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Enclosure to A-278, dated December 18, 1962, from AmEmbassy, Pretoria to Dept.

COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE PLAN

I. BACKGROUND

A. Resume of US - South African Relations - - United States relations with South Africa traditionally have been predominantly commercial and economic, and American investments here are substantial. In addition, however, South Africa entered both World Wars on the Allied side and contributed to the UN action in Korea. In the Cold War, South Africa is an asset to the United States and the West in its active opposition to Communism but it is also a liability to us because of its racial policies and its refusal to submit South West Africa to UN jurisdiction or improve the social welfare of the Territories' inhabitants. United States criticisms of these controversial South African policies, our failure to support South Africa on these matters at the United Nations and elsewhere, and our efforts to persuade South Africa to change or at least to modify these policies, has given rise to bitter resentment, and sometimes open official criticism of the United States in this country. The United States, although working for moderation in the UN, intends to keep strong pressure on South Africa.

B. Strategic Importance to US -- The Republic of South Africa is strategically important to the United States for the following prime reasons: its geographical location facilitates control of the Cape of Good Hope sea-routes; and the Republic makes a valuable contribution to our space program through support of the NASA Deep Space Probe Tracking Station as well as Station 13 of the Atlantic Missile Range.

C. Economic and Social Conditions Prevailing - - Based on major mineral and agricultural resources and a developing secondary industry, South Africa possesses the most advanced and stable economy in Africa and one which is generally impressive by Western standards as well. Essential to the operation of the White-owned economy (including agriculture) is the labor of about two-third of the 12-million non-White population. In spite of this demonstrable multi-racial nature of the economy, the Government is committed to a long-range policy of "separate development", implying an eventual restructuring of economic life

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in designated White and non-White areas. Facets of this policy in being include numerous extensive controls and limitations on the economic (as well as political and social) mobility and opportunities permitted non-Whites in areas designated as "White". One result of this is a great disparity between economic conditions obtaining for most Whites, on the one hand, and the mass of the non-White population on the other. To date little economic development has taken place in the Native Reserves, those areas set aside for parallel and separate African development. Priority currently is given to development by White capital of potential industrial areas bordering on these African Reserves, but this program, too, has progressed very slowly. The Colored and Indian population lives in considerable uncertainty as to the eventual implications of the Government's apartheid legislation as it affects their economic position in the White community.

D. Past, Present and Future Threats to Internal Stability* - - Two movements in South Africa have exploited the racial policies of the Government: 1) The Congress Alliance movement, which is composed of the Congress of Democrats, most of whom are members of the Communist Party; the African National Congress, which is dominated by the Communist Party at the leadership level; the South African Indian Congress, which is dominated by the Communist Party at the leadership level and whose membership also is infiltrated heavily by the CP; the Colored Peoples Congress, which is dominated by the CP; and the South African Congress of Trade Unions, an affiliate of the WFTU, which is completely controlled by the CP. 2) The other movement is the Pan Africanist Congress which was formed in 1959 as a result of a split in the ANC. This is an all-African extreme right wing type of organization which, prior to being banned, claimed a membership of some 50,000 but probably actually never had half that many members. The PAC has been losing strength rapidly to the point where it is difficult even to estimate its present underground membership.

The Congress Alliance was dissolved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in late July or early August 1962 in order to place more emphasis on the ANC, both for internal and external consumption. The member organizations of the Congress Alliance continue in being, with the

*See Embassy, Cape Town, Desp. No. 33, June 19, 1962.

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possible exception of the Congress of Democrats, which was banned subsequent to the Central Committee order dissolving the Congress Alliance. This order stated that if the COD was banned, it would dissolve.

The Communist Party of South Africa is an old, well-trained, well-disciplined party which, since being banned in 1950, operates illegally. It exercises an influence far greater than would be expected of a party of its strength.

The striking fact about all of the above is that, despite the apartheid laws, the ridiculous interpretation of these laws, and the publicity given to these interpretations, so few of the approximately 10,500,000 Africans, 1,500,000 Coloreds, and 500,000 Indians have ever joined organizations of the extreme right or left or, for that matter, any organization. Due to this fact there is no existing organization which at the present time or in the foreseeable future can represent the views of the majority of the non-Europeans in South Africa or communicate with them. New Age was a monthly paper which had a circulation which varied from 30,000 to 40,000 copies and was read at most by 150,000 people. This Communist outlet was banned on November 30, 1962.

A Congress Alliance committee was organized in late 1961 under the leadership of Nelson Mandela to perform sabotage. It performed two trial acts of sabotage in October 1961 and 13 acts of sabotage on 16 December 1961. Due to the number of saboteurs who were arrested by the South African Police, it was believed by the Committee that the sabotage movement was penetrated and needed complete reorganization. In late January 1962, Nelson Mandela was sent throughout Africa and to England to obtain aid for the sabotage effort. During his absence there was very little sabotage performed in South Africa. In mid-June, 1962 the Natal Provincial Committee of the ANC adopted violence as part of its program. In mid-July the Transvaal Provincial ANC Committee also adopted violence. About this time, the SACP (South African Communist Party) prepared a very sophisticated 43 page document calling for revolution in South Africa. At approximately the same time, the Central Committee of the SACP issued a directive which

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abolished the Congress Alliance and which directed that the ANC become more prominent in sabotage. On 23 July 1962 Nelson Mandela returned to Bechuanaland where he was met by Cecil Williams, a prominent South African Communist. He drove to Johannesburg in Williams' car. In late July Mandela, acting as chauffeur for Williams, drove to Durban and had at least one meeting with the sabotage committee there. He also met with ANC leaders and announced the ANC was no longer under the Congress Alliance. The rank and file of the ANC did not know that this new tactic had been directed by the SACP and thought instead that Mandela was moving away from the white Communist domination of the Congress Alliance. While returning to Johannesburg from Durban, Mandela was arrested by the South African Police and was subsequently convicted of incitement and illegally leaving the country. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 1959 the ANC was reorganized under a plan called the M Plan (Mandela Plan). Beginning in September, 1962 members were reorganized again into a highly secret organizational structure known as the Revised M Plan. This new structure is similar to the organization of the SACP and is in existence today.

The Congress Alliance sabotage group which has previously been referred to as having been formed in late 1961 apparently has been dissolved. In July 1962 the Central Committee of the SACP formed a small committee of hard core Communists known as the Black Hand to direct all violence in South Africa. A new organization was formed and was named Spear of the Nation which the Central Committee of the SACP calls the "military arm of the movement". This organization is independent of any front organization or combination of front organizations but uses members from any front to commit violence, which includes sabotage and assassination. The Spear of the Nation operates primarily through the ANC. There is some indication that the rank and file of the ANC apparently feel that the Spear of the Nation is its own organization, which it is not.

Subsequent to the return of Mandela, sporadic acts of sabotage started again. This has reached the proportion of averaging more than one act of sabotage each day since early October, 1962. This sabotage has mainly been against public utilities; however, a bomb was placed in the office of the Minister of Agriculture which did extensive damage. The Spear of the Nation has also directed violence at Africans who support the Government and claim to have been responsible for the death of some South

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African Police personnel. Some police personnel have been murdered, but there is no firm indication to date that they were murdered for political purposes. The Spear of the Nation expects to receive plastic explosives in the near future. They also expect to step up the rate of sabotage.

The Communist Party operating in the past principally through the Congress Alliance and at present through the ANC has sent many Africans outside South Africa to receive paramilitary and sabotage training. Training is reported to have been given in the Soviet Bloc, Communist China, Cuba, Egypt, Morocco and Ghana. At the present time, the Africans leaving South Africa for such training are primarily ANC representatives. A recent group of ten who went to Morocco for training were known as "Mandela's men". Allegedly acting to control the Communist movement, the Government in the 1962 Parliament sponsored and secured passage of the so-called Sabotage Bill (Emb. Airgram A-53, August 3, 1962) which fixes a death sentence for sabotage, prohibits the publishing or repeating the statements of banned persons and, among other things, provides for house arrest upon the decision of the Minister of Justice without court trial. This law could be used to suppress legitimate political activity; however, to date the house arrest provisions of the law have been used to suppress Communists. The Spear of the Nation has now issued a leaflet in which it declares "an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life", meaning that members will retaliate against the Government for convictions or actions against Spear of the Nation personnel. Quite apart from the moral question of placing a person under house arrest without a judicial trial, it remains to be seen whether the Sabotage Act will be effective against the perpetrators of sabotage by the Spear of the Nation group. It did not prevent rioting at Paarl in November or at Queenstown in December.

The PAC as well as the ANC have been exfiltrating members through Basutoland and Bechuanaland to Tanganyika. They are then moved from Tanganyika to points designated for training in para military activities. Approximately 40 PAC persons were exfiltrated through this channel in early 1962. They believed that they were going to be trained in Ghana and Cairo. The PAC has planned to start violence in South Africa in 1963. The lack of support in South Africa plus their failure to receive as much aid as they expected from other countries has caused them to now speak of violence in 1965 or 1966. It would appear that the PAC, which is anti-Communist

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and anti-White, has more potential appeal to the Africans than does the ANC, which is affiliated with the Congress Alliance and which is guided by the CP whose top leadership is mostly White.

The Republic of South Africa is open to infiltration by small groups of men and supplies either along its broad, sparsely patrolled coastline or through the wasteland areas of the borders of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. The broad land boundaries of Angola and Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia are likewise available for infiltration of equipment and personnel, but the political situation in these three countries, together with a certain amount of informal cooperation with the South African Government, does not at this time lend itself to external overland support from these countries against South Africa.

During the month of November, 1962, 56 students clandestinely escaped from South Africa and South West Africa into Bechuanaland. They are enroute to Tanganyika. Of these 27 so far have reached Dar-es-Salaam. There is reliable information to the effect that the ANC had inserted into the first group of 27 a number of students who were actually enroute to the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

In considering the internal security situation of the Republic of South Africa there has been included the territory of South West Africa. A change in the status of the mandate by UN action or by some type of combined African or Afro-Asian action would have to occur to make any change in the internal security estimate as far as the Territory is concerned.

The actual and potential sanctuaries from which support is now and may in the future be received are primarily as indicated above the Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland Territories. Support through these Territories might well come from either the Sino-Soviet bloc, other African nations, or both. Support will probably arrive principally by unscheduled air flights to any of these Territories from Tanganyika or overland by animal or motor transport. The problem is not so much of getting men and material into South Africa as the utilization of this material and manpower once they are in South Africa.

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E. Orientation of Foreign Policy and Relations with Neighboring States - - South Africa is strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western. It has no formal relations with any independent African state because of differences over apartheid and South West Africa. These same two factors strain South Africa's relations with most of the rest of the world, above all with the Afro-Asian Bloc, but also with the United States and most of the Western world. White South Africans feel strong cultural affinity with the United States and the West in general and believe that we and other Western peoples should be more tolerant, if not understanding, of South Africa and its problems in view of the country's strong anti-Communist stand in the Cold War.

F. External Threats - - Externally, and under the guise of African liberation, the Republic of South Africa is threatened by possible direct and indirect armed intervention from a Communist supported alliance of Afro-Asian States. There is disagreement within the South African Government, however, as to the extent of this danger.

II SOUTH AFRICA'S VULNERABILITIES.

A. Political - - South Africa is most obviously vulnerable, politically, by virtue of having moved through most of its independent existence (since 1910) in a direction contrary to world trends with regard to racial equality and protection of the rights of individuals among non-White groups. South Africa sometimes seems to exacerbate its vulnerability by (a) particularly inept timing, as when a new apartheid bill completely overshadows and largely negates the possible immediate political value of actions such as the Transkei Bantustan bill or the Government's action in permitting the UN representatives to visit South West Africa; and (b) by frequently taking rigid stands on the most controversial issues, minor as well as major ones, both internally and in international relations.

B. Socio-Economic - - The South African Government does, and can with some justification, claim that more has been done for Africans in South Africa than in any other country on the continent. Still, this misses the question of how much more could be done for or by the non-White population, given more opportunities for advancement in a highly developed economy, which holds the promise of considerable potential development. Seen in this light, the

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present minimal degree of African participation in the economy may be considered a South African vulnerability. As the forces of education and urbanization affect increasing numbers of Africans, creating new and spreading awareness of and demands for economic (and political) opportunities and rewards, it appears doubtful whether the majority of urbanized Africans will remain satisfied with their present state, or would ever consider the economic promise of "separate development" as anything but a step backward. The economic prospects in a semi-autonomous Transkei, or other subsequent areas, are not such as to alter this appraisal significantly.

The rather vague and long-range nature of the Government's plans for economic development of the Native Reserves contributes to the urbanized African's lack of enthusiasm to exchange even what may be a subsistence existence in an urban area for a sub-marginal existence in a strange, primitive "home-land". The economic implications of the intention gradually to remove the non-White working force from White areas, the goal of complete apartheid, in themselves may be seen to be disruptive, if not catastrophic. Such a policy contains at least the threat of significant economic disintegration, with possible consequences in terms of political stability as well.

Despite the Government's desires to stem and even reverse the influx of non-Whites into established urban and industrial areas (by fostering the economic development of Native Reserves or areas bordering thereon), it is unlikely that the dependence of the economy upon African labor will diminish for the foreseeable future, if ever. This dependence of the White minority upon large African working population in itself represents a present and probably continuing economic vulnerability, despite the fact that African labor unions are not recognized by the Government and wield little influence. This vulnerability exists in large part as a result of the low wage levels generally paid Africans in both the agricultural and industrial sectors, which only permit a standard of living potentially conducive to the exploitation of grievance and discontent. The elimination of this vulnerability by raising non-White wages encounters strong resistance from employers dependent on low-cost labor for survival, and also conflicts with political policy which looks on this labor force as only "temporarily" resident in urban areas.

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An increase in non-White incomes may also be considered a necessity in order to remove a more classical type of economic vulnerability, the extremely limited market now available to the domestic economy. The present market is limited to such a small part of the total South African population that further economic expansion ultimately will depend largely on the successful inclusion of the non-White population in the economic stream. Their continued exclusion, by economic or political means, makes the economy susceptible to growing inefficiency and stagnation.

C. Security (Police, Military, Paramilitary) and Intelligence - -The South African Police, in addition to their criminal and law enforcement responsibilities, are also primarily responsible for internal security. The police are fairly well trained and disciplined and, with the exception of the Security Branch, have adequate equipment. They receive air support from the South African Air Force, and being satisfied with this support have no plans for creating a police air arm.

The Minister of Justice announced to the 1962 Parliament that he intended to form a police reserve of 5,000 men to patrol residential and business areas and to guard public utilities. It is still not clear either when this reserve will be formed or whether it will have any function other than in times of national emergency.

The Security Branch of the Police is charged with the detection and suppression of subversion and the enforcement of various laws against subversion. It is a very small organization in comparison with the police force as a whole.

The capabilities of the South African Police under various situations are as follows:

1.) Until recently it was estimated that they had the capability of isolating and ultimately suppressing any local outbreak of violence or insurrection. At 4 a. m. on November 22, 1962, approximately 100 Africans from the Mbeweni Location attacked the police station in Paarl for the purpose of freeing seven prisoners. What was thought to be primarily a criminal action growing out of a series of murders and other crimes beginning in January 1962

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appears now to have additional implications. Eight men had previously been arrested, and seven additional had been arrested on November 21 for these crimes. When the Africans attacked the door of the police station, the police opened fire. In the resulting action over the next hour and a-half including attack of a police patrol at 5:30 A. M. and the mob's attack on whites and white homes after the initial attack on the police station, two Europeans and five Africans were killed; four other Africans were in the hospital with bullet wounds, and two Europeans were seriously wounded. There are three significant facts in this outbreak: (a) except for a few minutes in advance the police did not know that the attack was coming, (b) order was restored within a few hours, and (c) 337 who were connected with the riots and past crimes were arrested with the cooperation of the vast majority of the Africans living in the Mbekweni Location.

The SACP would like to create a situation in which the police would be forced to use violence to suppress a demonstration, i. e., another Sharpeville. The police are very aware of this danger and will do everything possible to avoid it. It remains to be seen whether the SACP is able to create such a situation.

2.) It is estimated that they have the capability of suppressing widespread sabotage or violence ~~of any kind~~. On the other hand, it is estimated that they do not have the capability of preventing individual ^{assassination} or organized acts of sabotage and other violence.

3.) They do not have the capability of knowing about the planning and implementation of sabotage or violence so long as it is done clandestinely by a disciplined clandestine organization, such as the CP operating as a Party, through the ANC or through the Spear of the Nation.

4.) They do not have the capability of preventing subversive elements entering and leaving South Africa.

5.) They do not have the capability of preventing the bringing of limited amounts of arms and explosives into South Africa for subversive purposes.

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6) They do not have the capability of preventing the dissemination of subversive literature either by hand or through the mail.

7) They do have some capability for preventing widespread dissemination of literature or the importation of sufficient arms and explosives to stage a significant outbreak of violence. By "significant" is meant an outbreak that would have any material effect on the economy, continuation of public utilities, or continuation of normal day-to-day activities. They can not prevent sabotage that can and, as a matter of fact, has knocked out public utilities for a given area for several hours.

D. Psychological/Informational - - It is improbable that under the present government psychological or informational subversion will be effective. There may be some increase in the circulation of subversive literature from Communist elements in the High Commission Territories. The reason for this change is that Basutoland is the only HCT that has a Communist Party and, unless conditions radically change, it is not likely that Communist elements in the HCT will be able to distribute literature in South Africa to a significant extent. For example, if New Age should be banned in South Africa/^{should move} ~~and~~ its headquarters to Basutoland, there would actually be much less distribution in South Africa of the paper printed in Basutoland than there is now of the paper while it is still published in South Africa.

III. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

A. Overall US Policy and Objectives for South Africa - - Our policy problem is how best to influence South Africa's internal policies in a constructive direction while maintaining correct and mutually advantageous relations. We do not intend to desist from criticism of South Africa's racial policies, both because we consider those policies dangerous and short-sighted.

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and because we regard it essential for our overall policy in Africa to remain in step with wider African opinion. Our basic approach, therefore, is to distinguish between non-cooperation in matters directly or indirectly related to South Africa's apartheid policy, and cooperation in other important fields.

Objectives pertinent to this paper include the following: (Guidelines for Policies and Operations, May, 1962)

1.) To inhibit the great potentialities for race warfare and genocide, Communist infiltration and possible eventual control, and the orientation of much of Africa along racist lines as a reaction to large-scale killings of both blacks and whites that may occur when the racial majority of South Africa has become well organized, armed and radically indoctrinated.

2.) To exert such influence as we possess in order to bring about:

a.) Voluntary concessions to the non-White population before such concessions are wrung from the government by violence.

b.) Creation of a coalition of moderate Nationalists and Opposition moderates as a basis of agreement on a program for gradual incorporation of the non-White population into the political, social and economic fabric of the country.

c.) Some time after the initiation of such a program, legalization of non-White political parties.

B. Changes in Objectives - - No changes in existing objectives recommended.

IV. COURSES OF ACTION NECESSARY TO ATTAIN UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES.

A. Political - - There are limited possibilities for the United States

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or third countries to take political action that would further the attainment of U. S. objectives to reduce or prevent Communist subversion in South Africa. These possibilities are primarily: a) continued judicious pressure and discreet attempts to persuade and convince government officials and other influential people that significant change must be made in South Africa's policies on racial matters and on South West Africa; and b) continued efforts to educate and influence present and potential South African leaders through the information and exchange programs. Official pressures and criticisms of the South African Government by the United States Government or third countries always are accompanied by the danger that they may arouse such antagonism that they would actually increase the intransigence of the South African Government on the matters concerned. However, maximum possible efforts to change these South African policies are imperative, in view of the facts that South Africa's present policies are (a) almost certainly facilitating Communist penetration in South Africa, and (b) proving a real liability to the United States and other Western nations in their efforts to influence underdeveloped countries, especially Afro-Asian countries, in the Cold War.

B. Socio-Economic - - U.S. The United States should press continuously upon the South African Government at every available opportunity an awareness of the eventual economic consequences of its policy of apartheid, which threatens to prevent the fulfillment of the Republic's considerable economic potential for the benefit of its entire population.

S.A.G. - Continued economic progress and stability in South Africa argue for a change in the South African Government's attitude, to permit greater participation in the economic processes of the country by the non-White population, with particular reference to higher wages, greater job opportunities and economic mobility, and the liberalization of (land) title holding rights in the urbanized areas.

Third countries and international organizations (e.g., UN, GATT, IMF) could make use of opportunities to press arguments similar to those suggested above, to induce modifications of the South African Government's

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apartheid policy to permit broader non-White participation in the economic processes of the country.

C. Security (including intelligence) - - No new course of action should be instituted to enable the South African Government to maintain internal security for the foreseeable future.

D. Psychological/ Information - - Anti-Communist materials, distributed by USIS within South Africa and within the Territories to the receptive press and other strongly Western-oriented institutions and a stepped-up exchange of persons program for non-Whites to combat the Communist exchanges should reinforce South Africa's own basic anti-Communism.

V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS.

A. Socio-Economic Programs - - Unlike most African countries, South Africa already possesses a highly developed economy, and has the resources available to undertake virtually any soci-economic program desired. However, Government planning of any particular program is related to its overall political view and goals, dominated by its apartheid policy. Thus the adoption or initiation of any particular short- or long-range public project by the Government is inevitably consistent with its apartheid policy, and will not necessarily be consistent with overall U. S. policy goals or with the courses of action suggested in Section IV., B.

L.) Long-Range Development - A significant number of long-range public development projects are planned by the South African Government, by the various semi-public corporations (involving iron and steel, phosphates, oil from coal and electricity), the railroads, and a 30-year, R. 560 million irrigation development of the Orange, Fish and Sundays Rivers. However, except for the direct and indirect employment provided to unskilled African workers, these projects do not promise significantly to alter or eliminate the socio-economic conditions mentioned as vulnerabilities

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in Section II. B., above. They will, in fact, tend more to reinforce the present White-owned and dominated structure of the economy.

2.) Short-Range Projects - - With regard to short-range projects, it must be noted that living conditions for the White, as well as much of the non-White population are already very high by African standards. Programs for community development, housing, health and sanitation, etc., for the non-White population have received considerable attention and investment already, and in the immediate future they are due to be continued. As in the case of long-range projects, they also are conceived in relation to the overall racial policy of the South African Government, and consequently are not necessarily consonant with U.S. ideals, goals, or courses of action outlined in Section IV, above. While individual projects undeniably are beneficial, desirable and praiseworthy, such as the urban housing built for Africans, still they are an aspect of a policy with which the U.S. basically does not express agreement or support.

In the course of the next five years, the Government has announced that it intends to spend R. 114 million on rural African development. In FY 1962-63 some R. 25 million has been appropriated, of which R. 8.1 million is for village development, R. 2 million for forestry development, R. 1.3 million for irrigation and water supplies, R. 1.9 for buildings (agriculture schools and youth camps) R. 2 million for land purchases, R. 1 million for machinery, equipment and electricity, and R. 6.6 million for general development. To the extent these amounts actually are spent, they will go into the development of African areas, where approximately 3 million of the African population lives. Considering the primitive conditions existing in these areas, this amount is not particularly large, especially when compared with the South African Government's budget allocation for other items, such as defense.

Outside Resources - While the South African Government receives no economic or technical aid from other countries on a government-to-government

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basis, foreign private investment has been, and still is, of considerable importance to the economy. Even after a serious outflow of foreign capital following the Sharpeville shootings in March 1960 (subsequently stemmed by exchange controls), direct foreign investment in South Africa remains about 2.5 billion dollars and non-direct plus direct total over 4 billion dollars. (Total U. S. investment -- direct and non-direct -- is over 550 million dollars. Although there is general agreement that foreign capital is still coming into the country at much less than the pre-Sharpeville rate, there is no consensus about the future necessity of foreign capital to promote a satisfactory rate of growth: the English-dominated business community says "yes", the Afrikaner Nationalist Government tends to argue "no". Most likely it will be welcomed where considered necessary and in support of the South African Government's policy of reducing dependence on imports where feasible.

B. Civic Action- -

1.) From a military viewpoint, the most desirable long-range development goal is to promote moderation in the racial thinking of Defense Force, Police Force Officers and explain the logic of such a course.

2.) To assist in avoiding unnecessary disorder, the following immediate short-range projects must be encouraged:

a) Token integration (Africans and Colored) of the South African Defense Force.

b) An active, aggressive role by the military services, especially the Army, in organizing and executing joint military-civilian civic works projects. Examples of such projects are: rehabilitation of African housing; preventive medicine and education schemes (especially language training) for locations and reserves; integrated

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military camp "open house" days.

C. Security Programs - -

1) Police and Paramilitary - The South African Police forces which are primarily responsible for internal security probably have adequate equipment and personnel to meet most current internal security threats, with the exception of some items of technical equipment and some advance training in operational research and counter-intelligence penetration techniques.

2) Military -

a) Continued support should be given to military programs of the host country's bona fide anti-Communist efforts particularly as they relate to external defense or participation in Free World joint anti-Communist activities.

1. Provision of needed U. S. military equipment, consistent with the terms of the Aide Memoires exchanged on June 15, 1962.

2. Increase formal training input into U. S. military schools for selected officers and NCOs. Such schools to include the U. S. Army Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; the Special Air Warfare Center, Hurlbut Air Force Base, Florida; Infantry Branch Courses and others to include Command and General Staff courses.

D. Psychological/Informational - -

1) Systematic publication and distribution of anti-Communist materials in the native languages should be planned for the three High Commission

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Territories. It is conceivable that direct support should be given to anti-Communist publishing efforts in the Territories. Within the Republic, regular presentation of anti-Communist materials to the press, practically all of which are solidly in agreement on opposition to Communism, should be continued with increasing emphasis on the non-White press. Distribution of an up-to-date anti-Communist book on a large scale among the non-Whites, as was done with "What is Communism?" several years ago, will again become desirable.

1) No special cultural exchanges are necessary beyond the usual commercial and potential President's Fund programs already available here. It may become desirable to have occasional Negro personalities like Louis Armstrong or Harry Belafonte include the Territories on visits. There is need for increased emphasis on non-White student exchanges at the undergraduate level.

2) USIS libraries are well supplied with anti-Communist materials. Other libraries happily accept USIS presentations of Anti-Communist books, including the subsidized "Student" editions. A steady supply of such publications should be assured for presentations, particularly to non-White libraries both in the Republic and in the High Commission Territories.

VI. APPENDICES

A. U. S. Resources Available for Application in South Africa - - - The principal U. S. resources available for application in South Africa would be in the fields of scientific assistance, private investment, or USIS types of operations (official and unofficial). United States military assistance capabilities would be limited by the possibilities that materiel may be used to suppress non-Communist political opposition or dissidence, especially among non-Whites. United States political support of South Africa, in regard to South Africa's internal and foreign policy, is severely limited because of the facts that (a) South Africa's repressive measures against non-Whites, and its probably illegal stand on South West Africa, are the policies that cause most of the foreign criticism of South Africa; and (b) the first of these two policies is a primary cause of subversive activities in this country.

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Enclosure to A-278, dated December 18, 1962, from AmEmbassy, Pretoria, to Department of State.

VI. APPENDICES (Continued from preceding page)

B. The South African Government and private enterprises have had and continue to have successful recourse to international lending markets, including U. S. banks, for financing various developmental projects beyond the scope of local resources.

There are no U. S. Government economic, technical assistance, or other such programs present in South Africa.

C. Of great value in the Republic are Ford and Carnegie exchange programs and other projects. The Territories may eventually need Peace Corps and AID programs. There is no better means of countering subversion than the training and education of present and future leaders, either here under American direction or through carefully planned exchange programs.

Private groups, such as ASPAU, should be encouraged to offer undergraduate scholarships to non-White South Africans.

U.S. labor unions can offer encouragement and assistance to local non-Communist unions.

American business firms, by good examples in employee relations can give support to African workers.

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