
Soviets man for man. If the use of these weapons is denied
to our own forces, the conventional bomb and artillery
support which could be made available for this operation
would be far below levels that were employed and considered
necessary in Europe during World War II.

c. The US Forces that have been mentioned in this study
are earmarked in current mobilization plans for deployment
to Europe. In addition to these forces the United States
has both ground and air forces which are now earmarked for
deployment to other areas. These additional forces could
be sent to Europe; however, this would have an adverse
effect on our world-wide war posture.

d. The equipment and related material needed to
initially outfit the additional mobilized forces required
in this study must necessarily be drawn from war reserve
stocks which are inadequate for a force of this size.
Additionally logistical support of deployed forces of this
magnitude engaged in an extended nonnuclear war would create
further critical shortages in certain conventional weapons
and ammunition. No reliance can be placed on the war pro-
duction base for major items of combat equipment that are not
in production on M-Day and in most categories in which
critical shortages exist a period of from one to two years would be required to balance production and consumption requirements.

e. The divisions of the UK, France and FRG are practically all understrength, logistic support is marginal, and they should not be considered in terms of capability of US divisions.